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Table of Contents

Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda: Governance Adrift
Terrell G. Manyak and Issac Wasswa Katono (1-24)

Is War Contagious? The Transnationalization of Conflict in Darfur
Jennifer L. De Maio (25-44)

Breaking with Township Gangsterism: The Struggle for Place and Voice
Doria Daniels and Quinton Adams (45-57)

Urban Water Politics and Water Security in Disadvantaged Urban Communities in Ghana
Kweku G. Ainuson (59-82)

A Bridge Between the Global North and Africa? Putin’s Russia and G8 Development Commitments
Pamela A. Jordan (83-115)

Book Reviews

Review by Uchendu Eugene Chigbu (117-118)

Review by Tamba E. M’bayo (118-121)

Review by Karen Flint (121-123)

Review by Eric M. Moody (123-124)

Review by Tosin Funmi Abiodun (124-127)

Review by Mousumi Mukherjee (127-129)


Review by Steven Stottlemyre (151-152)

Review by Madelaine Hron (152-154)

Review by Paul J. Magnarella (154-157)

Review by Andy Lamey (157-161)

Review by Adel Manai (162-163)

Review by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee (164-166)
Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda: Governance Adrift

TERRELL G. MANYAK & ISAAC WASSWA KATONO

Abstract: This study examines the challenges that threaten one of Africa’s most ambitious experiments in political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. Based on extensive interviews with local government leaders throughout Uganda, the research uncovered a complex interplay of conflicts that impact decision-making effectiveness. The sources of these conflicts center around (a) the impact of national politics on local government as the country approaches the 2011 election, (b) the inability to meet rising citizen demand for services as the tax base of local governments continues to erode, (c) the corrosive impact of social conflicts stemming mostly from poverty and illiteracy complicated by tribal and ethnic differences, and (d) the challenges of developing honest and effective leadership in local government. Can Uganda unravel this web of conflicts to bring meaningful governance to this young nation? Indeed, many countries within the developing world are watching this experiment with a great deal of interest.

Introduction

The Uganda experiment in local government was born out of a blend of idealism and practical necessity. The idealism arose from a nation that dedicated itself to building democracy after years of brutal despotism. The practical necessity came from the need to provide basic services in an environment where local government had essentially disintegrated. The result was a multilayered system of directly elected district and lower local councils with significant responsibilities for delivering basic services. The international community strongly supported this action and hailed it as an example of how other developing countries should proceed with nation-building. While the local government system was initially well accepted, Ugandans now appear increasingly disenchanted with the corruption, mismanagement, and bitter political conflicts that are regularly reported in local newspapers. These concerns have led to a
questioning of whether decentralization can continue as a viable system of local government in Uganda. Indeed, many observers express concern that Uganda is now at a major crossroad in determining the future of democratic governance. Thus, this study examines why Uganda’s local government system appears to be falling short of its founders’ expectations that decentralization would improve the capacity of local councils to deliver services and be more responsive to citizen needs.

This paper seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the sources of conflict through interviewing elected and appointed officials who are on the front line of governance. Twenty-two districts were visited over a nine-month period: Central Region—Kampala, Kayunga, Masaka, Mukono, and Sembabule; Western Region—Bushenyi, Hoima, Kabale, Kibaale, Masindi, and Mbarara; Northern Region—Arua, Gulu, Lira, and Maracha-Terego; Eastern Region—Iganga, Jinja, Mayuge, Mbale, Sironko, Soroti, and Tororo. Districts in each region were selected because of prolonged conflicts and mismanagement or because of their reputation for effective service delivery.

Over sixty interviews were held with district chairpersons, chief administrative officers and some technical officers, resident district commissioners, speakers, and councilors at the district level as well as mayors, town clerks, speakers, and councilors at the municipal level. Also interviewed were political leaders who were important in establishing the local government system. Each participant was assured full confidentiality, which is why no names are mentioned in the study. A formal interview script was not followed to facilitate an open discussion, but the researchers made sure the same standard questions were asked in all the interviews, and interviewer notes were compared for accuracy. In addition to the interviews, the researchers met with officials of the Uganda Local Government Association, the Local Government Finance Commission, the Uganda Management Institute, and the Uganda Ministry of Local Government for additional insights. The researchers also attended the Joint Annual Review of Decentralization and the Africa Local Council Oversight and Accountability conferences for further insights.

The study begins by providing a brief history of how the present day local government system evolved. Four conflict areas are then examined in detail. The first conflict source stems from how power struggles pose challenges at the central government level as President Museveni fights to maintain control of Uganda impact the local political environment. The second conflict source, which is largely an outgrowth of national politics, stems from the increased fiscal constraints being placed on local governments by politicians seeking to mollify the demands of citizens. The third conflict source arises from the corrosive impact of social conflicts stemming mostly from poverty and illiteracy complicated by tribal and ethnic differences. The fourth conflict source stems from the frequent failure of political and administrative personnel to provide local citizens with honest and effective leadership. The article concludes with thoughts and recommendations as to the future of local government in Uganda.
Background to Decentralization: We Were an Army of Children!

Uganda, like most African countries, is an artificial nation created by the British from a highly diverse assortment of ethnic groups. To manage this landlocked nation of 31 million people, the British devised a modified federal structure of local government that recognized five kingdoms (Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, and Toro) and administered the remaining areas through administrative districts. Each kingdom and district recognized traditional chiefs or appointed local chiefs who reported to a district commissioner. The largest of the kingdoms was Buganda, which occupies the area along the northern edge of Lake Victoria and includes the capital city of Kampala. This ethnic group of 5.5 million was favored by the British to fill administrative positions within the colonial government. However, to keep the Baganda under control, the British favored other groups, primarily the Acholi in northern Uganda, to provide military manpower. Following independence, Milton Obote, the first leader of Uganda (1962-1971), used his influence within the military to overthrow the federal constitution and depose the Buganda king (kabaka). He then centralized the government system with the 1967 Republican Constitution. Idi Amin (1971-1979) then used the military to overthrow the Obote government.

The atrocities committed by Amin, and then Obote during his return to power (1980-1985), led to a continuation of civil strife, with guerilla groups fighting in different regions of the country. The most important of these groups and eventual winner was the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. As the NRM army gradually claimed territory, a problem arose of how to govern the people now under its control. Local government officials had fled, but the NRM lacked sufficient manpower to fill the administrative void. The problem was solved by having each area establish its own local government, called a resistance council. The initial task of these councils was to assure military security, but police, health, education, and other basic functions were soon added. Political liaison was maintained with the NRM through a district administrator appointed by the movement.

The NRM takeover of the government in 1986 presented a major challenge. How could government services be delivered given the continuing political and military opposition that was still active in the northern areas? The most efficient way would be to create a highly centralized government. However, this approach would be unpopular among the idealistic NRM followers with their deep seated revulsion against the centralized, autocratic regimes of Amin and Obote. Another concern was that outside donor countries, whose financing was essential to the survival of the new government, were pressing for decentralization.

A compromise was found via the Mamdani Commission, which in 1987 recommended the creation of a central government while at the same time converting the already established resistance councils into local councils (LCs) that would be coordinated through districts. This decentralization reform policy was launched in 1992 through a presidential policy statement that was followed by the Local Government statute of 1993. Decentralization was then made part of a new constitution in 1995 and officially implemented in the Local Governments Act of 1997 that is still in force.

The end result was the creation of 45 districts that were divided into five administrative levels. Districts, including the city of Kampala, are the highest local government level, while
sub-counties, municipalities, towns, and city divisions are lower local government levels. The key political organ at each level is the council, which includes directly elected members and members that represent specific groups, namely women, youth, and persons with disabilities. Each local government was designated a legal entity with delineated power to raise taxes and provide basic services.9

Professional leadership would be provided by the chief administrative officers of the district and town clerks. Until recently, they were appointed by district service commissions that in turn were appointed by each council upon the recommendation of the district executive committee. Public contracts were let through district tender boards that were also put in place by the council. Finally, a resident district commissioner was appointed directly by the president to head the security committee, monitor the implementation of central government programs, and serve as the president’s personal representative in the district. A degree of external legitimacy was given to the new structure by the United Nations, which brought in an international team, primarily from Denmark and Zimbabwe, to provide a formal, legal structure to the arrangement.

What is important to note is that Uganda’s local government system was founded with a great deal of idealistic fervor.10 This point is reflected in an interview with an older NRM politician who participated in the bush war and the formation of the new local government system: “We were an army of children. We were all very young and very idealistic in going up against someone like Idi Amin. It was exciting to build a new form of government based on democracy that was the total opposite of the regimes of Amin and Obote.” With the passage of time, this system is beginning to feel pressures that are taking a toll on effective governance. Many people interviewed claim that President Museveni is abandoning decentralization as the price for staying in power. Others point to the inability of local governments to deal with the social tensions caused by poverty, illiteracy, and tribalism. Many, like the older NRM politician, just see a loss of idealism among local leaders as causing decay: “We worked hard to make the new system work. Now it has all changed because the new generation only cares about itself.”

Central Government Challenges: The President is Killing His Own Child!

The National Resistance Movement committed the new government in 1986 to promoting democracy through direct elections and full transparency. Because the NRM felt that much of Uganda’s problems were the result of corrupt political parties, a “movement only” government emerged in which candidates for office would be judged on the merits of their character and qualifications. Moreover, the NRM was to serve as an umbrella organization that would include all political parties, including some like the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) that were already well established in the country. However, pressure from the international community and growing opposition to movement-only rule led in 1992 to political parties becoming reactivated. After a national referendum in 2005 followed by an amendment to the constitution, political parties were permitted to compete openly in the 2006 election.

Observers of Ugandan politics claim the shift to a multiparty system was the result of political intrigue.11 They speculate that political parties were re-established in exchange for an
agreement to remove the term-limit provision of the constitution that restricted President Museveni to ten years in office. The Uganda parliament voted to remove the term limit, but reportedly only after a number of representatives received large sums of cash. The NRM justified removing the term limit on the grounds that President Museveni was still a relatively young man and much more needed to be accomplished in fulfilling the NRM mandate. Also, NRM reforms had succeeded to a point where Uganda could move to the next stage of democratization under a multiparty system. The end result was that parliament approved the term limit change in 2005. President Museveni was elected to a third term the following year.

The re-establishment of political parties was viewed with a great deal of suspicion in terms of the potential impact on local government. The Anti-Corruption Coalition predicted: “Under multiparty politics, formulation of policies will not be based on facts but on emotions.” Others were more willing to give the multiparty system a chance to develop. “The people are not used to multi-party politics and need to be stimulated to start appreciating and effectively operating under a multi-party system. It is like a cock that has been tied for a long time. Even if it is untied, it has to be chased for it to run.” The general impression from the interviews is that local government might have been better off if left nonpartisan. The local governance system is not sufficiently mature politically to handle the additional stress of party conflict. Parties also provide opportunities for political intervention that can be very upsetting to the decision making process. However, political parties are now viewed as a fact of life and local governments need to cope with their new environment. Indeed, the interviews found that many local governments were able to work successfully in a multi-party environment if the political leaders, particularly the district chairpersons (DCP) and mayors, want it to work. Where compromise fails to evolve, conflict arises and the decision making process is easily deadlocked. For instance, party conflicts in Lira and Sembabule districts have led to virtual stalemates in decision making.

Another consequence of creating a politically competitive environment that is of concern to local government officials is the apparent shift in attitude of the NRM toward local government as key elements of decentralization are being sacrificed to gain political advantage. These sacrifices include the creation of new, often unviable districts to assuage local political interests, the recentralization of key local government offices, and arbitrarily setting aside of unpopular sources of local revenue. The stress these policies have placed on local governments led one of Museveni’s former supporters to exclaim, “The president is killing his own child!”

New Districts: Museveni Himself was Surprised!

Political decentralization has long been supported by academics and the international community as a way to improve governance and the delivery of services. The assumption is that creating more elected local governments will increase the effectiveness of administration by bringing services nearer to where they are consumed and make government more responsive to the wishes of the people. This belief was clearly part of the justification for creating forty-five districts when the Local Governments Act was enacted in 1997. This number has since increased to eighty-one districts as of 2009, with many more are under consideration by parliament.
Several positive reasons can be found for creating these new districts in addition to improved governance and service delivery. First, many people feel marginalized in a rural country like Uganda where travel to district headquarters from a remote area can be quite arduous. Second, the government may try to lessen local conflict by separating tribal and ethnic groups into districts with their own governments. This strategy was most clear in the case in Tororo District where the Japadhola and Banyole groups have long contested the control of agricultural lands to the point where crops were being destroyed, homes burned, and people killed. On the other hand, splitting of districts can increase conflict between ethnic groups. For instance, the proposed division of Tororo district has caused severe conflicts between the Japadhola and the Iteso. The Minister of Local Government was even forced to issue a warning that local leaders must desist from inciting their subjects into violence. Third, a new district can breathe economic life into a poor region by bringing an immediate influx of financial resources. According to one report, the central government provides each new district between $280,000 to $560,000 to construct district offices and purchase vehicles, office equipment, and other amenities. The creation of jobs and letting of government tenders also serves as an economic stimulus, particularly for the town in which the new district headquarters is located.

The problem with new district creation is that political considerations often dominate decision making, primarily because new districts can be a key tool for consolidating political support prior to an election. New districts allow the party in power, in this case the NRM, to reward its local followers with jobs and contracts as well as making them politically more noticeable in parliament. One study found a strong statistical association between election support for the NRM and the creation of new districts. It should be noted that local citizens can mount considerable pressure in demanding district status. For instance, one proponent literally ate a rat in front of President Museveni as a sign of disenchantment with the delay by the central government in granting his area district status.

The field interviews reflected growing concern, if not frustration, over the rush to create new districts. This frustration was reflected in an interview with a councilor from a new district formed in the northwest region:

The Maracha-Terego District was formed three years ago out of Arua District, but they can’t get agreement on the district headquarters. The Minister of Local Government didn’t agree with how the majority of councilors voted. Thirteen councilors wanted Kubala as the headquarters, while six wanted Nyadri. Two abstained. The MP for Nyadri contested the vote and stalemated the decision. Eight sub-counties protested the minister’s decision and went to court. At the present time, all the district’s affairs are run from the old district headquarters in Arua. They even drive Maracha-Terego trucks around town. Museveni himself was surprised to learn that the new district was still without a government.

Concern over the creation of new districts has led to some strong reactions. The African Peer Review Mechanism expressed serious reservations about the economic viability of the new districts. In addition to the added financial cost and supervision burden, they will compromise the effectiveness of the new and old districts because they must now share the same limited
resource base. Even donor governments whose contributions make up a sizeable part of the national budget complain that new districts have been created without a systematic assessment of their viability and insist that this process should stop.

**Recentralization: The Council Was Bullying the CAO**

A major element of the Local Governments Act is the decentralization of administrative services. Acting through a district service commission, each council was to be responsible for recruiting, compensating, and disciplining its own staff. The members of the district service commission were appointed by the council on the recommendation of the district executive committee with the approval of the central government’s Public Service Commission. The most significant appointments made by the district service commissions were the chief administrative officers (CAO), the deputy CAOs, and town clerks.

The Local Governments Act designated the CAO (with equivalent language for town clerks) the chief accounting officer and head of the administration. To balance this power, the CAO was made responsible to the general direction of the elected district chairperson and the council. The district council could by a two-thirds vote remove a CAO from office on the grounds of abuse of office, incompetence, misconduct or misbehavior, physical or mental incapacity, or failure without justifiable reasons to implement lawful council decisions. The chief justice would then constitute a tribunal of justices to investigate the allegations and report whether a *prima facie* case existed. The key point is that removal of a CAO or town clerk was purposely intended to be a very difficult process, and few administrators were ever successfully removed.

The problem experienced with this division of power is that district chairpersons and legislators would frequently go beyond their legal role as set out in the Local Governments Act. Until recently this was possible because the chairpersons were able to use their appointment power to get whatever they wanted. The district service commission, public accounts committee, and tender board were appointed by the district executive committee and ratified by the council. Also, the internal auditor works under the CAO but reports to the council. Moreover, the actions of district chairpersons were often reinforced by councilors who, coming from poor economic backgrounds, found the money in district and local government budgets to be very tempting. The result is that district chairpersons and elected councilors habitually sought to override government regulations for their personal gain. While CAOs were not free from corruption and legality, the law made the administrative officers accountable for all their district’s actions, but it was silent on making the politicians accountable for their misdeeds.

Many administrators who resisted political pressures were terminated by their respective district service commission. The response was for the CAO to seek judicial intervention under the Local Governments Act. While the outcome could result in a lucrative settlement for the administrator, the process could be quite time consuming. For instance, a case was brought by a CAO who was terminated for stopping the deployment of military personnel to run polling centers in her district. The CAO responded by obtaining a judicial tribunal ruling against the termination. However, the district service commission which was controlled by the district chairperson countered by forcing her to retire “in the public interest.” It then took another ten
years of legal wrangling before a judicial review once again overruled the district and awarded the CAO a financial settlement.\textsuperscript{30}

The central government sought to give administrators greater protection from the political pressures being placed upon them by undisciplined chairpersons and councilors. Parliament provided this protection by amending the Local Governments Act in 2006 to stipulate that senior level administrators would no longer be subject to their respective district service commissions. Instead, they would be appointed by the Public Service Commission of the central government and assigned to districts by the Ministry of Local Government. Also, the tender boards were disbanded in favor of contract committees composed of administrative and technical personnel chaired by the CAO. While the administrators are still legally under the control of their respective elective bodies and evaluated by the district chairperson, recentralization effectively changed the working relationship between legislators and administrators.\textsuperscript{31}

Most administrators, as one would expect, saw the change in a very positive light because, as one informant stated: “the council was bullying the CAO before recentralization.” They also note the present fiscal reality that 95 percent of local government funds come from the central government and the central ministries want to make sure the money is being properly spent. As expected, elected officials were more mixed in their reaction with many being concerned about the long-term impact of recentralization:

- Recentralizing the CAO took away local power. The CAO now feels superior. He acts arrogant over the councilors and they now feel powerless. He even decides who can attend meetings in Kampala. This is the death of decentralization. For instance, the elected people know they can build latrines cheaper in their villages, but the civil servants choose to ignore them. The elected people can’t monitor or supervise the tender committee. Only the executive monitors. In effect they monitor themselves.

- Many elected officials noted a change in the working relationship with the CAO. A “you are not our employee” attitude is forcing more turnover as councils only need to complain to the Ministry of Local Government to seek a change instead of going through a judicial tribunal.

The goal of recentralizing the higher level administrators was to improve accountability and enhance the performance of local governments. While it is too early to pass judgment on this action, several important questions remain to be answered. Has recentralization seriously damaged the accountability link between elected and appointed officials at the district and local level? Will political pressure on administrators by elected officials merely shift to other forms of pressure such as using the central government ministries or members of parliament to force CAOs to make decisions they deem more favorable? The most important concern is whether the recentralization of these key administrative positions is just the first step in a broader effort by central government ministries to eliminate local control over resources?\textsuperscript{32}
Resource Conflicts: No Representation without Taxation

Decentralization in Uganda differs significantly from most other developing countries in terms of the range of services devolved to local governments. Among the services provided are the delivery of education, providing health care through hospitals and health centers, the provision of water supplies, the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of local roads, and field services including agricultural extension, protecting the forests and the environment, and poverty eradication. To pay for these many services, the constitution and the Local Governments Act empower local governments to collect specified taxes, licenses and fees in accordance with laws passed by parliament. It was recognized that local revenue sources would be insufficient to meet the mandated expenses. To cover the local deficits, the central government was mandated to provide grants paid directly to the districts from the Consolidated Fund. The districts and local governments could then formulate their budgets and plans provided the budgets were balanced.

The linchpin for the district and local governments in holding this financial arrangement together was initially the graduated tax (commonly called the G-tax). Created by the British in the 1930s, the G-tax was a personal income tax levied on all adult males no matter their employment status and all adult females in full-time employment. This tax, while highly unpopular, raised approximately 85 percent of local government generated revenue. Much of the unpopularity was because the G-tax served essentially the same purpose as an identity card for Ugandans. If not produced on demand, an individual could face serious legal difficulties. Another problem was the way the G-tax was collected. For instance, tax collectors would enter villages with armed police and drag defaulters from their homes, often in the middle of night.

The popular distaste for the G-tax came to a head in the 2006 election when opponents of President Museveni promised to repeal the G-tax if elected. Not to be outflanked, the president announced the suspension of G-tax collections. To justify this action, the president made the point that G-tax collections were inefficient. As much money was being spent in collecting the tax as was actually being collected. Instead of the G-tax, the government promised to increase central government transfer funds and then pass legislation to create taxes that would be more palatable to the public.

Once the president and the NRM were returned to office, the election promises fell short. The Local Government Finance Commission reports that only 5 percent of district and local budgets now comes from local sources. While conditional grants were increased, the amount transferred was well below the revenues generated by the G-tax. Also, the substitute taxes approved by parliament in 2008 failed to meet the needs of local government. The hotel tax helps larger population centers, but it provides little income for towns and villages with few if any hotels. The local service tax works well with salaried people but raises little revenue from rural peasant populations. The property tax has the problem of local government not having sufficient funds to hire and train assessors, plus the fact that a large percentage of the land is occupied by squatters.

The bottom line is that potential local revenue sources available to local governments are very limited in the funds collected, too politically volatile, uncollectable, or do not respond to the unique needs of communities, particularly those in areas disrupted by war. A sales tax is
presently being discussed within government circles because it could raise the necessary funds. However, President Museveni is opposed to a sales tax claiming that it would result in double taxation between central and local governments.\textsuperscript{39}

Concern with local government funding and the failure to meet resource demands was noted as a major source of conflict by virtually every person interviewed. “The central government collects the easy taxes and those keep rising.” “The president arbitrarily exempts local businesses from taxation and his word is law.” “After the G-tax was removed, our local government simply stopped working.” “It would be OK if the central government gave us the net of what we lost, but the finance people in Kampala want to use the money for themselves.”

Many local government leaders perceive funding dependency to be a form of re-centralization. They claim that central government ministries see local governments as enjoying too much autonomy and conditional grants are a way to reverse this trend.\textsuperscript{40} One district chairperson complained, “We are becoming nothing more than contractors for the central government.” Interestingly, the 10 percent spending flexibility allowed local governments in dispensing conditional grants also creates problems because ministries do not want to see local governments reallocating funds from their functional area to other uses. This further increases their desire to recentralize functions and regain fiscal control.

Another interesting claim by a number of local government officials is the belief that payment of the G-tax was important in building citizen responsibility. Men in particular were forced to work in order to pay the tax which in turn gave them a connection to their local government. Now, officials complain, they want a free ride with the government paying for everything.\textsuperscript{41} “People no longer work to raise graduated tax money. Men only eat, drink and produce children.” Reversing a famous American Revolutionary War expression, a councilor proclaimed, “People need to realize that there is no representation without taxation.”

**Societal Conflicts: It’s Like Teaching Them How to Dance**

District and local leaders consistently reported on the conflicts they experience in working with elected councilors. They see many councilors being put into power on the basis of unrealistic promises that citizens have no way to evaluate or don’t care to evaluate. This problem is traced mostly to illiteracy and poverty, which are then complicated by ethnic differences.

**Illiteracy, Poverty and Expectations: The Magic Road to Riches**

Uganda is a land with fertile soil and lush vegetation which means that people rarely go hungry. What people do lack is money and education. Despite the government’s vigorous effort to promote universal primary and secondary education, the literacy level remains around 70 percent. In terms of individual wealth, 35 percent of the population is below the poverty line.\textsuperscript{42} While many citizens are relatively well educated and financially secure, most people struggle to survive in a subsistence economy. To people living in this environment, the thought of becoming a district councilor would seem like an easy way out of poverty. Aspiring local politicians often sell what little they have, borrow heavily from friends, and make whatever promises seem expedient to get themselves elected and on the “magic road to riches.”\textsuperscript{43}
A very rude surprise awaits these poor, uneducated councilors when they assume their duties. They expect salaries, or at least large expense allowances, and health benefits. What they discover is that councilor allowances are set by the Local Governments Act to be 20 percent of locally collected tax revenues for the previous year. Given the recent reduction in local revenues, their allowances are even more at risk. In practical terms it means that a typical councilor might receive approximately 100,000 shillings per sitting (US $50), and payment is often late. Councilors are required to attend six district council meetings each year and six meetings of standing committees. Each trip necessitates travel and hotel expenses that are often not reimbursed in a timely manner. The problem of councilors’ expectations is aggravated by the fact that members of the executive committee and the speaker are paid salaries. The councilors think these members are “eating with the CAO.”

The councilors quickly become aware that district budgets consist of billions of shillings. Because they often do not understand or appreciate how government operates, they become suspicious, and friction begins to grow. For instance, a conditional grant transfer of 100 million shillings sounds like a reward to the administrators if the councilor does not understand the breakdown of these funds and expenditure lines. This problem is worsened when councilors learn of gross misuse of funds and the lack of financial accountability. They ask themselves, why can’t we have some of this money? Is it corruption to get back money they feel is owed to their voters for winning election to office? In their villages they are now viewed as “the big man,” and their voters expect them to deliver with contracts and jobs.

A problem that closely parallels the poor economic backgrounds of many councilors is their lack of education and limited facility in English, which is the official language of local government. While council debates can be held in local languages, the minutes and documents are all maintained in English. Some administrators reported in the interviews how they sometimes hide important facts by writing them in technical language which the councilors obviously would not be able to understand. A more serious problem is that councilors often do not comprehend the laws under which they operate. Respondents claim this causes councilors to feel inferior and insecure which translates into a need to assert themselves. The Ministry of Local Government does provide training for new legislators, but these programs are conducted in English, focus on laws and procedures that are often beyond their comprehension, and many councilors are reportedly more interested in getting their allowances than sitting through dull training sessions.

The problems of poverty and illiteracy combine to create potentially volatile conflict situations. Many councilors believe that power belongs to them because they were elected. They look at the council as a source of money and will try to undercut anyone who stands in the way of getting what is due them. Frustration over the attitude of these councilors is reflected in an interview with a town clerk:

There is ignorance of the laws, mostly among the councilors. They think the council should be able to do whatever it wants. Councilors don’t see this as corruption. It is more a lack of appreciation and understanding of the law. This problem then leads into corruption. We need to educate them. However, we tried capacity building seminars, but it didn’t help. It is more a reflection of
where they come from; poverty, bad families, trying to use politics to find economic security. They may come to serve, but they see all this money.

Other negative comments included: “The elected councilors have unrealistic expectations. They compare themselves to the technicians with salaries. They see themselves as political bosses and they should get a vehicle.” “They see the government as having all the money, but no money is set out for them. Why can't they get a million shillings?” Another wryly concluded, “All they know is that today is Tuesday.”

The respondents were in general agreement that the quality of the councilors is deteriorating. The challenge is how to reverse the trend. The most widely proposed solution is to require a minimum level of education, perhaps an “O” level. President Museveni opposes this action on the grounds that education is not a measure of character. Many educated councilors and district chairpersons have also been arrested for corruption and unethical behavior. From a political perspective, the uneducated, poor population is a solid voting base for the NRM. Imposing an educational requirement would most likely alienate this voting block. Moreover, it is argued that the universal primary and secondary education programs will eventually solve the problem. A second possible solution is to increase the allowances of the district councilors to attract better quality individuals to government service. Given the financial shortfall presently facing districts and local governments, the problem of remuneration will get worse before it gets better. In fact, many respondents commented that councilors in many parts of the country are refusing to attend legislative functions unless they are given their full allowances in advance.

Many district and local leaders take the problem of councilors in stride and try to work with it. Several leaders noted that four out of five councilors do not return for a second term, which means that a couple of years must be devoted to educating an entirely new class of councilors. A central government official exclaimed, “It’s like teaching them how to dance.” What helps is that councilors come to know that administrators and technicians are the only ones with knowledge about laws and projects. When councilors seek information, this is the opportunity needed to start training them to become legislators. One district has taken a more aggressive stance in working with councilors. They worked with local banks to loan councilors' money to buy boda-bodas [motorcycles]. They could use their boda-bodas to make money transporting people during the week and, most important, they had no excuse for not being able to attend legislative meetings. They also advised new councilors that if they wanted to be successful as legislators, they needed to go back to school. Many councilors were now completing their O-level certificates.

Group Tensions: The CAO Has No Friends in This District

Potentially dangerous ethnic issues are always near to the surface in local government decision making. In Masindi district, ethnic tensions arising from land disputes have led to several deaths. To outsiders these ethnic concerns can take on an almost amusing quality. For example a public health administrator found his program undermined by the tribal belief that men who use latrines instead of the forest will not be able to produce children. In still other
situations, politicians have used tribal and ethnic conflicts for personal advantage. An example here would be a member of parliament who was trying to undermine a district chairperson by dividing the district council along ethnic lines. The result of this intervention has been to make the district council virtually non-operational.

Group concerns can play a very immediate role in district and local governments. As a mayor commented, “In my council, people will shoot down an idea simply because the person raising it isn’t from the right ethnic group.” This problem may be aggravated by the recentralization because many administrators now do not belong to the same tribe or ethnic group as the population they serve. Some subtle hints of resentment were expressed with comments like, “He isn’t one of us,” and “the CAO has no friends in this district.” However, the CAO in a volatile western district claimed that coming from the outside has not posed a problem for him because a good administrator can handle ethnic differences. By not being from that group, the CAO can remain neutral and possibly serve as a mediator.

Group issues have also been impacted by the protracted war with Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in the northern region of Uganda by displacing thousands of people. The Masindi CAO reported that members of eighty-seven ethnic groups have moved into that region from the Congo, Kenya, and Sudan, as well as other parts of Uganda, but sub-county chiefs are having difficulty delivering services to these people because all the staff houses were destroyed in the war. A mayor expressed how displaced populations have impacted his town:

> The Kony war messed up our town because of the influx of displaced people. These people flock to our town every day looking for jobs. They are excess baggage and seriously stretch our resources. It is hard to do planning because of displaced people from the war. They build where they shouldn’t and knock over trash bins. Health care is a big problem. Local health centers are poorly equipped. Also, the budget doesn’t match the real population. The day population is 100,000, but the budget is based on the permanent population of 40,000.”

With the Lord’s Resistance Army presently relocated in the Congo, many of these conflicts created by tribal and ethnic pressures on local government are beginning to ease. Displaced persons camps are being closed as these displaced groups are able to return to their home villages and countries.

**Leadership Capacity Building: Conflicts that Undermine the System**

The Local Governments Act establishes overlapping centers of power. The elected executives (district chairpersons and mayors) head the executive committee of the councils, the CAO and town clerks direct the technical staff, the resident district commissioner represents President Museveni, and the council speakers set the legislative agenda. These power centers often fail to appreciate the importance of their respective roles in building the delivery capacity of the district and local governments. It takes only one power center to bring the service delivery process to a standstill. At the same time, the primary source of leadership is when the four power centers agree to work together in meeting the challenges confronting their districts. The
Local Governments Act provides the structure, but it is the actors occupying the power centers who must make the system work.

**District Chairpersons and Mayors: Bringing All the People Together**

The district chairpersons (DCP) and mayors are critical in setting the political tone for their district or local area. Through their power to appoint councilors to committees, political executives can very quickly create peace or conflict among competing groups. “They must be visionary to see the importance of bringing all the people together.” This point has become even more critical with the advent of the multi-party system. The most successful districts and municipalities appear to be those where the executive makes sure that all political parties are represented in the executive committee. The same principle holds true where there are opposing ethnic groups. The DCP has to be perceived as being fair in making appointments or those not appointed will become a constant source of conflict in the council.

DCPs are often a source of conflict because they are the political focal point of their districts. They are generally considered more important politically than members of parliament (MP) who represent only a subsection of a district’s population. Moreover, the DCP is continuously active politically within the district while the MP spends a substantial amount of time in Kampala. The result is that a politically savvy DCP is in a much better position to outmaneuver an MP should they find themselves in opposition. On the other hand, a DCP can attract political controversy if viewed as being in opposition to the ruling NRM. For instance, the district can be divided to make it less politically significant. Another example is the attempt to make the mayor of Kampala, who serves the dual role of chairperson in the urban district, an appointed position under central government control.

The power accorded political executives by the Local Governments Act has not always been used effectively in working with administrative staff. This point is reflected in a newspaper assessment of conflicts between elected and appointed leaders within districts. Most of the conflicts resulted from a failure to understand regulations, respective roles, political differences and love affairs. The endless conflicts resulted in 70 percent of the CAOs being transferred in 2008. The negative reputation of some DCPs in consensus building is further reflected in national assessments which rated the position of district chairperson as one of the most corrupt in the country. According to Transparency International, some DCPs reportedly “rigged” their way into office and then used their power to appoint unqualified people to public boards and committees. These appointees then take bribes and share the bounty with the DCP. Mayors are considered less corrupt only because less money trickles down to them. The Office of the Inspector General (IGG) regularly files extensive reports of misuse of office by political executives.

**Resident District Commissioners: I’m the Shock Absorber**

The role of resident district commissioner (RDC) was initially conceived by the NRM during the bush war as the person who would be responsible for making sure that resistance movement policies were being implemented, organizing the resistance councils, and assuring security. The most important function of this position was the political education of officials and citizens on
the principles of the NRM movement.\textsuperscript{59} The Local Governments Act divided this position between the district chairperson, who would be the elected executive, and the CAO, who would be in charge of policy implementation. This division of duties left the RDC with the primary responsibilities of representing the president in the district and serving as chair of the district security committee. The RDC was charged with monitoring and inspecting the activities of the local governments in the district and advising the district chairperson on matters of a national nature that may affect the district. While technically a senior civil servant, the RDC is purely a political appointee. It is not uncommon for RDC offices to be covered with election posters of NRM candidates.

The perception today of the RDC’s role in local government is one of sharp contrasts. Mayors were asked, “Who would you go to if your town faced a really serious problem?” Their answer was most often the RDC because he has the ear of the president. When DCPs and CAOs were asked about their perceptions, the response was mostly one of indifference if not disdain. “When a politician fails to get re-elected, make him an RDC.” “They are political failures.” “The RDC is just a spy and informer.”

The researchers found the RDC to be among the most interesting to interview. As expected, almost all were former MPs, and some had even served with President Museveni in the bush war. Others were NRM stalwarts who had failed to gain an elected office. Most felt they were doing their best to work with the DCP and CAO of their district in representing the president even though they sometimes were not invited to meetings. A few were refreshingly honest: “I can’t wait to leave this district. The people here do nothing but fight over issues that aren’t really issues.”

What seems clear from the interviews is that the role of the RDC has changed from what the Local Governments Act prescribed. The present focus appears less on monitoring local government activities and more on doing what the president thinks is important in that district to secure his re-election. An RDC described his job this way: “I’m the shock absorber for the president.” Thus in a northern district the RDC focused on security issues, in a central district the focus was on securing the rights of women, and most often it was on settling land disputes, much to the chagrin of lawyers.\textsuperscript{60} “Clear land titles do no exist in Uganda and it can take years to settle land disputes through the courts. Poor people trust me because I’m neutral and I represent the president. Since most land disputes are family wrangles, I usually can work out a compromise just be getting people to talk.”

This image of the wise, senior politician was not universal. In some districts RDCs are at logger heads with the DCP over which of the two is supreme. Many districts complained that RDC was nothing more than a political instigator for the NRM. For instance, the president named the NRM candidate who lost his race for district chairperson to serve as the RDC in that same district. Another example arose when an RDC tried to arrest municipal officials who were legally trying to demolish a building owned by a politician.\textsuperscript{61} Examples of such flagrant abuses of power appeared uncommon to the researchers. What is more important is that RDCs have for the most part allowed their role to evolve with events so they can be more useful to the president as individual problem solvers.
Council Speakers: Just Cuddle-up to Them

Another important role in the district and local governments that is largely overlooked is that of the council speaker. The primary function of the speaker, who is full-time and draws a salary, is to chair the bi-monthly council meetings and to chair the business committee that determines meeting agendas. This position can be a source of conflict with the district chairperson because speakers can determine the course of a meeting by not placing an item on the agenda or refusing to recognize certain councilors. Moreover, the speaker can only be removed by a two-thirds vote of the council and with the consent of the Minister of Local Government. A DCP who cannot get along with the speaker is in trouble because the business of the council comes to a stop.

Perceptions of the speakers’ position were mixed. Many respondents thought the speaker was a waste of money. As a full-time person, the speaker, in the eyes of most administrators, has little to do between the council meetings but meddle in their business. They claim the work of setting an agenda could be done in a couple of weeks before the council meetings. Other respondents, particularly councilors, see the speakers’ role as important in terms of serving as a political harmonizer and a buffer between the administrators and the elected councilors. They also claim that a speaker cannot set an agenda intelligently without having full knowledge of what is happening within the government between council meetings. They also see the speaker as their public relations person and someone with whom they can talk. The end result is that most DCPs and CAOs view the speakers as unimportant, but not worth the political capital it would take to curb their power. “The speaker can destroy you easier than you can destroy him. It is easier to just cuddle-up to them.”

Limitations

The political situation in Uganda is presently very fluid, and not all important areas of local government conflict could be covered in this article. One conflict area not examined in interviews is a simmering dispute between the Buganda kingdom and President Museveni regarding the establishment of a federal-like arrangement (termed feder) in which a regional government would be headed by the kabaka. President Museveni is opposed to federalism in Uganda on the grounds that it would create chaos and power conflicts between the regions and the central government. This tension led to riots in September 2009 in which several people were killed. A second unexamined conflict situation arose with the introduction of bill in parliament that would enable the central government to take over the administration and development of Kampala City plus parts of the major suburban areas of Mukono and Wakiso districts. The effect of the bill would be to give the NRM government a direct role in the running of Kampala through a metropolitan authority. The mayor would become ceremonial and the central government would appoint an executive director to run Kampala City Council. The Buganda leadership vigorously opposes this move as a government ploy to take over their land and reduce the kingdom’s strength.
Conclusion and Recommendations

This article investigated the sources of conflict that impact local governance in Uganda. Based on extensive interviews with local government leaders, it was found that power struggles at the national level and an apparent attitudinal shift on the part of NRM toward local government have resulted in policies that are leaving local governments administratively disoriented, fiscally impaired, and increasingly uncertain as to their future role in governance. Moreover, conflicts arising from the interplay of corruption, illiteracy, and ethnic tensions are inhibiting effective collaboration between elected and administrative personnel. This problem is further exacerbated when conflicts arise because local government leaders stray from their legislated roles. The result is that local government’s capacity to deliver services effectively is being seriously compromised. This inability to deliver services is leading to growing public disenchantment that could ultimately lead to the undoing of Uganda’s attempt to achieve democracy through decentralization. Some conflicts could subside following the 2011 election, since political leaders may feel less pressure to make politically expedient changes to the constitution and the Local Governments Act. It is also hoped that national and local government leaders, remembering the suffering that occurred under recent dictatorships, will be challenged to stop this slide into chaos.

The interviews suggested several policy changes that might help district and local governments alleviate some conflict areas and function more effectively:

1) Resolve the fiscal crisis of local government by instituting a viable change in the tax structure by possibly adopting a district sales tax.
2) Establish a special independent commission to evaluate the economic and political viability of proposed new districts.
3) Mandate that all district and local government elective offices be nonpartisan to reduce the stress caused by political parties.
4) Prohibit the further recentralization of administrative positions for five years to evaluate the impact of recent actions regarding the CAOs, assistant CAOs, and town clerks.
5) Expand the powers of the Inspector General of Government’s Office to investigate and prosecute cases of fraud and corruption.
6) Redesign the position of resident district commissioner to reflect how the role has evolved as the political representative of the president.
7) Require an O-level certificate as a minimum qualification for serving as a district or local government councilor to assure effective conduct of legislative business.

It should be noted in conclusion that Uganda has important qualities working in its favor with respect to building a viable local government system. First, Ugandans have a deeply felt appreciation for democracy following the mistreatment they experienced under years of dictatorship. They know what it means not to be free. Second, most district and local government leaders are very professional. While corruption does exist, the researchers were impressed by the level of expertise and commitment often exhibited in the interviews. Third, while frustration was expressed with the quality of local councilors, it should not be overlooked that many councilors interviewed are working hard to improve the quality of life of their

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11/v11i4a1.pdf
citizens and appear just as dedicated to building a democratic Uganda as those who participated in the NRM bush war.

Notes

1  Kisakye, 1996.
2  APRM, 2007; Barken, 2005; JICA, 2008; Muhumuza, 2008; Robinson, 2006; Steiner, 2006.
5  Kauzya, 2007; Mbazira, 2008.
7  Krutz, 2006; Makara, 1998; Wadala, 2007.
12  Barken, 2005.
13  Krutz, 2006.
14  JICA, 2008.
17  JICA, 2008, p. 49.
22  Ocwich, 2005.
23  JICA, 2008; Muhumuza, 2008.
24  Krutz, 2006.
27  Maseruka, 2008a; Robinson, 2006.
29  MOLG, 2008b.
30  Talemwa, 2009.
34  LGFC, 2009; TIU, 2005.
35  Francis and James, 2003.
37  Maseruka, 2008.
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Is War Contagious? The Transnationalization of Conflict in Darfur

JENNIFER L. DE MAIO

Abstract: Scholars often regard the transnationalization of civil wars as unique expansions of the war and in doing so overlook the importance of the international system in contributing to the spillover of violence. The relationship between domestic situations and international contexts directly contribute to the transnationalization of civil war. I focus on the widening of the Darfur conflict from a domestic conflict to a war with strong international connections and ties. I argue that the transnationalization of war in Darfur is not the result of diffusion or contagion. Instead, the spillover of violence is the result of calculations on the part of the Sudanese government, which is using the violence in Darfur to wage proxy wars in Chad and the Central African Republic. A dangerous system of war has developed, with the governments of Chad, the CAR, and Sudan supporting and arming rebel groups in pursuit of wider political objectives and military goals.

On May 10, 2008, rebels from the Darfur region of western Sudan launched an assault on the capital city of Khartoum. The following day, Sudan severed all ties with Chad, its neighbor to the west. While the attack by the rebels was an act of civil war, tensions in Darfur have escalated to include neighboring countries. Indeed, a system of wars has emerged around Sudan. The violence is the result of distinct domestic politics and involves different actors and issues that have become entangled and have spilled across the geographical and political borders that divided them. The genocide in Darfur is frequently cited as the cause of tensions in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The United Nations recently warned that the violence in Chad could turn into genocide similar to that in Rwanda in 1994. Eastern Chad and Darfur have a similar ethnic composition, with nomadic Arab groups and black African farmers both seeking access to land and scarce water points. The violence in Chad follows the same pattern as in Darfur - mostly Arabs on camel and horseback and in pickup trucks attacking non-Arab villages. But, the war in Chad is not an extension of violence in Darfur.

Scholars often regard the transnationalization of civil war as unique expansions of the war and in doing so overlook the importance of the international system in contributing to the spillover of violence. Few political analyses focus on the role of international structures and politics to explain domestic conflicts. Others instead ignore the domestic political environments...
that influence interstate relations. Yet, the relationship between domestic situations and international contexts directly contribute to the transnationalization of civil war. As Karen Rasler observes, internal conflict “is a product of a complex synergistic relationship between domestic institutional arrangements and the context of competitive international political relations.” In an era when civil wars have emerged as the primary challenge to global peace and stability, understanding the external dynamics of intrastate wars becomes critical for explaining why conflicts spill across borders. External factors and relations between government leaders can provide more or less favorable opportunities for access to resources, legitimacy, and coalition partners.

This article advances a model of state behavior that suggests that a threatened regime wishing to maintain its hold on power may allow and enable civil tensions to spill across borders and destabilize neighboring countries. This approach can be used as a means to consolidate power domestically and spread influence internationally. A civil war thereby becomes a proxy war between states with the advantage that governments can distance themselves from atrocities committed by their proxies by attributing blame to rebel factions.

The transnationalization of the conflict in Darfur is indicative of the behavior of a state that fears impending failure. The Sudanese government is concerned with regime survival and perceives regional stability and dominance as critical to that survival. An examination of the expanding conflict in Central Africa will develop this model and illustrate the causes and dynamics of the transnationalization of violence in Darfur.

The present essay focuses on the widening of the Darfur conflict from a domestic conflict to a war with strong international implications. The Darfur case study illustrates the argument that a government’s domestic concerns and foreign policy goals can interact to produce the transnationalization of civil war. Specifically, the spillover of violence stems from calculations on the part of the Sudanese government, which is using the violence in Darfur to wage proxy wars in Chad and the Central African Republic. A dangerous system of war has developed, with the governments of Chad, the CAR, and Sudan supporting and arming rebel groups in pursuit of wider political objectives and military goals in the respective neighboring states.

The Internationalization of Domestic Violence

In an effort to understand the internationalization of conflict in Darfur specifically and elsewhere in Africa more generally, we must ask how, why, and when do civil wars spill across borders? The post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by the prominence of internal conflicts Figure 1). Between 1989 and 2004, 111 out of 118 worldwide militarized conflicts were intrastate wars. Even though the number of internal conflicts is greater than the incidence of international wars, civil wars are rarely isolated domestic affairs. Through refugee flows and/or violent interstate disputes, civil conflicts can affect entire regions.
Many civil wars begin as intrastate disputes, but they become regional interstate crises when outside powers become involved. The idea of conflicts spreading is often compared to the contagion of disease, fire, and floods. President Bill Clinton, in discussing why the United States needed to send troops to Bosnia, explained that if the US failed to act, “the conflict that already has claimed so many people could spread like poison throughout the entire region.”

This sort of contagion or “domino effect” is a common way of explaining the spillover of civil wars. It is a process known as diffusion and entails igniting conflict in other states or the spillover processes by which conflicts in one country directly affect neighboring countries. Contagion, demonstration effects, information flows, and material and ideological support for ethnic diaspora are types of diffusion. An emerging literature addresses the issue of diffusion and argues in favor of “neighborhood effects,” that is a state’s regional context is an important influence on its conflict potential. According to this argument, there are identifiable zones of peace and zones of conflict, which may have evolved simultaneously. The diffusion hypothesis considers transnational dependence and studies how cross-border interactions clearly influence the risk of civil conflict. The focus on the regional dynamics of the transnationalization of conflict has validity: a civil war in Sierra Leone, for example, is most likely not going to affect the likelihood of conflict in Sri Lanka but could affect the likelihood of conflict in Liberia. There are three types of transnational linkages that may affect the risk that a state will experience a civil war: the character of political institutions in neighboring countries; the willingness of states to seek support from members of similar ethnic groups in adjacent states; and the level of economic interdependence: if it is low, conflict is less costly to neighboring actors.

The recent
work on diffusion suggests that the decisions and acts of individuals, groups, and governments must be considered in order to understand the dynamics of the transnationalization of civil war, but this way of thinking about the regional dimensions of internal conflicts assumes that things move in one direction: from the place where the conflict started to neighboring states, which are characterized as the “passive, innocent victims of epidemics, firestorms, floods, and rivers of refugees...It sees things happening in an uncontrolled and uncontrollable fashion.”

This essay proposes that governments will civil wars to spread across borders in order to engage in proxy battles with neighboring states. Governments can use transnationalized conflicts to strengthen their hold on the state and to gain regional superiority. The spreading of violence across borders is thus calculated and controlled. Escalation of the conflict will then occur when groups forge alliances with affinity groups across their borders and/or when outsiders perceive opportunities in joining ongoing internal conflicts. Outside groups (or states) will take advantage of windows of opportunity in order to capture the spoils, often resulting in intentional spillovers, irredentism, or border conflicts.

An example of this type of transnationalization of conflict can be seen with the Tutsis in Rwanda who allied with elements of Uganda’s Hima ethnic group in the early 1990s to invade Rwanda and displace a Hutu-led regime. Spillover of civil war also occurred in the late 1970s, when Somalis living in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region forged alliances with kin groups in an irredentist attempt to separate themselves and the territory they occupy from Ethiopia.

To be sure, conflicts can become transnationalized as the result of extreme insecurity and ethnic distrust. When kin groups live in neighboring states, civil conflict can spill across borders. But whether or not conflicts become internationalized depends in large part on the international relations between African states. As states begin to look outward to expand their power and rally domestic support, they deliberately foment internal rebellions in neighboring states. External powers back internal rebellions in order to have local groups fight their international wars for them. By arming surrogates, they can advance their goals with minimum accountability and avoid international censure. It is therefore a mistake to think of internal conflicts spilling over from one place to another through a process that is beyond human control. Many--perhaps most--intrapstate conflicts spill across borders because governments or political brokers perceive opportunities to wage proxy wars for whatever reasons against neighboring states. These transnationalizations of civil war are then the products of discrete decisions made by individuals, groups, and governments. During the Iran-Iraq war, for example, Kurds were often used as pawns between the two governments who at various times supported insurrection by their enemy’s Kurdish population in order to indirectly attack each other. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Rwanda used claims of helping kinspeople defend themselves in order to access natural resources in northeast Congo. Ethiopia has also engaged in proxy wars with Somalia with the aim of crushing radical Islam at its roots in Somalia.

There is little evidence in the Sudan case to suggest that civil war is contagious. Common timing of exogenous changes, political motivations, and interstate relations appear to be more compelling causes than any apparent diffusion or geographic effect. There is, then, some reason to doubt that domestic conflict is as contagious as sometimes supposed. What is more likely is that Sudan observed the domestic unrest in Chad and the CAR and used that unrest, combined

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11i4a2.pdf
with elements of violence in Darfur, to its advantage. International pressures and interests have further fueled the transnationalization of conflict and have contributed to the militarization of the political crises in Chad and the CAR, increasing the complexity between them and the Darfur conflict.

The International Relations of African State

The transnationalization of the conflict in Darfur illustrates the changing dynamics of Africa’s relations between states. With the end of the Cold War and in the absence of the superpowers competition for global hegemony, the international community has decreased its interest and interaction with the African continent. As a result, African international relations have changed to become regional rather than global in orientation. During colonialism and the post-independence period, most sub-Saharan African countries were so focused on consolidating domestic power that they generally respected the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Charter calling for noninterference in each other’s domestic affairs. This policy of noninterference was violated with the Ethiopia-Eritrea war that from 1998 to 2000 brought the largest-scale and costliest conventional interstate war to the African continent since the First and Second World Wars. The Eritreans and Ethiopians engaged in a test of wills over an impoverished and barren landscape where the border was never demarcated. Though border issues and tensions over currency and fiscal policies are often cited as causes of the war, the governments of both countries are widely accused of using the conflict as a basis for suppressing internal dissent. As the Ethiopia-Eritrea case illustrates, African countries seem to be looking outward and have a renewed interest in regional international relations. Part of the explanation for this shift and the emergence of interstate war derives from the changing distribution of power among African states. As a result of almost forty years of uneven development and growth, the distribution of African states along a spectrum from weak to strong has widened. For some political leaders, the norms of sovereignty championed in the OAU charter must be loosened to permit them to extend their spheres of influence, tighten their hold on the reins of power, and engage in incursions beyond their borders as a diversion tactic from domestic dissent. How do states choose their diversionary targets? One possible answer is that because of “the emotions generated by ethnic loyalties and the historical grievances associated with them, ethnic rivals make particularly useful targets for shifting focus away from domestic instability.” In situations of asymmetrical power distributions, some states or groups make more useful targets than others for the purposes of rallying domestic support. The core realist hypothesis of international relations is that international outcomes are determined by, or at least are significantly constrained by, the distribution of power between two or more states. As states weaken, they tend to look outwards as a means of consolidating support. And as surrounding states fall into political or economic crisis, stronger regional powers have additional incentives to intervene—in their own self-interest—to preserve order and, often, to take advantage of the economic resources and opportunities that exist in neighboring states. What then happens is that states can allow civil tensions to spill across borders and utilize the escalation of violence in neighboring countries as a proxy war between governments. Weak state capacity of many African states further allows the internationalization of conflict as governments have less control over their borders. Regimes benefit from proxy warfare versus
state-to-state violence because of the high level of deniability for atrocities committed across borders and the political legitimacy that comes from spreading power and influence. Nowhere is this truer than in Sudan.

One of the most serious threats to domestic stability in Sudan comes from the Zaghawa ethnic group, which has the support of the Chadian state. The Zaghawa reside on either side of the frontier and are reputed to be excellent fighters. For Sudan, the Déby regime in Chad is nothing more than a Zaghawa state. Sudan is therefore determined to get rid of President Déby who Khartoum views as a weak leader unable to control his followers. In a calculation reminiscent of the 1990 victory against the SPLM/A that came with the toppling of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, the Sudanese government believes that the solution to the war in Darfur lies in N’djamena, Chad’s capital, and in the ousting of the country’s president.25 Chad has accused the Khartoum-backed Arab Janjaweed militia of attacking villagers in Chad. It says the militia has also attacked some of the 200,000 refugees that came to eastern Chad after fleeing violence in Darfur. Chad also alleges that Khartoum is backing the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), which is a coalition of armed rebel groups and army deserters who have launched cross border attacks from Darfur. Sudan claims that Chad is supporting Darfur’s National Redemption Front rebels as they carry out cross-border raids. There have also been allegations that many of these rebels have become assimilated into Chad’s national army. Chad has called for United Nations peacekeepers to patrol the border with Sudan while Khartoum continues to resist any UN deployment. Chad has accused Sudan of supporting the rebels in recent attacks in order to prevent peacekeepers from getting too close to Darfur.26

With regards to the Central African Republic, Sudan has used its poorer neighbor to the south as a staging ground for attacks throughout its civil war. As is common practice in sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan and Chad also used the CAR as a refuge for the losing side in political or military battles. The CAR says Sudan backs Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) rebels who have captured towns in the country. The government says the UFDR are operating from Darfur with the support of the Sudanese government. Chad has accused Khartoum of trying to destabilize both Chad and the CAR and has suggested an anti-Sudan alliance.27 More than 46,000 refugees from the ethnic and political conflict in the CAR are currently in southern Chad. The CAR has thus been dragged into the violence of the countries that surround it, and its relations with its neighbors have exacerbated its own domestic instability.

The Darfur Powder Keg

The current conflict in Darfur in western Sudan began in February 2003 when insurgents attacked government targets, claiming that their communities were being discriminated against in favor of Arab groups. Darfur has faced many years of tension over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa communities. Darfur is a former independent state that the British annexed to their Sudanese colony in 1916. The region comprises a geographic area of about 500,000 square kilometers and is home to six million of Sudan’s approximately thirty-eight million inhabitants. Darfur, however, has consistently received a far-less-than proportional share of economic and development aid from the central government, leaving it one of Sudan’s most underdeveloped
regions. During the British colonial period, the colonial government invested primarily in the Nile Valley and in Khartoum: as a result, groups in other regions soon found themselves marginalized.\textsuperscript{28} During the period of Darfurian autonomy and later of imperial neglect, diverse ethnic groups shared the region in relative peace. When the time came in the 1970s to decide how the province would be apportioned between pro- and anti-Khartoum populations, Darfur reappeared on the political scene and divisions between the African groups (who were mostly sedentary) and Arab groups (who were uniformly nomadic) became salient.\textsuperscript{29} The first threat of civil war in the region loomed large in the 1980s, when the Sudanese government began arming Arab militias to contain the spread of violence from the South. In response to armament along ethnic lines, non-Arabs started to mobilize and acquire weapons to protect themselves against raids by nomadic Arab militias. What emerged in Darfur during this period was a classic security dilemma by which each side perceived preemptive actions from the other, armed itself in defense, and in doing so, sent off offensive signals. The 1984 famine exacerbated the situation by increasing competition for resources. By the time the Islamist government came into power in Khartoum in the late 1980s, the tensions in Darfur had escalated to the “stage of an undeclared sporadic war.”\textsuperscript{30}

The crisis that erupted in 2003 in Darfur was not simply the result of ancient “tribal” hatreds. Nor was it merely a response to drought and desertification. Instead, the origins of the war in Darfur are political. To be sure there has been historic conflict over land ownership in the region and longstanding grievances between ethnic groups, but the primary responsibility for the war lies with the peace process between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) that excluded certain groups from negotiations.\textsuperscript{31} Insurgents in Darfur were fearful that exclusion from the peace process would further marginalize their region and concluded that though they were significantly weaker than the government, attacks against military garrisons could be a viable strategy for addressing long-term grievances.\textsuperscript{32} Afraid of being excluded from the redistribution of power between the North and South, armed revolt seemed to be the only alternative to ensure a seat at the negotiating table. The rebels are divided into two loosely-allied factions, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and have justified the violence as a response to decades of government marginalization. When insurgents began their targeted attacks, the Khartoum government responded with an indiscriminate counter-insurgency campaign carried out by nomadic Arab militias known as the Janjaweed. By the end of 2003, violence in Darfur had escalated into a full-scale civil war resulting in more than 200,000 deaths and more than two million displaced peoples, mostly from the nomadic and sedentary Zaghawa and the settled Fur and Massaleit ethnic groups, who collectively identify themselves as Africans.\textsuperscript{33} By the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A was signed in January 2005, the crisis in Darfur had become, according to the United States, a full-scale genocide.\textsuperscript{34} As the result of pressure from the international community (which began in April 2004 with an unworkable ceasefire agreement), negotiations began between the government of Sudan and the rebel movements in the region. The government and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), the largest of the three rebel movements led by Minni Minawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5 2006.\textsuperscript{35} February 13, 2010 marked the seventh anniversary of the war in Darfur, and until all groups can be
Is War Contagious? The Transnationalization of the Conflict in Darfur | 32

convinced to perceive greater benefits from peace than from continued war, the crisis can be expected to escalate.

The Dynamics of an Internationalized Regional War

For many who follow the crisis in Darfur, Chad and the CAR are simply the neighboring countries that host the hundreds of thousands Sudanese refugees escaping armed militia attacks. While the conflict in Darfur has fueled and inflamed tension in Chad and the CAR, both are currently engulfed in their own civil wars. The crises in Chad, the CAR, and Darfur have different origins and though they have become closely linked, both Chad and the CAR suffer from problems of their own which the Darfur conflict has exacerbated but not created. Chad and the CAR each have long histories of unstable governance. During the colonial era, they were part of French Equatorial Africa, the federation of French colonial possessions in central Africa that extended northwards from the Congo River to the Sahara Desert. They became independent in 1960, but their economies were in shambles, they were under-populated, and they had small elites. Since 1966, Chad has been plagued by civil and international war. The CAR experienced multiple coups until 1965, when the former colonial soldier, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, became the CAR’s military ruler and crowned himself “emperor” in 1976. After Bokassa was overthrown in 1979 by French military intervention, the CAR returned to its pattern of coups and later rigged elections.

Although divided by international borders, eastern Chad, northern CAR, and western Sudan are closely linked historically, economically, and socially, with numerous ethnic groups common to both countries. Chad, a Sahelian country, is divided between a Christian "African" South and a superficially Arabised Muslim North. In turn, the Muslim ethnic groups—some of which (particularly the Zaghawa) can also be found in western Darfur—are deeply divided among themselves by clan affiliations. Among the southern groups (many of whose members are Christians), some (notably the Sara) are the same as those of the northern part of the CAR. This ethnic situation “leads to a kind of continuous ‘rainbow’ where, from the west of Sudan to the north of the CAR, ethnic groups blend into each other without the colonially-created borders having much relevance.” The political dynamics in each region have resonating effects on the domestic affairs of the various states. Chad’s President Déby and the president he deposed in 1990, Hissène Habré, came to power by launching military campaigns from bases across the border in Darfur, with the support of the Khartoum government. Sudan backed Déby because it perceived his government to be friendly and indebted to Sudan. This relationship was short-lived, however, and while the Chadian Arab–Khartoum alliance endured, tensions mounted between Déby and Sudan. Darfur became a base for Chadian dissidents in successive Chadian wars in the 1980s and, after 1986, Sudanese militias sponsored by Libya in its war with Chad were also active in the region. Libya had aspirations to create a vast Sahelian empire and an “Arab Belt” into central Africa: a key component of this plan was the annexation of Chad. In exchange for weapons, Khartoum allowed Gaddafi to use Darfur as a rear base for its wars in Chad.

Chad is currently ranked in the bottom five out of nearly 180 nations rated by the United Nations in its annual human development index assessment. The country does, however, have one source of wealth: oil. Oil has only started to be tapped in the last few years, and while the
fighting in Chad is not directly about natural resources, oil has made control of the government an even greater political prize.  

Like Déby, CAR President Ange Félix Patassé also needed outside "protectors" when he came to power in 1993. While Déby relied on the Sudanese and French, Patassé turned to Libya and the DRC rebel Jean-Pierre Bemba to keep him in power. There was open hostility between Chad and the CAR as the result of mutual animosity for their support teams. This tension was exacerbated by the increasing importance of the oil factor in sub-regional politics. The situation was ripe for armed conflict, so that when the current conflict in Darfur erupted in February 2003, it proved to be the spark that ignited the fire.

Déby served in the Chadian army, and during the 1980s, he carried out brutal attacks against Chadian Arabs, causing a Chadian Arab migration into Darfur. In 1989, Déby himself sought refuge in Darfur after a failed coup attempt against President Habré. Déby allied himself with Chadian Arab rebel groups in Darfur and enjoyed their support until 2006, when a rebel attack forced him to disarm and arrest Arab officers of the Chadian National Army.

Déby initially supported the government of Sudan against the rebels in Darfur. But, his ethnic identity came into play since members of his Zagawa ethnic group were among the rebels. The rebel movements are comprised of members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zagawa ethnic groups, and many Masalit and Zagawa have ethnic kin across the border in Chad who have provided support and refuge throughout the conflict. In addition, some of the Sudanese Zagawa who helped Déby seize power in Chad are still part of the Chadian military. Members of the Janjaweed militia also come from ethnic groups that live on either side of the Chad-Darfur border. Moreover, Déby backed General Bozizé’s CAR coup in 2003 and quickly found both Sudan and Libya against him. In 2003, he supported a coup in the CAR by General François Bozizé, switched alliances, and became an enemy of both Sudan and Libya. For its part, Libya has positioned soldiers along the Chad-Sudan border to ensure that it has a say in what happens in the region and to express its opposition to western peacekeepers in Darfur.

Not only was Déby facing international opposition, but he also began losing support at home. He was accused of favoring the minority Zagawa ethnic group by giving them influential positions and of corruption in the wake of his country’s newfound oil wealth. When Déby declared his intent to run for a third term in office, some elements of the Chadian elite resorted to armed conflict with the aim of gaining political power and a share of the oil wealth. Plans have been underway in Chad to build an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the coast. Chad received support from the World Bank for the project in exchange for a commitment to direct income from the pipeline towards alleviating poverty. The commitment was written into law, but the Déby government recently changed the law, giving itself greater discretion to determine the allocation of the oil revenue. Some of the money has been spent on arms.

In October 2005, almost two dozen members of the Chadian Army defected to Darfur where they received support, including arms and ammunition, from the Sudanese government. In exchange, the Chadian rebels fought alongside the Janjaweed militia against the Darfurian rebels. Rebel incursions into Chad from Darfur began in December 2005: Chadian authorities immediately blamed the aggression on the government of Sudan.
The Zaghawa ethnic group comprise one percent of the Chadian population: in order to maintain power, President Déby relied on political alliances. When he started to lose support at home, he forged new alliances with the Sudanese rebels who were eager to use the Chad-Sudan border as a buffer zone. By January 2006, the government of Chad was supplying the rebels with resources, including arms and munitions. Despite agreeing to a ceasefire in February 2006, Chad and Sudan continued to maneuver against each other and build alliances. Two months later, Déby officially severed ties with Sudan after an attempted coup. The governments restored relations by August, but Chad’s support for Sudanese rebel movements has been increasingly overt, and Khartoum has been encouraging Chadian opposition movements to unite under a single command. Rebel groups from Darfur play a critical role backing security forces in Chad in their fight against Chadian insurgents.

Two weeks after Sudan-supported rebels attacked the Chadian army in N’Djamena in October 2006, a Central African rebel group the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) seized the capital of the Vakaga Prefecture in northeastern CAR. CAR President Bozizé immediately accused Sudan of aiding and training the UFDR rebels. The Sudanese government officially denies its involvement in these attacks, but evidence suggests that the activities of armed groups in Chad, Sudan, and the CAR are increasingly related. While Sudan is allegedly supporting insurgents in northeastern CAR, rebels in the northwest have exploited developments in the Darfur-Chad crisis in order to expand their own areas of control.

Violence in the CAR is occurring in a context of extreme underdevelopment and poverty where power and resources are distributed along ethnic lines. The internal conflict and rampant criminality are compounded by the international unrest that surrounds the country. War in Sudan has had repercussions for the CAR since well before the conflict in Darfur began in 2003. During the North-South Sudanese civil war, the CAR served as refuge for thousands of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers in the 1980s and as a base from which the Sudan Armed Forces launched attacks against the SPLA in the 1990s. Refugees flowed from Sudan into the CAR: by the early 1990s, approximately 36,000 Sudanese refugees were living in Mboki in southeastern CAR. About half of these refugees were combatants who brought more than 5,000 weapons with them. As the result of the availability of small arms and the subsequent threat to its staff, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) closed its Mboki offices in December 2002. The situation improved with progress in the North-South peace agreement and the camp was eventually reopened in February 2004. When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the North and South in January 2005, the SPLA withdrew from the CAR. Refugees from the North-South conflict have returned home, but new refugees from Darfur have arrived in the CAR, including an estimated 3,000 in May 2007 alone. The CAR is also being used as a transit route for military activity originating in Sudan. During the April 2006 coup attempt against President Déby, the Darfur-based Chadian Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique (FUC) rebels crossed through northeastern CAR en route to attack N’Djamena. In a political gesture of support, President Bozizé closed the CAR border with Sudan, and while he maintains civil relations with the Khartoum government, he does not want to harm his alliance with Déby. An example of the importance of the CAR-Chad relationship came in December 2006 after Bozizé cancelled a scheduled visit to

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11/v11i4a2.pdf
Khartoum when Déby threatened to withdraw Chadian troops patrolling the CAR border region around Goré, as well as Bozizé’s Chadian personal security unit, should Bozizé set foot in Sudan. The movement of arms and combatant continues from Sudan into the CAR and on to Chad as the Khartoum government seems intent on maintaining the CAR, for a staging ground for attacks against Darfur and Chad. CAR rebels are capitalizing on Sudan’s use of CAR territory and with the support of Sudanese forces, are exploiting the security vacuums in Chad caused by the Darfur crisis. The Sudan/Chad/Central African Republic situation is far from being a simple spillover of the Darfur genocide. The three countries, however, have become entrenched in each other’s domestic crises and are now fully engaged in regional wars.

**Sudan’s Foreign Policy Agenda**

While the genocide in Darfur is not contagious, the common denominator in the three crises is Khartoum’s political will that drives the spread of the conflict in the region for reasons of regime security, economic expediency, and ethnic pride. Khartoum is motivated by several factors. First of all, the Sudanese government wants to control Darfur and is using the present ethnic cleansing to create an "Arab" environment, designed to secure the province in case of (probable) secession of the “African” South Sudan, following a scheduled referendum in 2011. Secondly, Khartoum is threatened by Déby’s Zaghawa ethnic group, which it perceives as "African" and therefore a potential ally for rebels in Darfur. Sudan’s main objective, therefore, is to either eliminate Déby or force him into a pro-Khartoum attitude. Khartoum is unlikely to thwart the spillover of violence from Darfur into Chad until Déby is either overthrown or made to change sides. Control of oil in Chad is also a consideration for the Sudanese government. As long as Déby and the Zaghawa control the mineral wealth in the country, the Darfur rebels will have financial and material support. If that oil wealth were to be in the hands of a pro-Khartoum government, Khartoum could have a better chance of defeating the rebels and of enjoying some of the spoils itself. The CAR ranks lower on the agenda since it has no direct ties to Darfur and since its own oil wealth remains a distant prospect. To be sure, the situation has become—as John Prendergast describes—“a power grab that goes beyond the Darfur-specific agenda.”

The old guard in northern Sudan has been substantially weakened by the North-South civil war and by the response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Khartoum is now experiencing a lack of elite legitimacy that in turn leads to elite vulnerability. Weakening state structures, political transitions, pressures for political reform, and economic problems can traditionally bring about vulnerability. Each of the above is present in Sudan. The Khartoum government is determined to fend off emerging political challengers and anxious to shift blame for whatever economic and political setbacks the country may be experiencing. Moreover, ideological justifications for staying in power have been overtaken by events, and Khartoum now needs to develop new means for legitimizing rule. As a result, the government is trying to bolster solidarity and its own political positions by engaging in power struggles with neighboring countries. In the case of Darfur, the governments of Sudan and Chad are each using ethnic alliances across their borders to consolidate and protect their positions at home.
Another important element that may be driving Sudan’s current foreign policy agenda is the North-South dynamic in the country. With the threat of a renewal of large-scale violence between the North and the South looming large, the Khartoum government may be building its power in the region in order to make secession a less appealing option for the South. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has been significantly weakened by the failure of Sudan’s ruling elite to share power with the former southern rebels as stipulated under the CPA. “In terms of political power and the economic sector, the [National Congress Party has] kept full control over the key ministries, and this is creating a credibility problem,” said Alfred Taban, editor of the Khartoum Monitor, an independent newspaper. “The SPLM/A and many southerners [are] very disappointed and [have] lost faith in the intentions of the NCP.” It thus remains likely that the South will vote for independence in 2011. The Khartoum government may be using the transnationalization of conflict in Darfur as means of signaling to the South that the North is a key regional player and will politically and economically crush the South if it votes for secession.

Implications of a Regional War

The recent war in the Sudan region, coupled with the conflicts in the DRC, the Mano River region in West Africa, and in the Horn of Africa, suggests that transnationalized conflicts are on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. This development has serious implications in terms of human casualties, flows of refugees and diseases, the destruction of infrastructure, trafficking in small arms, educational and health systems, and regional and domestic stability. Interstate wars are becoming more common as the result of the changing distribution of power among African states and the fact that African leaders are looking to international incursions to legitimize and consolidate domestic control.

It is not clear how the international community should respond to these developments. Perhaps the best use of external resources and experience would be in supporting strong regional and subregional organizations within sub-Saharan Africa. The international community could invest in training and providing logistical support for these organizations, thereby lending them capacity and credibility. Conflict management efforts should also focus on the decisions and actions of domestic elites who are responsible for sparking the transnationalization of conflict. For its part, the United States proposed the creation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM was established in February 2007 after a ten-year deliberation process within the Department of Defense (DoD) that recognized the emerging strategic importance of Africa and the fact that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but also the interests of the U.S. and international community. With AFRICOM, the goal is for DoD to "better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed." Rather than military intervention, AFRICOM’s missions will focus on providing diplomatic, economic and humanitarian aid with the aim of preventing of conflict, rather than at military intervention. There are concerns among American leaders that AFRICOM implies a permanent U.S. presence on the continent, most likely in Ethiopia. There is the concern that "stationing U.S. combat troops on African soil is counter-productive, unnecessary and impinges on the sovereignty of states." Civil society groups, NGOs, and activists have formed a coalition
called ResistAFRICOM to speak out against AFRICOM, and specifically to protest the reallocation of many duties that previously belonged to nonmilitary US agencies—such as building schools and digging wells—to the DoD. In response, a “networked, distributed command” idea is now being developed. In a speech in Accra, Ghana on February 20, 2008, President Bush denied that the United States was contemplating the construction of new bases on the African continent.

With the situation worsening in Darfur and the threat of renewed violence between the North and South in Sudan a real possibility, the current chances for peace in the region seem slim. The Khartoum government should be held accountable for the spillover of violence from Darfur. Without a change in leadership in Khartoum and a revision of policy goals, it is very likely that the transnationalization of the conflict in Darfur would involve not only the CAR and Chad but also Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Somalia, and thereby become Africa’s second continental war.

Notes

2 Keller 1998; Skocpol 1979.
4 Rasler 1992, p. 94.
5 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997, p. 143.
7 Harbom and Wallensteen 2005.
9 Migdal 1988; Gurr 1993; Keller 1998
10 Gleditsch 2002; Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006; and Gleditsch 2007.
11 Gleditsch 2006.
15 Keller 2002.
18 See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kurdistan-iran.htm
19 Keller 2002.
20 Few wars were fought between African states, with exceptions such as the conflict in Western Sahara, which involved Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco, and destabilization campaigns undertaken by South Africa in Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique.
21 Clapham 2000.
22 Weinstein 2000.
23 Levy 2001, p. 16.
   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7228572.stm
   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6213202.stm
29 Prunier 2007; Flint and De Walle 2005.
30 Prunier 2006.
31 Blaydes and De Maio 2010.
33 Blaydes and De Maio 2010; Flint and De Walle 2005.
34 While the United States, several other governments, and human rights organizations have declared the violence as genocide, there is still some controversy about whether the war in Darfur constitutes genocide. The United Nations, for example, has acknowledged that there have been mass murders and rape, but states that genocidal intent appears to be missing. See “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,” 18 September 2004.
35 The largest of the rebel groups is led by Minni Minawi and is comprised of fighters predominantly from the Zaghawa people.
37 Prunier 2007.
38 Prunier 2007.
40 Prunier 2007.
42 Flint and De Waal, 2005, p. 29.
44 Flint and De Waal 2005, p. 25.
45 Chad has been exporting oil on a significant scale since 2003 and is estimated to have reserves of up to one billion barrels, which is a considerable amount with vast potential spoils by local standards. “Darfur Conflict Zones,” BBC News. 6 December 2006.
   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4906930.stm
46 Prunier 2007.
47 Chadian Arabs make up 15 to 20 percent of Chad’s population and represent a crucial political constituency, particularly in the border zone (Marchal 2006).


Many argue that mineral wealth in Chad is contributing to instability and making life worse for most people, rather than bringing them higher living standards. See Gregory, Mark. “Oil Politics Fuels Chad Violence,” BBC News, 13 April 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4906930.stm

“Chad steps up claims of Sudanese subversion,” Sudan Tribune, 31 December 2005,


Ibid.


Sudan and Chad’s have recently begun a dialogue on normalizing relations between the two countries, but moves have yet to be made to reduce the power of their proxy militias. See “Sudan and Chad to End Hostilities,” BBC News, 10 February 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afrique/8507363.stm.

Ibid.


Brown 2001, p. 221.


See http://www.africom.mil.


71 See ResistAFRICOM at
   http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1552/t/5734/content.jsp?content_KEY=3855.
72 Tisdale 2007.
73 Feller 2008.

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Breaking with Township Gangsterism: The Struggle for Place and Voice

DORIA DANIELS & QUINTON ADAMS

Abstract: For many Cape Flats communities in the Western Cape Province of South Africa, gangsterism defines the dominant culture. How the state of wellness in such communities influences decisions that individuals make, and the choices that are available to them when faced with hardships, violence-related trauma, and socio-economic crises, seldom seem to be part of the research agenda. Limited research has been conducted on the well-being of the youth who grow up in gang-infested areas. This article reports on research that sought to develop a critical understanding how the childhood experiences of township youth influence their decisions to become gangsters. The findings show that decisions that township youth make cannot be separated from their community’s social disorganisation. Gangsterism formed a safe backdrop to childhoods characterised by a lack of personal validation in families, scarcity of suitable role models and personal economic deprivation. The street gang provided the stability and validation that was lacking in their home environments. However, in adulthood their uncritical acceptance of the gangster lifestyle is challenged. The research found that critical incidents in their lives force them to re-evaluate their childhood decisions. It is when critically reflecting on the meaning of their lives that decisions to leave the gang occur.

Introduction

The stories of people’s lives have to be read within the historical, cultural, and political contexts that shape them. This seems to not be the case when the phenomenon of gangsterism is studied. Our knowledge of gangsterism within the coloured communities around Cape Town is shaped by the phenomenon as a criminal entity. This is apparent in research conducted in the disciplines of social work and criminology. In these disciplines, studies overwhelmingly focus on the social problems that gangsters create for society. The subjects of such studies are identified as at-risk individuals whose alienation and disengagement from community requires study. This deficit discourse positions individuals as problems to be solved.

How the state of wellness in their communities influences decisions that individuals make, and the choices that are available to them when faced with hardships, violence-related trauma, and socio-economic crises, seldom seem to be part of the research agenda. What is seen as a limitation of current research is its uncritical engagement with how the individual has been shaped by his or her community culture and how community history influenced the individual’s decision to become a gangster. To engage with gangsterism only as a criminal
entity is to miss its complexity as a social and cultural phenomenon. Steinberg’s research on the lives of gangsters, as written up in *The Number*, underlines this point. His research is one of the few South African studies that sought to understand crime through the life and circumstances of the individual.\(^1\) By giving crime and criminality a human face he succeeds in moving beyond the criminal act to make meaning of why young coloured men of the Western Cape continue to live violent lives despite the opportunities that their democratic society now make available to them.

Children do not possess the maturity and self-knowledge to critically reflect on the historical, cultural, and biological reasons for their needs, wants, and interests. Thus, a decision to become a member of a street gang is not necessarily an informed decision. Researchers have to make sense of the relational, social, and cultural factors that influence the decisions vulnerable youth make about their lives and those who inhabit it, in order to understand them as adult subjects. Adults’ understanding of the world is different from when they were children in that maturity fosters the need in the human being to make meaning of his or her life and to reflect on past decisions. Adulthood often times brings a clearer understanding of life experiences when it is known under what circumstances an expressed idea is true or justified.

Transformative learning theory and resilience shaped the theoretical framework within which we interpret how three former gangsters make meaning of the world they function in and their development of a more critical worldview\(^2\). We are telling their life stories for the insights they could provide on the dynamic interaction between resilience factors and transformational learning processes. This new knowledge is not just transformational for the three men; it could also be valuable knowledge for community educators who work with youth who are vulnerable to the lure of gangsterism.

**Resilience and Transformational Learning as a Framework for Understanding Disentanglement from Gangsterism**

Resilience is often described as “individual variation in response to risk,” or as an occurrence that is characterised by good outcomes in spite of serious threats to adaptation or development.\(^3\) The construct of resilience is a derivative of two bodies of literature: physiological aspects of stress and the psychological aspects of coping.\(^4\) Within the discipline of developmental psychopathology resilience refers to the positive developmental outcomes for youth despite their exposure to adverse and negative circumstances. Defining resilience is challenging as many factors can be identified that could play a role. Some of the factors that researchers of resilience have pointed out are trusting relationships, emotional support that youth enjoy outside of the family, hope, and a belief in God and morality. The International Resiliency Project cautions that not enough is known about the dynamic interaction of these factors, the roles they play in various contexts, and the sources of such factors.

Risk is identified as a primary concept within the resiliency model, being a concept that refers to any power that facilitates the start of, the digression to or the continuation of the problem situation.\(^5\) An individual’s vulnerability to challenges, stress, and anxiety influences how he or she perceives his/her self worth as well as how he or she interacts with his/her world. Thus, demographic variables such as age and gender, together with disabling conditions such as parental conflict and marital violence are factors that could cause stress and anxiety in a
child’s world. What is clear from all resilience studies is the relationship between culture and resilience factors. Culture includes family and community culture. It is from within the confines of the local community that men can be recognised as men and carry out their responsibility as such. Rutter and Salo have argued that one’s identity is ingrained within the generational continuity of the household in which one was raised, together with the communal relationships and networks that exist within one’s neighbourhood.  

Transformational learning theory is a second component that informed our thinking about these men as adults. According to Mezirow, adults are only able to claim ownership of their personal and social roles once they develop a greater understanding and awareness of the world and its issues. Furthermore, researchers of transformational learning processes argue that a traumatic personal event or a series of events during adulthood could result in an acute personal or social crisis for the individual. When this happens, it will challenge their positioning as men in the world and could lead them to undergo a perspective transformation. Such experiences are painful and stressful life events that lead the individual to re-evaluate his life and his purpose in life.

**Community Disorganisation and Gangsterism**

Coloured people are over-represented in South African prisons. Though this group make up 9 percent of the population, they make up 18 percent of the prison population. Higher level of incarceration could suggest higher levels of community criminality. Gangsterism in the Western Cape is often linked to the forced removals of coloured families and their dispersal all over the Cape Flats. Standing and other researchers have argued that the informal social control that communities had over the youth was lost when established Cape Town communities were disbanded under the Group Areas Act in the 1960s. Crime and felony-related conflict became much more prominent and problematic in coloured communities after they were relocated to the Cape Flats. Official estimates for the 1990s put the number of gangs on the Cape Flats at approximately 130 and their combined membership at approximately 100,000. Whereas in the past street gangs were described as expressions of social cohesion in peripheral communities, the Cape Flats gangs of the twenty-first century are violent criminal fraternities that have alarmingly powerful memberships and constitute sophisticated criminal networks.

It cannot be ignored that the high levels of unemployment and poverty amongst township families have created the opportunity for gangs to exploit the vulnerable and the unemployed. Although young men are the primary victims of community violence, they are also overwhelmingly the perpetrators of violent acts committed in such communities. This is borne out by Standing’s research that found that hard-core gangs are more likely to target youths whose vulnerability is enhanced by economically unstable family backgrounds. Poverty, unemployment, and the absence of meaningful jobs are found globally to be contributing factors to the recruitment of youth to gangs. Capozzoli and McVey refer to the sense of hopelessness that poverty generates when youth are unable to obtain the goods and services that they need and that their peers have access to.

The youth’s involvements in gangs are often ascribed to either estrangement or disconnectedness from community. However, not all researchers concur with this argument.
Salo views membership in a gang as the means through which gendered personhood is affirmed and through which communities are forged and reproduced.\textsuperscript{17}

**Narrating the Personal Journey of Three Former Gangsters**

Access to Fly, SB, and Nate (pseudonyms) was negotiated through a community leader with whom all three have a working relationship. This was because we anticipated that these former gangsters would be suspicious of our motives to research their life stories. They consented to be interviewed and audio-taped, on condition that the audio-taped interviews were destroyed once the transcriptions were done. In addition to the $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 hours’ interview transcriptions, additional field notes were collected in the community during informal contact sessions with the three men.\textsuperscript{18} At the time of the interviews all three men had severed their ties with their gangs and said that they were vulnerable to vengeance attacks from gangsters. The names we use in the text are pseudonyms to protect their identities. We also scrambled some of the data that could identify their communities and be traced back to them. The table below provides demographic data on Fly, SB, and Nate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fly</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mother, 2 stepfathers</td>
<td>5 siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>mother</td>
<td>3 siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nate</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>mother</td>
<td>3 siblings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The men’s gender identities seemed to supersede their gangster identities, as they spoke a lot about their biological families and their positioning as sons in such families. When talking about their families, they focussed almost exclusively on their relationship with their mothers and the absence of their fathers. All three men were raised in female-headed households. Fly knew who his biological father was, though the men in his childhood were two stepfathers. There were many men present in the lives of their mothers, but none of these men seemed to have played a significant role in their lives. The various male figures from their childhood were described as abusive to both their mothers and to them as children. The following came from Fly’s narrative, referring to one of the stepfathers:

The time when I became aware, he was already there, and he already beat up my mother and me too … I remember once when he was hitting my mother, when I was a small boy, about three, four years old. While he was hitting my mother, I said to him: ‘Dad, don’t hit my mother like that,’ and he started hitting, and I jumped back, and he threw me against the wardrobe. … and I sat there ‘wind uit’ (winded) … and the tears rolled …,

SB and his three brothers were born out-of-wedlock. His mother was leading a promiscuous life, and four different men fathered her four sons. She drank a lot and often did not come home at night. SB remembers that as a child he constantly sought his real father amongst the many male partners that his mother brought home. His mother’s evasiveness about his paternity was interpreted by him as her unsureness of who fathered him. “She withheld things from me, …
and the fact that I always found her with different men. That could have led to me becoming rebellious against her. All the time she hid things about my father from me, and what happens now? SB eventually found out who his father was, but by that time he had passed away, and the opportunity to get to know him was lost.

Nate knew who both his parents were. They were drug dealers who had a shebeen and traded in alcohol and drugs. He, however, never knew his father, a man who had gained notoriety as one of the biggest drug lords in the community. Nate’s father was forced to relocate to Johannesburg, due to what Nate believes were drug-related issues. His mother was a shebeen queen. What was evident from the three men’s narratives was that the homes they grew up in contained no positive role models that they could emulate. Promiscuity, drunkenness, abuse, criminals, drug dealing, and drug running were amongst the descriptors they used to describing the adults in their lives. The anger and sometimes blame that the three men doled out was mostly to the parent who was present in their lives, namely their mothers. Nate stated that he “does not know what it is like to live with a mother,” as he left home for six years as a child to live on the streets. So too, Fly became a “stroller” and lived on the streets for long periods of time, while SB’s relationship with his mother was tumultuous.

The Community as the Gangs’ School of Initiation

We sought understanding of gang discourse and their composition of social capital, which we understand to be networks that grant a sense of identity and common purpose to both the gangster and the gang and imply costs and benefits. The townships in which SB, Nate, and Fly grew up had low socio-economic status and were typified by poverty and unemployment. All three townships were built between 1965 and 1980, after coloured communities were uprooted from urban residential areas that were rezoned as white residential areas under the Group Areas Act of 1950. Their parents’ classification as coloured under the Population Registration Act led to them being restricted to live in these newly created Cape Flats townships.

Nate grew up in Clarkstown, which is “worlds away from Plattekloof (an affluent white suburb), and also Belhar (a middle-class coloured suburb).” He described his family’s resettlement in the early 1960s as being “dumped” in Clarkstown. According to him, Clarkstown groomed young men for gangsterism. “Clarkstown … it is the place with the highest rate of gangsterism. I have adapted myself to what is the constitution of Clarkstown … and I fall in with that constitution. If I do not fall in with that constitution, I will never make it there.”

In his township people conform to the norms and standards by which Clarkstown residents live, namely that they produce and sell alcohol and drugs, and “stoop to the lowest level to acquire things.” Young males become gang members largely in response to their interactions with the local conditions of poverty. As a youngster, if you did not own a particular pair of training shoes, you identified someone who did, and then you robbed him of his shoes. Thus, acknowledgment is earned through engagement with what is valued, which is membership in a gang and involvement in the drug trade. Nate’s family is an example of what he describes. Nate was born into the drug trade. While growing up he was mainly exposed to people who made a living from trading in drugs and alcohol. His family was powerful in the community because they engaged with illegal activities such as running a shebeen in a residential neighbourhood.
At the time of the interview his sisters were running the shebeen and were still actively continuing their trade in drugs and alcohol.

Against the other two, SB seemed to have lived a normal childhood. Growing up he remembers his mother being the sole breadwinner for her four sons. His mother was always struggling to cope, both personally and financially. Things became difficult for the family when she fell ill and could no longer afford to keep her younger sons at school. When SB’s eldest brother deserted the family and moved to another township, SB was in Grade 11. He had to quit school to become his family’s breadwinner. It would seem that poverty, together with being pushed into the role of sole breadwinner whilst still a teenager, made him more vulnerable to be enticed by the gang. SB said he felt alienated and neglected by his mother and his tumultuous relationship with her influenced his decision to join a street gang at the age of seventeen. His gang members were all “boys growing up without dads, and who were used to being on the street.” SB continues: “Maybe I was just looking for people that could listen to me … They would maybe better understand than my mother did, that was what I thought.”

After he joined the gang, he quit his daytime job because his gang membership came with benefits such as accumulating material goods and easy access to money. As an established gangster SB could walk into a shebeen or any place where illegal activities were taking place and then demand his “tax,” which was the term he used for payoff money. In exchange for the “tax” that he received from his gang leader, his job was to rob businesses or individuals. SB later progressed from street gangster to prison gangster when he landed in jail.

Fly’s family life can be described as unstable and challenging for any growing child. His mother was the black sheep of her family, a woman who was never in a stable relationship, and who constantly uprooted her family. As such, the family was constantly at the mercy of relatives and strangers to house them when they were homeless. At one time their “home” was an outside toilet in a family’s backyard. An unstable family life together with a history of being fathered by a criminal impacted on how he was acted on by his relatives. “Whenever something would disappear, it would be Fly, Fly, Fly. My family, everyone, would … watch me. When something goes missing, even when I did not take it … And many times I would just get fed-up.”

Throughout his narrative, Fly kept on referring to the importance of respect: “… it starts in the home … your parents are the first to initiate you … in other words, they are the first to show you some respect, discipline. And it is just about that. It is all about you not knowing how to act and react … and then it is difficult.”

Fly described himself as a quiet child who did not make trouble. However, during childhood he would disappear for months at a time, living on the street, or helping street vendors sell fruit in the city center. During such periods away from home, he attached himself to various male figures. He made constant reference to an “Uncle Leon,” a street vendor who traded on Greenmarket Square in Cape Town. The first time he met Uncle Leon, also known as “Pappi,” he was about eleven years old. He remembers helping Pappi find a site and set up his table for the day. For two years Pappi was the only family he knew. And the reason that he stayed with him for so long was because he was shown respect by Uncle Leon. Other than
saying that Uncle Leon gave him accommodation, Fly did not divulge much about their relationship.

Fly was fourteen years old when he first went to jail. Police picked him up on an occasion when he was again “strolling” and kept him in jail for a few weeks while trying to locate his family. His second brush with the law was in 2002, when he was caught stripping a car that had been reported stolen. He was jailed for a year-and-a-half. It was at this time that he was recruited by a jail gang. Fly was a “Frans,” a label used for an offender earmarked by the 28 prison gang as one with potential to become a gangster. In the year-an-a-half that he was in jail, Fly participated in and passed the tests and tasks to be inducted into the 28 gang, which is the most influential prison gang. Though Fly had tattoos all over the exposed parts of his body, our reading of him was that he did not fit the hardened gangster profile. His justification for having been a gangster was, again, that he found the discipline that he sought, which had always been missing in his life. Furthermore, his notoriety in the community earned him respect amongst his peers.

Leaving the Gang Behind

In each of the men’s lives, a series of personal events happened that challenged their positioning as men in the world. Death of a family member or the birth of a child were two acutely personal experiences that influenced SB’s and Fly’s decisions to walk away from their lives as gangsters.

SB’s relationship with his mother was described as tumultuous. His gang involvement must have been the reason for many of their arguments, as it is clear that she consistently made her disapproval of his lifestyle known. She would remind him of the effects his lifestyle is having on her and his younger brothers, though he ignored her. Once, however, there was a retaliation attack on his family home after he fought with another gangster. The rival gang threatened his mother with death and trashed his family’s home. This incident was SB’s first experience of the dangerous consequences that being a gangster could have for one’s family. As a gangster, his mother’s voice stayed in his head, admonishing him about his lifestyle. “My mother’s voice, yes … Her voice was the only voice that even now helps. She was always there, even when I went to jail. She would always talk, even scold, and say ‘I am not putting you out because you are a gangster, it is because I do not agree with what you do.’”

His mother persisted in reminding him that his younger siblings were growing up and were witnessing his actions. On such occasions he did consider distancing himself from gangsterism. From how he describes her actions in dealing with his gangster activities, it is obvious that she showed resiliency by refusing to accept any assistance from him that resulted from criminal activities. This must have been difficult given that she was a cash-strapped single parent who could easily have benefitted from the protection and material gains that immediate family members of gangsters enjoy. Instead she distanced herself from him.

The birth of his baby daughter seemed to be the catalyst for his decision to change his life around. Parenthood forced SB to reflect on his new role as a father as well as challenged his positioning thus far as a man against the female sex. When SB became a father the realisation hit him that: “SB, you have a baby, you have a girl, you have a mother … you are older … that is
when I decided that my life as a gangster cannot continue … it is about the people who care about you."

He tells the story of how he was standing outside the hospital while his daughter was being born and how the magnitude of the moment hit him: he was about to become a father, which would place immense responsibility on him as a person. He remembers that the gender of his child triggered memories of all the bad things he had done to girls. That night he walked many kilometres from the hospital to his house, crying about his new baby daughter. That night he made the decision to be a father who would protect her and raise her. For months after her birth he avoided his gangster friends and focussed on his new role as a father.

Fly’s transformation, too, was the result of a collective of transforming life events. Though he had been a “stroller” all his life, he continued to stay in contact with his family. He would occasionally return home to check in on his mother and sisters and bring them fruit. However, when his mother died, he experienced a great sense of loss, and of loneliness. “I was looking for something that was not there anymore. I lost something valuable that had great meaning in my life.” This great loss spurred him on to rebuild his relationship with his sisters. Though not close to them, he now more regularly visits them.

A second change in his life is linked to his personal relationship and the deepening of his spirituality. Even when he was a gangster, Fly would repent about his deeds and “had the urge to … take on God in my life.” When he walked past churches, the “open lights,” he would pause to listen, and would silently ask that churchgoers pray for him too. However, at the time he did not take his thoughts about religion seriously and “did not realise how personal the issue (of finding God) was.” Fly’s religious conversion is however also tied to the emotional and spiritual support he received from the woman in his life. She was religious and was the one who motivated him to attend church with her and to lead “a life for God.” Her tragic death from a snake bite has been a very painful event in his life.

He spoke with great sadness about her death and her influence on his changed perspective on life. He has gained the confidence to pray on his own. Fly exudes an eagerness to understand the Bible and to reflect on what the verses mean and what their relevance are in his life. During the interviews his narrative was interspersed with quotes from the Bible, and he seemed very eager to engage us in discussion about religion. His wife’s untimely death has left him a single parent of one boy. Fly was very reflective about his role as a father, which he described as “a God-given responsibility.” He made a comparison between his role as a father and his experience as a son who suffered neglect and deprivation because of an absent father. Fly decided to break the generational continuity of the absent father by his decision to be present in his son’s life.

Nate gives religion as his reason for turning his back on the gang. He maintained that the only way for him to leave the gangster lifestyle was if he committed his life to God. Gangsters have a grudging respect for a gang member who decides to commit his life to God. However, this decision has made him vulnerable to constant prosecution and monitoring from fellow gangsters. Former gangsters always have incriminating information about other gang members and could place the operations of the gang under severe threat. Nate is very aware that one of the biggest concerns regarding ex-gangsters is that they will inform on the gangs, especially on
the operations of the drug trade. Therefore, the decision to leave the gang and gang culture is a serious one that required tremendous courage on his part.

When his decision became known, it was met with scepticism. The gang always assumes that there is a hidden reason for quitting and sets traps to catch one out. Nate related how a former gang member was shot dead when the gang found out that his religious conversion was a scam to sell drugs and increase his drug trade in the community. Despite his open declaration that he had quit gangsterism, Nate has had numerous opportunities presented to him to earn money by selling drugs. The seduction of easy money through gangsterism is a constant threat. These Nate saw as tests to determine whether he was serious about leaving the gang and to make sure that his decision was genuine. By saying no to such offers speak to the resilience of Nate to resist accepting the tempting offers of gangsters.

The Long Road Ahead

Their break with a gangster lifestyle is allowing SB, Nate, and Fly the space to commit themselves to their personal visions and dreams. They have replaced the gang identity with a personal identity. However, their personal identity requires that they take responsibility for their own actions and commit themselves to new visions for the future. In the past, the gang put pressure on them to act according to the norms and rules of the gang, and there was little or no time as individuals to take responsibility for their personal needs and aspirations. Now they have the freedom of making decisions that could affect their future and purpose in life.

The personal hardships that those who break away from gangs have to experience are sometimes the very reason why people remain in the gang or return to it. SB, Nate, and Fly found themselves without an income, and not knowing how to earn an honest living. Though they did not possess the skills to launch themselves into new careers, they resisted returning to their former activities. Bouncing back from a lifestyle of gang activities and criminality requires consistency in pro-social behavior. Both Nate and Fly were fortunate and could make use of the training opportunities that their church provided to help them prepare for their new lifestyle. Both have participated in a government-sponsored life skills training program for adults living in adverse risk conditions. Nate has plans to set up his own belt-making business, Fly has decided to start his own scrap metal business, and SB has been trained to refurbish old computers. The jobs that they now hold are a far cry from the life of a gangster, and the income that they generate is a pittance when compared to the money to which they had access before.

Conclusion

In this article we presented the stories of three former gangsters. By gaining knowledge from the perspective of the researched, we wanted to understand why male youths become involved in gangsterism and why some of them walk away from this lifestyle. The challenges that SB, Fly, and Nate faced as young men who became gangsters was researched within the ecology of their childhood, as well as that of the broader community. The townships all three grew up in were characterised by disorganisation in both their personal and public life. Their childhoods mirror their multiple marginalities as poor, coloured children from very distressed families. Nate was raised in a shebeen where illegal activities were happening daily and where he was...
initiated as a child drug runner. Fly’s family was often homeless; thus becoming a child of the street was an option he preferred over being at home. SB’s mother’s promiscuous lifestyle and his early baptism into the life of family breadwinner could have been very stressful responsibilities for a seventeen year-old. Given such family backgrounds they had to find ways to survive, and gangsterism provided the way.

Poverty’s impact on their worlds was in limited opportunities, marginalization, and social exclusion. All three boys’ vulnerability to challenging, stressful families influenced how they perceived their self-worth as well as how they interacted with their worlds. Their involvement in gang activities was their way of obtaining a competitive advantage in their own poor and unstable communities. More importantly, the gang became the substitute family where their gendered personhood was affirmed. Furthermore, it became a vehicle to acquiring material goods necessary for minimal well-being, which in their situations were the shoes, clothing, and money to which teenagers from a higher socio-economic community had access. Gangsterism was an avenue to adulthood that these three men from three different townships on the Cape Flats took.

In adult life, the trusting relationships and emotional support that were provided by a partner, together with a growing trust in God and family, were challenging their existing belief system. Many disconcerting moral dilemmas started presenting themselves, such as how to be a good father whilst still a gangster, or how to be a gangster without bringing harm to your family. As gang members they were used to unquestioning and sometimes mindlessly accepting gang rules. Becoming a parent or losing a parent challenged their value systems. They started to actively engage with and question who they are in the world. This ties in with what Mezirow refers to as transformational learning.\textsuperscript{21} They had “matured out” through a process of gradual disaffiliation and breaking away from the gang, at least in terms of commitment to and participation in violent gang activities. These changed perspectives were, however, facilitated by a need for common ground. Whereas in the past they adopted a self serving stance, they now seem to be living by normative values and rules.

Their transformed thinking about life and their roles in it are not easy and straightforward processes. They are constantly confronted by the deeds of their past for they had lived lives that included violence, crime, and drug trafficking, which led to their alienation from the community in which they lived. Though they have shed their gang lifestyle, they know that it is not a straightforward process of cutting one’s ties with the gang. Nor is there instantaneous readmittance to the community; or immediate support. These individuals know that living the life of the former gangster requires tremendous resilience and ongoing courage to stay focused on their new paths: one perceived misstep could mean alienation from the community, or even death.

Notes

1 Steinberg, 2005.
2 Taylor, 2008.
3 Hawley, 2000; also Masten, 2001.
9 Pinnock, 1984.
10 See Standing, 2005, on statistics on gangs. See also Kinnes, 2000.
11 For more, also see Kynoch, 1999.
12 Samara, 2005.
13 Standing, 2005.
16 Glaser, 2000
17 Salo, 2005.
18 One of us was working closely with these communities and with the families of these men. As such, data on the men were known prior to the interviews and were verified during that process.
19 This is a fictitious name for the township.
21 Mezirow, 2000, p.8.

References


Urban Water Politics and Water Security in Disadvantaged Urban Communities in Ghana

KWEKU G. AINUSON

Abstract: Ghana, like most developing countries, struggles to improve access to water and sanitation to its urban population. Presently, many areas within the country do not have access to clean water from the national grid. And in areas served by the approved utility company, water service is mostly erratic and increasingly unreliable. Available evidence indicates that only 59 percent of urban residents have access to improved drinking water. The main policy tool aimed at improving water supply is private sector participation in the water sector. The inadequacies in urban water supply are felt disproportionately in disadvantaged or peri-urban communities. Often, the needs of the disadvantaged communities are hidden in the aggregate statistics of the larger urban areas. This research theorizes that because of the unique characteristics of the disadvantaged community—a high concentration of low income dwellers, squatter communities, and poor infrastructure developments—private sector participation often has very limited effect on the disadvantaged communities. Using a multiple case study approach, this study analyzes the unique water problems faced by disadvantaged urban communities. The research concludes by espousing a multi-sectoral approach which utilizes all resources and uses multiple avenues for water delivery as the best approach to ensure water security to disadvantaged communities.

Introduction

In spite of the benefits of adequate water supply to economic wellbeing, Ghana like other developing countries struggles to improve access to water and sanitation to its urban citizens. At present, many areas within the country do not have access to potable water from the national grid. And in areas served by the approved utility company, water service is mostly erratic and increasingly unreliable. Available evidence indicates that as of 2008, only 59 percent of urban residents have access to improved drinking water from the national grid.1

Low water supply coverage is not peculiar to Ghana alone, but forms part of a systemic urban water supply problem in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).2 According to the UK based international charity WaterAid, water supply coverage in Burkina Faso and Uganda is estimated at 61 percent and 60 percent, respectively. In Ethiopia, only 22 percent of the population have access to potable water, while 43 percent and 48 percent of the population in Mozambique and Nigeria, respectively, have access to potable water.3
The problems that account for urban water supply shortages in SSA are enormous and very complex in nature. These problems range from institutional bottlenecks like water utility management capacity and weak regulatory mechanisms to infrastructure problems such as poor urban planning, rapid growth of squatter communities, and insufficient financial resources.4

According to the United Nations, the urban population in SSA continues to grow at a faster pace than any of the other continents. With an urban population of 13 percent in 1950, the urban population in SSA had increased to 33 percent by 2002.5 The United Nations (UN) estimates that by 2030 one in two Africans will be living in urban areas. In Ghana, the proportion of total population living in urban areas increased from 26 percent in 1965 to 46.3 percent in 2005. It is projected to increase to 58 percent within the next twenty years.6 The growth in the urban sector outpaces the growth in infrastructure development and therefore limits the ability of government to provide adequate utility services to all urban dwellers. The group hardest hit by this shortfall in urban water supply is the urban poor.7 Current estimates indicate that over 28 percent of the urban dwellers in Ghana live below the poverty line. The urban poor are more likely to congregate along urban fringes and defined areas within the urban centers.8 These poor urban communities are mostly populated by squatters and migrants workers, lack basic amenities, and usually have very poorly developed infrastructure.9

The response of governments to the urban water crisis has been through a multi-sectoral approach that strengthens legal and regulatory structures and emphasizes a clear separation between water policy making, water regulation, tariff reforms, and operational functions.10 The main goal of water sector reform in Ghana has been geared towards introducing private sector participation (PSP) into the water supply sector.11 This idea of PSP is based on a neo-liberal market ideology which advocates that PSP in the water sector will improve technical know-how and efficient utility management and bring much needed private capital investment.12 However, gains from PSP in the water sector have received mixed reactions from scholars and researchers, and its continued use as a policy tool has become very controversial among practitioners.13

Within the disadvantaged urban areas, the gains of PSP have been very minimal as PSP often leads to an increase in tariffs and slow expansion of infrastructure to disadvantaged urban areas.14 Private water companies have no real incentives to expand services to disadvantaged urban communities, which tend to have a high concentration of low income dwellers. To this end, residents in the disadvantaged urban communities are more likely to be unconnected to the national grid and therefore more likely to resort to the unofficial and informal sector for their water supply.15

This research studies three disadvantaged communities to explore a multi-sectoral approach to ensure greater water security in disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana. Part One sets the context of urban water policy in Ghana. It highlights the main policy areas and how they affect the low income urban resident. Part Two is a case study of three disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana. It highlights the unique water supply challenges faced by these communities. The third part explores multiple avenues to ensure greater water security in disadvantaged urban communities.
Urban Water Politics and Water Security in Ghana

Under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I and II (GPRSI and GPRSII), adequate water supply is featured as one of the priorities to reduce the incidence of poverty in Ghana. The GPRS sets out strategies to “to reduce human deprivation, promote human rights and achieve sustainable growth.” In spite of the emphasis on increasing access to water as part of poverty reduction, urban water supply is still under 60 percent coverage of its capacity. Meanwhile, with almost 50 percent of Ghana’s total population of 23 million living in urban centers and growing at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, inadequacies in water are bound to grow if there are no sustained measures aimed at addressing the phenomenon.

The total renewable water resource in Ghana is estimated at 53.2 km$^3$/yr out of which 30.3 km$^3$/yr is produced internally. In 2000, only 0.982 km$^3$ of water representing 3.27 percent of internally produced water was withdrawn for use. Thus, there are enough water resources within the country to satisfy urban water needs. However, in spite of the abundant water resources, water supply is erratic and unavailable in many places. Available data shows that in Accra, the capital, only 25 percent of residents have 24 hour water supply. For about 30 percent of residents, water supply service averages twelve hours a day for five days a week. For another 35 percent of residents, water supply is estimated at two days per week. For the remaining 10 percent living mainly in poor neighborhoods at the urban fringes there is no access to piped water supply. Ghana Water Company (GWCL), the only regulated utility service which provides water to all urban areas in Ghana, is able to meet the water demands of only 59 percent of urban residents.

It must be noted that the availability of water in its natural state does not necessarily lead to adequate water supply. Delivering water to needed points within urban centers entail four separate actions. This urban water delivery process entails capturing the needed water through diversion, reservoirs, or ground wells. The captured water then has to be transported to areas of economic need where it will be treated and delivered to consumers through pipes. The infrastructure system needed from capture to delivery requires long-term investments in fixed capital assets at a considerable cost. The investment cost in the capital assets to ensure delivery of water to all needed points is often beyond the means of governments, especially in developing countries.

Population growth in Ghana has also exploded in the last 50 years. With a population of 6.7 million in 1960, the population is estimated at 23 million currently, representing almost a 350 percent increase. The population has grown faster than government has been able to keep up with infrastructure development. Problems with sourcing technical experts, efficiency issues, and inadequate funding have all prevented GWCL from operating at it optimum.

Water Sector Reforms

In 1983, under the World Bank sponsored Economic Recovery Program (ERP), Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) adopted a five year water sector rehabilitation and development plan. The plan was aimed at institutional strengthening through manpower development, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing service and decentralization of water and sewerage supply. Following the decentralization plan in the five year rehabilitation and development plan, GWSC was mandated to concentrate on the provision of water and sewerage
in urban areas only. A semi-autonomous division within the GWSC, called the Community Water and Sanitation Division, was created in 1994 and charged with the responsibility of rural water and sewerage supply.

Restructuring the urban sector has been aimed at encouraging PSP in the delivery of water. As part of the restructuring and in preparation for public sector participation in urban water supply, the government has set up various institutions in the water sector to serve as facilitators and provide the backbone for a viable PSP regime. In this direction, the GWSC which hitherto was a full government corporation operating both rural and urban water was changed to GWCL, a semi-autonomous public agency. A Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) was set up in 1998 to facilitate rural water supply and a Water Resources Commission (WRC) was established in 1996 to see to the environmentally sound management of water resources in Ghana. In 1997, the Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC) was established to see to the regulation and provision of quality utility services. To coordinate the activities of the various institutions and get them to conform to government policies in the water sector, a water directorate was created within the Ministry of Works and Housing to coordinate all activities in the water sector. The work of PURC and GWCL provide the background information for this research.

The Public Utility Regulatory Commission

PURC is an independent regulatory institution set up to regulate water and electricity services. Under the Public Utility and Regulatory Commission Act of 1997 (Act 538), the functions of PURC among other things are setting water rates, regulating and monitoring the activities of GWCL, and embarking on public education to sensitize consumers about the functions of PURC. Section sixteen of Act 538 provides guidelines as to how water tariffs are to be fixed by utility companies. These functions are aimed at ensuring safe, clean, adequate, reliable, and efficient water service to the consumers while at the same time ensuring that consumers pay reasonable prices for the sustenance of utility providers. Within the water supply sector, PURC interprets its obligations as being limited to the regulation of the activities of GWCL. Thus, PURC jurisdiction does not extend to the informal water sector dominated by the small-scale water providers that serve as the main service providers in the disadvantaged urban communities.

By far, PURC’s most important function is setting of tariffs by which utility companies charge consumers for services provided. Act 538 provides in section 16 (3) that the tariff guidelines provided by PURC must strike a balance between consumer interests, investor interests, and the cost of production for water service providers. Since GWCL is the only recognized company providing water in urban areas, PURC uses a nationwide uniform tariff structure. For domestic customers, PURC utilizes an increasing block rate pricing scheme.

Ghana Water Company Limited

GWCL is an independent public company created in 1999 to succeed GWSC. The creation of GWCL was part of the water sector restructuring effort of the government of Ghana (GOG).
restructuring of GWCL was partly to increase its efficiency and effectiveness and also position it to encourage private sector participation in the water sector.\textsuperscript{28} The main objectives of GWCL are:

- planning and development of water supply systems in urban communities in Ghana;
- provision and maintenance of acceptable levels of service to consumers in respect of water quantity and quality;
- preparation of long term water supply plans in consultation with the appropriate coordinating authority established by the president;
- conduct water supply related research;
- create engineering surveys and plans as appropriate;
- construct and operate water works in urban areas;
- submit tariff proposals to PURC for review and approval; and
- conduct other related or incidental activities.

GWCL operates under the direction of the Ministry of Water Works and Housing which has oversight authority over the sectorial policies within the water sector. GWCL operates 86 pipe water systems in urban areas across the country. The total installed capacity of the water systems operated by GWCL is 737,000 m$^3$ per day as against an estimated urban demand of 939,070 m$^3$ per day, revealing a shortfall in water supply. Water supply problems are compounded by the fact that even though GWCL has the capacity to produce 737,000 m$^3$ per day, administrative and distributional inefficiencies put actual supply at 551,451 m$^3$ per day. The inefficiencies in GWCL account for most of the shortages in urban water supply to customers within the piped network of GWCL.

Most of the problems that affect GWCL were inherited from GWSC. GWSC was a public corporation that was, for a considerable period of time, kept under the dictates of politicians.\textsuperscript{29} It operated at a time when there was no independent regulatory institution to monitor its activities. GWSC operated as a water supplier, water resources manager and a water supply and resource regulator. Accordingly, politicians were able to keep water tariffs low with the aim of protecting consumers for a long period of time.\textsuperscript{30} Public policy objectives of GWSC were to a large extent geared towards satisfying political ends instead of strengthening the corporation to efficiently and effectively supply water. With low tariffs and interference from politicians, the corporation was plagued with low investment and general breakdown of water systems.\textsuperscript{31}

One of the important problems that confronted GWCL when it came into existence in 1999 was therefore capital investment to maintain the existing water systems and to undertake system expansion to cover the ever increasing urban population in Ghana. In 2005, PURC estimated that a total of $891 million will be required to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of 85 percent urban water coverage by 2015.\textsuperscript{32} Similarly, estimates by WaterAid Ghana indicate that $85 million in annual investment is needed to reach the MDG. Current spending averages only $17 million annually.\textsuperscript{33} GWCL is therefore in need of an average of $68 million in investment funds annually to reach it MDG goals.

The current financial commitment of the Ghanaian government and other donor partners to the water sector is woefully inadequate. For instance, GOG’s allocation to the water and sanitation sector in 2006 was lower than the previous year even though it is expected to increase its expenditure over time to meet set targets. Out of the expected annual expenditure of $85
million in the sector in 2006, government expenditure was only 3.7 percent, with the rest expected to be picked up by the donor community. However, donor funding is erratic and often inadequate. From 1990 to 2003, Ghana’s major donors contributed $220 million to the urban water sector. It is estimated that within the period of 2004 to 2010, donor support (excluding NGOs) for the urban water system will be only $185 million. In the light of the recent world economic crisis, these estimated donor contributions are likely to fall below target. GOG will therefore need to increase its financial commitments in the water sector and at the same time convince donor partners to increase theirs as well in order to meet its water supply targets by 2015.

Private Sector Participation

An earlier attempt at PSP in the water sector failed when a twenty year lease contract between the now defunct Azurix, a subsidiary of Enron, and the government of Ghana was cancelled. This lease contract failed mainly due to allegations of corruption and increasing public opposition to water privatization. In 2006, GWCL entered into a five year management contract with Vitens Rand Water Services BV of Netherlands and its subsidiary in Ghana, Aqua VitRa Limited operating under the joint name of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL). The main components of the management contract are system expansion, rehabilitation of existing water systems, capacity building to enhance the skill, and competence of the staff of GWCL and project management. Under the system expansion and rehabilitation component, the operator must work to increase the amount of treated water for sale, extend service to low income areas and rehabilitate existing networks to reduce non-revenue water (i.e., unaccounted for water). The operator also must work to ensure safety at the various dam sites and procure and install billing meters for consumers. Under the capacity building and project management component of the contract, the operator shall among other things train seconded staff and offer technical assistance to the grantor.

Since the agreement is only a management contract, AVRL does not have to provide any funding for the project. They get paid for the services of managing the urban water system in Ghana. The grantor (GOG) through GWCL has to provide the funding for the realization of the target components set out under the contract. The contract is estimated to cost $120 million. The government of Ghana is providing $12 million while its development partners, the World Bank and the Nordic Development Fund, are providing $103 million and $5 million, respectively. AVRL is entitled to contract with consumers for the supply of water on behalf of the GWCL. AVRL will therefore issue bills, receive payments, and disconnect consumers for non-payment. The facilities of GWCL also shall be under the care of AVRL for the duration of the contract. Upon satisfactory execution of the contract, AVRL shall have the right to submit a bid for a leasehold agreement. AVRL shall be paid a base fee for its services. In addition to the base fee, AVRL shall receive financial incentives based on the extent to which it exceeds performance targets as stated in the contract. The base fee will also be reduced by penalties based on the extent to which AVRL falls behind on the targets of the contract.

The success of the management contract depends to a large extent on the ability of GWCL and other regulatory agencies to monitor the performance of AVRL. For instance, adjustments
in the base fee can be made only with data on the performance of AVRL. Performance measures such as reduction in non-revenue for water needs accurate water production levels to measure. Other indicators like extension of services to areas outside the network are relatively easy to measure. Extension of water supply services to areas outside the coverage areas will have physical infrastructure and consumer satisfaction as indicators of performance. Personal interviews conducted with officials at the GWCL show that GWCL does not have the capacity to collate the data necessary for a full performance review of the management with AVRL. A senior policy staff interviewed at GWCL acknowledged that almost three years into the management contract GWCL has not been able to establish a baseline for AVRL on which to measure performance targets.

**Urban Poor**

Although extension of water infrastructure to serve the poor was a component of the AVRL management contract, three years into the contract no significant improvement in the services to the poor has been recorded. Under the contract, low income areas are defined as all areas which do not receive piped water services from GWCL. For purposes of this research, low income areas have been defined as areas which do not receive regular or piped water services from GWCL as well as areas with higher concentration of residents with average annual income at the threshold level of $400.

The urban poor in Ghana find themselves in a very vulnerable situation. When GWCL was created in 1998, it was mandated to supply water to urban areas in Ghana, i.e. cities or towns with population exceeding five thousand residents. There are areas or communities within these urban centers which exist almost as autonomous communities but are regarded as part of the larger city because of their location within the city limits. Thus, though these communities would have been regarded as rural because of the size of their populations, there are regarded as urban because of their geographic location. These communities tend to be at the urban fringes, exhibit shanty town characteristics, and have a high concentration of poor people. The communities are characterized by low income dwellers, squatters, inadequate infrastructure, and low levels of education. A sizeable proportion of these residents are rural-urban migrants in search of work in the cities. GWCL, which caters to the needs of the more traditional urban centers, therefore severely disadvantage these poor urban dwellers in water service provision. Although there is an acute water supply shortage in such areas, their plight is often hidden within the aggregate data obtained for the entire urban areas. Thus, though GWCL figures put urban water coverage at 59 percent, coverage in the poor neighborhoods is around 20 percent and in the worst areas below 5 percent. In Accra, GWCL water connection rates average 90 percent in high-income areas and sixteen percent in low-income settlements. In fact, in some of these poor neighborhoods, the living arrangements make it almost impossible for the GWCL to extend pipe service to the area. Residents build structures anywhere within the community, in most cases without official approval. In the communities of Nima, Sukura, and Ashiaman residential areas for instance, it is difficult for vehicles to drive through most of the area because buildings and structures have been erected on every possible space in the community. The political will needed to demolish illegal structures to pave way for pipes to be laid is often absent.
The main function of CWSA is to assist district assemblies with water supply in rural areas. Since rural dwelling units are generally not suitable for piped water systems, CWSA facilitates the construction of boreholes and hand dug wells to make water readily available to rural dwellers. Boreholes and hand dug wells provide suitable water alternatives to rural communities with fewer people and low incomes to economically afford the convenience of network piped water systems. Boreholes and hand dug wells therefore serve as a cheap alternative to get reliable and clean water supply throughout the year. However, since low income communities within the urban centers are not defined as rural areas, they do not come under the jurisdiction of CWSA and can therefore not benefit from the boreholes and the hand dug wells provided by CWSA. Poor communities in urban centers therefore resort to buying water from water vendors, small-scale water suppliers and other unapproved sources. Where there is piped water system close by, family members walk to fetch water or pay for people to cart water to their residence. In communities which are far from piped water supply, residents pay small-scale water suppliers who fetch water in motorized tanks for delivery. There is a lot of controversy about the source and quality of the water supplied by the motorized tanks as well as other small-scale water providers.

Residents in low income communities pay three or four times what residents on the GWCL network pay for water. In Accra, many of the 800,000 people living at or below the poverty line pay ten times more for their water than residents in high income areas. The operations of the small-scale water suppliers do not come within the purview of the PURC and therefore are not required to adhere to the regulations of PURC. PURC itself has not shown any interest in regulating the activities of the small-scale water providers. In its 2005 tariff policy statement, though PURC agreed that the best pro-poor measure of water supply will be to extend GWCL coverage to such areas, it said that the operations of the small-scale water providers should be left to the market forces. Because of information asymmetry, low income consumers do not possess the necessary information to make the right decision as to whom to buy water from and how much to pay. The urban poor are therefore left at the mercy of the small-scale water suppliers while the high income consumers enjoy the protection of PURC and the convenience of piped water from GWCL.

Case Study Communities
A multiple case study involving the three disadvantaged communities of Nima, Ashalley Botwe, and Ashaiman was used to study water supply in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods. The three case studies were arrived at by considering demographic factors such as income levels, educational levels, and ethnicity. Experts in the water sector were consulted as well as various government documents on the subject area. Data collection in the case study areas took place in December 2007 and January 2008 after obtaining the necessary permit on conducting research involving human subjects. Congruent nested mixed method was used to collect and analyze data in the case study areas. Actual data collection methods involved a combination of interviews of water sector stakeholders, focus group discussions, and household surveys.
The three communities exhibit the attributes of the quintessential peri-urban neighborhood with their poor infrastructure development and continuous deterioration of the surrounding environment. They fit the description offered by Birley and Lock that the informal nature of settlements makes it attractive to rural migrants because they serve as a conducive location for the establishment of squatter settlements in hope of deriving benefits from the city. In addition, city residents who are priced out of high income neighborhoods find these areas cheap alternatives.

Ashalley Botwe was barely a community in 1970; it was at best a rural area with only a few inhabitants and houses. The growth in the city of Accra in the latter part of the 1980s and the 1990s saw an increase in the population of residents in the area. Migrants coming into Accra to work settled in the relatively less expensive areas in Ashalley Botwe. Rapid population growth in Ashaiman took place during and after the construction of the main seaport terminal in Ghana. Low income migrants in search of jobs at the harbor hub quickly filled up the area. Subsequently, returning peacekeeping troops with saved income from their missions settled in Ashaiman as their income was not enough to earn them places in high income residential areas. Nima grew as an area that socializes new migrants to the city of Accra. Most of the growth in Nima took place during Nkrumah’s five year development plan in the 1960s when migrant trooped to Accra in such of jobs. Table 1 details these population changes.

Table 1 Population Change in the Case Study Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Population Change</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accra Region</td>
<td>734,896</td>
<td>1,203,292</td>
<td>2,548,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashalley Botwe</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>11,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashiaman</td>
<td>22,549</td>
<td>50,918</td>
<td>150,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nima</td>
<td>52,270</td>
<td>52,906</td>
<td>69,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ghana Statistical Service 2000 Census Data

Source of Water Supply in Disadvantaged Communities

Disadvantaged communities are often the last to receive water services from official water and sanitation providers. Living arrangements within these communities are often ill-suited to allow piped network without a major reorganization of structures. Where piped water exists, the informal nature of the living arrangements may prevent residents from acquiring the necessary legal documents necessary for pipe connection. While many “house owners” in Nima and Ashaiman could not produce any legal documentation to their properties, they did not feel threatened by their lack of documentation, arguing that their neighbors and others within the community knew they owned their properties.

Data from the study revealed that the case study communities relied heavily on small-scale water providers for their water supply. Ashalley Botwe residents depended on a combination of private mobile water tankers and hand dug wells. Nima and Ashaiman residents got their water supply mainly from their neighbors’ house pipe or public stand pipe. The market
arrangement for water in all three communities is similar even though providers differ slightly. Water providers are mainly local residents, and water is primarily sold in buckets to consumers.

There are enormous health risks associated with small-scale water providers. Local business people store water in poly tank containers—usually with a capacity of 1000 liters—with water from piped connections where it exists or tanker-delivered water. These poly tank containers are rarely cleaned and evidence of growing spirogyra around the tanks points to the quality of water in the tanks. The tanks mounted on water tankers, often manufactured from scrap metal, are also hardly ever cleaned. In an interview of twenty water tanker operators in Ashalley Botwe, the average cleaning time ranged from once a month to once every three months. The disturbing part was that drivers climbed into the tanks to clean them using laundry detergents containing bleach. It is not surprising therefore that international health agencies including the World Health Organization do not recognize the activities of small-scale water providers, especially tanker service. It is for this same reason also that the GOG does not recognize the activities of the water tanker suppliers.

Resident participants in the focus group discussion were emphatic when it came to the quality of water supplied by small-scale providers. There were numerous complaints about odor and particles in the water supplied by vendors. Mobile water tankers cart stream water or other kind of untreated water for consumers when the intended use is for construction or outdoor use and cart treated water when the intended use is domestic. However, consumers have no way of knowing the source of water when it is delivered to them. During the focus group discussion, consumers charged that tanker drivers often deliver untreated water even though they had paid for treated water. Mobile water tanker drivers vehemently denied this charge during an interview with selected drivers. Without testing the water delivered by these mobile water drivers it is difficult to determine in certainty the charge of consumers. However, the picture is quite clear. With no regulation and uninformed consumers, the incentive to cheat is very great.

There also was evidence of illegal water connections in the communities. Some poly-tank owners directly tap into the main water lines to fill their containers for sale. This phenomenon was very prevalent in Nima. In spite of persistent resident complaints both to the police and officials of GWCL, nothing seemed to have been done about them. With limited resources from GWCL and ill-equipped police to check such illegal connections, perpetrators sense a lack of credible commitment on the part of the authorities and therefore operate with impunity.

Information gathered from the case study area indicated that residents in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods paid more for water that residents in other parts of the urban area with piped water from GWCL. Based on the tariff structure of PURC, a bucket of water (35 liters) should be priced at GHc 0.0145, for this is the calculation used for residents in other parts of the city with piped water. However, in Ashaiman and Nima, residents paid an average of GHc 0.07 for every 35 liters of water consumed, and Ashalley Botwe residents paid an average of GHc 0.25 for every 35 liters of water consumed. (Table 2) The price differentials in the case study areas reflect the level of water scarcity in the localities. According to GWCL, unlike Ashaiman and Nima where about 50 percent of water demand is met, in Ashalley Botwe only 45 percent of water needs are met. In addition, residents in Ashalley Botwe reported earning more than
residents in the other two communities. Thus, there is a higher demand for water in Ashalley Botwe than in Nima and Ashalley Botwe. Table 2 illustrates the water prices in these three localities.

Table 2 Water Prices in the Case Study Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Buckets</th>
<th>Number of liters</th>
<th>Ashalley Botwe Price (Cedis)</th>
<th>Ashaiman Price (Cedis)</th>
<th>Nima Price (Cedis)</th>
<th>PURC Approved Price (Cedis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.0700</td>
<td>0.0700</td>
<td>0.0145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.1400</td>
<td>0.1400</td>
<td>0.0290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.2100</td>
<td>0.2100</td>
<td>0.0435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2800</td>
<td>0.2800</td>
<td>0.0581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.3500</td>
<td>0.3500</td>
<td>0.0726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

It must be noted that small-scale water providers incur transactional costs such as transportation and purchase of equipment and do not enjoy the economies of scale of the large utilities providers. However, with no regulatory oversight and no obligation to follow the directives of the PURC, they are free to charge any amount they deem fit. In all three communities there were voluntary institutions that have made attempt at some regulation. The chief concern of these voluntary organizations is the regulation of prices for small-scale water operators. Lists of prices approved by the local institutions were displayed on a number of buildings in the communities. However, there was very little indication that water sellers took the price list seriously, as prices varied from seller to seller with many in excess of the approved prices. With no compulsion and no selective incentives, very few small-scale water operators join these organizations.

The voluntary institutions were not so much concerned with regulating the quality of water their members sold. In any case, the associations possess neither the technical know-how nor the financial resources to arrange for quality checks. Membership in the water associations does not give one any special advantages, thus associations risk losing members if they push any regulations that will increase the operating cost of members. Thus, low income urban residents are left at the mercy of the small-scale water providers. Institutional reforms in the water sector have not been fast and far reaching enough to ensure increased water security in low income areas. The only option left to residents in disadvantaged communities is to rely on the unregulated services available through the informal sector.

Opportunities for Ensuring Improved Water Security

Achieving water security is very important. In fact, water security forms a fundamental part of poverty alleviation and forms part of the critical infrastructure that attracts foreign investments. It is obvious that GOG lacks the capacity to mobilize the needed resources to build network pipes to all needed areas by 2015. Thus, exploring other avenues to increase...
water supply as well as strengthening local institutions, even in the interim, is important to
diversify supply sources and ensure increased water security. In this direction, there is the need
to technical and financial support for small-scale providers. Official recognition of small-scale
providers that will include being subjected to the regulatory supervision of PURC will be a step
in the right direction.

Regulation of Small-Scale Water Providers

As the case studies indicate, small-scale water providers provide valuable services to the
disadvantaged urban community. Small-scale water providers are relied on as the main source
of water for disadvantaged urban areas in Ghana, providing more than two-thirds of all their
water supply. The usefulness of small-scale water providers is not unique to Ghana.
Disadvantaged urban communities in Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania as well as in
other African countries rely heavily on their services. In spite of their importance, several
problems exist in this sector. Chief among them is lack of access to capital to purchase tankers,
containers, water pumps, and resources to maintain their equipment. They also face constant
harassment from local officials as well as utility providers. These problems have been
exacerbated by the refusal of government and other practitioners to pay close attention to their
services, thereby preventing effective policy support for their efficient engagement. The lack of
support from government as well as practitioners has been due to the fact that in the first place
the services of the small-scale water provider are seen as a short-term fix to water inadequacies
in the urban area. Secondly, policy makers have dealt with a few large public enterprises that
have historically handled urban water supply. To them, it is easier to deal with the few large
enterprises than to deal with a heterogeneous group of small-scale water providers. Third,
international technical standards sometimes do not recognize the activities of the small-scale
water providers. For instance, because of the controversy surrounding water handling, the Joint
Monitoring Program of the World Health Organization does not consider water tankers and
water vendors as sources of safe water supply. Nonetheless, donor agencies and NGOs such as
the World Bank, the Canadian International Development Agency, the United Kingdom
Department of International Development, and WaterAid International have increasingly
recognized the services of the small-scale water providers and thus provide some assistance.
The heterogeneous nature of the operations of the small-scale water providers as well as the
lack of a coherent organization of their trade, however, severely hampers such assistance.

With rapid population growth, urbanization, and scarce financial resources, sub-Saharan
African governments cannot effectively provide for all their urban population in the foreseeable
future. Already, civil society groups have charged that the MDG goal of ensuring 85 percent
water coverage by 2015 is unattainable given current policies and financing levels. As a result,
the services of small-scale water providers have almost come to stay. If governments want to
make real progress at achieving the MDG goal of ensuring 85 percent water coverage by 2015,
then they must accept small-scale providers as partners.

Too little attention has been devoted to regulating small-scale water providers. The lack of
attention creates a serious regulatory gap, especially from the point of view of residents in
disadvantaged communities. Adopting policy interventions that regulate the quantity, quality,
and prices of the small-scale water providers can close this regulatory gap. Formal recognition will make it easy for small-scale water providers effectively to organize into cooperative associations through which their activities can be better regulated. Public agencies can then partner with them to ensure that proper equipments are used for the trade and strict hygiene standards are adhered to. For instance, individual business owners who pass a periodic hygiene and equipment test can display a sticker to that effect. Public agencies, through the cooperative associations can use negative market incentives like suspensions or withdrawal of licenses for operators who do not adhere to the strict hygiene standards. Consumers can then use the market information supplied through the hygiene stickers as well as membership in approved water associations to determine the services they choose. Public agencies must also work to ensure them easy access to capital as well as technical support for the mobile water providers for buying equipment and building containers. For the mobile water providers, such support must ensure that proper materials are used to construct water tanks. Support should also facilitate the designing of tanks so that drivers wouldn’t have to stand in the tanks to clean them. Education on the frequency of cleaning tanks as well as the right cleaning materials to use will remedy the scenario where drivers clean their tanks once every three months with laundry detergent. Water resellers should also be assisted as to the proper place to site containers and build tanks to either prevent or drastically reduce the buildup of spirogyra.

PURC has consistently said that they will not regulate the prices of the small-scale water providers, especially because of the fact that transport cost which makes up the bulk of production cost for the small-scale provider is difficult to control. PURC has therefore argued that prices should be subjected to the law of supply and demand. However, in the water business there is a high level of information asymmetry in favor of the water provider. Not only do consumers find it difficult to ascertain the source of water, they also have very little information about the quality of water delivered to them. With no enforced regulations and very little information available, consumers do not have enough information to make the right choice as to whom to buy from. Distortions in the market therefore make it easy for the poor to be further exploited. In any case, consumers who fall sick as a result of the negative externality of the operations of the small-scale providers may burden public health care cost. In addition, other adverse effect from the health problems may be eventually felt throughout the economy as lost job hours increase. If PURC hope to fulfill its mandate of protecting the interests of consumers, then it is incumbent upon that authority to regulate the activities of the small-scale provider.

PURC must work with GWCL to ensure that small-scale providers, especially mobile tanker services, have access to quality water. Existing booster stations (water treatment centers) must be expanded to ensure small-scale providers clean water for resale. In fact, GWCL must proportionally allocate treated water to small-scale providers. Consumers in the disadvantaged communities are also tax-paying members of the society and must therefore benefit from publicly supplied water. If piped networks cannot be constructed quickly to all needed areas, then water treatment centers should be sited strategically so that small-scale suppliers have access to treated water for their customers. GWCL must work to ensure that water sold to small-scale providers is sold at bulk water rate. When water treatment centers become easily accessible to tanker services, it will reduce their transportation cost and thereby translate into
reduced prices for consumers. In a survey conducted by PURC in 2005, consumers rated water accessibility as the most important water issue.\textsuperscript{52}

**Community Involvement in Decision Making Processes**

Water supply agencies must actively engage consumers in the decision making process as well as in the implementation of policies. Burby has argued that lack of public involvement in government plans often lead to wrong solutions and an apathetic public. Policies that have low public involvement tend to be dominated by technical experts and may then raise the fundamental issue of democratic participation in governance.\textsuperscript{53} In addition, as Lindblom and Cohen have acknowledged, citizens possess pertinent situational knowledge that can help ensure that policies take account of local conditions and reflect local values.\textsuperscript{54} The relevant situational knowledge is lost when there is no committed attempt at actively engaging the public, and the policies government or donor agencies seek to implement may seem irrelevant to the citizenry.\textsuperscript{55} In engaging consumers, public agencies must also engage the civil society groups that represent the interests of the consumers. The way forward is to use information, subtle persuasion and openness to ensure mutual understanding, trust and strive to achieve consensus. The current process of heavy handedness, name calling, and secrecy only deepens the mistrust between stakeholders.\textsuperscript{56} Current civil society opposition to water privatization has been due to the fact that civil society stakeholders have fundamentally regarded the planning process as shrouded in secrecy. Gleick et al. notes that water is so important for human health that in privatizing water services governments must set up clear guidelines that among other things ensure transparency and include all stakeholders in the decision making process.\textsuperscript{57}

Through a committed engagement process during planning and implementation, potential opposition to policies can be identified at the outset and dealt with appropriately. In the words of Pressman and Wildavsky, policy implementation that is revolutionary and not evolutionary is more likely to fail.\textsuperscript{58} In 1992, the city of Cartagena, Columbia was confronted with a situation very familiar in other developing countries – inadequate water supply. The city responded to the crisis with a management contract, but strong public opposition affected its effectiveness. Acuacar, the private company eventually won the support of the people when, with the help of the government, they implemented a large public relations campaign. It organized educational campaigns for community leaders and other stakeholders about the water treatment process and other important operating issues as well as the vision of the private company for the city. The water managers also listened to the concerns of the consumers and addressed them in an open and collaborative manner. In Cartagena, the efforts of the private operator not only demonstrated their commitment to reform water services, but it also began to alter the view of most residents that potable water was a free and ever abundant resource. In Ghana, a committed engagement process has the potential of changing the relationship of the government and the private company on one hand and civil society groups from one of distrust to mutual trust and coordination.

Involving consumers in the planning and implementation of water policies creates a sense of ownership and fosters a culture of maintenance which may mature into an elaborate community self-policing system.\textsuperscript{59} Community self-policing has the potential of reducing
agency policing costs. A genuine interest in communal projects will also ensure that community members give prompt and accurate feedback about the nature of community projects. In Bangalore, India, the use of citizen report cards has given community groups and consumer associations greater say in reforming utility companies and improving performance by publishing utility performance assessments. In this direction, PURC and GWCL should grant to consumer groups and civil society groups access to their operations. In India, the utility company joined forces with civil society groups to undertake public meetings and also administer surveys to measure consumer perceptions about utility services. Through this process, there was evidence of improvement in water services with local consumers reporting improvement in efficiency and less bribes being paid for water connections.

Increased Coordination of Water Supply Agencies

Current evidence points to very little coordination between public agencies. For instance, there is no formal relationship between local government institutions and the key water supply agencies. Local governments are mandated to initiate development projects at the district level. Better coordination between local government officials and the water supply agencies would ensure that all the necessary information needed at the community level is solicited to provide proper management of water supply systems. In addition, since local government institutions are directly involved with local communities, local government institutions can become partners in ensuring small-scale water provider compliance with regulations as well as help reduce the incidence of illegal water connections.

Ultimately, a major problem of water inadequacies in the disadvantaged neighborhoods is the issue of illegal settlements. The financial costs of breaking down illegal structures as well as the political costs are sometimes too prohibitive for water agencies to undertake any progressive water supply planning. In Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire for instance, efforts on the part of governments to reduce water supply inadequacies in disadvantaged communities by providing subsidized water connections have been hampered by the existence of illegal settlers who do not have the requisite documentation to participate in the program. A concerted coordination between developers, planners, and utility providers will be very instrumental in handling the problems of illegal structures. Often, planning departments and city councils are ill-equipped to handle the avalanche of building permits as well as handle defaulting developments. The result is the overnight mushrooming of unplanned, un-serviced and in many cases unrecognized neighborhoods. The Ghana Ministry of Water Works must create an interagency task force involving GWCL, PURC, district assemblies, town planning departments, and civil society groups to coordinate water supply management and most importantly curb the growth of squatter communities in urban centers.

Rain Water Harvesting

Rain harvesting has the potential to provide cheap and available water to disadvantaged communities. With torrential rainfall occurring during the months of April to June and September to October in most parts of southern Ghana, rainwater can supplement existing water sources to enhance water security. According to UNEP, a threshold of 200 millimeters of
rainfall is considered the minimum rainfall arrival to embark on a viable rainfall harvesting program. In Ghana, rainfall ranges from 800 millimeters to 2000 millimeters, thus offering an atmosphere conducive for rainfall harvesting. Extensive rainwater harvesting is already underway in Kenya, Botswana, Malawi, and Uganda. Maasai women taking part in a pilot rainfall harvesting program in Kisamese, Kenya have reported gaining four hours in a day due to reduced demands on their time to travel to their water source.

The culture of rain harvesting has existed for a long time in Ghana, especially among rural residents. With little modification, rainfall harvesting can be used in urban centers as well. In consultation with estate developers and builders, modifications can be made to current building codes to facilitate rainfall harvesting. Requiring newly constructed houses to have rain caps for harvesting rainwater will ensure readily available water to supplement domestic use such as bathing and washing. Technical assistance can also be provided to owners of existing houses who will want to modify their homes to maximize rain harvesting. In addition, urban residents can use rainwater for washing cars and gardening so that the pressure on GWCL to continually increase production of treated water will be minimized. Water savings realized from this program can then be channeled to supplement the needs of disadvantaged communities. Within the disadvantaged urban communities, local government, and civil society groups utilizing communal labor can collaborate to construct rainwater harvesting points and store water in tanks. This could serve as supplemental water source to the residents, especially the most vulnerable who do not live in any permanent structure to enable them embark on their own water harvesting projects.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the problem of inadequate water supply is not limited to one SSA country. It is a pervasive problem that permeates all urban centers throughout the developing world. The problems are therefore not new, and many countries have embarked on different strategies to address these problems. A formal collaborative regime between different water agencies throughout the sub-region will help propagate best practices and avoid mistakes. For instance, Kenya and Tanzania in 2005 embarked on a citizens’ audit approach to improve utility efficiency. In Kenya, the cities of Kisumu, Mombasa, and Nairobi have launched a water and sanitation social audit that brings together residents associations, NGOs, and service providers. This audit has been used successfully to improve the performance of service providers in Philippines, Ukraine, and Vietnam. In Cote d’Ivoire, apart from lifeline water policies, the Water Society has also licensed water resellers (small-scale providers) in disadvantaged communities to ensure increased water supply.
security. Available evidence indicates that water coverage has steadily increased for the last ten years in Abidjan, the largest city. In addition, with surtax on water bills, the water agency is able to provide 75 percent subsidy to low income residents for first time water connection. In this case, because the requirement to qualify for the subsidy was proof of legal settlement, many poor households in the informal sector were not able to take advantage of the subsidy.

In KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, as part of efforts to increase cost recovery in the water sector, the utility company introduced prepaid water meters. Each family had to buy a plastic card with a chip for R60 (about US$9) with additional "water units" available for purchase to supplement the card. People who were not able to pay for the cards resorted to unapproved water sources to satisfy their water needs. Subsequent research found that prepaid water meters negatively impacted hand washing and other hygienic practices. Eventually, this policy contributed to the worst cholera outbreak in South Africa’s history with more than 200 deaths recorded. Etego-Amenga reported that Ghana through a British company was installing prepaid water meters on a pilot basis in some part of the city of Tema. Collaboration with water agencies in South Africa will help to avoid a repeat of the problems South Africa experienced in 2003.

The water needs of low income urban communities cannot continue to be unserved. These communities form part of the larger urban society, and their water needs are tied to the overall water targets of the country. In addition, diseases that confront residents in disadvantaged urban communities reverberate through the entire urban areas as health care cost increases and production decreases because of lost job hours. Ensuring water security should involve innovation and pragmatism and should be devoid of dogmatic theories. In Ghana, like other developing countries, problems confronting the water sector are enormous and resources needed to solve these problems are limited. Thus, no single solution should be touted as holding the key to water security. The government in consultation with major stakeholders must combine various policy tools with the aim of ensuring water security.

Notes

1. GNA, 2009.
26 IFFM, 2002; Amenga-Etego and Grusky, 2005.
27 PURC, 2005.
31 Mensah, 1999.
32 PURC, 2005.
33 UNDP, 2006.
34 UNDP, 2006.
35 Public Citizen, 2002; Amenga-Etego and Grusky, 2005.
40 Yin, 1984.
41 Permission was sought from the Clemson University Institutional Review Board as part of a dissertation field trip.
47 Shiva, 2002; Barlow and Clarke, 2003.
49 WHO, 2005.
51 Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005.
52 PURC, 2005.
56 Amenga-Etego and Grusky, 2005.
57 Gleick et al, 2002.
60 Adikeshavalu, 2004; Paul, 2005.
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A Bridge Between the Global North and Africa? Putin’s Russia and G8 Development Commitments

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Abstract: This article investigates the extent to which President Vladimir Putin’s Africa policy was shaped by Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G8). Mindful of the changing geopolitical situation and Africa’s role in the global economy, Russian officials have viewed Russia’s ability to forgive the debt of African nations and contribute to solving international development problems within the G8’s framework as measures of its economic success and resurgence as a great power. Moreover, its G8-oriented strategy became a key part of Russia’s relations with Africa. Putin officials argued that Russia was better positioned to defend the interests of developing countries and could act as a metaphorical bridge between the G8 and the global South. While Russia complied with several Africa-related G8 commitments, its arms sales to Sudan and a widespread perception that it gave Africa inadequate attention during its chairmanship of the G8 in 2006 weakened its attempts to portray itself as a bridge between the global North and Africa.

Introduction

Russia joined the Group of Seven to form the G8 in 1998, when it was more focused on its economic and other domestic problems. However, during Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000-2008), as the economy recovered due to increased revenues from high oil and gas prices, Russia became a net creditor, and foreign policy was used more systematically as a tool to further its economic goals and revive its great power status. Aiming to fulfill these objectives, Russia began to participate in debt relief and other multilateral development assistance programs, particularly in Africa, to which the G8 had been paying a growing amount of attention.

In Russian foreign policy circles, realist thinking, which focuses on geopolitics and balance-of-power calculations, predominates. Russian leaders view great-power multilateralism as “more about co-ordinated action than fostering and adhering to common norms,” and their approach is more “instrumental than principled.” Russia therefore has used its new responsibilities as a G8 member in a realpolitik manner. Russia’s leaders also support a new...
configuration of international financial institutions (IFIs), to reflect changes in the global economy and in the increasing influence of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other emerging powers in the global South.\(^5\) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that Russia accepts the “objective reality of multipolarity” and “will actively continue to play a balancing role in global affairs.”\(^6\)

In furthering its realpolitik approach to international relations, Russia attempts to balance the actions of its economic rivals in Africa, including other G8 members. Russia’s rhetorical appeals to Africans therefore sometimes underscore how it differs from other G8 members. Such appeals note Russia’s preference for safeguarding national sovereignty in the face of foreign interference in domestic politics and giving non-Western states greater decisionmaking power in IFIs. They also refer to a sense of solidarity forged from similar experiences of economic hardship and the Soviets’ support for the African National Congress and other national liberation movements during the Cold War. The Putin regime argued that, because Russia was better positioned to defend the interests of developing countries, it would act as a bridge between the G8 and the global South. In 2006, when Russia held the rotating G8 presidency, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that Africans “realize that Russia continues to be an influential player in the system of global ties and [seeks] to use [its] authority and weight...on the international scene in the course of the solution of the tasks of development, particularly those directly affecting the interests of the African continent.”\(^7\)

In contrast to this official Russian line, foreign observers sometimes emphasize Russia’s less savory behavior vis-à-vis Africa, including its arms sales to Sudan’s genocidal regime and reluctance to sanction the Sudanese and other African authoritarian governments for human rights violations.\(^8\) Foreign media outlets have also covered a series of violent, racially-motivated attacks in Russia against African students.\(^9\) In addition, Russia’s increased investments in North and West Africa’s oil industry have been viewed as a potential threat to the energy security of the US and the European Union (EU).\(^10\)

The Africa policies of other G8 members, however, are no less self-interested than Russia’s. In fact, several other G8 members have lost credibility due to their own role in militarizing Africa and/or failure to comply with international human rights laws. For instance, between 2004 and 2008, the top five weapons suppliers were G8 members: the US, Russia, Germany, France, and the UK (in that order).\(^11\) In addition, the US “war on terror” served as grounds for the militarization of its Africa policy. Several Canadian mining companies have reportedly gained a reputation for having poor human rights records.\(^12\)

In light of these considerations, this article will examine the Putin leadership’s behavior in fulfilling Africa-related G8 commitments, with emphasis on debt relief, official development assistance (ODA), and funding for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment and primary education. Did Russia’s membership in the G8, a great-power forum, actually prompt it to shoulder more responsibility for aiding African countries? If so, was Russia perceived by Africans and Western observers alike as having represented Africans’ interests and served as a metaphorical bridge between the global North and South? More generally, how did Putin’s objectives in Africa fit into his realpolitik approach to international relations? In answering these questions, this article shows how Putin’s G8-oriented strategy became a key part of Russia’s relations with
Africa, although Russia’s objectives there were more attuned to its broader strategic interests. An examination of the scholarly literature on great and emerging powers’ renewed interest in Africa, with emphasis on their aid policies in the post-Cold War period and Russia’s evolving relations with Africa, precedes the analysis of Russia’s behaviour within the G8 framework.

A Renewed Scramble for Africa? National Self-Interest and Aid Policies

Many analysts view the behavior of foreign powers in Africa through the lens of power politics rather than through that of institutional liberalism, which focuses more on the role of international organizations in promoting cooperation among states. In addition, they place the topic within a broader discourse about how emerging powers such as the BRICs have transformed global economic relations and how increased energy demands have influenced emerging and great powers alike to exploit Africa’s natural resources.

Is a new scramble for Africa’s riches unfolding, then, with the emerging powers raising the stakes? Some analysts argue this point. Shaw, Cooper, and Chin stress that notions of global governance are changing as emerging powers, what they call the “new global middle,” are asserting themselves diplomatically and economically in Africa and elsewhere. “The EU is still Africa’s privileged political partner,” argues Holslag, “but China, Russia, India and Brazil are turning their African embassies into new diplomatic nerve centres.” In Russia, journalists began reporting more on how G8 member states and the BRICs came to view developing countries as markets for their goods and investment opportunities, particularly in the energy sector. Furthermore, commentators in African newspapers have expressed renewed concerns about foreign intervention and widespread prejudice against Africans.

Other analysts, such as Frynas and Paulo, caution that characterizing the current foreign interest in Africa as another winner-take-all “scramble” for its resources is an exaggeration, and that Western countries’ investments and volume of trade with African countries still outshine those of the emerging powers (i.e., the US and France are Africa’s top trading partners, with China in third and Britain in fourth place). These scholars prefer to frame the heightened competition over natural resources in Africa “in narrow terms as an increased international interest in African oil resources focused largely on the Gulf of Guinea, entailing greater private investment and diplomatic engagement from a larger than before number of external actors.” But they still admit that “the interest in Africa’s oil and gas resources has spurned a rivalry between international actors in Africa, notably the American and Chinese governments.”

How are aid policies affected by these new geopolitical and economic realities? The answer is not straightforward and reflects how the line “between [foreign direct investments (FDI)] and aid is often blurred, as is the line between aid and trade.” Many scholars agree that strategic and political considerations are often paramount in decisions about allocating official development assistance (ODA), although other factors, such as colonial history, trade, and poverty level, also are taken into account. Clearly, no government decides to donate based solely on altruism, and donors “will likely continue to shift resources to other countries through bilateral and multilateral aid organizations to achieve some mixture of goals.” Moreover, foreign governments—G8 members, the BRICs, and lesser powers alike—often prefer bilateral approaches, which grant them more control over the setting of conditions (i.e., requiring
recipients to follow “good governance” principles) and often feature high proportions of tied aid, which requires recipient countries to purchase goods and services from donor countries.25

During the early 1990s, many foreign governments, including Russia’s, significantly decreased their ODA to Africa, which could “perhaps [be] explained by the end of the cold war and a weariness with meagre results,” although domestic economic concerns and mass publics’ prejudiced views of Africans also played a role.26 Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, Western donors increased development and security-related assistance to Africa, a change that analysts attribute to foreign governments’ renewed attention to Africa’s energy resources and its growing importance in the world economy; the campaigns of aid organizations (i.e., Oxfam and Care), UN-sponsored agencies (UNICEF, the UN Development Program, and the International Labor Organization), and global networks (i.e., Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History) in pressuring G7/G8 governments to give more generously; and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led the US and its allies to target parts of Africa in their anti-terrorist campaigns.27 Taylor and Williams note that “the growing fascination with globalization and interdependence within Western governments, [combined with the effects of 9/11], persuaded some leaders to argue for a return to earlier notions that foreign aid should be used explicitly as an instrument of enlightened self-interest.”28

In turn, the period from the late 1990s until mid-2000s was marked by several major multilateral development initiatives. These include the IMF-World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) mechanism; the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the International Conference for Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002; and the G8’s pledges to increase support to Africa, notably at the 1999 Cologne (the Cologne Debt Initiative to expand debt relief to HIPC), the 2002 Kananaskis (with its Africa Action Plan to assist the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, or NEPAD) and 2005 Gleneagles (expanded ODA and debt relief) summits. Poku, Renwick, and Porto find that “while some [ODA] continues to be given in furtherance of geopolitical considerations (recent Chinese investment in Africa being a good case), there is a marked shift to allocations based on good policies driven by the practical development needs of Africans.”29

Other analysts, though, emphasize donors’ strategic calculations and criticize the G8 for insufficiently funding multilateral aid initiatives and for continuing to apply restrictive conditions to the receiving of aid.30 The EU allocated more money to development programs to prevent failed states and added Africa as “an important component” in its common foreign and security policy, while the US response was more geared to fighting the war on terror, according to Engel and Olsen.31 Japan also designed its Africa policy around strategic concerns, including its need for Africa’s raw materials.32 According to Ronald Labonte et al., before 2005, Canada was the only G8 country “even to approach [a more radical] position on debt cancellation/debt relief,” while the UK was considering the idea of debt cancellation, and Germany and the US were opposed.33 Sautman and Hairong found in 2008 that “Africa’s debt still [stood] at about US$300 billion. An additional $50 billion in aid was promised in 2005, but more than half was either double-counted or involved money already pledged.”34 The primary function of Western countries’ ODA, concludes Mahbubani, “is to serve the immediate and short-term security and national interests of the donors rather than the long-term interests of the recipients.”35
By the late 1990s, aspiring great powers such as Russia and China also increased their development aid to African countries. Like Russia, China “practices a realpolitik of aggrandising national wealth and power.”\textsuperscript{36} In addition, both countries seek to balance US power worldwide and win hearts by espousing rhetoric about multipolarity and the principle of non-interference in political affairs that resonate throughout the developing world.\textsuperscript{37} Remarks by Chinese leaders and diplomats have also reflected a theme of solidarity with African countries, because of similar economic development concerns and past colonial legacies.\textsuperscript{38}

Finally, Russian and Chinese leaders alike want to demonstrate their countries’ improved economic status and position themselves as trustworthy trade and investment partners in Africa, particularly in lucrative energy industries. China’s volume of trade with and FDI in African countries to date have been higher than Russia’s. For instance, by 2010, China expects its annual trade with Africa to top $100 billion.\textsuperscript{39} In contrast, between 2008 and 2009, the volume of trade between Russia and African countries was approximately $8.2 billion.\textsuperscript{40} However, Russia has written off more African debt than China has, given the Soviets’ larger investment in Africa during the Cold War and Russia’s obligation to contribute to debt relief as a G8 member. By 2006, China had written off nearly $1.27 billion in bilateral debts of 31 African states,\textsuperscript{41} whereas by 2007, Russia had cancelled over $20 billion of African debt.\textsuperscript{42}

Russia’s Evolving Relations with Africa

During the Cold War, the USSR spent billions of rubles, largely in military assistance, in developing countries with arguably limited long-term ideological or geopolitical benefit. During the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s new thinking about Soviet foreign policy resulted in a withdrawal from costly entanglements in the developing world.\textsuperscript{43} Immediately after the USSR’s collapse, Russia lacked defining interests in the developing world, apart from specific countries (i.e., China and Iran) and from soliciting debt payments, selling arms, and securing military cooperation agreements.\textsuperscript{44} Deterred by Russia’s economic problems and Soviet-era debt burden, state officials further de-emphasized development assistance, and sub-Saharan Africa was “perhaps the lowest priority on postcommunist Russia’s foreign policy agenda.”\textsuperscript{45}

By the mid-1990s, as foreign policy objectives began to expand geographically, the Russian government “resumed its earlier practice of extending credits to sweeten its economic dealings” and began to give more humanitarian assistance to Africa, including to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{46} By this time, the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences was one of world’s largest research centers of its kind, with approximately 130 researchers.\textsuperscript{47} However, some political elites continued to oppose new investment in Africa. According to Shubin, deputy director of the Institute for African Studies, they blamed Russia’s economic woes partly on its inherited Third World debt and held racist, condescending views of people in developing countries.\textsuperscript{48} Quist-Adade, a Ghanaian-born sociologist who earned his Ph.D. from St. Petersburg State University, similarly argues that Russia’s politicians and news media used Africa “as a metaphor for poverty, backwardness, and hopelessness.”\textsuperscript{49}

By the late 1990s, Russian officials began to rethink their relations with Africa, particularly in response to their growing geopolitical concerns. Because Russia sits “uncomfortably in both Northern and Southern camps,” Cornelissen argues, it “has had more incentive to accrue alliance partners from the South, including Africa, given the encroachment by the United States
on its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.” The Putin regime’s plans to expand relations with African nations originated with its “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of June 2000, which focused on security and economic assistance. It states that:

Russia will expand interaction with African states and assist an earliest possible settlement of regional military conflicts in Africa. It is also necessary to develop a political dialogue with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with sub-regional organizations and to use their capabilities for enabling Russia to join multilateral economic projects in the continent.

By 2006, Russian soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel were deployed to eight UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. In addition, Russia also participated in conferences related to achieving the MDGs, sent observers to meetings of regional organizations such as the African Union, and, in 2006, hosted the seventh meeting of the African Partnership Forum (APF), an international initiative to coordinate assistance to Africa that includes the G8, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU, the AU, African subregional organizations, and the African Development Bank. Between 2001 and 2005, the leaders of Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, and Ethiopia made official visits to Russia.

While Russia’s goal to shoulder its share of responsibilities as a G8 and UN Security Council member shaped its behavior in Africa, its strategic objectives there were paramount. As one Kremlin official noted, the “most important aspect of economic cooperation in our foreign policy is to encourage African countries to trade with us and to not only depend on development aid.” Since 2000, Russia has capitalized on its hydrocarbon resources as a way to gain geopolitical influence and expand its economy. Kornegay and Landsberg explain how, using the state-run oil giant, Gazprom, as its chief vehicle, Russia intends to create and control an east-to-west energy grid involving other producers such as Iran, Algeria, and Libya, “in order to consolidate an encircling dependency of the European market on the one hand and the emerging Asian markets on the other.”

By 2004, Russia had signed 37 economic assistance and technical agreements with African countries and trade agreements with 42 African countries. Russian officials and business people struck several more lucrative deals with their counterparts in African countries, including Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya. In 2006, a Kenyan newspaper reported that “Russian companies such as Alrosa, RusAl, Renova and Norilsk estimate to invest, over the next five years, a total of US$5 billion in sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resource industry.” Two years later, a Russian business newspaper saw Gazprom’s expansion into Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa as a part of its overall strategy to strengthen its position in global energy markets. In an effort to expand trade with its African partners, the Russian State Duma passed legislation stipulating that “traditional export goods from least developed, including African, countries shall be exempt from import customs duties.”

In persuading Africans that the Russian government prioritized relations with their countries more highly and had adopted a respectful approach to investment, the Putin regime claimed that Russia has a special affinity with African countries due to Soviet-era ties and
common development trajectories. In September 2006, during his only official visit to South Africa, Putin noted how the USSR had supported the then-outlawed African National Congress, and he and then President Thabo Mbeki stressed “striking parallels as both embark on periods of economic consolidation and growth on the back of economies expanding from the mineral wealth that provided the foundation of current prosperity.”62 The Russian government hailed Putin’s visit as a “signature event” that “imparted a powerful impetus to the development of the entire range of relations with the region, primarily in the context of the deepening of political engagement, a serious expansion and the diversification of ties in the trade, economic, scientific, technological, investment and other fields.”63 Agreements included Russian investments in South Africa’s nuclear power, aluminum smelting, and diamond industries, and a Russia-South African Business Council was formed. In 2007, the two governments agreed to initiate more joint projects in the areas of nuclear and space technology, defense, mining, and energy.64 Two years later, in September 2009, a South African satellite was launched from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan propelled by a Russian rocket.65

Russia’s G8 membership offered Putin officials additional ways to improve political and trade ties with Africa’s political and business elites. In particular, they stressed how Russia, more than any other G8 member, represents the concerns of developing countries in energy-related terms and understands their problems better because of its economic struggles.66 For instance, Vadim Lukov, a former Russian G8 official, remarked that, “Due to its close historical links with developing nations, Russia acted as a kind of a bridge between them and the G8.”67 An example of Russia’s acting as a bridge between developing countries and the G8 is the request made by Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos to Putin in 2006 for help from the G8 to forgive debt, eliminate famine, and fight pandemics.68 Lukov also noted Russia’s knowledge of overcoming problems related to energy production as useful to developing countries and how Russia forgave $34.6 billion in debts as a part of the G8 Cologne Debt Initiative and related programs.69 Another Russian commentator reported in 2006 how via the G8 and the APF, Russia “[sought] to help shape reliable mechanisms for attaining sustainable development and strengthening regional stability, and at the same time [sought] solutions to other problems facing the continent.”70 In 2008, Russians also emphasized how their government, unlike the US and Japanese governments, supported G8 expansion to include Brazil, South Africa, and India.71

Often the Putin regime’s rhetoric about its priorities in Africa centered on the G8’s development commitments. For instance, Alexey Doulian, former Russian ambassador to Rwanda, and Oleg Scherbak, former Russian ambassador to Zimbabwe, stressed in African newspapers how the agenda of Russia’s G8 presidency in 2006 addressed Africans’ concerns.72 According to Scherbak, “As a country that is developing socially, we probably understand the problems of developing nations better than anyone else in the G8.”73 In his address on Africa Day in May 2006, which was published in African newspapers, Putin said he was “convinced that the St. Petersburg Summit priorities—energy security, combating infectious diseases and education—are in full conformity with the interests of African peoples.”74 He claimed that his Africa trip fulfilled G8 commitments to expand trade and promote education.
Rhetoric vs. Reality: Analyzing Russia’s Overall Compliance with the G8’s Africa-related Commitments

How does Putin’s rhetoric about honoring Russia’s G8 commitments to Africa add up? Using annual compliance reports by the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group as measures, it appears to be weakly substantiated. The group’s findings indicate that Russia had the lowest overall level of compliance with the G8’s Africa-related commitments made between 2001 and 2008, although its record on certain commitments is more encouraging (see Table 1).75

On the positive side, as shown in Table 1, the G8 Research Group—which now includes scholars from the G8 Research Center at the State University Higher School of Economics in Moscow—awarded Russia full compliance on fourteen important Africa-related commitments. These include fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, debt sustainability, and ODA. On the other, in 15 of the 56 commitments outlined in Table 1, the G8 Research Group awarded Russia the single worst rating (although Germany, France, Italy, and Japan also received the single worst rating at least once). Its weakest ratings tended to be for commitments concerning trade, technical assistance (including bridging the North-South digital divide), and “good governance,” primary education funding in Africa, and peace support operations.

How can Russia’s lackluster performance be explained? First, Russia’s own socioeconomic development should be placed into historical context. During the 1990s, as it struggled to recover economically, it needed technical assistance, such as in the area of communications and computer technology. Its volume of trade with African countries progressively increased throughout the 2000s, but it did not match that of other G8 members. Secondly, the G8 Research Group’s final compliance reports evaluate only a twelve-month snapshot of a country’s performance, so they are weak longitudinal studies. Russia’s ratings on commitments to ODA, for instance, improved markedly between 2003 and 2008, while its ratings on commitments to debt relief fluctuated. Therefore, Russia appears to lack the capacity (if not the political will) to carry out some of these measures within twelve months, but may have a better track record over ten years. For instance, since 2003, Russia has been increasing its funding to an IMF-sponsored program to create regional technical assistance centers in Africa called AFRITRAC.76

Russia’s poor performance ratings on commitments to good governance (i.e., democratizing the decisionmaking process, judicial reform, strengthening the capacity of civil services, enhancing parliamentary oversight) and peace support operations, however, underscore the differences between Russia’s and other G8 members’ approaches to Africa. Russian officials tend not to pressure its African partners to conform to Western notions of democracy, and, in the UN Security Council, Russia has objected to sanctioning Sudan’s, Zimbabwe, and other authoritarian African regimes for human rights violations.

Lastly, Putin officials likely were aware that no G8 member state has a perfect compliance record (i.e., as noted in Table 1, overall compliance ratings for the 56 commitments range from a high of 88 percent for Canada and the UK to a low of 45 percent for Russia). They also may have calculated that Russia would not be expelled from the G8 for poor compliance with commitments that do not carry the force of international law. Russia already has learned that it can weather such controversies: it has remained a Council of Europe member, despite failing to
comply fully with the legally binding European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. With these explanations in mind, we will now turn to a discussion of Russia’s record on specific G8 Africa-related commitments adopted while Putin was president.

**Russia’s Contributions to G8 Commitments to Debt Reduction and Official Development Assistance**

By the late 1990s, Russian officials came to value international development issues more highly. In 1999, the Yeltsin government already planned to contribute to debt initiatives within the G8 framework, including the G7’s Cologne Debt Initiative, to which Russia was not formally bound to contribute. During the Putin era, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and several Russian journalists argued that Russia’s writing off billions of dollars in debt owed by African countries enhanced its international reputation by making it a major creditor nation and increased its economic opportunities in Africa.

At the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, G8 member states introduced a new plan for poverty reduction, including debt relief and promoting open trade and investment. The plan also required each G8 member state to appoint a representative to Africa to coordinate its implementation. In some respects, 2001 marked a major breakthrough in Russia’s economic recovery and contributions to debt relief. It was then that Putin agreed to support the Genoa Plan for Africa, including to open its markets (i.e., no import duties on goods from the poorest countries, except on weapons) and write off debt. By 2001, Russia was already the leader among G8 nations in the amount of debt relief it paid as a percentage of its GDP and fourth in terms of the total amount of debt relief (as of 2008, Russia was in third place, behind Japan and France).

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In June 2002, at a meeting of G8 finance ministers in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin announced that Russia was now capable of fulfilling its financial responsibilities as a member of the Paris Club and the G8. At the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa witnessed the G8’s adoption of an Africa Action Plan to support the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The Africa Action Plan included a “new US$6 billion in ODA, US$1 billion in debt relief, and greater access to G8 markets for African exports.” One G8 expert and former British diplomat, Sir Nicholas Bayne, described the plan as “a weapon in the fight against terrorism,” because of its commitments to peace support operations, although it failed to “endorse the NEPAD proposals for infrastructure projects or for more generous debt relief.”

At the Kananaskis Summit, Putin spoke about how Russia’s commitment to the resolution of Africa’s development problems was “appreciable” and that it supported NEPAD. As a part of its contributions to NEPAD, Russia donated millions of dollars for emergency relief to specific countries (i.e., Algeria, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) as well as to the UN World Food Program and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Putin also announced that Russia would help eliminate the external debt of the poorest countries, by contributing 20 percent of the total amount ($26 billion) agreed to by G8 countries. The G8 Research Group concluded in 2002 that, although Putin “was delayed in appointing an [Africa Action Plan] representative, Russia has since become relatively engaged in the process.”
Back at home, however, Russians still debated the worth of paying the external debt of poor countries. Former Finance Minister Aleksandr Livshits argued that opening markets of developed countries to goods from the poorest countries would be a more effective form of economic development than financial aid. Doing so, he said, would improve production and encourage foreign investment. At this point, when the Paris Club had decided only to restructure instead of forgive Russia’s multi-billion dollar Soviet-era debt, some Russian analysts criticized Western countries for not wiping it (and the debt of other former Soviet republics) clean while forgiving the debt of other economically-vulnerable countries. Ultimately, Putin decided to ignore these critics and continued allocating some of Russia’s new wealth towards debt relief. In so doing, he sent a strong signal to his G8 partners that Russia would act responsibly.

At the 2003 summit in Evian, France, Russian officials maintained that Russia was meeting its financial obligations as a G8 member. Putin’s G8 representative, Andrei Illarionov, told the press that the G8 “is a club of the strong, where you can’t come with an outstretched hand, because you need to pay.” Instead of negotiating over debt restructuring, Putin took part as an equal at Evian, Illarionov said. By 2003, Russia had written off $11.2 billion of African debt and donated millions of dollars to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian agencies. Despite this effort, it still received a poor rating from the G8 Research Group for not complying with its 2002 commitments to expand capacity-building programs related to “good governance” in African countries and to funding its share of the shortfall of the HIPC Initiative. The following year, the G8 Research Group awarded Russia “work in progress” ratings on 2003 Evian commitments to ODA and the HIPC initiative.

The US hosted the 2004 G8 summit on a remote island in Georgia, where leaders adopted Africa-related commitments concerning debt sustainability, technical assistance, fighting infectious diseases, food security, and peace support operations. The G8 Research Group awarded Russia a positive compliance rating on debt sustainability but ratings of noncompliance or “work in progress” for 2004 G8 commitments concerning technical assistance and providing emergency assistance to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan in the wake of a widespread famine in the Horn of Africa. One potential reason for Russia’s lack of compliance on these measures may have been that it was experiencing high inflation rates in late 2004, and Finance Minister Kudrin had announced that the government’s overall spending would be curtailed.

Britain’s 2005 G8 presidency focused on increasing the amount of development assistance to Africa. The leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa—the so-called Outreach 5 (O5)—attended the summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. At the summit, G8 members pledged to double their ODA to African countries, to $50 billion, by 2010. Russia was not initially included in an additional pledge to write off $40 billion worth of debt of eighteen of the poorest countries to the IMF, World Bank, and the African Development Bank because the agreement was made at a separate meeting of G7 finance ministers in June 2005. However, at the summit, the Russian government announced its plans to forgive an additional $2.2 billion in Third World debt within the HIPC framework. State Duma Deputy Vladimir A. Vasiliev reported in October 2005 that Russia had written off (or pledged to do so) $11.3 billion of African debt,
“including the $2.2 billion within the HIPC Initiative.” Also in Russia’s favor, the G8 Research Group found that it was now fully complying with the G8 commitment to debt sustainability in the HIPC framework. Back at home, some Russian analysts worried that domestic finances were being overstretched by the debt write-offs, while others recognized that Africa’s role as an international source of energy resources had grown, and that Russia needed to cultivate closer ties to its leaders. The latter view prevailed inside the Kremlin.

In 2005, Russia’s contributions to debt relief were strategically important. First, Russian officials hoped that their efforts to clear their own debt and contribute to Third World debt relief would lead to Russia’s joining the financial G7. Secondly, Russia was preparing for the G8 presidency the following year, when foreign observers would scrutinize it more closely. Kudrin announced during the Gleneagles Summit that “this year, on the threshold of our chairmanship of the G8, we will announce about a 100 percent write-off on a bilateral basis of the debts of the poorest countries.” Russia’s good faith efforts had their limits, though. The Russian government was less motivated to fulfill the Gleneagles commitments to doubling ODA to Africa by 2010, to promote economic growth in Africa through involvement in the NEPAD framework, and to improve Africa’s infrastructure and capacity to trade.

During Russia’s G8 Presidency in 2006, Putin—enjoying economic success and high popularity ratings compared to other G8 leaders—proposed new initiatives related to debt relief. First, he tried to use Russia’s promised debt write-off within the HIPC framework as leverage in appealing to his G8 partners to forgive the debt of poor countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Tajikistan, although this proposal was rejected. Secondly, he proposed that Russia’s upcoming payment to the Paris Club of $1.9 billion be directed toward paying more debt relief to the International Development Association. Then, a month before the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Kudrin announced that Russia would excuse an additional $700 million in African debt. The G8 Research Group acknowledged Russia’s full compliance with its 2006 St. Petersburg commitment to debt relief. Some Russians more strongly supported the government’s approach to writing off the debt of developing countries because of Russia’s improved financial position. In addition, in 2006, a coalition of Russian and foreign NGOs concerned with poverty issues (Dvizhenie Protiv Bednosti-Movement Against Poverty) formed to advocate the fulfillment of the UN’s MDGs and part of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty. However, others, including a noteworthy economist, still argued that paying off African debt was not in Russia’s interests, that Russia had no ethical reason to do so because it was not a former colonial power in Africa, and that CIS countries deserved to be included on the HIPC list.

Russian officials apparently were aware of and responded to these domestic concerns. Putin’s comments about debt relief before and during the St. Petersburg Summit reflected his regime’s growing emphasis on the need to reform international economic relations to help developing countries avoid future debt crises and disappointment that no CIS countries were added to the HIPC formula. In outlining the long-term political and economic advantages of Russia’s contributions to Third World debt relief, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak bluntly stated that “Russia is a great power, a member of the G8. We are interested in how the economic prosperity of countries would increase and in the advancement of the image of our country.” As Rossiiskaia gazeta, a state-run newspaper, explained, “The Russians assume that...
the debtor countries will use the funds for health, education, and various other social programs and that the countries will use Russian specialists, and Russian scientific potential, to enliven trade-economic ties and make it easier for Russian business people to enter markets there.”

Russian officials also tried but failed to convince foreign observers that Russia was adequately supporting the G8’s Africa initiatives. For example, two Russian Foreign Ministry press releases stressed how the G8’s Africa-related commitments had remained active during Russia’s G8 presidency, including how Russia’s hosting of the APF meeting in October 2006 indicated its “growing contribution…to multilateral efforts to aid the continent, especially in the part of debt burden reduction (totaling 11.3 billion dollars).” Despite these reassurances, several Western and African analysts still concluded that Russia’s G8 presidency had discounted earlier G8 development commitments. Political scientist Anthony Payne judged that the Russian government “did not want to invite [O5 leaders to the St. Petersburg summit], but ultimately fell in with the new practice, although at no point seeking to do anything serious with the wider dialogue.” A Namibian newspaper emphasized how Africa was “relegated to the margins” at the St. Petersburg Summit. Ross Herbert, head of the South African Institute of International Affairs’ NEPAD and governance unit, said “the signs are that the days of Africa being top of the G-8’s agenda are fading. Russia is resisting this.” These negative reactions suggest that Putin’s charm offensive in Africa in 2006 failed to convince observers that Russia’s G8 Presidency took development commitments seriously and that Russia represented a strong bridge between the G8 and the global South.

During Germany’s G8 presidency in 2007, G8 leaders made new development-related commitments, including a pledge to invest responsibly in Africa and a two-year Heiligendamm Dialogue Process “between the member states of the G8 group of countries and the important emerging economies [the O5] that deals with the biggest challenges the global economy is facing today.” In 2007, Russian officials continued to publicize their increased efforts to assist Africa’s economic development, whether as a part of the G8 framework or through bilateral trade agreements. By 2007, Russia reportedly had written off over $20 billion of African debt. In March 2007, members of the Movement Against Poverty met with the Putin’s G8 representative, Igor Shuvalov, to discuss ways to combat poverty in Africa. Shuvalov outlined the government’s goals: investing in railway and transport communications, improving conditions for economic investment, increasing access of African agricultural goods to markets in developed countries, and supporting efforts to combat global pandemics. Russia signed preferential trade agreements with the least-developed countries, which exempted them from paying import duties.

African diplomats tended to praise these decisions. The Union of African Diplomats in Russia called the agreements “commendable” and in line with G8 initiatives and the World Trade Organization’s Doha agenda. Patrick Chokala, former Tanzanian ambassador to Russia, argued that “Russia’s debt relief plan under the auspices of [the] G8 would understandably help stimulate our national economy and reduce the poverty burden of our people.” This time the metaphor of Russia’s acting like a bridge between the G8 and global South was beginning to seem more credible.
The G8 Research Group found that, in 2008, the year after the Heiligendamm commitments were made (and Putin’s final year as president), Russia had a mixed record for complying with Africa-related commitments. Russia fully complied with its commitment to the dialogue process, to increasing its ODA to Africa (including funds to fight infectious diseases), and to helping developing countries integrate with the world trading system (G8 Trade Declaration). Lavrov characterized the meeting of foreign ministers of BRIC countries in Ekaterinburg in May 2008 as falling within the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process with the O5. These positive compliance ratings indicate a growing trend toward Russia’s investment in the economic recovery of developing countries. But the same report also concluded that Russia had only “partially complied” with its Heiligendamm debt-relief commitments, citing the arrest of Russian finance officials on fraud charges as cause for the delay.

Since succeeding Putin as president in May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev essentially adopted his mentor’s foreign policy, including his handling of G8 commitments. Although Russia was not obligated to honor the 2005 G7 commitment to increase ODA to Africa, it agreed in 2008 to donate $2.6 billion to the UN Industrial Development Organization and to increase its volume of ODA by $400 to $500 million a year. In addition, by 2009, Russia had cancelled all the debt that lesser-developed countries under the HIPC initiative had owed it.

While Russia complied with a 2009 Hokkaido-Toyako G8 Summit commitment to increasing ODA, the same was not true for commitments concerning the financial support of a World Trade Organization work program called Trade for Aid, which provides technical assistance to developing countries to help build their capacity to trade, and aid to and investment in the agricultural sector. According to the G8 Research Group, Russia “failed to comply with its commitment to support the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) by reversing the decline in aid and investment for African agriculture, though it has increased food aid” via the World Food Program and the Multilateral Trust Fund of the World Bank Global Food Crisis Response Program.

In summation, Russian officials now regularly stress that Russia is a creditor nation that acts responsibly as a member of the international donor community, including as a member of the G8. They hold press conferences to publicize how their government’s contributions to development assistance have risen since the early 2000s, indicating that its ODA levels are edging closer to the norm for OECD countries. In February 2010, Kudrin announced that Russia’s accumulated ODA contributions had grown from $53 billion in 2003 to $121 billion in 2009 (although its annual contribution was $800 million, which was lower than other G8 countries’ ODA contributions).

Russia’s Compliance with G8 Commitments to HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment

The international donor community substantially under-funded the fight against HIV/AIDS until the late 1990s and early 2000s. Several factors spurred increased giving by governments and private donors, including pressure from NGO networks and some African governments, donor countries’ conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a global security problem, and the creation of UNAIDS (1996) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002. According to Johnson, since the early 2000s, “international donor aid for combating AIDS has been rising rapidly” and mainly comes from bilateral development assistance, donations to the
Global Fund, and funds from the World Bank and the private sector. The estimated contributions rose from US$1.6 billion in 2001 to US$8.9 billion in 2006, although Johnson argues that this amount is still insufficient. She cites Western paternalism, “failure to consult African governments,” and the US’s decision to channel much of its HIV/AIDS-related funding through bilateral mechanisms rather than the Global Fund as reasons why donations have not kept pace with the rising costs of prevention and treatment.

Russia’s financial commitments to global health, particularly fighting HIV/AIDS and other global pandemics, also increased during the 2000s. Sjöstedt argues that, “with regard to sub-Saharan Africa, Russian decisionmakers certainly agreed – both in statements and in practices – with the international norm on AIDS as a security issue,” but hypocritically did not extend the norm to Russia, despite its dangerously high number of HIV/AIDS cases. Since 2002, Russia has contributed to the Global Fund, which is considered an obligation of membership in the G8. In 2006, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:

By now our country has fully implemented its previously assumed commitment to contribute 20 million dollars to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002-2006. In 2005 Russia’s contribution to the Fund was doubled to 40 million dollars. We also intend to reimburse the Fund until 2010 about 220 million dollars, the money it proposes to allocate for the financing of projects within Russia.

Russia also donated to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, giving $8 million alone between 2003 and 2004 and donated funds to a World Bank initiative to fight malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia’s weakness as a G8 member between 2001 and 2008, though, was its under-investment in key multilateral initiatives, such as the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise. For instance, in 2005, the G8 Research Group found that, “Even though Russia has reiterated its commitment to the overall struggle with the AIDS pandemic through international forums, no steps have been taken towards the establishment of a Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise,” which was a 2003 G8 commitment.

Russia tried to remedy this inadequacy beginning with its G8 presidency in 2006. It pledged $20 million to the Global Fund, and at the St. Petersburg Summit, G8 leaders agreed to strengthen its campaign against the spread of infectious diseases. G8 leaders endorsed two Russian proposals in this area, including new research centers in HIV/AIDS vaccine development in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but neither involved directly fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa. Also in November 2006, Russia announced that it would reimburse the Global Fund the money it had received for funding Russia-based projects, approximately $200 million. As of February 2010, Russia had donated to the Global Fund a total of $235 million of $257 million pledged, which was still the lowest donation among the G8 members.

Since Russia held the G8 presidency, Russia has honored its pledges to the Global Fund and has helped support health systems in Africa. For instance, the G8 Research Group found that Russia had fully complied with a 2007 commitment to improve the human resource capacity of African health care systems, including a malaria national support program in Zambia. But it continued to lag behind other G8 countries’ performances in other respects. It had only partly complied with a 2007 commitment to the Global Fund because, while it had
donated to it, Russia failed to “actively [participate] in discussions on long-term funding with other states and non-state actors.” In addition, Russia did not comply with a 2007 commitment supporting sexual and reproductive health education in Africa. Overall, though, in terms of the G8’s health-related commitments, Russian officials have shown a willingness to cooperate, and Russia’s performance ratings have tended to be higher than in other Africa-related commitment areas, such as technical assistance, ODA, and primary education.

Russia’s Compliance with G8 Commitments to Universal Primary Education

In support of the Dakar Framework for Action of 2000 (guidelines for achieving the MDG of universal primary education by 2015) and the World Bank’s 2002 Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (a multilateral funding program for primary education), the G8 adopted several related commitments, beginning at the 2000 Okinawa Summit. At the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis, for example, G8 leaders agreed to support “the development and implementation by African countries of national educational plans that reflect the Dakar goals on Education for All, and encouraging support for those plans, particularly universal primary education, by the international community as an integral part of the national development strategies.” However, G8 states have all failed to fulfill their promises to primary education assistance via multilateral mechanisms. For instance, they increased their bilateral assistance to primary education in Africa, rather than support a joint effort, which would have required more coordination and resources. Putin placed modern educational systems on the agenda for Russia’s 2006 G8 presidency to strengthen Russia’s outreach to developing countries and its economic competitiveness, but the emphasis was more on acquiring high-tech skills through post-secondary education than acquiring basic reading, writing, and math skills on the primary level. This emphasis may partly be due to historical legacies from the Soviet era. The Soviets cultivated ties with friendly African regimes through funding university-level scholarships and educational programs, as a part of their ideological struggle with the West. During Putin’s presidency, the Russian government similarly funded thousands of scholarships for African students to attend the People’s Friendship University of Russia in Moscow (formerly called the Patrice Lumumba University). The Russian government allocated 750 university scholarships to African students for 2006-2007, and the Russian-Egyptian University opened in 2006 with Russian assistance.

In general, Russia has tended to funnel its ODA resources to post-secondary initiatives, and so, as a consequence, has not contributed significantly to multilateral programs that aim to fulfill the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. For instance, in June 2006, the G8 Research Group found that Russia’s promotion of primary education in Africa consisted only of a presentation by the Minister of Education and Science on the topic. Then, between 2006 and 2008, Russia donated $7.2 million to the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative, but this amount paled in comparison to the UK’s donation (£100 million between 2006 to 2007). The G8 Research Group subsequently concluded that Russia partly complied with a 2007 Heiligendamm Summit commitment to make and complete pledges to the Catalytic and Education Program Development Funds of the 2002 Fast Track Initiative but had failed to “engage other donors on the issue of long-term funding.” Nevertheless, when evaluating Russia’s compliance with education-related G8 commitments, it is important to compare it with
that of other G8 states, as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada at times also directed the bulk of their funds earmarked for primary education in Africa through bilateral mechanisms.

Conclusion

This article investigated the extent to which the Putin regime’s foreign policy toward African countries was shaped by G8 membership. Mindful of the changing geopolitical situation and Africa’s role in the global economy, Russian officials have viewed Russia’s ability to forgive the debt of African nations and contribute to solving international development problems within the G8’s framework as measures of its economic success and resurgence as a great power.

Russia’s record on compliance with Africa-related G8 commitments was the weakest among the eight member states, particularly on such themes as technical assistance, trade, good governance, and supporting primary education. NGOs, as well as some Western and African analysts, criticized the Putin regime for failing to bolster the Gleneagles Summit’s Africa-related commitments during Russia’s 2006 G8 presidency, and such criticism eroded Russians’ attempts to position their country as a bridge between the global North and South. Russia’s relatively weak compliance record, coupled with the negative media coverage of its arms sales to Sudan’s genocidal regime, might suggest that its political leaders were trying to undermine the development goals of its G8 partners. However, since 2001, Russia fully complied with fourteen key Africa-related G8 commitments, including increasing ODA, supporting debt relief, and funding multilateral initiatives to fight the spread of infectious diseases. Findings in this article also indicate that no G8 member has a perfect compliance record on Africa-related commitments, a conclusion that should give the reader pause before singling out Russia for the G8’s shortcomings. For instance, in 2009, One International, a global campaign to fight poverty in Africa, reported that the G8 had donated only one-third of the amount of official development assistance that in 2005 it had pledged to raise by 2010.148

Like other G8 members, Russia opposed potential G8 commitments that did not further its own interests. In June 2008, for example, the Russian government did not support a G8 initiative to assist poor countries harmed by global warming, which suggests that they did not view the initiative to be in their economic interests.149 Russia’s initiatives within the G8’s policy framework did not always succeed, either, as evidenced by Putin’s failed attempt to use Russia’s contributions to debt relief as leverage when negotiating with his G8 counterparts over extending similar relief to poor CIS countries.

Now that Putin is serving as prime minister alongside President Medvedev, his protégé, Russia’s orientation toward African countries has not changed. In 2010, Medvedev visited Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, and Namibia along with a large delegation of Russian business people. He travelled there “aware that Russia is far behind Western and Chinese companies when it comes to securing a share of the continent’s natural wealth.”150 During Medvedev’s visit, Russia and Nigeria signed a nuclear energy agreement, in furthering Russia’s goal to invest in Africa’s energy infrastructure.151 His annual statements on Africa and his 2008 foreign policy concept still highlight Russia’s contributions to the G8’s Africa-related initiatives.152 As this article has shown, Russian officials support these initiatives both to reassure their G8 partners that Russia had accepted that membership in leadership groups comes with a financial price and, like any
other great or emerging power, to pursue instrumental goals—fulfilling strategic political and economic objectives and enhancing its global image.

Table 1: Compliance with Africa-Related G8 Commitments, 2001-2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment (summit/year)</th>
<th>Can</th>
<th>Fran</th>
<th>Ger</th>
<th>It</th>
<th>Jpn</th>
<th>Russ</th>
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* Ratings were compiled by the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group on a three-point scale: -1 (lack of compliance), 0 (work in progress), +1 (full compliance). To access the text of final compliance reports on each of these commitments, go to <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/>. To access the G8 Research Group’s “G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding Reference Manual,” March 17, 2008, go to: <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/compliance_manual_2008-03.pdf>. Assessments of 2001 Genoa commitments to universal primary education and the HIPC Initiative, as well as of the 2003 Sea Island commitment to the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, were omitted because Russia was not rated.

** Italy was not rated due to lack of information at the time the report was compiled.

*** The author calculated the rating of overall compliance herself by 1) converting +1 to 100 and 5 to 50 (0 remains 0), 2) adding together all figures for each country, and 3) dividing the total result for each country by 56 (with the exception of Italy, which had 55 ratings).

**Notes**

2 The other G8 member states are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For background on the G8’s Africa initiatives, see Fratianni, Savona, Kirton 2003 and Bayne 2005. For background on Russia’s role in the G8 more generally, see Baev 2009, Jordan 2010, Jordan 2008, and Panova 2005.
4 I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for his/her feedback on this point.
5 Lukin 2009.
6 Lavrov 2007; see also Kramerenko 2009.
7 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
8 Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam International 2005: 23.
10 See Pham 2008.
11 See Bromley et al. 2009.
12 See Hartung and Berrigan 2005 and “Canadian Firms Dominate Mining Activities in Africa—and Have a Bad Human Rights Record,” The East African (Nairobi), March 1, 2010.
13 For a clear comparison of neorealist analysis with that of institutional liberalism, see Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 119-20.
15 Shaw, Cooper, and Chin 2009: 27-44.
16 Holslag 2007: 23.
20 Ibid. 250.
21 Ibid. 236.
22 McCormick 2008: 73.
23 See Alesina and Dollar 2000.
26 Easterly 2007: 161; see also Engel and Rye 2005.
30 See Easterly; Alden and le Pere 2004; Moss 2006; LeMelle 2010, Riddell 2007; Jeffrey Sachs, “G-8’s Aid Promises Gather Dust on the Shelf,” The Nation (Thailand), April 24, 2007; and Taylor and Williams 2004.
31 Engel and Olsen 2005: 15.
34 Sautman and Hairong 2008: 104.
36 Sautman and Hairong 2008: 91; see also Tull 2006.
38 Taylor 2009: 15. India has a similar approach to Africa. See Shrivastava 2009.
40 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009.
41 Tull 2006: 463.
43 Quist-Adade 2005: 88; see also Westad 2005 for background on Soviet involvement in Africa.
44 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 283-84. Russia signed military cooperation agreements with China and Kuwait in 1993, the United Arab Emirates in 1994, and South Africa in 1995, in addition to agreements with several fellow members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
46 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 283; see also Vasiliev 2005.
47 Shubin 1997-98.
50 Cornelissen 2009: 23.
51 Shubin 2004: 104.
53 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006d. Russia is not a full OECD member.
54 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005.
58 For more details about these agreements, see Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b and Pham 2008.
59 Curtis Abraham, “Give Me the Oil and I’ll Look the Other Way,” The Nation (Nairobi), October 13, 2006.
61 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
This conclusion is based on the G8 Research Group’s assessment of 56 Africa-related G8 commitments announced at G8 summits between 2001 and 2008, the years when G8 leaders endorsed by consensus a high number of Africa-related commitments, when Russia was included in ratings, and when Putin was Russia’s president. The commitments concern bridging the North-South digital divide and other technical assistance, supporting good governance and democratization, official development assistance, debt relief, education, trade with lesser-developed countries, health and infectious diseases, and conflict prevention and regional security. Evaluation is done on a three-point scale: -1 (lack of compliance), 0 (work in progress), and +1 (full compliance). Russia scored either a -1 or 0 on 42 of the 56 commitments. In comparison, the UK scored either a -1 or 0 on 12 of the 56 commitments, Canada on 13 of the 56 commitments, the US on 14 of the 56 commitments, Germany on 23 of the 56 commitments, France on 24 of the 56 commitments, Japan on 34 of the 56 commitments, and Italy on 42 of the 56 commitments. See Table 1 for a list of these commitments and country ratings.


Vasiliev 2005.


G8 Research Group 2002: 36.


Reut, “Po-vzrosloemu. Rossiia pomozhet Afrike.”


G8 Research Group 2004: 36, 41.


“Russian Finance Minister Claims that the State is Unable to Make Any Reasonable Investments at All,” Pravda (English edition), November 30, 2004; as noted in G8 Research Group 2005: 69.


Vasiliev 2005.


Baev 2009: 60. When the G7 members allowed Russia to join in 1998, they denied Russia access to G7 meetings concerning financial policies.


Ugodnikov, “Bogach, bedniak.”


See, for example, comments Putin made at the International NGO Forum in Moscow on July 4, 2006, accessible on: <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/civil8/cg8060704-putin.html>.


Ibid.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b; see also Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a.

Payne 2008: 530.


Anishyuk 2010.


G8 Research Group 2009: 230. Russia is not a member of the WTO but is still expected to donate to Trade for Aid.

Anishyuk 2010.

Johnson 2008: 497.

Ibid.

Ibid. 508-9.

Sjöstedt 2008: 22.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.


Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006c.


Russia’s Contributions to G8 Development Initiatives in Africa during Putin’s Presidency | 107

140 Labonte et al. 2004: 80-94.
143 Shubin 2004: 102.
144 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b.
151 “Nigeria-Russia Set to Sign Nuclear Deal,” This Day (Nigeria), June 20, 2009.

References


“Excerpts from the transcript of President Vladimir Putin’s Address to the Civil G8 NGO Forum,” Moscow, July 4, 2006, accessible on: <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/civil8/cg8060704-putin.html>.


___________. (2006c) “Speech by Andrei Kondakov, Russian G8 Foreign Affairs Sous-Sherpa delivered at an OECD meeting of the Executive Committee in Special Session (ECSS),”
November 3, 2006, accessible at:


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Gazeta (Russia)
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The New Times (Kigali)
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Novye izvestiia (Russia)
Pravda (Russia)
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (US government agency)
RIA Novosti (Russian government agency)
Rossiiskaia gazeta (Russia)
Reuters
St. Petersburg Times (Russia)
This Day (Nigeria)
Trud (Russia)
Vanguard (Lagos)
Vedomosti (Russia)
Vremia novostei (Russia)
BOOK REVIEWS


Researches that bring the cultures of African countries to the world’s attention are important for general knowledge transfer, historical and anthropological research, and development studies. While the western media has proven to be influential in its coverage of Africa, it has failed to depict satisfactorily the realities on-ground. This is probably why books remain the most reliable means for information dissemination, part of the series “Culture and Customs of Africa,” captures the comprehensiveness of African culture and customs, with particular emphasis on Rwanda. This country’s “recent period of genocide disrupted traditionally legitimized institutions…” (p.117) has been the principal news focus, but it is presented in this volume in the most different way.

With a foreword written by Toyin Falola, the volume is well structured and focuses on all relevant aspects of the daily lives of the people of Rwanda. It provides a well researched above-basic history, along with examples of religious beliefs, music and dance, literatures, architecture, gender issues, village customs, and family lives. The first chapter provides a historical overview along with information on politics, economy, and geography. The other chapters examine various aspects of culture and customs of the different peoples living within the country. The second chapter in particular exposes the country’s religion and worldview and provides considerable information on the traditional polytheistic cultures of its people and the evolution and practise of today’s Christianity within these cultures.

Rwanda, little known to the rest of the world prior to 1994, has become the cynosure of cultural and anthropological researchers. A lot has been commented and written about the country as a result of the genocide, but not much effort has been put towards evoking the positive sides of the country. A great deal has been hypothesized and promoted on how best to rebuild the structural fabrics of the country, but little is being done towards presenting the socio-historical aspect of the Rwandan people to the outside world in its truest form. This book fills this important gap within contemporary discourses on Africa. Adekunle provides culturally important facts about Rwanda without wasting space on the miseries of the country’s 1994 history. The book is a portrait of the wealth of Rwanda’s traditional cultural heritage, which revolves around poetry, music, praise-singing, and dances that reflect its history, historicity, beliefs, and worldview. Issues ranging from “literature and media” to “cuisines and traditional dress,” “gender roles,” and “music and dance” are well studied.
The book adopts a very clear objective, which it achieves through a clear methodology. If the objective of the author was to directly educate his readers with historical narratives of Rwanda while indirectly tracing the causes of the genocide, then his goal is accomplished. Also, if the book was written in order to indirectly enlighten its readers on Africa through a Rwandan case-study, once again, the goal is achieved. The book comes with a mixture of bland historicity and cultural elucidations on Rwanda, laced in a tone of advocacy and wrapped in a voice of urgency. The entire volume is a mix of clear scholarly research presented in the most intellectually stimulating diction. The use of photos, a glossary, and a historical timeline makes for good illustrations and easy understanding. The volume’s well-chosen bibliography gives credence to its originality and breadth. Overall, it presents Rwandan in a way that catches the interest of any lover of history, culture, and politics about Africa and African countries.

_Culture and Customs of Rwanda_ is a call to the world to know and understand Rwanda and Rwandans. It should capture a wide audience, ranging from undergraduate to graduate students and to general African studies researchers and practitioners. Individuals, consultants, and organizations interested in specific studies and researches on Rwanda will find it very useful. Also, due to its simplicity and clarity, it surely will appeal to other levels of readership, such as tourists and diplomats heading to Rwanda, who would through reading this book would gain a deep understanding of the country. It is a fact, according to Kofi Annan, that “in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda.” What Adekunle has done in this book is to restate the need for the world not to fail Rwanda or any other country again.

Uchendu Eugene Chigbu, _Technische Universität München, Germany_


With South Africa hosting the FIFA 2010 World Cup football (soccer) tournament, the first ever on African soil, from June 11 to July 11, Africanist historian Peter Alegi’s _African Soccerscapes_ could not have appeared at a more opportune moment. Staging the mega event in Africa indeed necessitates rewriting the history of the world’s most popular sport and, arguably, most “beautiful” game. Accordingly, Alegi’s concise and ingenious book is a timely reminder about the impact African players have had on global football and an affirmation of Africa’s mounting stature as a football powerhouse. The author posits the “Africanization” of world football as a complex experience in which political, economic, and cultural forces are at play.

Undeniably an increasing number of African players, among them Côte d’Ivoire’s Didier Drogba of Chelsea (England), Ghana’s Michael Essien also of Chelsea, and Cameroon’s Samuel Eto’o of Inter Milan (Italy), are now plying their trade with elite clubs in Europe. And this means they compete with the best football players in the world such as Argentina’s Lionel Messi of Barcelona (Spain), Portugal’s Cristiano Ronaldo of Real Madrid (Spain), and England’s Wayne Rooney of Manchester United (England), among others. This display of Africa’s
competitive spirit in sporting terms is even more impressive considering the shabby state of many domestic football leagues and associations across the continent.

While Africa’s progress in football management has been patchy at best, its pool of talented football players continues to expand and impress scouting officials from European and, more recently, Asian football clubs. Yet, Alegi shows that the globalization and commercialization of African football has not always been in the best interest of African players. Rather, European football clubs and agents have made millions of dollars through the recruitment of African players, a significant number of whom have failed to attain the kind of success players such as Drogba and Essien (now football-rich millionaires) have enjoyed in recent years. Africa’s “muscle drain,” which some cynics consider a form of “football slavery,” has not only ruined the careers of many young and promising African players but also had a debilitating impact on national leagues across the continent.

Indeed, scores of young African players recruited by European football agents and clubs after outstanding performances in FIFA Under-17 and Under-20 football tournaments have had their careers derailed after migrating to Europe. But Alegi is far from being pessimistic about the future of African football. That South Africa is hosting the 2010 World Cup is by itself a firm statement about Africa’s will to move forward and display its organizational competence. Likewise, the continent’s current crop of accomplished players from Algeria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria (the five African teams that qualified for the tournament) will join Bafana Bafana (The Boys, The Boys), the South African team, as Africa’s representatives to compete with the world’s best football nations such as Argentina, Brazil, England, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands.

Alegi’s previous work on football and politics in South Africa—his area of specialization—puts him in a vantage position to take on a continental expedition tracing the development of African football since the late nineteenth century, when British colonial officials first introduced the game in their African colonies. In doing so, he draws on a wide array of published English and French sources interspersed with oral testimonies extracted from other works. By working up his sources and weaving them meticulously, Alegi constructs a fluid and coherent narrative that demonstrates how Africa developed a distinctive football culture shaped by its sociopolitical and economic conditions during and after the colonial period. World football today is aware of Africa’s treasure chest of gifted players. Alegi’s main argument, in fact, is that “African players, coaches, officials and fans have written crucial chapters in the history of football and therefore any interpretation of the game’s global past must address the interaction of African practitioners and fans with this exciting and nearly universal expression of human culture” (p. xii).

The book’s six chapters combine a thematic and chronological arrangement that allow the author to draw on specific case studies to map out significant developments in the history of football in Africa from its humble beginnings as a minority European colonialists’ pastime to the continent’s most popular hobby and spectator sport. Alegi demonstrates that in the immediate post-colonial period, African political leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea (Conakry), and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), to name only a few, capitalized on football’s popularity to kindle
national allegiance to the fragile nation-states inherited from the colonial past. Since then, the game’s popularity in Africa has continued to increase exponentially as cable and satellite TV and the internet have cut across ethnic, religious, and national boundaries to bring together diverse supporters from disenfranchised as well as elite groups. The book’s epilogue highlights the build-up to the World Cup in South Africa and its implications for both the country and Africa in general.

Because Alegi writes in a language that is accessible to non-specialists and casual readers, the book will appeal to those outside academia seeking a quick read about African football to understand how South Africa came to host the world’s most important sporting event. In particular, the book will benefit sports journalists in need of a concise but rich reference about football in Africa since the colonial period. For academia, instructors teaching undergraduate courses about global sports or sports in Africa could assign the book or selected chapters to students, who most likely will appreciate the material for its informative strength, brevity, and lucidity.

African Soccerscapes is too concise, though. In addition, this is as much a complement as a criticism. For a book aimed at providing a panoramic view of the development of African football and its contribution to the global game, it is a fast-paced account that covers significant grounds in only 179 pages. Still, the price paid for brevity is the omission of many “household names” in African soccer while several less accomplished players feature in the book. There is no space, for example, for the likes of Rashidi Yekini of Nigeria, Abdul Razak of Ghana, Cherif Soulaymane of Guinea, and Papa Camara of Guinea. Although some of the excluded players may not have played in European leagues during their heyday, they personified football in not only their local communities but throughout the continent. Thus in a book about the growth of African football since the colonial period, even a one-line tribute to some of the players would have been the least they deserve.

In addition, Alegi tucks away women’s football in Africa in the last eight pages of chapter six, which may strike some readers as a token gesture to bring women into a male-dominated narrative. Sure enough, I think a separate chapter on women’s football in Africa would have enriched the gender balance of the book.

Further, it is somehow odd that the doyen of radio commentary on African football, the Zambian Dennis Liwewe, whose unmistakable voice brought the African Nations Cup to life before cable and satellite television became popular in Africa, does not feature in the book at all. Yet those who have followed African football since the 1970s would affirm Liwewe’s immense contribution to popularizing the game across the continent. It is somehow ironic therefore that a lesser-known Senegalese soccer commentator, Allou, for example, gets the plaudit as “a kind of football griot” (p. 43), a title more appropriate for Liwewe, who as a BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) sports correspondent covered most major football events in Africa for several decades.

Even if the abovementioned quibbles were serious limitations, they would not diminish the importance and timeliness of Alegi’s study. Truth told, sports in Africa only started to get serious academic attention a decade or two ago. As such, African Soccerscapes adds much substance to a body of knowledge on Africa that is still in its embryonic phase. Conclusively,
the book is a fitting tribute to the most historic moment in South Africa (and Africa) since the 1994 election of Nelson Mandela as the first black president of the host country of the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

**Note**


Tamba E. M’bayo, Hope College


As an African historian who writes about the history of African therapeutics I was drawn to Baronov’s title and opening questions. What are the “contributions of local African societies and cultures to the development of biomedicine in Africa?” What can the West “learn about Western medicine by understanding the African contributions to the development of biomedicine?” While he does a good job addressing how the colonial and post-colonial African context affected the role of biomedicine on the continent, the second question—also the title of his book—is continually alluded to but never answered. I had anticipated that this book might look at the influence Africans had on Western medicine through their role in introducing African remedies and medicinal plants to the biomedical pharmacopeia, or perhaps African influences on the agenda of the World Health Organization. Instead, Baronov rehashes older literature on African therapeutics, medical pluralism, and biomedicine and empire while creating new categories of analysis to examine these subjects.

Trained as a sociologist and clearly steeped within world systems theory, Baronov attempts to add a cultural dimension to an analytical framework that is otherwise dominated by economics. Indeed, the book does not aim to add new research regarding the topic of medicine in Africa but instead uses the topic as a foil to reflect upon the role of biomedicine as a “historical cultural formation” that was both transformed by the periphery and in turn “transformed the capitalist world system.” Baronov is not an Africanist per se, having written his dissertation and, in 2000, first book on *The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil*. Indeed, given his premise, that African pluralistic medical cultures made room for and incorporated biomedicine, one wonders why the study is even based in Africa? Indeed his argument could seemingly apply to any developing region where medical cultures are open and pluralistic in nature.

During the past fifteen years, scholars have examined the ways in which biomedicine acted as a tool of empire in both practical and ideological ways. Advances in tropical medicine enabled Europeans to live on the continent and cure African bodies, while ideas of race and science allegedly justified imperialism and racial segregation. While biomedicine was initially introduced by missionaries who hoped to win souls by curing bodies, wider access to
biomedicine became the concern of colonial officials particularly after World War I. Anxiety about the health of African workers led to the training of Africans as biomedical dressers, medical aids, and led to the opening of local dispensaries. While Africans largely continued to utilize African healers and understand the body and illness through their own local cosmologies, biomedicine became one alternative amongst other medical options. Biomedicine in its various forms—coerced and otherwise—and through different practitioners—European and African—challenged local cultural milieus. For instance, biomedicine encouraged bodily and individualistic understandings of illness rather than social and communal ones. Such medical interactions could thus frustrate practitioners of both medical cultures. Likewise, the practical and ideological uses of biomedicine led many Africans to develop a degree of skepticism towards biomedicine even if they sometimes used it themselves. Baronov re-examines and synthesizes much of this history on the continent, but creates his own structural categories of analysis—referring to the “three ontological spheres” of biomedicine—as a scientific enterprise, as a symbolic-cultural expression, and as an expression of social power.

Unfortunately, this analysis is often cumbersome, repetitive, and leads Baronov to write in the abstract rather than the concrete. Occasionally there are areas of specific examples—the history of biomedicine in the West or of African therapeutics as practiced primarily in the 1970s. These are easy to follow though they do not always make his point. For instance, theoretically he recognizes the plurality and dynamic changing nature of African therapeutics, yet he refers to his relatively modern examples of African therapeutics as antecedents of African syncretic medicine or what he terms “African biomedicine.” Given that Africans have been incorporating aspects of biomedicine and “modernity” into African therapeutics since at least the early twentieth century, such examples should demonstration syncretism not antecedents. More frustrating, however, is that the author does not use specific examples to make his final claims. This book’s argument is built chapter by chapter, but the final chapter which purports to tie together his various assertions includes no evidence that demonstrates how so-called African biomedicine changed Western biomedicine.

Indeed, Baronov’s larger problem remains the use and concept of “African biomedicine.” Without explanation, Baranov sidesteps the relatively common and useful concept of medical pluralism—the co-existence of multiple medical cultures available to and utilized by patients. On the one hand, he recognizes African therapeutics as pluralistic, but claims that “the introduction of biomedicine” led the “historical-cultural transition from African pluralistic medicine to African syncretic medicine,” which he says is more accurate to call “African biomedicine.” Yet then he claims biomedicine is no more outside of Kamba pluralistic medicine than “medical techniques and botanicals that the Kamba have borrowed from their Luo neighbors.” Baranov’s proposal seems to make several leaps of logic. First, Africa medicine has always been syncretic. And why does the addition of biomedicine to a medically plural society result in a new creation altogether? Isn’t it just medical pluralism again? Second, he underplays the significance of therapeutic border-crossing, which in and of itself, is often deliberate and seen as powerful and therapeutic. In a medically plural society, healers as well as patients make distinctions between various medical treatments and practitioners. Third, he simplifies relations between biomedicine and African therapeutics. Biomedicine was/is state supported and more
tightly regulated in terms of who gets access to medicines, tools, and licenses, whereas Kamba or Luo medicine may not be formally regulated. While some healers may have incorporated certain substances, tools, or diagnoses of biomedicine, it is always within the ontological sphere of African medical pluralism. But even here we must be careful about assuming a direction of influences. Using the example of successful yaws treatment in East Africa, he presumes the “absorption” of needles or needle-like devices into African therapeutics, whereas in southern Africa, African healers use of needle-like tools predates the introduction of biomedicine. Indeed, biomedical doctors used local medical terms to explain vaccinations to the wider African population. If we are to believe the somewhat dubious claim that biomedicine is being absorbed into African therapeutics, why should Baronov privilege biomedicine by terming the result “African biomedicine?” This makes it rather confusing, particularly when he refers to Africans who practice biomedicine as “African biomedical practitioners,” and practitioners of African therapeutics (African biomedicine) as PMPs or pluralistic medical practitioners (another created category). And what are we to call university biomedicine that is practiced and advanced on the continent?

Karen Flint, University of North Carolina, Charlotte


Daniel Branch wrote Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya with an explicit expectation that his readers know little, if anything, about the 1950s Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya. Acknowledging the relevance of the topic in light of the current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Branch tackles the conflict’s traditional political space in Kenyan history. More importantly, he confronts debates on “the lessons of imperialism, the nature of contemporary warfare, and the dynamics of civil wars” directly in response to doubts about the Mau Mau’s rightful place in Kenyan politics (p. xvi). It is in this latter area that Branch’s pragmatic analysis stand outs. In addition to its Introduction and Conclusion, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya is cleverly divided into six empirical chapters. The first three of these successfully lay the foundation for Branch’s later focus on loyalism by examining its origins within the rise and fall of the Mau Mau insurgency. His intentions are to clarify the “ambiguity that characterized the war’s early stages” and explore “how from [this indistinctness] the cleavage between the Mau Mau supporters and loyalists emerged” (p. xvi). Branch contemplates the “significance of violence as a force” in guiding the course of the conflict and its resulting legacies. It is this focus on violence and the participants’ actions during the conflict that make his book well worth the read. The author deftly delivers an analysis of the conflict that makes one instantly wish to seek more in-depth information about how, and particularly why, the Mau Mau insurgency is still relevant in the current Kenyan political environment.
Branch begins his analysis at the local level, during a tragic evening in mid-October 1952, with an event that places family loyalties against national identity. While his story of a poor widow named Matari and her gruesome death at the hands of her brother-in-law was only a minor speck in the history of the conflict, it exemplifies the significance of Branch’s examination of this conflict. It is in the search for answers to Matari’s dilemma that this book differs from the existing literature on three significant points: that “…loyalists were a far more important component of the conflict than…other accounts of the Mau Mau war” conclude; that it is the “similarities shared” between the loyalists and insurgents and not their differences “that are most notable;” and that the “motivations of loyalists were far more complex than too often assumed” (pp. 4-5).

In direct response to counterinsurgency theory’s dogma of winning the hearts and minds of the people, Branch declares that the “war between Mau Mau and the colonial state was…less about hearts and minds and rather more concerned with the eyes, ears, and mouths of potential informants” (p. 53). In fact, he concludes his analysis by stating that “no war can be understood until the limits of agency are acknowledged, its violence adequately explained, and all its witnesses and protagonists incorporated into its history” (p. 224). With that said, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya offers to all those interested in counterinsurgency operations—and want to venture beyond the current operations in Afghanistan—an excellent case study of “the particularly pernicious, invasive, and decisive nature of counterinsurgency campaigns” (p. 211).

Eric M. Moody, U.S. Air Force Academy


The present study is a product of a November 2002 International Conference held at Hanover, New Hampshire under the auspices of Dartmouth’s African and African American Studies Program, the York University UNESCO Nigerian Hinterland Project, and the Text and Testimony Collective. Specialists in the field of women and gender studies as well as Diaspora Studies collectively offer an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to the experiences of women in Africa and the Americas. The essays cover a broad chronological scope, touching on significant events from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century. The stated purpose of the volume is to provide information on the linkages and shared experiences between women in the Caribbean and women in the Nigerian hinterland. This study stands out mainly because it moves the question of gender firmly into the discussion on the African Diaspora and Global Studies. It reveals that at different historical periods, women on both sides of the Atlantic established strong links and negotiated their identity even within the context of slavery, labor and sex exploitation, racism, colonialism, and patriarchy.

The editors set the tone of the study by first, engaging recent scholarship in order to unpack the complex meanings and definitions of the term “Diaspora.” Diaspora is defined as a
process and a condition. As “a process it is constantly being remade through movement, migration, and travel, as well as imagined through thought, cultural production, and political struggle. As a condition, the African Diaspora exists within a global context of hierarchies of class, race, and gender” (p. 1). This definition goes against previous scholarships that define the African Diaspora as a mere dispersal of populations across the globe. Second, the editors push forward a major corrective by claiming that the experiences of blacks in North America cannot stand as the standard for explaining black identities in other parts of the world. Third, they point attention to the academic lacunae existing in the historiography: it is argued, for instance, that more scholarly work needs to be done on the impact of the Igbo culture in the Diaspora; on the migration of African female labor to the Caribbean and North America in the twenty-first century; on the educational, religious, and cultural exchanges between people of West Africa and the West Indies; and on varied trans-national networks developed by West Indian missionaries in Africa during the nineteenth century.

The volume assembles twelve essays divided into three main sections. The first two chapters are grouped under the heading “Africa in the Caribbean Imagination.” Faith Lois Smith re-creates the thoughts of nineteenth century clergymen and the black middle class in Trinidad. Largely influenced by Christian values and western education, vocal middle class men in Trinidad constructed women in Africa as ignorant and submissive and women in Trinidad as intellectual companions of middle class men. These men were fully committed to the abolition of the institution of slavery in the continent they regarded as their original home. Anthea Morrison complicates the idea of “Africa as home” by providing an inter-textual reading of the fictional works of Maryse Conde and Paul Marshall. In their fictional works, they present the image of African women crossing from one part of the Diaspora to the other, making sense of their gendered and racial identity, and more importantly, constructing their identity in relation to their imagined home, which may be either Africa or any other part of the Caribbean.

Part Two, “Race, Gender, and Agency in the shadow of Slavery” comprises six essays with related themes. Sturtz, MacDonald Smythe, and Samaro offer illuminating analyses on the changes and continuities in the performance of race and gender in the new world. Sturtz teases out the complex racial categorization recorded in mid-eighteenth century Jamaica and its implications for women and children of women born of European and African parents. Using the life history of Mary Rose, the argument made is that women irrespective of racial classification carved a niche for themselves in the economic and social domain. In another chapter, MacDonald Smythe examines the ways Mary Seacole, a Jamaican woman who served as nurse during the Crimean war, defined whiteness and blackness and reconstructed her identity through autobiographical writing. The life of Maria Jones constitutes the main concern in Samaro’s chapter. The essay demonstrates the sharp racial classification recorded in Trinidad in the mid-eighteenth century and its implications for blacks of pure African ancestry. Women’s agency represents a major theme threading through this section. The fact that women in Africa and across the Atlantic carved a niche for themselves irrespective of class, race and social status comes out strong in all the narratives. Olatunji Ojo places attention on the experience and agency of Eastern Yoruba women in Southern Nigeria during the colonial period. Yoruba
women, he argues, appropriated British laws and western education to break free from certain traditional practices and advance their social, political, and economic rights. Janice Mayer, in another chapter, compares British educational policy in Southern Nigeria and Barbados from 1875 to the mid 1940s with the aim of analyzing the influence of Victorian ideologies of domesticity on girls’ education.

In spite of the unifying themes, the essays presented in the study vary considerably in approach and point of emphasis. For instance, in the second section, Shepherd places special significance on ethnicity and gendered identities in the Diaspora using as examples the experience of migrant Indian women who formed a significant part of the population in Jamaica and Guyana during the nineteenth century. The article successfully locates the voices of Indian women who served as indentured servants in the Diaspora and provides accounts of rape and exploitation in their migratory journeys from Asia to the Caribbean. One of the chief strengths of this collection lies in its presentation of rich historical materials. It brings together sources including biographies, newspapers, autobiographies, public speeches, literary texts, archival materials, letters, missionary records, diaries, and official government publications. Overall, in spite of the differences in approach, sources, area of concentration, and thematic and stylistic expression, the essays purposefully integrate gender analysis into discussions on the African Diaspora.

The most impressive offerings in this collection are the essays grouped under the third section, “Building Diaspora in the Web of Empire.” Of four chapters, two stand out. Hakim Adi’s well written and thoughtful essay represents a model for generating further discussion on the sustained cultural and social linkages between women in the Caribbean and the Nigerian hinterland. He traces the social and political ties between Amy Ashwood Garvey and politically engaged Nigerian students living in Britain in the early twentieth century, a linkage that led to the formation of the Nigerian Progress Union in 1924. Adi convincingly shows that African and Caribbean women formulated thought provoking ideas on the African Diaspora independent of their male counterparts. By far the most enlightening essay is LaRay Denzer’s analysis of the life histories of three women from the West Indies who stayed in Nigeria at different times from the 1920s to the 1950s. LaRay explores the activities of Dahlia Whitbourne, Henrietta Douglas, and Amy Ashwood Garvey within the Nigerian landscape, arguing that these women were fully committed to the eradication of the plight of black people in Africa and in the Diaspora.

Gloria Chukwu examines the economic well-being of Igbo women in Eastern Nigeria during the Second World War and argues that though war-time economic measures adopted by colonial officials led to the loss of economic independence for most Igbo women, some of these women found creative ways to advance their economic status. In the last chapter, Mojubaolu Okome constructs African women as independent migrant bodies engaged in international migration and the creation of virtual communities on the World Wide Web. Scholars will find useful different virtual communities, e-journals, and e-newsletters highlighted in the study. Although one wishes that the author engages more with advanced scholarship on migration theories on the feminization of migration.

The volume is well edited; the helpful maps and the accurately marked index make the volume convenient to navigate. The greatest achievement of the study is its coherent manner of
situating gender into the debates on the African Diaspora. One only wishes that the editors offer an overarching theoretical paradigm that complicates the discussion on the linkages between women in Africa and those in the Diaspora. The editors might need to consider a second volume since only few chapters successfully achieved the stated purpose of the study. This remark aside, the volume is a welcomed addition to the growing body of literature on gender in the African Diaspora. For its worth, it provides useful information to scholars and students interested in the following fields of study: gender studies, modern Nigerian history, slavery, migration studies, colonialism, globalization, and literary arts.

Tosin Funmi Abiodun, University of Texas at Austin


This publication of Jose Cossa’s doctoral dissertation contributes to a key area of research regarding the interface of power and politics in policy-making and higher education in Southern Africa, with a specific case study of Mozambique. The book persuasively argues that even in the postcolonial context the sovereignty of the African countries in domestic policy-making is impinged by global regimes. The author uses several critical theoretical perspectives and discourse, such as international regimes theory, filter effect theory (FET), African Renaissance, Marxism-Leninism, classical liberalism, globalization, and systems transfer to establish his arguments. The arguments are further supported by an empirical study through which the author analyzes the power dynamics of global international regimes (GIRs) such as the World Trade Organization/Global Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO/GATS) and regional international regimes (RIRs) such as the Association of African Universities (AAU), and the implications of such power dynamics on the educational autonomy of local governments in Southern Africa.

The first three chapters discuss in detail the theoretical and analytical framework of the research project. The fourth chapter explains the specific context for a project assessment of why the Machel and Chissano administrations adopted the policy of universal education under two different political systems and historical contexts in Mozambique. Chapter five elaborates the author’s research methodology employed in investigating his research question—how do GIRs and RIRs perceive power dynamics during international negotiations that influence the autonomy of local governments to regulate higher education? Taking into consideration the fact that most research projects undertaken by social scientists to investigate the role of power and politics in policy-making takes a bottom-up approach in studying or interviewing the ones on whom power is exercised rather than the reverse. Thus, the very nature of Dr. Cossa’s research question provides a fresh perspective at a less commonly treaded ground. It also imposed a major limitation on his research design, however, due to the difficulty of conducting elite interviews, which he acknowledges in the book. “Although my initial intent was that my study consist of a purposefully selected sample of at least 12 (n=12) respondents-namely, at least six
Notwithstanding the limitation mentioned above, this book provides an excellent opportunity for young social scientists and researchers to learn from the rigorous methods used for the purpose of this research. The author conducted semi-structured interviews to collect his data and used a mixed method approach of qualitative and quantitative content analyses. The author triangulates between the nomothetic and ideographic methodological frameworks from the field of comparative education to interpret the data as he believes “when we manage to back up our sociocultural verstehen with a consideration of research propositions, our findings not only become less susceptible to criticism by one camp or another, but they become enhanced with a cross-field appreciation and respect” (p. 91).

The most important contribution of this study is its theoretical contribution in the field of comparative and international education by applying the FET as a tool for unveiling the subtleties of power dynamics among international regimes (GIRs and RIRs) and local governments. In doing so, Cossa’s study makes an attempt to show how the dimensions of power dynamics and international regimes theory has become key issues related to education globally. Based on the specific case study of Mozambique, the author makes generalizations about the role of power, politics, and higher education in Southern Africa. However, critics can easily put this generalization into question since Cossa provides little empirical data other than general findings from other countries, though he situates his study in the larger Southern African context in the literature review. Hence, we find him pointing out in conclusion that the study provides further ground for research in other parts of the world to understand the role of power dynamics in policy-making. This study also provides a good framework for those who are interested in studying the power negotiations between indigenous knowledge systems of Native Americans or Aborigines) and the modern systems of education in the context of globalization (p. 158). Therefore, this is a very important publication for all scholars and practitioners who are interested in education for international development and the factors affecting this development. Moreover, the implications of this study can be further extended beyond the area of higher education. It also enhances “the understanding of globalization by providing insight into nuanced forms of power that operate in the global arena and into the conflicting pressures that are put on individual countries by both global and regional forces” (p. 157). Though this empirical research makes a valuable addition to the globalization studies, however, the book is lacking in direct reference to existing globalization literature.

The key findings of this study as elaborated in chapter 8 shows very clearly the complexities that characterize power negotiations in international policy-making. Based on his legalistic conjecture about how GIRs and RIRs perceive power dynamics, Dr. Cossa explores several aspects of power dynamics in his analysis, such as hermeneutical power, informational power, manipulative power, monetary power, and regulatory power. The author thus ends the book re-emphasizing this complexity of power dynamics and negotiations “with both suspicion and hope” by quoting Michel Foucault (1982, p.249), “if intellectuals in general are to have a function…it is precisely to accept…this sort of revolving door or rationality that refers us to its
necessity, to its indispensability, and at the same time, its intrinsic dangers” (p.159). Hence, in the final analysis I agree with the author when he says that this book can also be very useful for those involved in peace studies and conflict resolutions in order to understand the complexities and dangers of international power negotiations and relations.

Mousumi Mukherjee, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign


Since the October 1998 completion of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TRC) process with the delivery of the Final Report to President Nelson Mandela, there have been many studies about the importance of the TRC process to societies that are still in transition. Significant edited works such as Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa* (2000), Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver, *After The TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa* (2001, Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, *Commissioning the Past: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (2002), and Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver?* (2008) immediately come to mind. For a broad overview of some of these works one may consult the insightful review article titled “The debate on truth and reconciliation: A survey of literature on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” ¹ The author Annalies Verdoolaege, is a Belgian researcher who has identified and commented on many of the texts that have been published on the subject. It is indeed these texts that also provided ample information for those involved in the TRC, for those who have been researching the whole process, and for those who desired to adopt the same model for their respective countries that have been deeply divided and are still grappling with transition.

Despite the TRC’s glaring shortcomings, it was generally hailed as a success story in and outside South Africa. This reviewer concurs with Doxtader and Salazar that “(h)istory will tell how, why and if the TRC’s form and underlying logic can be reproduced with therapeutic effect” (p. xiii). In fact, its success resulted in countries such as Liberia and East Timor adopting and emulating this model. Before, during, and after the TRC process, however, important documents were produced; whilst some appeared as unpublished discussion documents, others came onto the market as circulated instruments to measure and weigh the outcomes of the process. There were many others that were produced as published speeches and acts, which served as guidelines for those who have been involved throughout the process. In light of the central role that many of these documents played, Erik Doxtader and Philippe-Joseph Salazar, who have produced separate studies on the TRC process, decided to gather an array of documents that dealt with the primary themes of “truth” and “reconciliation.” Many have been
extracted from the TRC’s public (on-line) archives. These two scholars were, as expected, challenged by numerous practical questions such as “how to best edit and present selections...” (p. xvi); they, however, carefully selected the relevant documents and provided an informative introduction, “The Road to Reconciliation in South Africa.” This edited volume, the editors categorically state, is not a documentary history (p. xiv), and it was, as a matter of interest, inspired by Phillipe-Joseph Salazar’s Amnistier L’Apartheid: Travaux de la Commission Verite et Reconciliation (2004).

The editors divided the book into three parts, and each part was sub-divided into six different sections that altogether list sixty-six documents and that incidentally do not appear in any chronological order. The editors introduce each section and contextualize the documents and then conclude each section with sources information and additional readings. In terms of the volume’s organizational structure and presentation this reviewer would have preferred the editors to have prefixed each of the documents with the relevant source information and related readings instead of having inserted them at the end of each section, for this method would have better suited this volume, particularly since it has not been accompanied by a useful index.

Part I, “The Grounds of South Africa’s TRC,” begins with the five documents of Section 1 on “Dealing with a Crime against Humanity.” They reflect a range of issues such as the stand the United Nations adopted toward the apartheid regime in 1970 to the judgement in the case between Azapo, Biko, and Mxenge against the President of South Africa et al. The thirteen documents in Section 2, “The Theological and Political Roots of Reconciliation in South Africa,” include the famous Kairos (theological) document that was issued by the Institute of Contextual Studies in 1985 and “Concepts and Principles” that are recorded in the 1998 TRC Final Report.

Part II addresses “The Difficult Work of Finding Truth and Promoting Reconciliation” and consists of three sections. Section 3, “The Recounting of Suffering and the Findings of the TRC’s Human Rights Violations Committee” “has thirteen documents ranging from a selective register of testimonies of individuals such as Joyce Mtomkhulu in 1996 to the 1998 TRC Final Report “Findings from the Special Hearings on Women.” The fourteen documents in Section 4, “The Words of Perpetrators and the Process of Amnesty,” contain testimonies and the TRC’s Amnesty Committee’s decisions. Among the interesting testimonies is that of Eugene de Kock, who was the subject of Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s fascinating study A Human Being Died that Night: A Story of Forgiveness – a South African Woman Confronts the Legacy of Apartheid (2003). Section 5 records “What the Parties, Institutions and Business had to say about their Responsibility” and includes twelve documents such as the African National Congress’ statement to the TRC in 1996 and the Inkatha Freedom Party’s critical responses to the TRC Final Report of 1998. The theme of Part III is “Living with the Issue of Reconciliation.” It has only one section, namely Section 6 that contains nine documents under the label “Reconciliation and Reparations: The Terms of an Ongoing Debate.” Most of the documents in this section come from the TRC Final Report.

When the editors prepared and compiled this volume they were aware of the fact that “…critics will point out that ‘this or that’ is ‘not there’” (p. xv). Whilst their defence is reasonable, this reviewer still finds it difficult to accept their position in not having included documents that were exemplary in terms of their contents and importance. And though this
reviewer is indeed fully aware of the challenges that confronted the editors, they should have consulted the “Traces of Truth: Documents relating to the South Africa TRC” archives at the University of Witwatersrand and its many significant documents, some of which should have found their way in a volume such as this.

One of the most significant omitted documents, which could have been slotted into the final section, was that produced by the Khulumani Support Group (KSG). This group has struggled over the past few years to get permission from the American Courts to bring the international corporate companies that were complicit in sustaining the apartheid system to book. Since the final part of the compilation addresses the issue of “living with the issue of reconciliation,” KSG’s sterling work and its variety of documents should not have been ignored.

Despite this reviewer’s criticisms of this volume’s presentation and selection, Doxtader and Salazar have filled a significant gap in the TRC history-making process. They have compiled, edited and brought together sixty-six eye-catching and informative documents that shed light on the twin concepts of “truth” and “reconciliation” in (and beyond) South Africa. They are to be commended for having provided South Africans and other interested stakeholders with a volume that offers amazing insights into South Africa’s TRC.

1. Chapter appeared in Discourse and Human Rights Violations (Ch. Anthonissen and J. Blommaert, eds; Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins 2007), and an earlier version of the chapter that appears online at Rijks Universiteit te Ghent http://cas1.elis.rug.ac.be/avrug/trc.htm#pub May 2002

2. www.doj.gov.za/trc


Muhammed Haron, University of Botswana


Mami Wata appears in many guises throughout Henry John Drewal’s two recent publications examining the water spirit and the arts she has inspired. Divinity, nomad, trickster, benefactor, predator; depending upon the cultural and geographic context, Mami Wata is each and all of these things throughout Sacred Waters: Arts for Mami Wata and Other Divinities in Africa and the Diaspora and Mami Wata: Arts for Water Spirits in Africa and Its Diasporas. While few universals can describe the spirit through her many incarnations, her power to seduce devotees and non-devotees alike emerges time and again in communities where Mami Wata has left her mark.

In the preface to “Sacred Waters,” Drewal describes his own seduction by Mami Wata and the subsequent three decades of personal research that has culminated in these two
collaborative projects. Quoting a journal of Mami Wata memories, Drewal recounts his personal
“subjection... by the object of his affection,” depicting a long-developing and deeply held
personal and academic relationship with the divinity that moves beyond scholarship and into
the realm of devotion. The author has researched the divinity on three continents, named two
sail boats after her, constructed altars in her honor, and even participated in the annual
mermaid parade in Coney Island. The obvious affection and commitment Drewal holds for
Mami Wata is reflected in the two volumes, both of which represent significant contributions to
the growing body of scholarship exploring the water spirit and her devotees.

Drewal presents Mami Wata not so much as a fixed object of religious veneration but as a
constantly changing instance of encounter. Throughout his writing on the topic, Drewal
emphasizes Mami Wata’s placement at the site of engagement between different cultures,
traditions, and ways of living. The water spirit and her numerous incarnations never exist
within a vacuum. Instead, Drewal argues, they are actively formed through a continuous
process of interaction and reinvention. Consequently, the visual practices that emerge from
these moments of contact are not indicative of some unified and “authentic” culture – a notion
that Drewal and the other authors are quick to identify as fictitious – but products of cultural
hybridity and translation. Drewal introduces the concept early in both pieces, writing, “When
people objectify others, they are constructing themselves. In the process, [they] resymbolize
aspects of cultural others, translating and transforming them into our [their] symbols on [their]
own terms.” The essays in both works explore Mami Wata’s “trans-ness” in various geographic
and cultural contexts, demonstrating how the basic concept of the water deity has been and
continues to be creatively reworked to accommodate distinct lived realities.

The multi-disciplinary approach of both books fits the subject well, allowing for a scope of
analysis with appropriate breadth and diversity. This is especially true of “Sacred Waters,”
which contains forty-six essays by artists, writers, filmmakers, scholars, and devotees who
explore the visual tradition of Mami Wata as it is found in Africa, Europe, and the Americas.
Drewal has collected an impressive ensemble of topics that are treated from a variety of
scholarly perspectives, including anthropology, history, visual culture, and art history. Some
pieces are written from first-hand practitioners of Mami Wata traditions, providing the sort of
direct engagement often missing from similar treatments. Beyond the visuals in the book itself,
“Sacred Waters” includes a DVD supplying additional images, music and poetry recordings,
and performance videos. Given the labile nature of Mami Wata and the cultural practices
surrounding her, this approach provides a versatile perspective to explore the spirit in the
numerous waters in which she resides.

The essays are loosely organized into five overarching themes, including wealth and
morality, artistic agency, Mami Wata as artist’s muse, water spirits in the diaspora, and
exploration of the spirit’s movement between various cultural and historical contexts. Drewal
presents these categories in a pithy and illuminating introduction that sets the tone of the piece
while preparing the reader for the abundance of information that follows. Sadly, his
organizational program is not born out through the rest of the collection. Beyond Drewal’s
introduction, the essays are not clearly separated into their individual themes. The problem is
exasperated by the sometimes arbitrary classification of the essays themselves. Occasionally, the
individual pieces seem shoe-horned into their respective themes without apparent consideration for the essay’s content. In a collection of this size, this sporadic lack of organizational focus can lead to divergent and sometimes confusing passages. Fortunately, the stronger essays maintain the central thrust of Drewal’s program, even during those rare moments when the larger piece loses overall coherence.

Of those essays exploring Mami Wata as a locus of material acquisition and moral agency, Barbara Frank’s piece on the shift in attitudes toward wealth, consumption, and community in West African spiritual practice is especially engaging. Frank situates Mami Wata in the broader context of West African spirit beliefs. She explores the constantly changing relationship between devotees and “wealth-owning spirits,” illustrating how spiritual identity and economic ambition are often intertwined at the site of religious practice. Bogumil Jewsiewicki’s essay also stands out, exploring a particular incarnation of water spirit in the Congo. Referred to as Mamba Muntu, this female spirit grants wealth and prestige to her male devotees, but at an often terrible price. Jewsiewicki deftly ties the fluctuating relevance of Mamba Muntu to recent Congolese history, shifting political realities, and the growing presence of Christianity in the region. Both essays effectively demonstrate how Mami Wata and other religious entities often reflect the material realities of everyday life while providing devotees with a sense of economic agency, which is otherwise absent.

The second theme of the book explores Mami Wata’s travels between the ancient and the recent, the indigenous and the foreign, and the local and the global. This section is the largest of the book, comprised of fourteen essays that follow Mami Wata as she moves among various cultural, historical, and geographical contexts. It is also the most diffuse and least focused of the themes, leading to some perplexing additions that could have easily been left out for the sake of brevity and cohesion. The common thread through the pieces is often difficult to grasp and the entire section could have benefited from more strenuous editing. This comes as no small disappointment considering that the theme of cultural and historical nomadism adheres closest to Drewal’s central thesis.

Fortunately, the section contains strong individual essays to buoy the theme and illustrate Mami Wata’s propensity for border crossing, migration, and uniquely local incarnations. Sabine Jell-Bahlsen’s exploration of hair in visual culture and spiritual practice throughout the Oguta Lake region draws fascinating parallels between the original Mami Wata chromolithograph and contemporary hair motifs in Southeastern Nigeria. Osa D. Egonwa’s critical reassessment of Mami Wata scholarship also stands out. While most academic literature emphasizes Mami Wata’s “foreignness” as a product of cultural synthesis during the colonial encounter, Egonwa argues that she is essentially indigenous in nature. As “old wine in a new skin,” Mami Wata is a modern form of ancient water spirit that existed upon the continent far before Europeans arrived. His piece provides a fascinating counterpoint to other authors – Drewal included – who accentuate Mami Wata’s contemporary hybridity over her earlier cultural lineages.

The third section of the book contains essays that examine art and social agency. As a spirit who is believed to have direct, aggressively held ties with the material world, Mami Wata is often called upon to affect change in social realities when other avenues are exhausted. The
essays of this section investigate specific instances in which Mami Wata visual practice provides a system of action which individuals use to impact their world.

The majority of these pieces approach Mami Wata as the site of tense religious struggles between water spirit devotees and adherents of Christianity and Islam. In her essay, Birgit Meyer explores manifestations of Mami Wata in Pentecostal sermons and videos in southern Ghana. This context sees the water spirit portrayed as a temptress and a trickster, seducing otherwise devout Christians with promises of sex and wealth only to destroy them in the end. Meyer demonstrates how Pentecostals appropriate Mami Wata imagery to provide a warning to those who would stray from the path of Christian virtue. Jill Salmons discusses a different form of agency in her essay exploring an Ogoni Mami Wata association in the Niger Delta. Since the 1990s, the group has sought compensation from Shell and the Nigerian government for contaminating the Delta’s natural environment and exploiting the region’s oil reserves. Through an exploration of the group’s history, Salmons investigates the role of Mami Wata visual practice as the focus of a developing Ogoni national identity and a unified site of social protest.

The final theme of the collection addresses Mami Wata and other water spirit belief practices throughout the Atlantic. These essays explore manifestations of the spirit in the context of the diaspora, examining some of the diverse ways Mami Wata has appeared in geographical and cultural contexts outside of Africa itself. Marilyn Houlberg discusses one of these contexts in “Arts for the Water Spirits of Haitian Vodou,” a survey of water divinities and their artistic representations in the creolized African community of Haiti. Like many of the essays in the collection, Houlberg’s piece examines the effect of the 1885 Mami Wata chromolithograph upon local spiritual practices. In Haiti, the image has been used to represent both the Afro-Catholic Saint Marta la Domidora and Danbala, a snake divinity among a wider pantheon of Vodou water spirits. Houlberg’s treatment and the other essays of this section effectively demonstrate the ways Mami Wata has been translated through numerous unique belief systems across vast stretches of geographic space.

While the large scope and spotty organization of “Sacred Waters” sometimes obscures the book’s impressive depth of analysis, Mami Wata: Arts for Water Spirits in Africa and Its Diasporas presents similar material in a tighter and more visually captivating manner. Produced as the accompanying catalog for an exhibition organized by Drewal for the Fowler Museum, the book explores Mami Wata in her African and diasporic contexts as well as her significance to contemporary art practices. In contrast to “Sacred Waters,” the catalog benefits from a narrower focus and handsomely reproduced visuals. The majority of the piece’s twelve chapters are written by Drewal himself, imparting a clear research narrative and lucid authorial vision lacking in the larger collection of essays.

Drewal begins the catalog with a brief but effective survey of Mami Wata related art practices. His treatment is loosely chronological, adopting what Jan Vansina refers to as “a streaming model” of history. Drewal argues, “Such an approach considers the dynamics of multiple sources; diffusions and dispersals as opposed to independent inventions; confluence, divergence, and reconvergence; depths in contrast to surfaces; and currents, ebbs and flows.” Water metaphors aside, the tactic allows Drewal to approach Mami Wata as a matrix of
different art histories and social agencies, a constellation of intersecting belief practices and diverse visual cultures.

Following this tack, his survey excavates connections between ancient water deities in Sierra Leone and the appearance of European mermaid imagery during the colonial age, between representations of mudfish in Yoruba iconography and the 1885 snake charmer lithograph, which has provided the basis of many modern incarnations of Mami Wata herself. This fluid approach is again put to good use in the Drewal’s concluding chapter exploring contemporary artists who engage with Mami Wata. A diverse group of practitioners, including Bruce Onobrakpeya, Twins Seven Seven, and Gerald Duane Coleman, are introduced in brief descriptions of their lives and their unique working relationships with the water deity.

The staggering range of Mami Wata visual cultures introduced by “Sacred Waters” and “Mami Wata” testify to the breadth and complexity of African water deities and their accompanying devotional practices. While “Sacred Waters” is not free of organizational flaws, it presents a diverse and intricate subject with ambition and depth. “Mami Wata,” by narrowing its focus to a comparably small body of artistic practices, emerges as the more accessible and compelling of the two works. Small complaints aside, Drewal has provided a great service by compiling a number of diverse perspectives that bring the full, elaborate scope of the Mami Wata phenomenon into focus.

Dan Jakubowski, University of Florida


*Readings in Modernity in Africa* is a rousing and groundbreaking book. The book is structured in two parts with twenty five lucid chapters. The authors use a multidisciplinary approach to deal with different dilemmas of modernity in Africa. They succeed in firmly establishing the aim of the book. The authors, by putting forward core issues, both old and new, spur investigation into questions and meanings of modernity in Africa. It is even more impressive to notice an overview of literature on the key topics - modernity and modernization, and new insights in modernity in Africa. The authors, especially in the second part of the book, clearly manifest the fluidity, risk, and uncertainty in modern practices of daily life in Africa. The same practices are unfitting paradigms against the meta-narratives of modernization, a phenomenon that is claimed to more visible through field inquiry.

The twenty-five essays present new and original inquiry. Part I handles genealogies of modernity in Africa. It is subdivided into four parts, which deal with conceptual issues of modernity and try to show how these notions have changed in the African exemplar. In part I (A), the authors strive to give a grasp of the changes from the first decade of African independence to the more recent and complex era of modernity. Part I (B) examines how through using reflections on empirical field research that defines the social phenomena
undercuts, the standardizing notion of development. Part 1 (C) presents insights into how traditions are used as alternatives in modern society, especially in the political domain. Part 1(D) handles the themes of personhood and identity in Africa in the dilemmas between colonialism and the time of African renaissance.

Part II of Readings in modernity in Africa presents original ethnographic evidence of the changes that are no longer related to meta-narratives of modernization. It is further subdivided into four parts. Part II (A) analyses the fact that understanding contemporary politics in Africa deserves an inquiry into the formal constitutions and the concomitant practices of elites, belonging, citizens, and nation. Part II (B) focuses on the changing contours of African cities as new spaces of modernity, different from the conceptual notions of modernization. Part 2(C) comprises lucid essays which prove that technology exists in Africa; and in that case, technology only needs to be reinvented. This is very much in respect to ethnographic sounds and images in Africa today, as mentioned by the authors. Part II (D) focuses on faith to manifest how contemporary life in Africa is shaped, imagined and controlled. In Part II (E), the authors present ethnographic studies of how due to the fallen African elites, new forms of identities and role models emerge. The authors show that these new forms of identities unfortunately become financial new elites through the risky, informal and Machiavellian way.

The authors also did a tremendous job of providing notes and references that give opportunity for further inquiry by students, scholars, and academics focusing on contemporary Africa. The editors’ introduction is quite terse making the book avid of reading. The book’s illustrations add to the informative character of most of the essays.

The most striking thing this book offers is the stimuli into the study of contemporary daily life in Africa. The ethnographic essays are not simply given in detail about a single group or country but instead present a portrait of the problems encountered by people living in Africa. Elsewhere, it is striking to imagine the multifarious themes that are handled: Christianity, development, colonialism, sorcery, tradition, identity, social change, cosmopolitanism, postmodernism, and globalization. All these themes provide a lucid corpus on questions of modernity in Africa.

Ngade Ivo, University of Ghent and Elong Eric Ebolo, Vrije (Free) University Brussels


Bicycles are not really the focus of this book. Instead, this is an effectively written discussion of Mozambique’s experiences with economic change after its war ended in 1992. Hanlon and Smart draw on three decades of engagement with the detailed realities of Mozambique—everything from the practicalities of how to load a bicycle to the state of the roads—and on intricate journalistic, development sector, and government connections. In doing so, they produce not simply a narrative of reconstruction or corruption but rather a politically engaged set of questions, critiques, and proposals that build on what Mozambiquans and others know
about the country’s challenges. Hanlon and Smart advocate for change, ending the book with the question “Can Mozambique stop putting its hand out and become a developmental state” (pp. 200-07). This book offers a grounded, specific critique of both humanitarian efforts to save the poorest, and neoliberal market-centered development models. Pointing to the relative success of entrepreneurial medium-sized, local development initiatives in the cashew sector, it rejects international initiatives that build infrastructure and wait for salvation from globalization. Advocating not simply the bits and pieces of “good change” that bicycles represent, it argues for more activist and interventionist development capable of producing more than bigger loads for peddlers.

As even the authors admit, “There is no single way forward” (p. 204). And advocacy is the least coherent part of this study. Where Hanlon and Smart excel is in their careful exploration of the achievements—and limits—of current development initiatives. In close examinations of two provinces, Nampula and Manica, they show how difficult the problems are. They concretely discuss how dynamic peasant associations can be stymied by basics such as specific missing links—as when fish nets were unavailable to the builders of a fish farming project—or more general problems, such as a lack of markets for the new goods produced by peasants’ rising productivity. Hanlon and Smart argue that even successful practitioners of peasant-association, production-expanding development initiatives find themselves staying dependent on inputs that they do not control, rather than managing a transition to independent entrepreneurialism and self-directed growth. Beyond these direct interviews and site visits, the authors draw on larger collections of reports and economic data to make a broader audience understand difficulties that are probably obvious to Mozambiquans from places like Manica Province. With specific information—including numbers—about things like wages, electrical costs, the length of rose stems, and interest rates for would-be tree farmers—they make clear the frustrations of would-be market farmers in a context without government agricultural extension and credit facilities. This vivid detail enhances their credibility as they make unpalatable observations about some of the most heralded Mozambiquan efforts at market-based economic growth. Beyond detailed looks at Nampula and Manica, and at specific economic sectors including cashews and tobacco, Hanlon and Smart draw on survey data that make clear that these economic initiatives are part of a picture of economic differentiation, and that Mozambiquans are poor and becoming increasingly impoverished within these development-charged regimes.

Hanlon and Smart look to Mozambique’s leaders and government to offer real change, but they remain critical about elite leadership. They acknowledge the sacrifices local journalists and devoted officials have made in seeking democracy and transparency. But they note cases where Mozambique’s leaders were problems rather than solutions. They offer remarkable survey material that asked “How many of the following do you think are involved in corruption” and listed categories ranging from the president and his officials to health workers, and “In the past year have you paid a bribe to” see a health worker, get a permit, etc. (pp. 102-03). Trying to understand not simply high profile cases such as the assassinations of journalist Carlos Cardoso and economist Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua (pp. 113-15) but how those fit with Frelimo’s capacity to regulate itself and respond to critics an popular pressure, Hanlon and Smart portray corruption as present within Mozambique’s elite, and having grown in the
aftermath of new aid and opportunities of the twenty-first century, but remediable through internal self-correction more than by external pressures, sanctions, or interventions.

The most challenging aspect of this study is its overarching conclusion that bicycles—which in this context become a metaphor for a development model based in social investment (e.g. schooling), local infrastructure, and dependence on external investors—increase rather than diminish the numbers of people living in poverty. This is not an anti-aid diatribe or a romantic defense of autarkic village life. It is a visibly frustrated effort to assess the realities of Mozambique and imagine a way forward. A photograph of a girl and boy in school uniforms with a bicycle is for them less a “proof of development” through school places and new transport than it is a poignant image of two children likely to come to adulthood with schooling but without jobs or economic prospects (p. 200). For Hanlon and Smart, the current development wisdom is no more than an inadequate “cargo cult.” Supporting Mozambique’s current President Guebuza, they emphasize the state’s central role and the need to invest in the economy, cultivate entrepreneurialism, foster agricultural and processing initiatives, encourage demand, and develop good jobs (pp. 1464-7, 207).

Actually doing these things, especially within the practical limits sketched out in the book’s case studies, is easier said than done. Bicycles and incremental change may be far from ideal or sufficient, but they may be today’s practical option.

Carol Summers, *University of Richmond*


The Igbo, an ethnic group found in the South-Eastern and part of the South-Southern geopolitical regions of Nigeria, are best known to modern historians and anthropologists for their complex histories. Wrapped within this cloak of historical complexities is a very obvious fact which is evidenced by the way of life of the people till this day—the Igbo have been known to pride themselves on democracy and freedom in which consensus was a norm rather than a condition. *Olaudah Equino*, a slave abolitionist who was Igbo but sold to slavery during his boyhood, confirmed this in his 1789 autobiography, titled *Gustavus Vassa, the African*. As far as history supports, most of all Igbo traditional states governed themselves without giving power to any sort of king. They organized themselves into many independent village governments, with these village councils or assemblies meeting periodically and also being summoned as the need arose to discuss and take decisions on both internal and external affairs of the villages. Even though a lot is already known about this enigma termed Igbo, modern researchers are yet to provide simple answers to one of the most problematic research-questions in the history of histories—Who are the Igbo?

The question “who are the Igbo?” has puzzled scholars for ages, and delineating the exact content and boundaries of “Igbo-ness” has proven to be extremely difficult (p. 24). Harneit-Sievers’ *Constructions of Belonging* is one of most authentic and current efforts at deconstructing
the complex histories of the Igbo into highly readable and understandable bits. The book identifies key elements found within the building up of Igbo communities in the last century. It evokes the spirits of colonialism, the advent of Christianity in Igbo societies, and the political position of the Igbo within the Nigerian nation in such a manner that the reader is literarily arrested within the confines of Igbo culture and historicity. This makes the book highly revealing.

Comprising twelve chapters, the book is organized in four parts. Each part focuses on a different aspect of the Igbo life. Part one generally highlights the history of the Igbo and particularly examines Igbo community and the “Nri hegemony and Arochukwu” (p. 43) with ethnographic evidences. Parts two and three are hinged on creating community from “outside” (pp. 65-132) and “within” (pp. 149-93) respectively. The last part provides local case studies for adequate understanding of the Igbo communities. It is probably the most original part of the book. Its narratives delve deep into a three case studies. The three cases are analysed: “Umuopara and Ohuhu,” which exposes the “politics of competition and fragmentation”; “Enugwu-Ukwu in Umunri clan,” dealing with the local life and “history”; and “Nike,” which exposes “slavery” and the issues of “marginalization” within the Igbo community.

The author used practical on-the-location interviews as a core methodology for gaining relevant data rather than relying on mainly archival data created by British colonialists in Nigeria. The book adopts a combination of constructive and deconstructive approaches. It is constructive in the sense that through its positive interpretations of aspects of Igbo life and history, it tends to call for efforts towards improving and promoting further development of the Igbo and their locality. On the other hand, the book is deconstructive in the sense that it analyses and unpacks some of the myths normally held about the Igbo.

Harneit-Sievers’ argumentative towards the review of Igbo histories, beliefs and ideas is intellectually stimulating. The bibliographic make-up of the book is rich. The use of illustrative instruments such as figures, maps, photos, and tables provides for comprehensiveness for the entire book. The availability of end-notes and indexes provides a valuable guide for quicker readability and easier understanding of the book. This is actually what makes it appealing for a general audience of readers generally interested in understanding the broader context of Igbo and “Igbo-ness” (p. 24). Overall, the book will appeal to scholars and students of African literature and History.

The assumed weak point of this book could be pinned on its case study selection. The Igbo territory is presently composed of mainly five states of Nigeria’s south-east zone, with some other Igbo communities falling within the boundaries of at least four other states of Nigeria’s south-south region. The basis for the selection and adoption of the three case studies is not clearly explained by the author, although he does acknowledge that “by no means” do his three-case studies “claim to be representative for Igboland as a whole.”

In spite of this, the book is without doubt, a major contribution to African studies and literature, especially within the subject of ethnic studies. Every student of the Igbo society will find each part of the book extremely thought-provoking and will gain valuable knowledge about the Igbo. This is because the book is based on detailed historical data and high breadth of intellectual expositions on the issues covered. The book would readily serve for three major
uses: it fully stands out as an overview of the current literature on the Igbo of Nigeria; it partially fulfills the role of a literary exposé of ethnicity from a Nigerian context; and lastly, as a revelation of ethnic historicity in Africa.

Uchendu Eugene Chigbu, Technische Universität München, Germany


Western modernity congratulates itself on creating, albeit unwittingly, a world that is characterized by cultural contact, exchange, and mixture. But these have been attributes of human civilization for millennia, a fact that prompted Edward Said to write: “The history of all cultures is a history of cultural borrowings.” As such, the strongest undercurrent in John C. Hawley’s *India in Africa, Africa in India* is the concept of “south-south” cosmopolitanisms—cultural traffic that does not pass through, nor is mediated by, the west. All the essays in this collection, through tacit and direct conversation with this issue, challenge the “global north” as the progenitor of cosmopolitanism, a phenomenon that cannot be entirely understood as a consequence of the west’s modern encounter with its colonized “others.” If cosmopolitanism, broadly understood, entails cultural flows and exchange between cultural groups, then its genealogy and manifestations have to be re-evaluated. The impulse of Hawley’s collection is a generous one, locating cosmopolitanism in the cultural meeting between Africa and India. The collection also offers a historically broad examination of cosmopolitanism by including antiquity and pre-colonial times in its theoretical purview, epochs that were also marked by cosmopolitanism.

The first essay in the collection, Gwyn Campbell’s “Slave Trades in the Indian Ocean World,” erects the conceptual framework for subsequent articles by challenging previous scholarship like Joseph Harris’ *The African Presence in Asia: Consequences of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade* – a work that insists on a fundamental resemblance between slavery in the Americas and in the Indian Ocean. Campbell asserts that the theoretical models used to explicate slavery, diaspora, and identity formation in the New World cannot be mapped onto the slave trade in the Indian Ocean and consequent identity formations. Campbell draws from a vast array of historiographic and primary sources to demonstrate, instead, that the practice of slavery in the Indian Ocean was marked by much more fluid boundaries between superior and servile populations, a characteristic that has lent African identities in the Indian Ocean basin an idiosyncratic quality that distinguishes it from populations of African descent in the Americas. For this reason, Campbell even questions the very designation of an African diaspora (a term that occurs somewhat sparsely throughout the rest of the collection) in the Indian Ocean, a people who retain their sense of having been from somewhere else.

The grouping of essays that focus on Indians in Africa is particularly fresh because they distance themselves from the eastern African (and British colonial) context wherein the Indian experience is well noted and studied. These essays reinvigorate the scholarly terrain on Indians
in Africa by focusing on West Africa and its popular cultures. Specifically “‘Hindu’ Dance Groups and Indophilie in Senegal: The Imagination of the Exotic Other” by Gwenda Vander Steene and “The Idea of ‘India’ in West African Vodun Art and Thought” by Dana Rush address the ways in which Indian culture is imagined by West African communities through cultural practices, exoticization, and even identification. Both of these essays illustrate the ways in which the imagination of India by African societies circumvents Europe.

The last section of the collection, also using diverse disciplinary approaches, examines the African presence in India. Rahul Oka and Chapurukha Kusimba’s essay “Siddi as Mercenary or as African Success Story on the West Coast of India” highlights African cultural and political agency in India within a context of Islamic power and slavery, an agency that impacted the very contours and the nature of slave trade on a fundamental level.

Islam, as a religion and an ideological and political apparatus, is ubiquitous in this volume. It played a large role in the way the Indian Ocean basin emerged as a constellation through which African and Indian identities shifted and were renegotiated. But Islam was not the only religion that generated new and transforming identities. “Religion and Empire: Belief and Identity among African Indians of Karnataka, South India” by Pashington Obeng captures the way in which a number of religions – Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, ancestor veneration—enabled identities that defied both the hegemonic tendencies of the various empires that ruled over India as well as the indigenous caste system.

Through its exploration of “cosmopolitanism from below,” Hawley’s collection illustrates how cosmopolitanism in the non-western pre-colonial world speaks to current theoretical anxieties by defying “continental thinking,” “race,” and the “nation-state”, all of which are complicit with colonial constructs of collective identity to some degree. Moreover, this ‘cosmopolitanism form below’ is not as easily susceptible to accusations of being in aid of western capital and the cultural demands of globalization. The volume demotes the contemporary postcolonial intellectual as the paragon of cosmopolitanism because cosmopolitanism, as a historical condition, was so engrained in the pre-colonial societies of the Indian Ocean basin as to be free of intellectual or deliberation.

The collection contributes to and draws from a variety of disciplinary and theoretical frameworks, from history, sociology, and cultural studies, but does not incorporate literary texts as much as it could. This is odd given the fact that Hawley is a literary scholar and his introductory musings are themselves on a literary text—Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land—a text that “blends an anthropological record with a travelogue, a diary, and speculations” (1). Ghosh’s narrative is itself a metaphor for the cultural heterogeneity of the Indian Ocean basin. To this end, it may have been appropriate to enlist more literary sources, a fluid genre that by its nature, perhaps, eludes the very ideological enclosures that cosmopolitanism itself defies.

Emad Mirmotahari, Tulane University

In mid-1966, Jonathan Lawley was serving as District Commissioner in Gwembe in the Southern Province, near the shores of Lake Kariba, the only “ex-P[rovincial]A[dmistration] expatriate still in charge of a rural district in Zambia.” As independence approached the responsibilities of his post were shifted and he was replaced by a Zambian national: “I wrote a sort of lament in my diary saying that I would no doubt be the last white man in my lovely house with its flagpole . . . its lawn slashed every day by prisoners . . .”

The first chapter of this engaging and stimulating autobiography, “Raj Child to Rhodesian Boy,” gives some idea of the global scope of the story: in the east the jewel in the British imperial crown, in the south a late addition to the second, African empire, which Britain began to acquire after the loss of the “American colonies” in 1776. Jonathan Lawley, born in India, where his father was a civil engineer in the Indian Service of Engineers in the last years before independence, was educated in India, Britain, and South Africa, and has worked and lived in many parts of Central Africa. He has also gained experience in Francophone ex-colonies (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, and Madagascar), in the Portuguese-speaking world (Angola and Brazil) and even in the ex-German colony of Namibia. His experience is enlivened by a natural curiosity and a readiness to learn. Since in addition to his native English he speaks the African languages of Tonga and Bemba as well as French and Portuguese, he is always more than a visitor in these communities and his opinions are candid, informed, and tolerant.

Lawley tells a touching story of his family’s departure from the land of his birth when he was still of prep school age: “It came as a shock when we left India and my father told me that Britain was no longer the most powerful country in the world.” India was important for the way Lawley came to think of race, for at his school there “race was not an issue,” and all his life, despite some disappointments, he has held on to “the most positive view possible of the exercise of British power.” Though there is an element of imperial sunset nostalgia in this view, and he can write without comment at one point of “the houseboy and two garden boys,” his story gives conviction of a level and un-patronising encounter with colonial peoples, as his long friendship with his servant Stephen Mbwainga testifies.

After Indian independence Lawley’s family moved to Southern Rhodesia, where his father was in charge of government irrigation in the south-eastern part of the country, then undergoing rapid development. Having first arrived there after an unhappy time at school in England, he continued his education in Southern Africa, until he joined the British Colonial Administration and was sent to Cambridge University for the Overseas Services ‘A’ course. Years later he had to convince the British government that Southern Rhodesia was not his home base and that he was a “designated officer” whose home is a cottage in Suffolk, but he has maintained an attachment to Zimbabwe through all the complications of its post-colonial history.

Jonathan Lawley’s first posting in late 1960 was to Kalomo in what was then Northern Rhodesia, one of the three member states of the Central African Federation (with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). He also served in Gwembe, Luanshya, and Kitwe and his experience
as a colonial administrator took him from remote tribal communities to complex management posts in the capital, Lusaka. By this time Ian Smith’s Rhodesia had issued its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Among the writer’s responsibilities in the new Zambian administration was as one of the organizers of the celebrations of the second anniversary of independence, “chief rationing officer (petroleum products)” and development plan coordinator in the Ministry of Rural Development. It came as a shock to learn that he was to be retired “in the public interest.” When Jonathan Lawley left Zambia in mid-1969, he wondered if he would ever return, but as he learned later “Africa was in my blood.”

After a successful but short spell as a salesman for IBM in Britain, Lawley returned to Africa as personnel manager designate on an international consortium’s Tenke Fungurume mining project on the Katangan Copperbelt in Zaire (DRC), set in the malachite hills of the book’s title, greened in part by the seams of semi-precious stones that indicate the riches beneath the ground. This was a disappointing experience. In January 1976, the project lost the support of its funders, and those involved saw the “biggest, richest deposit of copper in the whole world lying abandoned.” Lawley acknowledged both technical and management failures, with participants Anglo and Charter as the main culprits. South Africa’s context and history had not prepared them for the requirements and opportunities of the new Africa. But for Lawley personally this seems to have been a turning-point. After experience in Morocco, he took a contract with a large company with diverse interests in Mauritius in 1977. The account suggests that working to help this firm fulfill its potential brought into focus his strengths in personnel management and communications. These he has gradually sharpened, with a strong sense of the importance of culture in adaptation to modern business and industrial management practice, which he has applied internationally since then. The post in Mauritius was followed by an appointment in Riyadh, but, having visited UDI Rhodesia again in 1975 where he had “A Taste of War,” Lawley took time out to serve as an election monitor in the first democratic elections in what was to become Zimbabwe. Lawley is proud of his own and Britain’s part in the transition to independence, and his account of the early Mugabe years is illuminating. In fact, among the most moving pages of the book, both joyful and sad, are those devoted to Zimbabwe, to the friends he has held on to there, and to some he has lost, to the people, and to the country’s natural beauty. Let us hope that his chapter on Zimbabwe today, “The Unhappy Country,” is not the last word.

From Riyadh, Lawley writes, “I longed for Africa,” and in 1982 he was appointed director of the Zimbabwe Technical Management Trust, funded by Rio Tinto. The post took him all over Africa and to other parts of the world. In preparing black African graduates for management responsibilities in mines and factories, the ZTMT placed them in pupilages in Britain and monitored them in their postings back home. Lawley writes vividly of the complexities of dealing with accomplished young African technocrats, a kaleidoscope of personalities from a patchwork of backgrounds. ZTMT ran for ten years: it seems to have fulfilled its brief admirably, with positive implications for the EU and countries beyond Africa. Sadly a proposal drawn up by Lawley and a colleague in 1993 for a South African version was never taken up: Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), of which Lawley is critical, was already in place. The few South African trainees in the ZTTT programme do not seem to have been compatible.
After leaving Rio Tinto, in retirement Lawley has worked for the BESO (British Executive Service Overseas), recruiting volunteers to work with African enterprise in Africa and elsewhere: a bakery in Lusaka, a cashew-nut processing plant in Mocambique. In Lawley’s view the take-over of BESO by VSO was a tragedy. Since then he has worked for the Royal African Society and the West Africa Business Association.

Beyond the colonial service and business of his title, Jonathan Lawley has many strings to his bow. He has a Ph.D. from the City University, London on “Transcending Culture: Developing Africa’s Technical Managers,” he has published a paper on the birds of Assumption in the Smithsonian’s Atoll Research Bulletin, and he has tried his hand at pêche à la mouche. In many respects he has been privileged, enjoying advanced education, international work experience, leisure for travel, and wildlife and bird-watching. The privilege is gratefully acknowledged, and he writes with candour about family, about love and loss, and about his own successes and failures. His is an exemplary twentieth/twenty-first-century life, a life of rapid change, from empire to commonwealth to the post-colonial globalised world of international capital, in which nationalism has not really been given a fair go. Lawley’s ability to name names, to many of which he can put faces, gives his views weight. He is critical of the new South Africa, “wondering what she stands for and whether she really cares,” but, while he acknowledges the harsh legacy of colonialism, and the sham of aid, he is on the whole confident and optimistic for Africa, arguing for higher expectations, for both the new Africans and those of the diaspora to assert themselves, and against the treatment of Africa as a special case.

Production values of the book are generally sound. Although the illustrations are disappointing, the maps and index are useful. The publishers could use a good editor and proof-reader.

Tony Voss, University of Kwazulu-Natal and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University


This book centers around the key themes of hybridity, the intersection of tradition and modernity, and the debates arising out of conflicting and continually shifting influences on the nature of Swahili literature and identity. It is a broad focus and one that inevitably ends up discussing certain components of the debate—literature and Swahili verse in particular—in greater detail. This is not to say that a narrower focus detracts from the book’s overall aims or the quality of discussion; in fact it is probably the case that a lengthier discussion of verse provides a lens through which to analyze broader trends in Swahili literature and identity, without compromising on analytical detail. The focus is further legitimized by the assertion that poetry has been a particularly important arena of conflict and debate between tradition and modernity.

Mazrui refutes the privileging of the Arab-Islamic contribution to the formation of Swahili language and literature over the “indigenous” contribution; instead taking the view that it is
born of Africa’s triple heritage of the indigenous, the Islamic and the Western. Chapter One charts the development of Swahili literature from initial Afro-Arab contact on the East African seaboard and the first generation of writing that utilized a Swahilized Arab alphabet, through colonial influences, to the nationalist era and beyond. The chapter draws on a number of conflicts within this history; tradition and modernity, urban and rural, and indigenous and foreign which are themes that recur throughout the book. Mazrui also draws on an interesting divergence between Tanzania and Kenya; that whilst Swahili culture is more prominent in Tanzania as a whole, it is Kenya that is the original home of Swahili literature, with Tanzania’s contribution to this body of work being smaller and more recent.

Later chapters focus, respectively, on Swahili verse, religion and literature, and the issue of translation. The chapter on Swahili verse justifies its focus by the importance of poetry amongst the Swahili. Debates within Swahili verse surrounding forms of composition and linguistics are stated to be reflective of broader shifts and debates on issues of class and power within the Swahili speaking world. In terms of religion, Mazrui argues Swahili literature and language have been shaped by conflict and accommodation between Islam, Christianity, and indigenous religion. This is not a one way process; in recent years there have been increasing translations of the Qur’an into Swahili, giving the religion an “indigenous imprint.” Mazrui explores the boundaries of Swahili literature and their reconfiguration in terms of translated texts taking on new meanings once translated into Swahili, and more generally in terms of the unpredictable effects on a body of literature that translation can have.

In concluding, Mazrui raises questions as to the future of Swahili literature and identity as affected by numerous forces from globalization and its responses; the decline in state nationalism; Islam; internal migration, and translation. What comes through most clearly in the concluding chapter is the continual reshaping of Swahili literature and the centrality of issues of class and identity in these processes of reconfiguration. Mazrui contends that whilst hybridity in a Swahili context necessarily predates new processes of hybridization associated with globalization, such developments have added a further layer of complexity to the hybrid nature of Swahili literature.

One small criticism pertaining to the use of sources is that the inclusion of long sections of poetry, in both original and translated form, breaks up the narrative flow of Mazrui’s analysis in places. While these inclusions support the arguments being set forward particularly in the chapter on Swahili verse, it may have increased the readability, especially of this technically dense chapter, if some of the quotations had instead been included in an appendix. Aside from this minor critique, Mazrui uses an interesting array of sources in extending his analysis from the specific to the broader political, cultural and historical context in which his discussion of the Swahili language and its literature plays out.

Swahili Beyond the Boundaries achieves its stated aims in exploring the development of Swahili literature towards new forms of hybridization, and more broadly in “promoting a more multicultural understanding of literature as a human experience”. Both components of this intended focus are explored subtly and consistently throughout the chapters providing a broad picture of Swahili literature’s development, present state, and its position globally. The rhetorical summations found in the concluding sections, however, can be as frustrating as they
are penetrating. While Mazrui raises some poignant questions regarding the future of Swahili literature, he makes no attempt to address them. Without recourse to speculation, this is perhaps too difficult a task to undertake, and Mazrui’s analysis contributes a great deal to the broader understanding of Swahili literature.

Much of Mazrui’s book would be enjoyed by anyone with a scholarly interest in Swahili as a language, body of literature or identity categorization. The analysis skillfully links specific discussions of literature and particular authors and texts into broader trends internationally, as well as the politics and history of Swahili-speaking Africa. At times the technical language of literature and verse in particular would be better suited to those with an understanding of literature studies or a pre-existing knowledge of Swahili literature. For the most part, however, Mazrui provides a fascinating, clear and insightful account of the development of Swahili literature, and the continually shifting hybridity that is such an essential component of its boundaries.

Charlie Wilson, Independent Scholar


Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield’s new volume represents an important contribution to the ongoing study of regime trajectories on the African continent. As with most edited volumes of this nature, the substantive country chapters vary in their quality, as do their thematic emphases. Nonetheless, students and scholars of African politics will find much within the volume in terms of valuable case-specific and broader insights.

The introductory chapter by the editors presents the broader concerns of the volume and highlights its central analytical, theoretical and methodological premises. The goal of the book is to evaluate “major trends and patterns” or “processes of change and continuity” in selected African countries and assess their “meaning” relative to the normative concerns of democracy (p. 1). The issue (and expectations) of greater political accountability is of central importance in the latter respect (p. 6). Although the case studies employ a variety of frameworks and techniques for addressing these concerns, they do so with attention to both the broader “structures” shaping political life and the agency and choices and actors involved in political processes. Comparison is used both within the case studies and between them to better understand the nature of country experiences and the forces shaping them. Finally, the editors present a series of questions, generated by the case studies, that can help to illuminate the relationship between democracy and accountability in Africa. These concern the extent to which presidentialism remains an operative feature of political life, whether patterns of mobilization and clientelism have changed, the evolving status of the developmentalist social contract characterizing post-colonial Africa, and the meaning of elections.

The substantive chapters that follow examine the political trajectories of specific countries. A total of eleven countries are examined, offering attention to a range of experiences. These
include analyses of breakdowns in democracy (Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda), critical evaluations of erstwhile democratic successes (such as Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Senegal), and investigations of patterns in countries where democracy has faced substantial setbacks and limitations (such as Kenya, Zambia, and Nigeria).

The stronger case studies fall into one of two categories. The first are those that offer descriptive accounts of patterns in particular countries that are then analyzed through solid explanatory frameworks. Cheeseman’s chapter on Kenya, for instance, describes the limits of changes in the country as evident in the persistence of executive dominance and practices of clientelism. While these continuities reflect elite intransigence, they are also sustained by popular norms and expectations – rendering them quite durable. Akindes’ chapter on Cote d’Ivoire offers a detailed account the country’s path from single-party governance to democracy and then to political violence and civil war. The unraveling of the old order, fragmentation of the polity into competing factions, and subsequent politicization of land and citizenship issues are presented as the underlying sources of these patterns. Chapters by Mustapha, accounting for the challenges and limitations of Nigeria’s renewed democratic experiment, and Alexander, offering a rich analysis of the totalizing discursive strategies that informed Zimbabwe’s precipitous decline, also deserve accolades in these respects.

The second set of laudable chapters are those that offer descriptive accounts of particular (as opposed to general) patterns and processes in countries. From these, readers obtain solid understandings of exactly how political situations are (or are not) changing in specific contexts. The chapter on Senegal, by Tarik Dahou and Vincent Foucher, details the clear lines of continuity before and after the 2000 “watershed elections.” Rather than a reconfiguring of the political order, political hegemony under a dominant party and executive has returned as the central characteristic of political life. The chapter on South Africa by Jeremy Seekings frames its discussion with reference to the conventional wisdom on the limits of the democratic experiment there—specifically, the embrace of a neoliberal economic model favoring capital and the excessive power of the ANC. Seekings’ account interrogates these points, suggesting that they capture only part of the South African experience with democracy. Important locations of accountability and opposition persist in the system, while organized groups such as labor remain forces that challenge neoliberal dominance.

The concluding chapter engages in two exercises. The first is to offer paired comparisons of the different case studies in the volume. These bring attention to key issues and factors that help to account for some of the varying patterns between the cases. The varying experiences of Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire are partially explained by reference to contrasting patterns of post-colonial state-society relations and differences the countries’ party systems. Ghana’s and Nigeria’s respective paths are accounted for by differences in party systems, as well as in characteristics of elite culture. The second, and in my view, more successful, exercise is to return to the questions presented in the introduction. Here the editors bring attention to the ways that phenomena such as presidentialism and clientelism have (have not) been reshaped during the democratic era. Specific references to the case material help to draw this out.

Overall the volume is a success. Yet, two limitations stand out. First, the comparative dimensions of the volume might be stronger. Comparative points between the chapters are not
very clearly established at the outset, with the result that theoretical connections between cases are not easily generated in the readings of the country studies. Moreover, the paired comparisons in the conclusion bring attention to variables and factors that might have been more effectively highlighted at other points in the volume. Second, some of the country chapters could be more effectively analytical as opposed to descriptive – either of a particular country trajectory or the contemporary political landscape.

These comments notwithstanding, this book represents a very valuable contribution to the study of African politics. As indicated above, many of the substantive chapters are exemplary in their analyses and accounts of political trajectories in different countries. Whitfield and Mustapha deserve high marks for this volume, which should be in the libraries of all serious scholars of the continent’s politics.

Peter VonDoepp, University of Vermont


*African Anthropologies* is a ground-breaking edited volume on the history, critique, and practice of doing and teaching anthropology in post-colonial Africa. The book’s authors reposition anthropology’s Western-centric history by including African contributions to anthropological theory and practice. This work is invaluable to professional anthropologists the world over, Africanists, teachers and scholars of African history, and most importantly, African anthropologists.

*African Anthropologies* significant contributions to scholarship and the discipline of anthropology are threefold. First, it serves as a necessary supplement to previously published volumes on the history of anthropology and anthropologists such as Gérald Gaillard’s *The Routledge Dictionary of Anthropologists* (2004). In fact, Gaillard opens his book with an apology to the reader for being unable to compile a chapter on African anthropologists. Gaillard suggests that Africa’s intellectuals rejected anthropology as a colonialist pursuit, sentiments that were often repeated by the contributors to *African Anthropologies*.

Second, this book raises the “indigenous anthropologist” question without explicitly embroiling itself in the disciplinary debate. In their introduction, the three esteemed editors encourage “Western anthropologists to achieve that degree of rapport and mutual respect for human equality with African intellectuals” (p. 1). As a first step toward this end, the African anthropologist contributors utilize their social science skills and inherent empathy to “study Africa primarily for the benefit of Africans’ understanding of themselves” (p. 26). They eloquently demonstrate the value of doing anthropology in their own backyards by examining the very conditions of teaching and knowledge production in eight different African countries. Third, the authors in this edited-volume are dedicated to a critical anthropology that is reflective about the discipline’s potentials and limitations for a decolonized sub-Saharan Africa.
By actively pursuing a balanced “pure/applied dichotomy” (pp. 2-3), this book strongly contributes to the need (and demand) for more situated accounts of localized cultural processes. *African Anthropologies* aims to de-center Western epistemological traditions by nurturing African ways of knowing and creating its own traditions. “It is in this context that we can locate an African anthropology, one that cherishes the proven tools of fieldwork and mobilises them to address larger social problems and challenges of development and underdevelopment” (p. 5).

The first section, “Regional Histories of Anthropological Practice,” begins with an introduction written by the editors. In Chapter Two, Alula Pankhurst notes how Ethiopian intellectual culture can be traced back to student contributions beginning in the 1950s. Ethiopians played a role in shaping the views of the six foreign research traditions in that country. David Mills discusses Audrey Richards’ role in East African anthropology in Chapter Three. Richards advocated for the application of the social research being undertaken by the glut of British anthropologists in southern and eastern Africa during the colonial period. Her disciplinary vision was in the minority, however; research was prioritized over teaching and training, which gave the burgeoning institutes of social research little relevancy in the politicized, post-colonial landscape. Victor Ngondizashe Muzvidziwa’s fourth chapter on anthropology in Zimbabwe argues that the discipline there was able to rise above its colonial roots by studying the impacts of globalization. In Chapter Five, Séverin Cécile Abega describes the difficulties of the Cameroonian case. He points out the constraints on Cameroon’s anthropologists including funding problems, lack of institutional support, distrust of anthropologists, few publication outlets, and subordination to foreign researchers.

The second section of the book is “Acknowledging Critiques, Debunking the Myths.” Chapter Six, “Forgetting Africa” authored by famed Africanist Johannes Fabian, leads off this section. He argues that if knowledge is salvation, then forgetting Africa is a social act committed by the one who forgets. This act, however, can only logically happen from a Western perspective. Fabian reflects for his reader “how much we stand to lose when we forget that Africa remembers” (p. 150). In Chapter Seven, Christine Obbo reminds the reader that despite the appeal of globalization, particular lived experience still matters for the majority of people. This is why anthropology remains relevant on the African continent. Mustafa Babiker demonstrates in Chapter Eight that African anthropology has much to contribute to the disciplinary discourse. He critiques the “crisis scenario” as leading to a perpetual cycle of dependency for African states, and he critiques the “herder/farmer dichotomy” as being more of a continuum. Robert Launay discusses the cursory focus on Islamic studies in African anthropology, which in Chapter Nine he argues were viewed as inauthentic cultural practices.

The last four chapters of section three titled, “The Future of Anthropology in Africa: Application and Engagement,” are written by P. J. Ezeh, Mwenda Ntarangwi, Mary Amuyunzu-Nyamongo, and Washington Onyango-Ouma, respectively. Chapter Ten traces how Nigerian anthropologist Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe’s training helped shape his public policies as both a Nigerian president and community leader. In Chapter Eleven, Ntarangwi writes about his experiences bringing American university students to Kenya. As a Kenyan himself, Ntarangwi explores his “dualistic encounter with the field” (p. 229) as a foreign teacher and native researcher. Chapter Twelve traces community mobilization through participatory...
learning and action tools designed to “empower the communities to identify their needs and homegrown solutions” (p. 242). Like many of the authors in this book, Mary Amuyunzu-Nyamongo sees African anthropology as an engaged, empathetic undertaking. Onyango-Ouma appropriately concludes the volume with a chapter on ethics by examining the different perspectives of practicing anthropology in one’s own country.

The authors are all well-respected African insiders who are exceptionally qualified to contribute to the ongoing debate about the crisis of identity in anthropology by offering both unique and ongoing insights into the challenges facing African anthropology. They accomplish this heady task by drawing on a plethora of important sources, each relevant for their respective contributions. Teachers of African anthropology now have an expansive bibliographic collection to draw on. The only drawbacks to this work are: (1) the theoretical section was placed in the middle instead of at the beginning where it belongs, and (2) the book needs to be expanded to include the anthropological history of other African nations. For example, no Lusophone African anthropologist contributed to this work.

Brandon D. Lundy, Kennesaw State University


Filip Reyntjens examines a decade long period of instability, violence, war, and extreme human suffering in Central Africa. Reyntjens is one of the most prominent experts in issues regarding human rights and the politics of the Great Lakes and has worked consistently in the Congo wars theme. The book first examines the question why the recent wars in the region have occurred. In order to answer this Reyntjens follows a rather eclectic approach with three different perspectives: the collapse of the Zairian/Congolese state, warlordism coupled with plunder, and external interventionism.

The author argues that the progressive decay of the state combined by its acutely or endemically unstable neighbors contributed to a perverse cycle in which Zaire threatened its neighbors just as its neighbors threatened Zaire. Thus, there is a identification with Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, who in his book Congo: From Leopold to Kabila states that the major determinant of the present conflict and instability has been the implosion of the state and its instruments in the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, Reyntjens explains that the most compelling factor added to the unraveling of successive wars in the region can be found in the recent history of Rwanda. According to Reyntjens, despite being relatively the smallest state in the region Rwanda has been the epicenter of all crises since 1994. Moreover, the author argues that the status of regional superpower acquired by Rwanda is truly astonishing. It was obtained through the force of arms which Rwanda allowed to prevail because of the tolerance inspired by the international community feeling guilty after the genocide.

As mentioned above, this book attempts to present a synthetic overview of the complex situation and violent evolution of the Zaire/Congo. Especially in Chapter 4, the author analyzes
instrumentally the fall of the Mobutist state. In addition, the Armed Forces of Zaire, isolated from their neighbors, turned to external actors for support. Reyntjens there captures each one of the players involved and their motives. Particularly important has been the author’s contribution in Chapters 5 and 6, where the study of the inter-bellum era is presented, a period which contained all seeds of the war started in August 1998. There, Reyntjens successfully captures two key dimensions of the Great Lakes region conflict. The first consisted of the shifty alliances which produce an unpredictable and constantly evolving geopolitical landscape where players engage in cost benefit analysis and adhere to the logic the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The other dimension deals with the magnitude of the humanitarian fallout in the region that according to Reyntjens has not resulted in an international punishment for the masterminds of the mass atrocities committed.

One of the book’s weaknesses is fact that the author does not employ any analytical tool for the history of the complex situation in South Kivu and the actors involved. The Banyamulenge are a group of Banyarwandan migrants which are involved in the region’s turbulent ethnic politics. The author offers only a minor part of his analysis to the Banyamulenge historical importance, which could have been more lengthy and evaluated in greater depth. Another area where the author could have been more explanatory is the complicated politics of Burundi since 1994. The continually evolving political landscape of the country and its transfers of power leave the reader merely confused.

Despite having made several criticisms, however, it still is important to note that Reyntjens has produced a valuable survey of Congo’s long and often tortured history that will undoubtedly be useful in the college classroom. It would make an ideal supplemental text for a course on African politics or African history. Even if not assigned as required reading, it deserves a place on the shelves of university libraries as every undergraduate student researching Africa’s First World War will find this book very helpful. Scholars of the Great Lakes have, thanks to Reyntjens, a worthwhile addition to their personal and/or university library collections.

Ioannis Mantzikos, University of Peloponnese, Greece


The Historical Dictionary of Libya is the one-hundredth book in the Jon Woronoff-edited series of historical dictionaries of Africa that began in 1974. A well-established and independent Libyan-focused scholar, Ronald Bruce. St. John provides a historical backdrop to present-day Libya with the intent of shedding light on the cultural context from which Muammar al-Qadhafi pulls his unique ruling style. At roughly the same length as the Third edition, this Fourth edition is a very concise consolidation of topics relevant to the politics of revolutionary Libya, with only a few entries pertinent to pre-colonial histories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan.
The 288 pages of dictionary entries have been significantly revised and updated since the previous edition, accounting for the many changes in both Libyan domestic and foreign policies since the late 1990s. A majority of entries are defined as they pertain to Libya in its current form under Qadhafi. The somewhat scant information about members of the Libyan ruling class reflects the relative secrecy that continues to surround that country’s high-level governance. Nevertheless, the comprehensive list of entries yields enough information for readers to thoroughly analyze decisions and dimensions of the modern Libyan state. Additionally, the appendices that directly follow the dictionary entries act as a good quick-reference guide for everything from governing elites to economic sanctions.

This edition also contains several smaller sections that complement the entries. A short series of maps illustrating territorial disputes between Libya and Chad and Libya and Tunisia helps readers visualize the roots of Libya’s first two major legal interactions with the international community. The Chronology outlines major developments in Libya since the beginning of the Karamanli Dynasty in the 19th century with particular focus on Libya’s foreign affairs since the One September Revolution. The Glossary and List of Abbreviations are sound collections of terms useful for clarifying some dictionary entries as well as scholarly articles pertaining to North Africa and Islam in general. The Bibliography is by far the most valuable aspect of this edition. It is divided into eight separate categories, each of which is further divided into several category-specific subjects, and is preceded by an introduction that takes the form of an annotated bibliography of other bibliographic sources appropriate for Libyan studies.

Though the Fourth Edition foregoes the inclusion of an expansive pre-colonial account of Libyan history, it is an invaluable resource for both the casual student and seasoned scholar of modern Libya. Its bibliography includes a good deal of up-to-date (as of 2006) sources without sacrificing those that are dated yet remain authoritative in their analyses. The sources come from several disciplines and cover as many decades, providing an exhaustive foundation for the study of Libya. The dictionary entries and the supporting sections offer a well-rounded background for the understanding of Libya as it has progressed under Qadhafi since the One September Revolution.

Steven Stottlemyre, The University of Arizona


As Nelson Mandela wrote in Long Walk to Freedom, “No one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones” (p.187). Though one out of every seven hundred people in the world is incarcerated and the world’s prison population is over nine million, the correctional services of many countries around the world are acutely under-researched, as analysis, statistics and data about criminal justice systems are often extremely limited, difficult to access, and inaccurate.
Jeremy Sarkin's *Human Rights in African Prisons* is therefore a most welcome and very important intervention in a restricted field of inquiry, joining the ranks of the precious few books on this subject, including Callamard’s Amnesty International report on prisons in Africa (2000), Bernault’s historically-based collection, *A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa* (2003), or Mahmoud’s non-refereed case-study examination, *The Human Rights of African Prisoners* (2006). Comprehensive in scope, Sarkin’s edited volume explores several themes: African prisons in a global context; the history of prisons in Africa; prison governance; overcrowding; pre-trial detention; children in prisons; the condition of female offenders; rehabilitation and integration; alternative sentencing; and the African Commission’s approach to prison reform. Throughout, the reader also gleans a myriad of disturbing details about conditions in African prisons, from torture techniques to *trokosi* (the use of virgin girl slaves as reparations for crimes, p. 148). The collection features ten specialists in the field of African law, including Victor Dankwa, former chair of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the first Special Rapporteur on prisons and conditions of detention in Africa. Dankwa’s entry examines the topic of overcrowding. Some African prisons currently operate at more than 300 percent capacity, or three times the number of inmates they can accommodate. This volume identifies overcrowding as the most critical problem in African prisons and develops it throughout all of the chapters.

To support their claims, the book’s contributors draw on an impressive array of hard-to-find reports, case studies, statistics, legal documents, and scholarly articles. Specialists in this field will be delighted by the volume’s thorough bibliography. Yet even interested general readers and undergraduates can enjoy this study, since the prose is clear, free of extraneous detail, theoretical asides, legalese or policy jargon. Unlike many edited collections, the chapters work nicely together, to form a cohesive, interrelated whole. In sum, this is a lucid, well-informed and compelling overview of the critical issues in African correctional institutions. Non-experts will particularly appreciate Sarkin’s succinct and thoughtful introduction to prison conditions world-wide. Insightfully, he compares Africa to the United States, (the world’s most punitive country, with a prison population of over two million), and alludes to shared concerns, including overcrowding, resource management and racial discrimination. Also helpful is Stephan Pete’s historical survey, which shows how current practices of overcrowding, corruption and brutality have their roots in colonial practices. Dankwa outlines the causes of overcrowding, referring to political repression, economic underdevelopment, lengthy remands, unnecessary arrests, stiff sentences, etc. The chapters on pre-trial detention, rehabilitation and alternative sentencing further address this issue. For instance, Michel Schonteich describes lengthy pre-trial remands as “discrimination against the poor and powerless” (p. 105) and argues that resulting overcrowding is actually expensive and dangerous for the state, because of security concerns, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, or a lack of a rehabilitated, educated labour-force. The book concludes with a discussion of prison reform and the role of the Special Rapporteur, who from 1996-2004 inspected prisons in sixteen African countries. Julia Sloth-Nielsen’s and Lisa Vetten’s chapters on minors and women are noteworthy, as both are often neglected in official data and prison research. Most children are in prison either because their mothers are incarcerated or because they are convicted/awaiting trial for such
petty crimes as loitering, vagrancy, begging, or truancy. Both women and children are at greater risk of human rights violations, including violence, sexual abuse, disease, and death. For instance, Vetten notes that many female prisoners do not even have access to sanitary napkins or underwear. However, Vetten’s discussion fails to address the critical issue of abortion. In many African states, women are sentenced to life for “murder”/“attempted murder” for abortions/attempted abortions. Many of these women are rape victims, and often alleged “abortions” are miscarriages.

Overall, this volume provides an excellent introduction to African prisons. Experts in the field, however, may be somewhat frustrated by its synoptic overview. Because of its broad coverage, this collection has a tendency to generalize “Africa” and to conflate “African” specificities. References to specific judiciary or penal systems largely serve as exemplary illustrations, often offered without historical or political contextualization. Curiously, there is no mention of the renowned, brutal prison abuse of the Mau Mau by British colonialists, just as there is no naming of dictators, be it al-Bashir, Nguema, Mswati, Mobutu, Bokassa, Idi Amin or even Robert Mugabe. To refer back to Nelson Mandela, any judgment or in-depth understanding of any one nation is forestalled here. The notable exception is South Africa. It is clear that the contributors are specialists in South Africa and interested in Anglophone African countries. Human rights specialists may similarly be dissatisfied by the volume’s lack of in-depth analysis or theorization of human rights issues or imprisonment. Discussions of human rights mainly consist of outlining human rights documents and legal instruments, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and then explaining how African prisons fail to fulfill them. The roles of non-governmental organizations and of social, cultural or religious institutions in judiciary systems and prison reform are neglected. Despite its limitations—completely understandable because of its harbinger status and ambitious scope—this book is essential reading for African scholars, legal experts, human rights workers, and even informed, socially-conscious general readers, and thus is a must for any academic library.

Madelaine Hron, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada


William A. Schabas, the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights and Professor of human rights law at the National University of Ireland, Galway, offers a meticulous analysis of the history and application of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. In 1948, the then fifty-six member states of the United Nations that adopted the Convention, tried to outlaw forever what Winston Churchill once called “a crime without a name.” These states were reacting to the atrocities of World War II and to jurist Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide and vigorously urged that the United Nations legally prohibit and punish it. Article 1 of the Convention states that “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. Article II defines “genocide” as a series of actions undertaken “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,” whether by killing, inflicting serious bodily or mental harm, destroying group conditions of life, preventing births, or transferring children to another group. Although only 140 states out of over 190 have formally ratified or acceded to the Convention, those that have not are still obligated under international customary law not to engage in, conspire to commit, or promote genocide.

Schabas goes through the Convention almost word by word, explaining the legal meaning of each on the basis of the Convention’s drafting history (travaux préparatoires), judicial interpretations, and statements by authoritative legal bodies. He notes that the Convention rested practically dormant until the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, created the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Each of these tribunals, as well as the more recently created International Criminal Court, has incorporated the Genocide Convention into its statute.

In addition to prohibiting genocide, the Convention requires countries to prevent it. Many criticized the United States, France, and other western states for not acting to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. What exactly is this state obligation? For an answer, Schabas turns to the International Criminal Court’s 2007 judgment in the case involving Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. There the ICJ stated that a state’s duty to act to prevent arises when it learns of a risk of genocide and has the means to deter it. The obligation varies with the capacity of a state to act effectively. This may differ with a state’s geographical location and the strength of its political influence over the parties involved in the potential genocide.

Schabas notes that universal jurisdiction applies to the crime of genocide, because many states, including the U.S., regard the crime as one against all of humankind. They have passed the necessary legislation enabling their courts to prosecute suspected perpetrators regardless of where or against whom the crime was committed. A number of western European countries have tried suspects involved in mass killings in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Schabas refers frequently to the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to interpret parts of the Convention. One of the major difficulties is determining who fits into the four named, protected groups. In the Jean-Paul Akayesu case (1998), the ICTR had to determine whether genocide as defined in the Convention and ICTR Statute had occurred in Rwanda. Since genocide involves the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or social group, it was necessary to determine the meaning of these four social categories. Because neither the Genocide Convention nor the ICTR Statute had defined them, the task fell upon the ICTR Trial Chamber itself. Based on its reading of the travaux préparatoires, the Chamber concluded that the drafters perceived the crime of genocide as targeting only stable, permanent groups, whose membership is determined by birth. The drafters excluded political and economic groups that one joins voluntarily. The Chamber then defined a national group “as a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.” An ethnic group is “a group whose members share a common language or culture.” A racial group is “based on the hereditary physical traits
often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.” A “religious group is one whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”

Significantly, the Tutsi-Hutu distinction in Rwanda did not fit into any of the above categories. The Tutsi belong to the same religious groups and national group as do the Hutu. Tutsi and Hutu share a common language and culture. And any hereditary physical traits formerly distinguishing Hutu from Tutsi have become largely obliterated through generations of intermarriage and a Belgian classification scheme based on cattle ownership. Consequently, had the ICTR justices stopped here, they would have been forced to conclude that genocide, as legally defined in the Convention and Statute, had not occurred in Rwanda.

The Chamber next asked whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of any one of the four protected groups. The justices concluded that the answer is “no,” because the intention of the Convention’s drafters was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group. Based on the case testimony, the Court concluded that the Tutsi did indeed constitute a stable and permanent group and were therefore protected by the Genocide Convention and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute.

By adding “stable and permanent group, whose membership is largely determined by birth,” to the four existing social categories, the Chamber significantly expanded the kinds of populations that could be protected by the Convention. One might wonder whether unisexual groups, homosexuals, or persons mentally or physically impaired permanently at birth might constitute protected groups under the Tribunal’s expanded definition. Schabas is clearly opposed to the expansive “permanent” and “stable” approach employed by the Tribunal, despite the fact that the Darfur Commission of Inquiry claimed in its 1995 report that the ICTR conceptualization has become part and parcel of international law.

Intentionality is a constitutive element of genocide. Intent is a mental factor that is difficult to determine with precision in the absence of a sincere confession by the accused. Again, the ICTR provided a jurisprudential roadway by reasoning that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act from the general context of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same protected group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by others. Specific factors to be considered include the scale of atrocities committed and the deliberate and systematic targeting of people because of their membership in a particular group, while excluding members of other groups. Hence, an individual, who attacks only one person and never explains why, can be convicted of genocide as long as his one attack fits into an overall pattern of genocidal acts by others against members of the same protected group.

The ICTR Trial Chamber also made a major contribution to the progressive development of genocide law by addressing sexual violence in the Akayesu case. It noted that the Genocide Convention and Article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute offer as one of the definitions of genocide the “causing [of] serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group.” The Justices maintained that acts of sexual violence constituted genocide provided they were committed with the
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, because sexual violence
certainly constitutes inflictions of “serious bodily and mental harm” on victims.

Schabas’ treatment of the crime of genocide is very comprehensive and authoritative. He
covers many more important issues than could be discussed in this review. This work is
indispensable to anyone concerned with humanitarian and public international law.

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Falguni A. Sheth. Toward a Political Philosophy of Race. Albany, NY: State University of

Imagine a case of domestic violence in which the perpetrator beats his partner once every two
weeks. It every other way his behavior is exemplary: he is a loyal and dedicated employee, a
doting parent and, most of the time, a loving partner. Yet every fourteen days he flies into a
drunken rage and assaults his wife. How might we understand his actions? One possibility is to
judge his violent episodes against the backdrop of his otherwise admirable character. The
assaults are aberrations or accidents which, given the husband’s self-control in other areas, it is
reasonable to think he will be able to get under control, without need of outside intervention. A
second possibility however is to condemn the beatings as unacceptable, regardless of how
pleasant the husband is at other times. The attacks are serious enough to warrant immediate
intervention. On this view, the violence is not an accident or aberration, but a recurring and
systematic pattern of behavior, and must be understood as such in order for it to end.

The second view is surely a more reasonable response to domestic violence. According to
Falguni Sheth, it is also a more reasonable response to the injustices liberal states commit
against vulnerable populations. When U.S. Muslims were arrested and detained in the wake of
September 11, many commentators viewed it as an aberration on the part of an otherwise just
society. According to Sheth however, the mistreatment of Muslims was merely one instance in a
longstanding historical pattern involving such episodes as slavery, Jim Crow, and the wartime
detention of Japanese Americans. If we want to fully understanding the overall pattern we need
to recognize its systematic, non-accidental character. Moreover, we need to grasp the
overlooked role the concept of race plays in making such injustices possible.

Events involving the persecution of Japanese- or African-Americans are normally thought
to involve a pre-existing racial minority which is singled out for persecution. In Sheth’s view,
however, this understanding gets the causal story backwards. A group that is perceived as
posing a political threat has a racial identity imposed upon it by the state during episodes of
oppression. On her view, racial identity is itself the product of anxiety and panic on the part of
the wider society. As she puts it, “I distinguish between racial markers—skin type, phenotype,
physical differences, and signifiers such as ‘unruly’ behaviors. The former, in my argument, are
not the ground of race, but the marks ascribed to a group that has already become (or is on the
way to becoming) outcasted.” The fear of Muslim terrorism that occurred in the U.S. following
the destruction of the twin towers lead to Muslims being racialized in Sheth’s sense of the term,
a process which in turn made it possible to violate their rights in a widespread and deliberate way. Muslims became a suspect group who were slotted into specific legal categories—non-citizen, enemy-combatant, terrorist—that permitted severe measures to be used against them. Recent debates in the philosophy of race have often focused on whether race is a natural or socially constructed attribute. Such debates have also tended to characterize race primarily in terms of the black experience, and to refer rarely, if at all, to philosophers in the so-called continental tradition. Sheth’s analysis is triply original in the way it breaks from each familiar approach. While her position overlaps with the social constructivist view, she is concerned with more institutional-political questions than the biological ones that have informed the natural-construction debate. She also ranges far beyond the African-American experience and discusses at length not only the mistreatment of Muslims after September 11 but that of East Indians in the U.S. and Canada a century earlier. Finally, Sheth’s book makes frequent reference to the insights of Heidegger, Foucault, Arendt, and Schmitt, which she variously modifies and extends to suit her subject.

Sheth argues that a core function of states is to maintain social order by managing and regulating their populations. Certain members of the polity are deemed as posing a threat to that order. Sheth’s term for such people, “the unruly,” speaks to this perception, which can apply to groups that are perfectly peaceful. The unruly can represent an unfamiliar belief system such as Islam, or bring to mind a troubling history such as slavery or colonialism. The response of the state to such groups is to define them at the level of law or public discourse by some common trait or traits. Thus, while the political ideology or threatening memory they represent is intangible, it is now “represented or manifested by something else that may or may not be tangible, such as outward garb, physical comportment, phenotype, accent, skin color, or something even more subtle.”

Sheth’s discussion of the suspicion and harassment of Muslim women illustrates this process. In Europe and North America the practices of purdah and hijab, forms of modest dress that can include covering a woman’s head or face, have been the subject of widespread criticism. Sheth outlines the many different reasons—religious, political and personal—that Muslim women have given for practicing hijab, and argues that the practice is rooted not only in cultural and religious norms, but also the women’s own agency. In the West however women who follow Islamic dress codes give rise to the inchoate sense that they are somehow rejecting or challenging core liberal values, values that concern everything from transparency to the role of religion in the public sphere. Muslim women thus come to represent an “affront to a rational, reasonable, liberal American culture.” As a result, liberal and feminist analyses that criticize veiling and other forms of purdah routinely question whether such practices can ever be rooted in the women’s own agency. As Sheth summarizes the Western critics’ view, “Can these women ‘possibly’ be doing this of their own accord? Surely they must be subject to external constraints or pressures.”

The end result is that veiling and similar practices function as markers which are used to categorize an unruly population, in this case Muslims, as a racial group. Normally Islam is considered a religious rather than racial term, but in Sheth’s usage race applies a far wider range of attributes than skin and hair color. “Can gender be a form of racial division? In a
historicized context, yes. Can sexuality be a racial description? Yes.” Racialization on Sheth’s view can apply to any unruly group which is too powerless to define itself in the public mind. This lack of social power, and the use of markers to impose an identity on the group, whether they be clothing, accent, skin color or something else, form the essence of race in her view. “Race is a metaphysical mode of dividing populations.”

Sheth’s use of the term metaphysical in reference to a social phenomenon may sound strange. Her usage however is bound up with her understanding of race as a form of technology in Heidegger’s sense. On Heidegger’s technological-determinist view, technology is not a neutral tool that simply enables us to act on our pre-existing desires. Technology rather structures the field of possibilities we find meaningful. To oversimplify, technology uses us more than we use it. Racial divisions are technological on Sheth’s account because they also exercise their own determination over us, invariably acting to exclude vulnerable groups from the full protection of state and society.

In Sheth’s view race is a technology of considerable power. That power, however, is mitigated by two considerations. Not just any group can have a racial identity imposed on it. Rather a group must already be socially vulnerable in order for it to be racialized. In addition, it is possible for a previously racialized group to obtain the status of what Sheth terms “border populations.” Such groups have formally obtained the rights and privileges of the majority population, but can exercise those rights only in a precarious way. Border-populations thus occupy an uneasy position that is above pure subjection but still short of equality. Sheth makes a thought-provoking argument to the effect that African-Americans occupy such an insider-outsider status. Ongoing discrimination in banking, housing and other realms exists alongside increased black representation in realms ranging from the media to the presidency.

Border populations play a key role in how liberal societies understand themselves. Such groups provide a fig-leaf of justification for the inherent fairness of liberal institutions. Among other functions, border populations allow the most powerful interests in a liberal society to depict their core institutions as racially neutral. The genuine breakthroughs of blacks and other border groups are held up as evidence that their mistreatment is both a relic of the past and a regrettable accident. In this way border-populations provide an alibi or cover for what Sheth terms “the mythology of liberalism—that individuals are automatically protected by law, except under certain—unusual or contingent—circumstances.”

Much of Sheth’s book is devoted to exposing just how pernicious liberal mythology is. When it comes to both the writings of liberal philosophers such as John Rawls and the everyday workings of liberal societies, race on her view inevitably functions as a tool of stigma and exclusion. She highlights a remark by Rawls concerning people who live in a minimally just Muslim society: “[u]nlike most Muslim rules [they] have not sought empire and territory. This is because their theologians understand jihad in a moral and spiritual sense, and not in military terms.” Sheth takes this passage to highlight a deeply condescending attitude toward Muslims. Rawls however is far from alone. Our society she concludes is one defined by “a preference within liberalism for the elimination of fundamental differences.”

Sheth does not say very much about how the problems she diagnoses might be solved. There are passing references in her conclusion to extending full constitutional rights to non-
citizens, but she does not outline which particular rights she has in mind. Nevertheless, her book has much to recommend it, not least the quality of the writing. Sheth manages to clearly present the ideas of such famously obscure sources as Heidegger and Derrida. In setting out her own views she displays a marked preference for limpid sentences and vivid analogies over jargon, brackets and slashes. Sheth also has a shrewd eye for the shifting dynamics of racial hierarchies. One might challenge the details of her analysis of the situation of African-Americans for example, but her core claim that they occupy a certain insider-outsider status is subtle and persuasive.

Sheth is also an excellent ambassador on behalf of continental philosophy, demonstrating an exemplary mixture of sympathy and admiration for her sources that makes her interest in them contagious. She has such an easy command of their ideas, and can apply those ideas to contemporary political issues with such ingenuity, that one comes away with a heightened desire to read these thinkers anew. Indeed, reading Sheth’s book sometimes feels like taking a lecture series on continental philosophy with a gifted and inspiring teacher.

Sheth’s respect for continental theorists means that when she criticizes them, it is with considerable force. To take but one example, Agamben has written about the way the laws of liberal states create legal zones of exception, in which certain populations lose the protection of the law (Guantanamo Bay is perhaps the best known example). Sheth persuasively argues that something is missing in Agamben’s analysis, namely, an awareness that not all populations are equally vulnerable to the process of legal abandonment Agamben describes. “After all, if they were, then Muslim immigrants, white middle-class software engineers, and former United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would all coevally be in danger.”

Unfortunately, Sheth’s treatment of liberal philosophers never rises to the same level. Instead one gets the sense that Sheth does not respect liberalism enough to take it as seriously as a philosophy. Many of Sheth’s philosophical sources have, to put it mildly, stumbled over questions of difference. Heidgger and Schmitt were fascists. Foucault had a kind word to say about the Khomeini regime in Iran. Arendt’s writings contain grossly insensitive passages about Polish Jews, African-Americans and black South Africans. Sheth nonetheless draws on these same thinkers’ signature ideas. No doubt she would maintain, correctly, that their lapses do not invalidate their central arguments. Yet in her discussion of liberalism, Sheth takes Rawls’ remarks about Muslim rulers to exhibit a disregard for equality that permeates his work as a whole. Continental theorists pass by with a smile and wave. But one false move by a liberal, and Sheth exhibits all the charity and sensitivity of an airport security guard singling out a Muslim family for interrogation.

Sheth engages liberalism primarily as a descriptive theory rather than a normative one. Hence her critical remarks about the myth of liberal societies being perfectly just. Revealingly, however, she does not quote anyone who actually believes this simple-minded view. Liberal theorists have long been alive to the dangers of racism and exclusion at work in liberal societies: Ronald Dworkin on affirmative action; Will Kymlicka on national minorities; and Joseph Carens on open borders. Sheth’s critique of liberalism is considerably weakened by her lack of engagement with this literature. Had she extended to liberal philosophers the same seriousness and care she exhibits toward continental ones, she might have recognized that in her appeal to
agency and constitutional solutions, among other areas, her own position relies on staunchly liberal elements.

Sheth’s discussion of liberalism is not the only area where her argument appears to employ two weights, two measures. It is unclear why hijab as it is practiced in Muslim societies is not properly understood as a racialized form of oppression in Sheth’s terms. It seems more consistent with her theory to view hijab as being a response on the part of Muslim men to the “unruly” threat of the sexuality of women, who lack power in Muslim societies. Sheth however highlights the women’s status as agents rather than victims. She is surely right that it is insulting to insinuate that Muslim women cannot exercise the practice autonomously. But in the context of her book it seems to highlight a double standard, given her lack of emphasis on agency in explaining how racial categories function in liberal societies.

Sheth argues that race is not merely a form of technology, but a technology in the Hedegeggerian sense. Heidegger’s hard determinist position however has fallen out of favors among philosophers of technology. As they have often pointed out, it is a routine occurrence in the history of technology for a tool to be put to a different use than the one it was invented for (as anyone who has ever used a copy of Being and Time for a doorstop knows). Even if technology is not entirely neutral, the agency of users still plays a role in how it is deployed. In her discussion of race however Sheth, like Heidegger, downplays the role of user agency, in her case, by ignoring how people self-identify as members of racial groups. This is not only an explanatory but a political weakness of her account. To take but one example, in the 1980s veterans of the U.S. civil rights movement were influential in the campaign to impose sanctions against South Africa. Their sense of racial identification with the victims was an important force for justice, yet one which Sheth’s rigidly negative and deterministic view of race does not capture.

Sheth’s central argument concerning the nature of race is ultimately hard to accept. One reason is that her usage is confusing, including not only categories like white, black and Asian, but also female, gay and communist. A better name for Sheth’s book would have been Toward a Political Philosophy of Stigmatization and Persecution. It is not clear what is gained by categorizing all persecuted groups as races. Among other problems, categories such as race and gender seem to require as a necessary condition innate physical attributes such as skin color and sex organs. However exaggerated the emphasis on such attributes has been, it still seems reasonable to separate such forms of identity from more purely social ones such as religion and political affiliation. Most of us would find it much easier to change our religion or political philosophy than our race or gender. For this and other reasons, Sheth’s discussion of race never quite reaches the same level as her discussion of major thinkers in the continental tradition. It is as an engagingly written and provocatively argued introduction to that tradition that the real value of her book is found.

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This book is about the nature of the relation between colonialism and modernity. It addresses the key issue of how and why colonialism was a bulwark against any transition to modernity in the continent. Olufemi Taiwo selected three West African countries and former British colonies, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania, as case studies in the post-independence decade, to answer those thorny questions.

Taiwo’s major assumption is that the legal system inherited from colonialism was not fair and this explains why liberal democracy and the rule of law failed to take root in Africa. He challenges what has become conventional wisdom in studies pertaining to colonialism and modernity: the belief that colonialism was a uniform phenomenon affecting the whole continent in the same way and that colonialism and modernity are twins.

A great deal of care should be taken to differentiate between colonialism and modernity, because historically they are separate and should also be separated for analytical purposes. They do not, in fact, belong to the same discourse. African colonialism is different and specific. Former colonies like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa have, by every accord, reached the highest steps of modernity. This is not the case with the “dark continent.” What Africa has achieved are superficial markers, Taiwo insists: rapid urbanization, limited industrialization, mass consumption, more schooling, and a road infrastructure. The distinctive marker of modernity is its politico-philosophical discourse summed up in three concepts: subjectivity, reason, and progress. It is here, that Taiwo breaks new ground.

Suggesting that Africa is impermeable to modernity or that Africans are congenially unable to work modernity are non plausible, racist theses. Africa and Africans, indeed showed openness, flexibility, adaptability, and diligence to modern forms of life when they were offered the opportunity.

Contrary to previous scholarship which lumps European colonists together, Taiwo believes that missionaries, differently from traders and especially administrators after them, should be credited for the implantation of “civilization” in Africa. They proved more revolutionary than the administrators in their interaction with Africans. They introduced Christianity and set up an educational system for the indigenous population. But, most importantly, missionaries, like the Rev. Henry Venn, according to Taiwo, were keen on creating a middle class committed to civilization as partakers of its fruits. They involved native Africans in their “civilizing” mission and trained them to establish and run their own lives and institutions, beginning with their churches. Even though the missionaries’ most notable contribution was in the realm of religion and education, they similarly promoted agriculture, medicine, architecture, and printing. In so doing, they had many converts who responded enthusiastically and took over the task of modernizing their African communities in partnership. Samuel Ajayi Crowther, James Africanus Beale Horton, Rev S.R.B Attoli Abuma, and others were Taiwo’s “prophets without honor” and the apostles of modernity.

Henry Venn and those who shared a similar philosophy wanted a total remaking of the African world, a development that was to be anchored on commerce and civilization, which
was believed to be a prerequisite to Christianity, a remaking and a development which would start under their supervision, and which eventually would be turned over to Africans themselves. This is what Taiwo calls the autonomy model according to which Africans can be trusted to run their own affairs and had to be equipped with the capacity for self-support.

The opposite model, the conservative and reactionary one, is the aid model; the one recommended and implemented by administrators—soldiers, residents, hired guns, who since the late nineteenth century governed Africa. These, like Lord Lugard, favored recruits of chiefly provenance, not outcasts; inaugurated socio-cryonics with its attendant consequence of preserving or shaping existing institutions, regardless of their state of health or relevance to serve their needs of a cheap empire-building; and had a narrow imperialist perception of their mission, to do whatever for the glory of the mother country and the profits of their sponsors. To this main “philosopher of the empire” the African belonged to the infancy of the human race. Worse still, he was a savage, an animal who was capable of mimicking humans. That was a sterling view of one of the most celebrated administrators of the British Empire in Africa.

For Lugard and many administrators like him, the African failed to cope with the rest of humanity and was not, therefore, in a position to enjoy the fruits of civilization. They had to grow and mature before admission to the community of adults. This is why throughout the entire period that he served as administrator in Nigeria, Lugard fought a fierce battle against a specific group of natives: the Western-educated elite made up mostly of returning slaves and indigenous converts to Christianity.

Such racist views of Africa and Africans were strongly reflected in the legal system that Anglophone countries inherited from Britain and which accounted for the failure of such countries to have representative and fair systems. Given that the inhabitants of the colonies were judged to be beyond the pale of British citizenship for no other reason than their being characterized as inferior human beings, they were not, then considered as individuals and could not, as a result, aspire to the position of a citizen and holder of rights. Moreover, the modern legal system is built on a basic philosophical disposition that is suspicious of power and of the state in which it is vested. Such suspicion is absent from the legal discourse about Africa.

Africa was in the process of turning modern, but colonial officials aborted those efforts when they set up indirect rule in the service of their countries. Taiwo remained, however, positive about the prospects of a modern Africa.

This study, which matured over almost a decade, should be recommended to philosophers, students of African studies, and all those concerned with the future of Africa.

Adel Manai, Universite Tunis El Manar

Africa is a new frontier for Chinese expansion in the early twenty-first century. At the Beijing Summit and the Third Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged to give aid and open its market for over four hundred types of tariff-free import items from Africa. Even though China has neither the power nor infrastructure to be a First World nation at the moment, it has the ability, resources and political will to be a champion of the developing world. Meanwhile the United States is facing serious military setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan and losing the diplomatic battles against North Korea and Iran over their nuclear weapon programs. It has become increasingly difficult for Washington to maintain its global dominance. Against this significant shift of balance of power, Meine Pieter van Dijk has brought together a team of economists to evaluate the success of China in fostering closer diplomatic and economic relations with African states.

All the ten chapters are divided thematically into four sections. In part one, the introductory chapter by Meine Pieter van Dijk sets the framework for understanding the rise of China in Africa and the geopolitical implications for the West. Filip de Beule and Daniël Van den Bulcke review the remarkable accomplishments of China’s open door policy and highlight the importance of Africa for its economic growth. As China becomes “an outward investor, both as a market seeker and a resource seeker,” it has made significant inroads into Africa’s industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors (p. 49). Therefore, the new Chinese presence in Africa should be seen as an extension of its economic policy.

Part two explores how China has combined the strategies of providing government aid, promoting direct investments and creating free trade agreements to expand its influence. According to Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière, most Chinese aid and loans were spent on the infrastructure projects and the transfer of technical knowledge. This has challenged the Western paradigm that regards neoliberal structural reform as a precondition for Africa’s capacity building and development. Peter Kragelund and Meine Pieter van Dijk reconstruct a regionally diversified picture of Chinese economic activities in Africa. They point out that most Chinese investments are concentrated in those countries with strong diplomatic ties with Beijing. Meine Pieter van Dijk stresses that Beijing has developed numerous free trade partnerships to reorient the African economy towards the fast-growing Chinese market.

Part three presents in-depth case studies of Chinese expansion into Africa. Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund investigate the scale of Chinese investments in Zambia’s mining, construction, and agricultural sectors. Because Beijing has provided Chinese state-owned enterprises with easy access to investment capital and the necessary banking services, these companies are more competitive than the multinational firms in Zambia. Meine Pieter van Dijk looks at the Chinese responses to the civil war and human rights abuses in Darfur in 2008. At least in Sudan, China was under tremendous international pressures to set aside its policy of non-intervention and to negotiate directly with the warring factions. However, what distinguishes China from other Western powers is the diversification of its investment strategies in Africa. According to Meine Pieter van Dijk, China recently built an industrial zone in
Ethiopia and an export processing zone in Tanzania, and invested heavily in African banking institutions. Evidently, the Chinese state-owned enterprises have enjoyed strong support from Beijing and prepared to make long-term business decisions rather than seeking immediate profits.

In the concluding section, Peter Knorringa asserts that the growing Chinese economic influence may not contribute to the rise of African corporate responsibility as the West has expected. But this assessment overlooks the fact that many African ruling elites have advantaged themselves by tapping into the Chinese aid, investments and bilateral trade. Meine Pieter van Dijk draws attention to the importance of energy security. As with other global powers, China is concerned about energy supplies in the midst of high oil prices and a global rush for oil, natural gas, and other resources essential for industrial development. Beijing has succeeded in pursuing a pragmatic policy that serves its diplomatic and economic agendas since the 1990s.

This edited book vividly portrays a strong sense of pragmatism and opportunism in China’s Africa policy. Overall, China today is determined to maintain a stable international environment for its economic growth and to avoid provoking a vigorous response from the United States towards its expansion. Such geopolitical and diplomatic agendas are as important as economic concerns. One methodological problem of this work is that most contributors only draw on western language materials to investigate the subject. If they had studied the Chinese official and unofficial sources, they would have acknowledged that Beijing has constantly adjusted its strategies to maintain its competitive effectiveness in the continent.

Equally important is the growing Chinese cultural influence in Africa. From 2001 to 2006, more than 10,000 African government officials and technical personnel received training in China. Today Beijing has founded twenty-four Confucius Institutes in seventeen African countries to promote the study of Chinese language and culture, and offered scholarships to African students to go to China (Paradise, 2009; Sautman and Yan, 2009). In addition, there have been increasing numbers of Chinese migrants in search of business opportunities in Africa (Dobler, 2009). These technicians, students and migrants are the new agents of China’s penetration into the continent.

In conclusion, the editor and contributors have presented accurate, up-to-date quantitative data about the rise of Chinese influence in Africa. This book is an important reference for anyone interested in the latest development of Sino-African relations.

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