War Veterans: Continuities between the Past and the Present

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Abstract: This article makes the case for strong parallels in the collaborative relationship between veterans and the party in the first seven years of independence and in the extended election campaign period from February 2000 to the presidential election in March 2002. Just as the ruling party used ZANLA veterans to build power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers in the first seven years of independence, so it used veterans alongside others, and especially youth, to try to preserve its power among these constituencies. The fast-track land resettlement program, like the earlier cooperative movement, provided valuable symbolic support for the party’s revolutionary credentials but demonstrated the party’s low commitment to achieving large-scale economic transformation. As in the first seven years, so in the post-2000 campaign period, veterans often had their own agendas, distinct from the party’s, as they sought power and privilege, both of which were threatened by a change in regime. Whereas from 1980 to 1987, ZANLA veterans and the ruling party targeted the opposition party, ZAPU, and its former ZIPRA guerrillas, in the post-2000 campaign period the party and veterans colluded against the new political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Across both time periods, veterans and the party relied on liberation war appeals, violence, and intimidation to attain their distinct and overlapping objectives. Another parallel between the two time periods is in the political discourse about “authentic” and “fake” veterans.

Introduction

The emerging conventional wisdom is that guerrilla veterans’ power was first visible in their violent 1997 protests against the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front or ZANU(PF). Their subsequent extraction of sizeable lump-sum payments and monthly war service pensions is portrayed as the birth of a new alliance between the ruling party and veterans. This came to play a pivotal role in the parliamentary and presidential electoral campaigns between 2000 and 2002. ¹ In Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe, I examine the political dynamic between veterans and the ruling party in military integration and demobilization programs in the aftermath of the negotiated Lancaster House peace settlement.² A central argument of the study is that veterans and the ruling party were both collaborators and antagonists, often simultaneously. Each sought to build power and privilege through mutual manipulation of the other, through the use of violence and intimidation, and through legitimating appeals to their participation in the liberation war. The epilogue (the basis for this

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paper) makes the case for strong parallels in the collaborative relationship between veterans and the party in the first seven years of independence as well as during the extended election campaign period from February 2000 to the presidential election in March 2002. In the epilogue, and elsewhere, I also argue that public debates about whether those involved in the post-2000 campaign violence and land invasions were ‘real’ war veterans ought to be understood as a continuation of a political discourse about ‘authentic’ and ‘fake’ veterans that has been used by veterans and the party since 1980.3

Despite the contextual differences between the founding years of independence and the post-2000 extended election campaign period, there was an underlying continuity in the collaboration and conflict between veterans and the ruling party across these time periods. I focus on their collusion. Just as the ruling party used Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) veterans to win electoral power among the rural majority in 1980 and then to build power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers in the first seven years of independence, so it used veterans (ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA [Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army]) alongside others, and especially youth, to try to preserve its power among these constituencies. The land invasions, occupations, and fast-track land resettlement program, like the earlier cooperative movement, provided valuable symbolic support for the party’s revolutionary credentials but demonstrated the party’s low commitment to achieving large-scale economic transformation. As in the first seven years, in the post-2000 campaign period veterans often had their own agendas, distinct from the party’s, as they sought power and privilege, both of which were threatened by a change in regime. Whereas ZANLA veterans and the ruling party targeted the opposition party Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and its former ZIPRA guerrillas from 1980 to 1987, in the post-2000 campaign period the party and veterans colluded against the new political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Across both time periods, veterans and the party relied on liberation war appeals, violence, and intimidation to attain their distinct and overlapping objectives.

WINNING RURAL SUPPORT

In the 1980 election campaign, ZANU(PF) and ZAPU concentrated on winning the crucial rural vote. Both used guerrillas to campaign but ZANU(PF) deployed ZANLA political commissars in the rural areas on an incomparably greater scale. To ensure their party won the election, thousands of ZANLA guerrillas were deliberately kept out of assembly camps in violation of the settlement. After the ceasefire, and thus also in violation of the settlement, ZANLA infiltrated thousands of its guerrillas from Mozambique into the country, most likely in an attempt to enable ZANLA guerrillas to assemble in the numbers the party had promised at Lancaster House.4 Joshua Nkomo claimed that ZANU(PF) killed a ZAPU candidate as well as eighteen to twenty party workers.5 The British election monitors’ report claimed that in one-third of the rural areas the voters were not free to vote, chiefly because of ZANU(PF)/ZANLA violence and intimidation. The observers drew attention to the range of methods of ZANLA coercion and intimidation:

Whether or not they were acting on instructions of their political leaders...They extended from brutal ‘disciplinary murders’ as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform to generalized threats of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war if ZANU(PF)
failed to win the election to psychological pressure like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines which would reveal how individuals had voted and to the physical interdiction of attendance at meetings. The universal longing for peace, and the ambience of recent violence, made the threats of general retribution or a continuance of the war a potent weapon even in the hands of unarmed activists, since it was independent of the secrecy of the ballot.  

Focused chiefly on the violence of Rhodesian forces, the Commonwealth Observer Group’s report failed to recognize the extent to which ZANLA violations of the settlement were orchestrated. Since ZANU(PF) won 57 of the 80 parliamentary seats - the other 20 seats were reserved for whites - these and other observers asserted that electoral violence and intimidation had not altered the election result which they therefore accepted as the legitimate expression of the voters’ preferences. According to interviewees in 1992, ZANLA guerrillas who had campaigned in the 1980 election were later paid by their victorious party for their revolutionary contributions.

In the campaign for the parliamentary election between February and June 2000, ZANU(PF) and the veterans colluded in an organized campaign of violence and intimidation in the rural areas against all suspected MDC supporters, and especially African farm workers on white-owned commercial farms. Led by war veterans, land invasions (which began in late February 2000 and affected about one-third of the white commercial farms by June) were a deliberate attempt to place intimidating and often violent party campaigners close to their rural targets. Both party leaders and veterans claimed they were fighting a third chimurenga [liberation war] to consolidate and defend the war of liberation, and promised war and violence against MDC supporters and/or an MDC electoral victory. Between thirty-six and forty people died during the campaign period. The MDC won 57 out of 120 seats, though the ruling party retained a significant parliamentary majority because the constitution provides for another 30 seats for appointees, all ZANU(PF) supporters. MDC candidates continued their challenge of election results in thirty-eight constituencies on the grounds that ZANU(PF) violence and intimidation was a criminal offence in terms of the Electoral Act and had affected the result. The party allocated Z$20 million to the war veterans association to pay veterans and youth for their participation in the parliamentary campaign. Individual party leaders and MPs also reportedly paid or promised to pay youth whom they hired to perform acts of violence against the opposition. The party used the state apparatus - the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the police, and the army - to provide transport and other logistical support to those involved in land invasions. In October 2000, the government offered amnesty to those who had committed politically motivated crimes between January 1 and July 31 2000, thus perpetuating a history of official impunity for party supporters who engaged in violence on behalf of the ruling party. Based on a list of names and affiliation of perpetrators of election violence in the parliamentary election campaign, 21% were identified as war veterans.

WINNING THE ARMY’S LOYALTY

At independence, the three major armed forces -- ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the Rhodesian forces--remained intact. The ruling party joined together ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas in order to build power over the Rhodesian forces and to retain the loyalty of the guerrillas who
expected to form the new army. Simultaneously, the ruling party also sought to assert ZANLA’s power over ZIPRA. The three armies’ leaders agreed that the guerrilla appointments to middle and junior management posts in the newly created battalions should be based on merit. But in November 1980, when ZIPRA seemed likely to win more of these command posts, the party ended merit-based battalion appointments because neither it nor ZANLA could tolerate an army in which the opposition would dominate. In 1982, the party and ZANLA veterans colluded in a vicious attack on ZIPRA members in the army, especially those in command positions. Disappearances, detentions, arrests, torture, refusal to obey ZIPRA commanders or accept ZIPRA appointments were the order of the day. ZANLA veterans who took over ZIPRA positions benefited. ZANLA’s greater war contribution was often invoked to justify their right to control the army. Impunity was provided in July 1982, when the government introduced the Emergency Powers Act (Security Forces Indemnity). This effectively reinstated the Smith regime’s Indemnity and Compensation Act, which protected government officials and the security forces from prosecutions as long as they intended to serve the public interest. Though the Supreme Court struck down these regulations as unconstitutional in 1984, it had no practical effect for perpetrators or victims.

The army was a critical resource in the party’s strategy for retaining power after 2000. Both of the army’s top leaders (themselves liberation war veterans), as well as many other veterans in the army, had vested interests in the party remaining in power. The army’s leaders have enjoyed opportunities for patronage, including access to land and profits in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the army fought to defend that country’s government until late 2002. These leaders authorized the use of their personnel, vehicles, planes, and allegedly arms to assist in the land invasions during the parliamentary and presidential campaigns.

After the MDC won all urban seats in the capital city of Harare in the June election, the police and the army attacked people in the surrounding high-density suburbs to punish them for voting for the MDC. The ruling party and army leaders took steps to respond to their anxieties about potential MDC loyalties in the army. In September 2000, Moven Mahachi, then Defense Minister, introduced legislation to create a reserve force composed of war veterans and to bring the war veterans association and related issues under the Defense Ministry. In May 2001, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) commander Constantine Chiwenga, a war veteran, reportedly toured army barracks to mobilize support for President Mugabe in the election. He is said to have advised soldiers that the army should never allow Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC leader and presidential contender, to govern Zimbabwe. He called the former trade union leader a ‘deserter’ of the 1970s liberation war -- in fact, Tsvangirai stayed in Zimbabwe during the war--and said no ‘self-respecting’ soldier should ever consider saluting him. To secure party loyalty, Chiwenga introduced a policy of promotions for all war veterans in the army, and banned war veterans from army retirement before the presidential election. At least two army officers filed papers in the High Court alleging that Chiwenga had removed them from the army because he believed they were MDC supporters. Mugabe promised every member of the uniformed services (including the army) a plot under the fast track resettlement scheme. All war veterans, including those in the army, were given 25% increases in their monthly pensions from August 2001, backdated to January 2001. In August 2001 Didymus Mutasa, a senior party loyalist, warned for the second time in two months of a military coup, should
Tsvangirai win the presidential election. In January 2002, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, the Zimbabwe Defense Force commander, flanked by the heads of the uniformed services stated:

We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.

WINNING THE SUPPORT OF URBAN WORKERS

In the early years of independence, the ruling party pressed and persuaded the white-dominated private sector and the bureaucracy, which were both seen to be pro-Smith and pro-Muzorewa bastions, to employ demobilized guerrillas, and in particular those belonging to ZANLA. The ruling party wanted to place loyal cadres in bastions of pro-Muzorewa and pro-Smith support to build a power base. In 1980 and 1981, the party had dealt harshly with a number of workers’ strikes, denouncing labor militancy as a threat to nationalism and to the gains of the nationalist struggle, and lambasting the labor movement for its marginal role in the liberation war. In February 1981, the ruling party engineered the creation of a politically subservient federation of trade unions, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). At the same time, it also introduced elected workers’ committees. Formally, these committees were only intended to improve communication between workers and management. Workers’ committees did not even have bargaining rights over pay and job grading. Veterans, most of whom were unskilled workers, sought and obtained positions on the committees in order to enhance their power in the workplace. Other workers tended to defer to their liberation war credentials. Veterans used the committees to address legitimate workers’ grievances concerning racism, poor working conditions, and low salaries. They also wanted to see other liberation war veterans in management positions and resented working under African managers who had served the former regime. They often retained their martial and revolutionary war names, which an ex-combatant has described as “deliberately derogatory, a statement of defiance or a challenge to the enemy.”

Veterans and the ruling party colluded in at least two ways. Though the party was chiefly concerned with establishing control over the urban work force, its leaders frequently proclaimed a commitment to grand schemes to transform the nature of society and to empower workers through workers’ participation. This rhetoric encouraged the militant aspirations of the unskilled ex-combatants on the committees. The party also became involved in solving workplace disputes when ex-combatants on workers’ committees marched the managers, against whom they had grievances, to party headquarters. The militancy of workers and the party intimidated management who had to learn to deal with a new power structure and its socialist pretensions. The entire exercise was infused with intimidation and occasional violence. Ultimately, the party withdrew support for veterans’ activities in the workplace when it no longer deemed them expedient, leaving veterans with a sense of betrayal.
In April 2001, apparently with senior party backing, ZANU(PF)'s newly elected Harare provincial party executive, which included war veterans such as Stalin Mau Mau, Mike Moyo, Chris Pasipamire, and Chris Mutsvangwa, formed a committee to deal with labor disputes in its province. The labor committee included Pasipamire, the chair, and Joseph Chinotimba, the ZNLWVA’s (Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran’s Association) Harare Province chair. The goal was to win back the urban vote from the MDC (it won all the Harare and Bulawayo constituencies in the 2000 general election) by solving workers’ grievances against employers and by promising workers that they would run the companies in the future. The party also sought to intimidate those companies believed to be MDC supporters and financiers into abandoning their MDC links. In less than two months, the war veterans and their supporters had invaded about 200 mainly white-owned private companies (as well as foreign embassies, NGOs, and other organizations), chiefly in Harare and Bulawayo. Executives and managers who resisted demands to pay exorbitant amounts of compensation to sacked workers or to reinstate them were forcibly marched to the provincial party headquarters where they were threatened and often tortured and beaten. Veterans and their supporters often forced executives to hand over money. The police rarely tried to stop these illegal activities or to charge those involved. Nkosana Moyo, Minister of Industry and International Trade, publicly condemned the company invasions (two weeks later he resigned). Others, notably Minister of Home Affairs John Nkomo (also national party chair) and ZANU(PF) Vice President Joseph Msika, voiced ‘lukewarm’ objections. However, only after international pressures and threatened sanctions did government and party officials and ZNLWVA leaders (including Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi and Chinotimba) order the company invasions to stop, disband the labor committee, and call on the police to arrest ‘rogue’ elements for intimidation and extortion of money from company officials. These officials accused the ‘rogue’ elements of distorting party policy which was supposedly to use the labor committee merely to intercede in labor disputes through negotiations between employers and the Labour Ministry. Hunzvi said of the accused, “These people want to tarnish the image of the Government and the war veterans and we do not tolerate that.” Police arrested and charged thirty-six people, including war veterans. When Mike Moyo, a former vice-chair of the ZNLWVA Harare Province and the secretary for security in ZANU(PF)’s Harare province, was arrested on charges of extortion (he was later freed), he accused John Nkomo, the national party chair, and July Moyo, the Labour Minister, of ordering or sanctioning the company occupations. Moyo accused John Nkomo of protecting big people who were office bearers in the ruling party, and charged that Chinotimba and Hunzvi had benefited greatly from extortion and should be arrested. After a lull, company invasions resumed. The party’s active support for its new Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions, of which Chinotimba is the vice-president, suggests its continued desperate attempts to win urban support by any means. The new federation seeks to decimate the MDC-linked ZCTU.

WINNING THE LOYALTY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

At independence, supporters of the previous regime dominated the civil service. The ruling party’s privileged recruitment and promotion of demobilized ZANLA veterans over ZIPRA
veterans and better-educated civilians was intended to provide patronage and ensure loyal cadres. The central government also instructed urban councils to hire veterans on their staff. Where ZAPU controlled councils, ZIPRA combatants had an opportunity to benefit from party patronage. But in the 1980s, ZANLA veterans in the army and in the Fifth Brigade colluded with the party and sometimes tortured, killed, and attacked ZAPU leaders, local government councilors, and civil servants. After the Fifth Brigade’s violence in 1983 and 1984, the CIO and ZANU(PF) party youth took over an orchestrated campaign of political violence against ZAPU leaders, councilors, council staff, and others such as ZIPRA guerrillas, to ensure the ruling party’s victory in the 1985 local and parliamentary elections in ZAPU strongholds. Government repression did not make a dent in ZAPU’s electoral support. After ZAPU’s successful performance in the July 1985 general elections, despite virtually every rural and urban ZAPU office outside Bulawayo having been closed or burned out, the government detained, among others, nearly 200 employees of the Bulawayo City Council: municipal police, ambulance drivers, garbage collectors, and some middle-level bureaucrats. Many were ex-ZIPRA combatants or ZAPU wartime organizers.

Especially in the wake of the parliamentary election of June 2000, the ruling party sought to ensure that the civil service and local authorities were staffed by ZANU(PF) loyalists. Government and party leaders (including cabinet ministers Border Gezi, Stan Mudenge, and Aeneas Chigwedere) and provincial governors threatened civil servants who did not support the party with loss of their jobs and even death. Police commissioner Augustine Chihuri declared publicly his support for the ruling party in January 2001. ZIPRA and ZANLA veterans colluded with the party in purging, through threats and violence, suspected MDC supporters in the civil service and local authorities. These purges have included rural teachers and headmasters, rural and district council staff, district and provincial administrators, and senior police officers. Immediate beneficiaries of job openings included war veterans. War veterans in the police force have been the major beneficiaries of promotions in a bid to guarantee party loyalty in the presidential election campaign. Disgruntled police officers alleged that many veterans who were promoted were illiterate and that professional officers were overlooked. The aim, they alleged, was for all police posts to be led by war veterans by the time the presidential election was held.

THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Government and party officials portrayed demobilized ex-combatants who joined the cooperative movement in the early 1980s as a revolutionary vanguard whose war credentials were well suited to collective enterprises. According to official rhetoric, cooperatives were a step toward either economic modernization or a socialist transformation, a goal of the liberation struggle. In fact, cooperatives were a vehicle to engage and to placate demobilized ZANLA ex-combatants and had symbolic value insofar as they provided concrete evidence of the party’s revolutionary commitments. The party’s disinterest in the development of ex-combatant cooperatives is evident from the minuscule provision of government resources to an allegedly high profile development program. Moreover, the party’s partisan interests prevailed over any commitment to the development of cooperatives. From the outset, the ruling party was hostile to ZIPRA cooperatives and their NGO supporters and the security organs intimidated,
harassed, and often attacked ZIPRA cooperatives. The ex-combatants had little interest in cooperatives other than as a source of income. Those who were advanced their demobilization funds to form cooperatives— they had to purchase their own means of production— often abused their funds. Similarly, ex-combatants on state collectives, where the state owned the means of production, formed an elite who used their party links and war credentials to gain privileged access to government resources and dominate their fellow cooperators. The cooperative movement was a high profile and symbolic regime campaign. At the same time, it was an opportunity to incorporate ex-combatants as party patrons and to build party power.

The ruling party supported land invasions and occupations after February 2000 as a long overdue pursuit of the liberation war goal of regaining the land from the whites, and as central to the third chimurenga. The second chimurenga had been fought for political independence, the third was a struggle for economic justice. “The economy is land, and land is the economy” served as the party’s rallying cry in the parliamentary election campaign. The party praised war veterans for instigating spontaneous land invasions in February 2000 and for serving as the party’s revolutionary conscience. Subsequent land invasions were orchestrated by the party and often led by war veterans.

But the land invasions had little to do with the party’s rhetoric concerning development and equity. Rather, the party used land as a source of patronage to try to boost its waning power at a time when the depleted treasury limited other options. In July 2000, the party commenced its new fast-track resettlement program on land it had confiscated from mainly white farmers. The party’s parliamentary manifesto promised that this resettlement would result in an agricultural bonanza. The Supreme Court, ruling unanimously on the unconstitutionality of fast-track resettlement in December 2000, found no coherent program of land reform. The Court argued that it was primarily ZANU(PF) supporters who were beneficiaries and suspected or acknowledged it was MDC farmers whose land was acquired. The goals of such resettlement were clearly unattainable. The government, with army assistance, intended to move people onto the 4,700 farms (almost all white owned) it had listed for compulsory acquisition. The country had no resources to implement viable land reform. Inputs, infrastructure, and agricultural staff did not exist for such an ambitious undertaking. Foreign aid was unavailable. Under the cover of land reform, thousands of farm workers lost their jobs and white farmers lost their land for the benefit of chiefly ZANU(PF) supporters, regardless of whether they were even interested in farming. The failure of a significant number to take up their plots raised questions about their interest in farming and its viability under current conditions. Stories of war veterans (as well as others) selling land plots suggest that some veterans were using their central role in land occupations and land allocation committees to enhance their power and make money.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to make the case for the continuities in collaboration between the ruling party and ZANLA war veterans between 1980 and 1987 and between the ruling party and ZANLA and ZIPRA veterans since 2000. The party and the veterans are treated as unitary groups in order to demonstrate a political dynamic that has characterized their relationship. I have tried to highlight a remarkable consistency in their power-seeking agendas, their appeals
to the revolutionary liberation war, and their use of violence and intimidation. The ruling party and veterans have manipulated each other as they have pursued their distinct and overlapping agendas. This collaborative relationship has been interwoven with strong hostilities between the party and veterans. Conflict has been an important component of the relationship between the party and the veterans since 1980. Recent cases include veterans’ complaints at the party conference in Chinhoyi in December 2002 that the ZNLWVA had been excluded from land committees, especially for the allocation of commercial farm plots, and that police had removed initial settlers (including veterans) to make way for new plot holders. Muddled reports in early January 2003 suggest that war veterans in Bulawayo and Chitungwiza initiated food riots to protest their exclusion from a role in distributing grain and the opportunity to profit from this.

Looking to the future, the current environment of chronic material shortages seems likely to undermine the level at which the party has been able to sustain central control over politics. The party will find it increasingly difficult to concentrate adequate material and symbolic resources on the war veterans as it attempts to placate other critical constituencies, notably the army, the police, the bureaucracy, and the party’s formal youth militia. There is a serious risk of growing fragmentation within the party and among war veterans, and the forging of competitive alliances of different groups of war veterans, party leaders, and groups in the army. Will the center remain strong or will it fracture? Will Zimbabwe continue to be distinguished from many other African states by a relatively powerful center or will it be increasingly susceptible to warlord-style politics? Mugabe’s decision to take over the chairmanship of the ZNLWVA suggests that he would like to rein in and control the war veterans.

Notes:

4. Rice, 1990, p.83, pp.200-1 claims that as many as two-thirds of ZANLA’s 30,000 guerrillas entered Zimbabwe from Mozambique after the cease-fire. Rice, 1990, p.161 cites Emmerson Munangagwa’s post-election claim that 9,000-10,000 guerrillas, or 40% of all ZANLA forces did not assemble. Renwick, 1997, p.86 estimates 7,000 did not assemble. On ZANU(PF)’s infiltration of women fighters as refugees after the ceasefire and the party’s use of them in the election campaign, see Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, p.262.
9. This paragraph draws on ZHR NGO Forum, July 2001, especially pp.2-3, 6-7, 12, 14, 16-17, 33-36; ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, especially pp.40, 42-3. These reports contain...
detailed statements by party leaders and veterans threatening violence and war against opposition supporters.

10. “Legal Chiefs Who Turn the Law to Mugabe’s Advantage,” The Times (UK), February 4, 2003 describes how the former High Court president, Judge Chidyausiku, and his successor, Judge Paddington Garwe, both ZANU(PF) loyalists, stalled MDC challenges to the election results and personally allocated judges to hear such cases. In the event, in the thirty-one months since the MDC filed the petitions, only 14 cases have been heard. The MDC won 6 cases and lost 8.


27. Schiphorst, 2001, pp.63-4, citing, inter alia, the Chief Industrial Relations Officer’s remarks in 1984 about the submission of the ZCTU leadership to the party and the government; see also Maphosa, 1992, pp.19-20.


44. For example, “ZFTU ‘Persuades’ Factory Workers to Join its Ranks,” Zimbabwe Standard, April 12, 2002.
56. International Bar Association, 2001, chapter 7; Blair, 2002, chapter 9, especially pp.177, 179-84; Alexander, forthcoming.
57. “Confusion reigns over proposed land audit,” Zimbabwe Mirror, December 24, 2002. It should be borne in mind that many ZNLWVA leaders, including those who were complaining, also benefited from the allocation of commercial farms.
58. For example, “Food riots point to turf wars,” Comment from ZWN News, January 11, 2003. This piece suggested that the ‘real’ war veterans were at loggerheads with the police and the party youth militia. Other articles suggested that militant youth were angry at being left out of the lucrative food distribution loop, e.g. see “Zimbabwe food riots ‘caused by war veterans,’” Daily Telegraph (UK), January 6 2003.
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