A Bridge Between the Global North and Africa? Putin’s Russia and G8 Development Commitments

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Abstract: This article investigates the extent to which President Vladimir Putin’s Africa policy was shaped by Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G8). Mindful of the changing geopolitical situation and Africa’s role in the global economy, Russian officials have viewed Russia’s ability to forgive the debt of African nations and contribute to solving international development problems within the G8’s framework as measures of its economic success and resurgence as a great power. Moreover, its G8-oriented strategy became a key part of Russia’s relations with Africa. Putin officials argued that Russia was better positioned to defend the interests of developing countries and could act as a metaphorical bridge between the G8 and the global South. While Russia complied with several Africa-related G8 commitments, its arms sales to Sudan and a widespread perception that it gave Africa inadequate attention during its chairmanship of the G8 in 2006 weakened its attempts to portray itself as a bridge between the global North and Africa.

Introduction

Russia joined the Group of Seven to form the G8 in 1998, when it was more focused on its economic and other domestic problems. However, during Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000-2008), as the economy recovered due to increased revenues from high oil and gas prices, Russia became a net creditor, and foreign policy was used more systematically as a tool to further its economic goals and revive its great power status. Aiming to fulfill these objectives, Russia began to participate in debt relief and other multilateral development assistance programs, particularly in Africa, to which the G8 had been paying a growing amount of attention.

In Russian foreign policy circles, realist thinking, which focuses on geopolitics and balance-of-power calculations, predominates. Russian leaders view great-power multilateralism as “more about co-ordinated action than fostering and adhering to common norms,” and their approach is more “instrumental than principled.” Russia therefore has used its new responsibilities as a G8 member in a realpolitik manner. Russia’s leaders also support a new

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configuration of international financial institutions (IFIs), to reflect changes in the global economy and in the increasing influence of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other emerging powers in the global South.5 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that Russia accepts the “objective reality of multipolarity” and “will actively continue to play a balancing role in global affairs.”6

In furthering its realpolitik approach to international relations, Russia attempts to balance the actions of its economic rivals in Africa, including other G8 members. Russia’s rhetorical appeals to Africans therefore sometimes underscore how it differs from other G8 members. Such appeals note Russia’s preference for safeguarding national sovereignty in the face of foreign interference in domestic politics and giving non-Western states greater decisionmaking power in IFIs. They also refer to a sense of solidarity forged from similar experiences of economic hardship and the Soviets’ support for the African National Congress and other national liberation movements during the Cold War. The Putin regime argued that, because Russia was better positioned to defend the interests of developing countries, it would act as a bridge between the G8 and the global South. In 2006, when Russia held the rotating G8 presidency, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that Africans “realize that Russia continues to be an influential player in the system of global ties and [seeks] to use [its] authority and weight...on the international scene in the course of the solution of the tasks of development, particularly those directly affecting the interests of the African continent.”7

In contrast to this official Russian line, foreign observers sometimes emphasize Russia’s less savory behavior vis-à-vis Africa, including its arms sales to Sudan’s genocidal regime and reluctance to sanction the Sudanese and other African authoritarian governments for human rights violations.8 Foreign media outlets have also covered a series of violent, racially-motivated attacks in Russia against African students.9 In addition, Russia’s increased investments in North and West Africa’s oil industry have been viewed as a potential threat to the energy security of the US and the European Union (EU).10

The Africa policies of other G8 members, however, are no less self-interested than Russia’s. In fact, several other G8 members have lost credibility due to their own role in militarizing Africa and/or failure to comply with international human rights laws. For instance, between 2004 and 2008, the top five weapons suppliers were G8 members: the US, Russia, Germany, France, and the UK (in that order).11 In addition, the US “war on terror” served as grounds for the militarization of its Africa policy. Several Canadian mining companies have reportedly gained a reputation for having poor human rights records.12

In light of these considerations, this article will examine the Putin leadership’s behavior in fulfilling Africa-related G8 commitments, with emphasis on debt relief, official development assistance (ODA), and funding for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment and primary education. Did Russia’s membership in the G8, a great-power forum, actually prompt it to shoulder more responsibility for aiding African countries? If so, was Russia perceived by Africans and Western observers alike as having represented Africans’ interests and served as a metaphorical bridge between the global North and South? More generally, how did Putin’s objectives in Africa fit into his realpolitik approach to international relations? In answering these questions, this article shows how Putin’s G8-oriented strategy became a key part of Russia’s relations with
Africa, although Russia’s objectives there were more attuned to its broader strategic interests. An examination of the scholarly literature on great and emerging powers’ renewed interest in Africa, with emphasis on their aid policies in the post-Cold War period and Russia’s evolving relations with Africa, precedes the analysis of Russia’s behaviour within the G8 framework.

A Renewed Scramble for Africa? National Self-Interest and Aid Policies

Many analysts view the behavior of foreign powers in Africa through the lens of power politics rather than through that of institutional liberalism, which focuses more on the role of international organizations in promoting cooperation among states. In addition, they place the topic within a broader discourse about how emerging powers such as the BRICs have transformed global economic relations and how increased energy demands have influenced emerging and great powers alike to exploit Africa’s natural resources.

Is a new scramble for Africa’s riches unfolding, then, with the emerging powers raising the stakes? Some analysts argue this point. Shaw, Cooper, and Chin stress that notions of global governance are changing as emerging powers, what they call the “new global middle,” are asserting themselves diplomatically and economically in Africa and elsewhere. “The EU is still Africa’s privileged political partner,” argues Holslag, “but China, Russia, India and Brazil are turning their African embassies into new diplomatic nerve centres.” In Russia, journalists began reporting more on how G8 member states and the BRICs came to view developing countries as markets for their goods and investment opportunities, particularly in the energy sector. Furthermore, commentators in African newspapers have expressed renewed concerns about foreign intervention and widespread prejudice against Africans.

Other analysts, such as Frynas and Paulo, caution that characterizing the current foreign interest in Africa as another winner-take-all “scramble” for its resources is an exaggeration, and that Western countries’ investments and volume of trade with African countries still outshine those of the emerging powers (i.e., the US and France are Africa’s top trading partners, with China in third and Britain in fourth place). These scholars prefer to frame the heightened competition over natural resources in Africa “in narrow terms as an increased international interest in African oil resources focused largely on the Gulf of Guinea, entailing greater private investment and diplomatic engagement from a larger than before number of external actors.” But they still admit that “the interest in Africa’s oil and gas resources has spurned a rivalry between international actors in Africa, notably the American and Chinese governments.”

How are aid policies affected by these new geopolitical and economic realities? The answer is not straightforward and reflects how the line “between [foreign direct investments (FDI)] and aid is often blurred, as is the line between aid and trade.” Many scholars agree that strategic and political considerations are often paramount in decisions about allocating official development assistance (ODA), although other factors, such as colonial history, trade, and poverty level, also are taken into account. Clearly, no government decides to donate based solely on altruism, and donors “will likely continue to shift resources to other countries through bilateral and multilateral aid organizations to achieve some mixture of goals.” However, foreign governments—G8 members, the BRICs, and lesser powers alike—often prefer bilateral approaches, which grant them more control over the setting of conditions (i.e., requiring
recipients to follow “good governance” principles) and often feature high proportions of tied aid, which requires recipient countries to purchase goods and services from donor countries.\textsuperscript{25}

During the early 1990s, many foreign governments, including Russia’s, significantly decreased their ODA to Africa, which could “perhaps [be] explained by the end of the cold war and a weariness with meagre results,” although domestic economic concerns and mass publics’ prejudiced views of Africans also played a role.\textsuperscript{26} Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, Western donors increased development and security-related assistance to Africa, a change that analysts attribute to foreign governments’ renewed attention to Africa’s energy resources and its growing importance in the world economy; the campaigns of aid organizations (i.e., Oxfam and Care), UN-sponsored agencies (UNICEF, the UN Development Program, and the International Labor Organization), and global networks (i.e., Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History) in pressuring G7/G8 governments to give more generously; and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led the US and its allies to target parts of Africa in their anti-terrorist campaigns.\textsuperscript{27} Taylor and Williams note that “the growing fascination with globalization and interdependence within Western governments, [combined with the effects of 9/11], persuaded some leaders to argue for a return to earlier notions that foreign aid should be used explicitly as an instrument of enlightened self-interest.”\textsuperscript{28}

In turn, the period from the late 1990s until mid-2000s was marked by several major multilateral development initiatives. These include the IMF-World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) mechanism; the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the International Conference for Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002; and the G8’s pledges to increase support to Africa, notably at the 1999 Cologne (the Cologne Debt Initiative to expand debt relief to HIPC), the 2002 Kananaskis (with its Africa Action Plan to assist the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, or NEPAD) and 2005 Gleneagles (expanded ODA and debt relief) summits. Poku, Renwick, and Porto find that “while some [ODA] continues to be given in furtherance of geopolitical considerations (recent Chinese investment in Africa being a good case), there is a marked shift to allocations based on good policies driven by the practical development needs of Africans.”\textsuperscript{29}

Other analysts, though, emphasize donors’ strategic calculations and criticize the G8 for insufficiently funding multilateral aid initiatives and for continuing to apply restrictive conditions to the receiving of aid.\textsuperscript{30} The EU allocated more money to development programs to prevent failed states and added Africa as “an important component” in its common foreign and security policy, while the US response was more geared to fighting the war on terror, according to Engel and Olsen.\textsuperscript{31} Japan also designed its Africa policy around strategic concerns, including its need for Africa’s raw materials.\textsuperscript{32} According to Ronald Labonte et al., before 2005, Canada was the only G8 country “even to approach [a more radical] position on debt cancellation/debt relief,” while the UK was considering the idea of debt cancellation, and Germany and the US were opposed.\textsuperscript{33} Sautman and Hairong found in 2008 that “Africa’s debt still [stood] at about US$300 billion. An additional $50 billion in aid was promised in 2005, but more than half was either double-counted or involved money already pledged.”\textsuperscript{34} The primary function of Western countries’ ODA, concludes Mahbubani, “is to serve the immediate and short-term security and national interests of the donors rather than the long-term interests of the recipients.”\textsuperscript{35}
By the late 1990s, aspiring great powers such as Russia and China also increased their development aid to African countries. Like Russia, China “practices a realpolitik of aggrandising national wealth and power.”\(^{36}\) In addition, both countries seek to balance US power worldwide and win hearts by espousing rhetoric about multipolarity and the principle of non-interference in political affairs that resonate throughout the developing world.\(^{37}\) Remarks by Chinese leaders and diplomats have also reflected a theme of solidarity with African countries, because of similar economic development concerns and past colonial legacies.\(^{38}\)

Finally, Russian and Chinese leaders alike want to demonstrate their countries’ improved economic status and position themselves as trustworthy trade and investment partners in Africa, particularly in lucrative energy industries. China’s volume of trade with and FDI in African countries to date have been higher than Russia’s. For instance, by 2010, China expects its annual trade with Africa to top $100 billion.\(^{39}\) In contrast, between 2008 and 2009, the volume of trade between Russia and African countries was approximately $8.2 billion.\(^{40}\) However, Russia has written off more African debt than China has, given the Soviets’ larger investment in Africa during the Cold War and Russia’s obligation to contribute to debt relief as a G8 member. By 2006, China had written off nearly $1.27 billion in bilateral debts of 31 African states,\(^{41}\) whereas by 2007, Russia had cancelled over $20 billion of African debt.\(^{42}\)

**Russia’s Evolving Relations with Africa**

During the Cold War, the USSR spent billions of rubles, largely in military assistance, in developing countries with arguably limited long-term ideological or geopolitical benefit. During the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s new thinking about Soviet foreign policy resulted in a withdrawal from costly entanglements in the developing world.\(^{43}\) Immediately after the USSR’s collapse, Russia lacked defining interests in the developing world, apart from specific countries (i.e., China and Iran) and from soliciting debt payments, selling arms, and securing military cooperation agreements.\(^{44}\) Deterred by Russia’s economic problems and Soviet-era debt burden, state officials further de-emphasized development assistance, and sub-Saharan Africa was “perhaps the lowest priority on postcommunist Russia’s foreign policy agenda.”\(^{45}\)

By the mid-1990s, as foreign policy objectives began to expand geographically, the Russian government “resumed its earlier practice of extending credits to sweeten its economic dealings” and began to give more humanitarian assistance to Africa, including to Rwanda.\(^{46}\) By this time, the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences was one of world’s largest research centers of its kind, with approximately 130 researchers.\(^{47}\) However, some political elites continued to oppose new investment in Africa. According to Shubin, deputy director of the Institute for African Studies, they blamed Russia’s economic woes partly on its inherited Third World debt and held racist, condescending views of people in developing countries.\(^{48}\) Quist-Adade, a Ghanaian-born sociologist who earned his Ph.D. from St. Petersburg State University, similarly argues that Russia’s politicians and news media used Africa “as a metaphor for poverty, backwardness, and hopelessness.”\(^{49}\)

By the late 1990s, Russian officials began to rethink their relations with Africa, particularly in response to their growing geopolitical concerns. Because Russia sits “uncomfortably in both Northern and Southern camps,” Cornelissen argues, it “has had more incentive to accrue alliance partners from the South, including Africa, given the encroachment by the United States
on its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.” The Putin regime’s plans to expand relations with African nations originated with its “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of June 2000, which focused on security and economic assistance. It states that:

Russia will expand interaction with African states and assist an earliest possible settlement of regional military conflicts in Africa. It is also necessary to develop a political dialogue with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with sub-regional organizations and to use their capabilities for enabling Russia to join multilateral economic projects in the continent.

By 2006, Russian soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel were deployed to eight UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. In addition, Russia also participated in conferences related to achieving the MDGs, sent observers to meetings of regional organizations such as the African Union, and, in 2006, hosted the seventh meeting of the African Partnership Forum (APF), an international initiative to coordinate assistance to Africa that includes the G8, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU, the AU, African subregional organizations, and the African Development Bank. Between 2001 and 2005, the leaders of Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, and Ethiopia made official visits to Russia.

While Russia’s goal to shoulder its share of responsibilities as a G8 and UN Security Council member shaped its behavior in Africa, its strategic objectives there were paramount. As one Kremlin official noted, the “most important aspect of economic cooperation in our foreign policy is to encourage African countries to trade with us and to not only depend on development aid.” Since 2000, Russia has capitalized on its hydrocarbon resources as a way to gain geopolitical influence and expand its economy. Kornegay and Landsberg explain how, using the state-run oil giant, Gazprom, as its chief vehicle, Russia intends to create and control an east-to-west energy grid involving other producers such as Iran, Algeria, and Libya, “in order to consolidate an encircling dependency of the European market on the one hand and the emerging Asian markets on the other.”

By 2004, Russia had signed 37 economic assistance and technical agreements with African countries and trade agreements with 42 African countries. Russian officials and business people struck several more lucrative deals with their counterparts in African countries, including Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya. In 2006, a Kenyan newspaper reported that “Russian companies such as Alrosa, RusAl, Renova and Norilsk estimate to invest, over the next five years, a total of US$5 billion in sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resource industry.” Two years later, a Russian business newspaper saw Gazprom’s expansion into Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa as a part of its overall strategy to strengthen its position in global energy markets. In an effort to expand trade with its African partners, the Russian State Duma passed legislation stipulating that “traditional export goods from least developed, including African, countries shall be exempt from import customs duties.”

In persuading Africans that the Russian government prioritized relations with their countries more highly and had adopted a respectful approach to investment, the Putin regime claimed that Russia has a special affinity with African countries due to Soviet-era ties and
common development trajectories. In September 2006, during his only official visit to South Africa, Putin noted how the USSR had supported the then-outlawed African National Congress, and he and then President Thabo Mbeki stressed “striking parallels as both embark on periods of economic consolidation and growth on the back of economies expanding from the mineral wealth that provided the foundation of current prosperity.”

The Russian government hailed Putin’s visit as a “signature event” that “imparted a powerful impetus to the development of the entire range of relations with the region, primarily in the context of the deepening of political engagement, a serious expansion and the diversification of ties in the trade, economic, scientific, technological, investment and other fields.” Agreements included Russian investments in South Africa’s nuclear power, aluminum smelting, and diamond industries, and a Russia-South African Business Council was formed. In 2007, the two governments agreed to initiate more joint projects in the areas of nuclear and space technology, defense, mining, and energy. Two years later, in September 2009, a South African satellite was launched from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan propelled by a Russian rocket.

Russia’s G8 membership offered Putin officials additional ways to improve political and trade ties with Africa’s political and business elites. In particular, they stressed how Russia, more than any other G8 member, represents the concerns of developing countries in energy-related terms and understands their problems better because of its economic struggles. For instance, Vadim Lukov, a former Russian G8 official, remarked that, “Due to its close historical links with developing nations, Russia acted as a kind of a bridge between them and the G8.” An example of Russia’s acting as a bridge between developing countries and the G8 is the request made by Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos to Putin in 2006 for help from the G8 to forgive debt, eliminate famine, and fight pandemics. Lukov also noted Russia’s knowledge of overcoming problems related to energy production as useful to developing countries and how Russia forgave $34.6 billion in debts as a part of the G8 Cologne Debt Initiative and related programs. Another Russian commentator reported in 2006 how via the G8 and the APF, Russia “[sought] to help shape reliable mechanisms for attaining sustainable development and strengthening regional stability, and at the same time [sought] solutions to other problems facing the continent.” In 2008, Russians also emphasized how their government, unlike the US and Japanese governments, supported G8 expansion to include Brazil, South Africa, and India.

Often the Putin regime’s rhetoric about its priorities in Africa centered on the G8’s development commitments. For instance, Alexey Doulian, former Russian ambassador to Rwanda, and Oleg Scherbak, former Russian ambassador to Zimbabwe, stressed in African newspapers how the agenda of Russia’s G8 presidency in 2006 addressed Africans’ concerns. According to Scherbak, “As a country that is developing socially, we probably understand the problems of developing nations better than anyone else in the G8.” In his address on Africa Day in May 2006, which was published in African newspapers, Putin said he was “convinced that the St. Petersburg Summit priorities—energy security, combating infectious diseases and education—are in full conformity with the interests of African peoples.” He claimed that his Africa trip fulfilled G8 commitments to expand trade and promote education.
Rhetoric vs. Reality: Analyzing Russia’s Overall Compliance with the G8’s Africa-related Commitments

How does Putin’s rhetoric about honoring Russia’s G8 commitments to Africa add up? Using annual compliance reports by the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group as measures, it appears to be weakly substantiated. The group’s findings indicate that Russia had the lowest overall level of compliance with the G8’s Africa-related commitments made between 2001 and 2008, although its record on certain commitments is more encouraging (see Table 1).75

On the positive side, as shown in Table 1, the G8 Research Group—which now includes scholars from the G8 Research Center at the State University Higher School of Economics in Moscow—awarded Russia full compliance on fourteen important Africa-related commitments. These include fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, debt sustainability, and ODA. On the other, in 15 of the 56 commitments outlined in Table 1, the G8 Research Group awarded Russia the single worst rating (although Germany, France, Italy, and Japan also received the single worst rating at least once). Its weakest ratings tended to be for commitments concerning trade, technical assistance (including bridging the North-South digital divide), and “good governance,” primary education funding in Africa, and peace support operations.

How can Russia’s lackluster performance be explained? First, Russia’s own socioeconomic development should be placed into historical context. During the 1990s, as it struggled to recover economically, it needed technical assistance, such as in the area of communications and computer technology. Its volume of trade with African countries progressively increased throughout the 2000s, but it did not match that of other G8 members. Secondly, the G8 Research Group’s final compliance reports evaluate only a twelve-month snapshot of a country’s performance, so they are weak longitudinal studies. Russia’s ratings on commitments to ODA, for instance, improved markedly between 2003 and 2008, while its ratings on commitments to debt relief fluctuated. Therefore, Russia appears to lack the capacity (if not the political will) to carry out some of these measures within twelve months, but may have a better track record over ten years. For instance, since 2003, Russia has been increasing its funding to an IMF-sponsored program to create regional technical assistance centers in Africa called AFRITRAC.76

Russia’s poor performance ratings on commitments to good governance (i.e., democratizing the decisionmaking process, judicial reform, strengthening the capacity of civil services, enhancing parliamentary oversight) and peace support operations, however, underscore the differences between Russia’s and other G8 members’ approaches to Africa. Russian officials tend not to pressure its African partners to conform to Western notions of democracy, and, in the UN Security Council, Russia has objected to sanctioning Sudan’s, Zimbabwe, and other authoritarian African regimes for human rights violations.

Lastly, Putin officials likely were aware that no G8 member state has a perfect compliance record (i.e., as noted in Table 1, overall compliance ratings for the 56 commitments range from a high of 88 percent for Canada and the UK to a low of 45 percent for Russia). They also may have calculated that Russia would not be expelled from the G8 for poor compliance with commitments that do not carry the force of international law. Russia already has learned that it can weather such controversies: it has remained a Council of Europe member, despite failing to
comply fully with the legally binding European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. With these explanations in mind, we will now turn to a discussion of Russia’s record on specific G8 Africa-related commitments adopted while Putin was president.

Russia’s Contributions to G8 Commitments to Debt Reduction and Official Development Assistance

By the late 1990s, Russian officials came to value international development issues more highly. In 1999, the Yeltsin government already planned to contribute to debt initiatives within the G8 framework, including the G7’s Cologne Debt Initiative, to which Russia was not formally bound to contribute. During the Putin era, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and several Russian journalists argued that Russia’s writing off billions of dollars in debt owed by African countries enhanced its international reputation by making it a major creditor nation and increased its economic opportunities in Africa.

At the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, G8 member states introduced a new plan for poverty reduction, including debt relief and promoting open trade and investment. The plan also required each G8 member state to appoint a representative to Africa to coordinate its implementation. In some respects, 2001 marked a major breakthrough in Russia’s economic recovery and contributions to debt relief. It was then that Putin agreed to support the Genoa Plan for Africa, including to open its markets (i.e., no import duties on goods from the poorest countries, except on weapons) and write off debt. By 2001, Russia was already the leader among G8 nations in the amount of debt relief it paid as a percentage of its GDP and fourth in terms of the total amount of debt relief (as of 2008, Russia was in third place, behind Japan and France).

In June 2002, at a meeting of G8 finance ministers in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin announced that Russia was now capable of fulfilling its financial responsibilities as a member of the Paris Club and the G8. At the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa witnessed the G8’s adoption of an Africa Action Plan to support the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The Africa Action Plan included a “new US$6 billion in ODA, US$1 billion in debt relief, and greater access to G8 markets for African exports.” One G8 expert and former British diplomat, Sir Nicholas Bayne, described the plan as “a weapon in the fight against terrorism,” because of its commitments to peace support operations, although it failed to “endorse the NEPAD proposals for infrastructure projects or for more generous debt relief.”

At the Kananaskis Summit, Putin spoke about how Russia’s commitment to the resolution of Africa’s development problems was “appreciable” and that it supported NEPAD. As a part of its contributions to NEPAD, Russia donated millions of dollars for emergency relief to specific countries (i.e., Algeria, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) as well as to the UN World Food Program and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Putin also announced that Russia would help eliminate the external debt of the poorest countries, by contributing 20 percent of the total amount ($26 billion) agreed to by G8 countries. The G8 Research Group concluded in 2002 that, although Putin “was delayed in appointing an [Africa Action Plan] representative, Russia has since become relatively engaged in the process.”

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Back at home, however, Russians still debated the worth of paying the external debt of poor countries. Former Finance Minister Aleksandr Livshits argued that opening markets of developed countries to goods from the poorest countries would be a more effective form of economic development than financial aid. Doing so, he said, would improve production and encourage foreign investment. At this point, when the Paris Club had decided only to restructure instead of forgive Russia’s multi-billion dollar Soviet-era debt, some Russian analysts criticized Western countries for not wiping it (and the debt of other former Soviet republics) clean while forgiving the debt of other economically-vulnerable countries. Ultimately, Putin decided to ignore these critics and continued allocating some of Russia’s new wealth towards debt relief. In so doing, he sent a strong signal to his G8 partners that Russia would act responsibly.

At the 2003 summit in Evian, France, Russian officials maintained that Russia was meeting its financial obligations as a G8 member. Putin’s G8 representative, Andrei Illarionov, told the press that the G8 “is a club of the strong, where you can’t come with an outstretched hand, because you need to pay.” Instead of negotiating over debt restructuring, Putin took part as an equal at Evian, Illarionov said. By 2003, Russia had written off $11.2 billion of African debt and donated millions of dollars to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian agencies. Despite this effort, it still received a poor rating from the G8 Research Group for not complying with its 2002 commitments to expand capacity-building programs related to “good governance” in African countries and to funding its share of the shortfall of the HIPC Initiative. The following year, the G8 Research Group awarded Russia “work in progress” ratings on 2003 Evian commitments to ODA and the HIPC initiative.

The US hosted the 2004 G8 summit on a remote island in Georgia, where leaders adopted Africa-related commitments concerning debt sustainability, technical assistance, fighting infectious diseases, food security, and peace support operations. The G8 Research Group awarded Russia a positive compliance rating on debt sustainability but ratings of noncompliance or “work in progress” for 2004 G8 commitments concerning technical assistance and providing emergency assistance to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan in the wake of a widespread famine in the Horn of Africa. One potential reason for Russia’s lack of compliance on these measures may have been that it was experiencing high inflation rates in late 2004, and Finance Minister Kudrin had announced that the government’s overall spending would be curtailed.

Britain’s 2005 G8 presidency focused on increasing the amount of development assistance to Africa. The leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa—the so-called Outreach 5 (O5)—attended the summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. At the summit, G8 members pledged to double their ODA to African countries, to $50 billion, by 2010. Russia was not initially included in an additional pledge to write off $40 billion worth of debt of eighteen of the poorest countries to the IMF, World Bank, and the African Development Bank because the agreement was made at a separate meeting of G7 finance ministers in June 2005. However, at the summit, the Russian government announced its plans to forgive an additional $2.2 billion in Third World debt within the HIPC framework. State Duma Deputy Vladimir A. Vasiliev reported in October 2005 that Russia had written off (or pledged to do so) $11.3 billion of African debt,
“including the $2.2 billion within the HIPC Initiative.” Also in Russia’s favor, the G8 Research Group found that it was now fully complying with the G8 commitment to debt sustainability in the HIPC framework. Back at home, some Russian analysts worried that domestic finances were being overstretched by the debt write-offs, while others recognized that Africa’s role as an international source of energy resources had grown, and that Russia needed to cultivate closer ties to its leaders. The latter view prevailed inside the Kremlin.

In 2005, Russia’s contributions to debt relief were strategically important. First, Russian officials hoped that their efforts to clear their own debt and contribute to Third World debt relief would lead to Russia’s joining the financial G7. Secondly, Russia was preparing for the G8 presidency the following year, when foreign observers would scrutinize it more closely. Kudrin announced during the Gleneagles Summit that “this year, on the threshold of our chairmanship of the G8, we will announce about a 100 percent write-off on a bilateral basis of the debts of the poorest countries.” Russia’s good faith efforts had their limits, though. The Russian government was less motivated to fulfill the Gleneagles commitments to doubling ODA to Africa by 2010, to promote economic growth in Africa through involvement in the NEPAD framework, and to improve Africa’s infrastructure and capacity to trade.

During Russia’s G8 Presidency in 2006, Putin—enjoying economic success and high popularity ratings compared to other G8 leaders—proposed new initiatives related to debt relief. First, he tried to use Russia’s promised debt write-off within the HIPC framework as leverage in appealing to his G8 partners to forgive the debt of poor countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Tajikistan, although this proposal was rejected. Secondly, he proposed that Russia’s upcoming payment to the Paris Club of $1.9 billion be directed toward paying more debt relief to the International Development Association. Then, a month before the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Kudrin announced that Russia would excuse an additional $700 million in African debt. The G8 Research Group acknowledged Russia’s full compliance with its 2006 St. Petersburg commitment to debt relief.

Some Russians more strongly supported the government’s approach to writing off the debt of developing countries because of Russia’s improved financial position. In addition, in 2006, a coalition of Russian and foreign NGOs concerned with poverty issues (Dvizhenie Protiv Bednosti-Movement Against Poverty) formed to advocate the fulfillment of the UN’s MDGs and part of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty. However, others, including a noteworthy economist, still argued that paying off African debt was not in Russia’s interests, that Russia had no ethical reason to do so because it was not a former colonial power in Africa, and that CIS countries deserved to be included on the HIPC list.

Russian officials apparently were aware of and responded to these domestic concerns. Putin’s comments about debt relief before and during the St. Petersburg Summit reflected his regime’s growing emphasis on the need to reform international economic relations to help developing countries avoid future debt crises and disappointment that no CIS countries were added to the HIPC formula. In outlining the long-term political and economic advantages of Russia’s contributions to Third World debt relief, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak bluntly stated that “Russia is a great power, a member of the G8. We are interested in how the economic prosperity of countries would increase and in the advancement of the image of our country.” As Rossiiskaia gazeta, a state-run newspaper, explained, “The Russians assume that
the debtor countries will use the funds for health, education, and various other social programs and that the countries will use Russian specialists, and Russian scientific potential, to enliven trade-economic ties and make it easier for Russian business people to enter markets there.”

Russian officials also tried but failed to convince foreign observers that Russia was adequately supporting the G8’s Africa initiatives. For example, two Russian Foreign Ministry press releases stressed how the G8’s Africa-related commitments had remained active during Russia’s G8 presidency, including how Russia’s hosting of the APF meeting in October 2006 indicated its “growing contribution...to multilateral efforts to aid the continent, especially in the part of debt burden reduction (totaling 11.3 billion dollars).” Despite these reassurances, several Western and African analysts still concluded that Russia’s G8 presidency had discounted earlier G8 development commitments. Political scientist Anthony Payne judged that the Russian government “did not want to invite [O5 leaders to the St. Petersburg summit], but ultimately fell in with the new practice, although at no point seeking to do anything serious with the wider dialogue.” A Namibian newspaper emphasized how Africa was “relegated to the margins” at the St. Petersburg Summit. Ross Herbert, head of the South African Institute of International Affairs’ NEPAD and governance unit, said “the signs are that the days of Africa being top of the G-8’s agenda are fading. Russia is resisting this.” These negative reactions suggest that Putin’s charm offensive in Africa in 2006 failed to convince observers that Russia’s G8 Presidency took development commitments seriously and that Russia represented a strong bridge between the G8 and the global South.

During Germany’s G8 presidency in 2007, G8 leaders made new development-related commitments, including a pledge to invest responsibly in Africa and a two-year Heiligendamm Dialogue Process “between the member states of the G8 group of countries and the important emerging economies [the O5] that deals with the biggest challenges the global economy is facing today.” In 2007, Russian officials continued to publicize their increased efforts to assist Africa’s economic development, whether as a part of the G8 framework or through bilateral trade agreements. By 2007, Russia reportedly had written off over $20 billion of African debt. In March 2007, members of the Movement Against Poverty met with the Putin’s G8 representative, Igor Shuvalov, to discuss ways to combat poverty in Africa. Shuvalov outlined the government’s goals: investing in railway and transport communications, improving conditions for economic investment, increasing access of African agricultural goods to markets in developed countries, and supporting efforts to combat global pandemics. Russia signed preferential trade agreements with the least-developed countries, which exempted them from paying import duties.

African diplomats tended to praise these decisions. The Union of African Diplomats in Russia called the agreements “commendable” and in line with G8 initiatives and the World Trade Organization’s Doha agenda. Patrick Chokala, former Tanzanian ambassador to Russia, argued that “Russia’s debt relief plan under the auspices of [the] G8 would understandably help stimulate our national economy and reduce the poverty burden of our people.” This time the metaphor of Russia’s acting like a bridge between the G8 and global South was beginning to seem more credible.
The G8 Research Group found that, in 2008, the year after the Heiligendamm commitments were made (and Putin’s final year as president), Russia had a mixed record for complying with Africa-related commitments. Russia fully complied with its commitment to the dialogue process, to increasing its ODA to Africa (including funds to fight infectious diseases), and to helping developing countries integrate with the world trading system (G8 Trade Declaration). Lavrov characterized the meeting of foreign ministers of BRIC countries in Ekaterinburg in May 2008 as falling within the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process with the O5.123 These positive compliance ratings indicate a growing trend toward Russia’s investment in the economic recovery of developing countries. But the same report also concluded that Russia had only “partially complied” with its Heiligendamm debt-relief commitments, citing the arrest of Russian finance officials on fraud charges as cause for the delay.124

Since succeeding Putin as president in May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev essentially adopted his mentor’s foreign policy, including his handling of G8 commitments. Although Russia was not obligated to honor the 2005 G7 commitment to increase ODA to Africa, it agreed in 2008 to donate $2.6 billion to the UN Industrial Development Organization and to increase its volume of ODA by $400 to $500 million a year.125 In addition, by 2009, Russia had cancelled all the debt that lesser-developed countries under the HIPC initiative had owed it.126

While Russia complied with a 2009 Hokkaido-Toyako G8 Summit commitment to increasing ODA, the same was not true for commitments concerning the financial support of a World Trade Organization work program called Trade for Aid, which provides technical assistance to developing countries to help build their capacity to trade, and aid to and investment in the agricultural sector. According to the G8 Research Group, Russia “failed to comply with its commitment to support the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) by reversing the decline in aid and investment for African agriculture, though it has increased food aid” via the World Food Program and the Multilateral Trust Fund of the World Bank Global Food Crisis Response Program.127

In summation, Russian officials now regularly stress that Russia is a creditor nation that acts responsibly as a member of the international donor community, including as a member of the G8. They hold press conferences to publicize how their government’s contributions to development assistance have risen since the early 2000s, indicating that its ODA levels are edging closer to the norm for OECD countries. In February 2010, Kudrin announced that Russia’s accumulated ODA contributions had grown from $53 billion in 2003 to $121 billion in 2009 (although its annual contribution was $800 million, which was lower than other G8 countries’ ODA contributions).128

Russia’s Compliance with G8 Commitments to HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment

The international donor community substantially under-funded the fight against HIV/AIDS until the late 1990s and early 2000s. Several factors spurred increased giving by governments and private donors, including pressure from NGO networks and some African governments, donor countries’ conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a global security problem, and the creation of UNAIDS (1996) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002. According to Johnson, since the early 2000s, “international donor aid for combating AIDS has been rising rapidly” and mainly comes from bilateral development assistance, donations to the...
Global Fund, and funds from the World Bank and the private sector.\textsuperscript{129} The estimated contributions rose from US$1.6 billion in 2001 to US$8.9 billion in 2006, although Johnson argues that this amount is still insufficient.\textsuperscript{130} She cites Western paternalism, “failure to consult African governments,” and the US’s decision to channel much of its HIV/AIDS-related funding through bilateral mechanisms rather than the Global Fund as reasons why donations have not kept pace with the rising costs of prevention and treatment.\textsuperscript{131}

Russia’s financial commitments to global health, particularly fighting HIV/AIDS and other global pandemics, also increased during the 2000s. Sjöstedt argues that, “with regard to sub-Saharan Africa, Russian decisionmakers certainly agreed – both in statements and in practices – with the international norm on AIDS as a security issue,” but hypocritically did not extend the norm to Russia, despite its dangerously high number of HIV/AIDS cases.\textsuperscript{132} Since 2002, Russia has contributed to the Global Fund, which is considered an obligation of membership in the G8. In 2006, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:

> By now our country has fully implemented its previously assumed commitment to contribute 20 million dollars to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002-2006. In 2005 Russia’s contribution to the Fund was doubled to 40 million dollars. We also intend to reimburse the Fund until 2010 about 220 million dollars, the money it proposes to allocate for the financing of projects within Russia.\textsuperscript{133}

Russia also donated to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, giving $8 million alone between 2003 and 2004 and donated funds to a World Bank initiative to fight malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{134} Russia’s weakness as a G8 member between 2001 and 2008, though, was its under-investment in key multilateral initiatives, such as the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise. For instance, in 2005, the G8 Research Group found that, “Even though Russia has reiterated its commitment to the overall struggle with the AIDS pandemic through international forums, no steps have been taken towards the establishment of a Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise,” which was a 2003 G8 commitment.\textsuperscript{135}

Russia tried to remedy this inadequacy beginning with its G8 presidency in 2006. It pledged $20 million to the Global Fund, and at the St. Petersburg Summit, G8 leaders agreed to strengthen its campaign against the spread of infectious diseases. G8 leaders endorsed two Russian proposals in this area, including new research centers in HIV/AIDS vaccine development in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but neither involved directly fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa. Also in November 2006, Russia announced that it would reimburse the Global Fund the money it had received for funding Russia-based projects, approximately $200 million.\textsuperscript{136} As of February 2010, Russia had donated to the Global Fund a total of $235 million of $257 million pledged, which was still the lowest donation among the G8 members.\textsuperscript{137}

Since Russia held the G8 presidency, Russia has honored its pledges to the Global Fund and has helped support health systems in Africa. For instance, the G8 Research Group found that Russia had fully complied with a 2007 commitment to improve the human resource capacity of African health care systems, including a malaria national support program in Zambia. But it continued to lag behind other G8 countries’ performances in other respects. It had only partly complied with a 2007 commitment to the Global Fund because, while it had
Russia’s Contributions to G8 Development Initiatives in Africa during Putin’s Presidency

donated to it, Russia failed to “actively [participate] in discussions on long-term funding with
other states and non-state actors.”138 In addition, Russia did not comply with a 2007
commitment supporting sexual and reproductive health education in Africa.139 Overall, though,
in terms of the G8’s health-related commitments, Russian officials have shown a willingness to
cooperate, and Russia’s performance ratings have tended to be higher than in other Africa-
related commitment areas, such as technical assistance, ODA, and primary education.

Russia’s Compliance with G8 Commitments to Universal Primary Education

In support of the Dakar Framework for Action of 2000 (guidelines for achieving the MDG of
universal primary education by 2015) and the World Bank’s 2002 Education for All-Fast Track
Initiative (a multilateral funding program for primary education), the G8 adopted several
related commitments, beginning at the 2000 Okinawa Summit.140 At the 2002 G8 summit in
Kananaskis, for example, G8 leaders agreed to support “the development and implementation
by African countries of national educational plans that reflect the Dakar goals on Education for
All, and encouraging support for those plans, particularly universal primary education, by the
international community as an integral part of the national development strategies.”141
However, G8 states have all failed to fulfill their promises to primary education assistance via
multilateral mechanisms. For instance, they increased their bilateral assistance to primary
education in Africa, rather than support a joint effort, which would have required more
coordination and resources.142

Putin placed modern educational systems on the agenda for Russia’s 2006 G8 presidency
to strengthen Russia’s outreach to developing countries and its economic competitiveness, but
the emphasis was more on acquiring high-tech skills through post-secondary education than
acquiring basic reading, writing, and math skills on the primary level. This emphasis may
partly be due to historical legacies from the Soviet era. The Soviets cultivated ties with friendly
African regimes through funding university-level scholarships and educational programs, as a
part of their ideological struggle with the West.143 During Putin’s presidency, the Russian
government similarly funded thousands of scholarships for African students to attend the
People’s Friendship University of Russia in Moscow (formerly called the Patrice Lumumba
University). The Russian government allocated 750 university scholarships to African students
for 2006-2007, and the Russian-Egyptian University opened in 2006 with Russian assistance.144

In general, Russia has tended to funnel its ODA resources to post-secondary initiatives,
and so, as a consequence, has not contributed significantly to multilateral programs that aim to
fulfill the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. For instance,
in June 2006, the G8 Research Group found that Russia’s promotion of primary education in
Africa consisted only of a presentation by the Minister of Education and Science on the topic.145
Then, between 2006 and 2008, Russia donated $7.2 million to the Education for All-Fast Track
Initiative, but this amount paled in comparison to the UK’s donation (£100 million between 2006
to 2007).146 The G8 Research Group subsequently concluded that Russia partly complied with a
2007 Heiligendamm Summit commitment to make and complete pledges to the Catalytic and
Education Program Development Funds of the 2002 Fast Track Initiative but had failed to
“engage other donors on the issue of long-term funding.”147 Nevertheless, when evaluating
Russia’s compliance with education-related G8 commitments, it is important to compare it with
that of other G8 states, as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada at times also directed the bulk of their funds earmarked for primary education in Africa through bilateral mechanisms.

Conclusion

This article investigated the extent to which the Putin regime’s foreign policy toward African countries was shaped by G8 membership. Mindful of the changing geopolitical situation and Africa’s role in the global economy, Russian officials have viewed Russia’s ability to forgive the debt of African nations and contribute to solving international development problems within the G8’s framework as measures of its economic success and resurgence as a great power.

Russia’s record on compliance with Africa-related G8 commitments was the weakest among the eight member states, particularly on such themes as technical assistance, trade, good governance, and supporting primary education. NGOs, as well as some Western and African analysts, criticized the Putin regime for failing to bolster the Gleneagles Summit’s Africa-related commitments during Russia’s 2006 G8 presidency, and such criticism eroded Russians’ attempts to position their country as a bridge between the global North and South. Russia’s relatively weak compliance record, coupled with the negative media coverage of its arms sales to Sudan’s genocidal regime, might suggest that its political leaders were trying to undermine the development goals of its G8 partners. However, since 2001, Russia fully complied with fourteen key Africa-related G8 commitments, including increasing ODA, supporting debt relief, and funding multilateral initiatives to fight the spread of infectious diseases. Findings in this article also indicate that no G8 member has a perfect compliance record on Africa-related commitments, a conclusion that should give the reader pause before singling out Russia for the G8’s shortcomings. For instance, in 2009, One International, a global campaign to fight poverty in Africa, reported that the G8 had donated only one-third of the amount of official development assistance that in 2005 it had pledged to raise by 2010.148

Like other G8 members, Russia opposed potential G8 commitments that did not further its own interests. In June 2008, for example, the Russian government did not support a G8 initiative to assist poor countries harmed by global warming, which suggests that they did not view the initiative to be in their economic interests.149 Russia’s initiatives within the G8’s policy framework did not always succeed, either, as evidenced by Putin’s failed attempt to use Russia’s contributions to debt relief as leverage when negotiating with his G8 counterparts over extending similar relief to poor CIS countries.

Now that Putin is serving as prime minister alongside President Medvedev, his protégé, Russia’s orientation toward African countries has not changed. In 2010, Medvedev visited Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, and Namibia along with a large delegation of Russian business people. He travelled there “aware that Russia is far behind Western and Chinese companies when it comes to securing a share of the continent’s natural wealth.”150 During Medvedev’s visit, Russia and Nigeria signed a nuclear energy agreement, in furthering Russia’s goal to invest in Africa’s energy infrastructure.151 His annual statements on Africa and his 2008 foreign policy concept still highlight Russia’s contributions to the G8’s Africa-related initiatives.152 As this article has shown, Russian officials support these initiatives both to reassure their G8 partners that Russia had accepted that membership in leadership groups comes with a financial price and, like any
other great or emerging power, to pursue instrumental goals—fulfilling strategic political and economic objectives and enhancing its global image.

Table 1: Compliance with Africa-Related G8 Commitments, 2001-2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment (summit/year)</th>
<th>Can</th>
<th>Fran</th>
<th>Ger</th>
<th>It</th>
<th>Jpn</th>
<th>Russ</th>
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### Russia’s Contributions to G8 Development Initiatives in Africa during Putin’s Presidency

#### Africa: Health Systems (Heiligendamm 2007)

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#### Africa: Food & Agric. (Hokkaido-Toyako 2008)

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#### Africa: Peace Support (Hokkaido-Toyako 2008)

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### Rating of Overall Compliance

- **88%**
- **71%**
- **78%**
- **52%**
- **61%**
- **45%**
- **88%**
- **85%**

* Ratings were compiled by the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group on a three-point scale: -1 (lack of compliance), 0 (work in progress), +1 (full compliance). To access the text of final compliance reports on each of these commitments, go to [http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/). To access the G8 Research Group’s “G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding Reference Manual,” March 17, 2008, go to: [http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/compliance_manual_2008-03.pdf](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/compliance_manual_2008-03.pdf). Assessments of 2001 Genoa commitments to universal primary education and the HIPC Initiative, as well as of the 2003 Sea Island commitment to the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, were omitted because Russia was not rated.

** Italy was not rated due to lack of information at the time the report was compiled.

*** The author calculated the rating of overall compliance herself by 1) converting +1 to 100 and 5 to 50 (0 remains 0), 2) adding together all figures for each country, and 3) dividing the total result for each country by 56 (with the exception of Italy, which had 55 ratings).

### Notes

2. The other G8 member states are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For background on the G8’s Africa initiatives, see Fratianni, Savona, Kirton 2003 and Bayne 2005. For background on Russia’s role in the G8 more generally, see Baev 2009, Jordan 2010, Jordan 2008, and Panova 2005.
4. I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for his/her feedback on this point.
6  Lavrov 2007; see also Kramerenko 2009.
7  Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
8  Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam International 2005: 23.
10 See Pham 2008.
11 See Bromley et al. 2009.
12 See Hartung and Berrigan 2005 and “Canadian Firms Dominate Mining Activities in Africa—and Have a Bad Human Rights Record,” The East African (Nairobi), March 1, 2010.
13 For a clear comparison of neorealist analysis with that of institutional liberalism, see Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 119-20.
15 Shaw, Cooper, and Chin 2009: 27-44.
16 Holslag 2007: 23.
20 Ibid. 250.
21 Ibid. 236.
22 McCormick 2008: 73.
23 See Alesina and Dollar 2000.
26 Easterly 2007: 161; see also Engel and Rye 2005.
30 See Easterly; Alden and le Pere 2004; Moss 2006; LeMelle 2010, Riddell 2007; Jeffrey Sachs, “G-8’s Aid Promises Gather Dust on the Shelf,” The Nation (Thailand), April 24, 2007; and Taylor and Williams 2004.
31 Engel and Olsen 2005: 15.
34 Sautman and Hairong 2008: 104.
36 Sautman and Hairong 2008: 91; see also Tull 2006.
38 Taylor 2009: 15. India has a similar approach to Africa. See Shrivastava 2009.
40 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009.
41 Tull 2006: 463.
43 Quist-Adade 2005: 88; see also Westad 2005 for background on Soviet involvement in Africa.
44 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 283-84. Russia signed military cooperation agreements with China and Kuwait in 1993, the United Arab Emirates in 1994, and South Africa in 1995, in addition to agreements with several fellow members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
46 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 283; see also Vasiliev 2005.
47 Shubin 1997-98.
50 Cornelissen 2009: 23.
51 Shubin 2004: 104.
53 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006d. Russia is not a full OECD member.
54 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005.
58 For more details about these agreements, see Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b and Pham 2008.
59 Curtis Abraham, “Give Me the Oil and I’ll Look the Other Way,” The Nation (Nairobi), October 13, 2006.
61 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
63 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
64 David Masango, “Country and Russia Build on Political Ties with Sector-Specific Targets,” BuaNews (Tshwane), March 19, 2007.
65 Russian Embassy in South Africa 2009.
67 Lukov 2006.
68 “Russia—President Dos Santos Calls for Russian Assistance to Africa,” Angola Press Agency (Luanda), November 2, 2006.
69 Lukov 2006.
75 This conclusion is based on the G8 Research Group’s assessment of 56 Africa-related G8 commitments announced at G8 summits between 2001 and 2008, the years when G8 leaders endorsed by consensus a high number of Africa-related commitments, when Russia was included in ratings, and when Putin was Russia’s president. The commitments concern bridging the North-South digital divide and other technical assistance, supporting good governance and democratization, official development assistance, debt relief, education, trade with lesser-developed countries, health and infectious diseases, and conflict prevention and regional security. Evaluation is done on a three-point scale: -1 (lack of compliance), 0 (work in progress), and +1 (full compliance). Russia scored either a -1 or 0 on 42 of the 56 commitments. In comparison, the UK scored either a -1 or 0 on 12 of the 56 commitments, Canada on 13 of the 56 commitments, the US on 14 of the 56 commitments, Germany on 23 of the 56 commitments, France on 24 of the 56 commitments, Japan on 34 of the 56 commitments, and Italy on 42 of the 56 commitments. See Table 1 for a list of these commitments and country ratings.
76 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
77 Jordan 2003.


Vasiliev 2005.


G8 Research Group 2002: 36.


Reut, “Po-vzrosloemu. Rossiiia pomozhet Afrike.”


G8 Research Group 2004: 36, 41.


“Russian Finance Minister Claims that the State is Unable to Make Any Reasonable Investments at All,” Pravda (English edition), November 30, 2004; as noted in G8 Research Group 2005: 69.


Vasiliev 2005.


Baev 2009: 60. When the G7 members allowed Russia to join in 1998, they denied Russia access to G7 meetings concerning financial policies.


Ugodnikov, “Bogach, bedniak.”


See, for example, comments Putin made at the International NGO Forum in Moscow on July 4, 2006, accessible on: <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/civil8/cg8060704-putin.html>.


Ibid.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b; see also Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a.

Payne 2008: 530.


Anishyuk 2010.


G8 Research Group 2009: 230. Russia is not a member of the WTO but is still expected to donate to Trade for Aid.

Anishyuk 2010.

Johnson 2008: 497.

Ibid.

Ibid. 508-9.

Sjöstedt 2008: 22.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.


Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006c.


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“Excerpts from the transcript of President Vladimir Putin’s Address to the Civil G8 NGO Forum,” Moscow, July 4, 2006, accessible on: <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/civil8/cg8060704-putin.html>.


__________. (2006c) “Speech by Andrei Kondakov, Russian G8 Foreign Affairs Sous-Sherpa delivered at an OECD meeting of the Executive Committee in Special Session (ECSS),”

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November 3, 2006, accessible at:  


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Nezavisimaia gazeta (Russia)
Novye izvestia (Russia)
Pravda (Russia)
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (US government agency)
RIA Novosti (Russian government agency)
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