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Becoming Local Citizens: Senegalese Female Migrants and Agrarian Clientelism in The Gambia

PAMELA KEA

Abstract: Drawing on ethnographic research with Senegalese female migrants in Brikama, The Gambia this article examines local citizenship and agrarian clientelism. Emphasis is placed on female migrants because of the dearth of ethnographic literature on female migrants in West Africa and to highlight the centrality of female migrants to processes of incorporation, specifically that of agrarian clientelism. Female agrarian clientelist relations are based on a host-stranger dichotomy in which recent migrants are given access to land in the dry season for vegetable cultivation, which is sold in local markets, in exchange for providing unremunerated labor for hosts for the cultivation of rice in the rainy season. It is argued that as mobile citizens these migrants move between different territories or spaces. These may include ethnic territory, descent territory, and/or the “space of the nation,” each with resources, some of which are distinct, some of which overlap. In this sense migrants do not simply move from one physical space to another but also from one group of resources to another. By engaging in the practices and procedures that are central to agrarian clientelist relations migrants become local citizens. In this sense local citizenship must be understood as practice, rather than status. Further, within postcolonial Gambian society such status is subject to ongoing negotiation and struggle. Migrants, in turn, are central to the reproduction of: hosts’ identities; host/stranger dichotomies; the accumulation of wealth through people; agrarian relations; and agrarian clientelism.

Introduction

Agrarian clientelism, a form of labor contracting whereby migrants enter into share-contracts or sharecropping relations with local farmers, has been key to the commoditization and expansion of agrarian production in West Africa from the nineteenth century to the present. Various types of agrarian clientelism have been examined and presented in the literature on agrarian labor and permanent and seasonal migration. However, the role of agrarian clientelism in incorporating migrants into local communities remains relatively unexamined.

Drawing on ethnographic research with Senegalese female migrants in Brikama, The Gambia this article examines processes of incorporation, local citizenship and agrarian clientelism. Emphasis is placed on female migrants, both because of the dearth of ethnographic literature on female migrants in West Africa and to highlight the centrality of female migrants to local institutions of incorporation. Regional migration within West Africa, particularly labor migration, has generally been depicted as a “male phenomenon.”
with little attention paid to independent female and family migration. Although in many cases it is socially unacceptable for women and girls to migrate independently it is all too easy to overstate and exaggerate the degree to which patriarchal norms serve to restrict, contain, and define the nature of women’s mobility, thereby underestimating the extent to which they do in fact migrate. Such underestimation is of particular concern given the increasing feminization of labor migration in West Africa. Further, there is a growing body of literature on migration, transnational practices, citizenship and processes of incorporation amongst Africans who migrate from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Yet, there is comparatively less research on these issues in relation to infra-continental migration.

I place emphasis on migration as a social process with a focus on local cultural institutions of incorporation, specifically that of agrarian clientelism. Indeed, it is maintained that our understanding of contemporary migration in West Africa needs to focus on processes of incorporation, as articulated through specific cultural practices and institutions, in order to “(re-) embed migration research in a more general understanding of society.” Such a focus means being attentive to the “internal dynamics” of West African societies in shaping the migration phenomenon.

The “internal dynamics” of West African societies can be partly captured in Kopytoff’s (1987) model of the African frontier, which situates mobility, settlement history, and the establishment of a “social and political order” in the context of an abundance of land. The first come-late comer (host-stranger) dichotomy, also central to Kopytoff’s model, is one of the significant “socio-cultural paradigms found in West Africa.” It can be said to characterize settlement history and the social and political order of most West African societies. Further, it is central to an understanding of agrarian clientelism and the incorporation of migrants into local communities. Latercomers, frontiersmen and women, through authority, intermarriage and domination of local groups, lay claim to founder status.

The majority of Gambians are involved in smallholder production, cultivating groundnuts (the traditional male dominated export crop), rice, horticultural produce, and a number of other food crops. Most combine farming with non-agrarian livelihood strategies. Many of those who are engaged in local forms of exchange are women and children, many of whom are recent migrants. Female agrarian clientelist relations are based on a host-stranger dichotomy in which recent migrants, or “strangers” (lungtangolu in Mandinka), are given access to land in the dry season for vegetable cultivation, which is sold in local markets, in exchange for providing unremunerated labor for hosts for the cultivation of rice in the rainy season. It is maintained that agrarian clientelism is central to processes of incorporation and facilitates a sense of belonging and local citizenship amongst migrants. Further, migrants do not simply move from one physical space to another but from one group of resources to another. In this sense, processes of incorporation and the sense of belonging that ideally accompanies such processes can be highly complex and contradictory: the diverse resources that migrants contribute and that they draw on facilitate processes of incorporation and their ability to establish a sense of belonging. Yet, it is only by engaging in the practices and procedures that are central to agrarian clientelist relations that migrants are able to become local citizens. In this sense, following “feminist reformulations,” local citizenship must be understood as “practice, rather than status.” Further, within postcolonial Gambian society such status is subject to ongoing negotiation and struggle.
Methodology

This article is based on thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork on gender, migration and the social relations of agrarian production in Brikama and Kembujeh, Western Division in the mid-1990s and in November 2005. During this period I carried out fifty interviews with mainly female farmers. I carried out forty-two life history interviews, consisting of thirty-three women and nine men. Detailed case study work was undertaken with six hosts and seven recent migrants who worked in Kembujeh. In addition to carrying out life history interviews with them, I visited their farms on a regular basis. The three case studies used in this article come from these interviews and the detailed case study work. The fieldwork was partly carried out in Suma Kunda, Brikama, one of the oldest wards (kabilolu) in the old quarter, and in Kembujeh, an area on the outskirts of Brikama. The majority of the female hosts of Suma Kunda, and their clients, farm in Kembujeh, located on the outskirts of Brikama. Initial contact and access to these research sites was established through my research assistant Binta Bojang and her mother Mama Bojang, who works as a farmer in Kembujeh. My description and analysis of female agrarian clientelist relations draws on material gathered from this sample. I then resorted to generalization on the basis of "comparative analysis." My generalizations were strengthened on the basis of further conversations with other clients and hosts, at the time and when I returned in 2005, and through the use of primary and secondary literature. Although a focus on female migrants’ relations with their husbands or male family members informs my understanding of the formers’ experiences, I am concerned in this article with the relations that are established between female hosts and Senegalese female migrants.

Citizenship and Processes of Incorporation

Much of the literature on migrants and citizenship focuses on formal citizenship, concerned largely with the state and legal understandings of citizenship, as well as alternative types of citizenship, also variously referred to as social citizenship and “substantive citizenship practice.” The latter is concerned with the way in which migrants express and articulate alternative types of citizenship by, for example: laying claim to citizenship “on moral grounds;” theorizing citizenship as subject-making (following Foucault, as produced through relations of power and technologies of surveillance); and seeing it as “a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging.” In many accounts the migrant assumes a variety of subject positions, “some of which they define for themselves and some of which are defined for them.”

As well as offering a variety of ways of theorizing citizenship, anthropological research has contributed to our understanding of the ways in which migrants are incorporated into communities and establish a sense of belonging. Goode (1990) recasts recent migrants and residents in a neighborhood in Philadelphia as hosts and guests, where the latter are incorporated into the community if they “learn the rules.” Chavez (1991) applies Van Gennep’s theory of rites of passage to the process of migration whereby: separation entails departure; the liminal stage entails a period of transition; and incorporation entails a process whereby the migrant establishes a sense of belonging, and/or is incorporated into the new community. Brettell (2006) highlights the importance of how migrants themselves “define their own sense of belonging.” Yet, the rise of autochthony and “ethnic citizenship” throughout many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, as documented by Geshiere and Nyamnjoh

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v12/v13i3a1.pdf
(2000) amongst others, has profound effects on the extent to which migrants’ are allowed to feel that they belong.

Following Diouf, drawing from his interview with Bloom (2003), I use the term mobile citizenship to refer to a “dialectics of ideas and space.” The concept of mobile citizenship must be understood in relation to that of “territorialization,” which Diouf defines “as a way to project the self as an individual and as a member of a collectivity in a territory . . . you fill up a physical territory with resources that are ideological, cultural and political.” In this sense a person moves “between different levels of territorialization.” These may include “ethnic territory,” religious territory, the “space of the nation,” each with resources, some of which are distinct, some of which overlap. The resources that a migrant contributes to these different territories or spaces, and/or is able to take advantage of, affect their ability to establish a sense of belonging, or the extent to which they are made to feel that they belong. Such an understanding reinforces the notion that there are “mobile ways of belonging that are, in some cases, contradictory and opposed, and in others, reinforcing.” It also allows one to appreciate migration/mobility as consisting as much of movement from one physical place to another, as of movement from “one group of resources to another.”

If one theorizes citizenship and incorporation as Diouf does, then one can appreciate the way in which migrants, rather than passing through a linear process, as in Chavez’s rites of passage theorization of migration whereby one phase leads to the next, a migrant may occupy a liminal position in certain respects (e.g. in the “space of the nation”) and be incorporated in others (e.g. “ethnic territory”).

Hosts and Strangers

There have been stranger communities in West African societies for hundreds of years. The term stranger (lungtango, s., lungtangolu, pl.) in the literature is used to refer to a temporary visitor, a recent immigrant, or someone who resides in the community but does not claim descent from the founders. The stranger is frequently represented as male, with the exception of women who marry into lineages, and who accompany their spouses as migrants. Strangers have been incorporated into communities through marriage, kinship, clientship, and other social networks. The nature of the stranger’s incorporation is historically variable and dependent on the status of the migrant within local cultural and political economies. Significantly, the distinctions between hosts and strangers must be seen as processual and in flux.

Host-stranger distinctions in The Gambia were “sanctioned” with the spread of Islam in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as well as by the colonial authorities. Further, Geschiere and Jackson (2006) situate contemporary discourses on citizenship and autochthony in sub-Saharan Africa in the contradictory politics of colonial rule. Following Lentz (2006) with reference to Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, an increase in “discourses of autochthony” can be attributed to the historical “dialectics of the “liberation” of labor in African capitalism.” Migrants in plantation and mining economies in Southern and East Africa were encouraged by colonial administrators and plantation and mining owners to migrate in search of labor. Colonial systems of taxation forced migrants to migrate to cash crop producing regions in order to generate an income with which to pay taxes. At the same time, colonial administrators sought to “territorialize” people by affirming an identity politics rooted in a visceral connection to “the soil” and the home village in order to facilitate
indirect rule. Further, they created and reified ethnic difference as a way in which to manage local populations.29

Migration in West Africa

West Africa has a long history of migration, in which particular types of migration characterize different periods. A trade in goods in part characterized the period of the Atlantic slave trade. However, “the circulation of African bodies” serves as the defining feature of this period.30 Successive periods of jihad, between the late sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries, witnessed the mass movements of Muslims, thereby “reconfiguring the religious, political, and even economic geography of Sahelian West Africa.”31 During the colonial era one witnesses increasing levels of labor migration for cash crop production and colonial ‘development’ initiatives, which included the building of railways and the extraction of natural resources.32 Yet, one can also define much of this labor migration, which was frequently seasonal, as forced, given the need for cash generated by the colonial imposition of a variety of taxes.33 The British imposed a cash head tax in The Gambia, in order to force Gambians into the cash economy to generate income to cover the colony’s running costs.34

Post-colonial migration in West Africa is characterized by rural-urban migration and labor migration for agrarian cash crop production and the extraction of natural resources.35 The nature of such migration has been defined, controlled, and contained by African states, states located beyond the African continent, and Africans themselves.36 This work has been theorized in terms of a push-pull neo-classical economic approach to migration, in which wage differentials serve as the main motivating factor for migrants.37 Such an approach fails to take into account the larger structural context and conceptualizes individuals as rational actors who decide to migrate on the basis of wage differentials alone.38 Much of this colonial and postcolonial research on migration was also theorized from a structuralist and political economy approach, reflected largely in the work of dependency and world systems theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein.39 They locate migration in a capitalist development trajectory, following Marxist political economy, in which structures are privileged and agency and culture given little recognition.40 These approaches have been critiqued by the household strategies approach, which considers the household as the key site where migration decisions are made.41

The current article draws theoretical insights from members of the Manchester School, who carried out research in the 1960s on urban migrants and migration in southern and central Africa, which highlighted the relationship among political economy, social relations, and migration processes.42 They are credited with the development of social network theory in anthropology in which social relations, in the form of kinship and friendship, are seen as central to migration and processes of incorporation.43 Of particular interest is the way in which agrarian clientelism engenders particular networks and social relations in the destination area, thereby facilitating processes of incorporation.

Context

The Mandinka’s extensive trade networks in ivory, slaves, leather, salt, and gold over a period of hundreds of years ensured their presence throughout West Africa.44 The majority ethnic group in Brikama and The Gambia, the Mandinka migrated from Manding, the former Mali Empire located in the Upper Niger, from the early ninth or tenth century over a
number of centuries. Through domination and intermarriage of local groups they established ‘Mandinka-ized’ states. Mandinka social and cultural institutions were established and the Mandinka language predominated. Local griots and elders within the community tell narratives about the founding of Brikama, based on the Mandinkas westerly migration from Manding from the thirteenth century. From this period, Mandinka migrants, the descendants of who now identify themselves as hosts, were “welcomed” as “strangers” by the indigenous peoples of the Gambia. These narratives provide detail on: the initial migration; the alliances that the migrants established along the way; the founding of Brikama; and the order within which wards (kabilolu) were established and rulers (kings, mansalu, and chiefs, seyfolu) held office. These themes can be related to key themes in the literature on African frontiers. Each of these events asserts the right of the original settlers/founders, their descendants, and affines to: hold political office; establish particular rights to land; and act as hosts to strangers in entrustment (karafoo) relations. Claims to founder status are made on the basis of genealogical links through the patriline and include people related through marriage and through the mother’s line. Consequently, those who marry into these founding kabilolu define themselves as hosts. In so doing they draw on the prestige and status such an identity confers. Indeed, in the early part of the twentieth century, as now: “Amongst the Mandinka, the most salient identity tended to be that of the hometown.”

Founding kabilolu in Brikama have historically served as “political and ritual units” where power is institutionalized. Compounds are grouped together within different kabilolu. The kabilo-tiyo (head of the ward), the compound head, the alikalo (village/townhead), the imam (the head of the Muslim community who leads prayers and naming, marriage and funeral ceremonies), the seyfo (chief) and the kafo-tiyo (leaders of the village/town work groups) all make up the village/town council (kebbakafo, lit. elders association). This council is largely male dominated but may include a few female hosts of an older generation.

Brikama is largely a Mandinka and Muslim town. Nonetheless, it is very diverse with inhabitants from a range of ethnic groups found throughout the Gambia, which include Wolof, Jola, Fula, Aku (Creole), Serer, Serahuli, Caroninka, Manjago, Balanta, and a number of other minority groups. West Africans, Lebanese, as well as small numbers of Europeans and North Americans reside in the city. It is a bustling small city with approximately 80,000 residents. Its proximity to Banjul, the capitol, and the coastal areas, as well as to Serrakunda, the largest city in The Gambia, ensures that there is a steady flow of migrants to the city. Many rural migrants, forced out of farming as a result of the Sahelian drought and decreasing prices for groundnut crops, come in search of the employment opportunities that a city the size of Brikama affords. Given that The Gambia is surrounded by Senegal, there has historically been a great deal of cross-border movement between the two countries, with Gambians and Senegalese migrating temporarily or permanently from one country to the other. Senegalese and Gambian traders also move between the two countries doing business. Indeed, the re-export trade, in which nationals of the two countries import goods that they then re-export to The Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso, has flourished since the 1970s and ensures sustained cross border movement. The border between the two countries is artificial, reflecting the politics of colonial rule and serving to negate the cultural and social similarities between the two countries. Historically, Casamance was “part of the Gambia River complex and it was not until 1889 that it was arbitrarily separated from the Gambia.” Indeed, Casamance is largely separated from the
rest of Senegal by The Gambia itself. Many Senegalese migrants have migrated to The Gambia since 1983, partly as a result of the conflict in Casamance.\textsuperscript{34}

Female farmers in Brikama work as smallholder farmers, cultivating rice on uplands and lowlands in the rainy season and vegetable gardens on low-lying land used for rice production in the rainy season, as well as on the edges of these rice fields. Occasionally female farmers choose to cultivate groundnuts, millet, and fruit trees. Male farmers have historically farmed groundnuts on uplands southeast and west of Brikama in the rainy season. Increasing numbers are moving out of groundnut production because of drought, low market returns, and the removal of subsidies on farming inputs and groundnut crops.\textsuperscript{35}

**Agrarian Clientelism**

Seasonal and permanent migrant labor has been central to the commoditization of agrarian production in West Africa from the nineteenth century to the present. Frequently, migrants enter into share-contracts or sharecropping relations with local farmers in which they receive land and/or crops instead of wages. The relationships are highly variable: in most cases migrant farmers, who are invariably gendered male in the literature, contribute their labor for the cultivation of their hosts’ crops in exchange for access to land. Alternatively, migrant farmers may be given a portion of the crop that they have helped to cultivate. The “strange farmer” (luntaango), a male agrarian seasonal migrant, enters into a contractual relationship with the host of a particular community. From the early part of the nineteenth century the strange farmer’s labor was crucial to the emergence and development of The Gambia’s export groundnut industry. Female farmers’ labor was relegated to subsistence crop production.\textsuperscript{56}

In abusa contracts migrant farmers grow their own crops on borrowed land and receive one-third of the cash crop they have helped to cultivate. However, there are variations in the abusa share contract system, with migrants receiving more of a share of crops in some forms of abusa than in others.\textsuperscript{57} Documented extensively by Hill (1963), these contracts were central to the expansion of cocoa production in Ghana and the Côte d’Ivoire. In Senegal, the utilization of navetanes (migrant workers) was based on a system of land, labor, and time sharing with seasonal migrants. Navetanes, as with the strange farmer labor system, were central to the commoditization of the groundnut industry.\textsuperscript{58} Within both labor systems host farmers benefit from additional labor, increased yields and the fact that they do not need to pay migrant laborers cash. Most importantly, these relations are not just about access to land but also about the integration and incorporation of strangers into local communities.

In the 1970s female farmers in The Gambia were encouraged by the state, the World Bank, the European Community, the UN, the Islamic Development Bank, and various nongovernmental organizations to grow horticultural crops in the dry season in order to improve household income.\textsuperscript{59} This expansion led to a further intensification of women’s and children’s labor because it required increased labor input throughout the year. A fall in household income, partly as a result of a decline in groundnut prices, has resulted in an increased need for cash amongst households.\textsuperscript{60} Further, as a result of the commoditization of agrarian production one witnesses the increased individuation of production and diversification into other livelihood strategies. This process of individuation and diversification has, in turn, led to an increasing shortage of labor. Consequently, households can no longer rely on family work groups in the completion of particular agrarian tasks.\textsuperscript{61} Although both hosts and their clients have been affected by this shortage, most hosts are
structurally positioned in such a way that they are able to recruit labor from potential clients.

The introduction of horticultural production in low-lying areas on the outskirts of Brikama led to the emergence of a system of land and labor sharing in which stranger-migrants are given access to land primarily in the dry season for vegetable cultivation in exchange for providing unremunerated labor for their hosts for the cultivation of rice in the rainy season. This system of agrarian clientelism has developed in a context where land and labor are in increasingly short supply. Migrants, such as Sarjoe and Jutula, enter into agrarian clientelist relations in order to gain access to land, and the networks such access provides. The following case studies highlight their experiences in establishing clientelist relations with hosts when they first migrated to Brikama.

Two Case Studies

Sarjo Camara is a fifty-year-old Balanta woman from Casamance. She had two children in Casamance then came with her husband to join her family in Kembujeh in the late 1970s. They came for a better life. There are people, she tells me, who move back and forth between The Gambia and Casamance, but she has lived in Brikama since the late 1970s. In Casamance she had access to a lot of land but has much less now. She grows vegetables during the dry season on two medium sized plots (approximately three hectares), given by Junkong Koli of Suma Kunda. During the rainy season she cultivates rice on one plot and Junkong Koli uses the second plot. She has been cultivating vegetables for five years and grew only rice prior to this. She maintains that vegetable production is very profitable for her. Before this she was able to grow groundnuts near Gidda. However, people have since settled there. So, she no longer has access to the land. As Sarjoe states, ‘It is difficult to have land because I wasn’t born here and they [strangers] have to borrow it.’ In the past she has had to farm on different plots from one year to the next. However, she has been working on these plots for some time and has not had to change them. A lot of people have come to ask her where they can farm and she tells them they have to go to the host. When she first came she went to a woman in Suma Kunda (Junkong Koli), introduced by someone they knew in common, and gave her kola nuts. She said, “As of today you are my mother because I have no family.” The woman allowed her to use some land. Sarjoe’s husband borrows land from Fulas in Wellignon (Interview, January 1997).

Jutula, a sixty-year-old Mandinka woman, was born in Salikenya, Guinea and moved to Banganga, Casamance when she was small. Both her parents were born in Salikenya and were descendants of this village. She moved with her mother and one brother because it was the biggest place in the area. In both villages they grew rice and millet in the rainy season. During the dry season they would mill millet and rice and thresh groundnuts. She came to Brikama in 1993 with her husband and her four children. They left because “there is no stability in Casamance. They were afraid they might be killed.” On arrival they went to the scefo’s (chief’s) place and asked him for anyone who wanted to host them. They stayed in Darboe Jarjue’s compound in Suma Kunda for a year. When she arrived in Brikama she started gardening. Her husband is a marabout. He farms groundnut, coos, and maize in the rainy season and goes to Dakar during the dry season to work as a marabout. During the dry season Jutula cultivates three plots. She cultivates two vegetable plots in Kembujeh on land given to her by Darboe Jarjue. She also grows sorel on an upland plot on the way to Sanyang. Drammeh, a Jahanka man, gave her the plot. Her mother’s surname is Drammeh.
She met Drammeh and said, “Well, you’re my uncle because my mother’s name is Drammeh.” So, he gave her the plot. She harvests her sorel crop and either sells it to Senegalese men or sells it herself on the stall in Brikama market (February 1997).

Both Jutula and Sarjoe migrated to Brikama with their husbands: Jutula moved because of the ongoing conflict in Casamance; Sarjoe moved “for a better life.” Sarjoe had family in Kembujeh with whom they stayed when they initially arrived, making use of her kinship networks. Jutula, on the other hand, went to the seyfo with her husband to see if anyone would host them. Darboe Jarjue hosted them and gave Jutula land for farming. They stayed with Darboe for a year.

Migrants are dependent on the good will of hosts to stay in their adopted communities. Previously migrants who wanted land would visit the seyfo or alikalo who would direct him/her to an area, which had yet to be cleared. The alikalo could allocate land within particular districts and received taxes for land use. Increasing demand for farming land has meant that migrants can no longer expect to get land from the alikalo. The latter either approaches a family who is in a position to lend land to migrants (fu banco, lit. loaned or borrowed land), or the migrants approach a family directly.

When seeking out a host, Sarjoe gave Junkong kola nuts and stated: “As of today you are my mother because I have no family.” Although Sarjoe has family with whom she initially stayed in Brikama, when she says that she has no family she means that she has no network of support with hosts in Brikama. Similarly, Amie Beyai, a Balanta women in her forties who had migrated from Casamance, approached her future host stating: “Please will you be my mother because I don’t have one here.” She then informed me that she “built a friendship with this woman.” In this sense, networks, framed either through relations based on friendship or kinship terminology, are central to processes of incorporation. Here, the kinship relation entails use of the term mother. However, it must be distinguished from a true blood relationship (woluwu). The terms “mother” and “friendship” are part of the language of honor and respect inherent in clientelist relations and point to the strong moral dimension to these relations. This moral dimension draws partly from Islamic principles of charity and generosity. Such relations form the basis of agrarian clientelism and are crucial in accessing land for agrarian production and accommodation as well as support from established hosts.

As potential clients, migrants go through the practices and procedures that are central to the establishment of agrarian clientelist relations. In so doing they affirm their identities as strangers, potential clients, and local citizens, and those of their hosts. Following Diouf, descent status, framed in terms of host-stranger distinctions, constitutes a territory or space with ideological, cultural, and political resources. Within a descent territory migrants entrust themselves/put themselves under the protection of ngakarafaima hosts in relations of patronage. Historically, as migrant farmers, warriors, hunters, and traders, strangers would entrust/put themselves under the protection of hosts in relations of patronage. Entrustment (karafoo) facilitates the establishment of agrarian clientelist relations, effectively a relationship of reciprocal obligation in which hosts provide land or other forms of material support, helping recent migrants to establish themselves in Brikama. Agrarian clientelism represents an investment in people, networks and relationships. Indeed, clientelism serves as “an extensive network of people bound together by reciprocal obligations.” The practice of karafoo helps to sustain the reciprocal obligations and sense of trust that underpin clientelist relations.
Jutula managed to get land both from her host Darboe and from Drammeh, a Jahanka and a wealthy Islamic scholar and marabout who drives a brand new Mercedes and wears richly colored and exquisitely embroidered clothing. He is a powerful landowner in the area because marabouts have historically been given land by clients and disciples (talibe, sing.) as a display of gratitude. Both Jutula and her husband, who works as a part-time marabout, are part Jahanka, a caste of Muslim clerics, marabouts, and scholars. A minority group in The Gambia, they belong to the Serakulle people. As well as laying claim to land within descent territory Jutula draws on her cultural and ideological resources within a new “ethnic territory.” She invokes a shared ethnic identity in order to lay claim to land to which she would otherwise have no legitimate rights.

Mobile Citizenship and Belonging

Migrants who successfully establish agrarian clientelist relations convey a knowledge of the rules and a respect for the ideology and cultural codes that underpin host-stranger distinctions. Such knowledge, deference, and acquiescence constitutes, in turn, a distinct resource that migrants can draw on in their attempts to become clients to hosts. In drawing on such resources they are able to benefit from the material, political, and cultural resources that their position as clients avails them of. Within this descent territory, and ethnic territory, recent stranger-migrants become particular types of local citizens with particular rights. Here citizenship must be understood as practice rather than status.

As clients gain rights to land and local citizenship hosts, in turn, acquire labor power. Within many African rural societies rights and access to land are, by and large, determined by membership of a social group. This is unlike market economies where rights and access are determined through monetary transfers. Such membership, attained through agrarian clientelist relations, entitles strangers to local citizenship and land. Most female hosts, on the other hand, are given usufructuary rights to farming land through affinal ties. Women occasionally inherit the paramount title to land used for rice cultivation from their mothers rather than through their patrilineal kin group. The decision to let stranger-migrants farm in Kembujeh is left to female senior hosts as rice farming and vegetables are their domains. Agrarian clientelism and the karafoo relations that inform it, as well as other similar clientelist based institutions, continue to combine two different types of rights, those of access to land and local citizenship.

There is a significant body of literature on processes of incorporation of stranger-migrants, mobility, access to land and labor, and local citizenship in West Africa, with a particular focus on the Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Benin. One of the most prominent institutions, the tutorat, is a form of agrarian clientelism found in the Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and in many other parts of West Africa. The tutorat, described by Le Meur as a frontier institution, is a patron-client relationship that closely resembles Gambian agrarian clientelist relations. It facilitates the transference of land rights from hosts within a community to strangers. As is the case with agrarian clientelist relations in Brikama “rights in land are extended on the basis of a moral economy principle: any individual has a right of access to the resources required to ensure his own and his family’s subsistence.” Recent migrants are given indefinite rights to the land, which may be transferred from one generation to the next. Migrants are obliged to provide their labor, fulfill particular duties, and work to support their tuteur and the community. The variations of tutorat, and agrarian clientelism, highlight their flexibility.
next. This is partly regulated by the demand for land and the changing nature of the agricultural economy.

The *tutorat*, and agrarian clientelist relations, must be situated within a local moral economy, which depends on the incorporation of recent migrants for the “wider reproduction of the community.” Mandinka hosts and elders work to reproduce particular sets of social relations – chiefly those based on “seniority and patronage.” The reproduction of particular sets of social relations entails an investment in people and a person’s reputation, both of which involve the accumulation of dependents (children, clients and wives) and expenditure on ceremonies, praise singers, dress, and gifts. In short, investments are made in the social relations and networks that (re)produce social identities and vice versa. There is an extensive body of literature on the notion of wealth in people in which an investment in people and the claims on people to which such investments give rise serve as a “form of wealth.” Material wealth and status enhance a person’s ability to invest in people, and an investment in people, in turn, helps to generate material wealth.

**Deterritorialization: A Case Study**

Hosts promote inclusion and feelings of belonging by incorporating migrant farmers into clientelist networks of support and providing them with seasonal access to land. At the same time they reinforce social hierarchies and host-stranger dichotomies; monopolize rights to political office; make use of clients’ unremunerated labor; and maintain rights over the land. Such rights allow hosts to exercise power and maintain authority over clients. In this sense there are “mobile ways of belonging that are, in some cases, contradictory and opposed, and in others, reinforcing.” Rather than attempting to exclude the recent migrant completely from access to resources, however, hosts have historically aimed to (re)produce a “distinctive identity” and to have their rights, authority, and legitimacy as hosts recognized. Here, the stranger is both marginal and partly included within the community. “The sense of *territorialization* is always coupled with the idea of *deterritorialization*, which shows that the identity being produced through such processes is always unstable, flexible and negotiable.” Despite having access to land, clients such as Mariamma frequently referred to their feelings of “strangerness.” In the following case study Mariamma conveys a sense of the way in which she is made to feel excluded and as if she does not belong.

A tall and slender Senegalese Mandinka woman in her early thirties, Mariamma proudly proclaims that her parents are descendants of Sami in Casamance. She came to Brikama, from Casamance in 2001. She married in Casamance and “her husband, a farmer, was the first to come here” (to Brikama). He came to find better living conditions. He left her with his parents and sent for her once he had a place to stay. They got land in Kembujeh by helping in fields. When she arrived she also farmed with her husband on a host’s groundnut and millet fields. She got to know the local hosts in the neighborhood and they ‘introduced’ her to a rice field.

When she came here she found it tough before getting to know people. Her first days were depressed and lonely, with nobody to talk to. She could do nothing to earn something. She feels it was unavoidable that she would be treated differently. Where she comes from there is a feeling of ownership. Here she often feels homesick. She feels she has no ownership. She has no voice. Someone can take advantage of you. They can tell you a foul word (discriminating word) because you are a stranger. In a joking way people may say, “When are you going back because here is not your home?” You feel the person is
expressing his/her ownership over you. The person is emphasizing that he/she is a citizen of this area (Interview, November 2005).

Mariamma’s feelings of exclusion and otherness are expressed through her claim that “she feels she has no ownership,” in the sense of belonging to the community and being a citizen of the community. Hosts, she maintains, both deny her rights to a feeling of ownership and express their ownership “over her” by laying emphasis on their status as citizens/hosts and her status as a “stranger.” In so doing they reinforce the structural differences between the two. By becoming a client Mariamma has attained a form of local citizenship. Indeed, many of the female migrants I interviewed felt that they had attained a form of group membership and local citizenship in becoming clients. Yet, clearly such a status can involve “ongoing negotiations and struggle.” For instance, many migrants who come to live in Brikama voice a desire to return “home” to live, despite the fact that they have lived in Brikama for many years. However, a return journey is unrealistic and highly unlikely, given their financial constraints.

Mariamma’s feelings of exclusion must be contextualized. In postcolonial Gambian society many strangers, particularly African foreign nationals, are made to feel unwelcome. Dominant and popular images of the stranger, generated through state rhetoric and the media, criminalize non-Gambian African nationals, particularly those from Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Sierre Leone, Mauritania, and Senegal. Skinner highlights the importance attributed to national identity in the postcolonial era in defining subjects and the concept of the stranger. Indeed, after the 1994 coup, in which Sir Dawda Jawara’s People’s Progressive Party was toppled, one witnessed a resurgence in national pride amongst Gambian youth and those who failed to benefit from the previous government’s system of patrimonial redistribution. Popular discourse maintains that: “ during the Jawara regime the borders were open and every ‘stranger’ had access to the country to enter and work.” West African foreign nationals are consistently criminalized. They are blamed for engaging in: theft; prostitution, drug trafficking, fraud, and other “criminal acts.” It is important to recognize that discourses that inform local autochthon-migrant distinctions overlap with and influence those that inform Gambian-foreign national distinctions and vice versa. Berry describes the way in which Ghanaians define themselves as both Ghanaian citizens as well as citizens of their local communities, thereby bringing together locally based discourses on citizenship and autochthony with notions of citizenship espoused by the state. Similarly, non-Gambian migrants who are incorporated into local communities as clients may have attained a form of local citizenship whilst in the “space of the nation” they are unable to gain legal citizenship.

Conclusion

Despite the increasing commoditization of the agrarian economy, agrarian clientelist relations persist. Indeed, the social relations of agrarian production continue to be partly organized through these relations. Hosts can no longer rely on family and community work group labor in the production of crops because of the increased individuation of agrarian production. This process of individuation has been brought about partly as a result of the commoditization of agrarian labor and the intensification and diversification of production. Consequently, clients’ unremunerated labor represents a flexible form of labor upon which hosts rely heavily. Within the context of an increasing shortage of agrarian labor, the provision of migrant farm labor is a highly valued resource. Indeed, as well as
facilitating migrants’ incorporation into the local community, this practice helps to ensure the continued existence of nonwage agrarian labor relationships, thereby “mitigating the forces of the market economy.”88 Forms of hierarchy and authority as vested in seniority, clientelism, relations of entrustment (karafoo), Islam and the local moral and political economies of communities such as Brikama persist.

Bryceson highlights the process of “deagrarianization,” or “rural income diversification away from agricultural pursuits,” that has occurred in sub-Saharan Africa in the last fifteen years as a result of market liberalization.89 As a result, one witnesses an increasing reliance on migrant labor as fewer men and young women in the region farm. “The Gambia’s annual rate of urbanization is 8 percent, and it is now one of the most urbanized countries in sub-Saharan Africa.”90 Young women increasingly lend land, mainly gained through affinal ties, to recent migrants from Senegal, Guinea Bissau and other parts of The Gambia. They receive an obligatory payment of a portion of the harvested vegetable and/or rice crops. Similarly, an older generation of female farmers who no longer farm yet maintain rights to the land are lending land to clients throughout the year and receiving payments of harvested produce.92 Amanor (2010) highlights a similar trend in Ghana, where one witnesses the decline of family farms, the individuation of agrarian production, and greater use of hired labor and sharecroppers, many of whom are migrants.

The internal dynamics of Gambian agrarian political economy have produced a continued need for migrant farm labour. At the same time the sustained arrival of migrants has partly shaped the existing social relations of agrarian production and the nature of agrarian clientelism. In this sense there is a need to “view migration as a process which is an integral part of broader social transformations, but which also has its own internal dynamics and which shapes social transformation in its own right.”93 Agrarian clientelism, which serves as a way to recruit labor and lend land, is central to migrants’ incorporation into local communities. Through the act of entrustment and its accompanying practices and procedures recent migrants are transformed into clients and local citizens. Once given access to the land they are able to lay some claim to the land.

Senegalese migrants come to Brikama with particular ideological, political, economic and cultural resources. They move “between different levels of territorialization,” contributing resources and benefiting from some, most notably land and local citizenship, in the process. Here territory, “territoire,” is both a “productive, physical space” as well as an ideological field.94 These migrants partly migrate in the knowledge that they can establish clientelist relations. Such sustained movement affects the changing nature of the social relations of agrarian production. Migrants, in turn, are central to the reproduction of hosts’ identities, host and stranger dichotomies, the accumulation of wealth through people, agrarian relations, and agrarian clientelism.

Notes

2 Abdul-Korah 2011, p. 390.
4 Adepoju 2003.
5 See for example Koser 1998; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999; Davidson and Castles 2000;
Werbner and Fumanti 2010. Historical and contemporary research on regional migration in West Africa has focused largely on rural-urban migration, colonial and post-colonial labor migration, and forced migration (Sharpe 2005, p. 174).

10 Kea 2010.
11 For a detailed analysis of female agrarian clientelist relations in the Gambia see Kea 2004; 2010.
12 Bloom 2003, p. 50.
14 Research for this article was funded by: the Nordic Africa Institute research grant; School of Oriental and African Studies fieldwork grant; Central Research Fund Award (Irwin Fund), University of London; and ESRC postdoctoral grant (no. PTA-026-27-0394).

15 A kabilo is a patrilineal kin group or a lineage of many families who usually have the same last name but cannot necessarily trace common descent (Dey 1980, p. 152).
16 Miller and Slater 2000, p. 21.
18 Mattias and Werbner 2010; Ong 1996, p. 737; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999, p. 4.
19 Brettell and Sargent 2006, pp. 3-4.
21 Bloom 2003, p. 50. Mamadou Diouf is a Senegalese historian teaching African history at Columbia University, where he also directs the Institute of African Studies. He has a research interest in migrant identities.
22 Ibid.
25 For instance, Murphy and Bledsoe (1987, p. 126) highlight the way in which historically strangers in a Kpelle chiefdom with political or military power to contribute to local founders were positioned hierarchically above those strangers who could merely contribute their labor power, and consequently became clients and/or slaves.
29 Ibid.
30 Akyeampong 2009, p. 25.
32 Ibid.
35 Abdul-Korah 2011, p. 391.
36 Akyeampong 2009, p. 25.
41 Kabeer 1994.
45 Dalby 1971, pp. 3-5.
46 Gamble and Hair 1999, p. 57. The Mandinka are spread throughout West Africa from the Gambia to the Côte d'Ivoire, with greatest prevalence in the Senegambia region, Mali, and Guinea Bissau (Dalby 1971, p. 6).
51 Kea 2004, p. 365.
54 The “movement des forces democratique de la Casamance” (MFDC), a secessionist movement made up of freedom fighters, seeks independence from Senegal. They have waged war against the Senegalese state since 1983 when approximately 100 Senegalese were killed while demonstrating against the Senegalese state. The MFDC claim that most of the government’s resources are targeted to the Northern part of Senegal (Evans 2007).
55 Kea 2010.
57 Amanor 2006, p. 151.
60 Barrett and Browne 1989, p. 6; Cornia 1987.
63 Quinn 1972, p. 37.
64 Kea 2010.
66 See Chauveau, Colin, Jacob, Delville, and Le Meur (2006) with reference to Jacob (2004, 2005) on the “moral duty of gratitude” that strangers are expected to display towards their tuteurs in tutorat in the Côte d’Ivoire.
67 See Linares (1992, p. 129) for a discussion of the way in which lenders and borrowers of land in a Mandigized Jola village in Casamance are expected to see themselves as “‘brothers’ under the tenants of Islam.”
68 Bellagamba 2004.
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Hip Hop as Social Commentary in Accra and Dar es Salaam

MSIA KIBONA CLARK

Abstract: This paper looks at the use of African hip hop as social commentary in Accra, Ghana and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Hip hop is by its definition a tool of self-expression and self-definition, and is often used as a tool of resistance. Young artists are using the platform of hip hop to speak out on a host of social and economic issues. A transcontinental conversation is now happening with artists all over Africa and the Diaspora. This paper focuses on the hip hop communities in Accra, Ghana and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Both nations have hip hop communities in which socially conscious hip hop is marginalized. In addition, the histories of these two nations are linked by their histories as battlegrounds in the struggle for Pan Africanism, non-alignment, and socialist ideals. These factors have influenced the use of hip hop for social commentary in both cities. This examination of hip hop in Accra and Dar es Salaam reveals important conversations occurring around politics and economics, on both a national and international level. Hip hop artists and the youth they represent are an important component of any social or political struggle towards progress. This research contributes to the need to engage with African hip hop culture and understand its growing implications for Africa.

Introduction

Hip hop is one of the most important cultural movements to occur in Africa in recent decades and has evolved into a potent voice for African youth expression. When hip hop arrived in Africa in the 1980s it swept across the African continent like a tidal wave, starting with smaller segments of the youth population and by the 1990s becoming firmly implanted in almost every country on the continent. All over Africa, in countries like Burkina Faso, Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, hip hop’s presence dates back to the 1980s and 1990s.¹ Today, each of Africa’s metropolitan areas (and many smaller cities) has a hip hop community, a community that includes rap emcees, producers, DJs, graphic designers, musical performances, and in many cases radio stations, dancers, and fashion designers. All of these elements promote hip hop by participating in the continuation of the culture in various ways.

Hip hop in Africa has allowed African youth to participate in social, political, and economic discourse on a national and global level. This participation is seen in the lyrical content emanating from hip hop music all over the continent, providing for rich social commentary in the form of socially conscious hip hop. In looking at examples of this utilization of hip hop in Africa, Accra and Dar es Salaam provide valuable case studies as both cities have strong hip hop communities and artists that are active on the international scene. However, unlike some hip hop communities in Africa, namely those found in Senegal

and South Africa, socially conscious hip hop does not enjoy popular support in Accra or Dar es Salaam. In addition, both Ghana and Tanzania have similar histories, histories rooted in anti-colonial struggle, socialism, and Pan Africanism. Though both countries have taken somewhat divergent paths, the hip hop coming out of Ghana and Tanzania has definitely been influenced by the histories of both countries and can be heard and seen in the hip hop music produced in both countries. As such, an examination of hip hop in Accra and Dar es Salaam provides important information on the ways in which hip hop is used for social commentary and the factors that influence hip hop’s use as social commentary.

Hip hop’s origins lie in its use as a tool of self-expression and self-definition. In 1988 in the United States hip hop artist Chuck D famously referred to hip hop as the Black CNN.\(^2\) Meaning, if one wants to know what is going on in inner city and Black communities; one only needs to listen to the hip hop music coming from those communities. Within the hip hop of the ghetto one finds ample commentary on the conditions of the urban poor and criticisms of government policies. It is within this tradition that artists in Accra and Dar es Salaam are using the platform of hip hop to speak out on a host of social and political issues.

An analysis of hip hop songs reflects a style of social commentary that resonates with Ghanaians and Tanzanians alike. An almost essential feature of hip hop is its ability to transform the very language artists select as a mode of communication. Hip hop creates new vocabulary while redefining and transforming established vocabulary, all the while artists seem to speak in proverbs. This tradition dates back to hip hop’s start as a sub-culture, a resistance to the establishment. Hip hop lyrics have always been directed to the youth in a way that is meant to reflect a genuine distrust of authority.

Hip hop artists in Accra and Dar es Salaam often critically examine government leaders, though they differ slightly in the ways in which they do this. They also deconstruct social institutions and economic oppression in songs that address urban life, migration, and the perceived failure of elders to protect the youth. A sample of hip hop lyrics from both communities shows how hip hop is used as a voice of the youth and will also show differences and similarities between hip hop music in Accra and Dar es Salaam. In addition, hip hop artists in Ghana and Tanzania often invoke the images or words of former Presidents Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere in a manner that suggests a level of reverence for the words and actions of these leaders. This is often done in such a way that artists are simultaneously expressing criticism of current regimes.

Two factors influencing these uses of hip hop as social commentary in Accra and Dar es Salaam are domestic economic and political changes, and the emergence of new pop music genres. Domestic economic and political changes provide both the inspiration for the lyrical content and influence the manner in which artists tell their stories. Meanwhile the pop music scenes marginalize conscious hip hop, impacting the perception and visibility of conscious hip hop.

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The 1980s saw the transformation of the economies of both Ghana and Tanzania as leaders in both countries began to implement World Bank and IMF prescribed structural adjustment policies.\(^3\) Soon after, the economies of both countries took a severe hit, and Ghanaians and Tanzanians felt the sting of neoliberal economic policies. Many chose to flee to the West, sparking explosions in African immigrant populations in many Western nations.\(^4\) For example, after 1985 African migration to the United States doubled with each passing decade.\(^5\) Among the factors influencing that migration out of Africa was the lack of economic opportunities at home, caused by newly implemented economic policies.\(^6\) In the urban areas of Accra and Dar es Salaam the decline in the standard of living would provide
inspiration for many hip hop lyrics. As their populations faced increased poverty and a decrease in social services, frustration began to be reflected in the music.  

Finally, hip hop in both Accra and Dar es Salaam has often been confused with and overshadowed by the more commercialized pop music genres, Hip-life and Bongo Flava, respectively, distorting the conversation around urban youth music in Accra and Dar es Salaam. As a result, a search on YouTube of “hip hop in Accra” or “hip hop in Dar es Salaam” brings up results that include videos with glossy images of African youth singing in local languages, often about love and having a good time, an indicator of blurred distinctions between hip hop and pop music. Many of these artists are pop musicians and what is often labeled “hip hop” is actually pop music, but the tendency to label pop music as hip hop means there is often confusion over what hip hop actually is. While Hip-life and Bongo Flava both contain elements of hip hop culture, the confusion over the genres often leads to a distortion of hip hop in Ghana and Tanzania. For example, there have been several published works providing informative examinations of socially conscious hip hop in Tanzania, but some of them have identified Bongo Flava as being synonymous with Tanzanian hip hop. In both Accra and Dar es Salaam these distortions have led to efforts by hip hop artists to distinguish themselves in a struggle to establish their music as separate from either Hip-life or Bongo Flava. However, the economic incentives of performing pop music have influenced a number of hip hop artists, and consequently socially conscious hip hop.

The hip hop scenes in Accra and Dar es Salaam offer insight into the ways hip hop is used as a tool social and political expression in those cities. As countries where the hip hop scene is not as politically aggressive with its content as Senegal and South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania offer good examples of hip hop’s social and political potential. The histories of these two countries and the challenges artists face also expose the impact of certain factors on the development and use of socially conscious hip hop.

Emergence of Hip Hop in Ghana and Tanzania

Hip hop arrived in Ghana and Tanzania by the mid-1980s. Much of the music was initially in English, with the first artists to begin rapping often being the children of the elite, who were fluent enough in English to write hip hop verses and have access to rap cassettes from abroad. A look at early footage of hip hop music videos shows many early hip hop artists mimicking the styles and sounds that they heard from American hip hop. By the mid-1990s, however, hip hop in both countries appears to have gone through a localization process. During this time hip hop artists in Ghana and Tanzania began to incorporate local sounds, and, more importantly, began rapping in local languages about topics of significance to local populations.

In Ghana one of the first to popularize this trend was Reggie Rockstone. Rockstone returned from living abroad in 1994 and would help usher in a new music genre, Hip-life. Hip-life contains elements of Ghanaian High Life, hip hop, reggae, and R&B. The lines between Hip-life and hip hop are often blurred; the implications for hip hop in Ghana (sometimes called GH rap) will be discussed later. Today most Ghanaian hip hop artists rap in Twi, as well as Pidgen, Ga, and Ewe.

In Tanzania the history of Swahili hip hop is murky. Several academic sources, however, recognize Saleh Jabir (aka Saleh J, Saleh Jaber, Saleh Aljabry, or Swaleh J) to be the first to record an album in Swahili with his 1991 album King of Swahili Rap, but the debate
in the Tanzanian hip hop community has not been resolved. Jabir was primarily taking popular American hip hop songs and re-doing them in Swahili. Around the same time “organic” Swahili hip hop in Tanzania emerged. Among the early artists to begin rapping original verses in Swahili were 2Proud, Fresh G, Gangsters with Matatizo, Dika Sharp, and De-Plow-Matz.

By the mid-1990s hip hop in Ghana and Tanzania was still in its infancy, but quickly maturing into a genuine voice of the urban youth, especially the poor urban youth. The majority of the hip hop artists in both Ghana and Tanzania used local languages and dialects in the music. As well, many of the songs spoke to the plight of the poor, to life on the margins and in the “ghettos.”

The Rise of Neoliberalism in Ghana and Tanzania

Both Ghana and Tanzania began their independence with strong, ambitious leaders. Under Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere both countries were led by presidents who implemented socialist economic policies and attempted to steer their nations away from invasive Western influence. Both Ghana and Tanzania saw impressive gains in the areas of healthcare and education, as Nkrumah and Nyerere focused on the development of these sectors. Ghana’s infrastructure was developing into one of the best in Africa, while in Tanzania a strong national identity was forged with the adoption of Swahili as the national and official language. With similar beginnings, both Ghana and Tanzania later moved in a different direction, towards neoliberal economics with free-market reforms, privatization, and the rolling back of social services.

After Nkrumah was ousted from power in 1966, Ghana endured a series of coups, ending with the 1981 coup led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. Following the Rawlings coup Ghana entered a period of economic and cultural repression, when many Ghanaians, including several musicians, left the country. To the east, in Tanzania, Julius Nyerere enjoyed widespread support. In 1985 he became one of the first African presidents to voluntarily step down, handing over power to Ali Hassan Mwinyi in the 1985 presidential elections. After Nyerere’s departure from office and his death in 1999, successive Tanzanian presidents would take the country in a very different direction.

The mid-1980s saw both Ghana and Tanzania headed quickly towards capitalist economic reform as they began talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in order to help their struggling economies. With this aid came donor prescribed structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which African states were obliged to adopt. One of Tanzanian President Mwinyi’s first responsibilities was to sign agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. While under the leadership of President Rawlings, Ghana became a favorite of the West for its embrace and implementation of IMF and World Bank prescribed SAPs. Both privatization and neoliberalism were at the core of the SAP formula, as was the devaluation of African currencies. Other conditions included massive cuts in government spending, especially in public services such as education and healthcare. These SAPs would see Ghana and Tanzania adopt economic policies, which also led to foreign penetration of local markets, and deregulation.

Life in both Accra and Dar es Salaam became more difficult. Residents faced widespread poverty, housing problems, high rates of underemployment and unemployment, and a decrease in access to healthcare and education. In neighborhoods like Nima in Accra and Temeke in Dar es Salaam, from which many hip hop artists would
emerge, problems include overcrowding, poor housing and sanitation, substandard healthcare and education, and high crime. The implemented neoliberal economic policies also led to displaced rural peasants flooding the cities in search of work and opportunities, straining an already stressed infrastructure. The ranks of the unemployed also became filled with illiterate and semi-literate youth who increasingly turn to the informal market and illegal activities to survive. The following 2006 quote from Tanzanian scholar Issa Shivji could be applied to both Ghana and Tanzania:

Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s destroyed the little achievements in education, health, life expectancy, and literacy that we had made during the nationalist period. Neo-liberal policies of the last ten years have destroyed the small industrial sector—textiles, oil, leather, farm implements, and cashew nut factories—which had been built during the period of import-substitution. Most important of all, we have lost the respect, dignity and humanity and the right to think for ourselves that independence presented.

This is the environment in which many hip hop artists emerged. Hip hop music provided youth with an opportunity to address the problems they were seeing around them. Ironically, it would be some of the tools of globalization that would provide artists with the opportunity to have their voices heard. Privatization allowed for the emergence of a number of independent radio stations in both Ghana and Tanzania. In Ghana there was a re-birth of the music scene, as artists returned and new ones arose. In Tanzania many citizens would purchase their first television sets in the mid-1990s as new stations emerged. This all provided an opportunity for young artists to have an outlet for their music. Stations needed local music to play, and the artists needed stations to play their music. This period also meant easier access to news, music, and culture from abroad, allowing hip hop artists to connect to global social and political movements.

The era of globalization has also meant greater access to an international audience. Every major hip hop artist in both Ghana and Tanzania now has an internet presence. In conducting preliminary research it became clear that the level of internet presence strongly correlated with artists’ success abroad, and at home. As an increasing number of Africans are using social media, a scan of artists’ fan pages on Facebook finds a number of fans based in Africa.

Artists are utilizing social media tools to get their music out, to control their images, and to remain relevant. Artists will often release mixtapes (free online albums), announce tour dates, and post album release information via social media. This allows artists to bypass traditional avenues that are often hostile to socially conscious hip hop. Artists will also use email and the internet to collaborate with artists in other locations. Artists in both Tanzania and Ghana have used the internet for collaborations, exchanging beats or vocal tracks with artists in other countries. Tanzania’s Fid Q has an internet program called “Fidstyle Fridays” in which he has interviewed various artists, including African American artist and activist Toni Blackman. He has used this platform to interview socially conscious hip hop artists and to highlight hip hop culture. Likewise, Ghanaian hip hop artist Sarkodie used social media to promote a recent American tour. He also has his music in rotation with online music listening sites like Spotify and Pandora, where listeners anywhere in the world can listen to his for free. The result has been incredible, as artists who were only known nationally, are now gaining international audiences. These audiences include the Tanzanian
and Ghanaian diasporas respectively, but also other Africans and non-Africans. In addition, the artists themselves are becoming more aware of what artists in other parts of the continent are doing. In interviews with several Tanzanian and Ghanaian hip hop artists all indicated knowledge, albeit limited, of what artists in other countries were doing.

**Impact of Pop Music on Hip Hop**

As noted earlier, there is great ambiguity between hip hop and both Hip-life and Bongo Flava. These two pop genres emerged in the 1990s (Hiplife in the early-1990s and Bongo Flava in the late-1990s), and their influence on youth music in both countries would be significant. Hip hop in these countries has been overshadowed by both of these genres, resulting in different reactions. Ghanaian artists seem to have largely accepted that Hip-life outsells hip hop and have in turn used Hip-life to deliver socially relevant messages. In Tanzania, hip hop artists are fighting back and trying to challenge the Bongo Flava machine by drawing a line in the sand between hip hop and Bongo Flava.

The question of authenticity in hip hop thus becomes important, and is an issue that is debated globally. While authenticity is a core value in hip hop, it is also a concept that is difficult to concretely define as it takes “a variety of forms in a multitude of contexts,” varying significantly even within local hip hop communities. Kembrew McLeod’s 1999 look at authenticity in hip hop ties authenticity to staying culturally authentic, rejecting the mainstream, and having knowledge and appreciation of hip hop’s traditions and values. Many of these ideas of authenticity have been expressed by hip hop artists in both Ghana and Tanzania. There are, however, debates surrounding the supremacy of content versus skill in determining hip hop authenticity. Some see social and political consciousness as a pre-requisite of true hip hop. Others look to skill in lyricism and lyrical creativity as a measure of hip hop authenticity. These are all debates that are occurring within and among hip hop communities globally, and often add another element to the debate over pop music’s influence.

Interviews with artists in both Ghana and Tanzania brought out clear differences between the two countries in the relationship to pop music and hip hop. In Ghana several artists interviewed in 2010 and 2011 identified as both hip hop artists and Hip-life artists. In an interview with Ghanaian artist Yaa Pono, the artist vacillated between identifying as a hip hop artist and as a Hip-life artist, moving easily between both identities. Likewise, Ewe hip hop artist Ayigbe Edem also maintained a dual identity. Numerous musicians are interviewed and ultimately asked about the debate between Hip-life and hip hop. There are varying views, but those interviewed relayed the presence of a hip hop “movement,” or a hip hop community that distinguishes itself from Hip-life in Ghana. There was some belief expressed that this movement was in fact growing, though the blurred lines between Hip-life and hip hop influenced that growth.

Hip-life began as lyrics rapped or sung over High Life beats in Ghanaian languages. Today, music that artists and fans classify as Hip-life is rapped over a variety of beats, leading to further confusion. In 2012, 4SYTE TV released the documentary “A Documentary on Hip Hop in Ghana” that appeared on the internet. Numerous musicians are interviewed and ultimately asked about the debate between Hip-life and hip hop. There are varying views, but those interviewed relayed the presence of a hip hop “movement,” or a hip hop community that distinguishes itself from Hip-life in Ghana. There was some belief expressed that this movement was in fact growing, though the blurred lines between Hip-life and hip hop influenced that growth.

In an interview, music producer Panji Nanoff described what he sees as some of the fundamental characteristics that distinguish Hip-life from hip hop, including free shows, social relevance, mainstream acceptance, and indigenous rhythms. While hip hop also
addresses social issues, Nanoff says Hip-life does it in a way that is humorous, often making use of proverbs to make a point. In the end Nanoff says that Ghanaian hip hop, and by extension socially conscious hip hop, is not commercially viable. U.S.-based Ghanaian artist M.anifest concurred with Nanoff’s assessment, going further by indicating that the political confrontations that happen in other hip hop communities do not occur Ghana. In other words, the social and political critique by artists in other hip hop communities is minimized in Ghana, a result of both the social and political climate and the influence of Hip-life music.

Tanzanian hip hop artists are openly hostile towards Bongo Flava, which unlike Hip-life contains very little social or political commentary. In fact, one of the most important distinctions between the two is that Tanzanian hip hop is often, though not always, more socially and politically conscious. Bongo (a slang word for Dar es Salaam) Flava is a term given to youth music coming out of Dar es Salaam. Bongo Flava songs are a mixture of hip hop, R&B, and reggae performed in Swahili. Bongo Flava songs are about love and having a good time. Tanzanian hip hop, on the other hand, is performed almost exclusively over hip hop beats. In addition Tanzanian hip hop lyrics are rhymes that address a variety of topics, including political and social issues.

As with Hip-life, it is difficult for many to articulate all the distinctions between hip hop and Bongo Flava. The main difference is lyrical content. Bongo Flava is almost entirely apolitical, while songs that comment on social and political issues are almost always hip hop songs. Interviews in 2009 and 2010 with twelve different recording artists in Tanzania yielded interesting results on the perceptions of pop music’s influence on hip hop. Many, especially older artists like Sugu and Zavara, KBC, and Saigon, expressed a clear disdain for Bongo Flava and saw it as having a destructive influence on hip hop and the ability of hip hop artists to get their music out. Artists Coin Moko of Viraka and Ehks B and Rage Prophetional of Rebels Sonz are all hip hop artists that produce socially conscious lyrics. In an interview with the three artists all agreed that they were resigned to an underground status because of their refusal to switch to the Bongo Flava format.

Economically, hip hop has been marginalized in Tanzania, with many of the artists relegated to “underground” status. Radio stations reinforce this in their play lists. In a 2010 interview, Clouds FM presenter Ruben Ndege defended the station’s decision to primarily play Bongo Flava, insisting that it is what Tanzanians preferred. Like Panji Nanoff in Ghana, Ndege argued that socially conscious hip hop was not commercially viable. This has helped to fuel the tensions between the two genres as economic livelihoods are affected. According to Shani Omari, the tensions led to the emergence of slogans like “Okoa Hip Hop” (Save Hip Hop). They have also spurred the activism of artists, like hip hop pioneers Sugu and Zavara Mponjika, who promote hip hop culture in Tanzania.

The implications for hip hop in Accra and Dar es Salaam are therefore varied. While artists in Ghana have both hip hop and Hip-life through which to tell their stories, hip hop, especially conscious hip hop, in Ghana continues to struggle to find an outlet in the face of Hip-life. In Tanzania, the marginalization of hip hop has meant that most hip hop artists are outside of the mainstream. Fid Q and Profesa Jay are among the rare hip hop artists to produce socially conscious music and find success and recognition in both pop and hip hop. While hip hop remains strong in Tanzania, its marginalization affects its reach and cripples the influence of the artists on social change.
The Lyrics

Hip hop artists in both Accra and Dar es Salaam have utilized hip hop to respond to the conditions in their respective countries, albeit in different ways. Many artists have delivered thought provoking lyrics, providing a discourse on living conditions, political corruption, greed, and ineffective political policies. In Ghana many of the lyrics are reflections on society and the behavior of Ghanaians themselves. They are more social commentary than direct attacks on the political or economic system. After the 1981 Rawlings coup the government kept a tight control on freedom of speech. The government even passed laws that limited both freedom of speech and criticisms of the regime, such as the Preventive Custody Law (PNDC Law 4), which allowed for the indefinite detention without trial of anyone critical of the regime. 39 While Rawlings loosened his grip after holding and winning multi-party elections in 1992, there remained concerns around his human rights record and the amount of criticism one could direct at the government. Successive presidents have further liberalized Ghanaian society. The Ghanaian hip hop community, however, has yet to fully embrace the practice of direct criticism of the government. Instead, through their commentary on social concerns, artists indirectly address domestic and foreign policy impacts.

Tanzania also lacks a history of social protest, particularly on the mainland, but the country has never experienced the type of censorship or repression Ghanaians experienced under President Rawlings. While social and political activism is rare among hip hop artists in Tanzania, many artists do address both social and political issues in their lyrics, often pointing direct blame at political and economic systems. Many of the early hip hop artists in Tanzania influenced this tradition of using hip hop to address social issues. Artists such as Kwanzaa Unit, Hard Blasters, De-Plow-Matz, and 2Proud all set the stage for the socially conscious hip hop that would be produced by future generations of hip hop artists. Many Tanzanians see their use of Swahili as linked to a sense of national identity. A common saying among East Africans is that “Kiswahili was born in Zanzibar, grew up in Tanzania, fell sick in Kenya, died in Uganda and was buried in Congo.” 40 Hip hop artists in Dar es Salaam rely on the almost poetic ways in which Swahili is employed in social critique in Tanzania when directing their own social critiques.

Ghanaian and Tanzanian hip hop provide important examples of the social and political dialogues occurring among youth in both countries. It is the voices of the artists that the youth are listening to, and artists in both countries have the potential to influence the conversations, perceptions and actions among both young Africans and mainstream social institutions.

Ghana

One of the few Ghanaian hip hop artists to speak out openly on political issues, calling out officials by name, is A Plus. He has, in fact, released an album or song every election cycle since 2000, including the albums Freedom of Speech and Letter to Parliament. His song “Osono Ate Ahwe” (“Political Review”) addresses the election of President John Atta Mills in 2008. The song criticizes President Mills, saying that since his regime the prices for commodities have gone up and the value of the Ghanaian cedi has gone down. A Plus also comments on the greed that exists in the government, and corruption in the political process. In the song he admits to being threatened for his outspokenness but insists that it will not stop him from
speaking out. In fact, A Plus has gained a reputation among Ghanaians for his political commentary, discussing issues most Ghanaian artists choose not to.

**Sarkodie’s “Borga”**

Ghanaian artist Sarkodie is popular artist and enjoys widespread success. He released the hit song “Borga” in 2009 and caused a stir in the Ghanaian Diaspora community. “Borga” is a Twi word that refers to Ghanaians living abroad. The song (original Twi in endnote) was directed at those Ghanaians living abroad, deconstructing the image of the Ghanaian living in the West.

Do you think this it is easy? Stop we’re really hustling
Someone is in Canada he needs to go begging for his daily meal
A lot of these *borga* are not truthful
You would have known life in the West is ugly
You are a tailor in Ghana and you make money
You have food to eat, at the very least, you have somewhere to sleep
You’ve saved money to get a visa
You want to travel to America just to suffer
Advice doesn’t change a man unless he experiences it

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Whose fault is it that you are suffering?
Had it been you were in Ghana you would have commissioned schools and been hired by *Tigo* [mobile network] to be a manager
Rather you are in the West sweeping the streets and after shake yourself cause you don’t have a place to sleep

Sarkodie criticizes Western values and economic aspirations, which leads many Ghanaians (and Africans) to seek lives in the West. “Borga” points to the images of the West that are present in Ghana and sustained by returning Ghanaians. In doing so, Sarkodie attempts to pull back the curtain on the lives of Ghanaians abroad while touting the benefits of making a life at home in Ghana. The song is therefore not critical of conditions in Ghana; instead it addresses the desires for a life in the West among many Ghanaians. The song is an attempt to address the reality of the lives of Ghanaian immigrants in the West, from the perspective of a Ghanaian at home.

Another artist is relative newcomer, Yaa Pono, whose debut album “Nsem Kua” ("Funny Proverbs") takes a humorous spin on social commentary. Many Ghanaian hip hop artists deliver their lyrics in a style that is likened to speaking in proverbs. What distinguishes these songs is that simply taking a few lines from a song will not reveal the overall message of the song. These types of hip hop songs require the listener to hear the entire story before fully appreciating the message in the song.

The lyrics in the song “Good Morning” detail a day in the life of Yaa Pono, a man struggling to survive in the city with few financial resources. It is a story of life in urban Accra, and one that is intended reach millions of Ghanaians facing similar challenges:

It’s daybreak, I feel so sad
It looks like my teeth have been painted
The woes of life have even made me forget to brush my teeth
Daybreak Africa, I have just seen this man with a tree around his neck
. . . breakfast is okay, even if I hadn’t had it I will still have to skip lunch
Some say the morning is bright but I see it as blurred. Seeing the “man with a tree around his neck” refers to seeing a man pass by who seemed to be weighed down by burdens. Yaa Pono goes on to discuss the difficulty of getting food because of a lack of money:

I am going to see if the waakye [rice and bean dish] seller is in
If I don’t get meat I’ll get wele [goat skin]
I wish I could buy koko [a cheap porridge] but the line is long.

This passage thus laments not being able to afford meat, and therefore having to eat goat skin, which is cheaper. Cheaper still is koko, where the line of people buying it is long, indicating the number of people who could only afford the cheapest option. In these passages, as in other parts of the song, Yaa Pono identifies himself as being among the many people who face similar limited daily choices because of a lack of resources.

Tanzania

Tanzanian artists such as Sugu (Mr. II) and Profesa Jay (aka Profesa J or Professor Jay) became famous in the late-1990s and early-2000s for their criticisms of the government. Sugu’s 1998 song “Hali Halisi” (“The Real Situation”) was a commentary on life in Tanzania, in the face of corruption, poverty, and unemployment. Sugu sings:

We have hard lives, even the president knows
And still we have smiles for every situation
This is the real situation
Everyday it’s us and the police, the police and us.

Sugu recently made history in becoming the first hip hop artist to win political office. In the 2010 parliamentary elections Sugu (aka Joseph Mbilinyi) won a seat representing the southern Tanzanian city of Mbeya. Sugu, who made a career holding government leaders accountable, ran under the opposition party Chadema. During the elections he pointed to growing economic inequality and corruption as two social ills facing Tanzania. His decision to run was influenced by a desire to have an opportunity to address some of the issues he rapped about in his ten albums and nearly twenty-year career.

Profesa Jay’s “Ndio Mzee”

Profesa Jay’s most notable contribution to socially conscious music was his 2001 song “Ndio Mzee” (“Yes Sir/Elder”). The song deals with the false promises made by politicians, promises that are forgotten after the election. In the song (original Swahili in endnote) Profesa Jay plays a politician making a series of promises with the response of “ndio mzee” from the crowd.

And I will get rid of all your problems, “Yes Mzee.”
These things, they are infuriating, “Yes Mzee.”
And they really annoy me, “Yes Mzee.”
So, things will change, okay? “Yes Mzee.”
And, I will take the reins okay? “Yes Mzee.”

As a follow up to “Ndio Mzee” Profesa Jay released “Nang’atuka” (“I Resign”) in 2008. In “Nang’atuka” Profesa Jay returns as the same politician, now apologizing to his voters for his wrong doings and abuse of power. In the song he confesses all his sins and resigns from office, a thinly veiled message to politicians in Tanzania.
Hip hop artists in Dar es Salaam have continued to use engage in social commentary. Artists like Roma, Izzo Bizness, Rage Prophetional, and Fid Q have all utilized hip hop to critique social and political issues. Roma and his song “Tanzania” reflect on post-independence Tanzania while admonishing contemporary leadership. The song reflects on the promising years of Tanzania’s post-independence period with lines such as:

1.9.6.1 Kambarage [President Nyerere] became a hero
Without bloodshed he made December shine . . .
You resigned when we still needed you
You didn’t want to stay in power too long, you left it to Ali Hadji [President Mwinyi]
Now they fight for the presidential house with raw lust.

Roma goes on to admonish current politicians in Tanzania:

Their drivers approach women for them
They abandon a lot of innocent children
Their wives go out with youth undisciplined
Because their husbands are busy with illegal deals
The price of their cars can build a school in the village
There are illiterate children grazing cows in villages.

Roma’s song invokes the image and words of President Nyerere in a manner that directly criticizes successive regimes. Roma expresses a belief that successive governments failed to live up to standard set by Nyerere, who’s landmark 1967 Arusha Declaration sought in part to curb corruption and ensure that the government acted in the best interest of the people. His song is thus both praise for Nyerere and a commentary on excessive greed and corruption in Tanzania today.

Izzo Bizness directs his song “Riz One” the son of the current president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete who is named Ridhiwan but is also known as Riz One. In the song, Izzo Bizness tells Ridhiwan to pass the message to his father that people are tired of the current situation. Izzo Bizness talks about corruption and drugs, as well as electricity, water and oil shortages, all in a message directed at Ridhiwan. The song is unique in directing a message to the President’s son who is around the same age as many of the hip hop artists. The song sought to identify Ridhiwan as a member of Tanzania’s hip hop community, and in doing so asked Ridhiwan to be a bridge between the hip hop community and the political system represented by his father.

Rage Prophetional’s “Ugumu wa Maisha”

Underground hip hop artist Rage Prophetional, one of the few Tanzanian hip hop artists to rap in English, was a finalist in the 2008 Channel O continent-wide Emcee Africa competition. Rage’s song “Ugumu wa Maisha” (“Difficulties of Life”) reflects on corruption and racism in both politics and society:

Days turn to nights and struggles turn to pain
Policies seem to change, green turns to white
Whites steal from Blacks and Blacks turn on Blacks
Blacks become like caged animals hidden like fox
When they came to attack, bullets sounding like symphony
Treating us like orangutans, showed us no sympathy
Rage Propheticonal was raised in England but returned to Dar es Salaam in recent years. His time in England is evident in his choice in language, as Rage is fluent in both English and Swahili. His period overseas is also reflected in his commentary on racism, an issue largely absent from most Tanzanian hip hop, contributes to discussions of racism and economics on a global scale. Rage Propheticonal is part of the group Rebel Sonz and the only one in the group to rap in English.

**Fid Q’s “Propaganda”**

An artist who has gained both a mainstream and underground following is Fid Q. The artist recently performed at Nkrumah Hall on the campus of the University of Dar es Salaam in front of academics and political dignitaries, including the former Organization of African Unity Secretary General Salim Salim. Often paying homage in his music to “old school” artists like KBC and Zavara of Kwanza Unit, Fid Q has taken his influence seriously and spearheaded several outreach projects, such as the Africans Act 4 Africa campaign. The following is an excerpt from Fid Q’s song “Propaganda” off of his 2009 album of the same name (original Swahili lyrics in endnote):

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The police label me a vagrant while they know I’m an emcee
Then, they give me signs as if they utter Tasbih [prayer beads] repetitively
The bad that doesn’t hurt me is the good that doesn’t help anything
I’m thankful for my views being heard everywhere
From the counties, divisions, districts, regions up to the national level
I would die with no scandals; I will leave a legacy
These rhymes might even cause farmers to ingest seeds
Also, they’re like liberation struggle in the eyes of Che Guevara
If you are gifted like Marco Chali, people will recognize you regardless
It’s the fools, who die from jealousy because they’re not real
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You are not supposed to trust a liar, even when he is telling the truth
It’s a sin to use religion as a tool to con people
They profit under the disguise of [foreign] aid
They don’t teach us to be leaders; but maybe leaders in following [them]
Controversies always start when we begin to scrutinize them
Instead of solidifying our beliefs in following them, secrets start to leak.53
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In the song Fid Q articulates the potential power of the hip hop emcee in influencing the people, and the responsibility he feels he has to pass on truths that could make, as he says, “farmers ingest seeds”; the seeds representing the tools needed for change. He also calls out politicians and religious leaders, suggesting that it is those following in the steps of past visionaries that will spark the call for change. In addition, Fid Q ties together several different elements, including Islamic imagery and links to broader social movements, in his mention of Che Guevara.

**The Use of Images: Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere**

Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere were two African giants. They were both leaders at the forefront of African and Pan African liberation struggles, and they both left a significant presence in their respective nations, on the African continent, and beyond Africa’s borders. For today’s hip hop artists, both leaders left behind a legacy of Pan African ideals and
national pride. Artists in both Ghana and Tanzania have evoked the images and words of both Nkrumah and Nyerere.

The use of images and speeches from Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere are very popular among hip hop artists. Sarkodie’s video for his 2009 song “Layaway” features images of the Kwame Nkrumah monument in Accra.\(^54\) In addition, Sarkodie transposes images of Kwame Nkrumah giving a speech with his own image in the same video. In the video and song for “Tanzania” hip hop artist Roma included images and video clips of Julius Nyerere in the video and excerpts from some of Nyerere’s speeches in the chorus. The cover photo for Fid Q’s album “Propganda” depicts him wearing a t-shirt designed by the East African clothing line KinaKlothing. The t-shirt is one of their most popular and prominently features the image of Julius Nyerere.

**Fokn Bois’ “Tenk U”**

Ghanaian hip hop artists Wanlov the Kubolor and M3nsa, collectively known as Fokn Bois, made a film that was billed as the world’s first Pidgen musical. The film, titled “Coz ov Moni,” was a comedy about two friends (Wanlov and M3nsa) who get into trouble due to their pursuit of money. Included in the soundtrack is a song called “Tenk u,” which in the film is done is a dream sequence. The song is addressed to the audience and is on one hand a criticism of today’s leaders while at the same time it is a tribute to past leaders. Below is the verse given by M3nsa in Pidgen. The verse by Wanlov was only available in English.

**M3nsa’s Pidgen lyrics:**

I force travel small wey I see da hosslings, of da people, da women, n demma offsprings
Mek I dey ask questions, man for do sometin
To contribute, to build, positive construction
---
Look wanna leaders, look wanna teachers
Look all these so called friends dem say dem com relieve us
Many hundred years ago dey com in da name of Jesus
Da same people turn around den enslave non-believers
Along with the believers da same tin dey happen today headed by strong deceivers
I still be very inspires even tho oppressors screw up

**Wanlov the Kubolor’s lyrics:**

Don’t sit on your ass waiting on so-called leaders
Just puppets being led with strings by them to mis-lead us
It’s up to you to make the best in life
Chale never ever give up. Try!
If we don’t dictate they will come and dictate to us
They will squander everything, we won’t even get a stone
Read, think, train, get up stand up, fight for your right
Bleed, stink, pain, no sudden flight, toil through the night
It’s not Black versus White, it’s poor man versus the suit and tie
They make the wars and we enlist to shoot and die
The youth must try and learn about their ancestors\(^55\)
The chorus of the song pays homage to numerous past leaders, inside and outside Africa. In the film images of these leaders are flashed in the background. The first line of the chorus is: “Patrice Lumumba, Mbuyu Nehanda, Nzingha, we de tank you.” The chorus goes on to name individuals such as Kwame Nkrumah, Yaa Asantewaa, Martin Luther King, Thomas Sankara, Fela Kuti, Fred Hampton, and others, followed by the refrain “we de tank you.” As in Roma’s “Tanzania,” Fokn Bois have created a tribute to past African (and Diasporan) leaders, while lodging criticisms at current leaders. For “Tenk U” Fokn Bois took a more serious approach than they often do. M3nnsa’s verse, like Fid Q’s, admonishes the use of religion in human oppression. Both M3nnsa and Fid Q point to the deception of the people by religious leaders. These lyrics may have been inspired in part by the conspicuous presence of mega churches all over Accra, and their emerging presence in Dar es Salaam.

Wanlov’s verse is more inspiration for those being oppressed. Wanlov views the problem as an economic one. Like Rage Propheticional, Wanlov lived for a time in the West, but unlike Rage, Wanlov does not see racism as the problem. With the line “It’s not Black versus White, it’s poor man versus the suit and tie” he makes it a point to note that the problem is not racism, it is economic. Fokn Bois has tended to take more humorous approaches to social commentary. They have also not shied away from controversy, with their provocative songs like “Sexin’ Islamic Girls,” which also challenges social and religious institutions.

Conclusion

The economic and political changes of the 1980s and 1990s provided inspiration for the hip hop that emerged out of both Accra and Dar es Salaam. Those changes, as well as the popularity of pop music, have also influenced the ways in which hip hop has been used for social commentary in both cases. These changes influenced the levels and types of social consciousness found in Ghanaian and Tanzanian hip hop.

Some of the more politically charged African hip hop scenes are found in Dakar, Senegal and Cape Town, South Africa, where socially conscious artists have been at the forefront of both the hip hop scene as well as social movements. In both Senegal and South Africa hip hop emerged fairly early, in the 1980s, and was led at the outset by socially conscious groups like Positive Black Soul (PBS) in Senegal and Prophets of the City (POC) in South Africa.

In both countries, the early politicization of hip hop seems to have had an impact on the mainstreaming of politically conscious hip hop and hip hop artists, via radio airplay, video play and major music performances. This has given artists the means to both promote hip hop culture and participate in important social and political conversations. This mainstreaming of politically conscious hip hop did not happen in Ghana and Tanzania, and while politically conscious hip hop in those countries remains present, it is much more
marginalized. Ghanaian and Tanzanian artists have, nonetheless, pushed for the greater visibility of hip hop in the mainstream. Many artists in Ghana have included pop tracks on their CDs, while in Tanzania many artists continue to resist pop music. In both countries, however, pop music impacts the hip hop community as both genres compete for space.

The influence of the social, economic, and political environments have inspired artists to use hip hop to challenge the changes brought about by economic globalization and privatization. Artists have addressed the ways in which social and economic conditions have impacted their countries. Poverty, for example, is a big topic for hip hop artists, especially the impact of poverty on the lives of people and the prices of commodities. Using their music as a platform to address these issues, the artists speak directly to the youth, who make up large percentages of the population. Many hip hop artists in both Accra and Dar es Salaam focus only on national issues and on domestic social commentary, though artists such as Rage Prophetional and Fid Q do tie in broader struggles. Rage Prophetional, as well as Wanlov the Kubolor and M3nsa (aka Fokn Bois), all spent considerable time in the West. This has served to broaden their focus to pull in global dynamics. Wanlov lived in Los Angeles for a number of years before returning to Accra, and M3nsa spent much of his time between the London and Accra. Their music draws on figures and ideals from across Africa and the African Diaspora in their criticisms of current leaders.

Socially conscious hip hop coming out of Accra and Dar es Salaam presents important perspectives on society. In both Ghana and Tanzania there have been dramatic shifts away from the policies of both Nkrumah and Nyerere, but reflections on those policies have found their way to the lyrics and videos of hip hop artists. That many of these artists were born in post-Nkrumah and post-Nyerere eras but recall their values and ideals speaks to the important legacies of those leaders.

There are some key differences between Ghanaian and Tanzanian hip hop. Among them, Ghanaian hip hop often utilizes less direct and more subtle ways in which to address social issues in their songs, as in the use of proverbs, such as Yaa Pono’s “Good Morning.” In other cases this is done more directly, as in Sarkodie’s “Borga” or A Plus’ “Osono Ate Ahwe.” Tanzanian artists have produced lyrics with more direct political content, addressing not only corruption and poverty, but also foreign aid and living conditions. Artists like Roma and Izzo Bizness place direct blame on political leaders. Since both countries face significant social and economic difficulties, the differences in content and approach could be attributed to their past political histories, as well as differences in cultural norms towards direct political engagement.

Two areas needing growth in both countries include the inclusion of gender and calls for social change. Both Ghanaian and Tanzanian hip hop fail to adequately address gender issues. This is due in part to the lack of female hip hop artists in both countries. While both Hip-life and Bongo Flava have several female artists, few females enter into hip hop. In trying to find female hip hop artists in both countries, it became clear that there was a serious lack of a female presence. In fact pop artists and singers, like Tanzania’s Ray C and Nakaaya or Ghana’s Tiffany and Eazzy often get labeled as hip hop. While there are female hip hop artists like Tanzania’s Rah P (now based in the U.S.) or Witnesz, who’s song “Zero” (with Fid Q) is a classic hip hop track, they are among the few. As a result women have been largely omitted from discussions of social, economic and political problems. While not as explicit as American hip hop videos, many of the hip hop music videos from both Ghana and Tanzania also tend to reinforce gender stereotypes and patriarchal structures.
Another similarity is that artists have yet to parley their lyrics into calls for change. In Tanzania artists in that country have come close, although few mainstream artists have pushed for change. While artists in both countries have utilized the images of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere in their songs and music videos, few have actually taken steps to elicit change. Meanwhile, social and political observations in hip hop lyrics have created a space for dialogue. Hip hop culture has in fact succeeded in engaging youth in Accra and Dar es Salaam in political discussions.

Many of the songs released by artists are bought, passed around, and looked up online by youth throughout the country and in the Diaspora, drawing them in to important social, economic, and political discussions. Artists’ Facebook fan pages indicate fans that are based locally, as well as in the Diaspora. Those fan pages often contain songs that can be listened to online. With online music listening sites like Pandora and Spotify, many of these artists (e.g., Fid Q, Sarkodie, Wanlov the Kubolor, and M3nsa) offer listeners an opportunity to listen to their music for free. In addition, many of these artists have music available online, either for purchase or free download. The purchase and download of these songs has allowed fans in the Diaspora to listen to those songs. Sarkodie’s 2011 concert tour in the U.S. led to performances in New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles. At the Los Angeles performance it was clear to this author that many of the attendees were Ghanaians, who likely heard Sarkodie’s music from one of these sources. In addition, Sarkodie’s song “Borga” is said to have elicited response tracks from Ghanaians in the Diaspora, challenging Sarkodie’s assertion that life in the West is difficult.

Ultimately, hip hop artists and the youth they represent are an important component of progressive social or political struggles. Understanding hip hop’s use as social commentary is important in that it is a significant means by which younger Ghanaians and Tanzanians communicate among themselves and with broader society. Hip hop music and artists present stories of urban Africa, of young Africa. Ghanaian and Tanzanian hip hop offer stories and perspectives that are valuable for understanding social and political dynamics in those countries. Examinations of the factors influencing socially conscious hip hop reveal broader economic, cultural and political forces that impact youth expression. It is therefore important to engage with African hip hop artists and culture in order to understand better the growing implications of this culture for Africa as a whole.

Notes
2 Kitwana 2003; Hann 2011.
3 Konadu-Agyemang 2000a; Perullo 2005.
4 Konadu-Agyemang et al 2006; Falola and Afolabi 2007; Clark 2009.
5 Deane and Logan 2003; Clark 2009.
6 Diouf; Okome 2002.
7 Brydon & Legge 1996; Lugalla 1997; Bond & Dor 2003; Mawuko-Yevugah 2010.
8 Englert 2003; Stroeken 2005.
9 Perullo 2005; Shipley 2009.
In reviewing discussion boards and interviewing some of Tanzania’s hip hop pioneers [Balozi (Dola Sol) and Saigon of De-Plow-Matz (or Deplowmatz), Sugu (2Proud or Mr. II), and Zavara (Rhymson) and KBC of Kwanza Unit] there were varying accounts of the history of Swahili hip hop in Tanzania. A few different names were mentioned as artists who pioneered Swahili hip hop and when that transition occurred.

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Kwaku 2000; Shipley 2009; Cho 2010.
not truthful / Anka mobehunu se amanone mpo ye foo kyere / you would have known life in
the West is ugly / Wote Ghana pam adee nya wo sika / You are a tailor in Ghana and you
make money / Nea wobedi, woanya koraa wowo beebi da / You have food to eat, at the very
least, you have somewhere to sleep / Woabo sika ano de akogye visa / You’ve saved money
to get a visa / Wope se wotu kwan ko America ko bre kwa / You want to travel to America
just to suffer / Afutuo nsakyeru nipa na koso hwe / Advice doesn’t change a man unless he
experiences it / --- / Amanehunu kwa, wei eye hwan na fault / Whose fault is it that you are
suffering? / Obre a wote Ghana anka woabie sukuu ama Tigo afa wo manager / Had it been
you were in Ghana you would have commissioned schools and been hired by Tigo
[mobile network] to be a manager / Na wote obi man so pra kwan ho / Ewo se woso ho, efiri
se wonni beebi da / Rather you are in the West sweeping the streets and after shake
yourself cause you don’t have a place to sleep.

44 Yaa Pono 2011. Translated by Kwame Benjamin Appiah.
45 Ibid.
46 Mr. II 1998. Lyrics translations come from the following sources: Perullo Alex 2005;
Hulshof Carolien 2008; Africanhiphop.com 2002.
47 Clark 2010.
48 Ibid.
49 Profesa J 2001. Translated by Perullo Alex 2005. The original Swahili lyrics are:
Na nitafuta shida zenu zote, “Ndio Mzee.” / And I will get rid of all your problems, “Yes
Mzee.” / Hivi nani, ni vijimambo, “Ndio Mzee.” / These things, they are infuriating, “Yes
Mzee.” / Na vinanickera kweli kweli mimi, “Ndio Mzee.” / And they really annoy me, “Yes
Mzee.” / Basi hali itabadilika, sawa? “Ndio Mzee.” / So, things will change, okay? “Yes
Mzee.” / Na hatamu tutaishika,okay? “Ndio Mzee.” / And, I will take the reins okay? “Yes
Mzee.”
50 Roma 2010. Translation provided at
http://www.eastafricanantube.com/media/36875/ROMA-TANZANIA and edited by
author.
51 Izzo Bizness 2011. Translated by author and Kibacha Singo.
52 Translation of title and lyrics provided by author.
53 Fid Q 2009. Lyrics and translation provided by artist and edited by author. The original
Swahili lyrics are: Polisi huniita mzururaji, na wanajua mie ni emcee / The police label me a
g vagrant while they know I’m an emcee / Kisha hunipa ishara kama wanavuta uradi kwa
Tasbih / Then, they give me signs as if they utter Tasbih [prayer beads] repetitively / Baya
lisilonidhuru ni jema li’so na faida / The bad that doesn’t hurt me is the good that doesn’t
help anything / Nashukuru kote nasikika napotoa haya mawaidha / I’m thankful for my
views being heard everywhere / Kuanzia kata, tarafa, wilaya, mikoa hadi ngazi ya Taifa / From
the counties, divisions, districts, regions up to the national level / Nikifa siachi
skendo, nina uhakika nitaacha pengo / I would die with no scandals; I will leave a legacy
/Kwa hivi vina hata wakulima hujikuta wanameza mbegu / These rhymes might even cause
farmers to ingest seeds/ Pia ni kama liberation struggle machoni mwa ‘Chegu’ / Also, they’re
like liberation struggle in the eyes of Che Guevara / Ukiwa mkali ka’ Marco Chali, raia
wata-feel tu / If you are gifted like Marco Chali, people will recognize you regardless / Wajinga nd’o hifa kwa wvuu sababu hawoko real tu / It’s the fools, who die from jealousy
because they’re not real / --- / Haupaswi kumuamini muongo hata kama akiongea ukwel
You are not supposed to trust a liar, even when he is telling the truth /Ny dhambi kutumia dini kama njia ya kutupatelpi / It’s a sin to use religion as a tool to con people / Wanajinguia kipato kwa kivuli cha misaada / They profit under the disguise of [foreign] aid / Hawaiifunzi twa viongozi, labda viongozi wa kuwafuata / They don’t teach us to be leaders; but maybe leaders in following [them] / Utata hujia, tufanya kwanza kuwachunguza / Controversies always start when we begin to scrutinize them / Badala ya kuwafuata, ndipo siri zinapovuja / Instead of solidifying our beliefs in following them, secrets start to leak.

Images can be seen in Sarkodie’s video for “Layaway” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxkmIaJmYtQ.

English translations found on the Fokn Boiz video “Tenk u” can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODQcOeuXiik:
“Tf force travel small wey I see da hosslin, of da people, da women, n demma offsprings / I have managed to travel and see the struggles of the people, the women and their offspring / Mek I dey ask questions, man for do sometin / It’s got me asking questions, I must do something / To contribute, to build, positive construction / To contribute, to build, positive construction / --- / Look wanna leaders, look wanna teachers / Look at our leaders, look at our teachers / Look all these so called friends dem say dem com relieve us / Look at all these so called friends who claim they came to relieve us / Many hundred years ago dey com in da name of Jesus / Many hundred years ago they came in the name of Jesus / Da same people turn around den enslave non-believers / The same people turned around and enslaved non-believers / Along with the believers da same tin dey happen today / Along with the believers, the same thing happens today / Headed by strong deceivers / I’m still be very inspires even tho oppressors screw up / I’m still very inspired even though oppressors screwed up.” Pidgen lyrics were provided by the artist.

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The Nation State, Resource Conflict, and the Challenges of “Former Sovereignties” in Nigeria

IKECHUKWU UMEJESI

Abstract: Opinion leaders in Europe have often expressed penitence over Europe’s colonial legacies. While these leaders rethink the roles of their nations in colonialism, human rights abuses arising from colonialism, and state formation elsewhere, the discourse underscores the need to revisit colonialism as an ideology, and the role of the nation state in grievance construction in Africa. This article revisits colonial ideology and examines how the colonial legacy of the nation state affects the internal security of postcolonial Nigeria. The aim is to understand grievance dynamics underlying the relationship between the state and local communities, and how this relationship has resulted in contestation for sovereignty between the Nigerian state and previously independent communities. Using archival and ethnographic data, the article focuses on selected coal and oil producing communities of Southeastern Nigeria and the Niger Delta region.

Introduction

In April 2011, David Cameron, the Prime Minister of Britain on a visit to Pakistan acknowledged the role British colonial rule played in creating Pakistan’s post-colonial security challenges. Cameron stated: “As with so many of the problems of the world, we [British people] are responsible for their creation in the first place.” Pakistan, a part of colonial India, was a British territory between 1757 and 1947. In a similar view on the colonial era, Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams referred to colonialism as “illegitimate rule” that was “motivated by greed.” To George Orwell, the well-known British novelist and journalist, the British Empire was “a despotism with theft as its final object.” While these statements recall one of the most critical and poignant epochs of interracial relations in human history, they have failed to engage with both the ideological underpinnings of colonialism and the functionality of its structural relics, such as, the nation state in Africa.

The nation state in Africa has always been a subject of scholarly and policy analyses since its creation. A look at the evolution of the state as presently constituted in Africa reveals that it is relatively new. Its history is traceable to the resolutions of the 1884-85 Berlin Conference on Africa. Convened by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany, the conference participants, Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and King Leopold of Belgium, divided the African continent among themselves. Although the Berlin Conference has often been described as a meeting where Africa was “partitioned,” the Conference was merely to formalize long-standing colonial and commercial interests of different European nations in Africa. In what later became Nigeria, K.O. Dike, Nigeria’s foremost historian, contends that prior to the Berlin Conference “Becroft [a British Consul]...
had succeeded in making British rule familiar to the native states under his consular jurisdiction.”7 This same trend was followed by various European settlers in other parts of Africa, often well before the nineteenth century. These include the French in Algeria, the Dutch (Boers) in South Africa, the British in the Natal and Cape regions of South Africa, and the Portuguese in Angola.8

The presence of colonial pathfinders such as traders and missionaries from different Europeans countries heightened the possibility of conflicts between different European nations. Hence, one major objective of the Berlin Conference was to pre-empt wars among different European nations in Africa, a distinct possibility given the strife with which colonial officials and traders jostled for spheres of influence in Africa.9 After the Conference, European nations simply strengthened their presence through “effective occupation,” a principle adopted by the Conference as proof that a given power was really interested in a particular territory it had laid claim to.10

In Nigeria, the process of state creation, albeit unofficial, commenced immediately after the Berlin Conference with the granting of a Royal Charter to the Royal Niger Company (RNC) in 1885.11 The charter was meant to legitimize the British presence in Nigerian territories pending the Foreign Office’s formalization of the imperial takeover. Between 1885 and 1900, the RNC intensified both coercion and diplomacy on indigenous kingdoms and communities. Their goal was to obtain the signatures of the rulers of these kingdoms and communities in the form of treaties of friendship and protection. According to Boluwaju Olaniyan, an economic historian who studied consular and company regimes in Nigeria, in 1886 alone, the RNC secured 237 treaties from local rulers.12 The extent to which the local rulers understood the content of these treaties has been contentious; however, the conflicts that ensued between colonial authorities and the local chiefs over their sovereignties indicate significant misreading of the treaties between both parties. K.O. Dike noted that there were usually the “differing conceptions of ‘sovereignty’, ‘suzerainty’, and ‘protection’ . . . between the two peoples.”13 At the expiration of the RNC rule on December 31, 1899, the British government took over the administration and commenced the official formation of the nation state. This included the creation of administrative units—counties, districts, provinces, and protectorates. These units were created based on commercial and administrative convenience rather than on grounded geo-ethnic understanding of local groups.

To Lord Frederick Lugard, the first Governor-general of amalgamated Nigeria, and a group of British traders in Nigeria, administrative and commercial considerations justified the declaration of colonial rule and the creation of a “Nigerian nation state” in 1900. However, to the several indigenous communities and kingdoms, the British plan was a usurpation of their sovereignties and rights to their ecologic resources. For instance, not all the sections of the so-called “Protectorate of Southern Nigeria” were effectively under British colonial rule as of 1900 when it was proclaimed. In Southeastern Nigeria, for instance, Adiele Afigbo, a notable Nigerian historian, contends that wars of conquest and pacification of resisting communities continued into the 1920s.14 To these communities, known for their Greek-like village democracy, the idea of a Nigerian nation state, constituting over two hundred ethnic nationalities, some of which the British authorities were ignorant of their very existence, was more or less a joke. Hence, while the British colonial officials gloated over their successful creation of a Nigerian state in the first quarter of the twentieth century, Nigeria was anything but a united and functional state.15 Different ethnic groups and their constituting communities hardly understood the meaning of the
new political structure and its implication for their indigenous sovereignties. The inattention that underlies the creation of the colonial states in Africa, especially Nigeria, illustrates the ideological basis of colonialism as expounded by the post-Columbus European ideologues. What was the ideological underpinning of colonialism and how did European ideologues justify it? How, did this ideology influence state creation and what kind of state did it create? Finally, how does the state resonate with the former sovereignties? This article examines these questions in view of the recurring internal conflict in Nigeria between the state and local communities, especially, over natural resource ownership.

Racial Minimalism and the “Morality” of Colonialism

Colonialism as a phenomenon best demonstrates a racist conceptualization of white supremacy over non-white races. This phenomenon took centuries of consistent justifications (by adventurers, religious men, and scholars), ideological mutations and blending with mercantilism to evolve into reality. While racist jingoism may have been as old as when two different races first came into contact, some of the earliest records of colonial intents may have been influenced by the developments in the post-Columbus New World. This includes the transatlantic slave trade and stories written by European adventurers and traders in Africa. According to the political scientist and anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani: “Although the origin of European race doctrines about Africa lay in the period of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, these doctrines grew in complexity in the period that followed that of ‘discovery’ and colonial conquest.”

To demonstrate the way in which Europeans, especially, Enlightenment scholars perceived Africa and Africans in this era, writers depicted Africa and its peoples in various strange ways. Robert Burton (1577-1640), an English scholar at Oxford University noted:

Leo Afer observes of the commonalty of Africa – base by nature and no more esteemed than dogs; no learning, no knowledge, no civility, scarce common sense, nought but barbarism amongst them, like rogues and vagabonds, they go barefooted and barelegged, the soles of their feet as hard as horse-hoofs…laborious, miserable wretched, unhappy life, like beasts and juments if not worse (for a Spaniard sold Indian boys for a cheese, and a hundred negro slaves for a horse).

Burton did not limit his criticism to the Africans; he also assailed the Indian race. Burton wrote, “Indian drudges are ugly to behold, and…rusty and squalid, because poor, it is ordinarily so. Others eat to live, but they live to drudge; a servile generation, that dare refuse no task”.

The well respected Scottish Enlightenment philosopher and historian David Hume (1711-1776) ridiculed the African’s value and sense of judgment. Hume noted “You may obtain anything of the Negroes by offering them strong drink, and may easily prevail with them to sell, not only their children, but their wives and mistresses, for a cask of brandy.”

In another context in which he compared European civilization vis-a-vis Africa’s, he differentiated the two thus: “So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in colour. The religion of fetishes so widespread among them [Africans] is perhaps a sort of idolatry that sinks as deeply into the trifling as appears to be possible to human nature.” According to Hume’s biography he did not visit Africa during his lifetime; hence, his writing is likely to have been
influenced by stories told by slave traders and merchants trading between Africa and the Americas.\textsuperscript{22}

Immanuel Kant, a German Philosopher/Anthropologist and a contemporary of David Hume, also wrote in line with the prevailing perception of Africa and Africans in Enlightenment Europe. In his 1763 essay \textit{Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime} Kant stated:

The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who represented anything great in art or science any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world.\textsuperscript{23}

For Kant and some of his contemporaries, Africans and other non-Europeans were more inclined to laziness and were intellectually less gifted than Europeans. While Kant was a celebrated anthropologist and philosopher of his age, he failed to acknowledge the exploits of the ancient African civilizations of Egypt, Kush, Nok, Ghana, Igbo-ukwu, Ife, and Benin, among others. Again, like his contemporary David Hume, it is not on record that Immanuel Kant visited Africa.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, he did not explain the method he used in his assessment of industry and talent among black people.

To other writers of the Enlightenment and Industrial Europe (mostly in the 1800s), the emancipation of non-European races depends on colonialism and state formation by European nations. It was thought that European civilization and Christianity would salvage non-Europeans from primitivism. The 1800s constituted a defining century in European colonial adventurism, especially in Africa except for the Cape region of South Africa where the Dutch had settled since the 1650s. After the theoretical abolition of the slave trade in Britain and its territories in the 1790s, efforts in the 1800s focused on suppressing the trade in Africa and convincing other nations to also abolish the trade in their territories and promote civilization via legitimate commerce—trade in commodities.\textsuperscript{25} It was perhaps the commercial need of Europe and the strategic importance of Africa that changed the tone of Euro-centrists from one of derision to that of relative partnership. To the German poet and literary critic Wolfgang Menzel, Africans and aboriginal Australians could only emerge through some kind of fusion (perhaps genetic and/or cultural) with Europeans. This, he hoped, would yield a highly intelligent society. Menzel ascribed what he described as the “splendid qualities of the Greeks and Romans” to a “similar combination of the Thracian and Semitic families.” In detail, Menzel wondered:

It may be asked whether at some future time the rest of the world may not be flooded with Europeans from the East Indies, from the Cape, and from the Botany Bay, and by this means a universal commixture take place? I believe rather that the final complete triumph of Christianity and of [European] civilization will be the consequence of an entire fusion of the whites and blacks.\textsuperscript{26}

Finally, Menzel cited America as an example where White civilization has triumphed over Indian primitivism and hoped Australian aborigines and Africans would follow. It is such
racist illusionism that Arthur de Gobineau echoed in his quip: “history springs into being only at the magic touch of the white race.”

To further illustrate the misconceptions about Africa and justification for colonialism in the late 1800s and early 1900s, Captain Vallier, a French traveler in the Congo, wrote in 1900 about Congo: “We find here nothing but anarchy and ill-will, in order words, a society in its infancy, without any organization, a scattering of humanity, who escape from contact with us and paralyzed our most generous efforts with inertia.” As we shall see later in this article, it is this idea of racial superiority on the part of European colonial adventurers that underpinned colonial administration and the state it created. Hence, from its inception, colonial rule aimed at changing supposedly the inferior indigenous to something superior, alien and European.

**Racial Minimalism: The Limitations of a Discourse**

The common string linking the views advanced by writers of Enlightenment and Industrial Europe was the assumption that non-Europeans were racially and institutionally inferior to Europeans. The Nigerian philosopher Michael Eze has identified common limitations to this thesis: most of these minimalist scholars never travelled outside their home continent; they relied on European adventurers’ notebooks, meaning that they did not write experientially; they believed that geography determined human psychosocial development and character.

The racial parameter as a template for judging civilization and development cannot provide an informed basis for the comparative history of different peoples. As the popular cliché goes, “empires rise and fall.” Hence, in assessing a race or culture, its present state relative to others may not sufficiently portray the achievements of its past. It is this mode of racial perception in which one people is presumably superior to others that often overlooks the accomplishment of individual members of the “other.” Once a so-called race is profiled as inferior, the tendency is for the supposedly superior race to forcibly impose its institutions on the perceived inferior race. It should be noted, however, that there were exceptions to such views. For instance, L.S Amery, a former British Dominion Secretary, differed with the imperial idea of making the colonies look like little Englands. To Amery, Western values “tend to judge distant problems in the light of its own experience and to try to fit them into its own formulas, regardless of their relevance to local conditions.” In other words, he recognized that fundamental institutional differences between the West and other peoples could hinder the functionality of imposed Western values and institutions in other contexts.

It must be emphasized that judging one civilization based on the values of other civilizations obscures the dynamism and functionality of its institutions. The existence of humanity in any geo-cultural context reveals that to a large extent its institutions and material and immaterial cultures are not static. The dynamic interaction of diverse elements in Africa’s indigenous socio-political and ecological spaces sustained its people long before the Euro-African relationship developed. It is the ideological ground as provided by racial minimalism and fuelled by mercantilism that thus justified colonial adventurism in Africa and the nature of the nation states it bequeathed. To colonial apologists, therefore, the colonization of Africa and imposition of the nation state as a philanthropic “civilizing mission” was indispensable.

While different states existed in Africa prior to the European colonial era, the state with its present geopolitical constitution is essentially a relic of that era. Therefore, a critical
question that arises in this context is to what extent is the notion of the new state a civilizing and sustainable institution in Africa, especially in Nigeria? It is arguable that creating a sustainable and grassroots oriented state was ever the goal of colonialism. The conscious alienation of colonial administration from indigenous peoples, the master/servant relationship that colonial labor policies promoted, racist slurs against local people, harsh tax practices, forceful expropriation of natural resources, alienation from land, and other forms of exploitation illustrated the fact that the state represented an alien and economic agenda of the colonial powers against the interest of their subject peoples.\textsuperscript{33} As will be seen later in this article, for the local communities, such as in Nigeria, the idea of the state (colonial or postcolonial) became equated with racism, maltreatment, dispossession, elite pillage, and injustice; hence, the emergence of resistance to the state. What was the socio-political framework in pre-colonial Nigeria, and how did colonialism change it? The next section examines this question.

Colonial Intrusiveness: Contradicting the “Indigenous” and “Reforming” It?

Ethnic groups or communities in different regions of Nigeria developed into sovereign monarchical kingdoms, chiefdoms or village democracies.\textsuperscript{34} In Southeastern Nigeria and the Niger Delta region, from where this study draws its primary data, small independent communities with full territorial, socio-ecological, and economic and political sovereignties controlled their land and natural resources. In these areas, no known efforts were made toward building large ethnic or multiethnic kingdoms. Prior to British rule in Nigeria, these polities had their tailored government, sustainable land tenure systems, and resource ownership models. In Southwest and Midwestern Nigeria, the Yoruba and Benin peoples both evolved ethnic kingdoms. However, like their eastern neighbors, they also practiced communal resource-ownership systems, although with greater hierarchical control by their obas (kings in Yoruba and Benin).\textsuperscript{35}

The Hausa-Fulani rulers of Northern Nigeria developed kingdoms or emirates. The emirs adopted an Islamic administrative system and exercised enormous control over their territories. Land and natural resource ownership system based on relative feudalism was practiced and the Fulani emirs collected taxes from landless commoners or talakawas.\textsuperscript{36} The primary place of the traditional rulers in the political administration of Northern Nigeria made it easy for the colonial state to take control of the land, once they gained control of the emirs. Land in Northern Nigeria (especially among the Hausa/Fulani), does not seem to have as much mystical connotation as in Southern Nigeria.\textsuperscript{37} The perception of land in a non-mystical sense may have been connected to the predominantly Islamic practices and the nomadic economy of the region.

In Southern Nigeria (East and West), land and natural resource ownership did not reside with one individual; rather it resided with the community. The colonial era British ethnographer Percy Amaury Talbot noted that “throughout the whole of Southern Nigeria the land is...communal and belongs to the people generally.”\textsuperscript{38} Degradation of land was seen as an abomination in local communities, because land degradation contravenes certain attributes of land, among which is that the land is holy, i.e., believed to be a link between the living and the dead. Talbot describes the mystical perception of land in Southern Nigeria thus: “The feeling [reverence] partly arises, no doubt, from the belief in the spirits of the earth, the local representative of which is usually regarded as the tutelary guardian of the people and its soil, and partly from the worship of ancestors who dwell in it.”\textsuperscript{39}
The perception of land in this manner implies also that land is valued beyond pecuniary compensation. Writing about indigenous land use practices in Southeastern Nigeria in pre-colonial times, P.E.H. Hair, a British colonial official in the Udi Division of Eastern Nigeria, noted that this “was the correct traditional doctrine: ancestral land must never be bartered for money.” Talbot argued that it was in fact colonial rule that introduced the commoditization of land in Southern Nigeria: “By immemorial custom it [land] can never be alienated or sold, and it is only of recent years and in a few parts of the country, where Europeans and other aliens have made dual appearance in numbers, that any private individual rights in land are beginning to be recognized.”

The indigenous model of land ownership and alienation did not fit into the colonial context, hence the necessity to reform it. The reformation, which ignored the indigenous socio-ecological order, involved the proclamation of several land and mineral resource-related Ordinances beginning with the Crown Land Ordinance of 1900. With this legislation, all territories the Royal Niger Company had acquired from local rulers through treaties were turned over to the colonial state. These lands became known as “Crown Lands.” T.O.S. Elias noted that Crown Land was “no more than a convenient administrative device or a generic name for all the lands which are in reality the property of the Nigerian public, held on their behalf by the Government.” A question that may be of interest here is: how much did Nigerians realize their stake in the new state as of 1900? Put differently, was there any such thing as a “Nigerian public” as of 1900? The Nigerian nation state as presently constituted is unarguably a relic of British colonial craftsmanship. As pointed out earlier, prior to the commencement of British colonial rule in 1900, indigenous communities in Nigeria lived in sustainable independent political units. Hence, the awareness of a national wealth belonging to “the Nigerian public” hardly existed in 1900. Independent kingdoms and communities were not integrated into a common Nigerian public and preferred to be identified by their indigenous identities than as Nigerians. This leads us to the question, why was Nigeria created, by whom and for what purpose? The following section peers into these fundamental questions that underlie the evolution of the Nigerian state.

The Nigerian Nation State: For Whom and for what Purpose?

This section examines the arguments adduced by colonial officials for the formation of the Nigerian nation state and the role players in this process. If put in question form: what were the arguments behind the formation of the Nigerian state as presently constituted? Did Nigerians create their state? On the other hand, was the state imposed on Nigerians? This section will attempt to offer insights into these questions in order to understand the grievance dynamics and the nature of the conflict between the nation state and former sovereignties in Nigeria.

The formation of the present-day nation state of Nigeria was purely British-driven and followed a top-down colonial approach. The process started with the amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906 into the “Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria” with Lagos as its headquarters. The Protectorate of Southern Nigeria included the two provinces of Eastern and Western Nigeria; while the provinces of Northern Nigeria formed the “Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.” Essentially two separate countries, the “Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria” and the “Protectorate of Northern Nigeria” maintained distinct administrative structures and were governed by their respective High Commissioners.
reflected the broader ethnic/religious divides between the mainly Islamic Hausa-Fulani North and a more diverse South, was considered expensive for purposes of administration and “unsustainable” in the long term.49

Considering the challenges posed by the administration of two countries in a contiguous geography, different British colonial officials expressed the need to amalgamate both countries before 1914.50 From an official viewpoint, which was stated by Lord Frederick Lugard, the eventual creation of a Nigerian state on January 1 1914 was based mainly on the subsequent reasoning: “The construction of a rival railways in Northern and Southern Nigeria accentuated the necessity of having a single railway policy, with a single administration, and over a year ago [1913], the Secretary of State decided that the time had come to give effect to the scheme of constituting a single Government for Nigeria.”51 While it may seem ridiculous to amalgamate two distinct countries merely to have a unified railway system, it shows the economic basis (rather than socio-cultural consideration) behind the British decision to amalgamate the distinct Northern and Southern Nigerias. Various opinions have been expressed on the amalgamation of 1914. Takena Tamuno, a Nigerian historian argues: “As in 1906 [amalgamation], the primary British aim was economic.”52 Northern Nigeria is landlocked and its produce exports had to go through Southern Nigerian seaports. Hence, it did not make economic sense for British trading companies to pay double taxes in two countries, when they could pay once in a united country. The amalgamation movement also gained popularity with the revenue forecasts, which indicated a bright economic future for the country. For instance, Lugard had projected that the revenue for 1914 was “exactly a million Sterling greater than the estimated revenue for 1912...The estimated Revenue of Nigeria this year [1914] stands at 3½ millions, and Trade has increased from 5 million to nearly 15 millions in this period of under 8 years.”53 In another instance, the mineral resource potential of Nigeria was also highlighted to support the viability of a Nigerian nation state: “The possibilities of United Nigeria under the new regime are practically unlimited, with the large store of vegetable and mineral wealth that the country has been found to possess”.54

Economic consideration in Lugard’s colonial conception was clear. For him, colonial rule was not just “philanthropy.”55 He perceived colonialism and the formation of nation state as a dual mandate in which Britain will bestow civilization, or as he puts it, “happiness and welfare [to] the primitive races.”56 In return, Britain and indeed Europe will reap industrial growth by sourcing cheap raw materials from Africa. According to Lugard:

Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from the motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this dual mandate.57

To emphasize this economistic drive in the creation of the Nigeria, other colonial advocates, especially British traders, had since 1830s called for direct British rule of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria as a way of ensuring safe trading environment.58 For instance, in 1882, a British trader in the Niger Delta had suggested to the British Crown: “I believe that instead of so many petty kings and chieftains, if we had one strong government over all these rivers, the increase in our trade would be enormous, and the impetus it would give to civilization would be almost incalculable.”59 In effect, while the formation of the Nigerian
nation state arguably may have benefited Nigerians in some ways, the primary goal of its founders was the economic benefit that Britain and its traders gained. Africa as a continent was viewed by European traders and officials as a land of great economic potentials and the risk of investment in colonialism did not compare with the projected benefits. One writer fantasized about the riches of Africa thus:

On the land itself, Nature seems to breathe the fifth part of all her nectar [on Africa]. ‘Africa,’ says a well known geographer, ‘is eminently rich in the variety and high development of its animals.’ Her mineral wealth is now attracting the attention of the civilized world. Foreigners can hardly look up on her commercial resources with eyes unmoved.\(^6\)

How did the colonial (Nigerian) state resonate with local communities and individuals? Local opinions voiced against the new nation state immediately after its amalgamation in 1914 reveal the inherent arbitrariness in the formation of Nigeria. Colonial officials had ignored the indigenous socio-cultural affinities and geographical contiguities of communities. They were even distorted in certain instances. Perhaps no opinion captured this anomaly than the February 3 1914 editorial in The Times of Lagos:

We had been complaining for years that portions of Yoruba tribes had been incorporated into the administration of Northern Nigeria, not withstanding that they were allied to the countries and peoples under the Southern administration by conterminous boundaries and by ties of kindred, kinship and intermarriages, and by tribal institutions. By an arbitrary arrangement, an imaginary line ran in some cases through a town or single and individual tribal territory. As a consequence the inhabitants or dwellers in one town found their town, their territory and themselves cut up into two divisions and placed under two distinct and differing types of administrations, with different laws, customs and usages, although professedly and admittedly British. A farmer finds that his dwelling and himself come under one administration, while his farm land goes under the laws of another and an altogether antagonistic system . . . Even properties of an individual owner within the radius of the same locality shared the same fate. This anomaly was the subject of frequent discussions in the Legislative Council, brought up by the native unofficial members of the Council.\(^5\)

The editorial writer thus captured a dire scenario whereby the Yoruba ethnic group, which geographically belonged to Southern Nigeria, had some of its villages excised and added to Northern Nigeria, which before 1914 was a separate country.

More recent Nigerian scholars and analysts, critical of the unification of contrasting peoples into one country, later expressed their fears on the viability of the state. Takena Tamuno describes the nature of the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria this way: “A single Governor-General for the Northern and Southern Provinces from January 1, 1914 constituted an important feature of Lugard’s Amalgamation scheme, which resulted in the political fusion of North and South without compelling immediate or subsequent administrative unification.”\(^6\)

In the same manner, Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the 1960s and also the former Premier of Northern Nigeria described the amalgamation in his autobiography My Life as “the mistake of 1914.”\(^6\) He wrote this to describe not only the administrative challenges facing the Nigerian nation state but also the lack of commitment at
nation-building and citizenship orientation on the part of colonial officials. It is this view of Nigeria that Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the defunct Action Group and a contemporary of Ahmadu Bello, made more lucid in his description of Nigeria: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression . . . The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not.” These fears not only point to the mosaic nature of the Nigerian state but also mark the beginning of a contentious relationship between the superior authority of the state and the former sovereignties that constitute the new state.

The hurried creation of the state, especially the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates, presented its challenges as it did not give room for any consultations with local people. Lugard admitted that he spent only “six months . . . studying local conditions and submitting proposals for the Amalgamation” of Nigeria. After this period of feasibility study, Lugard travelled back to England and submitted his findings to secretary of State Sir Edward Grey, who then mandated the amalgamation. It is not known how Lugard arrived at his conclusion that all the indigenous communities and ethnic kingdoms could surrender their sovereignties to the powerful central authority of the state. As his account shows, he did not consult local communities; neither did he work in a committee. Takena Tamuno notes: “The British government did not seek the opinions of Nigerians before amalgamating Northern and Southern Nigeria in January 1914.”

It was not practicable for Lugard to arrive at credible conclusions in just six months. Nigeria is a large country, and as of the early 1900s lacked a good communication infrastructure that would have afforded him access to all the parts of the country. In his report, Lugard acknowledged that the country “covers an area of over 330,000 square miles, or more than five times the size of England and Scotland, or one-third of the size of British India [present day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh].” With this challenge, it would have taken Lugard several years to reach out and consult with all of the constituencies of Nigeria. This initial anomaly spurred opposition to the new state from local communities and individuals critical of the state.

To help gain a deeper understanding of the views of local people on the formation of the Nigerian state, the article utilizes primary data on issues related to the sovereignty of the new state over local communities and the responses of individuals and communities to its authority vis-à-vis the ownership of natural resources in local communities. Primary data, such as archival materials on colonial era events, observation, and interview responses were used in this analysis.

**Collection of Primary Data**

The data used in this article were collected from Enugu-Ngwo, a coal producing community in Southeastern Nigeria and the oil-rich community of Egbema and its neighbors in the Niger Delta. These communities are known for their conflict with the state over their land and mining rights. Elderly respondents with experiential knowledge of state-community contestation, coal mining and oil exploration/exploitation in their communities were interviewed. In addition, archival materials on coal mining and oil exploration in colonial Nigeria were also collected from the National Archives Enugu (NAE) in Southeastern Nigeria between November 2007 and March 2008. The validity of archival documents was verified from the narratives of elderly respondents who experienced mining-related activities and conflicts in both colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.
Contending for Natural Resource Rights and Notions of Sovereignty: Field Data

Different archival accounts of the reactions of local peoples to the mineral exploration of their communities during the colonial era give insights into the manner in which local people responded to the emerging state vis-a-vis the sovereignty of their communities. In this letter written in January 1949 by a community chief against Shell D’Arcy’s oil exploration, the community rejected the right of the state to explore for mineral resources on their land. According to his letter:

In the full interest of our land, we do not want any of the Shell D’Arcy parties [exploration groups] to enter or to explore our land nor to drill it. The land is ours and should not be tampered with by any party whether alien or aborigine. We are yet preparing to send our children overseas to study all about land with all in it and so we don’t want our mineral resources to be touched or to be meddled with lest posterity [and] the unborn will blame us for the same. The arrangement or license granted by the government to the Shell D’Arcy Exploration Parties (both of you not being the land owners) is inimical to our interest and we don’t cherish or welcome it. We are the land owners. If any exploration is thought expedient to the economic benefit of our people, such an arrangement and permit to enter our land and explore it should be between us and the experts to such an exploration under some terms which would be for the interest of us present and our descendants to come (emphases added).69

In a similar petition written on November 15, 1949, the petitioners also disputed the sovereignty of the state over their land and as the petition stated, over “everything that grows on top or stays in the ground.” In detail, the petition noted, “We the aborigines of this community, dispute the right of anyone – Nigeria or British Empire, over our land, water, trees, rocks. In short, everything that grows on top or stays in the ground. We urge you Dear Sir [District Officer] tell the Shell Company to stay away from our domain.”70

While the above views were expressed in colonial Nigeria, the author wanted to know how the study communities viewed state authority over mineral resources in their communities presently. The author asked Chief Nduka (pseudonym) in an interview in Egbema, an oil producing community in the Niger Delta, why communities such as Egbema, resist the exploitation of oil in their localities? He responded:

We [the Igbo people] have never been conquered by other tribes [ethnic groups], we have never been ruled by others. Igbo communities did not seek to build empires by incorporating other communities or looking towards our non-Igbo neighbors. So when they [colonial officials] came, what they brought with them [the state] was strange, lumping everyone together, dictating how you use your land, imposing chiefs on local communities, exploring and taking our oil in Egbema and our neighbors in Rivers area [lower Niger Delta]. It was strange. In that case it will be difficult for the people to accept the new state in just a few years, so we resisted the imposition of Nigeria, because Nigeria means taking our land by force, imposing forced labor policy, collecting taxes and dictating how we use our land…In Egbema in particular, history follows us everywhere we go; so I am not surprised if the present generation has not given up fighting to keep what is ours, the way their fathers resisted the Whiteman.”71
To this respondent, the Nigerian nation state takes: “our land by force...dictating how we use our land.” Another respondent in the coal-producing Enugu-Ngwo community, Chief Uwakwe (pseudonym), was also detailed in the way he saw the acquisition of their ancestral land by the colonial state in 1915 for coal mining. Local people in this community have always felt the colonial state acquired their land through deception and force. The 76-year-old chief, citing copiously from a copy of the “Deed of Grant” (colonial agreement for transfer of land to the state), said:

Remember, this land [colliery] was originally taken by force in 1912. However, as a result of British diplomacy, in order to show the world that they are democratic, they came back in 1915, employed a very terrible and ruthless Warrant Chief Onyeama, ordered him to go inside the bush and fish out the leaders of these people to sign a Deed of Grant so that the land they took by force can be covered by a legal document. In 1915, the eleven chiefs signed the Deed of Grant under duress, granting the land to the colonial masters. The land was taken by force in the period of ignorance. Now is the era of awareness, we are saying, give us back our land.

A former highly-placed political office holder in old Anambra State and an indigene of Enugu-Ngwo, discussing the acquisition of his community’s land for the establishment of the colliery, gave an account of why the forebears of Enugu-Ngwo thought, they “were robbed by Nigeria.” In detail, he said:

Before the coming of the Whiteman [often implies British colonialism], Enugu-Ngwo owned its natural resources. Natural resources in this sense do not mean coal. Our fathers did not know about coal, tin or oil, but they knew about their God-given land, they guarded it jealously and fought off the belligerent Nike, Akegbe and Awkunanaw neighbors who were always intent on carving out portions of our land. Their understanding of nationhood and ownership of national properties did not encompass what belonged to Nike, nor did Awkunanaw believe that Enugu-Ngwo land belonged to it. Each community guarded its wealth. At the inception of colonial rule, it changed. So what is yours now became mine and vice-versa. This was in principle. Did all communities accept it? No. It was an alien concept. Even the Irish have not accepted English domination; there is still war in Britain over the imposition of England on Northern Ireland. How then do you think Enugu-Ngwo, rich in coal, will allow its traditional enemies such as Nike and Akegbe to share in its wealth? Extend it to Ijaw land; will they allow the Igbo or Hausa to share the [oil] wealth in their land? They were robbed by Nigeria...The community; the national identity of groups is still alive. You talk about the Nigerian public, whose public? When did it emerge? Who initiated it?

When the researcher raised the issue of resource ownership and conflict between mineral-producing communities and the state, the former highly placed political office holder stated:

The press and the Nigerian public have given what is happening in local communities a wrong interpretation. Those people dying and killing others [militants] in the creeks are not asking the federal government to give them back their oil. The issue is greater than oil, it is greater than coal. It is a question being raised about the polity [Nigeria]. Without the Whiteman, the
fighters in the Creeks would not have known about oil; but without oil, they have long in the days of their fathers asked the Whiteman to leave their land and go back to Europe. That is what Jaja of Opobo fought and died for, that is what Nana of Itsekiri and Obong of Calabar fought and died for. That is self and community assertion. We should not limit the agitation to oil and coal. Oil and coal are foreign but land is not. That is the same thing Enugu-Ngwo is saying, a reversal to the pre-1915 order, not the coal. Minerals are immaterial without the land.  

Local narratives in this section question the sovereignty of the Nigerian state over the natural resources in local communities, such as, oil, and coal. They show similarities with colonial era opposition to oil exploration activities as contained in the archival sources above. These sources reveal how local people opposed mining rights that were granted by the colonial state to British mining companies such as Shell D’Arcy without the consent of host communities – a practice that has continued in the postcolonial dispensation. Hence, to the local people, there is little or no difference between the manner they have been treated by both the colonial and the postcolonial states. Opposition to the modern state is therefore a continuation of the struggle against the loss of indigenous sovereignty to British colonial rule, even though the present state is no longer under foreign rule. It is this intersection between the assertion of community rights (often based on the pre-state notion of sovereignty) and state authority that leads to conflict between the state and the local communities that produce mineral resources.

Discussion

The minimalist theory of race that Eurocentric writers championed provided the ideological platform upon which European colonization of Africa and other regions of the world rested. In Africa, the theory spurred paternalism, mercantilism, colonial adventurism, and, finally, the creation of modern nation states by colonial powers. These states, in most cases, have remained more or less as geopolitical contraptions that served colonial interests and are estranged from local peoples. In the case of Nigeria, this article has highlighted that economic considerations of the British government and colonialist drive, more than any other issue, underpinned the formation of the Nigerian state. To colonial officials, the socio-ecological and political interests of the local communities were secondary. Hence, in the formation of the state, the opinion of indigenous communities was not sought, nor were their political structures accepted as the basis of the new state. While this framework was used in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, it was not entirely the same in other British colonies. For instance, in the former British Malaya (Malaysia and Singapore), the colonial state was created out of recognized pre-existing sultanates and pirate forts. These structures also became the constituent provinces of its post-colonial existence, with Singapore later permitted to secede in 1965. In Africa, the United Nations hurriedly stamped the borders of postcolonial states without considering the pre-colonial geo-ethnic order.

As noted above, this imposed state structure with its characteristic centralization of authority has often been at variance with the socio-ecologic and economic interests of local communities, a conflict that threatens the survival of the post-colonial state. Hence, although British colonialism bequeathed a nation state to Nigerians at independence in 1960, the overall concept of the state estranges it from local communities where it is seen as alien and a dispossessor of local sovereignty.
For instance, British colonialism distorted pre-colonial indigenous land tenure system and set up a framework in which the state owns all land, mineral resources, and the power to transfer usufruct. This colonial framework, which the postcolonial state retains, has become volatile and has resulted in contestation for ecological and mineral resource rights between the state and formerly independent communities. To the local communities, therefore, there is hardly any difference between the oppressive colonial state and a postcolonial state that has continued the dispossession begun by the colonial state. The perception of the state as an interloper in communities’ natural resource wealth owes to an institutionalized view of the state as an alien institution synonymous with British colonialism known for its racist and exploitative practices. In this conflict, pre-state sovereign units assert the desire to repossess their ecological rights from the state. This assertion of indigenous resource-ownership rights (or resource nationalism of former sovereignties) portrays an uncomfortable relationship between pre-colonial political units and the new, more powerful nation state. It also indicates a resurgence of traditional political authorities against a dominant nation state, such that it poses a threat to the survival of the state.

Conclusion
In the light of the above analysis and the “penitence” shown by post-colonial European leaders (such as the British Prime Minister) on the roles their nations played in creating these problems, it is important to suggest that the former colonial powers have critical roles to play in enhancing the sustainability of the postcolonial states such as Nigeria. A more rational and realistic approach to remedying what is often seen as “colonial injustices” by local communities must go beyond mere rhetoric or financial reparation as in the Italian-Libyan Treaty in 2009. The security challenge of the post-colonial state is as much a reality in Africa as it is in Pakistan. Hence, former colonial powers must engage with the agitation for restructuring the nation states in ways that acknowledge pre-colonial identities and rights. In Nigeria, this agitation has been swirling among pro-democracy groups for the practice of true federalism since the early 1990s. Such conflict due to structural imbalance is not exclusive to Nigeria alone; it is at the fore in the Angolan/Cabindan conflict, among others.

The structural certification granted to African nations by the United Nations Organization (UNO) in the 1960s did not consider the fact that they were merely colonial contraptions that served foreign interests. Those interests are not entirely relevant in the postcolonial dispensation.

While this article does not advocate a wholesale return to a pre-colonial status quo conflict between the state and its component parts over mineral resource-rights in countries such as Nigeria poses an existential threat to the state. The prevailing framework of the nation state (at worst) reflects internal colonization of formerly independent communities whose sensitivities have often been ignored by the state. Put differently, the alienation initiated by colonialism persists under the post-colonial dispensation. Remediying this framework should constitute a part of any meaningful measure aimed at addressing those “problems of the world” David Cameron and other Western leaders are sorry for. How can Britain “remedy” its colonial misdeeds in Nigeria?

It must be acknowledged that the United Kingdom holds considerable influence on Nigeria’s economy and at the United Nations where it is a permanent member. To demonstrate UK’s economic influence on Nigeria, the UK Trade & Investment notes that
Nigeria is the second largest trading partner of the UK in Africa. Such influence could be used, though tactfully, to support local groups calling for a national conference for the restructuring of the Nigerian state to reflect a truly federal system where power is devolved between the central government and local communities/federating ethnic groups. While these groups have been largely ignored by state officials or hounded by erstwhile military regimes, the popularity of the “agitation for restructuring” among communities and ethnic groups is not in doubt. Hence, given the UK’s influence on Nigeria and at the UN, strong support from the UK for the restructuring of the country alongside federal principles that bequeaths some socio-economic and ecologic rights to the local communities will be a more sustainable way to atone for colonial misdeeds.

Notes

1. BBC 2011a.
3. BBC 2011b.
4. See Brendon 2007, p. 4.
16. “Former sovereignties” connote local communities, kingdoms, and other geo-ethnic expressions that were politically independent in pre-colonial Nigeria. It is this collective that were constituted under British colonialism to form the Nigerian nation state.
19. Ibid., p. 214.
25. See Dike 1956.

See Griffiths 1986, p. 204.

See Meredith 2011, pp. 93-115.

Horton 1979; Alagoa 1979; Smith 1979.


See Grundy 1964, p. 387.


Talbot 1937, p. 680.

Talbot 1937, p. 682; see also Shipton 1994.

Hair 1954, p. 56.

Talbot 1937, p. 680.

Meek 1946, p. 88.

Ibid.

Elias 1951, p. 46.


See Ekeh 1975.

The Colony of Lagos has been under British rule since 1860. *The Times of Nigeria*, February 3 1914, p. 4; Tamuno 2006, p. 393.

Lugard 1914, p. 1.

Tamuno 2006.

Lugard 1914, p. 1.

Ibid.

Tamuno 2006, p. 394.

Lugard 1914, p. 3.

The Lagos Standard 7 January 1914, p.5.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Dike 1956, pp. 128-52.

The Lagos Observer 12 October 1882, p 3.

Ibid.

The Times of Lagos 3 February, 1914, p. 4.


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Lugard 1914, p. 1.

Ibid.

Tamuno 2006, p. 394.

Lugard 1914, pp. 1-2.


Chief Nduka (pseudonym). 2008. He was eighty years old. Personal interview, Obiapku Egbema, Imo state (one of the states in the Niger Delta region), 12 January 2008 (transcript in author's possession).

Chief Uwakwe (pseudonym). 2008. He is a titled traditional chief (*Ishi-ANI*), age seventy
six. Personal interview, Coal Camp in Enugu on 15 February 2008 (transcript in author’s possession).
73 Ibid.
75 Ibid. The community’s land was expropriated for coal mining by British colonial government in 1915.
76 Clive 1998.
77 Herbst 1997, p. 121.
78 Meek 1946; Uchendu 1979.
79 See Davidson and Munslow 1990; Umejesi 2011.
80 Under the 2009 Treaty, Italy agreed to pay, five billion dollars to Libya within a period of 20 years (see Armstrong 2009, pp. 1-2).
82 Herbst 1997, p. 121.

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http://www.historytoday.com/piers-brendon/moral-audit-british-empire


REVIEW ESSAY

Radical History and the Struggle Revisited: The Cambridge History of South Africa

ARAN MACKINNON


The much anticipated Cambridge History of South Africa (CHSA) seeks to provide, as the editors of Volume 2 state, an authoritative survey of the history of South Africa from earliest times to 1994. This monumental work, in two volumes, is a once-in-a-generation summative collection of essays by many of the leading historians of South Africa. It carries on in the tradition of its predecessors, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume 7, South Africa, Rhodesia, and the High Commission Territories (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1963), edited by EEric A. Walker, and the widely read two-volume Oxford History of South Africa (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1968 and 1971) edited by Leonard M. Thompson and Monica Hunter Wilson. The new CHSA covers the major historical developments in a more-or-less chronological manner, though there are differences of approach between Volume 1 and 2. Both volumes also provide an overview of the principal historiographical developments with particular emphasis on the editors’ and authors’ own significant contributions. They emphasize especially interpretations from the radical school that evolved under Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido at the University of London and at Oxford University respectively, and in South Africa at the University of Cape Town and then the University of the Witwatersrand. The overall approach of the project is, therefore, necessarily reflective, and so it tends to shy away from grappling fully with the still evolving post-apartheid historiography or to provide many sign-posts for the way ahead in South African history. As the editors acknowledge, however, much of the work on South Africa by professional historians has been dominated by the same political divisions that plagued the country’s past. To their credit, the editors are acutely mindful of the limitations this poses for inclusivity of a broader range of voices. As the editors of Volume 1 note (p. xiv) the CHSA is “almost by definition” an emanation of the British establishment, and so the perspectives in the following chapters reflect the work of mostly white academics but with notable exceptions.


http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v13/v13i3a4.pdf

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Volume 1 opens, after a brief introduction, with a useful and insightful editors’ discussion about the production and meaning of South African history, including how to interpret the limited evidence available from the pre-historical period. In a way that does not seem to emerge as clearly from Volume 2, this first chapter considers the implications and influences of the post-apartheid settings on our understanding of South African history. It also considers the broad range of sources that are available, including the rich body of oral, material and visual evidence. The editors also draw our attention to the development—led by Carolyn Hamilton, John Wright, and others—of South Africanists’ considerable expertise in parsing out the ways that pre-colonial evidence was often mediated through colonial lenses. The balance of this chapter sets out, in chronological order, the major schools of historiography. This valuable discussion provides an important consideration not only of the types of self-conscious narratives produced since early times, ranging from rock art and recorded oral evidence through the various colonial categories of history to those created at the end of apartheid, but also the historical contexts they emerged from. While the focus of this discussion highlights the period under consideration in Volume 1, it provides some sobering thoughts that could equally apply to Volume 2. Chief among these is the posing of very salient and discomforting questions for South African history and historians, and that is who owns both the production of history and the meanings to be derived from it?

The next seven chapters provide an engaging introduction to and analysis of the established treatments of the major developments in South African history to 1885. Chapter 2 by John Parkington and Simon Hall, leading scholars of pre-historical archaeological sites in South Africa, sets out the establishment and development of food producing communities in the region. Among the critical questions that Parkington and Hall address are the nature and completeness of the technology package that arrived with pioneering farmers and the extent to which the Central Cattle Pattern is a useful tool of analysis for historical change among pre-historical pastoralists. This chapter does an excellent job of explaining complex data and the nature of the excavations of important sites. The diagrams and maps, however, do not provide sufficient detail, nor is there enough discussion of them to assist the reader’s understanding. It is also somewhat curious that the authors have elected to use the old standard Christian-centric dating system as opposed to the more current Common Era (CE) convention. This continues in Simon Hall’s next chapter on the development of farming communities in the second millennium A.D. In this narrative, Hall guides us through the formation and expansion of identifiable hierarchal societies that can be tracked through pre-historical as well as written sources. An important theme of the chapter is the extent to which these communities made clear links, socially and commercially, with the wider world. He introduces the Shona-speakers and the Mapungubwe complex in the Limpopo valley, and then guides us through the expanding trade networks that eventually connected up with Great Zimbabwe before considering the emergence of the Sotho-Tswana communities of the South African high-veldt as well as the Nguni-speaking farmers of the eastern littoral.

Robert Ross’s lively treatment of the Khoisan and European entanglements sets the stage for the first white colonial foundations in the Cape in chapter 4. Significantly, the maps are quite clear, and Ross pays close attention to the interplay of people and the environment. John Wright provides the next, critical chapter, on political transformations between the 1760s and the 1830s. Wright’s keen but judicious treatment of the “Mfecane” debates here is a masterful synthesis of this complex and contested topic, although he is less concerned with the apparent meanings derived from the debate than with clearing a path through them. Martin Legassick and Robert Ross teamed up to craft chapter 6 on the slave and settler
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economies that emerged in the Cape. It is here that we begin to see the clear furrow of radical and materialist history in the CHSA, and this very detailed analysis relies on what seems the almost inescapable geographic progression of settler history emanating from the Cape and projecting into the interior through trade, Christianity, and conquest. In chapter 7, Norman Etherington, Patrick Harries and Bernard Mbenga consider the new relations wrought by the ascendency of imperial power over colonial and African societies. It is somewhat surprising, given the fresh perspective that Etherington provided in his critically-acclaimed The Great Treks (London: Pearson Education, 2001) that this chapter in the CHSA still refers to the binary of frontier relations in what is otherwise portrayed as an open, fluid period of social and political relationships. The chapter does, nevertheless, pay significant attention to questions of race, identity and science, as well as the familiar narrative of imperial history.

The final chapter in Volume 1, Paul Landau’s compelling synthesis on the theme of “Transformations in Consciousness” is somewhat out of keeping with the previous chapters’ chronological progression. Landau takes a thematic approach to understanding, “what ordinary people were saying” about themselves and how they thought they could affect their world. This chapter is perhaps more anthropological, even philosophical, than historical, but it does reveal a great deal about how some people articulated their understanding of the major historical forces of the period prior to industrialization. Overall, this volume covers most of the important developments in the history and historiography and serves as an important reference work. It would have benefitted from better, larger maps and diagrams, as well as an annotated bibliography—Volume 2 has at least a full bibliography, but it does not appear to cover both volumes—and review of at least some of the better, well-established online resources now available.

Volume 2 is a longer and somewhat more comprehensive synthesis covering the period from 1885 until 1994. It includes statistical tables as well as a bibliography. The starting date is linked to what the editors see as the motors of South African history, the domination by European settlers through conquests, mineral discoveries and the advent of industrial capitalism. As with the first volume, it seeks to reflect past scholarship and historiography. The editors state this volume is the culmination “above all . . . of the so-called radical or revisionist historians and their successors since about 1970.” (p. 1) While this period was undoubtedly a high-water mark of South African history, and the contributors to Volume 2 are among the preeminent scholars of the field, in the CHSA they remain focused on the period prior to the formal end of apartheid. It is lamentable that these important and very influential historians have not sought to provide some more solid signposts for the consideration of history after 1994 or to engage more fully with the important realms of public history and heritage which have recently exploded. There also appears a hesitancy to consider these emergent fields or the wider popular efforts to lay claim to the production of history and historical memory. A discussion of heritage and historical memory, for example, is afforded just six pages in the final chapter, though some of the implications of these approaches appear throughout many chapters. The overall arc of Volume 2 follows a different approach than Volume 1 with thematic chapters, some of which have considerable chronological overlap, and others that are focused on specific thematic topics such as demography or the economy.

The introduction to Volume 2 provides a broad and very useful consideration of the historiography. Here, the editors pay particular attention to the politically-inspired nature of the radical and Marxist interpretations. Indeed, it is hard to imagine appreciating, let alone
understanding, South African history and historians over the past fifty years without a clear recognition of its central role in political activism from all sides of the spectrum. They also provide the context for the emergence of important new threads of social and feminist history, but there is less attention to the historiography of both rural and urban developments than one might have expected. Given the considerable body of works on environmental history related to South Africa, especially in terms of settler capitalism and perceptions of African management of the environment, it is somewhat surprising that there is not more space devoted to this important area of study.

The chapters in Volume 2 move from thematic to chronological developments covering what the editors see as the motors of South African history: the domination by European settlers through conquests, mineral discoveries, and the advent of industrial capitalism. It also seeks to explain how various identities were forged through both agency and domination. The first chapter, by Saul Dubow, provides a very engaging and sweeping narrative on the nature of South African identity. This is, essentially, a historiographical analysis of the ways historians and South Africans themselves have thought about social and economic categories such as race, class, nationalism, and citizenship as well as ideas about belonging and community. As with Paul Landau’s somewhat similar chapter in Volume 1, Dubow’s could have served well as the summative concluding chapter for Volume 2, especially if it had been expanded to include more consideration of the post-apartheid period. Stanley Trapido’s posthumous chapter 2 considers the forces of imperialism and settler capitalism in a classically radical fashion. Here one is reminded not only of Trapido’s insightful and cutting analyses, but also of his great passion for the struggle. His contributions will be missed.

Shula Marks, who not only shaped many of the seminal arguments and analyses that are the foundation for the CHSA but also trained many of the historians who also contributed to these foundations, wrote the next two chapters spanning the period from 1880-1910. These chapters cover the important yet complex relations among race, class, gender, and consciousness as well as emergent nationalism among blacks and Afrikaners in the prelude to the South African war and the forging of Union. Ever insightful and sensitive to questions of agency as well as the powerful forces of domination and subordination, Marks captures the essence of the period by stating that “Everywhere, colonial and colonized subjects were actively engaged in complex cultural choices, although some had more ‘choice’ than others.” (p. 105). In chapter 5, Bill Freund nicely captures the radical interpretation of the rise of white domination by considering the challenges to and limits of the segregationist state from 1910-1948. He notes the contradictions inherent in the Union government’s efforts to create a hegemonic order that could reconcile the demands of white supremacists and industrial capitalists. This is followed by Philip Bonner’s chapter covering the nature of South African society and culture for the same period. While this chapter does an excellent job of covering both developments in both urban and rural areas, it seems perhaps less concerned with popular culture than it is with class.

In chapter 7 Deborah Posel considers the nature and dimensions of the “Apartheid Project” from 1948-1970. In addition to explaining how the meaning and evolution of apartheid have been understood, Posel makes the important point that at its core, apartheid was about the politics not of just defining but also of managing population groups and demography. As with all the chapters in Volume 2, the authors remind us that the shaping of white domination was a deeply ambiguous and uneven project, and that, more importantly, understanding its persistence requires recognizing the interaction of the
successes and failures of the state. In chapters 8 and 9, Anne Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, and Tom Lodge respectively address popular responses to apartheid from 1948-1975 and the resistance that led to tentative reforms from 1973-1994. Mager and Mulaudzi’s chapter analyzes the ways that the majority of South Africans came to understand the struggle, and the relationship they had with their political elite leadership. Of particular note in this chapter is the attention to both women and consumer culture in the resistance movements. Tom Lodge’s insightful chapter explores the limits of change in the relationship between the political and economic transformation of the country. His analysis of the trade union movement and the connections with popular resistance is particularly engaging.

Perhaps less consistent with the scope and purpose of the CHSA, though certainly still expertly crafted, is chapter 10 by Charles Simkins on the changing population. This brief chapter, while replete with interesting and important data, seems somewhat disconnected from the main flow of the radical narrative and provides rather less analysis than is needed to show the relationship between history and demographic change. In chapter 11, Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings provide a masterful overview of the nature and progression of the economy. While the analysis here remains focused on key economic indicators, it also provides a nuanced look at people’s lives intersected at so many points with economic developments. Of particular importance is the way Nattrass and Seekings illuminate an understanding of poverty in all its manifestations. The penultimate chapter by Tlhalo Radithlalo is a lively and detailed consideration of the ways South Africans expressed themselves culturally through literature and the arts. This insightful chapter is too brief and the CHSA could have benefitted from its expansion, especially into an analysis of the post-apartheid period. Similarly, the final chapter by Albert Grundlingh, Christopher Saunders, Sandra Swart, and Howard Phillips is also all too brief given the important topics covered. Indeed, this important summative chapter only cursorily considers the recent and possible future historiographical developments in the major areas of the environment, heritage, resistance, and health. It is somewhat surprising that the CHSA did not provide more scope for a consideration of what the authors show are the longer established analyses of these topics, especially the history of health, and, as noted previously, environmental history, both of which have deep roots in the pre-1994 period.

In the final analysis, the CHSA is a welcome and authoritative culmination of historical scholarship from the seminal period of apartheid. It reflects the very considerable and important contributions of leading academics from a period when history and politics were so deeply connected to the struggle to transform South Africa. As such, the CHSA is also clearly bound by the historical confines of that period. It will remain for the next generation of scholars to grapple with South African history after the end of apartheid.
BOOK REVIEWS


The book presents a chronological exposition from 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a refreshment station at Table Bay up to the San’s participation in the second Korana war (1878-79) along the Gariep.

One’s first reaction when embarking on reading this book is to ask “Why yet another publication on this subject?” The writer himself provides the following motivation: “the matter has little presence in South African public life,” and none of the number of scholars writing on the Cape San colonial experience “have analysed this case specifically as one of genocide” (pp. 21-22). While one wonders on what grounds the writer bases his first allegation, and while the accuracy of the second statement is debatable, the reality of genocide of the San peoples is an incontestable part of the tragic racial history of South Africa. Traces of viewing the San, and also the Korana, as a “plague” to be eradicated appear as recently as in 1929; two articles by C.J. Strydom in the *Huisgenoot* (of 29 November and 20 December) deal with the “purification” of the North-West of Bushmen and Korana (Afrikaans title: “Boesmans en Korannas—Hoe die Noordweste van hulle gesuiwer is”!)

In a time where fundamentalist intolerance, xenophobia, and racism still crop up constantly, Adhikari’s book serves as an apt, timely, and necessary call to guard against the horrors of such outrage. While very little criticism can be brought against the content of the book—it does indeed testify to the skill, expertise, and scholarship of the writer—I am not entirely convinced that the multi-faceted nature of the question is sufficiently addressed and emphasised. In my opinion this challenge has still to be taken up. In this regard I would like to point out the following. First, initially the San were not limited to the Cape but were spread out across the whole of Southern Africa. To a greater or lesser extent they met with the same fate in Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and the then South African Republic (ZAR) and Orange Free State (OFS). It seems as if minimal research has been conducted focusing on the San genocide in the last two of these regions. Second, colonial documentation does not always distinguish clearly between ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman,” and the term “Hottentot” was often used to refer to both groups. The blurriness of borders between “Hottentot herdsmen” and “Bushmen hunter-gathers” that has been pointed out in the so-called Kalahari debate meant that action taken against the ‘San’ often led to the slaying of Khoekhoe and vice versa. For example, during the Battle of Mumusa between the ZAR and the Korana of Chief David Massouw Rijt Taibosch in December 1885 that led to the destruction and extermination of the last functional community of Korana in Southern Africa, a number of San fought on the side of the Korana. This battle is, in the light of Adhikari’s definition and the analogies present in the actions of the Cape government after the second Korana war, clearly an instance of genocide. Because genocide of indigenous peoples in Southern Africa is not limited to the San, this question remains open to a wider, more inclusive examination. Third, I am convinced that racist and religious views of the settlers, trek farmers and frontier freebooters, together with greed, played a major role in the
genocide of the first indigenous peoples, and thus demand a more detailed exploration than is supplied. In the fourth place, the fact that the Korana, Griqua, and Bastard groups also played a role in the extermination of the San is mentioned only in passing. According to earlier sources their influence was considerable. While colonialism unmistakably played a role in the creation of an unstable interior there is indication of a pre-colonial phase where it was about raids, revenge, and the capture of slaves and women from other groups. I am unaware of recent research in this regard and am of the opinion that greater clarity on this aspect of history would enable us to construct a more nuanced image of the genocide of the San. Finally, in order to avoid complete extermination the San did not only migrate to the geographical peripheral areas. They deliberately concealed their San identity by taking on the customs and language of surrounding populations—hence the popular use of the appellation “the secret San.” In effect, the San were not only subject to genocide, but also to ethnocide. While the writer refers to a distinction between genocide and ethnocide, the latter did have an impact on the disappearance of the San and deserves attention in our final analysis. Nevertheless, Adhikari’s book is a highly recommended textbook to all who are interested in the subject.

Piet Erasmus, *University of the Free State*


Eric Allina’s book about forced labor regimes in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique bears more than merely titular similarities to Douglas Blackmon’s *Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II* (2008). Both volumes document the intimate relationship between global capitalism and race-based systems of slavery, but the respective regimes under the microscope also seem reflections of each other—government and private corporations acting as one; random arrests, usually for such crimes as “vagrancy” or lack of identification, to make worker quotas; the long and deadly hours of toil in mines or on plantations. Just as Blackmon’s book brought to greater public awareness the de facto continuation of slavery in the post–Civil War American South, so does Allina make a most worthy contribution to the growing body of literature on slavery and its profits in the European-occupied spheres of Africa.

*Slavery by Any Other Name,* in fact, is the first book to make use of the archives of the Mozambique Company, a collection of papers accidentally left behind in Mozambique when the company’s charter ended in 1942; these papers, missing for decades and not available for scholarly use until the 1990s, document how this company, shielded from “the public oversight that sometimes limited violent and exploitative practices in other territories,” managed to develop “a system of forced labor more efficient and extensive than any in Africa” (p. 13). Allina deftly illustrates how Portugal, lacking resources comparable to the rest of Europe from having lost Brazil earlier in the century, sought to develop its African colony of Mozambique on the cheap by outsourcing much of it to the Mozambique Company established by Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrada, Portugal’s answer to Cecil Rhodes. The company, in return for a hefty share of the profits, pledged to facilitate white settlement and carry out a “civilizing” mission.
unto the “natives.” Of course, these two things were related, for the company sought to “civilize” Africans through a regime of required labor (to rid them of their imagined indolence), usually for the operations of white farmers and industrialists, who, operating on the cheap themselves, provided little to nothing in the way of amenities or food for their workers and often whipped them for failing to meet assigned production quotas—violence which increased at month’s end, when it was time to pay the workers.

Allina expertly explicates how the Mozambique Company established a veritable police state for Africans in order to compel their labor—the company-issued official passes, the random arrests, the ever-increasing “hut taxes” designed to force those who could not pay into the labor pool, and more (even before Portugal, under António Salazar, became the only dictatorship among the colonial powers). But beyond the “big picture,” Allina is able, from the surviving documents, to replicate a localized view of how company officials negotiated with individual chiefs for the labor of their followers; how the company disrupted relationships between youth and elders, between men and women, by driving so many youths into the wage labor market; and how Africans resisted by crossing borders into British-occupied territory when they could or migrating to other employment at strategic times. If there is one criticism of this book, it is that Allina misses the occasional chance to demonstrate the extent of apparent pan-European solidarity in the face of challenges to white rule in Africa. For example, a brief mention of how Portugal received “arms and matériel from the British” during the 1917 rebellion in Barué rather surprises the reader given how much space the author devotes to illustrating the competition of these two powers, but the author fails to attach any meaning to this example of cooperation (p. 120).

In the end, white colonists’ success in Mozambique “depended on coercive state intervention to supply African labor: the state’s heavy hand must replace the market’s invisible hand” (p. 179). When the only state structure is one whose sole purpose is the pursuit of profit, the potential for atrocity is nigh limitless, for no longer exists there any sense of the “common good,” especially when the pursuit of profit is reinforced colonial racial hierarchies and a habitus of “civilization.” Allina does yeoman work in illustrating the tangle of capitalism and racism which made up Portugal’s privatized venture in Mozambique, and his book ranks among other examinations of savage colonialism on the African continent, such as Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost (1998), being a perfect volume not just for African history courses but also colonial and labor studies.

Guy Lancaster, Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & Culture


Common discussions of copyright and intellectual property usually focus on familiar media such as publications, film, television, and music, copyright being individually owned and executed by authors, publishers, or producers. However, copyright can be extended to all original, creative works, in any form – so how does copyright apply to works without singular author? This is the question that Boateng focuses on in The Copyright Thing Doesn’t Work Here:
Adinkra and Kente Cloth as Intellectual Property in Ghana. Do not be deceived by this book’s relatively short length. Into 182 pages, Boateng skillfully navigates the disciplines of legal studies, African studies, and sociology to examine the application of copyright law to the Ghanaian art forms of adinkra design and kente cloth. The introduction covers the historical and theoretical framework for her argument, including the Asante and Ghanaian historical context, intellectual property law, and implications for adinkra and kente cloth as intellectual property. Boateng devotes chapters to Asante considerations of authorship, the role that gender has in cloth production and appropriation, the limits of intellectual property law as applied to artisans, the politics and economic implications of appropriation of adinkra and kente, and global regulation of the art forms. The main debate about adinkra and kente as intellectual property is centered on the fact that these art forms are considered to be both individually and communally authored and based on social norms so that individual authorship is formally forsaken in favor of broader claims to communal authorship, although individual authors receive anecdotal credit for their work. Doing so places the work in the public domain, at which point others, particularly the Ghanaian state and those who make mass-production replicas of adinkra and kente, can benefit from the authorship of artisans without penalty. As Boateng argues, the artisans’ definitions of authorship are much more complicated than simply individual or communal, and for that reason, applications of copyright and intellectual property to adinkra and kente fall short.

Boateng’s sources are wide-ranging. While she uses oral testimony in the form of life histories and interviews as the initial basis of her argument, that argument is also thoroughly referenced and supported by works within intellectual property and copyright law, African art, and sociology and anthropology. Within intellectual property and copyright, Boateng cites works including James Boyle’s The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (2008), as well as Tsikata and Anyidoho’s “Copyright and Oral Literature,” published in Power of Their Word: Selected Papers from Proceedings of the 1st National Conference on Oral Literature in Ghana (1988), in addition to several works from the World Intellectual Property Organization. In her discussions on adinkra and kente, she especially draws upon G.F. Kojo Arthur’s Cloth as Metaphor (2001) and Doran H. Ross’ Wrapped in Pride: Ghanaian Kente and African American Identity (1998), referencing also texts such as Ivor Wilks’ Asante in the 19th Century (1975).

Where Boateng shines, however, is in her handling of sociological theory to analyze the power dynamics inherent in intellectual property law and its applications in Ghana. In her examination of Ghanaian folklore, she examines class issues, debates over tradition and modernity, and the effects of commodification, nationalism, and globalization on lawmaking and within Ghanaian culture, informed by texts such as Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (2000) and Henry Giroux’s Terror of Neoliberalism: Authoritarianism and the Eclipse of Democracy (2004). It is this analysis that elevates her work from the purely anthropological, with its use of life histories, or solely within the realm of legal studies, with its focus on copyright. Boateng’s thorough use of such sources supports her argument quite well, and the endnote citations include extra, useful details about her sources. The potential audience for this text could be anyone interested in present limits of copyright and intellectual property, as well as those interested in the complicated relationship between tradition and modernity especially as it relates to folklore. I believe anyone interested
in exploring the complex interactions and negotiations that occur when laws come in contact with reality will enjoy Boateng’s analysis.

Michelle Guittar, Northeastern Illinois University


Kenya has been a beacon of stability in the East African sub-region albeit a political milieu colored by institutionalization of violence over the years and economic marginalization, often viewed in ethno-geographic terms. Daniel Branch’s book is a presentation of statecraft and governance crisis in post-colonial Kenya, focusing mainly on the role played by elites. It ought to be noted that the violence that rocked Kenya following the 2007 elections was not a surprise episode but a simmering volcano only waiting to explode. Ethnicity as a medium of political mobilization coupled with profound divisions along regional and religious lines have characterized local politics (Ajulu 2001, p. 1). Indeed, the spate of communal violence has either been sponsored or condoned by elites in positions of power. What the author describes as “fetishisation of order” (p. 18) by successive Kenya’s ruling elites is an outcome of a strategy of informalizing state repressive institutions to serve political ends.

The volume is niftily organized, chronologically presenting dynamics of Kenyan politics under three regimes (Kenyatta 1963-78; Moi 1978-2002; Kibaki 2002-present). It is basically a blend of informed personal reflections and biographical characterization of the most influential personalities in the country’s political scene. This approach makes the author’s account of Kenya’s political history more fascinating. A reader who is fairly well informed on Kenya’s domestic politics will be intrigued by the author’s use of captivating chapter-titles, sub-headings that reflect popular local political jargons. Ironically, the text in chapter five, titled “Love, Peace and Unity, 1982-88,” paints a gloomy period, one dented by random arrests, “a democracy of torture chamber”, Wagalla massacre, and in which the author says “the country resembled a police state” (p. 165).

The book will definitely attract the attention of the academic community of political scientists, historians, and university students, especially those keenly interested in African politics. The author adeptly clarifies concepts prominent in the literature on African politics such as ethnicity, redistribution, inequality, corruption, succession politics, etc. Branch uses two sets of primary sources to compile what he calls as “archives of repression,” namely diplomatic memoirs and civil society reports. Rightly so, Branch cautions that both of these sources should be treated with care as they might have been prejudiced by strategic and political agendas of their authors.

The recurring themes of the book are ethnic chauvinism, political assassinations and corruption. The author observes that “ethnicity is not an intrinsically bad thing” but can be used to act as a restraining force on misbehaving elites jostling for power (p. 293), and that in the Kenyan case it emerged as a “response to the shortcomings of the formal economy, labour market and the state” (p. 294). As redistribution policy was abandoned by successive regimes, Kenyans made best use of ethnic networks to access land, jobs and political power. This is
essentially “neo-patrimonialism” even though the author shied away from using the term to describe patronage networks or informal client-patron power networks based on mutual favors (Brown 2004). Political assassinations of influential figures like PG Pinto, Tom Mboya, JM Kariuki, Robert Ouko, and activists Oscar King’ara and John Oulu, have marred the country’s political history. Moreover, mismanagement and scandalous deals like Goldenberg, disappearance of strategic food reserves, and Anglo Leasing, are endemic in Kenya’s governance system. They have led the author to conclude that a fundamental overhaul of politics and governance has not yet taken place in the four years since the 2007 disputed election. Branch’s conclusion that “Kenya’s politics is not best described as democratizing, but rather as a hybrid form of democracy and authoritarianism (p. 296)” is spot on.

There are, nonetheless, some sections of the book that needed improvement. A slightly enhanced analytical section on the outcome of the 2010 referendum vote would have immensely reinforced the author’s argument on the entrenched ethnic nature Kenya’s politics. The 30 percent disapproval rate, with the highest “No” vote recorded in the Rift Valley Province, is not a matter to gloss over. Thirty-one of forty-nine Rift Valley constituencies voted “No” pointing to fears expressed by the Kalenjin community of domination by other groups in the new counties (KNDR 2010, p. 27). An apparent omission also in this section is President Moi’s “No” campaign against the draft constitution. The book is silent on Moi’s role and personal reasons for opposing the draft constitution. Besides, there is no mention at all of initial mediation attempts in the post 2007 election violence by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was the first external mediator to arrive under the umbrella of the All-Africa Conference of Churches (AACC). Lastly, it is inaccurately presented that when the constitution was amended in 1991 to pave way for multiparty elections, the presidential tenure was restricted to two terms of “four” years (p. 240), instead of the inserted two five-year term limits.

Notes
1. See also Khadiagala 2008, p. 6.

References


Rasul Ahmed Minja, University of Duisburg-Essen

Authors Brock, Holm, Sørensen, and Stohl, have done a creditable job in writing a book-length analysis on fragile states, richly illustrated by case studies of Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Haiti, and which also examines both the positive and negative contributions of outsiders to these fragile states.

The authors prepare the canvas for the study by noting, in the introduction, that interstate war has been in decline since the end of the Second World War; what is not in decline, however, is the occurrence of intrastate war. Such intrastate conflict is not the exclusive province of fragile states, but, as the authors note, “where there is large-scale, intrastate violence there tends to be state fragility” (p. 2). This observation is perhaps a bit tautological, since conflict is one of the factors that tend to define state fragility, but the observation is nevertheless important, particularly since such conflict tends to spread to neighboring states. Another important observation, and perhaps one of the key reasons for studying fragile states, is that they can provide a breeding ground for terrorism and violence—something noted by U.S. leaders when “the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States . . . stated that the country was now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones” (p. 8). This threat, combined with humanitarian concerns, provides ample motivation for studying the dynamics of fragile states.

In the initial chapter the authors examine key indicators that define fragile states. These indicators are reinforced by a review of the literature and by comparison with other indices such as the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, and UN and the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) measures.

There are some striking counter-intuitive revelations in the book, such as the identification of some states that “ought to be fragile” but are not, such as Costa Rica and Botswana, which are examined in contrast to the case study countries of Afghanistan, Haiti, and the DRC. Another counter-intuitive notion is the idea of a “resource curse,” where the presence of valuable natural resources in a country can actually increase the probability of fragility, due to the intense competition for control of these resources by factional interests within the country. Sierra Leone’s “blood diamonds” are a case in point. Among the three case studies, the DRC is the most extreme example of the “resource curse.” Having oil, rubber, diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, and coltan in abundance, the DRC has never been able to use these resources to the benefit of the state in the way that Botswana has, for example, but control of these resources has proven too great a temptation for those in power who wanted to keep the wealth for themselves.

In Chapter 4, examining the options for coping with state fragility, the authors conclude that “the capacity of outsiders to address the problems of weak states is limited and . . . both domestic and international conditions make interventions problematic undertakings” (p. 97). In this chapter, the authors note that international organizations in general, and the African Union (AU) in particular, have modified their long standing policy against intervening in the affairs of a weak state, with that change justified by the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) citizens’ lives outweighing any notions of state sovereignty. Notably, the AU’s precursor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had always been reluctant to take such a bold stand.
Given the authors’ skepticism about the capability of outsiders to effect positive change in fragile states, the concluding chapter’s recommendations are tepid at best. The authors propose two things: first, “re-examine external conditions conducive to the mitigation of fragile statehood” (p. 167); second, in “cases of severe violent conflict that threaten the lives of thousands [or more] . . . international society should be ready to act with much greater speed and efficiency” (p. 170). In other words, monitor the situation of fragile states, but intervene only when the consequences of inaction appear to be disastrous.

Subject matter experts and general readers who are interested in the fate of fragile states will enjoy this book, but, considering the weighty subject matter and the combined expertise of the four scholars who wrote this study, the lack of a more dynamic series of recommendations is disappointing.

Norman Clark Capshaw, U.S. Africa Command and the University of Phoenix


Only a truly dedicated historian with the passion and the patience for minute details, including those details which are found scattered in space and time, could write this book. By organizing and interpreting such details, J. Calvitt Clarke III has rendered outstanding service to those of us who for personal or professional reasons are interested in Japan’s relations with Ethiopia. While Ethiopia had had a longstanding, and at times intimate, diplomatic relations with the United States after World War II, Ethio-Japanese relations had been eventful before World War II. But there was a gaping hole about the latter in the scholarship until now. This book is the first and fullest account of Ethio-Japanese relations before World War II.

Clarke starts out with the discourse about the notion of “the yellow peril,” the genealogy of the idea, and moves on to the history of Japan’s “colonial” ambitions in Africa and how, among other things, Europe’s changing attitudes towards Japan crushed those ambitions from the outset. What follows is a general discussion of the dilemmas of modernization Ethiopia had faced and how it generally resolved them as illustrated by the struggle that ensued between Ethiopia’s “Japanizers” and “traditionalists” in the 1920s and 1930s. The author then casts the major characters in Ethiopia who were to play central role in the debates about whether Japan could serve as a model for Ethiopia’s modernization, drawing in passing a useful comparison, including in the appendix, between the constitution of Meiji Japan (1889) and Ethiopia’s first constitution (1931). Clarke finds a “close’ resemblance between the two. It is remarkable to discover in this book that Ethiopia’s approach to modernization resembled that of Japan to some extent. Both Ethiopia and Japan showed readiness to adapt different systems of organization and thought from abroad in their respective effort to modernize their societies. Both countries put emphasis on the positive role of education in social transformation. We also learn that although Emperor Haile Selassie was committed to Ethiopia’s modernization, he was unwilling to devolve power as Emperor Meiji had done in Japan. Haile Selassie sought to perpetrate himself as “absolute monarch.” The question is whether this divergence explains
the failure of Ethiopia and success of Japan. This, of course, is an intriguing issue, which is worth exploring more fully in its own right.

Halfway into the book we are treated to the visit of Ethiopia’s foreign minister Heruy Welde Sellase to Japan from November to December 1931. Sellase later authored a book in Amharic about what he called Great Japan, which was subsequently translated into Japanese and was published in Tokyo as Dai Nihon in 1934. The same portion of the book includes critical reviews of the myth and reality of Japan’s interest in Ethiopia. This is followed by a closer examination of the changing contours of the relationship between Italy, Russia, Japan and China—again in the context of Ethio-Japanese relations. The gripping story of a “royal wedding” between an Ethiopian and a Japanese and the various reactions to it in different quarters in both countries are then dissected piece by piece.

The contending theories about political and military ties between Japan and Ethiopia are closely examined in Chapter 8 against the background of Italy’s impending assault on the East African country, the support for Ethiopia among the Japanese at the grassroots level, and the 1934 visit by Ethiopia’s first “consular secretary” to Japan, Dabba Birrou. The book’s last chapter is concerned with the official and unofficial positions of Japan vis-à-vis the Italian invasion and subsequent occupation of Ethiopia in 1935. The reactions generated by Italy’s actions in different segments of Japanese society are also carefully outlined. As part of the conclusion about Japan’s official position, the author says: “Japan has chosen an opportunistic policy toward the so-called Italo-Ethiopian war, sometimes favoring Italy, sometimes Ethiopia” (p. 162).

One of the unique features of the book is that it integrates a variety of issues relating to Ethio-Japanese relations in the 1920s and 1930s and treats them in a manner that is both engaging and stimulating, significantly raising in the process the level of discourse in this field.

Of course, the book is not flawless. To start with the title of the book, Alliance of the Colored Peoples, is somewhat misleading because there is no indication, except for some anecdotal statements, of sustained discourse either in Ethiopia or in Japan about such alliance. If anything the generalization we could draw from this book is that the driving force of Ethio-Japanese relations was more complex and that it was not solely, or even primarily, based on “pigmentational solidarity.”

Another flaw is that major events in the book are generally related only by the month and date of their occurrence, with the year rarely mentioned. This approach probably sprang out of the confidence the author placed in his readers’ capacity to know which events took place in which years. But the fact is that this system of dating makes the task of reading cumbersome at best, especially given the density of the book. No indication in the book also whether or not the author had visited Ethiopia and consulted Amharic archives there. Instead it was implied that he had not. If so, the question becomes if he was able to travel to Rome, Tokyo, and Washington for archival research, why was he unable to go to Ethiopia to do the same? Surely, language could be a barrier for the author in Ethiopia (if he does not speak Amharic), but still he could have found some way for dealing with that challenge. After all, the central issues in some of the chapters of the book included the discourse which had taken place among Ethiopian elites in one of the oldest newspapers in the country. Last but not least, Clarke uncritically repeats Jeanne Pierre-Lehman’s familiar but logically untenable assertion (p. 5) that
Japan’s victory over Russia (in 1905) inspired Ethiopia’s victory over Italy (in 1896). If this issue was tangential to the subject under discussion one could have simply ignored it as a minor distraction—but it is not. That said, however, the book is still a most welcome analysis of the history of relations between Ethiopia and Japan before World War II. Clarke Alliance of the Colored Peoples (2011) does for Ethio-Japanese relations before the Second World War what Theodore Vestal’s The Lion of Judah in the New World (2011) does for Ethio-American relations after the Second World War.

Seifudein Adem, Binghamton University


The editors introduce the argument of Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century by precisely analyzing post-colonial and post-independence Africa in the preface of the book. The analysis highlights how post-colonial and post-independence political and economic scholars described African continent, especially those with a North Atlantic cultural orientation who called Africa “The Hopeless Continent” in The Economist (p. viii). However, the twenty-first century African scholars and investors in the current analysis view Africa in a more positive manner, as a continent of hope for the world economic growth and as an active participant in international political and economic system.

The goal of the editors is to respond to the general perspective of under-representation of Africa in the mainstream international relations theory (p. viii) and as an augment to the previous volume Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory (Kevin Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., 2001) in order to align the theory with the fastest economic and social development growth of the continent in the twenty-first century. This goal makes the contribution of this book significant to the on-going debate about theoretic and contextualization of political power, sovereignty of states, conflict resolution, peace-keeping, social development, and the changing social dynamics in the continent of Africa in relation to IR. Africa is an interesting continent; politically, economically, and developmentally. For over four decades, the political economy of the continent was based on development aid from “colonial masters,” grants from financial institutions where African states were merely recipients not recognized contributors, and the policies were basically overshadowed by the definitions of the aid-giver described by the editors as “colonialist imaginations” (p. 1).

In 2010, the UN’s Millennium Development Summit was held to evaluate progress on the implementation of eight UN Millennium Goals (MDGs) by the developing countries. The Summit concluded that poverty and vulnerability to health challenges were likely to remain on the African continent due to ecological changes and most probably also exacerbated by political conflicts, energy shortage and poor management of the available natural resources (pp. 9-12). Yet, Africa is not left without hope.

Although Africa and developing world have been marginalized in IR theory debate, some scholars have argued that this is due to lack of engagement with developing world, particularly the African continent, that has resulted into living in denial of some developed world of African
positive contribution to world political and economic system. However, South Africa has emerged a member of the G20 countries; a grouping of the world’s top fastest growing economies. This is the dawn of African participation in international relations forums at a higher level.

Karen Smith, a contributor in this volume, argues that one way of including Africa as an object of study and Africans as potential agents of IR is by critically evaluating the interpretation of concepts used in IR and concepts that are absent in Western IR discourses (p. 26). The objective understanding of the concepts of political governance and democracy in Africa as a community (ubuntu philosophy) rather than individual states is critical as one considers the participation and contribution of Africa to IR scholarship at global level (p. 27). The African society is a “depend on” rather than “independent of” community in their faculty; therefore, it is crucially important for IR scholars from the English-speaking community to respect and interpret African contribution to IR scholarship with objectivity. Therefore, this scholarship should be viewed from both collectivist and individualist rather than either collectivist or individualist perspectives. Deliberate ignoring of collectivist view of political governance in Africa may raise difficulties in understanding the biasness of African contribution to IR scholarship theory in political and economic development internationally; since the world is not only comprised of individualist views, but collectivist views, identity, and culture too.

The future of Africa in IR scholarship is seemingly promising. Africa has extensively and positively contributed to political and economic development of international relations system of both developed and developing world through the slave trade, Diasporas, and post modernity participation in bilateral and multilateral political and economic forums. It is notable also that in the past two decades Africa has positioned itself in its rightful place in the world.

Paradoxically or candidly, Africa is the giant of the world political and economic development reform. Although the African continent has been negatively defined in international relations by some scholars, it is the only continent whose resources ranging from human to mineral resources have contributed significantly to the IR. Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century is a must read resource for graduate students in political science, public administration and international business administration.

George Allan Phiri, Institute of Research, Development & Training


As part of the Women’s Roles through History series, Women’s Roles in Sub-Saharan Africa provides the reader with a general and accessible over-view of women’s lives and roles in history throughout sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, the authors, Nana Akua Amponsah, PhD student at the University of Texas (Austin) and Toyin Falola, history professor at the same university, try to cover the huge cultural and social diversity in Africa together with the main historical processes that have shaped the different situations and experiences of African women.
The volume starts with a very brief chronology covering some of the outstanding events in sub-Saharan Africa in which women played an important role. Following a brief introduction, where the neglect and lack of knowledge of African women’s roles in African history is highlighted, the book touches on women’s roles in several areas, such as: courtship and marriage, family, religion, work, arts and literature, government, and education. Together with a series of black-and-white pictures, each chapter is accompanied by a complete list of notes as well as suggested readings. Moreover, at the end of the book there is a brief glossary of a series of specific terms referred to along the volume.

The first two chapters offer an overview of marriage as an institution, which despite being more a sort of social, political and economic transaction, favoring the group’s position in society, rather than the individual, romantic love, and the courtship process was, and still is, an important factor to accept or reject the marriage contract. Indeed, romantic love goes beyond the Western ideal of exclusivity and has always been a strong component in ancient African societal systems. Moreover, this part of the book provides an overview on the delicate topic of the still-existing arranged marriages and women’s role in marriage within the realm of family and kinship, paying special attention to female or matrilineal descent systems. The following chapter touches on the gendered nature of religion, focusing special attention on women’s roles in traditional African religions, Christianity and Islam, as well as the paradoxical impact of such religions on women’s social, cultural, political, and economic roles. Indeed, when in some cases religion has been a source of equality; in other instances it has been a source of oppression.

Chapter four deals with women’s roles in the labor market; going from the traditional domestic and agricultural jobs to current positions in the labor market, which despite offering them more economic opportunities, are also a source of discrimination and sexual harassment. Linking to this issue, chapter six touches on women’s roles as political actors. While women are essential in African societies, their access to political authorities has been mostly indirect, which has been partly the result of the colonial political discrimination. Recently, however, more and more women have acquired more politically active roles, including their participation in armed combats.

Chapter five is entirely devoted to women’s roles in arts and literature and the gendered natured of such area, whereby women have traditionally used songs, poems and narratives to convey their experiences and cultural values to the new generations. Moreover, in the current economy market, women’s artworks, far from stopping, have developed their own strategies of “survival.” Finally, and in close connection with this part, the last chapter touches on women’s roles in education during three main periods: pre-colonial times, when most education was non-formal, colonial, and post-colonial times, highlighting the negative effects that gendering education had on women. While in the latter periods women’s education was scarce and aimed towards typically feminine tasks in the domestic arena, numerous governmental agencies, NGOs and scholars have been concerned with studying this lack of educational opportunities and its consequences in the labor market, namely, restricting women’s access to some public roles and increasing their poverty levels, compared to men.

All in all, it can be said that the book offers quite an optimistic vision of the different roles women play in sub-Saharan African societies, trying to step away from either the traditional image of victimized women or some few cases of powerful queen mothers or spiritual leaders.
as agents of dramatic change. Although it is true that the vast diversity of women in this region cannot be categorized in these two groups, and that many socioeconomic and political achievements in the continent have been developed thanks to many “ordinary” women, it should also be noted that, considering the huge diversity in the sub-Saharan continent, the book is quite interesting as a mere introductory text to the issue, but is, on the whole, too wide in contents and geographical scope.

Ester Serra Mingot, Student of the European Master in Migration and Intercultural Relations


Focusing on the post-apartheid Namibian state, this first monograph of anthropologist John T. Friedman intrigues from the onset in its attempt to constitute the “state itself as an ethnographic object of study” (p. 3). In a methodologically novel way, Friedman approaches the Namibian state through an exploration of state-related political imaginations among people of Kaokoland in northwestern Namibia—conceptualized as the multiple ways in which Kaokolanders “perceive, talk about, represent, construct as well as experience the Namibian state” (p. 8). In capturing such state imaginings in Kaokoland, explicitly chosen for its geographical and political marginality vis-à-vis the post-apartheid Namibian state, the author relies on study of colonial archives and extensive fieldwork conducted primarily in and around the region’s capital town Opuwo in 2000, 2001, and 2008. In particular, he focuses on the notions of government (Part 1), courts (Part 2), and chieftainship (Part 3) as a prism through which to refract political imaginations of Kaokolanders and thus “ethnographise” the Namibian state.

Part 1, “Govern-mentality in Kaokoland,” draws from Foucault’s conception of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ in investigating competing discourses on the art of government in the region. Through the study of colonial archives and extensive key informant interviews, Friedman skilfully maps how Kaokolanders (primarily Herero and Himba) relate to and what they expect from the post-apartheid Namibian state. The dominant discourse he uncovers is marked by a “diminished entitlements and services” critique: while the South African apartheid regime was perceived as a reliable provider of services, the post-apartheid Namibian state stresses individualistic responsibility towards the state. This seems to contradict the local notion, informed by the colonial past, that “the state is literally expected to feed and nourish the individual directly—like a father does his child” (p. 80). With the dawn of the post-apartheid state in Namibia, a feeling of abandonment often expressed in terms of “apartheid” now prevails in the region, which, Friedman suggests, can also be read as a “moral indictment of neo-liberal democracy generally” (p. 96). The prominence of paternalism within the political imagination in Kaokoland is thus a historically created as well as creative element shaping the contemporary citizen-subject/state relationship.

This dialectical process is further explored in Part 2, “Courts, Laws and the Administration of Justice,” in which Friedman examines the administration of legal pluralism in Kaokoland as another prism through which to explore political imagination in the region. Through detailed trial records, notes and key informant interviews, he skillfully disentangles the ways in which
Kaokolanders perceive both the legal judicial order orchestrated by the state exemplified in the magistrate court, and the application of traditional customary law as exercised through traditional courts. Great attention is paid to re-drawing lines of arguments advanced by plaintiffs and litigants in choosing either type of court, and the respective measures taken in response to the impeachment of law. Charting how judicial experiences shape state-related imaginings, the notion of paternalism again emerges powerfully: the magistrate court is discursively produced as “a-parental” (p. 171) because its institutes punitive rather than restorative or compensatory measures, thus said to neglect collective familial responsibility. In contrast, considerations pertaining to the social embeddedness of offenders and litigants are of central importance in proceedings of the generally preferred traditional courts.

Part 3, “Chiefship and the Post-Apartheid State,” draws from historical record to show how leadership claims in the region are based on classic examples of “invented traditions” shaped by immigration histories and colonial administration processes. Thus caused fusions and fissions of chieftainship in Kaokoland have also left an imprint on the relationship with the post-apartheid state. In negotiating political belonging, the wider trope of “family” again assumes central importance. Patrilineal descent determines one’s association with a certain chief, and hence affiliation with one of Kaokoland’s two traditional authorities. Belonging to a certain traditional authority in turn grounds one’s party alignment and political positioning vis-à-vis the state—thus primarily ascribed through descent. Again, a thread from child to chief is being spun, critically influencing how the state comes to be imagined through the prism of family and kinship. Further, as it is the post-apartheid state which bestows traditional authorities with representation powers and political leverage, it is also shown how civil and traditional governing structures are not two separate spheres but are in fact intimately infused (p. 180), thus offering an interesting perspective on the often cited legal bifurcation of the post-colonial African state (Mamdani, 1996).

_Imagining the Post-Apartheid State in Namibia_ is a stimulating addition to contemporary debates of state processes in Africa, highlighting the potential contribution of anthropological inquiry to such research. However, Friedman’s conceptualization of paternalism as the overarching theme may at times be stretched too far. For example, it is suggested that the magistrate court is perceived as “a-parental” due to the fact that it institutes punitive rather than compensatory measures. Arguably though, a paternalistic relationship also entails punishment and acting against a child’s will in order to impose certain values—the observed aversion to the punitive model of justice might thus be not fully explained by what Friedman calls “an implicit longing for a more paternalistic state” (p. 171). Further, while the notion of paternalism entrenched in the Kaokolander’s political imagination is the unifying theme across the book, it follows loose strands rather than one thread, rendering the reading experience challenging at times. Yet, Friedman’s innovative approach—ethnographically capturing the state through the political imaginations of those who inhabit it—succeeds in yielding fascinating insights pertaining to the mutually constitutive relationship between government and the governed and thus opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry. Scholars of political science, social anthropology and development studies alike will greatly benefit from this thought-provoking study.
References


Ina Rehema Jahn, University of Oldenburg


Britain and Africa under Blair: In Pursuit of the Good State (2011) is a rich and perspicacious analysis of the weight of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s presence in Africa during his premiership. Writing from the position of experience (having worked for the Foreign Office in the early 2000s) and intellectual rigor (as an expert on international relations), Julia Gallagher presents to us a rich account of New Labour’s political commitment to the Kleinian “development of individual subjectivities through relationships” (p. 5), cosmopolitanism and communitarianist ideal that resonate with thin, far-off social networks. Put simply, this is about conceiving of (international) politics as more of building relationships than an instrument for oppression as well as one-upmanship.

Thus, from the adumbration of Tony Blair’s humanitarian wars in Africa to the moralizing of Robin Cook’s ethical elements to New Labour’s language of idealism in foreign policy and to Gordon Brown’s “helping the Third World” (p. 12) mantra, the emphasis is using the platform of international relations to better the plights of suffering people in Africa (particularly Nigeria and Sierra Leone). The book is also about Britain helping in deepening African continent’s consolidation of democratization, freedom and wellbeing. It is in the pursuit of this good state of affairs that finds materiality in shared values and human development that Blair’s passion for Africa comes to the fore:

For Blair, Africa was intrinsic to the doctrine of international community, part of his wider plan to make the world better: it was, according to one political rival, ‘Blair’s badge of morality, moral honour … [Africa came] to embody the ethical dimension of foreign policy’ (p. 13).

Taking the basis of her argument from a constructivist perspective, Gallagher stated that under Blair Britain’s core principle in international relations about Africa is anchored in “ethical approach to politics” (p. 1). This goes to explain that Blair (even Gordon Brown) considered international politics as an extension of domestic political community. To this end, as New Labour envisioned about Africa, constructivism utilizes “… alternative ontology to explain and interpret aspects of world politics that were anomalous to neo-realism and neo-liberalism” (Burchill et al, 2005, p. 195). It is also within these parameters that we can pursue the good state: the Durkheimian ideal community.

Britain and Africa under Blair is a book with seven chapters excluding the conclusion chapter, as well as bibliography and index; earlier drafts of chapters 4, 5, and 6 had appeared in the journal, Millennium: Journal of International Politics and African Affairs in 2009. The book has a robust theoretically/conceptual basis as well as empirical scaffold: this is based on “fifty
interviews and informal discussions conducted in 2007 [by the author] with British MP’s, former ministers and government officials, and with Sierra Leonean and Nigerian political activists, journalists and academics’’ (p. 23). The semi-structured nature of the interviews conducted paints in a bold relief the validity, reliability and naturally occurring manner of facts extracted during the interviews. The people interviewed were given the opportunity to say things as they were rather than being boxed in by the interviewer’s cues and prompts.

Although the book weaves a good tapestry of Gallagher’s hands-on knowledge of Africa, intellectual agility, and ability to manage empirical data, I do not buy into the idea that Blair’s mission in Africa was totally altruistic; Britain’s “do-good imperialism” (Cooper 2001, p. 29) mission in Africa during the colonial era, a metonymy of New Labour’s engagement in Africa, was hiding with a knife! This experience leaves so many questions unanswered about Britain and Africa under Blair.

The book should make a good read for anybody interested in apprehending the color of British politics in contemporary Africa, ethical leadership and international relations, which are vital in the age of globalization and human side of politics.

References


Uzoechi Nwagbara, *Greenwich School of Management*


This edited volume seeks to portray the complexity of late colonial history in Zambia. It accomplishes this goal by shedding light on conflicts in the nationalist movement, chiefly and religious institutions and experiences of Western and Asian communities.

Andrew Roberts provides the context for the following twelve contributions, which cover Northern Rhodesia from 1945-1964. He reminds us that the copper industry only began to prosper from 1949, that the trade union legislation allowed Africans the same bargaining rights as white unionists, and Africans increasingly managed to represent their views and interests in the public and political sphere. Giacomo Macola reinterprets the split of the ANC (African National Congress) into the ZANC (Zambia African National Congress) and UNIP (United National Independence Party) as an eruption of socio-economic and ethnic cleavages. He claims that the split was a clash between Bemba-speakers vs. Bantu Botatwe, as well as between waged workforce in the Copperbelt and its vast hinterland vs. rural-based agricultural producers in the Southern and Central Provinces. His argument, however, is not persuasive: that some Tonga militants interpreted criticism against ANC president Nkumbula as criticism against a non-Bemba leader, that Nkumbula lacked the authority to end Copperbelt beer-halls boycotters, that seven opposing party officials were Bemba or from urban centers, and that Nkumbula
predominantly addressed the concerns of Southerners in a Southern Province meeting. All these incidents do not provide enough reasons and evidence to support his claim. It seems like his description of the internal differences within the party point rather to underlying power struggles, problems of authority, representation and legitimacy.

Walima Kalusa’s case study of a paramount chief shows his ambivalent relationship to the nationalist parties and the colonial government. Interestingly, he only joined the liberation struggle to bow to the masses of his people, simultaneously trying to preserve his power and autonomy. Marja Hinfelaar helps us understand how religious authority in the form of Catholic movements informed political attitudes, action and public debate. She sketched important features such as their concern with morality, resistance, and conformity to the colonial government and how mission schools shaped the Christian identity of elites. Kenneth Vickery presents a biographical account of Dixon Konkola, Railway Union and Union Congress president, as well as the first president of UNIP, at least for a few weeks. Ian Phimister portrays the lifeworlds of white miners on the Copperbelt around 1959, their affluence, material culture, racist attitudes, as well as the composition of well-educated staff (mostly British) and semi- or unskilled daily-paid workers (mainly from South Africa). Joanna Lewis depicts the commemorations of David Livingstone in 1955 as predominantly white, generalizing how “the white community in Livingstone” and how “the Africans” perceived the celebrations. I wonder whether her newspaper reports provide enough evidence to support her conclusions, especially since she neglects that public perceptions were probably more diverse. The unit of analysis was also not clearly defined in Jan-Bart Gewald’s contribution on the association of rumors with colonial fears and African aspirations concerning the Mau Mau in Kenya. More attention would be needed to differentiate who listened to whom, who believed whom, when, why, and who did not. Friday Mufuzi documents the political actions by Indian traders in Livingstone against their discrimination, some of them even supporting the African parties. Joan Haig conducted interviews in which Hindus emphasized the creation of a collective identity and feeling of belonging while pushing back past experiences of segregation and hardship. Christopher Annear reinterprets data collected by Ian Cunnison. Annear argues that storytelling, instead of being part of the “essential character of The Luapula Peoples,” was rather a strategy of recent migrants attempting to secure rights to land and fishery. Finally, Andrew DeRoche’s chapter deals with two female American diplomats who shaped US policy towards Africa.

The narrative character makes this volume an enjoyable read. However, Zambian studies have more potential to contribute to basic disciplines. Most of the articles explore a particular topic over a specific period, but a research problem would also include a question and its significance. I argue that research on Zambia should not be content with simply enhancing our knowledge on its society, but also address a wider audience by contributing to debates on concepts, theories and methodology. In my opinion, several of the case studies could be used to refine concepts and theories on the public sphere, authority, moral debate, political criticism and opposition, as well as assimilation and exclusion strategies of expatriates. And this is a chance that we should take.

Esther Uzar, University of Basel

The author employs a Fanonian theoretical and ideological framework in his penetrating critique of post-apartheid South Africa in an earnest commitment to the aspirations and “living politics” of the shack dwellers of South Africa. It is a highly important work that illustrates the relevance of Fanon’s philosophy of liberation to the socio-economic and political developments in South Africa since the ANC formed the country’s first multi-racial democracy in April 1994 to date. In short, “ultimately a Fanonian perspective insists that we view the sweetness of the South African transition from apartheid as bitter, realised at the moment when ‘the people find out that the ubiquitous fact that exploitation can wear a Black face’ (Fanon 1968: 145) and that a Black, too, can be a Boer (*amabhunu amanyama*)” (p. 5).

Gibson begins examining “the problem of [South Africa’s] unfinished liberation” and specifically how Steve Biko’s philosophical interpretation of Fanon informed the conception, ethos and agenda of Black Consciousness, formed in 1969. This is the focus of Chapter 1. In the following chapter, “the specific political economic choices [that] defined and [were] made during the transition period by the nationalist political elites” (p. 74) are outlined. Such choices contributed to the prevailing systemic inequalities of South Africa in which black poverty has increased. For the author, “the shift from the Freedom Charter towards neoliberalism was an ethical shift away from ideas of the social and public good” (p. 77). This betrayal by the ANC occurred during the decade of the 1980s as the ANC elite “outmanoeuvred its opponents on the left” (p. 78), encouraged a climate of anti-intellectualism, and supported the 1986 slogan of making South Africa ungovernable.

The forms of spontaneous educative direct democracy that was spawned in the townships was hijacked by the ANC in order to create an opening in the negotiations with the white minority elite and consequently the “the rank and file of the movement became cannon fodder” (p. 95). Neither did the collapse of the USSR help the unfolding political developments, for the demise contributed to a continued defensive Stalinism within the ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) that became wedded to the politics of compromise. By the mid-1990s the ANC had fully embraced the fundamentalism of the market—heralding a shift away from a radical social-democratic paradigm. Consequently discussions on alternative conceptions of a future South Africa were silenced.

“The New ‘reality of the nation’” (the focus of chapter 3) has been the rise of a small but significant black bourgeoisie through the adoption of the Black Economic Empowerment program (BEE). Gibson contends the program “is essentially a conservative project that acts against empowering poor communities by naturalizing poverty and reinforcing the neoliberal status quo.” (p. 121). The consequences of neoliberalism are examined and the new forms of spatial apartheid in the affluent gated communities as well as how the ANC elite has appropriated Biko’s Black empowerment for narrow class interests that excludes the black majority.

The history of the founding of the shack dwellers movement—*Abahlali base Mjondolo*—is presented in chapter 4, entitled “Unfinished Struggles for Freedom.” Here, the author presents a detailed socio-economic and political context of the struggles of the shack dwellers and how they draw parallels with former struggles against apartheid but also their differences. However,
the people of the shacks with their “shack intellectuals” such as S’bu Zikode are demanding not only the right to houses promised them by Nelson Mandela’s government, but dignity, recognition and a right for their demands to be fulfilled in the unfinished project of emancipation. More importantly, Gibson is convinced that their democratic collectivist methods of solving community and societal problems is the new way forward for South Africa in adopting creative and people-centered strategies or what the organization calls a “living politics.” In their boycott of the 2005 municipal elections they sought to remind the ANC that their vote could not be taken for granted in the slogan: “No Land, No House, No Vote” (p. 156). Gibson claims: “Just as the struggle against apartheid brought the vote, the shack dwellers’ struggle has challenged the meaning of the vote and given a voice to the poorest of the poor” (p. 157).

The final chapter, “Xenophobia or a new humanism?” is a further enunciation of the Fanonian principles and thinking of Abahali. It is committed to political self-education and eschews the Manichean thinking of illegal and legal shack settlements, insisting that regardless of their culture, ethnicity and language, all are entitled to membership. The latter is made up of Indians, Pondo, Xhosa, young, and old in a cosmopolitan urban reality. Unquestionably, in challenging the legacies of post-apartheid South Africa, Abahali offers an inspiring new vision of inclusive democracy and an alternative politics for not only the southern region but the rest of Africa.

Ama Biney, Independent Scholar, London


Rebecca Ginsburg provides an impressive anthropologic account on black domestic labor during the apartheid period in South African Republic. The main focus is on small everyday interactions of domination and resistance, emotional experiences of racial inequality, and provisional yet strictly observed boundaries between blacks and whites in the intimate spaces of their lives, i.e. the family homes. The book is divided into five chapters, each dealing on different aspect black domestic labor in apartheid era Johannesburg.

The first chapter, “Getting to Know the Corners,” illuminates the general landscapes of Johannesburg, spatial arrangement of urban spaces, limiting “influx of natives into the towns” (p. 37), keeping races apart from each other and permitting just limited contact and interaction. It explains how white families became increasingly dependent upon black domestic labor; attracting black women into urban areas. Upon arrival, blacks faced challenges of getting to know the place and learning to navigate safely through the spaces that were predominantly white.

The second chapter, “The Tempo of Kitchen Life,” illuminates the nature of black domestic labor in white household. Within the shared domestic space, boundaries between races are unstable, negotiated and still carefully observed. Simple acts of life—bathing, eating, sitting—become subject of racial negotiations. The domestic hierarchies mean limited availability of recourses as food, technology of domestic space. The author shows the strategies of defacement
and surveillance of domestic workers and their resulting sufferings of being constantly observed, controlled, reduced to silent and invisible, and feeling of “not belonging to yourself.”

The third chapter, “Children and Leaving,” addresses childcare related responsibilities of domestic workers. As black women have had to leave their own kids in rural areas, the white babies became substitute for their maternal needs. The deep mutual fondness between them lasted normally until child reached age of five. Then, he started internalize racist attitudes and turned from “affectionate white toddler to racially prejudiced white child” (p. 96). The chapter illuminates significant, yet underestimated aspect of inequality, i.e. unequal distribution of maternal love and care.

The fourth chapter, “Come in the Dark,” addresses issues related emotional needs of the black domestic workers. Many domestic workers, although under continuous surveillance, suffered extreme social and emotional isolation. Black domestic workers regularly conducted acts of disobedience, i.e., hosting black visitors on white property (their own children, girlfriend maids, or their male visitors). There were high risks involved; it required mastery of ruse and pretending.

The fifth chapter, “House Rules,” reveals specific spatial arrangements within the house. The house was divided into different spheres of limited presence and limited visibility. While black domestic workers were “unapologetically present” in the kitchen, they turned into “unnoticeable” during family even or social gatherings. The arbitrary domestic boundaries differed strongly depending on social background of house owners; rules were revised due the feminist movement in and to growing international pressure against Apartheid politics since 1960s. Yet the boundaries had been pushed and transgressed on daily basis both by blacks and whites. The house itself, the author says, became a site of “bitter and heartfelt racial negotiations” (p. 163).

Apartheid might be defined in many its aspects: racist ideologies, punitive practices, economic inequality, emancipatory struggles, or double consciousness resulting from long term subordination. The author illuminates a significant yet underestimated aspect, that of social sufferings resulting when one’s social and emotional needs are not and cannot be met. It is deprivation of emotional intimacy and experience of belonging, of normal bonding practices within family and community, of personal time and personal space, of maternal case and spousal intimacy. It is experience of defacement, of being exposed to continuous control and surveillance and subjected to someone’s will, and finally, feeling of not belonging anymore to oneself.

This is a book about silent domestic war of crossing invisible boundaries and conquering new territories, even if it meant simply sitting on the whites’ furniture or drinking from employer’s glasses. It tells how subordinates struggle, within limited spaces and limited recourses, to get their social and emotional needs met. Commenting on interracial relations within white households of apartheid period, the author calls it relations of love, “the fractured, conflicted, pathological, self-doubting love that often exists among family members in a dysfunctional household, but love nonetheless, including fondness for, knowing of, and dependence upon another person” (p. 138). The statement is subject of debate, yet it sheds new light in understanding social dynamics and dependencies under inequalities of power.
The book is a great success. It unveiling different aspects of domination and subalternship, ways of resistance, cooperation and collaboration, traumatizing experiences and of subaltern mind. Although the book does not offer lot of theorizing, it is of great interest to anyone familiar with classical works by Hannah Arendt, James Scott, Erving Goffman, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, Henri Lefebvre, Judith Lewis Herman, et cetera. No doubt, the book is worth to be listed among the classics, too.

Rasa Balockaite, Vytautas Magnus University


Child Migration in Africa explores how one of the most vulnerable groups of people, children, engage in migration in Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire without the company of their birth parents. The authors who have demonstrated their knowledge about the subjects and their environment are Iman Hashim, an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Kulter University, who has done extensive work on children’s migration in Ghana, and Dorte Thorson, a teaching fellow at the Department of Geography and Environment Science, University of Reading, who has done an extensive work on children including ethnographic research with children and adolescents migrating between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire.

The authors argue that even though the child migration in Africa might be characterized as exploitation and child trafficking across the globe, the migrant children see it as a rite of passage, as empowerment, as economic improvement, and as a means to help them pay for their school. Similarly, even though poverty is the chief reason the children migrate, the poorest children do not actually migrate because they cannot afford bus tickets.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first highlights literature concerning child welfare not only in Africa but in the Western world. It addresses the UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations, including the popularly ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1989 as well as the Africa Union (AU) Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (AU 1990). They differentiate African childhood from that of the Western hemisphere, saying that West African “children of all ages are perceived to be part of the social relations surrounding the family because this provides them with material, social and symbolic safety and well-being” (p. 8). This indicates that African childhood is more complex because it intertwines the above-mentioned dynamics. Children usually have a connection, such as their family members or friends already at the place of migration.

Chapter two discusses the impact of the economic and social environment in relation to the root and the impact of boys’ and girls’ ambitions to relocate “family members’ incentives to permit or discourage their children’s movement” (p. 16). The authors wonder why children wander about unsupervised, apparently unlike some other societies. They note that the migration is a search for identity for the children. The authors use narratives of the participants to show the complexity of child migration in Africa. Based on their study, the authors note that
children are never coerced by adults to work. Yet, children are normally present in the work environment and are encouraged to engage in minimal tasks like helping their parents and older siblings, fetching water, or babysitting younger ones. Children pride themselves on working and they are rewarded from the proceeds, which they use to purchase little items. Based on the cases the authors studied, boys normally run away from home or migrate without the permission and/or knowledge of their parents, unlike girls, who seek permission and often feel reluctant to run away.

Chapter three articulates the authors’ research with the children concerning their migration. All the participants knew they were limited to any employment that required literacy. Only four out of seventy-five children interviewed for the project have obtained a high school diploma. The chapter concludes that “the discourse on poverty and lack of opportunity to earn money in rural communities dominates the justification for migration” (p. 63). Yet, ambition to be familiarized with the city, the ability to purchase new things such as bicycles, and the ability to assist family members unveil “the many layers of motivation underneath the poverty discourse” (p. 63). The authors found that at times the migration of children is a result of conflicts in the family.

Chapter four focuses on the trips and arrivals of child migrants to their new destinations, as well as the migrant networks that might facilitate and construct children’s experience of migration. This could take the shape via impromptu arrangements. The authors highlight some instances in which a child would follow a stranger he or she has just met to work. One child migrant said, “[H]e told me to come with him and I did, even though I didn’t know if he was going to kill me or what. He promised to find work for me where I’d earn 50,000 CFA francs [$94] in one year” (p. 65). The authors discover that journeying is part of the extensive migrant network. Only a handful of children embark on the journey alone when travelling outside their rural areas. They also travel in pairs or groups in order to make it an amicable social event. Another reasons associated with migration to urban areas is that it commands respect for the migrant.

Chapter five gives an account of an array of vulnerabilities the children may face in their quest for a better life, which includes exploitation and refusal of payment to children by employers. Further, migration is a result of deep poverty and an urge for autonomy. Child migrants are regularly criticized by the adults, citing that they are vulnerable to dangerous work and exploitation. On the contrary, “this [is] part of their enactment of self” (p. 96) in the course of proving to adults that they possess the resilience of enduring adversity and the ability to earn an income. They also reject being treated as children so they negotiate their societal arrangement. The authors note that employers take advantage of migrant children and youths. They deliberately delay paying children wages even upon relatives’ intervention. Even though there are structural inequalities in place, some migrants get money to support them as they go to school.

The final chapter took “up the theme of children’s agency in their migration in order to challenge representations of child migrants as passive victims of exploitation, lacking an active role in decision-making and migration processes” (p. 113). But the authors hesitate in “taking this position too far, as … [the authors] do not want to represent children as completely autonomous agents.” Alternatively, they emphasize that their choices are a result of several,
evolving ambitions and opportunities that the authors constructed within a variety of constraints and boundaries.

In sum, *Child Migration in Africa* is well articulated by informing us of the critical and cultural aspects, as well as underlying issues behind child migration in Africa, which can be easily interpreted or misunderstood. Also, it contributes to the body of work that examines children’s lived experiences and how youth are dynamically participating in (re)constructing, negotiating and challenging their worlds through migration.

Uchenna Onuzulike, Howard University


History is there to refine our conception of reality. Today’s Zambian political atmosphere is overwhelmed by persuasions of the people associated with Barosteland in the Western province to secede from Zambia in order to regain political and economic autonomy. The Barosteland Agreement of 1964 on which the unitary state Zambia was build was abrogated in 1965 during the Constitutional Amendment. Reluctance by government to re-instate it led activists in Mongu district on January 14, 2011 to a bloodshed riot. In the context of such experiences, Miles Larmer’s critical study of the realities of late-colonial and post-colonial Zambia becomes relevant. Larmer challenges the idea that there was a certain homogenous orientation towards nation building in Zambia. Utilizing archival records of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Archives, the National Archives of Zambia, and interviews with surviving participants Larmer displays an appealing perspective of conceptualizing Zambian political history within African post-colonial politics. His work is substantiated by a critical examination of available historical accounts.

In the introductory notes, Larmer identifies the previous narratives’ alignment with ideologies of nationalism, developmentalism, and modernization at the expense of recognizing internal differences as limitations. Chapter one develops further the view that embraces heterogeneity and divisions. He shows how ethnicity, class divisions, and differences in ideologies marked political orientations in the run-up to independence and how these differences were reflected within UNIP. For example, Larmer discusses how the ANC, UNIP and other breakaway parties were regionally constructed, how each ethnic region identified its specific leader, and how each leader differed. Simon Kapwepwe sought to reconcile modernist nationalist’s policies with enduring respect for Bemba cultural heritage. Harry Nkumbula, from the stronghold of Southern Province, sought to mobilize direct African action against federation through trade unions. Kenneth Kaunda, the UNIP president since 1959 had a non-aggressive approach; his authority was at times questionable; much of his authority and position rested in external endorsement. Kaunda’s questionable ethnic background allowed him to emerge as the first President of Zambia. However, Larmer shows that UNIP and indeed Kaunda did not remain in power as a coherent product of people’s aspirations for national identity but through successive repression of political opponents. Following the abrogation of the Barosteland Agreement UNIP lost popularity in the Western Province (pp. 55-56). Discontented freedom
fighters, killings at Lumpa Church, banning of chitemene system of farming, and increased taxation caused UNIP to lose support in the Northern Province and Copperbelt.

Chapters two and three develop an intriguing story on the discontentment of 1970s, showing how the banned ANC and the UPP supporters found expression within the one party system. Their rejoining of UNIP brought about internal divisions; to stop such Kaunda introduced national, provincial, and district security committees (p. 99). In chapter four Larmer continues showing how the unhappiness led the rural rebels under Mushala to seek military means of overthrowing the government. Mushala, a sidelined freedom fighter acting as voice of the neglected people of North Western Province, opposed Kaunda’s one-party state but without a well thought-out plan. He was killed in 1982. Chapter five concerns the educated minority Zambians; they too were critical during the economic decline and illegitimate leadership, and they saw the regional liberation movements as draining the country’s economy. With figures like Valentines Musakanya they organized a coup plot in 1980, which eventually failed.

In chapter six, Larmer turn to the relationship of Zambia with South African apartheid and locates the flow of his account in the context of the liberation movements that existed in Zambia. In chapter seven, he tells us how anti-colonial social movements effectively worked in post-colonial political transitions. He includes the contributions made by the Catholic Church, Watchtower, Alice Lenshina’s Lumpa Church, and the Protestants and events leading to MMD’s economic liberal strategy. The epilogue gives snippets to the subsequent events. The conclusion projects Zambian “history of opposition” on Africa.

This book certainly corrects many distortions in Zambia with few notable limitations. Larmer’s interviews seem to marginalize prominent female figures and Kenneth Kaunda. It manifests a certain bias to “supernatural” stories; for instance, Larmer cites a single witness to Mushala’s reliance on magical powers (p. 152). Similarly, such stories associated with Alice Lenshina activities are overlooked. Finally, church related documents are missing in chapter seven.

This book is highly recommended to those with political ambitions and interests, to educators, to clergy members, and to all Zambian citizens.

Brian Nonde CMM, Mariannhill Institute


This book is an in-depth, masterful analysis and discussion of the landscape of memorialisation and commemoration in South Africa in the two decades since the end of Apartheid. For her analysis Marschall draws on a variety of sources including interviews and statements by government and heritage officials, marketing material, feedback from the public as well as the analysis of the symbolism and physical form of numerous South African monuments and memorials from both a local and international perspective. While much of this discussion has been presented in article form elsewhere, this book brings all aspects of the project together in a dense, multi-layered volume that addresses the political and socially contentious nature of South Africa’s memory landscape as well as the potential that such memorialisation offers for
nation-building and reconciliation. As such, the book largely focuses on new monuments and memorials that have been erected mainly by governmental parties since the election of the African National Congress government in 1994. Where applicable, old monuments erected by previous political regimes are discussed as many of these have been subject to re-interpretation or are used as touchstones for new installations. Marschall’s interest is primarily in the role that public commemorative markers play in providing a space for healing and grieving, for nation-building, as well as solidifying official versions of history and political reality.

The book is composed of ten chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. There is one chapter on conservation issues and the policy background pertaining in South Africa, especially the new heritage framework put in place after the institution of democracy including, for example, an emphasis on the importance of intangible heritage. It is an importance that is not always reflected in new heritage installations, which Marschall argues and demonstrates throughout the book still tend to draw primarily on the existing western language of monumentality.

Chapters two to four focus on the role that memorials play in helping individuals, communities and nations deal with traumatic and violent pasts. While this may sometimes result in division because of differing ideas of how such a past or individuals should be honoured, they do serve to help restore dignity through the public acknowledgement of suffering.

Chapter five discusses the way in which prominent, existing markers of commemoration have been dealt with. The prevailing approach has not been the widespread tearing down or displacement of such markers but rather their contextualisation, slight alteration to be more inclusive, or balancing by the erection of a new monument that tells the other side of the story.

The remaining four chapters explore the links between these markers, nation-building, the solidification of particular interpretations of the past, and the role that monuments play in the commodification of heritage. This is discussed with reference to initiatives such as the National Legacy Project and, particularly, Freedom Park, designed as a symbolic centre for the New South Africa. Issues of politicized identity such as gender and the “Africanization” of the memory landscape are also discussed. The chapter on the Monument to the Women of South Africa is devoted to the gendered dynamics of the new landscape of memory, the marginalization of women in this process and the relationship between gender and national identity. The chapter on Africanization looks at the role that new monuments can play in providing a critical response to existing monuments, such as that at the Blood River/Ncome battle site in Kwazulu-Natal. The aesthetic influence of old monuments on the design of the new is also discussed. Monuments and memorials may also come to be tourism draw cards. The presence of tourism can have profound effects on the way in which the past is presented and ultimately packaged. This is the topic of the final chapter.

Marschall sets out in this book to not only provide us with a survey of the current heritage landscape of public commemoration in South Africa but also to critically interrogate it. She does this throughout, situating the discussion, where necessary against the broader backdrop of monuments and memorials elsewhere, such as post-Communist Eastern Europe and assessing the degree to which such heritage installations achieve their objectives. Such study touches upon many different fields of inquiry. As such, this book is likely to be of interest to a wide
range of scholars and heritage managers including historians, art historians, anthropologists, archaeologists, museologists, psychologists, policy makers, heritage administrators, community organisers, and those in tourism studies.

Natalie Swanepoel, University of South Africa


Writing an anthropological study that speaks to political scientists is anything but a walk in the park. In his first book, Mike McGovern accomplishes this difficult task masterfully. Making War in Côte d'Ivoire has the ambitious goal of explaining how it was possible that for five years, from 2002-2007, Côte d’Ivoire was trapped in a situation of “neither war nor peace” (Chapter 6). To clarify this notion, the book’s seven chapters are woven around two central questions: why does violence take place and under what circumstances does it become less devastating than expected, especially when compared to other conflicts in Africa (p. xxii)?

In order to answer these questions the author employs a constructivist framework and adopts a qualitative research agenda that challenges the parsimony of rational choice approaches. However, McGovern does not intend to produce “a postmodern lark, questioning the reality of the facts it purports to explain” (p. xx). His argument is a multi-causal explanation of the Ivorian conflict and pays particular attention to the contradictions between and within the country’s many disparate groups (young vs. old, north vs. south, Muslim vs. Christian, autochthones vs. strangers) and how they may be aligned or played off against each other (pp. 24-25).

Starting with an anecdote of French skinheads who visited Côte d’Ivoire in 2003 to study how Laurent Gbagbo’s socialists mobilize the youth in their country, the first chapter invites the reader to think about Côte d’Ivoire’s culture, languages, and history in terms of contrasts before passing into a chronology of the events that led to the crisis of 2002.

The second chapter, conceptualized as an “anthropology of stereotypes” (p. 35), reflects upon different forms of violence over the past 150 years, the concepts of “thirdness,” warfare, economy, and personhood, which all play parts in the conflict. A full understanding of the conflict—according to the author—only emerges when the process of history is taken seriously and single events are contextualized within the larger picture.

In the third chapter, the book turns from the general to the concrete. McGovern argues that it was the reference to autochthony that allowed much violence and killings. He offers a thought-provoking interpretation by arguing that Gbagbo and the Forces Nouvelles have utilized existing local resentments in order to satisfy the goals of national elites (p. 89).

The link between decolonization and intergenerational tensions in Chapter Four could have been clearer. However, by analyzing Ivorian popular music from Zouglou to Coupé Décalé (pp. 116-22), the chapter introduces another important concept: the play frame (p. 127), according to which actors reduce reality to a simple game, helps McGovern to explain the apparent paradox of both youth violence and xenophobia in an otherwise cosmopolitan society. In this sense it serves not only as an excuse for violence, but also as a natural limit to it (p. 134). Stretching the
argument to this extent runs the risk of euphemizing the violent conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. This reservation applies to some extent to the many direct comparisons he offers to northern Europe and the United States, which—to be fair—are relativized in the afterword.

While Chapter Five stresses the importance of the cocoa filière for the Ivorian economy and its elites, Chapter Six examines the role of mid- and low-level functionaries and how they benefit from a situation of ongoing uncertainty. Together with the omnipresent references to France’s special relationship with Côte d’Ivoire, these chapters close the circle that begins with the individual, and was followed by the local, regional, national, and international levels. Lest the reader think that the book’s second central question might have become lost among anthropological concepts, Ivorian cocoa production, and Parisian nightclub music, the conclusion synthesizes the previous chapters and extrapolates three reasons that have prevented the Ivorian conflict from becoming a full blown war: the Ivorian self-image, the many actors who gain more from a hybrid situation, and the very peril of waging a war (pp. 207-08).

This cleverly conceptualized ‘inside-out’ analysis commends itself through a deep contextual knowledge and fully lives up to its interdisciplinary aspirations (Keohane 1984, p. 25). Minor criticisms include the slip in the alphabetization of the glossary (pp. xii-xiii), the inversion of the labels in Figure 9 (p. 146) and the naming of Côte d’Ivoire as Africa’s biggest coffee producer (footnote 3, p.138). Despite these quibbles, McGovern convincingly guides the reader through his sophisticated argument. The passion of someone who has a long professional experience in the region as well as an impressive interdisciplinary academic background speaks through each and every line of the book and makes the work appealing to a broad audience.

References


Amanda McVety’s first book seems to suffer from a bit of schizophrenia; is it primarily about U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral relations from 1947-1974 and “U.S. development as foreign policy in Ethiopia” as the subtitle suggests? Or it is intended to be more a history of President Harry Truman’s Point Four program and its successor program, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)?

Readers of African Studies Quarterly will be disappointed at McVety’s portrayal of U.S.-Ethiopian relations during the Cold War, as less than a quarter of the book (approximately 55 out of 221 pages) actually deals with this relationship. In fact, it is not until chapter 5 (beginning on page 121) that discussion of U.S.-Ethiopian relations during the Cold War begins. The first four chapters are dedicated to an overabundance of background information on the intellectual origins of both modernization/development (going as far back as the Scottish Enlightenment)
and the Point Four program. Furthermore, once the case study of U.S. aid to Ethiopia begins, important topics such as the 1960 failed coup attempt against Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (an important turning about in U.S.-Ethiopian relations); Eisenhower administration discussions over whether or not to provide Addis Ababa with military aid; or the Ethiopia-United States Mapping Mission are not discussed in any meaningful way (the first being covered in one paragraph and the other two not mentioned at all).

Instead, McVety’s coverage of U.S.-Ethiopian relations focuses narrowly and exclusively on Washington’s development aid to Addis Ababa. But the author’s portrayal of this history is one sided as McVety relies exclusively on U.S. based sources. Despite mention of a research trip to Ethiopia in her acknowledgements, the only Ethiopian sources cited are the published public speeches of Haile Selassie. Even if Ethiopian governmental records are unavailable for research one would expect at the very least the author to review Ethiopian newspapers and conduct oral history interviews in order to provide the reader with some understanding for how U.S. aid to Ethiopia was viewed by Ethiopians themselves. Disappointingly, however, not a single Ethiopian newspaper or oral history interview is cited, leaving the book without an Ethiopian voice.

_Enlightened Aid_ fares better as an account of Point Four and USAID aid to Ethiopia. McVety perceptively points out that while the modernization of Ethiopia seemed mutually beneficial to both Washington and Addis Ababa, the motivations Truman and Selassie had for entering into an aid relationship often ran cross purposes from each other. According to McVety, in extending the Point Four program to Ethiopia, Truman was driven by a combination of humanitarian, paternalistic, and strategic impulses to aid Ethiopia in launching an agricultural revolution so that it could become the “bread basket” of the Middle East and, more importantly, become tied closer to the United States and therefore kept safely out of the Soviet orbit in the Cold War. Selassie, meanwhile, was more interested in leading his country through an industrial (rather than agricultural) revolution in order to increase the Ethiopian government’s (and by extension his personal) power vis-à-vis both internal (Eritrean and Oromo separatists) and external (Egypt and Somalia) enemies.

McVety makes the argument at the end of her book that the history of United States development aid to Ethiopia proves that foreign aid does not work. This might very well be the case, but one would need to present case studies from more than just Ethiopia in order to persuasively make this argument. Furthermore, before McVety can effectively argue that U.S. foreign aid has failed to improve the lives of those in the developing world, local voices need to be incorporated into such a study in order to demonstrate that the thousands of rural villagers across the developing world who had schools, wells, and irrigation systems built for them or who received famine assistance through U.S. development aid felt that such aid had done more harm than good to their lives.

Despite these aforementioned faults and the failure of _Enlightened Aid_ to be either a thorough history of U.S.-Ethiopian relations or a definitive study of the failure of U.S. development aid, McVety’s study nonetheless makes an important contribution to the historiography of U.S. efforts to modernize the developing world by providing a case study (albeit an incomplete one) of U.S. efforts to import development and modernization theories to Ethiopia. Furthermore, in this study McVety has published probably the most thorough study
of the theoretical origins of the U.S.’s first technical assistance program to the developing world, Truman’s Point Four program. For these reasons Enlightened Aid, if disappointing to Africanists, is an important read for anyone interested in the history of U.S. development aid.

Phil Muehlenbeck, George Washington University


Despite the remarkable proliferation of books on all facets of African history in the last fifty years, scholars and general readers alike still suffer from the general weakness of the genre of African biography (in quantity, quality, and variety). With the possible exception of Nelson Mandela, the broad field of significant African political, military, social, and cultural leaders has not been well served by biographers, and this is true even for those key figures who died many years, even decades, ago. In this respect, this book—which offers short, simple, but in some cases, very personal biographical sketches of ten important political leaders from that short span of time during which nearly all African states gained their independence—is a welcome addition to African historical literature.

The authors, the husband and wife team of Thomas and Margaret Melady, are accomplished professionals in the fields of diplomacy, academia, and African affairs. Mr. Melady has served as U.S. Ambassador to Burundi, Uganda, and the Vatican, and, with a PhD from the Catholic University of America, has taught at St. Johns, Fordham, and George Washington universities as well as other institutions. Mrs. Melady, who holds a doctorate from the Gregorian University of Rome, has taught on the faculties of a number of American colleges and served as president of American University of Rome.

Despite the academic credentials of the authors, however, *Ten African Heroes* is not a work of traditional scholarship, but rather a series of biographical sketches that are centered (to varying degrees) on the personal interactions that the Meladys had with each of the subjects: Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Seretse Khama, Thomas Mboya, Holden Roberto, Eduardo Mondlane, William Tubman, Sylvanus Olympio, and Ahmadou Ahidjo. A short introduction describes the historical context of the era during which Africa was experiencing “the sweep of independence” and then offers a description of Tom Melady’s early involvement with the Africa Service Institute (an organization set up in 1959 to assist African diplomats and students living the New York area). The book then includes one short chapter of just ten to fifteen pages on each leader. The Meladys focus each biographical piece around their personal interactions with the subject (when possible), which in some cases were regular and substantial, but in others were infrequent and rather inconsequential. In all cases, the authors offer favorable portraits of their subjects, and in some of them, they relate the truly unique interactions they had with the African leaders. Clearly of particular interest to the authors, the Meladys often stress the religious backgrounds and perspectives of the subjects—such as Senghor’s admission that the Jesuit scholar Pierre Teilhard de Chardin “saved him from falling victim to Marxism” (p. 17), Mboya’s deep interest in the changes then being discussed within the Roman Catholic Church, the authors’ sense that Nyerere was “a deeply religious man” who
was significantly influenced by his early educational involvement with the American Spiritan Fathers (p. 47), and Kaunda’s “commitment to non-violence” being related to “the basic Christian values that he embraced in his youth” (p. 52). The chapters also stress the ways that the Meladys sought to promote the prestige and influence of those African leaders most interested in pushing peaceful, democratic, non-communist political development in Africa. In many cases the Meladys did this by bringing African leaders to the United States to receive honorary degrees from certain Roman Catholic universities, and in other cases the Meladys worked with the ecumenical Christian community to place positive pressure on political leaders to achieve those ends.

Although some chapters have relatively little new information because the Meladys had minimal actual interaction with the African leader (for example, the chapters on Nyrere, Khama, and Tubman), the chapters on Senghor, Kaunda, Mboya, Roberto, Mondlane, and Olympio offer new and interesting stories of conversations and interactions between the authors and the specific leader. In particular, the Meladys’ discussions with Senghor about Teilhard de Chardin, their correspondence with Kaunda about how best to engage with the Portuguese regarding “their problems in Angola and Mozambique” and with the Vatican regarding a clear statement on racism, their engagement with Roberto in New York when the latter landed at the airport with a gunshot wound after an assassination attempt in Tunis (Roberto called the Meladys at home upon landing, arranged to have them meet him at the hospital that night, and went to their home upon discharge), their help in getting a memo from Mondlane on “the Catholic problem in Mozambique” to the Vatican’s permanent representative at the UN, and their early discussions with Olympio about the latter’s dispassionate efforts to force the UN to honor its obligations to its trustee territories, are new and interesting.

Each chapter concludes with a short list of books written by or about the subject, and the volume includes three appendices: The National Council of Churches Press Release of 5 June 1961, which was a statement from leading Protestant and Catholic clergy and laymen calling for the Portuguese leadership to stop the bloodshed in Angola; Senghor’s Address on the Civilization of the Universe, given at Fordham University in November, 1961, on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate (arranged by Tom Melady); and Khama’s Address on Racial Reconciliation, given at Fordham in October, 1965, after receiving his honorary doctorate (again arranged by Tom Melady).

Readers particularly interested in the lives of these ten “heroes,” or in the involvement of certain American religious groups in African affairs during the return of independence to African states, should consider reviewing the applicable chapter(s). Most scholars will find little new in them, with the exception of those intimate conversations, correspondence, and other interactions that make this book as much a memoir of the Meladys’ interaction with these African leaders as it is a series of biographies of those “African heroes.”

Lt Col Mark E. Grotelueschen, United States Air Force Academy

Kennedy Agade Mkutu’s Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley attempts to explain why there are so many small arms in circulation in North-East Africa and what their effects are on the pastoralist culture of the region. Over a period of seven years, the author researched these questions through interviews, focus groups, participant observation, questionnaires, and scrutiny of historical records.

Where the author does well is in describing the historical and anthropological culture of the pastoral societies of North East Africa, especially the intra- and inter-ethnic conflicts between them. This book looks at the dynamics of the pastoralist life in the region to explain why there is such a demand for arms. Agade Mkutu notes that “as pastoral life revolves around cattle, so does pastoral conflict” (p. 13). The increase in regional arms needs is inversely correlated with decreased access to water and pasture for the cattle. Additionally, changes in the traditional tribal power structure brought about by the imposition of artificial borders during the colonial period have reduced traditional means of resolving conflicts.

Mkutu also succeeds in describing the impact of small arms proliferation on pastoralist society in terms not just of economic cost but human impacts as well. This includes not only injuries and death but also the shifting gender roles caused by the greater numbers of widows, increased child dependency rates, and increasing inequality in the distribution of wealth via cattle.

The book’s major failing is its third chapter which describes the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The author is exceptionally informative in describing the paths that weapons take into the Rift and how they accumulate in different regions. That said, he apparently has managed to research and write an entire book about the regional influence of small arms without learning much about small arms themselves. By no means was this book ever meant to be a technical treatise on firearms, but a better understanding of them by the author could have improved it immensely. Much of the information regarding firearms displayed in tables and the text has so many mistakes and contradictions in terminology that future researchers will have difficulty using it as a baseline in future studies. This is a pity considering the regional changes in firearms distribution undoubtedly caused by the recent Libyan Civil War and the burgeoning conflict in Southern Sudan.

Despite these problems and occurrences of rather stilted language, those studying social change in Africa will find Guns and Governance of great use. Of special note are the changes in tribal administration and interaction brought about by colonialism and national independence, how these changes have influenced the flood of small arms, and how this flood has changed the cultural landscape of the Rift Valley. Scholars studying weapons proliferation may find this book of less use beyond the excellent descriptions of the trade routes used and the actors who use them. These actors and routes will also be of interest to those looking at items other than small arms that may be traded illicitly in North East Africa.

Donald Woolley, Duke University

Müller reflects a significant aspect of the religious culture of one of the biggest churches in Southern Africa, the Zion Christian Church (ZCC). Founded by Engenas Lekganyane in 1925, the ZCC is historically rooted within the network of the early Pentecostal movement in South Africa. However, it is widely renowned as the prototype of so called Zionist Christianity showing characteristic features of dress and dance styles, music and healing performances or prophetic praxis. Moreover, the ZCC has established a centralized structure that helped sustain its considerable weight in the religious landscape throughout the transformations in recent South African history. Ecclesiastically the ZCC represents a dynastic leadership, since 1975 presided over by Bishop Barnabas Lekganyane, who resides in Moria, a holy place some fifty kilometers east of Polokwane. Moria is the destination of several yearly mass pilgrimages of ZCC members from the church’s urban strongholds to their rural headquarters. As the ZCC’s “single most distinguishing characteristic” (p. 7), Müller focuses on the understanding of such and related pilgrimages. In a personal approach and employing a narrative style, the author widens the perspective on pilgrimage. Since the controversial appearances of politicians during the days of apartheid, the Moria pilgrimage has become the best-known feature in the ZCC ritual calendar. It still forms a central chapter in Müller’s perception. Yet, next to pilgrimages to a defined sacred space, in a next chapter Müller sheds light on a different type of pilgrimage that magnetizes ZCC members. ZCC members undergo outward-bound pilgrimages to secular places in urban centers within and outside South Africa. The attention in this type of pilgrimage lies on the sacred person, for it centers on the ZCC Bishop. Whereas the pilgrimage to the sacred space is motivated by personal expectations and individual desires of believers, in its outward-bound pilgrimages the ZCC acts out a more socio-political profile in a public sphere.

Another remarkable outcome of this analysis of ZCC pilgrimage is the essential part occupied by acts of preparation for any kind of pilgrimage. In this vein Müller incorporates the local church context into his description of ZCC pilgrimage. The local congregational life integrates individual believers into the ZCC church context by constantly preparing members for pilgrimage and by fastening their ties to a traveling church. From here, from the local church, starts Müller’s own pilgrimage into Zionist Christianity as well. With roughly half a year of participant observation undertaken primarily over weekends in 2005, the book reads in part as an adventurous travel of a South African researcher into a foreign religious sphere found just around the corner. Zionist Christianity, which colors the South African religious tapestry over almost a century, is still portrayed as another world; thus inherently the study documents the continuing transition into post-apartheid society. Müller’s tacit steps into a world foreign to him are mirrored in his autobiographical style of presentation that reminds at times on recollecting notes from a diary. The reader learns about unprecedented settings of field research, interspersed with personal assumptions and hypotheses whose verifications or falsifications are simply left open in the writing process. Starting with the difficulty to identify adequate research units in order to set foot on ZCC ground, the story is full of accidental situations popping up in the practical process of participant observation. We witness intimate scenes of family life in ZCC urban homes and personal exchanges in more rural settings. The author documents by chance meetings under shady roofs during or after Sunday services. He
interprets the unstructured flow of communication with young ZCC members in broken English during car rides to pilgrimage sites, in rare cases supported by semi-structured interviews. Müller hints at the endeavors of food supply during a weekend pilgrimage and sparse toilet facilities at places of mass meetings in the presence of the Bishop. His general perspective is on all-day activities rather than on a debate on highly contested theological terrains that have surfaced in the longer research history on the ZCC. Although this case study shares important research material available in Afrikaans, dating back mainly to the 1980s, the author’s interest however lies in a synchronic portrayal of ZCC church life. Tentative discussions of historical changes and ritual passages within the ZCC can be found in footnotes, maybe due to Müller’s comparatively short exposition to ZCC Christianity. More explicitly his insight into the considerable political impact specifically of urban ZCC pilgrimages bears the contours of a fresh discourse on the public theology of Zionist Christianity in a society in transition.

Andreas Heuser, Basel University


In City of Extremes, Martin J. Murray describes the emergence of new spatial dynamics as a result of city building efforts shaping Johannesburg to the utopian vision of a World-Class City. He argues that these new spatial dynamics, emerging after Apartheid and spearheaded by real estate entrepreneurs, reinforced the existing spatial and socioeconomic inequalities and introduced new patterns of social segregation, largely marginalizing the urban poor and black underclass. Through interviews, on-site observations, press releases and newspaper articles Murray provides a convincing analysis of the discourse on the city, bringing to the fore prevailing ideologies and perceptions, as well as a breakdown of place marketing of various real estate developments in and around the city. Maps and pictures throughout the book give pictorial context to the rich descriptions Murray gives on the built environment of the city.

The book contains three parts. The first part, Making Space: City Building and the Production of the Built Environment, provides a historical background of the city in order to comprehend the complexity of the city and the roots of today’s spatial ruptures. In chapter 1 and 2 Murray describes how the city of Johannesburg is shaped by its history, the natural landscape and the economy. It shows the evolution of Johannesburg as a mining town located at the fringes of the British Empire, to the high-modernist city with a modern Central Business District characterized by high-rise buildings. These two chapters are marked by architectural descriptions and is, to my disappointment, heavily drawn from one single source.

The second part, Unraveling Space: Centrifugal Urbanism and the Convulsive City, deals with the breakdown of the high-modernist city after Apartheid. It describes the process of spatial fragmentation and disintegration of the city leading to decentralization, deindustrialization and horizontal sprawl. Chapter three tells the tale of the socioeconomic stagnation and decline of the city center. Murray attributes this decline to real estate capitalists investing in the rapidly urbanizing suburbs leading to the withdrawal of business enterprises.
from the historical central business district, advanced by dissatisfying urban management. The fourth chapter describes this abandoned city center or ‘outcast ghetto’ while chapter 5 focuses on the opposite world of edge cities. Johannesburg is described as a patchwork of cities with a decaying urban core and multiple island-cities mushrooming in the suburbs.

With Fortifying Space: Siege Architecture and Anxious Urbanism, the last part Murray describes the characteristics of management and regulation of urban space in Johannesburg. He links the rise in entrepreneurial urbanism with an emergence of siege architecture, leading to a reinforcement of spatial inequalities between rich and poor but also creating new cleavages. In chapter 6 the citadel office complexes in the central city are described, creating new relationships between public and private space by privatizing conventional city features and thus changing the experience of city life. In chapter 7 emerging forms and functions of urban management practices are analyzed, describing the entrepreneurial take on urban governance with City Improvement Districts and Residential Improvement Districts practically operating as a ‘shadow state’. The last chapter focuses on gated residential communities and the role of discourse, security and place marketing in these.

While Murray has an impressive list of interviews, I am missing the perspective of the inhabitants themselves throughout the book. In the introduction, Murray states that this book is based on participant observation and ethnographic observation. Still, the book lacks this ethnographic reflection. The ‘outcast ghetto’ and the fortified, utopian gated residential areas and office complexes are pictured as homogenous and opposite worlds. Even though Murray emphasizes that these “poles exist together not as disconnected places but as crystallized endpoints along a continuum of wealth and impoverishment” (2011: xiv), he does not recognize the heterogeneity and interconnectedness of these two ‘poles’. He fails to describe satisfyingly the various ways in which urban residents manage to negotiate and overcome the physical and semiotic borders and how the spatial dynamics described influence everyday social life by creating formal and informal rules that govern everyday life and interaction in the city. Repetition and the use of dense descriptions and meaning-laden terms do not always make this book an easy read. All in all Murray manages to make his point that urban planning is an exercise of power. His focus on the market driven urban planning and the city’s history and discourse bring enlightening analyses, his insights for example on public and private space in the citadel office complexes are inspiring. The book is a suggestion for people interested in politics of power, urbanization and the history of Johannesburg.

Geertrui Vannoppen, *Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa*


*Reversed Gaze* is intended for professional anthropologists to remind them about the importance of what they do, “a holistic approach to lived experiences and the human condition” (p. ix). Ntarangwi reprimands those within the discipline who have become sidetracked by exoticizing for the sake of alterity or becoming caught up in the subjective and reflexive turn in anthropology without bringing these insights back from the field to engage with these same
ongoing power differentials (e.g., race, gender, class, religion, and ethnicity) in their everyday lives. Anthropology graduate students should also read *Reversed Gaze*. Ntarangwi divulges corporate secrets gleaned from a lifetime within the profession. He focuses his analysis on “anthropologists’ subjectivities as they ‘practice’ anthropology within academic departments, at professional meetings, in classrooms and lecture halls, and through ethnographic writing—all of which constitute the ‘other side’ of anthropological practice that is often absent in scholarly papers, ethnographies, and memoirs” (p. 2).

This book would also be helpful for those who disparage the discipline of anthropology for its colonial legacy or “soft” approach to science. Challenging the notion of anthropology as a pseudo-science, Ntarangwi spends over ten years collecting data for his work as a participant observer writing nine-hundred pages of hand-written notes in six notebooks. As for those who argue that anthropology has not been able to emerge from its colonial shadow, Ntarangwi automatically contests this notion through his position as an “outsider within.” As Faye V. Harrison explains on the book’s dust jacket, “this book demonstrates that critique need not be a destructive exercise.” Ntarangwi acknowledges that anthropology continues to “study down” while the idea of “studying up” is gradually making its way from the margins to the mainstream. By overtly coupling methodology, practice, reflexivity, and theory, Ntarangwi emphasizes the discipline’s tenets of holistic, long-term community engagement ideally suited to provide cultural competency, which goes a long way in demonstrating professional relevancy.

*Reversed Gaze* is divided into six chapters, each representing a step in Ntarangwi’s professional anthropological development. In the first chapter, he challenges who belongs at the center of anthropology’s canon. He argues for affecting real change from within the discipline. Ntarangwi ultimately believes this is possible in a field that prides itself on giving voice to the marginalized through empathy and understanding. In chapter two, Ntarangwi depicts how his conception of a “reversed gaze” developed as an anthropology graduate student when he experienced the racial divide in the United States firsthand as a largely tacit phenomenon even among his fellow graduate students who were trained to observe cultural divisions in identity. Chapter three continues to critique the societal deep structures of racism as well as the grand narratives of anthropology and approaches to teaching. For example, in writing about the commoditization of higher education, Ntarangwi chastises U.S. colleges and universities for focusing on “what the professor needs to do to enhance student learning, and little is said about the student’s active role in the learning process” (p. 68).

Chapter four, “Remembering Home, Contrasting Experiences,” expertly describes the immigrant experience upon returning home. I found the discussions of both the “brain gain” as well as the secretive way immigrants discuss their experiences abroad once they are “home” most informative. Immigrants are often forced to work demeaning jobs while in the United States making them eager to gain their education as fast as possible and then return home where they “tend to display an image of economic success and cultural sophistication” “even if transmigrant Africans spend most of their lives in America cleaning toilets or working at nursing homes” (p. 80). This brief discussion by Ntarangwi challenges both the theory of “brain drain” as well as helps to explain why so many immigrants do not portray an accurate picture of life in the United States to their friends and family.
Chapter five, “Mega-Anthropology: The AAA Annual Meetings,” honestly describes the spectacle that is the AAA annual meeting. This chapter is most useful for graduate students interested in the anthropology profession. Ntarangwi gives practical advice such as how to be successful when seeking a job at an academic institution. By the final chapter, he suggests, “As anthropologists, we have to inhabit our historical realities in order not to repeat the same mistakes today” (p. 129). Anthropologists, as both “takers and givers,” “often find themselves torn between their academic expectations and obligations and their local commitments and relationships in the field” (p. 142). This relational position allows for the production of knowledge and a unique power emergent out of this role as interlocutor. According to Ntarangwi, it is what we do with this advantaged position that has the most potential to enlighten or harm.

Brandon D. Lundy, Kennesaw State University


Patricia de Santana Pinho attempts to put Paul Gilroy’s theorization of the diaspora, and in particular the concept anti-antiessentialism, into on the ground, qualitative research. Utilizing participant observation and interviews with two famous blocos afros or black carnival groups, Ilê Ayê and Olodum, in Salvador, Bahia Brazil. This book is updated and expanded version of her 2004 book *Reinvenções da África na Bahia* (translated by Elena Langdon).

Pinho provocatively argues that “anti-racist struggle requires us to deconstruct the idea of “race,” with the ultimate goal of superseding it” (p. 5). To that end, Pinho interrogates the “Myth of Mama Africa” utilized by the blocos afros, and the biologized and gendered notions of “race” within it. While acknowledging the blocos afros’ laudable goals of challenging racism and encouraging self-esteem and pride through their social programs and schools, Pinho critiques their conceptualization of Mama Africa as a static and essentialized one that dangerously, biologically reifies the concept “race”; this version of Mama Africa shares much in common with Western, racist depictions of Africa. This way of thinking about race makes the blocos easily manipulated and exploited by politicians and those in the tourism industry earning money off black cultural production; with this conception, black identity is easily commodified and sold, manipulated by elites and those in the tourism industry, and turned anti-liberatory.

Those interested in engaging scholarship on the African diaspora as well as race in Brazil will find the book particularly useful. Pinho does an excellent job of engaging scholarship from a range of sources. For example, Pinho recognizes racism in Brazil, but challenges Hanchard and Andrews (racial democracy is not a myth, but living and breathing), Telles (racial democracy has not died out), and Twine (poor black Brazilians are resisting through believing in the promise of racial democracy). However, those wanting a quotidian sense of what it means to be a leader of one of blocos afros or a follower, look elsewhere. The voices of the activists are sparse and mostly used to illustrate particular theoretical points.

Ultimately, Gilroy’s anti-essentialism remains insufficient to confront ongoing racism. “How is it possible to promote anti-racism without further endorsing the idea that there are
insurmountable barriers that divides us? The solution lies in cultural transformation . . . By producing new representations and spreading their meanings, it is possible to replace old patterns of inequality and difference” (p. 220). The solution that Pinho proposes is cultural and representational, not legal or political.

I understand and am sympathetic to her cause. As an anthropologist, the biological falsity of the concept of race exists along with the social reality of centuries of racism and racial inequality. But the “cultural transformation,” the anti-anti-essentialism she touts, is politically insufficient in addressing racism. How does her anti essentialist stance then “expand the reach of the agency of the oppressed” (p. 222). While Pinho admits the book is not about public policy, she dismisses existing efforts such as affirmation action in Brazilian universities and the Racial Equality Statue, for essentially inscribing biologized notions of race into Brazilian law. While admittedly concerned with continued anti-racism, what would she leave in their place?

Kenneth Williamson, Kennesaw State University


People of Faith is about slavery, religion, and the construction of identities and how these elements interacted with each other amongst a group of Africans from the Mina Coast who were part of the Mahi Congregation in 18th century Rio de Janeiro. By the time the Portuguese version of this book was published in Brazil twelve years ago, the connection between Rio de Janeiro and the Mina Coast was practically ignored given that West Central Africa was the primary source of slaves both to the captaincy and the city of Rio de Janeiro. Soares begins by describing the Mina Coast and the slave trade to Brazil. The Mahi came from the hinterland of the Bight of Benin and during the 18th century were caught up in the expansion of both the Kingdom of Dahomey and the slave trade. In 1699, the Portuguese Crown legalized slave trading from the Mina Coast to help meet the needs of the expanding American market that the ports of Kongo and Angola seemed increasingly unable to satisfy. The main places of disembarkation of these slaves in Brazil where the ports of Rio and Bahia whose primarily objective was to feed the gold mines of Minas Gerais. Still, a portion of these slaves was retained in both locations. Soares suggests that during the first half of the 18th century Africans from the Mina Coast represented up to 10 percent of the city of Rio de Janeiro’s slave population.

Using baptismal, marriage, and burial records along with manumission letters, Soares identifies and situates the Mina within the panorama of enslaved and freed Africans in the city, with particular attention to religious practices and internal organization. The Mina who converted to Catholicism were initially established in the Church of the Rosário, which was made up predominantly of Angolans and Creoles. Due to conflicts with Angolans and Dahomians, as well new alliances, the Mina separated into four congregations, with one founded by the Mahi group in 1762. This congregation created two more devotions: one to the Almas do Purgatório to pray for the souls of deceased Mina, and the other to Our Lady of Remédios to aid poor and sick Mina. Soares’ analysis of the statutes of the Mahi Congregation (1786) shines light on the construction of the Mahi identity within the Christian world. In the
document the Mahi territory in Africa is described as a powerful “kingdom” and a bright light of Catholicism surrounded by the “darkness” of the Kingdom of Benin and other heathen groups. As the author notes, the Mina “nation” in Rio gathered Africans from different ethnic groups, such as Savanu, Mahi, Agonli, Dahomey, and Iano, all of whom spoke what colonial observers called the “general tongue of Mina.” They were all considered part of the Mina “nation,” whatever their actual provenience.

This research contributes to studies on black brotherhoods that demonstrate that individuals from a particular region could interact and create new forms of sociability and organization. However, unlike previous studies that have established a direct relation between places of displacement and “nations” or “gentios” (heathen groups), Soares proposes the notion of “provenience groups” to describe the form of organization created by Africans in the New World that was rooted in the reference to a shared provenience. While Soares’ notion of “provenience group” does not eliminate the importance of slave populations’ native social organizations and cultural practices, the principal focus is on how these elements were placed alongside others to be redistributed and reorganized once in the New World. In this respect, the author notes that there was a process of self-attribution, at the group level, of an identity attributed or imposed from the outside that could or could not relate with previous realities in the form of actual place names, kingdoms, and internally recognized ethnic groups.

Soares explores questions of identity and ethnicity through an interdisciplinary approach grounded in empirical standards and methods of history connected to anthropological theory, which can be noted by her reference to anthropologists as Fredrik Barth, Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira, João Pacheco de Oliveira, and Miguel Bartolomé. Furthermore, sociologist Norbert Elias’ work on the French court is transposed to colonial Rio, allowing Soares to understand a society permeated by ancient régime’s rules of sociability.

“People of Faith” shares an untold story of how a group of Africans remade their lives in the diaspora, reworking their cultural backgrounds through time and space. Unfortunately, as the author acknowledges, the book does not provide information on the Mina who were not baptized or were baptized on parishes outside the city of Rio. Individuals interested in the history of slavery and Catholic Church in Brazil will benefit from this research. Moreover, this study is an example of how New World documentation can help reveal slave proveniences and agency.

Vanessa S. Oliveira, York University


Politics of Innocence is the strange story of Burundian politics in a remote refugee camp in Tanzania where politics as such are officially banned. Ironically politics are banned by the foreign agencies seeking to protect the refugees—from politics. Most ironic is what Turner calls the emasculation of refugee masculinity as young western humanitarians from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) autocratically assert political control over refugee life via control of food distributions, hiring policies, camp leadership, and a ban on
refugee involvement in Burundian politics, under the assumption that refugees are only victims, and therefore inherently apolitical.

Turner spent a year as a participant observer in 1997-1998 at the Lukole Camp for Burundians in western Tanzania, with more recent follow-ups. He spent his time in the camp doing the ethnographic thing—hanging around bars, doing structured interviews with refugees, and conducting surveys. He processed interview and survey data, analyzed UNHCR memoranda, and attended agency meetings. He describes a dissonance between the international community that assumes power over the refugee camps, and a politically subservient refugee “leadership” asked to focus strictly on the distribution of food and water, delivery of social services, and so forth in accordance with UNHCR policy. The result is a book that is about the mechanisms of control by outsiders, and how powerless refugees are shaped by the political concerns of the humanitarian community.

For example, in the section “Counting, Controlling, Catering” Turner describes the problems associated with “seeing like a bureaucracy.” The UNHCR bureaucracy does this, as Turner writes, by transforming refugees into biological specimens who are calorie consumers, plot inhabitants, morbidity statistics, i.e. the categories which officials sitting in distant offices can “see.” Central to this view is that pre-existing social distinctions are assumed away and replaced by a homogenous category “refugee.”

The distant view, Turner writes, helps the UNHCR to reduce normal camp politics into science of management, i.e. a technical exercise in which success is measured in terms of UNHCR’s capacity to protect refugees from their own vulnerabilities, whether in terms of food provision, or the inequalities that the UNHCR sees in refugee society. Only after all this system is established are the views of elected refugee leaders permitted to shape management of the community; and even then the refugee leaders’ successes are still measured by the bio-metrics of the UNHCR’s world, in which “Good Participation” means implementing the UNHCR’s program by accepting the pre-existing category of apolitical victim. “Bad participation” is about subverting the UNHCR’s system by collecting extra ration cards, selling distributed commodities in the marketplaces, seeking independent information from Burundi, and especially joining the clandestine Burundian political parties that flourished in the camps.

The best parts of Politics of Innocence are the stories Turner tells about how refugees respond to those who count, control, and cater to them. A good example is the UNHCR policies regarding gender. In official documents, “women and children,” who include 75 percent of many African populations in general (and refugee camp populations in particular), are lumped together as vulnerables deserving of special attention. Women in particular were sought after by the well-meaning UNHCR for positions involving trust, because they are believed to be more willing to implement UNHCR policy than men—in other words they were believed to be more docile and compliant.

Ironically, as Turner writes, lumping children and women together infantilizes women, and reifies adult men as “dangerous aliens” who on a good day were summoned by camp authorities for lectures about “security problems,” and on a bad day were expelled for illicit political or market activity. Both male and female refugees interpreted this situation as meaning that the UNHCR was a “better husband” than the under-employed young men in the camp. As Turner writes this effectively stripped the young men of a masculinity rooted in the
need to support a family, because “one’s male identity [was] taken by the white man.” The irony of this is that the way to reassert their masculinity was through means declared “illegal” by the UNHCR, particularly trading in refugee camp commodities, and military training in support of the clandestine political parties.

It always seems that books of this nature have lacunae when it comes to refugee views, which is then filled with analysis by refugee practitioners. Turner’s book certainly does not do this. In fact, his affinity is with the refugees and their leaders whose understandings of the camp are extensively described. Ironically, left out in the book though, are the views of UNHCR staff, who Turner describes as oblivious to the very human nature of refugee society and politics. In other words, he in effect accuses the UNHCR staff of being anthropologically incorrect. Still, it would be interesting to know how UNHCR workers explain why they “infantilize” refugee involvement in camp administration. In particular, it would be interesting to challenge such workers, who are often well-educated humanitarians, with the refugee assertion that they are the “husband” of the refugee women.

Perhaps the UNHCR staff are as culturally oblivious (and bureaucratically savvy) as Turner presents. And indeed, such questions are important for the international refugee relief regime since ultimately the success of policy-makers, as Turner emphasizes, is not dependent on the calculation of refugee bio-metrics but rather on the resolution of broader political situations in which the refugees themselves always play an adult-level political role. Or, as Turner concludes, “As long as the [refugee policy] simply focuses on relative security and perceives the refugees as apolitical, innocent victims, they cannot grasp the complex mechanisms of repatriation, political mobilization and violence.”

Or in other words, Turner’s advice to the UNHCR seems to be that you cannot take the politics out of politics!

Tony Waters, California State University - Chico


Nineteenth and twentieth-century Tangier, a coastal city in northern Morocco, has exercised an enduring fascination on writers, male and female, of several nationalities. This fascination has generated a rich and vast literature, both representing the city and analyzing the representations of the city.

In Writing Tangier in the Postcolonial transition, Michael K. Walonen, currently an assistant professor of English at Bethune-Cookman University (Florida), focuses mainly on the North-American and European expatriate intellectual community settled in Tangier during the last years of the colonial period and the earliest years of independence (1945-69). It analyzes the dynamics of imagined alterity of socially produced space in the works of English-speaking writers such as Paul Bowles, Jane Bowles, William Burroughs, Brion Gysin, and Alfred Chester, and Moroccan writers such as Tahar Ben Jelloun and Anouar Majid.

This monograph is partially based on a 2009 dissertation entitled The Social Dynamics of Space and Place in the North Africa Writings of Paul Bowles, William S. Burroughs and Brion Gysin.
that was presented to the University of Louisiana at Lafayette and published by ProQuest/UMI. Walonen has written a short book (151 pages of text and 10 pages of bibliography) but otherwise a dense read. Writing Tangier is organized into an introduction and seven chapters. Chapter 2 examines the cultural dynamics of Tangier’s expatriate society. Interestingly, it explains how the spaces of the city afforded a perceived alluring alienness, and it sheds light on the interactions between foreign writers and Moroccan locals. Chapter 3 focuses on Paul Bowles’ (1910-1999) philosophy of space and sense of place. Chapter 4, the shortest in the book, deals with Jane Bowles’ (1917-1973) vision of spatial impenetrability. In Chapter 5, Walonen explores the demystification and remystification of the Maghreb in William Burroughs (1914-1997)’s Tangier writings. Chapter 6 presents English-born painter and writer Brion Gysin’s (1916-1986) conflictive Maghreb. Chapter 7 is devoted to Alfred Cheste’sr (1928-1971) writings. And finally, Chapter 8 examines the position of Tahar Ben Jelloun and Anouar Majid vis-à-vis Morocco and Tangier and their sense of dislocation.

The author does not include a chapter of conclusions and closes his book with a brief afterword that asserts the vital relevance of discussions on space and place for the field of cultural studies, and pinpoints some personal experiences in the origin of this academic inquiry.

The book covers a wide range of topics, starting with Tangier’s cosmopolitanism and post-independence transformation, and moving to gendered divisions of space, conceptualizations of inside spaces as sites of confinement, representation of anti-colonial revolt, intercultural encounter, nostalgia for the bygone days of the International Zone, etc.

Walonen’s book makes a significant contribution to the field of colonial and postcolonial literary studies. It is a good example of the fruitful nature of the spatial turn in literary and cultural studies, and it casts valuable and important new light into the fiction of many writers, particularly Paul Bowles, William S. Burroughs and Brion Gysin. Also, the author has to be praised for his relevant selection of authors and texts, and his systematic analysis of two interesting issues: contrast in non-native and native writings, and contrast among the views of English-speaking writers. Another significant strength of the text is the author’s concise, lucid, and accessible writing style. A minor weakness in a book focused on conceptions of space and place is perhaps the poor quality of the only two maps included.

Overall, the book can be highly recommended. It is a noteworthy contribution to the field of postcolonial African Studies, and it will be greatly appreciated by any scholar wishing to have a comprehensive reading of a wide variety of complex themes related to expatriate literature in general, and English-speaking intellectual circles in Morocco in particular.

Just a last word on the title of the book, at the risk of being too honest. Writing Tangier is the title of a 2005 special issue of the Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Intellectual and Cultural Studies (named after a previous conference organized at the Abdelmalek Essaadi University of Tetouan, Morocco, in 2004), the title of the proceedings of the aforementioned conference, and also the title of a volume edited by Ralph M. Coury and R. Kevin Lacey (Writing Tangier: Currents in Comparative Romance Language and Literature, 2009). It might have been convenient to find a different title for this monograph.

Araceli González-Vázquez, Collège de France