The Organizational Structures for Community-Based Natural Resources Management in Southern Africa

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Abstract: Throughout Southern Africa there has been a move to decentralize natural resource management (NRM). Decentralization has taken many forms, resulting in different organizational structures for NRM. Fourteen case studies from eight countries can be classed into four types, depending on the key organizations for NRM: (1) district-level organizations; (2) village organizations supported by sectoral departments (e.g. Village Forest Committees); (3) organizations or authorities outside the state hierarchy (e.g. traditional authority, residents’ associations), and (4) corporate organizations at the village level (e.g. Trusts, conservancies, property associations). Attitudes towards district-level schemes amongst local people are generally negative. The greater the authority village organizations receive the more likely they are to succeed. In the cases with corporate organizations, local residents have received user or proprietary rights over resources. Such cases reflect the best chances of community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) being successful. It is clear that policies that explicitly decentralize authority to village-level organizations help to avoid some of the problems that have emerged. The impact of private sector stakeholders can be positive or negative depending on the institutional arrangements in place. Many of the cases have demonstrated the key role that external facilitation plays in building the capacity of local organizations. Traditional leaders have continued to play a role in NRM, with varying degrees of authority and control. The paper ends with a discussion of the key features for the success of CBNRM.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, coinciding with the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in development theory and practice, there has been a policy shift to advocate that local resource users play a more active role in the management of natural resources. There has been considerable progress in decentralizing authority over forests from the state to local

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communities in Asia, and there are now numerous examples within Africa. In the wildlife sector there has been considerable activity in the last decade, especially in southern Africa, where almost all countries have programs to allow communities to manage and benefit from wildlife. In Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, and Namibia, a wildlife management focus has provided the major initiative for CBNRM. In South Africa, land restitution has been the major driving force for more equitable and participatory forms of natural resource management. In contrast, in Lesotho the need for more effective rangeland management provided the primary impetus for CBNRM. In a few countries, such as Malawi and Tanzania, forestry has provided the focus for decentralization.

Decentralization describes the process by which bundles of entrustments (e.g. regulatory and executive powers, responsibility and authority in decision making) are transferred to local groupings (e.g. local governments or communities). Decentralization can occur through devolution, in which case the entrustments are transferred more or less completely to the local users. Devolution is often the mode of decentralization considered in this study, but the term decentralization will be used throughout much of this article for purposes of consistency. In all, the decentralization initiatives in the region, effort has been made to transfer at least some responsibility and authority over natural resources from a central level to a lower level, whether to local government, state aligned district organizations, and/or directly to communities themselves. This transfer of authority can manifest as the control of decision-making; the control of income, expenditure, and benefits; the control of developments such as tourism ventures; the transfer of ownership and property rights; and improved status amongst the individuals and organizations involved. It is therefore not surprising that decentralization is frequently accompanied by competition for the benefits of the new authority. This may take place between the organization receiving authority and existing organizations (e.g. between traditional leaders and newly formed community-based organizations), or between the body transferring the authority (usually the state) and the receiving authority, or it may emerge amongst different actors within the community.

This paper analyses the organizational structures in case studies from southern Africa, attempts to identify those organizations and tiers that are important in CBNRM, and derives a typology of cases based on the organizational structures. The objectives of the study were to determine the new loci of authority within different CBNRM approaches; to understand the policies, systems, and contexts that define who asserts control and authority and under what conditions; and then from this, to pinpoint the institutional arrangements and factors that provide good opportunities for success in CBNRM. By “success,” we mean systems where stakeholders, particularly local people, have a positive attitude towards CBNRM, and where sustainability appears to have been achieved (though many systems are still in their infancy and thus difficult to assess). The focus is on the formal organizations that have emerged in the different countries and case studies.

Fourteen case studies were completed in eight southern African countries (see Figure 1). Each covers a diversity of sectors (wildlife, range, and forest management) and involving both co-management and common property arrangements (Table 1). Within a country, there is often much diversity of CBNRM approaches and outcomes (e.g. Zimbabwe), so the case studies cannot be seen as being representative of the particular countries from which they are...
Most case studies are based on specific donor initiatives, while others describe situations without any project intervention. The case studies were based mainly on existing literature and the direct experiences of the case study researchers, where necessary limited fieldwork was applied to explore areas that were under-researched. Most of the case studies span the period from initial implementation of the CBNRM project to the end of 1999 when the write-ups for case studies were completed. Each case study was structured using a common framework of issues that would be covered. The framework is presented in Figure 2. It indicates the key issues that were considered to be important in determining success of NRM. We recognize that processes and power relations within communities also have a profound impact on the success or failure of CBNRM, particularly with regard to equity in decision-making and the distribution of benefits. However, these aspects could not be dealt with in sufficient depth within the confines of this paper, and instead we refer readers to the case study synthesis report.

Section 2 outlines the results of the preliminary data exploration using principal components analysis. We then present a typology of the organizational structures that we recognize, followed by a description of each type (Section 3). Section 4 looks at some of the policy, commercial, and facilitation contexts that mould the organizational structure. The role of traditional leaders in CBNRM is then examined (Section 5). We conclude with the key lessons for successful CBNRM (Section 6).

2. THE PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS

As a data exploration tool, non-linear principal components analysis (PCA) was used to assess the degree of correlation of variables and the relative similarity of cases. For each case, 12 variables were assessed. Each variable was given a ranking from 1 to 4 (for instance, “locus of authority at the district level” was given a 4 when the district government was very important in NRM, as for example in CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, and a 1 when it was not important, as for example in Namibia). Ranking obviously introduces a subjective element into the analysis. The technique is used to explore variation and was used as a first step towards establishing a typology of cases.

In the first PCA conducted (results not shown), the Fish River case study (from South Africa) came out as peculiar. This is because it is the only case in which the locus of authority is with a community organization, a residents’ association, which is neither defined by any national legislation nor part of the traditional system. In the subsequent analysis this case was deleted, so as to fully allow the differentiation of the remaining cases.

For the next analysis the correlation of variables and similarity of cases is presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. Close placement of variables in the scatter diagram indicates positive correlation of those variables while distant placement indicates negative correlation. Close placement of cases indicates similar cases while distant placement indicates different cases. Figure 3 shows a grouping of correlated variables at the extreme right on the 1st dimension. These include the following variables: (1) degree of authority residing with community-based organizations (CBOs) with corporate status (i.e., they can sue and be sued, hold property, enter into business contracts, etc.); (2) positive feelings by villagers towards CBNRM; (3) degree of policy support to CBOs; (4) degree of support by NGOs; (5) degree of...
support by sectoral departments (line ministries); (6) values of resources; and (7) proportion of benefits returned to villagers. At the opposite end of the axis, i.e., negatively correlated with the above-mentioned variables, are (1) degree of authority residing with village committees that are not corporate organizations and (2) degree of authority residing with district-level organizations. Figure 4 illustrates the cases that are associated with each end of this dimension. The cases from Botswana, Namibia, and Makuleke are at the right extreme, while at the left extreme are cases from Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Lesotho. The Malawi and Tanzania cases are midway on the 1st dimension, illustrating their mixed nature, i.e., having positive support by villagers but not dealing with high-value resources, and, in the case of Malawi, not having village-level corporate organizations.

The 2nd dimension illustrates a different kind of variation in the data, relating to the degree of authority over NRM residing with traditional leaders, with high levels at the bottom of the 2nd dimension and low levels at the top end. Traditional leaders are the main source of authority regarding natural resources in the Zimbabwe Chivi case, and are part of other organizations in the cases of Makuleke, Namibia, Lesotho and Zambia. At the other extreme, we have the Tanzania case where traditional leaders are all but absent from the decision-making process for NRM.

3. WHERE IS THE NEW LOCUS OF AUTHORITY?

3.1 The typology of cases

The CBNRM cases covered in this study can be classified into four main organizational structures based on the organizations that wield the most authority, the degree of community involvement, and the attitudes of community participants:

1. Cases where decentralization has resulted in district organizations being the new locus of authority. These can be local government organizations, such as district councils (Zimbabwe Sengwe case of CAMPFIRE), or multi-stakeholder, district organizations aligned to sectoral departments (Zambia cases). In these cases the CBNRM agenda is driven by central state authorities at a district level. There is little community involvement in planning or decision-making, and a large percentage of the revenue is retained at district level. Consequently, people on the ground rarely identify with these initiatives and few have a clear understanding of their purpose and objectives. This paints a bleak picture for the future of CBNRM in these areas.

2. Cases where sectoral government departments support village committees at lower levels, such as Village Natural Resource Management Committees in the Malawi case, which are supported by the Forestry Department. Many of these committees appear relatively successful as CBNRM organizations, provided they do not become elitist but remain accountable to the community at large (mechanisms to ensure this need to be in place). Furthermore, the greater the authority such committees receive and the more the state is willing to let go, the more likely they are to succeed. Thus, in Malawi and Tanzania the committees, in consultation with the community, can formulate their own by-laws, while the Resource Management Committees in the Zimbabwe Gokwe case are weak and still largely controlled by the Forestry Commission.
3. Cases where NRM at the lower level is largely based on organizations or authorities outside of the state hierarchy. Within this category we have two very different kinds of cases, one based on traditional leaders in the Zimbabwe Chivi case and one based on Residents Associations in the South Africa Fish River case. In these cases, the lack of external support and the absence of any clear policy and legal framework for CBNRM are limiting the achievement of sustainable NRM.

4. Cases where organizations consisting of community members themselves are the locus of authority in some kind of corporate organization (Trusts, Conservancies, Associations as in the cases in Botswana, Namibia, Makuleke and perhaps Lesotho, and Villages in the case of Tanzania). In these cases local residents or resource users have received user or proprietary rights over resources. This provides them with the authority, through their elected executives or boards, to make rules, approve developments, enter in partnerships with the private sector, receive revenues, and distribute benefits. Most to all of cash benefits are returned to the community. Community-members are particularly behind the schemes in these cases, and in some countries (e.g. Namibia) a demand-driven movement to establish further such CBNRM initiatives is emerging. The level of interference by the state is less than in the preceding cases, but it still retains ultimate authority and continues to make decisions that impact on the CBNRM organizations. Recent developments in Namibia and Botswana illustrate this.

3.2 District control of CBNRM (e.g. Zimbabwe Sengwe and Zambia cases)

3.2.1 The organizational structures In all countries except Namibia, district organizations have a role to play in NRM, a role that varies from pervasive (e.g. Zimbabwe and Zambia) to facilitatory (e.g. Malawi). Namibia has no district organizations; its regional government has little role in NRM at present although this may change with the government’s new decentralization policy. 15

Most district organizations for NRM, whether sponsored by local government or sectoral departments, form the upper tier of a hierarchy of organizations that extend down to grassroots level. This tiered arrangement is, theoretically, designed to enable community needs and priorities to filter up into district-level planning processes. The reality is often the opposite, with these organizations forming a channel through which decisions made at a higher level can trickle down. In Zimbabwe the Rural District Councils (RDCs) are linked to Ward Development Committees and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs). VIDCOs have little direct role in resource management since this function has not been delegated down by the councils. The District Councils in Zambia similarly link into lower tier organizations known as Ward Development Committees and Resident Development Committees, but in terms of CBNRM, these are superseded by the sectoral department organizations and are barely functional at the village level.

In Sengwe all decisions over CAMPFIRE are made at district level, including those concerning quotas, the granting of concessions, problem animal control, and rules regarding wildlife utilization. Villagers from a Ward are represented by a single councillor at the district, and he is only one of a number of councillors, many of whom may be from areas poor in
wildlife and have little interest in CAMPFIRE apart from the revenue it generates. Furthermore, many decisions are made by government officials at the district level rather than by councillors. In Zambia, decisions relating to wildlife in Game Management Areas (GMAs) are made by multi-stakeholder forums operating at district and sub-district level that report directly to the wildlife department. These forums are the Wildlife Management Authority in the Mumbwa GMA case and Local Leader’s Committee in the Lupande GMA case. Along with chiefs, sub-chiefs, members of parliament, wildlife department officials, and other representatives, councillors from the district councils sit on these bodies creating a link to local government. Community members are not represented in these organizations. Thus, there is virtually no mechanism to cater for local people at village level and consequently the community is sidelined and voiceless.

3.2.2 Benefit distribution and attitudes towards CBNRM

In Sengwe 50% of the total revenue from hunting leases (15% as a levy and 35% as a management fee) is retained by the Rural District Councils. The remainder is channelled to the community, often after inordinate delays. This is resented by the community who feel they should receive a larger proportion of the funds generated, especially since they must bear the costs of wildlife damage. A similar situation prevails in Zambia. In Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA) 35% of the income returns to the community for development projects. Local leaders are primarily responsible for determining how these funds are spent, and the development activities have tended to cluster around chiefs’ palaces. Previously only 40% of the income from Lupande GMA reached the community, but recent restructuring now sees about 80% going directly to Village Action Groups.

Sentiments of community members towards CBNRM in the Zambian and Zimbabwean cases are largely negative. There is discontent due to crop losses and other damage by wildlife, lack of compensation mechanisms, the high proportion of revenue retained by the district, the lack of consultation on issues such as fencing, a feeling “their” animals are being driven to other areas to be hunted, the lack of communication with the private sector operator, and the operation of law enforcement agents (e.g. village scouts). In many areas, local people perceive the wildlife program as a donor and wildlife department initiative, rather than a community-based program.

3.3 Village committees supported by sectoral departments (e.g. Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe Gokwe cases)

3.3.1 The organizational structures

A number of cases have a village-level committee (Village Natural Resource Management Committees in Malawi, Village Forest Committees in Tanzania, and Resource Management Committees in the Zimbabwe Gokwe case) as the primary CBNRM organizations. These committees are supported by the forestry department, and are elected by the community. In Malawi and Tanzania, the committees have a clear role in the management of forest areas, woodlots, and reforestation programs. Their duties include making and enforcing rules on the
conservation of state forests, regulating the utilization of forest products, planning fire patrols and fire fighting, and collecting revenues. The committees in Gokwe play an intermediary role between the forestry department and local people, brokering rules for accessing forest products from the state forest and monitoring resource use in the village. Committees in Malawi and Tanzania can play an active role in by-law formulation, unlike in Zimbabwe. In Tanzania, village management plans and use rules are reframed as by-laws that are approved by the District Council. All these committees are embedded within the local organizational system (e.g. the committees in Malawi report to Village Development Committees - VDCs) consisting of members of the community and chaired by the village head. A group of VDCs then form the Area Development Committee, chaired by a chief. Membership of this committee includes the traditional leaders, government extension officers, members of parliament, NGOs, and elected councillors. The next level up is the district level. In Gokwe, the Resource Management Committees should report to Village Development Committees, but the latter are weak, leaving the Resource Management Committees without much authority.

The role of the forestry department varies amongst case studies. In Malawi it has a dominating presence in the Chimaliro case but, in Mangweru, mobilization for forest management was largely driven by the community. The Village Forest Areas are under the committees exclusively, but forest reserves on state land are jointly managed by the committees and the state. In the latter case the state still makes most of the rules, monitors and enforces resource use, and holds ultimate authority as the owner of the land. In Tanzania, the forestry department has taken a very facilitative role, having almost no say in the workings of the committees. In Zimbabwe, the forestry department has a dominating role, with very little authority in the hands of the committee. The Tanzanian case is peculiar because villages in Tanzania have corporate status and thus hold a good deal of authority. The Zimbabwe case is at the other extreme with the committees having minimal authority and legitimacy. The Forestry Commission controls most aspects of the “shared” resource.

3.3.2 Benefit distribution and attitudes towards CBNRM

In Mangweru, Malawi, the committee has full control of revenue (mainly from the sale of poles, firewood, and timber). The committee has allocated this revenue for various community development initiatives. The initiative and success shown by the community in Mangweru has resulted in the Forestry Department maintaining a low profile and not demanding any share in the benefits. In contrast, in Chimaliro the state takes a proportion of the benefits (70% for the state forest and 20% for the village forest area). In Tanzania, almost all the benefits of permits to collect forest produce and fines go to the village. The village also collects cattle and hut taxes, and of these 60% remain with the village and 40% go to the District Council. The amounts of money raised are not very high.

There are very positive attitudes towards CBNRM in Malawi and Tanzania, in contrast to the Zimbabwe Gokwe case. In Malawi, the removal of restrictions on the use of the forest reserve, free technical assistance, material assistance, and various capacity building sessions have given rise to positive community attitudes. There was, however, a general dissatisfaction with delays in formally ratifying the regulations drawn up by the community and a general perception that some influential members of the community received more than a fair share of
the benefits. In the Tanzanian case, there is considerable pride in the improved forest quality that has resulted from the committee’s efforts. In the Gokwe case, the CBNRM scheme is not viewed favourably. In some areas, villagers viewed the committees with suspicion, as possible spies for the state. Many residents in the villages regard the state forest as theirs and are unanimous in their view that the forest should be returned to village ownership and control.

3.4 Control residing in organizations and authorities outside the state hierarchy (e.g. South Africa Fish River and Zimbabwe Chivi cases)

3.4.1 The organizational structures

Of all the cases, the Fish River case study is exceptional because the primary organizations for CBNRM are civil society organizations known as Residents’ Associations, which are aligned to the major political party in South Africa. These have evolved and subsumed the responsibilities of traditional leaders without any intervention from the state. Their lack of legal status is undermining their effectiveness in enforcing rules.

The legislation in Zimbabwe gives authority over NRM to the District Council. However, this authority may or may not be exercised. Where high value wildlife and timber are concerned, the council makes sure it has the sector under its control (e.g. CAMPFIRE in Sengwe). Where high value resources are not present, as in Chivi, the workings of the council are all but absent at the local level, and de facto NRM rests with the village traditional leaders, even though they do not have the legal mandate.

3.4.2 Benefit distribution and attitudes towards CBNRM

There are few commercial benefits in these cases. The resources are largely used for subsistence purposes, and management tends to be somewhat ad hoc and ineffective from a resource sustainability perspective. In the Fish River case study, local people feel powerless to stop the incursions of neighbors into their areas for resources. Traditional leaders in Chivi are critical of the District Council because it fails to support their efforts.

3.5 Corporate organizations at village level (e.g. Botswana, Namibia, South Africa-Makuleke, Lesotho, and Tanzania cases)

3.5.1 The organizational structures

In Botswana, Namibia, and Makuleke there are corporate organizations formed by all residents or rights holders within a designated area (sometimes spanning several villages). These Trusts, Conservancies, or Communal Property Associations, respectively, elect their own management committees and are governed by legally-recognized constitutions. Membership, physical boundaries, and accountability mechanisms must be defined by the constitutions. These organizations have the authority to make rules, approve developments, to enter into partnership with the private sector, receive revenues, and decide on benefit allocations. Grazing Associations in Lesotho can also be classed in this section, as users are allocated grazing rights...
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in Range Management Areas. The Tanzanian case can also be classified here as villages enjoy a peculiar legal status because they can sue, be sued, and hold property.

By way of example we describe the Namibian case. The elected management organization is the Conservancy Management Committee. This committee makes decisions about day-to-day administration, but major decisions such as expenditure on capital items are made in consultation with all conservancy members through an AGM or special meeting. Rules are developed through the committee and traditional leaders in consultation with residents in each conservancy. These rules are then included in a NRM plan. In some conservancies, anti-poaching units formed by the traditional leaders and committees enforce these rules. Local government councillors have no official role in conservancies, but often assist in their formation as a means of developing their constituencies. Once a conservancy is established it receives conditional ownership over huntable game, use rights over other species through a permit system, and the right to benefit from tourism and hunting activities. It can also register as a hunting farm to gain rights to trophy hunting, although in this case quotas are set by the state in consultation with the conservancies.

Although these corporate organizations are provided with a fair degree of autonomy by legislation, the state (particularly at a central level) continues to assert its control in a variety of ways. Sometimes its role may be as pervasive as in the previous organizations described, albeit less institutionalized at various levels. In Botswana, the Department of Local Government recently issued a directive (to be implemented with immediate effect), which instructed that all funds earned by CBNRM projects must now be transferred to the District Councils for management by them. This has caused an outcry amongst the CBNRM community in Botswana, as it is seen as a serious threat to the long-term sustainability of these projects. The previous discussions on the Zimbabwean situation support this assertion. Other surprise announcements by the Botswana government included a ban on lion hunting and a dramatic increase in game license fees. In neither case were the wildlife management trusts consulted.

Recent work by Corbett and Jones (2000) in Namibia questions the gap between conservancy policy and legislation, and its interpretation and implementation. They talk about “aborted devolution”: a situation in which “governments have introduced policy and legislation with the intent of devolving authority over natural resources to local communities, but in practice this devolution is not taking place.” They argue that in these situations communities will soon recognize that the reality does not match the promises made by government. Consequently, they will revert to their old ways of viewing wildlife as state property and return to poaching. Some of the problems identified in Namibia include: (1) wildlife quotas set by government rather than conservancies; (2) the renewal of tourism and hunting concessions with the private sector, within conservancy areas, is enacted by government rather than the conservancies; (3) governments demand that conservancies acquire permits for huntable game, this is in contrast to the situation on private farms; (4) government refusal to allow conservancies to make decisions about how to deal with problem animals.

In South Africa, the Makuleke community successfully regained ownership of land in Kruger National Park from which they had been removed. However, the community had to agree that the land would continue to be a protected area managed by the South African National Parks Board. Land title and all commercial rights were transferred to the Makuleke,
but the Parks Board is still a powerful actor on the joint management board. This was
demonstrated when the Makuleke Communal Property Association came up against strong
resistance from the Parks Board when they published a tender for a hunting concession in the
restituted area. In the end, the state conceded, but it probably would not have done so if the
community had not been in the powerful position of holding the land rights.

All members of a Grazing Association in Lesotho are required to pay a joining plus yearly
subscription fee, and members have to abide by the policies, grazing plans, and grazing permits
used by the association. However, the rights allocated in the legislation guiding these
associations are undermined by another piece of legislation that allows access to these areas by
persons not part of the association.

3.5.2 Benefit distribution and attitudes towards CBNRM

In Namibia, Botswana, and Makuleke 0-4% of the revenue is required to be sent to the
government, and the communities decide how revenues should be distributed. In these cases,
the residents are supportive of CBNRM, though it is too early to assess the outcome. The major
area of complaint in Namibia relates to the poor flow of information between conservancy
committees and members that compromises members’ ability to participate in decision-making.
In some cases communities are dissatisfied with the government for not being more proactive
on problem animal control. Negative feelings are also evolving in response to the government’s
inability to transfer some of the legislated responsibilities (see above).

4. THE POLICY, COMMERCIAL AND FACILITATORY FRAMEWORK

4.1 National policies and legislation

In earlier periods the central state attempted, through command and control policies, to
regulate natural resource use. More recently, especially over the last decade, in all countries
studied there has been effort to decentralize authority and control for NRM. In general, this has
been supported by legislation. Only in a few countries and for a few sectors does the legislation
remain in the old command and control style. For example, in Zimbabwe forestry legislation
makes no provision for local management. The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (of 1928,
amended in 1987) confines the use of forest products in communal lands to “own use,”
requiring permits for commercial exploitation.

In Namibia and Botswana, there are strong policy frameworks that decentralize authority
and give rights directly over to wildlife community organizations. While the policies and
regulations for wildlife use are highly progressive, those for other resources are not. Few
comprehensive development strategies have been designed for woodlands, fisheries, and veld
products. Namibia has a comprehensive tourism policy, but Botswana does not. Changes in
wildlife policy and legislation in Namibia after independence gave communal area residents
conditional ownership over wildlife provided they register as a conservancy. Recently, the
forestry department has followed the example set by the wildlife sector and developed similar
draft legislation for woodlands. In Botswana there has been a decade of policy development
aimed at achieving community-based wildlife management, although recent actions by the state
are threatening this (see above).
The only other country covered in this study where community members hold secure tenure over natural resources is South Africa, but in this case it is also the land that is covered by the new legislation. Land restitution, in cases like the Makuleke, has effectively placed land ownership back in the hands of the claiming community. Land restitution makes it possible for communities who were evicted during the apartheid era to lodge a claim for restoration of their land.

In the other countries decentralization policies are in place, but generally the identified lower level organizations are state aligned. In Zimbabwe the Rural District Councils Act of 1988 (and its precursors) gives authority over NRM to Rural District Councils, rather than to community levels. Control over wildlife is decentralized to local government (districts) through the granting of “appropriate authority” under the wildlife act. Wildlife is state property in Zambia, but the Wildlife Policy of 1993 bestows user rights to landholders. Thus, local people who reside in Game Management Areas are eligible to a share of revenues generated from wildlife utilization. The organizational structure of wildlife management does not allow local communities to assert much control or decision-making power; the state still has all authority. The situation is similar to Zimbabwe, and the same problems and constraints apply. With the recent restructuring of wildlife management in Zambia, though there is a proposal to transfer the ownership of GMAs to the villages in the corresponding areas.

Malawi has progressive legislation for forest management that removes restrictions to the access and use of woodlands and promotes community participation. The policy also promotes co-ordination between the Forestry Department and other government departments. But unlike Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa, it does not provide village-level organizations with statutory authority. Furthermore, de jure rights over communal resources remain vested in the state, and there are no moves to transfer ownership of forest reserves to the community (which contrasts with South Africa where land claims are forcing this approach).

In Lesotho, conflicting legislation undermines successful CBNRM. While Grazing Associations are allocated rights in terms of the Societies Act their effectiveness is limited because farmers who choose not to be part of the Grazing Association cannot be excluded from grazing their cattle in the area (Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations). This makes it difficult to prevent use of the better-managed areas by non-association community members.

4.2 The private sector

The ultimate success of many CBNRM initiatives depends on private sector investment. In many wildlife areas private operators provide capital, expertise, and market access. There are, however, many examples where the community benefits little from private sector involvement. For instance, in Zambia, tourism partnerships have provided only a few employment opportunities. Safari companies deal directly with the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund after being selected by the National Tender Board, and the chief is the only local level member on the selection panel. He maintains the power to allocate communal land for tourism enterprises without consulting with the community, although the District Council must provide final approval of the site. If the plans are approved by all relevant authorities (District Council, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Service and the Zambia National Tourist Board),
full title deeds may be transferred to the private sector operator by the Commissioner of Land. This effectively isolates the community and means that the operator is under no obligation to share revenues with the community except in special circumstances where a token of appreciation may be provided to the chief. The private sector, in alliance with other players, can shift the balance of power away from communities.

Safari operators in Zimbabwe usually deal directly with district officials, which isolates the community from any discussions. When communities report problem animals (e.g. crop-raiding elephants) there is seldom action from the safari operator, who will often only act, and then reluctantly, on the orders of the District Council.

Another class of entrepreneurs includes those who use local natural resources but pay no resource rents (e.g. woodcarvers, firewood traders, charcoal traders, traditional healers, and medicinal plant traders). These may be community members or outside the community entrepreneurs. They often by-pass the community by working through specific households (e.g. charcoal makers). These entrepreneurs, especially the outsiders, are problems local organizations face in regulating resource use. Entrepreneurs pose one of the greatest threats to sustainable local-level NRM in Malawi, where there are major conflicts between outside entrepreneurs and local communities. The entrepreneurs are much more sophisticated than villagers in terms of resource acquisition (mostly illegal), processing, transportation, and marketing, and therefore harvest large quantities of resources at a time. Many show very little interest in managing the resource they are exploiting. Many of the woodcraft industry’s entrepreneurs in the Malawi case are economically powerful individuals with no accountability to local institutions, so they are virtually a law unto themselves, harvesting wood where and when they want. Individuals in the firewood and charcoal trade cause similar problems. The impact of this trade on woodlands is substantial, particularly in the Mangweru area. Natural resource committee members received death threats after they attempted to challenge the rights of charcoal makers to harvest wood. The government, through the Forestry Department, tries to control this trade through roadblocks, fines, and seizure of products, but has had little impact.

4.3 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

NGOs have played an important facilitatory role in many of the CBNRM cases presented here. In some countries NGOs are even being used as project implementers by government departments. In other instances NGOs are the power brokers or mediators between communities and government (e.g. as in Makuleke where the community was up against the powerful South African National Parks Board). An NGO was largely responsible for pioneering CBNRM in Namibia, while in Botswana international and national NGOs have been key players over a three year period helping the community to develop their constitution, prepare their land use and management plan, and lobby to get the Trust registered. It remains to be seen whether such an intensive and expensive facilitation process can be replicated elsewhere, and to what extent it is necessary for success. Other NGOs have offered intensive training programs on environmental education, soil and water conservation, wildlife utilization, fuelwood saving devices, gender issues and so on and have integrated and linked the wider needs of the community with land and NRM concerns. In the Zimbabwe Gokwe case study, the community Resource Management Committees were set up by the Forestry Commission to facilitate and
manage the resource-sharing scheme. In some areas the committees were viewed suspiciously and regarded by villagers as spies for the state. The Forestry Commission had a long history of conflict with local people in this region, and one wonders whether the situation could not have been improved if the project had been implemented by an NGO.

NGOs are potentially powerful actors as they can push communities into certain decisions and they provide material benefits and employment. If NGOs are good facilitators their role will diminish as the community's capacity increases. This is not always the case as they have vested interests in continuing their relationship with the community. For the Makuleke restitution claim, NGOs (and donors) were in competition with one another to become part of the process and, as a result, had a disruptive effect, contributing directly to conflict. Good facilitation was recorded in a number of Namibian cases, and has been called consistent and persistent “light touch” community empowerment and facilitation. This approach involves working directly with communities (rather than through other organizations), regular field visits, follow-up, staying in touch with community power shifts and internal dynamics, and training and capacity building. Communities are “nudged” into taking action so that facilitators are not making a decision for or on behalf of communities. This requires assisting communities and community organizations to identify key issues and potential problems, and helping them work through these issues and develop appropriate decisions, solutions, and actions - a necessary process so the NGO does not become the community’s gatekeeper to the world.

Governments are sometimes reluctant to engage NGOs due to perceptions that NGOs are radical organizations having potential to cause disruption. This has happened to some extent in Lesotho and South Africa. An NGO that provided technical support to Rural District Councils at the inception of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe is advocating for benefits and management of CAMPFIRE to go below District Council level. Consequently, the NGO is now viewed suspiciously by the Councils and has been, to a large extent, replaced by the CAMPFIRE Association – an association with representatives from all Councils involved in CAMPFIRE.

5. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES

In general, colonial and post independent processes have eroded the authority of the traditional leaders. The independence era in most of the countries has resulted in dual local authority systems consisting of traditional leaders and government organizations. The dual structures often compete for control resulting in a situation that may be exploited. Four types of cases are recognized. At one extreme are the cases where traditional leaders have been almost completely removed (e.g. Tanzania, Fish River), while at the opposite extreme are the cases where traditional leaders exert excessive control over CBNRM (e.g. Zambia). In a number of cases, potential conflict between state organizations and traditional leaders has been avoided by incorporating traditional leaders into the new organizations (e.g. Makuleke, Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi, and Botswana). In other situations there have been attempts to reduce the powers of the traditional leaders, but they remain the key players in NRM (Zimbabwe-Chivi).

In some countries traditional leaders have been deliberately excluded for being undemocratic, corrupt, and agents of the previous regimes (e.g. Fish River, Tanzania, Zimbabwe). Even so, traditional leaders often remain a strong force. Parallel to the state-supported system in Zimbabwe, there is the traditional system of chiefs, headmen and, at the
lowest level, kraalheads. Since 1982, control at the local level has been vested with the Rural District Councils rather than traditional leaders. This has undermined the authority of the traditional leaders but not necessarily their support. In all the Zimbabwean study sites, the traditional leaders have maintained a degree of authority over NRM, but there are many examples of individuals going against the traditional leaders by using the ambiguous situation existing between kraalheads and the modern organizations (VIDCOs).

In Zambia, traditional leaders have a much more influential role in decision-making around wildlife management than in most of the other countries and are members of the governing committees at all levels. Their ability to sideline the community has been discussed above in Section 4.2.

The relationship between the dual structures may be fairly complex and confusing due to unclear mandates. In Makuleke the traditional leaders are integrated into the new Communal Property Association (CPA), blurring the roles of the CPA executive versus the tribal council. The CPA executive increasingly assumes functions originally falling under the tribal council partly because of the chief’s position as chairperson of the CPA. The lessening of the role of traditional leaders is likely to increase when the Makuleke gain tenure rights to the land they currently occupy (part of the agreement) and ownership becomes vested in the CPA. However, because traditional leaders have been an integral part of the land claims committee, there is little disruptive competition between the two structures at this stage.

Traditional leaders may receive their authority in CBNRM from legislation or being elected. In northwest Namibia traditional leaders are generally members of the Conservancy Management Committees in an executive capacity, as patrons, or as non-voting members. In most cases, they are elected to the committee, but in others they are co-opted to avoid potential conflict. On the other hand, in northeast Namibia, where traditional leadership is stronger, the traditional leaders delegate authority to the Conservancy Committees to manage natural resources on their behalf. The situation is similar in Malawi where the VNRMCs report to the traditional leaders who remain external to the committees but have strong powers. Traditional leaders play a key role in local organizations at all hierarchical levels (village head, group village head, sub-chief and chief). The village head in particular has considerable authority, having overall supervisory control over Village Forest Areas (VFAs), having to be approached for permission to access state and VFAs, and having final say about management rules. Thus, although authority and control is decentralized to community-level, much of this authority is vested in a single individual.

That the role of traditional leaders is in continuing flux is illustrated by recent legislation in Zimbabwe. The recent Traditional Leaders Act gives certain powers to traditional leaders, but the new legislation has given legal status to another hierarchical system without clarifying the overlapping nature of the traditional and modern systems. Similarly, recent legislation in Namibia has restored some authority over natural resources to traditional leaders but does not define the scope of this authority. Moreover, this new authority is likely to be undermined with tenure reform and the establishment of Land Boards, which will remove the rights to allocate land from the traditional leaders. In Malawi and Zambia, the recent legislation has reduced the role of traditional leaders and made them more accountable to the populace.
Most of the case studies reveal that there can be considerable variation in the role, legitimacy, and strength of the traditional leadership from one area to the next. Sometimes the traditional leaders may be respected and supported whilst in other areas they may be rejected and weak. Generally, it appears that where the traditional leadership is strong and legitimate it will be supported. It may even have a very positive impact on CBNRM as discussed in the Malawi, Makuleke and Lesotho case studies. Where it is weak or biased towards certain groupings, as in the Fish River and Botswana cases, chiefs and other lineage leaders are likely to have less support.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUCCESS FACTORS

In all the countries studied, there has been progress towards CBNRM and a move away from largely unsuccessful, centralized command-and-control approaches. The move to community-based management has been more successful in some cases than in others. In most instances there is little evidence, with the possible exception of specific case studies in Namibia and Malawi, to demonstrate that decentralized authority has resulted in more sustainable natural resource management. The assumption is that if true community control is in place then sustainable use and management will follow; but the links between local management and sustainable NRM still require attention and further research effort.

In this section we distil some of the key lessons for the move to local authority. The study has revealed a range of factors and conditions that may help contribute to the success of CBNRM initiatives and the empowerment of local communities. These include a real commitment by government to transfer management authority (and the full bundle of rights) to the lowest level possible; clarity around the mandates of and relationships to different stakeholders such as traditional leaders, local government and line departments; integrating CBNRM organizations within local government organizations; ensuring representativeness and accountability of management organizations; dedicated facilitation (often by NGOs) that builds capacity and flexibility; recognizing the importance of traditional leaders; planning for private sector and their ability to generate income based on the natural resource; recognizing that the value of the resource will be a key variable in determining the kind of organizational structure that is likely to be successful.

Many challenges for the implementation of CBNRM still exist, and there are many lessons still to learn. Each situation is unique and influenced strongly by a variety of contextual factors. It is therefore important that we are not too prescriptive in determining what works and what does not. Overall, policies and implementation approaches that provide community members with the authority to make decisions regarding the use and management of natural resources appear to have a greater chance of succeeding (provided attention is paid to capacity building) than those transferring control to higher levels. Possibly one of the most important lessons for policy makers and practitioners (and researchers) is the need to be flexible and recognize that CBNRM is a dynamic process in which different issues, concerns, and power plays emerge as the process unfolds.
6.1 Supporting village-level organizations for CBNRM

Decentralizing to the lowest possible level and state support for communities

The greatest success in CBNRM has been achieved where there is a strong policy and legal framework transferring authority over wildlife, forests, and tourism directly to representative community-based organizations. Generally, the unit of management in CBNRM should be as small as practicable. 22

Even though appropriate policy and legislation may exist, there can be large differences between the stated intent of government and how bureaucracies apply this intent in practice. Lack of commitment by the state to truly release authority to a local level, despite its policies advocating decentralization, is a major factor limiting the success of community initiatives. 23 In other instances, vacillation and bureaucratic delays result because government has not yet realized the practical and logistical implications of its new policies, and it is poorly prepared and ill equipped to deal with implementation aspects. A parallel problem relates to financial and capacity limitations within departments and the officious attitude and poor ability of many government officials to work with local communities and engage in participatory processes. 24

The case studies show the more the state lets go, the greater the likelihood for success, as shown by village-level committee, ranging from those with many powers (Tanzania, Malawi) to those with few (Zimbabwe Gokwe). Success is more likely where policies transfer proprietary rights over land or resources to resource users, through the facilitation of villages or sets of villages becoming corporate organizations, as in Botswana and Namibia. In these cases there is legal recognition of rights and recourse to the law. However, this success is in the context of high-value resources and considerable facilitation of the process by NGOs. In these countries there are now a number of functioning conservancies and wildlife management trusts. The path to success is not simple. It is of note that in the early days of CBNRM in Namibia many conservation officials were sceptical of the approach and little field support was provided. Recent evidence from Botswana and Namibia indicates that the state continues to reserve the right to make unilateral decisions on important issues, particularly those related to income and revenues.

In Malawi, the Department of Forestry facilitated several training and skills development workshops in the case study areas, building the capacity of the community organizations to become involved in NRM. However, long delays in approving regulations and management plans have resulted in dissatisfaction and a loss of interest by the communities in participating in CBNRM. The reluctance of the South African government to take the step of legalizing its tenure reform proposals is having a major negative impact on NRM in communal areas. In Zambia, the limitations of the country’s wildlife programs have been recognized and there are moves to devolve tenure rights, to increase transparency and accountability, and to ensure a much greater percentage of revenue reaches communities. 25 This appears to be more than Zimbabwe has achieved given that problems with the Rural District Councils have been articulated extensively over the last few years.

One issue always creating problems is bureaucratic delay (in approving legislation, dealing with applications, and sanctioning local plans). This is sometimes a delaying tactic by government due to lack of faith in their policies. In other instances, it is because the bureaucracy...
has not realized the logistical implications of its new policies and is therefore unprepared to
deal with implementation aspects. In Botswana, the Land Boards have delayed the approval of
land use and management plans, effectively putting CBNRM on hold in some areas. This
illustrates problems among the various stakeholders as Land Boards, with representatives
drawn from the entire district, are often interested in ensuring that the resources in a Controlled
Hunting Area (hunted meat or potential grazing) are available to their broader constituency
rather than satisfying the interests of the communities actually living in the areas.

Clarifying mandates

First, there are many instances when policies may be promoting contradictory outcomes, as
illustrated in the Lesotho case. Second, the study reveals a complex of different organizations at
a decentralized level that have some role in NRM. It is clear that the more complicated the
organizational arrangements and the greater the diversity of state-based actors directly
involved, as in Zambia and Lesotho, the more likely the community is sidelined in the course of
decentralization. In these cases, there is also increased likelihood of overlapping jurisdictions
and mandates (amongst sectors, between traditional and state organizations, etc.), potentially
leading to contestation and conflict among actors. Institutional ambiguity can be an important
factor in disrupting CBNRM. 26

Neither of these situations bode well for sustainable CBNRM. On the other hand, where
policies are clear and “appropriate authority” is decentralized directly to community level, the
situation is greatly simplified and there is considerably less ambiguity regarding rights and
responsibilities.

Integration of CBNRM structures and systems of local government

While decentralization directly to community level greatly simplifies the organizational
structure and results in considerably less ambiguity regarding rights and responsibilities, the
danger here is that these organizations will come to operate in isolation of broader district level
planning processes, potentially leading to decreased political support. To ensure local and
district political support to CBNRM projects and the integration of CBNRM into regional and
district development plans, it is necessary that CBNRM organizations mesh within local
government structures and development processes. At the extreme, there are cases such as the
Fish River where CBNRM is difficult because the civic associations have no formal link to any
legally mandated organizations.

In Botswana, in the past, trusts tended to have little connection to local government and the
broader district development context. This has been solved to some extent by the establishment
department and national CBNRM forums to help coordinate activities among different
stakeholders. 27 However, perhaps the lack of connection between CBNRM trusts and local
government precipitated the current situation, where control, at least of the funds derived from
management, has been shifted back to local government. Embedding within state structures
must still allow appropriators to devise their own institutional arrangements that are not
challenged by external governmental authorities. 28 There is obviously a fine balance between
giving authority to community-based organizations and embedding them within the local government system.

Ensuring representativeness and accountability

With any transfer of authority, there exists the danger of creating a new set of elites who use this authority for personal gain. In some communities in Botswana, the Boards of Trustees for NRM trusts started to live lives of their own, forming very close alliances with the safari operators and losing contact with their constituency. In Malawi, community members complained of the elitist attitudes of some representatives on the committees. Mechanisms to deal with these issues need to be built in the constitutions of the various bodies. Highly stratified and differentiated communities with multiple interests pose a particular challenge in that varying incentives and disincentives for participating in CBNRM are created. Here, the role played by external facilitators is critical.

6.2 Facilitating the process and ensuring flexible systems

In all the cases, the process of developing CBNRM systems has been complex and, at times, conflictual, requiring much dedicated effort, commitment, and flexibility by all stakeholders involved. It is clear that the path to successful CBNRM is not simple. Years of disruptive political manipulation in South Africa have practically rendered CBNRM approaches impossible in communal areas in the Fish River area. In the Zimbabwe Gokwe case, many villagers rejected the scheme proposed by the Forestry Commission partly due to a deep sense of mistrust between the community and the state, a result of a long history of conflict. The process of defining and registering community-based organizations, developing competent organizations that are representative of the different interests of local actors, and sensitive to the dynamics and power relations in the community is an arduous task, needing at least 2-3 years. Facilitation of the process is an essential prerequisite for success. Any attempt to speed up this process would condemn the CBNRM initiative from the start by ignoring the importance of the social process.

CBNRM approaches must be flexible and adaptable to fit local contexts, complexities, and needs. As is the case in Botswana and Namibia, each CBNRM organization should be able to determine their own boundaries and membership, select their own management structures and procedures, and develop their own constitutions (beyond certain prescribed provisions to ensure accountability), by-laws, rules, sanctions, and management plans. Despite an enabling policy environment and considerable progress in decentralization, only a few initiatives have adequately contributed to enhancing the capacity of village or community organizations to plan, implement, and manage on their own. NGOs can play a major role in this capacity building. This is illustrated in the Botswana case, where NGOs were very active in the community for three years prior to the community being recognized as a corporate organization.
6.3 Recognizing the importance of traditional leaders

Despite the weakening role of traditional leaders, evidence from the cases indicates that neither colonial nor post-independent policies have managed to destroy traditional leadership. North (1990) notes that informal structures will continue to persist despite the imposition of more formal systems. Some balance needs to be achieved regarding the role that traditional leaders have in CBNRM. In some instances (e.g. Zambia) chiefs continue to assert a disproportionate amount of control, while in other cases their exclusion from the formal NRM institutional arrangements has led to conflict. In a number of cases local people themselves have chosen to elect their chiefs and headmen onto the executive committees of the new CBNRM organizations (e.g. Makuleke, some cases in Botswana and Namibia). In other cases these leaders serve in a non-executive capacity as, for example, patrons. The important point is that it is the community who decides whether or not traditional authorities are represented. With the exception of the Fish River study, it appears that traditional leaders will continue to play an important role in CBNRM, with traditional systems of control being the dominant form for community management of lower value resources. Indeed, the strong leadership provided by well-respected chiefs and headmen has been cited as one of the strengths of CBNRM in Malawi and Lesotho. CBNRM programs need to look for ways to constructively incorporate the traditional leadership.

6.4 Planning for the private sector

There is a fine line between promoting commercialization as an incentive to manage natural resources better, and the potentially negative impacts that enhanced commercialization may bring, especially when the opportunities are recognized and exploited by more powerful groups outside the local community. The private sector is a powerful actor with an understandably high degree of self-interest. This puts community organizations at a disadvantage, and sometimes a facilitator is required to ensure an equitable arrangement. Powerful entrepreneurs tend to ignore local regulations and controls, undermining the authority of community organizations and appropriating the resource base. Where CBNRM organizations in Malawi have attempted to take action, they have received threats and warnings from the perpetrators. In these situations, government law enforcement agencies have been relatively ineffective in providing back-up support.

6.5 Insufficient benefits derived from CBNRM

For resource users to participate in CBNRM, the benefits of doing so should exceed the costs. Increasingly, CBNRM initiatives are demonstrating that the benefits may not justify the costs. In community-based wildlife projects, the costs carried by community members (costs of damage by wild animals, opportunity costs of land and restrained use of certain resources, costs of participation and labor) are rarely balanced by the benefits. Benefits from new institutional arrangements should accrue to all resource users/managers and not just certain sectors of the community or the management structure.

One clear pattern that has emerged from our study is that the chances of formalized CBNRM succeeding appear greater in situations where high value resources are involved,
providing the communities with a potential income stream (e.g. Botswana, Namibia, etc.) and thus an incentive to participate. However, where this is not the case, such as in the communal areas of South Africa, the way forward is much less clear-cut. Here, emphasis will have to be placed on the need for more sustainable management of resources used for everyday purposes rather than on the potential to earn income from the spins-offs of high value resources such as wildlife.

In some areas, the lack of significant high value resources may prevent the achievement of community-based management, as the costs of collective action will always be higher than the benefits (e.g. Fish River). Thus, appropriate organizational structures are likely to vary dramatically among contexts, for example, with systems based on norms and customs where low-value resources are present and systems based on corporate organizations where exceptionally high-value resources are concerned, with a range of organizational structures between these extremes.

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Notes

1. This paper was based on case study reports throughout Southern Africa; see acknowledgements for case study authors.
6. It is recognized here that the concept of community is complex. Communities are not homogenous entities but are highly differentiated and stratified with multiple interests and actors who have varying rights and access to resources and who can influence processes and decision-making within the community in different ways (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Kepel 1999).
8. “Institutional arrangements” is a broad term that in the context of NRM covers the policies, organizations, rights, rules and conventions that structure the way in which people interact with natural resources, particularly with respect to their access, use and management. Institutional arrangements also include informal institutions (cooperation, indigenous belief systems, spiritual controls) (Richards 1997); these are not discussed in this paper. Our focus in this paper is on the organizational structures that derive from policies and legislation, where organizations are recognized bodies or entities that pursue their goals within the rules (institutional arrangements).


10. It is possible that for some cases studies the legislation and institutional arrangements may have changed between write-up of the case studies and publication of this paper. For example CBNRM in Zambia was undergoing a process of change at the time of write-up, as was local government in Malawi and South Africa. Where possible work has been updated for the purposes of this paper.


14. Figure 3. Principal components analysis of 13 case studies using 11 variables, indicating the correlation patterns of variables. Figure 4. Principal components analysis of 13 case studies using 11 variables, indicating the similarity of cases.


17. Jones, pers. comm.


19. Ibid.


29. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


35. Ibid.
References


Corbett, A and Jones, B.T.B. “The Legal Aspects of Governance in CBNRM in Namibia.” Paper prepared for the CASS/PLAAS second regional meeting on the legal aspects of governance in CBNRM. University of the Western Cape, October 16-17, 2000.


Table 1: Case studies forming the basis of this paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and authors</th>
<th>Specific cases studies</th>
<th>Sectoral focus</th>
<th>Key characteristics of study site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA Rozemeijer and van der Jag (2000)</td>
<td>KH1 – a Controlled Hunting Area – Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park.</td>
<td>Wildlife management</td>
<td>Three settlements ~12,000 km². About 850 people – Bushmen, (70%) and Bantu. A mix of livestock and small stock rearing, subsistence hunting and gathering, labor intensive public works, and handicraft production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESOTHO Matela and Ntale (2000)</td>
<td>Peleng Sokong Range Management Area.</td>
<td>Rangeland management in communal areas.</td>
<td>35 949 ha adjacent to the Ka se dam. Altitude 1600-3195 m a.s.l. Terrain steep with high elevation areas designated for summer grazing. Snow common in winter. Livelihoods based on cattle, farming and migrancy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA Cooke (2000)</td>
<td>Fick River, Eastern Cape Province, consisting of 9 villages.</td>
<td>Management of common pool resources in a communal area and co-management of local nature reserves.</td>
<td>In 1969 the Makuleke community were evicted from 25,000 ha in Kruger National Park. In 1998, they successfully regained ownership under a restitution claim. Condition of the agreement – not to resettle the area but have exclusive commercial rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chirwa chewinga and Sango wards.</td>
<td>Wildlife management through CAMPFIRE.</td>
<td>Area between Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe and Kruger National Park in South Africa. Mopane woodland. 20 people/km². Most Shangaan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gwene Communal Area – Matembe village adjacent Mutangabiri State Forest</td>
<td>Forest management on state land through co-management.</td>
<td>State forest of 82.1 km². Mwonzora woodland. Euphorbia candelabrum. Kalahari and forest. 819 mm p.a. 35 people/km². Shangwe and Shona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA Kapungwe (2000)</td>
<td>Mumbwa Gama Management Area (GMA)</td>
<td>Wildlife management on communal and state land.</td>
<td>Mumbwa GMA (230 km²) borders Kazungula National Park. 1,790 people/km². 3 chiefs have portions of the chieftom in the GMA. 1,200 mm p.a. Mwonzora woodland. Agriculture and consumptive use of wildlife are main sources of livelihood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lupande GMA</td>
<td>Wildlife management on communal and state land.</td>
<td>Lupande GMA (4,080 km²) borders South Luangwa National Park. 8.67 people/km². Six chiefs control the area. 700 mm p.a. Mopane woodland. Rich in wildlife and other resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kwandu, Mayuni Wuparo and Salambala conservancies in Caprivi Region.</td>
<td>Wildlife management on communal land.</td>
<td>&lt;600 mm p.a. Savanna. 4.2 people/km². Many ethnic and political clashes. Wildlife densities low although improving.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1

[Map of Southern Africa showing countries and regions]

Figure 2

- **Government policies and legal instruments**
  - Setting the broader institutional framework
    - Promoting policy reform
    - Facilitating local capacity

- **District councils - by-laws, regulations, benefit sharing provisions**
  - Setting the framework for village management
    - Building civic society

- **Village government**
  - Setting the framework for household behaviour

- **Private sector - outsiders**
  - Joint ventures with communities and local government

- **NGOs, International agencies**

- **Households and individuals, including groups and individuals commercialising natural resources**
Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article: