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Poor Urban Communities and Municipal Interface in Ghana:
A Case Study of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis

GEORGE OWUSU AND ROBERT LAWRENCE AFUTU-KOTEY

Abstract: Like many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana, is undergoing a rapid pace of urbanization associated with socio-economic, environmental, and institutional challenges for urban residents and local government authorities. Under Ghana’s laws, Metropolitan Assemblies (large city local governments) have overall responsibility for the development of their respective cities. This article explores the poor urban communities—municipal interface based on a study carried out in the largest (Accra) and third largest (Sekondi-Takoradi) cities. The study concludes that mechanisms for engaging poor urban communities are limited largely due to the absence of functional decentralized sub-district structures in these communities. In addition, the indirect attempt by the Metropolitan Assemblies to address infrastructure and service needs of poor urban communities through a public-private partnership centered on privatization (franchising and contracting) and community-based participation in the provision of social services has distanced the Assemblies from poor communities. This situation has reinforced the view that the Assemblies are unresponsive to community needs. The implications of limited community-municipal interface for poor urban communities and urban development in Ghana in general are also explored.

Introduction
Rapid urbanization characterized by urban sprawl and the emergence of slums and other informal settlements is a common feature of developing countries. It has been argued that developing country cities are harboring an increasing proportion of the poor and destitute. Again, evidence indicates that the “bright lights” of cities and towns describe the lure of urban life and the promise that urban centers hold for individuals and groups who are hungry, jobless, ill, just curious, and so forth – fueling movements to urban centers. While rural-urban migration is an important factor in the rapid pace of urbanization, the single most influential factor is natural population growth in cities and towns. This situation is partly

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The authors would like to thank the residents of the poor urban communities of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi in this study for their willingness to share information, CHF-Ghana (an NGO) for financial support, and all others who made the fieldwork possible.

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v12/v12i1a2.pdf

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due to the fact that the urban migrants are predominantly young people, and this inevitably contributes to high rates of natural increase in urban centers. Youth populations in cities are coterminous with high levels of unemployment, a major contributory factor to urban poverty. Moreover, urban poverty is equally associated with poor living conditions.4

In much of the developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth and development have not kept pace with rates of urbanization. For instance, while Sub-Saharan African countries can match the urbanization rates of China and India (considered industrial powers of the future), they cannot boast of anything near the respective rates of economic growth of these two countries.5 The resultant effects of this situation are increasing urban poverty and the emergence of slums and other informal settlements. The growth of urban poverty and emergence of informal settlements in cities of the developing world are largely occurring within the context of decentralization.6 Decentralization advocates argue that because decentralization brings government closer to the governed both spatially and institutionally, government will be more knowledgeable about and responsive to the needs of urban people. Therefore, decentralization has brought to the fore issues of the structure and processes of city governance, which have important ramifications for how urban poverty is defined and addressed. This has implications for those living in poverty and how political processes may include or exclude the urban poor.

As with many Sub-Saharan African countries, Ghana is undergoing a rapid pace of urbanization with its attendant challenges. Already evident in urban Ghana are the effects of rapid urbanization manifest in socio-economic, environmental, and institutional challenges for urban residents and local authorities. Millions of urbanite Ghanaians currently live in densely populated and overcrowded unsanitary conditions often lacking access to basic services such as water, sanitation, and health care.7 According to Ghana’s development policy blue-print, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2006-2009 (GPRS II), in 2001, the number of people living in urban slums was about five million (representing about 58 percent of the total urban population), and growing at the rate of 1.8 percent per annum.8 The slum areas are very pronounced in the largest cities, and there is a growing incidence in the secondary cities as well. Increasing urban poverty and slums are occurring within the context of a decentralization program described as one of the boldest local government reforms to be found in the developing world.9

This article explores slums and municipal interface in Ghana based on a study carried out in selected poor communities in two metropolitan areas of Ghana, namely Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi.10 It explores the effectiveness of Metropolitan Assemblies (city local governments) in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi in engaging poor communities as well as addressing the needs of these communities.

After the introduction, the paper will examine theoretically the links between decentralization and urban governance, followed by a description of the research methodology. The paper will then look at decentralization and urban governance in Ghana. This is followed by a brief discussion of the selected communities and their development challenges. The paper then turns its attention to poor communities and municipal interface in Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra. It ends with a concluding discussion on the implications of the study for slums and urban development in Ghana.

Urban Governance, Decentralization and Urban Poverty: A Theoretical Perspective

The rapid urbanization and the increasing proportion of the world’s poor who live in urban areas in many parts of the developing world have led to the recognition that poverty can no longer be regarded as primarily a rural phenomenon.11 There is also a wide recognition of the
links or connections between poverty and governance at all levels. In the case of urban governance, it is argued that technical issues of planning, infrastructure development, and service delivery are unlikely to have a significant impact on the poor unless important issues about the impact of the structure of metropolitan governance are addressed. This is because the structure of metropolitan governance has serious and far-reaching implications for those living in poverty and for how political processes may include or exclude the urban poor.

According to the United Nations Development Program, a missing link between anti-poverty efforts and poverty reduction as well as other economic development strategies is governance. The basic argument here is that even with well-structured and well-intended development plans and programs, the presence of unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt governance institutions result in failure of plans and programs. In such an environment, reform of governance institutions should be moved front and center to provide the minimum conditions for getting poverty reduction programs and other people-centered initiatives off the ground.

It has been argued that accountable and responsive governance institutions provide a platform for harnessing the energies of collective action in cities exemplified by urban social movements and organizations. According to Beall, urban social movements that are the result of urban poverty and the absence of effective channels for social change have shown that people in urban communities engage in a range of mutual support and self-help activities. These initiatives provide evidence that communities are imbued with “social assets” that can be identified and helpfully engaged within policy terms. Castells has noted that these urban social movements must be built on cooperative activities at community or neighborhood level. They can only be described as successful if they achieve structural change, most notably a shift in the balance of power among urban social classes in favor of the urban poor. This provides the opportunity for galvanizing middle-class and civil society pressures for governmental actions for sanitary reforms and serious efforts to address other urban challenges. This situation, however, is currently rarely the case in cities in the developing world – a condition which Chaplin has described as the “absence of threat from below.” Hence, the lack of government action.

The urban governance arguments have found expression in governments delegating the task of mobilizing and allocating society’s resources for public purposes – decentralization of power and authority as well as resources to lower units of governments. A key constraint of decentralization is how best to translate it into practice and, more importantly the practical framework for engaging poor communities, especially in urban areas where sanitation and waste disposal facilities are in critical condition.

Promoting citizen participation in decision-making processes and the failure of urban services to keep pace with rapid urban growth have prompted urban local governments to shift from direct public services provision to public-private partnerships involving local communities, citizens, and the private sector in the provision and management of services. However, it is not all that clear that governments unable to provide direct basic services to the poor will fare any better with the responsibilities of regulating the provision and management of these services by other non-state actors. These processes of engaging with poor urban communities by urban local governments have to a large extent not reduced the hostility and mistrust between them and poor urban communities. This is because sanitation and waste management have witnessed little improvement. Ayee and Crook attribute this situation to the politics of patronage at the urban level, the relationship between city...
government and community level groups, and the failure of regulation—three factors that reinforced each other and result in failure or limited improvement in services provision. It has also been noted that policy-makers have been over-optimistic about the willingness and capacity of poor communities to provide basic services in the face of the absence of public provision. Underlying this assumption is the romanticized notion of the social solidarity of the slum, which translates into a strong spirit of collective action on local issues. However, it is argued that social and economic deprivation can be as much a force for social fragmentation as it is a point for collective action.

Research Methodology

This study is part of a large study on situational analysis of five selected poor communities in Accra (Sabon Zongo, Avenor and Ga Mashie) and Sekondi-Takoradi (Kwesimintsim and New Takoradi). The analysis is based on data generated from four methods, namely secondary sources, focus group discussions (FGDs), interviews (key informants/local government representatives and experts), and transect walks. The use of multiple methods ensured triangulation of data by allowing for the cross-checking of information with the basic aim of validating answers and conclusions reached in the study.

The secondary data sources generated information on the general Ghanaian urban environment: governance structure of Ghanaian cities; key stakeholders and their influence on urban development; and city-level poverty levels. The primary data generated from interviews, focus group discussions, and transect walks included oral histories of settlements, community infrastructure/services and opportunities, social structures, and local government activities in the communities. Table 1 shows the total number of interviews (key informant, expert, and Assembly member) and transect walks conducted in the selected communities in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi.

Table 1: Interviews and Transect Walks Conducted in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Selected Community</th>
<th>No. of FGDs</th>
<th>No. of Key Informant Interviews</th>
<th>No. of Expert Interviews</th>
<th>Assembly Member Interviews</th>
<th>Transect Walk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>Sabon Zongo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avenor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ga Mashie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sabon Zongo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
<td>New Takoradi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kwesimintsim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Four FGDs were conducted in each community involving adult males, adults females, the youth (between the ages of 18 and 38 years, and single), and members of NGOs/CBOs operating in the community; and nine key informant interviews (mainly traditional and opinion leaders of the community). In addition, interviews were held with elected local government representatives in each of the communities, as well as twenty-two expert interviews (mainly senior administrative/planning officers of the metropolitan local government authority, academics, and senior officers of NGOs). Aided by a local guide, a
transect walk was conducted in each community, which provided an opportunity to observe directly the community basic infrastructure and services, housing conditions, economic activities, level of income/wealth, and so forth.

Selected Poor Communities and Development Challenges

Poor urban communities of Accra (Sabon Zongo, Avenor, and Ga Mashie) and Sekondi-Takoradi (New Takoradi and Kwesimintsim) were selected on the basis of several criteria, including their migrant or indigenous status, location, age of settlement, and demographic composition. Sabon Zongo and Avenor are largely migrant communities, while Ga Mashie (comprising two communities, Ussher Fort and James Town) and Kwesimintsim can be described as indigenous communities. On the other hand, Avenor and New Takoradi are mixed, harboring multiple ethnic groups including both migrants and indigenes. In terms of location, New Takoradi and Ga Mashie are located on seafronts, hence the importance of artisanal fishing. The rest are located close to city center and are thus very accessible from all parts of their respective cities.

While the selected communities share differences and similarities in terms of their location, migrant/indigene status, and demographic composition, a clear delineation that distinguishes the five communities from other neighborhoods in their respective cities is the neglect of their basic infrastructure and services, particularly the very limited supply of sanitation, waste disposal, and drainage. As a result, an overwhelming proportion of residents rely on limited public facilities such as public toilets and bathrooms. In-house toilet, house-to-house solid waste collection, and in-house pipe-borne water supply are limited to only a few households (see Table 2).

Table 2: Adequate Sanitation and Water Facilities Used by Households in Selected Poor Neighborhoods in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi (%), 2000*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Residential Neighborhood</th>
<th>Selected Adequate Sanitation and Water Supply Indicator</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Water closet (WC) Toilet (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>Avenor</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sabon Zongo</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James Town**</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra (city average)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
<td>New Takoradi</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Kwesimintsim</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>City average</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Adequate sanitation and toilet facilities such as in-house pipe-borne water, in-house water toilet, and regular house-to-house waste collection are limited. The table excludes public toilet facilities and waste disposal methods such as burning, opening/public dumping, and burial. ** James Town is part of the larger neighborhood of Ga-Mashie. Source: Ghana Statistical Service

Table 2 shows the proportion of households in the five poor communities as of 2000 with “adequate” access to sanitation and water facilities. While the city averages are not good, they
are even far lower in the five selected neighborhoods, except for Avenor. These averages from the communities can be contrasted with figures from the middle and high-class areas in the two cities. For instance, in high-class residential areas of Accra such as Airport and Cantonments over 80 percent and 70 percent respectively of households had in-house toilet and door-to-door solid waste collection system as of 2000.

A key development challenge is the inadequacy of urban infrastructure and services vis-à-vis a fast growing population. Rapid urban population growth is evident in a high population concentration per hectare. For instance, in 2000, while the average population density of Accra was 140 persons/ha, it was about 650 persons/ha in Sabon Zongo. This high population on a small piece of land and the inability of local and central governments to provide adequate sanitation and water facilities means residents must queue to use public toilets, while many also use plastic bags and then dump them at open refuse dumps and other open spaces within the communities. More importantly, constructed and natural drainage systems get choked with human and solid waste. The massive increase in the use of plastic bags has further exacerbated the situation. This is generating a public health crisis with potential serious consequences.

Decentralization and Urban Governance in Ghana

Ghana embarked upon a decentralization program in 1988 as a key element in the process of democratization and the search for a more participatory approach to development. The decentralization program is regarded as enhancing an effective response to local development challenges and as facilitating the involvement of local people in decision-making and the development process in general. The decentralization program is enshrined in Ghana’s Constitution and spelled out in the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462).

A local government in Ghana could be a Metropolitan Assembly (a city/large town with a population of over 250,000), Municipal Assembly (one town local government area with a population of over 95,000), and District Assembly (a local government area comprising a district capital and other small centers, and rural areas with a population of over 75,000). In all, there are 169 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), made of six Metropolitan Assemblies, thirty-nine Municipal Assemblies and 124 District Assemblies. The six Metropolitan Assemblies include the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) and the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (STMA). Table 3 shows the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies and their sub-district structures.

Table 3: MMDAs and Sub-District Structures*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL AND DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES (MMDAs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-Tier Metropolitan Assembly (Population 250,000 and Over)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Metropolitan Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sub-Metropolitan Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Town/Area Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unit Committees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unit committees are formed for populations of 500-1000 and 1500 in rural and urban areas respectively. Urban, Area, and Zonal councils are formed for settlements with populations above 15000, 5000-15000, and 3000 respectively.
Under the national Constitution and the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), MMDAs have overall responsibility for the development of their areas of jurisdiction. In order to reach all the citizens of a local government area, the structures of the Assembly, that is the sub-district structures, go as far as the neighborhood and community levels. The sub-district structures comprising a four tier structure for Metropolitan Assemblies and three tier structure for Municipal and District Assemblies (see Table 3). These sub-district structures form the basic backbone of decentralized institutional framework. The basic aim of these structures is to take decentralization to the grassroots level by involving local people in all decision-making processes.

Like all other Assemblies, Metropolitan Assemblies consist of two-thirds elected members and one third appointed by the central government in consultation with key stakeholders in the districts. The central government also appoints the Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE), who is the head of the Metropolitan Assembly, with approval from the members of the Assembly. The elected and appointed officials of the Assembly are assisted by a team of civil servants, such as the District Coordinating Director, Planning Officer, Budget Officer, and Finance Officer, who provide managerial and technical support for the MMDAs.

In all, about 87 functions ranging from environmental sanitation to infrastructure provision have been delegated to the Assemblies. Figure 1 provides a broad list of MMDA functions. In metropolitan areas, however, environmental sanitation constitutes the single biggest function of Metropolitan Assemblies. This function has tended to overshadow other equally important functions such as physical planning, development control, and investments promotion.

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**Figure 1: Functions of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs)**

The functions of the District Assemblies are spelled out in detail in the Section 10(1) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and Section 2 of the National Development Planning Act, 1994 (Act 480). The functions of the Assembly are defined as deliberative, legislative, and executive. Section 10(1) of Act 462 provides details of the functions of the District Assemblies as follows:

- Responsible for the overall development of the district and shall ensure the preparation and submission through the Regional Coordinating Council;
  
  i. development plans of the district to the National Development Planning Commission for approval and;
  
  ii. budget of the district related to the approved plans to the Minister for Finance for approval.

- Formulate and execute plans, programs and strategies for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district;

- Promote and support productive activity and social development in the district and remove any obstacles to initiative and development;

- Initiate programs for the development of basic infrastructure and provide municipal works and services in the district;

- Responsible for the development, improvement and management of human settlements and the environment in the district;

- Cooperate with appropriate national and local security agencies responsible for the maintenance of security and public safety in the district;

- Initiate, sponsor or carry out such studies as may be necessary for the discharge of any of the functions conferred by the Act or any other enactment and;

- Perform such other functions as may be provided under any other enactment

In addition, Section 10(4) of Act 462 urges the District Assembly to take such steps and measures as are necessary to the execution of approved development plans of the district.
Slums and Municipal Interface: Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra

As already noted, to better manage the complex challenge of urban growth, the sub-structures of Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) and Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (STMA) have been established: AMA has thirteen Sub-metropolitan Assemblies and STMA three. It is the Sub-metropolitan Assemblies and their other substructures which are tasked with the responsibility of dealing with waste management, infrastructure development, and other needs of communities within their areas of jurisdiction. The sub-structures are very important as they form the basis for problem identification and for the initiation and implementation of self-help projects at the local level.

Field observation in the two metropolises, however, revealed that in many communities the sub-structures (Area Councils and Unit Committees) are absent or non-functional. This is well captured in this quote by a member of the Avenor Unit Committee:

We have problems with the Avenor Unit Committee.... We were elected as members of the Unit Committee, but the Committee has not been inaugurated. So it means we have not been given any mandate to work. So either these Unit Committees are abolished or they [authorities] find some ways and means to help them work.

Attempts at addressing the infrastructure and services needs by the AMA and STMA respectively have been conceived in terms of public-private partnerships. According to Ayee and Crook, since the creation of the Metropolitan Assemblies provision of services in the metropolitan areas has entailed two similar approaches. These are privatization of waste collection and public sanitation (through franchising and contracting out) and encouraging more community-based participation in the provision of local cleansing and sanitation services (mainly through engaging micro-enterprises for local waste collection and franchising management of public toilets to approved local businesses and community groups).

The indirect attempt by the Metropolitan Assemblies to provide poor urban communities with services like toilets and solid waste collection has run into difficulties. First, with weak or non-existent Unit Committees, Assemblies have delegated their role as the development agent to private enterprises and other individuals. This approach has further distanced the Assemblies from the people—a view which has reinforced the perception that the Assembly is unresponsive to community needs. Hence, the widely held view among residents of the study communities that “the Assembly has done nothing in this community.” Second, the franchising and sub-contracting of public services to micro-enterprises and individuals by the Metropolitan Assemblies have enhanced and facilitated city government political patronage networks. It must be stressed that these networks go further up to the level of the national or central government. Recent events involving the compulsory seizure of public toilets in many parts of Accra and Tema by supporters of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) following the party’s victory in national elections in December 2008 and subsequent change of government in January 2009 give credence to this view.

Though contracts for operating public toilet and other services are supposed to be given to entities with demonstrated capacity, in reality most frequent beneficiaries are Assembly Members and others associated with the Sub-Metropolitan Assemblies and their parent organizations (AMA and STMA) as well as political party leaders and their affiliates. In Sabon Zongo, focus group discussions and key informant interviewees noted that a change in the position of an Assembly member or an official of the Sub-Metropolitan Assembly implied a change in the business entity or individual managing the public toilets in the community. As such the regulatory role of the Sub-Metropolitan Assemblies has been severely weakened due largely to conflict of interest resulting in poor services delivery – services which the poor...
have to pay for either formally or informally. Thus, though public toilets have been privatized and users pay for the service, quality has remained very poor. For example, a participant in the women’s focus group discussion, Sabon Zongo, stated: “The toilets have not improved. They have become worse. We have to queue to use the toilets even as early as 5 a.m. and because of the stench you need to change your clothes after visiting the place.”

As the overall development authorities for Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi, the AMA and STMA are required to spearhead the development of their respective cities. However, a key weakness of the AMA and STMA is their weak development planning focus. Like much of Ghana, planning and development control have largely chased development. In large cities and towns such as Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi, however, this situation is exacerbated by the rapid pace of urban sprawl and population growth. Both AMA and STMA have a Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP), which is linked up or tied with the three pillars of Ghana’s development policy framework, as outlined in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II). Content analysis of both cities’ MTDP indicates programs of action emphasizing among others slum upgrading, improving sanitation and waste management, provision of basic services and infrastructure, sealing of roads, and construction of drains in flood prone areas. If carried out, these development programs would have both a direct and indirect impact on slum communities in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi.

As with many development plans formulated at the national and local levels, a key constraining factor is the lack of political will and inadequate funds to implement plans. Indeed, the logframe of the MTDP of AMA on slum upgrading listed political will, and adequate financial and logistical commitments as key assumptions/risks for plan implementation. The lack of political will results partly from the absence of a comprehensive national policy framework on urban and regional development as well as the half-hearted approach to fiscal decentralization. This weak financial situation of local governments is further compounded by the lack of transparency and accountability in the disbursement and mobilization of funds by the Assemblies. In fact, annual reports of the state’s Auditor-General and the Accountant General have consistently revealed a number of lapses centered on corruption and poor financial performance of the MMDAs (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Commonly Reported Lapses or Internal weaknesses in the Financial Management Performance of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies by the Auditor-General and the Accountant-General](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v12/v12ia1.pdf)

- Non-submission of accounts
- Misapplication of funds
- Non-deduction of 5 percent withholding tax on contract payments
- Questionable payments for uncompleted projects
- Overdue loan payments
- Goods paid for but not delivered
- Suppression of value books
- Failure to retire imprest
- Unsatisfactory performance of Revenue Collectors
- Weak internally-generating revenue mechanisms.

In the context of limited fiscal decentralization by the state and lapses or internal weaknesses in the financial management of Assemblies, implementation of development plans and programs has been seriously affected. The non-implementation of development plans and programs account for the disillusionment with the performance of the AMA and STMA and their Sub-Metropolitan Councils, and hence comments such as the following from a key informant of Ga Mashie, Accra:

> What they [AMA] need all the time is making money for themselves. You know AMA goes round all over Accra collecting property rates. What are they using that money for? Recently the “borla” people [garbage collectors] complained that they have not been paid. The “borla” [garbage] was all over the place. What are they using the money for? Every morning they go to the market women to collect taxes, what are they using the money for?

As illustrated in the above quotation, questions have been raised regarding the efficient use of resources by the MMDAs. Thus, while funding may not be enough or inadequate in the light of numerous demands by various communities, questions have been raised about the way contracts have been awarded, projects funded, their total cost, and the quality of work on projects executed by the MMDAs. It is also difficult to assess the various targets set out in the two cities’ Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP). The MTDP covering the period 2006-2009 has now expired. Comments from top officials of the Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assemblies suggest quite clearly that actual developments in the two cities have to a large extent not been guided by their respective plans. This supports Donkor’s assertion that development plans in Ghana are mere “paper tigers” drawn with ambitious rhetoric and agenda that in most cases failed to see the light of day.

Even though several institutions, including traditional authorities, NGOs, and CBOs interface with the poor and slum communities, none of these institutions are better placed than the Metropolitan Assemblies. Owing to weak structures, which to a large extent are due to unclearly defined mandate and inadequate finance, CBOs tend to have a very limited impact on the overall well-being of communities. NGOs tend to be project-focused and engage urban communities during project duration and therefore have a relatively short-term impact on these communities. In addition, NGOs have been criticized for duplication of efforts. As an expert respondent in Sekondi-Takoradi noted that NGOs “waste time only to go to the communities to duplicate each others effort such that they provide similar community services every now and then.”

All communities (including urban) in Ghana have traditional authorities represented by the chieftaincy institution. The powers and authority of chiefs are anchored in traditions and customs of the locality in question. However, chieftaincy disputes, centered on who were the first settlers and hence owners of the land, and by extension overlord (chief) of the community, are present in all the study communities. Therefore, the use of traditional leadership as a community unifying institution is problematic. The key informant interviews and focus group discussions conducted in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi revealed a high level of displeasure with these disputes among residents. Respondents noted that these chieftaincy disputes have slowed community development and created disharmony among community members, as noted by a 20-year female trader and resident of New Takoradi, Sekondi-Takoradi: “there have been some general improvements in this community [New Takoradi] but not so much as expected because of chieftaincy disputes.... This problem has persisted for quite a long time now. In fact, we need unity and peace in New Takoradi.”
Conclusion: Implications for Urban Development

Decentralization has been widely trumpeted as a key antidote to the challenges of metropolitan areas. This belief has been pushed on the basis of the argument that decentralization brings government closer to the governed both spatially and institutionally. More specifically, the argument has been made that decentralization enhances governance and therefore allows municipal governments to be more knowledgeable about and responsive to the needs of the urban people, most especially the urban poor. While we largely share this belief, the critical question is how to translate this belief into practice.

Ghana, like most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, is undergoing rapid urbanization, with massive growth of its metropolitan areas. The urbanization process and its attendant challenges of increasing poverty and slums development, poor infrastructure, and poor sanitation and waste management, especially in large metropolitan areas such as Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi, are occurring within the context of a decentralization program introduced since 1988. A widely shared view is that poor city infrastructure and neighborhoods are the result of poor city governance. In this direction, decentralization has been strongly advocated as a solution to the emergence of urban slums and other challenges of rapid urban growth in many parts of the developing world. However, the Ghanaian case as explored in this study indicates that decentralization is unlikely to have meaningful impact on poor urban communities if it is based on mere rhetoric.

Poor urban communities in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi are confronted by weak infrastructure and services provision. Most critical to these poor urban communities is the poor state of waste and sanitation facilities. To address this situation, AMA and STMA have conceived two approaches, namely, privatization and community-based participation in waste collection and management of public toilets. These approaches have, however, run into difficulties due to weak local institutional structures (especially local government sub-structures) to monitor the activities of private operators as well as public agitation against payment for poor services. In addition, the franchising of waste collection and sanitation has enhanced the city government’s political patronage, for contract awards have become a means of rewarding political loyalists. This has further weakened the Metropolitan Assemblies’ capacity to regulate private operators and ensure improved service delivery.

As highlighted in other studies, the Assemblies have not been adequately resourced in relation to the numerous functions delegated to them under the law by the central government. This situation has been compounded by the Assemblies’ lack of accountability in the disbursement of funds and a perception of widespread corruption. Also, the sub-district structures of the Metropolitan Assemblies, which would have given the Assemblies’ visibility in poor communities as well as act as liaison structures between poor communities and top-level city and national structures, have remained absent and non-functional. Therefore the Metropolitan Assemblies have not made any significant impact on the provision of services, infrastructure, and the performance of the basic municipal functions. As such, the contribution of Metropolitan Assemblies in the two cities of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi to urban development and urban poverty reduction could be described as marginal at best.

In the absence of effective sub-district structures to actively engaged poor urban communities, the Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assemblies have attempted to address the poor municipal-community interface through the use of local FM radio stations and mobile public address systems mounted on vehicles (information vans). These are, however, ineffective. This is because in many cases the timing of these radio programs or of
announcements using the mobile public address systems; the cost of calling in to a local FM radio program; and the language or medium of communication. All of these hinder the poor from participating in such programs.

Despite the challenges hampering the smooth operations of the Metropolitan Assemblies and their sub-structures, they remained the most credible urban institution in terms of interfacing with slum communities in particular, the poor in general. Besides credibility, the Assemblies have the potential to promote pro-poor governance agendas as they are directly linked to higher decision and policy making levels. Unlike other actors such as traditional authorities, NGOs, and CBOs, Assemblies are uniquely placed in terms of influencing policy. Therefore, they have the potential to promote a pro-poor development agenda and a broad-based development process that will benefit the majority of the Ghanaian population.

For Metropolitan Assemblies to remain an effective urban development authority and a credible interface agent with poor urban communities, they must have all their sub-district structures as articulated under the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462) functional and operational. This will facilitate the process of community involvement and even ownership of local services. It will also improve accountability of service providers in cases where services such as toilets and solid waste collection are contracted out to private entities by re-directing services provision towards citizens’ concerns and priorities, and provide voice to those concerns and priorities.38 This envisaged strategy for the development of poor urban communities is dependant on the central government’s commitment to a genuine decentralization program. This is because the extent to which decentralization results in improvements in human development outputs and poverty reduction is largely a function of the resources and systems for allocating funding, primarily by the central government.

Notes

1 Davis, 2004; UNFPA, 2007a, 2007b.
4 Beall, 2000a.
5 BBC, 2007, p. 16.
6 Beall, 2000a.
8 NDPC, 2005, p. 53.
9 Naustdalslid, 1992; Mohan 1996; Crook and Manor 1998.
10 This study was funded by Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) Ghana with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The field exercise was carried out between June-August 2008.
11 Devas, 2005.
13 Devas, 2005.
15 Beall, 2000b.
16 Castells, 1983.
17 Chaplin, 1999.
18 Ayee and Crook, 2003; Crook and Ayee, 2006.
The official data on Avenor (Accra) as of 2000 from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) in terms of households used of toilet, door-to-door solid waste collection, and in-house pipe-borne water must be accepted here with caution. This is because our field investigations (including transect walk) in Avenor in June-August 2008 indicated that only one household had an in-house toilet, with the rest of the households dependant on the only public toilet in the community. Heller (1999) has called for caution in the use of official statistics on sanitation and waste due to distortions that result from considering the population served by collective systems as being the same as the population who benefit from these services.

References


Combatting Corruption in Nigeria: The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes (EFCC)

EMMANUEL OBUAH

Abstract: Corruption is a persistent cancerous phenomenon which bedevils Nigeria. Misappropriation, bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and money laundering by public officials have permeated the fabric of the society. The office seekers of major political parties top the list of unfit or corrupt officials. Elected officials in high echelons of power and public officers use their positions to engage in corrupt activities. It is estimated that corruption accounts for 20 percent of the GDP of Nigeria. For several years, Nigeria has been at the bottom of Transparency International’s (TI) Corrupt Perception Index (CPI) ranking. In 2002, the Nigerian government created the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption and financial crimes. This paper reviews the scope of corruption and the efforts by the Nigerian government to combat it by examining the various perspectives for understanding the causes of corruption. The study while recognizing the importance of the various perspectives, notes that both the rent-seeking and institutional theories offer deeper insights into the systemic nature of Nigerian corruption. Finally, the article examines the activities of the EFCC and notes that it faces serious challenges as the configurations of the Nigerian political landscape are uncertain.

Introduction

Corruption is a persistent cancerous phenomenon which bedevils Nigeria. It has been acknowledged in many quarters that corruption is Nigeria’s worst problem and is largely responsible for its woes, such as the instability in the Niger Delta, the debt overhang, barriers to democratic elections, and impediment to flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Nigeria is not significantly dissimilar to many developing countries: corruption has been a multifaceted phenomenon characterizing the global economy. Although most studies of corruption focus on developing countries, there are few studies on corruptive practices, the role of the anti-corruption agency, and the debilitating impact of corruption on Nigeria.
There are a number of reasons for focusing on the scope and impact of corruption in Nigeria and the difficulties in dealing with it. Nigeria occupies a central place in Africa as the most populous country, with an estimated population of over 149 million. It is one of the continent’s richest countries and is blessed with a huge diversity of natural and human resources. It is also characterized by a multiplicity of different ethnic groups. Like many mono-cultural economies in Africa, its economy is heavily dependent on crude oil. Paradoxically, it is this important natural resource that sustains corruption in Nigeria. As in many African states, corruption is a malaise that infects the society. Corruption drains from African countries over $140 billion per year.\(^3\) Corruption deters investment because it is a disincentive to potential investors; it distorts public expenditure, increases the overheads for running businesses, and diverts resources from poor to rich countries. According to Transparency International (TI), corruption accounts for about 20 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\(^4\) Nigeria is also identified as among the top nations in the over $1 trillion annually paid globally in bribes.\(^5\) Corruption was partly responsible for the collapse of the first (1960–66) and second (1979–83) republics. These interesting facts make the choice and significance of Nigeria apt, especially as it is one of the few countries in Africa that has taken a bold step to set up an anticorruption agency to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of corruption activities.

Corruption in the form of misappropriation, bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and money laundering permeate Nigerian society. Over the years, various administrations have articulated polices and measures designed to combat corruption. Examples include General Murtala Mohammed’s (1975–76) crusade to confiscate assets illegally acquired by Nigerians; Shehu Shagari’s (October 1979–December 1983) ethical revolution to combat corruption through the introduction of code of conduct for public servants; General Muhammadu Buhari’s (December 1983–August 1985) war against indiscipline; and General Ibrahim Babaginda’s (August 1985–August 1993) ethical and social mobilization crusade. These efforts have been largely cosmetic attempts to address a systemic problem that is deeply rooted in the country’s fabric. In addition to these ethical schemes, there have been a number of legislative acts and functional mechanisms to combat corruption. Prominent among them include the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (1991), the Financial Malpractices in Banks Act (1994), the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act (1995), the Nigerian Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2000), and so forth. In its effort to fight corruption and create credibility to attract international investments, the Obasanjo administration (May 1999–May 2007) among other things, established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002. The EFCC is charged with wide ranging responsibilities within the context of preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting cases of economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.

The central argument here is that in spite of the creation of the EFCC, major political parties’ office seekers, elected officials, and public officers use their positions of authority and access to power to engage in corrupt activities. To this end, the paper examines the salience of Nigeria, the scope and severity of corruption in
Nigeria, and the government’s attempt to combat corruption through the creation of the EFCC. The article argues that although corruption appears in many forms in Nigeria, both the institutional and rent-seeking theories offer better understanding of the underlying causes of corruption. Finally, there is a discussion of the structure, role, and activities of the EFCC and its continued relevance in Nigeria’s political landscape.

The Causes of Corruption in Nigeria

Corruption has been defined differently by various scholars and organizations. One widely cited definition is that proffered by Nye: “corruption is a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status-gain; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding behavior.” According to the World Bank, corruption is the abuse of public office for private gains. It estimates the cost at about $80 billion worldwide. This includes public officials accepting, soliciting, or extorting bribes, and private actors offering bribes to subvert or circumvent public policies for competitive advantage and profit. Similarly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined corruption as the “misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit – through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement.” TI defines corruption as an inappropriate or illegal behavior of the public sector official (politician or public officer) by misusing the entrusted power for private gain of the person or related people.

There is a substantial body of literature on corruption. There is also a corpus of country-based and sector-based studies on corruption in developing countries that show not only the ramifications but the lively market that corruption creates, especially in parts of the bureaucracy that can generate huge bribes. The literature generally suggests five strands of hypotheses as explanations for the causes of corruption: rent-seeking, cultural relativity, low salary, imitation, and institutional/political centralization.

Some scholars have argued that corruption could make positive contributions to the economic and political development of an economy. For examples, Myrdal and Leff point out the significance of corruption as a deliberate tool of administrative delay that attracts more bribes and acts as a lubricant to an otherwise sluggish economy. For both Merton and Abueva, corruption in the form of nepotism, spoils, and graft perform a requisite function to aspects of political development such as unification and stability, popular participation in public affairs, development of viable political parties, and bureaucratic responsibility. Abueva further noted that in capital hungry economies of developing countries, large-scale graft that funnels capital to struggling entrepreneurs aids them in creating industries. On the contrary, others, including various studies by the World Bank and UNDP, show negative impacts of corruption on investment, growth of the economy, and the political process.
The other strand of literature on corruption deals with the various attempts through legislation and the establishment of functional mechanisms to deal with corruption and other financial crimes.\textsuperscript{16} The study by Chukwuemerie and Malgwi, which focused on corruption and the measures introduced by various Nigerian governments to combat it, is very instructive. While recognizing the contributions of these studies in understanding corruption in Nigeria, their work complements and expands the scope of existing studies by assessing the role of EFCC in fighting corruption.

According to the World Bank, corruption occurs when “the actions of individual(s), groups, or firms in both the public and private sectors influence the formation of laws, regulation, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage by means of illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.”\textsuperscript{17} It could also occur when changing and altering the implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of illicit and non-transparent provision of private gain to public officials. While there are a number of explanations on the causes of corruption, the following explanations would suffice: cultural relativity, low salary syndrome, imitation, institutional, and rent-seeking.\textsuperscript{18}

According to the cultural relativity argument, the covetousness of corruption in developing countries occurs when gift giving becomes a bribe resulting from new consciousness developed among students, military officials, and others created by rapid industrialization whereby they are exposed to the modern world. The cultural relativity school contends that confusion between bribes and gifts, the process of modernization, the burden of the extended family system, and the lack or absence of public domain are responsible for corruption in developing countries.\textsuperscript{19} As de Dardan pointed out, the absence of public property in traditional African societies is responsible for the inability of African leaders to distinguish their public functions and property from their private ones.\textsuperscript{20} Although this may account for some corruption in Africa, the notion that traditional African societies lacked public domain is a non sequitur because there are traditional structures in African societies, such as village farmland, lineage farmland, village squares, village huts, and communal roads that are communally owned and maintained. Secondly, as Kallon noted, even if the public domain argument was credible, it is still misleading, for those involved in corruption are well-educated people, many of whom were trained in the western tradition, which supposedly has long tradition of public domain.\textsuperscript{21}

Corruption in Nigeria and other developing countries has also been explained in terms of low-salary and strong kinship ties. This perspective opines that public officials in developing countries are corrupt because their salaries are so low that they cannot make ends meet by depending solely on their meager salaries. Furthermore, strong kinship ties characteristic of these societies place nepotistic pressure on public officials. Accordingly, they resort to corrupt activities to make ends meet and help the relatives.\textsuperscript{22} Although this might be plausible for the medium and low levels public officials, it does not explain why highly paid public partake in corrupt activities. Although low salaries may not be a justification for graft, this
perspective offers insight into the wide spread corruption, cronyism, and nepotistic activities in Nigeria.

Another explanation is derived from the theory of imitation arising from the proclivity of human being to copy or imitate the lifestyles of other individuals believed to have accomplished important things in the society. Using Maslow’s concepts of hierarchy of needs and Bandura’s observational learning theory, Gire suggested that corruption is prevalent and reproduced in Nigeria because of the imitation of the lifestyle and behavior of other members of the Nigerian society who are, or have been, in positions of authority.23

Furthermore, the UNDP’s institutional theory offers an interesting perspective on corruption. According to this perspective, corruption arises when public officials have wide ranging authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives, or when their accountability responds to informal rather than formal forms or regulation. For institutional theorists, the causes of corruption result from a failure of state institutions and a lack of the capacity to manage society by means of a framework of social, judicial, political, and economic checks and balances, or where there is monopoly control of public officials wielding discretionary powers in the absence of accountability systems.24 The institutional explanation is pertinent to understanding the breadth and depth of corruption among governors and chairpersons of states and local government areas (LGAs) in Nigeria since 2000. Institutional theory can be explained in terms of political centralization in which the governors and chairpersons claim that the 1999 Nigerian constitution bestowed immunity from prosecution while in office. This has resulted in an abuse of power, extravagance, and a gross abuse of the budgeting process. For example, the governor of Rivers State in 2006 budgeted $33.2 million for unspecified “grants, contributions and donations”; $77 million for unspecified “special projects”; $65,000 per day for transport and travel for his office; and $11.5 million for purchasing new government vehicles.25 The situation in Rivers State is similar to that in other states.

Finally, rent-seeking has been used to explain the incidence of corruption in Nigeria. According to this perspective, corruption results from too much government intervention in the economy, which creates rent-seeking opportunities. Rent-seeking is a redistributive activity that takes up resources. Corruption therefore results from rent-seeking when someone has a monopoly over goods or services and has discretion to decide who receives, when it is received, and how much is received.26 Rent-seeking through corruption by public officials can hurt innovative activities, and since innovation drives economic growth, public rent-seeking can distort and hamper growth even more severely than production.27 Public rent-seeking includes, but is not limited to, the following: taking bribes for issuance of business licenses or permits; taxes on documents; taking bribes to obtain import licenses; and taking bribes to influence bids for privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) or for government contracts. Shleifer and Vishny noted that these forms of rent-seeking are more likely to hurt innovation because innovators need these government-produced services and goods. These services are inelastic to business. They therefore become primary targets of corruption. If, therefore, innovators do not have money to pay
bribes to get licenses and permits, for example, they would not be able to enter the market and innovate.28 The rent-seeking theory, for the most part, appears to explain the incidence of corruption amongst public officials in strategic positions in Nigeria. The following are some of the underlying causes of corruption in Nigeria that may emanate from rent seeking activities:

1. *The lack of transparent financial institutions in an economy can make a larger part of the population dependent on corruption.* In the 1980s, the discredited Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) aided Nigerian officials to launder money derived from corrupt activities in overseas banks.29 In recent times, Nigeria has seen a spike in bank failures and takeovers due to corruption and money laundering.

2. *Where the government is involved in buying and selling of goods and services and distribution of subsidies.* Under such situation a private firm may want to bribe a government official if the department is involved in awarding contracts so that the official may structure the bidding specification in order that the firm is the only qualified supplier, or is selected as the winning contractor. For example, the British Serious Fraud Office investigated an allegation that a British-based company in Nigeria set up a slush fund of $170 million to bribe Nigerian officials to win building contracts.30 The danger is that once selected, the firm may charge inflated prices or skimp on quality because it had already bribed government officials. Various administrations over the years introduced rent-seeking activities. For example, General Ibrahim Babaginda’s programs in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the construction of the new capital territory in Abuja, the revitalization of the troubled steel and aluminum industries, and the Liberian mission created rent seeking opportunities.31 Bribes for government contracts are paid upfront, and once paid, contractors can pretty much do as they please. The government’s involvement in the provision of subsidies and benefits can also cause corruption, especially where the services are too low or limited to satisfy all who qualify, or when government officials use their discretion in allocating services.

3. *Corruption may also arise where firms and individuals want to avoid the cost of delay.* For example, businesses are likely to pay “speed money” in order to facilitate faster processing of application or documents. Individuals frisked at police check points in Nigeria are likely to pay bribe in order to avoid wasting their precious time. Similarly, individuals who apply for passports or driver’s licenses in Nigeria are likely to pay bribe to speed up the issuing process.

Although the foregoing perspectives are very important in understanding the scope and severity of corruption in Nigeria, the rent-seeking and institutional theories offer more insights to the severity and scale of corruption that characterize the public sector in Nigeria.

**The Scope of Corruption in Nigeria**

Nigeria has been variously classified as a “failed,” “failing,” or “fragile” state in which governments consistently fail to honor the social contract entered with the people and in which kleptocratic and “lootocratic” practices have been identified as...
significant debilitating indicators to its development. A failed state is one in which the institutions of the state and society are weak and lack the necessary capacity to manage society through various checks and balances. Nigeria operates a fiscal federalism with a strong central government that controls and distributes the main resources to the federating units—the states and LGAs. Nigeria has 36 states and 774 LGAs. Under this arrangement, both states and LGAs receive monthly appropriations from the federal government. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, this system has led to the “decentralization of corruption”- a situation in which corruption has become rampant and an organized crime. Some LGAs (in Abia, Bauchi, Kaduna, Ondo, Rivers, and Nasarawa states) have been accused of reckless spending and misappropriation of funds to the tune of N1.6 trillion ($1=N150) between 1999 and 2007.

The scope of corruption has expanded significantly since the administrations of Generals Ibrhahim Babaginda and Sani Abachi. For some scholars, Nigerian corruption has moved from prebendalism to predation in which office holders and public officials try to repay their supporters, family members, cronies, and ethnic group members with sums of money, contracts or jobs. Corruption was blamed for the collapse of the first (1960-66) and second (1979-83) republics. Part of the reason for the burgeoning of corruption is the economy’s reliance on crude oil, which encourages rent-seeking and corruption. The US Senate Kerry Report noted a link between oil and corruption in Nigeria. Among other things, it noted that under- or over-invoicing of imports and exports were common practices, especially in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). There were also reports that about £212bn in oil money had been looted from the country’s treasury by past and present leaders, and that the EFCC was helping to combat an estimated £12 billion which was annually stolen from state coffers.

It is common practice for government contracts to be inflated because public officials factor in kick-backs, which are usually paid upfront before the completion of the contracts. Graft continues to prevent the judiciary from functioning adequately. There is a widespread perception that judges are easily bribed or “settled.” For example, there were long delays and frequent requests from judicial officials for small bribes to expedite cases. The court Chief Registrar of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja was charged N37 million for fraud and money laundering in 2005. There were numerous allegations that legislators both at the national and state levels accepted bribes and favors from the executive branch to facilitate the passage of bills favorable to the executive branch. It was reported that some “powerful” Nigerians caused bank failures to the tune of N53 billion as a result of insider credit abuses.

Nigeria has been vulnerable to official venality. Elected officials, public servants, and military officials in position of authority use their positions to engage in corrupt activities. It has been projected by the EFCC that between 1960 and 1999 about £220 billion or $380 billion has been plundered and squandered by public officials in Nigeria. This is more than six times the amount the US provided for the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe under the Marshall Plan. During the early months of General Sani Abacha’s administration, an official report indicated...
that an estimated $12.2 billion had been side-tracked to off-budget accounts from
1988 through 1993, when General Ibrahim Babaginda was the Head of State.\textsuperscript{41} TI’s
2004 Global Corruption Report listed General Sani Abacha (1993-98) among the top
ten presidents who had allegedly embezzled between two and five billion dollars.\textsuperscript{42}
The 2006 row between President Obasanjo and the vice president over corruption
was indicative of how high corruption had permeated the Nigeria society. In fact, it
has been estimated that during the eight years of the Obasanjo administration,
Nigeria lost a minimum average of $4 billion to $8 billion per year to corruption
(equating between 4.25 percent and 9.5 percent of its total GDP in 2006).\textsuperscript{43}

Nigeria has been consistently ranked very low by TI. For examples, in 2006,
Nigeria ranked 146 out of 163 with 2.2 corruption perception index (CPI) score; and
in 2007, it was ranked 148 with 2.2 score.\textsuperscript{44} According to TI, low CPI scores indicate
that the public institutions are heavily compromised. Furthermore, TI noted that in
Nigeria, more than 50 percent of bribes were directly asked for, while 60 percent
were offered to avoid problems with authorities; and more that 40 percent offered
bribes to obtain access to a service they were entitled to.\textsuperscript{45}

According to the Independent Advocacy Project (IAP) corruption index, the most corrupt sectors in
Nigeria were the Nigerian Police Force, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria, the
Ministry of Education, and the Customs and Excise Department.\textsuperscript{46}

The most worrisome aspect is that corruption is deepening and taking new
dimensions, especially among the Nigerian states. The September 2006 EFCC report
indicated that corruption among states had reached a tragic stage where some state
governors were stealing, looting state treasuries and fronting relatives with state
money to establish their own private businesses. For example, the governor of Abia
State, Orji Kalu, was alleged to have siphoned government funds to the tune of N35
billion using his wife, mother, daughter, and brothers as fronts to establish a business
empire which included Slok Airline, Slok Pharmaceuticals, and a newspaper house.\textsuperscript{47}

It is against this backdrop that this article examines the activities of the EFCC since
its creation.

\textit{The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)}

Given scope of corruption and the tarnished image of Nigerian in international
circles, the Nigerian Government in 2002 created an anti-corruption agency with the
mission “to curb the menace of corruption that constitutes the cog in the wheel of
progress; protect national and foreign investment in the country, imbue the spirit of
hard work in the citizenry and discourage ill gotten wealth; identify illegally
acquired wealth and confiscate it; build an upright workforce in both public and
private sectors of the economy and; contribute to the global war against financial
crimes.”\textsuperscript{48} The creation of the EFCC marked a significant shift from rhetoric about
fighting corruption to actually fighting corruption. Efforts by previous governments
to provide the legal frameworks for combating corruption included, but were not
limited to, the Miscellaneous Offences Act 1985; the creation of the National Drug
Law Enforcement Agency in 1989; the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act
1991; the Money Laundering Act of 1995; the Advanced Fee Fraud and Related
The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission | 25

Offences Act 1995; and the Foreign Exchange Miscellaneous Offences Act 1995. Noble and desirable these efforts were, either they were strangled due to inadequate enabling laws and regulations or neglected for an apparent lack of commitment on the part of stakeholders to fight corruption in high places.49

At the global level, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was increased pressure on developing countries by governments of industrialized countries and international organizations to combat and reduce corruption, which had become widespread and was a bane to economic development. For example, the Group 7 countries at its 1989 summit established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering. By 2001, the FATF had placed Nigeria on the list of non-cooperative countries.50 It was against this backdrop of failed efforts and international pressure that President Olusegun Obasanjo adopted a multi-pronged approach to fight corruption in order to redeem Nigeria’s image by creating or enacting the following: the Anti-Corruption Commission; the Due Process Office in the Presidency; the Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Act of 2000; and the EFCC Act of 2002.

The Purpose, Powers and Structure of the EFCC

The Establishment Act of 2002 (as amended in the EFCC Establishment, Etc. Act, 2003), bestows on the EFCC the broadest and most current laws against financial and economic crimes and terrorism in Nigeria. As a financial intelligence unit the EFCC is mandated to coordinate the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes, and terrorism.51 Under its broad economic and financial crime and terrorism mandate, the EFCC is charged with preventing, investigating, prosecuting, and penalizing financial and economic crimes such as illegal oil bunkering, terrorism, capital market fraud, cyber crime, advance fee fraud (419 or obtaining through different fraudulent schemes), banking fraud and economic governance fraud (transparence and accountability). The EFCC has extensive special and police powers including the power to: investigate persons and/or properties of persons suspected of breaching the provision of the Establishment Act of 2002 and any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.52

The EFCC has enabling powers under the Establishment Etc. Act 2003 and 2004 to deal with terrorism and terrorist offences including; willful provision or collection of money from anyone, directly or indirectly, to perpetrate an act of terrorism; committing or attempting to commit, participate, or facilitate the commission of a terrorist act; and making funds, financial assets, or economic resources available for use by any person or persons to commit or attempt to commit, facilitate, or participate in the commission of a terrorist act.53

The Structure

The EFCC is an independent agency headed by an executive chairman under the direction of a board. The chairman, supported by the directors of the five operations
units—financial crimes and intelligence; advance-fee fraud and other economic crimes, enforcement, and general operations; prosecution and legal counsel; organization and support; and training school—is the chief executive and accounting officer. The Commission receives support from the presidency, the legislature, and the judiciary. The agency also cooperates with like organizations from other countries to uncover corruption and money laundering activities involving Nigerians. In terms of its structure and organization, the Commission is committed to containing economic and financial crimes, generating and disseminating effective economic and financial crimes intelligence to assist law enforcement, and inculcating prudent and sincere dealing amongst Nigerians via a transparent value system and preventive measures. The organizational structure reflects the major broad activity areas of the commission, namely, economic and financial crimes intelligence, investigation and enforcement, prosecution, crime prevention through mass communication and advocacy, and proactive and reactive execution of anti-terrorism operations. The head office is in Abuja, with regional offices in Lagos, Enugu, and Port Harcourt.

Activities of EFCC since its Creation

Following its establishment, the Commission swung into action by launching “Operation Redemption,” which was intended “to get all economic and financial criminals out of business and behind bars.” The Commission challenged Nigerians to send any information on any government officials to it so that it could commence investigation. Nigerians responded, and those efforts paid dividends. The Commission has been involved in a number of investigations, arrests, and detentions resulting in indictments, return and recovery of stolen money, and imprisonment. The agency has been responsible for a number of high profile investigations such as that involving the former inspector general of Nigeria Police, Tafa Balogun who was accused of stealing more than $121 million and was jailed for six months, fined $30,000, and had property worth $150 million seized. The Commission was also responsible for the arrest of Hon. Morris Ibekwe (Imo State) for allegedly obtaining under false pretences the sum of $300,000 from a German national and head of the Munich System Organization Company. Other notable cases include the former governor of Lagos State, Major General Mohammed Buba Marwa; the former Chairman of the Nigeria Ports Authority, Bode George; the bribery scandal and fraud involving members of the National Assembly Committee and the Minister for Education over budget matters; the former governor of Bayelsa State, Chief Depreye Alamieyeseigha; the investigation of all state governors and local government officials as of December 2006; the thirty-year imprisonment of civil servant fraudsters in 2008; the trial of the Chairman of the National Electricity Regulatory Commission; and the trial of Mallam Nasir Ahmed El-Rufai, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, in 2009. The 2006 indictment of the serving Vice President, Atiku Abubakar for abuse of office, fraud, and embezzlement by both the EFCC and the Administrative Panel of Inquiry is indicative of how deep and
pervasive corruption has permeated the Nigerian society. The list is almost inexhaustible.

In addition to its investigative power, the EFCC has the power to bring charges of corruption so that accused persons can be brought to court for criminal trial. In 2006, the EFCC had received 4,200 petitions on illegal corruption, investigated 1,200 cases, and taken 406 cases to the court. After months of investigation of the petitions and allegations of corruption against thirty-one out of thirty-six states in Nigeria, the EFCC decided to indict fifteen governors and gave a clean bill to only six state governors. The appendix provides a summary of the list of governors that were indicted or under investigation or cleared of corruption in 2006. The EFCC’s indictments, arrests, and reports on corruption involving high profile public officials were indicative of the distance high level public officials in Nigeria were willing to go to exploit, loot, steal, misappropriate and launder public money for personal aggrandizement instead of improving the well-being of the people.

Before the 2007 general election, the EFCC published an advisory list of corrupt and unfit candidates to hold public offices. The list was submitted to all registered political parties and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). An analysis of the list of unfit politicians with respect to the spread among the major political parties showed that the Peoples Democratic Party had the highest number of unfit political office seekers (53), followed by the All Nigeria Peoples Party (39), the Action Congress (28), the Peoples Progressive Alliance (10), the Democratic Peoples Party (5), and the Alliance for Democracy (1). The spread among the states was: Zamfara (18), Adamawa (16), Taraba (15), Abia (12), and Bauchi (10). Furthermore, of the forty-three high profile cases amounting to over N1 trillion published by EFCC in October 2009, eleven involved former governors; five involved former federal ministers; two involved two serving senators and three serving members of the House of Representative; and several other cases involved high profile public civil servants.

The EFCC has also made progress in the following areas:

- Recovered money and assets derived from crime worth over $700 million, and £3 million from the British government between May 2003 and June 2004.
- Recovered N100 billion assets from ex-governors and N55 million bribes in 2005 from committee members of the National Assembly given as public relations to lobby for increase in education budget.
- Recovered N200 billion from fraudulent bank officials and $700 million from corrupt public officers who allegedly looted public funds.
- Confiscated over forty oil tankers engaged in crude oil bunkering.
- Recovered $750 million from 419 gangs and N50 billion worth of assets from the impeached governor of Bayelsa State, Chief Alamieyeseigha.
- Recovered over N85 billion by the Due Process Office.
• Put over five hundred suspects in custody and prosecuted one of the world’s biggest fraud cases involving the perpetrators Amaka Anajemba, Emmanuel Nwude, and Nzeribe Okoli who duped a Brazilian banker, Nelson Sakaguchi, of about $242 million.

• Indicted fifteen state governors in 2006.

• Made restitution to victims of 419 frauds recovered from scam investigations. For example, in October 2005, the EFCC refunded the sum of $4.48 million to an 86 year old Hong Kong woman, Juliana Ching.68

• Increased the revenue profile of Nigeria by about 20 percent due to its activities in the Federal Inland Revenue Service and the Seaports.

• Recovered revenue of over N20 billion from government, and billions more naira for the government in terms of failed contracts.

• Reduced crude oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta region through prosecution of persons involved and confiscation of ships.69

• Succeeded in securing the return of N50 million from the British Metropolitan Police Proceeds of Corruption Unit following the successful confiscation hearing of a mistress of a former governor of Plateau State, Chief Joshua Dariye.70

• Assisting banks to recover bad debts that resulted from credit abuse by directors of failed banks. For example, it confiscated documents and property worth N3.5 billion of the Chief executive Officer of Tanzila Petroleum Company, Ltd. for defaulting on a bank loan.71

• It has forty three ongoing high profile cases in different courts at various stages involving politicians, office holders, lawmakers, businesses, and non-Nigerians.72

Although the above examples are the tip of the iceberg, it is a significant and symbolic start. In cooperation and collaboration with other states and global actors such as the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the UK’s Office of Fair Trading and Metropolitan Police, and international actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, Egmont, and Microsoft, the EFCC is not only significantly contributing to the fight against corruption but is also helping salvage the hitherto negative image of Nigeria in the international arena. Nigeria’s image has for too long been synonymous with corruption, and the EFCC is working hard to change this image. For example, in May 2007, Nigeria became a member of the internationally acclaimed Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.73

**Challenges Facing the EFCC**

The EFCC faces some major challenges in the fight against corruption. One is the claim of immunity from arrest and prosecution by the president, vice president, and
governors and their deputies. Many state governors and their legal defense lawyers have interpreted the provisions in subsections 308(1) and 308(2) of the immunity clause of the 1999 Constitution as giving absolute immunity from criminal prosecution while in office. As a result of this institutional and legalistic argument, it has been difficult to prosecute these governors and also the vice president and the president while in office. This claim of immunity is absurd because it was not the intention of the framers of the constitution to allow elected officials to steal and plunder the nation’s wealth. However, although claiming immunity under subsection 308(1), governors can be prosecuted under civil law as provided by subsection 308(2).

The significant delays, frustrations, and waste of resources in the current prosecution regime constitute another challenge facing the EFCC. It has become an art for defense attorneys to ensure that financial crime cases do not continue, and substantive cases are never tried on their merits. Defense attorneys can delay and prolong cases by a tactic of applying for stays on proceeding. Where such application is not granted, the defense attorneys accuse the judges of bias and therefore grounds for application to transfer their cases to other judges.74 Similar to the above challenge is the problem of congestion and the slow pace of court proceedings caused by an insufficient number of courts and judges and antiquated manual recording system. Delays and congestion in judicial proceedings can be reduced by establishing a special financial crime court for the adjudication of corruption and money laundering cases.

Of equally importance is the cyber nature of financial crimes. This has created a jurisdictional challenge and increased the costs of investigation and prosecution. The digital revolution has collapsed traditional physical boundaries and therefore altered the territorial jurisdiction for the prosecution of cyber crimes. Associated with this jurisdictional problem is the challenge posed by the increasing costs of prosecuting these cases, which run into millions of naira.75 Furthermore, the EFCC faces the challenge of the inadequacy of the existing procedural laws in Nigeria that question the evidential status and admissibility of computer and electronically generated documentation.76 In fact, the Nigerian legal procedural system has not kept pace with evidential value of information generated by the cyber revolution. Finally, the EFCC faces the challenge posed by instability and continuity in leadership. By the end of 2007, Alhaji Ribadu was ordered to proceed on study leave and replaced by Ibrahim Lamorde in an interim capacity; and on May 2008, Farida Waziri was appointed as the Chairman of EFCC.77 Changes in leadership driven by partisanship without sufficient cause might jeopardize the efficacy of the Commission.

Conclusion
It has been the task of this article to examine the causes of corruption and the role of the EFCC in fighting it. Corruption in all its ramifications is severe and has permeated Nigerian society. The prevalence and preponderance of corruption activities dates back to the early independence period, but since the 1980s it has burgeoned to unprecedented proportion. Corruption occurs primarily when there is
a failure of established institutions and the lack of capacity by these institutions to manage frameworks of social, judicial, political, and economic checks and balances. In trying to understand the ramifications and severity of corruption in Nigeria, we have noted that although a clinical understanding of the causes of corruption and its widespread nature requires an application of all the perspectives for the explanation of the causes of corruption, both the rent-seeking and institutional theories offer deeper insights into the systemic nature of corruption.

It has been further noted that the rent-seeking activities causing corruption range from relationship between bureaucrats and their superiors, which provoke contests for positions, to the lack of transparency in financial institutions and the significant involvement of the government in the economy in the provision of goods and services. The web of relations established by rent-seeking activities coupled with decentralization of power among the various federal units in part explains corruption among the top echelon of government departments and the public sector. The major political parties continue to top the list of unfit or corrupt office seekers while elected officials, political appointees, police, customs and other public servants use their offices and positions to participate in corrupt activities.

The EFCC was created against the backdrop of previous failed schemes to combat corruption and the need to repair Nigeria’s image to attract foreign investment. The EFCC as an investigative and prosecutory agency has made some inroads in the fight against corruption among public officers. By investigating and prosecuting corrupt public officials accused of corruption and publishing an advisory list of corrupt and unfit candidates, the EFCC hopes to deter Nigerians from engaging in corrupt activities. The article further noted the serious challenges faced by the nascent anti-corruption agency. Although the EFCC has continued to investigate allegations of financial and economic crimes against former state governors and other public officials of the Obasanjo era, the next few years could be a litmus test for the war against corruption. The challenges will be: whether the EFCC continues to enjoy the support of a new presidency and national legislature in the campaign against corruption; whether the EFCC succumbs to the allegation (by a minority) that it picks only a few persons, especially those with serious political ambition, as scapegoats and abandons its strategies; and whether the EFCC can to expand its adversarial investigative strategies to include the private sector and, more importantly, those who served in the previous military administrations of General Ibrahim Babaginda and General Sani Abacha, a period that witnessed the massive looting of the country’s wealth by its leaders. These and others are the challenges that face the EFCC, and its future will depend on the political configurations that emerge.

Notes

1 Ribadu, 2007a.

2 The studies by Chukwuemerie (2003) and Malgwi (2004) expanded on the nature and scope of corruption and various mechanisms by various
Nigerian governments to deal with the problem. Although the role of the EFCC was discussed especially in Malgwi, the agency was at its early years of existence.

3 Ribadu, 2007b.
5 Malgwi, 2004, p. 149.
7 World Bank, 1997; Bhargava, 2005, p. 4.
20 De Darden 1999.
28 Ibid.
31 Lewis, 1996.
32 Obuah and Enyinda, 2004; Foreign Policy, 2006; World Bank IEP, 2006.
33 HRW, 2007a.
34 Ribadu, 2007c.
35 Lewis, 1996.
37 US Department of State 2005.
38 EFCC 2005.
41 Lewis, 1996.
43 HRW, 2007b, pp.31-2.
45 TI 2005.
49 Ribadu, 2004a.
50 Although Nigeria was listed as non-cooperative in 2001, by June 2003 the TAFT had determined that it had made some significant progress in the fight against corruption and removed it from the list of non-cooperative countries. See Malgwi, 2004, p. 146.
52 Ibid.
Atiku Abubakar was indicted for alleged corruption in the disbursement of the Petroleum Development Fund, which was placed in the Trans International Bank and the Equatorial Trust Bank. Following the indicted, the INEC denied him the right to compete in the presidential election. A Lagos High Court voided the documents that contained the allegations, and the Supreme Court later ruled that Atiku should compete for the election (Ajani et al., 2006; BBC News, 2007).


EFCC 2009c. The former governors were from the following states: Ekiti, Plateau x2, Jigagwa, Abia, Delta, Edo, Tarawa, Enugu, Adamawa, and Oyo. The estimated N1 trillion was the amount the author calculated based on the separate amounts published by EFCC.

www.efccnigeria.org.
71 Aminu, 2009; Ojeifo 2009.
72 EFCC, 2009c.
73 The Egmont Group, which has over 106 members with headquarters in Toronto, Canada, is an international network of FIUs that was formed in 1995 to promote the exchange of financial intelligence information and enhance global cooperation in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (Nwajah, 2007).
74 Ribadu, 2004b.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 THISDAY, 2008 May 16.

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www.efccnigeria.org. For EFCC reports and news.


**Appendix**

Appendix EFCC Investigation of State Governors in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicted Governors</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Governors under investigation</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chimaroke Nnamani</td>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>Adamu Mu'azu</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oriji Kalu</td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>Peter Odili</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boni Haruna</td>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>Ahmed Markafi</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayo Fayose</td>
<td>Ekiti</td>
<td>Lucky Igbinedion</td>
<td>Edo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adamu Abdullahi</td>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>James Ibori</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jolly Nyame</td>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>Bola Tinubu</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Dariye</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Gbenga Daniel</td>
<td>Ogun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sani Ahmed</td>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>Attahiru Bafarawa</td>
<td>Sokoto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saminu Turaki</td>
<td>Jigawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicted ex-state governors</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Governors cleared of corruption</td>
<td>State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chris Agige</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>Donald Duke</td>
<td>Cross River</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muhammed Lawal</td>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>Danjuma Goje</td>
<td>Gombe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abubakar Audu</td>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>Bukola Saraki</td>
<td>Kwara</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abba Ibrahim</td>
<td>Yobe</td>
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<td>Adamu Aliero</td>
<td>Kebbi</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Peter Obi</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
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The Role of Labor Migration to Neighboring Small Towns in Rural Livelihoods: A Case Study in Southern Province, Zambia

CHIHIRO ITO

Abstract: Securing a livelihood in rural Africa is a distinctly complex process involving interactions between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and between urban and rural activities. In addition to subsistence agriculture, farmers are often engaged in non-agricultural activities that provide important income sources in both rural and urban contexts. Although migratory labor is recognized as an important source of non-agricultural income, it has not been adequately considered in terms of livelihood diversity and access to various types of activities in the areas from which workers migrate. This article analyses the role of labor migration, especially to neighboring small towns, in relation to the complexity of livelihood strategies within the village. Field research in Southern Province, Zambia, revealed a great deal of variability among households in terms of strategies to maintain and improve their livelihoods. The article proposes that labor migration to neighboring small towns is crucial for livelihoods in rural areas for two main reasons. First, labor migration functions as a coping strategy when drought occurs. Second, migration is a livelihood choice based on an interrelation between access to other livelihood strategies and other social factors within the village.

Introduction

In contemporary Africa, securing a livelihood in rural areas has become progressively more complex over the last several decades. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to describe and analyze accurately the state of affairs in its entirety in terms of interactions among social and economic sectors and geographical territories. In most rural areas, agriculture has been the primary source of livelihood for most people. However, agricultural production is often supplemented and sometimes sustained by other social and economic activities to adapt and...
cope with variable environmental conditions and social and economic changes. Increasing pressures and opportunities resulting from recent economic liberalization and globalization have led to diversification in securing a livelihood becoming the norm. Some researchers have noted that non-agricultural activities typically are increasing in importance for rural livelihoods and that rural populations are becoming less agrarian with each passing year.

While non-agricultural activity has markedly increased in importance as a necessary component of rural livelihoods in recent times, labor migration has a long history in Africa, and has had a major influence on rural societies and economies since the colonial era. In many African countries, labor migration first arose with the recruitment of rural farmers into the mining sector and plantations. In this sense, labor migration was introduced to farmers in a structural policy-related context. Although much of this recruitment was involuntary at that time, it had a major effect on rural societies and economies and impacted livelihoods in both positive and negative ways. A large research effort has been directed toward analyzing the impact of labor migration on the home villages that migrants leave to find work. These impacts include remittances, which are considered a critical financial benefit of labor migration, and the effects of labor shortages on social organization.

At the same time, the primary concern of most migration studies has been on the reasons inducing people to move. The well-known framework for understanding the causes of migration has been the “push-pull” perspective, examining factors such as increasing population pressure, scarcity of land, and income disparity between urban and rural areas. The theories based on this perspective consider the migrating actor as an economically rational individual. In the late 1980s and 1990s, an academic movement known as "New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM)" criticized earlier migration studies for overly emphasizing the structural and historical factors involved in migration, and producing an individualistic view. Oded Stark stressed that most households have kept their social and economic ties with areas in which labor is performed and remittances are sent from. Consequently, he argues that the unit of analysis should be the family or household rather than individual, which previous thinking had recognized as a single rational actor and decision maker in the act of migration. More recent studies influenced by NELM have analyzed labor migration as a household strategy in a more holistic framework. However, these studies typically attempt to understand the causes of migration within the framework of the ‘push-pull’ perspective, and their primary focus tends to be restricted to income differences between urban and rural areas, a shortage of land, agricultural failure, and the absence of employment opportunities in rural areas.

These previous migration studies have paid little attention to the conditions of livelihood diversity and complexity in the areas from which migration occurs. As mentioned
above, the sources of livelihood in rural areas are extremely diverse. Since the early 1990s, a number of studies concerned with livelihood diversification in rural Africa have emerged, in a framework known as the “Livelihood Approach.” One scholar defined livelihood diversification as “the process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and to improve their standards of living.” He emphasized the importance of diversification not only in regard to income sources, but also for access to income. A focus on access to strategies and assets related to securing income are thus important factors in examining rural livelihoods. Some case studies have indicated that income differentiation can be both a cause and a result of livelihood diversification and increasing non-agricultural income opportunities.

In situations where farmers are able to choose several ways of making a living in a given rural area, labor migration may not necessarily be the last resort. The decision-making process underlying labor migration may be more complex than previously believed. It is essential to reconsider the choice to migrate for labor under conditions where other options for sustaining their livelihoods are available, what the relationship is between other livelihood activities and labor migration, and how labor migration is integrated into rural society.

This article aims to clarify the role of labor migration in relation to livelihood diversity in rural areas. It will present a wider framework for understanding the causes and impacts of labor migration for rural societies and economies. Additionally, this article has a particular focus on the role of labor migration to neighboring small towns. Studies of migration and rural-urban interaction have traditionally focused on large cities. Small and intermediate sized towns, however, have been considered as having a critical role both for rural and urban development. Through analyzing the interactions between small towns and rural areas, this paper will elucidate their role as the destinations of labor migration. Moreover, it will provide a framework for understanding present-day rural Africa as an open system involving extensive interactions with small urban areas.

Methodology and Data

This study sought to produce a comprehensive understanding of social and economic systems in rural Africa, based on field work carried out in two villages in Lusitu Ward in Siavonga District, Southern Province, Zambia over two study periods, totaling sixteen months: August 2006 to March 2007 and August 2008 to March 2009.

The research methodology employed in this study included both interviews and participatory observation. I lived with local residents in the study villages and conducted interviews with heads of households (n=45), focusing on demographic change, social and
economic activities, and the agricultural situation. Thirty-seven people who had experienced labor migration, but resided in the village at the time of research, were identified for participation in interviews, regardless of age, sex, and social status. These thirty-seven people typically had experienced migration a number of times, resulting in a total of eighty-eight collected cases. Interviews were in-depth, one by one discussions about the migrants’ destinations, durations, motives, and work experiences. For the purposes of analyzing interactions among small towns, fieldwork was also carried out in a neighboring town, Siavonga. In addition to informants in the village, people who migrated from the study area and stayed or resided in the town were interviewed about their lives.

Most migration studies define labor migration as short-term, typically under a year. In this study, however, labor migration was not defined based on the length of time migrants spent away from their villages, because even migrants who spend several years away may be expected to return home. Even if migrant laborers no longer send remittances to their relatives at home, they may still be asked for assistance in case of hardship. Therefore, this article defines labor migration as migration undertaken with the aim of getting employment (earning an income) in the destination towns and cities. This attempt to include long-term migration allows for an examination of how migrants’ sentiments towards their hometown can be changed by the length of stay in their new residence.

The data analyzed here, as mentioned above, comes from people who had returned to their home village after their migration experience. However, in the field study conducted in Siavonga, some workers in the process of migration were interviewed. Some migrants were still in their destination cities and had the option to return to their home village. Thus, both positive and negative sides of migrants’ experiences could be investigated.

The following two sections provide a brief background of the study area and describe the livelihood activities undertaken by local people in detail. Next comes a section on the characteristics of labor migration in the study area and the conditions that made labor migration to small towns possible are presented and analyzed. The section that follows discusses the different roles and importance of labor migration among households with relation to rural livelihood diversity and access to it. Lastly, this study argues for an integrated perspective on labor migration from the point of the access to livelihood strategies and the social situation of each individual and household. It concludes that more attention should be paid to the daily interaction between the neighboring small towns and rural areas.

**Brief Background of Study Area**

The study area, Lusitu, is in the Siavonga District of Southern Province (Map 1),
approximately 150 km south of Lusaka along a paved road.

Map 1: Location of study area.

The Tonga constitute the primary ethnic group in the district and are dominant in the Southern Province. The study area in this paper was selected for two major reasons. First, Zambia has a long history of labor migration, which has occurred on a large scale beginning with the colonial era. However, the migration trend has changed in last twenty years. Since the 1920s, when copper mining began in Northern Rhodesia (present Zambia), the Copperbelt has been the major area for population influx. After independence in 1964, the capital city of Lusaka developed and began to constitute a major migration destination. The urban population rate in Zambia has increased from 21 percent in 1963 to 29 percent in 1969, and then to 40 percent in 1980. Most of the urban population was concentrated in the Copperbelt cities and Lusaka. However, this migration trend has changed since the late 1970s, when Zambia experienced a severe economic crisis due to the decline of copper prices and the sudden rise in oil prices, and also because of a national economic structure unaltered since the colonial era in its dependence on copper. In 1983, the Zambian government agreed to implement Structural Adjustment Programs, including raising the price of maize meal. These policies hit the living conditions of the urban population, especially those with low
incomes, and depressed the migration flow to major cities. In the past twenty years, net in-migration to urban areas as a whole has declined, particularly in the 1990s. In this situation, alternative migration trends have emerged. Some studies indicated that population movement from urban to rural areas predominate rather than from rural to urban areas, partly because of return migration, and that some small and intermediate regional cities have experienced a new influx of migrants. Therefore, in this changing trend of migration history in Zambia, it is important to see how small and intermediate towns work as the destinations of migration for rural people instead of the large cities.

A second reason is the relevance of the changing migration patterns to the study of livelihoods at the micro level. In the study area, people had originally resided along the Zambezi River before 1958. As the Kariba Dam, which was the largest artificial dam in the world at that time, was constructed by the colonial governments of then Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the local population was forced to leave and move to Lusitu. Because ecological conditions in the region were ill-suited for agricultural production, the local population has developed ways of compensating for the resulting food deficit. The Southern Province can be divided into five general topographical and ecological regions: the plateau, the valley, the escarpment, the Kafue flats and the Barotse plains. Lusitu is in the valley region. Annual precipitation in the valley ranges from approximately 600 to 800 mm. Figure 1 illustrates inter-annual variability of precipitation in the study area from 1974/75 to 2005/06.
Some characteristics of Tonga society related to the issues in this article are that the Tonga did not have strongly centralized organizations and the "villages are not necessarily enduring units with stable populations tied to particular localities." In the study area, this Tonga trait is observed pronouncedly because the resettlement caused by the Kariba Dam construction and its impact on society, such as national support and foreign aid from donors, NGOs, and churches after resettlement. In the study area, the number of "villages" has increased from five when they were resettled in Lusitu to twenty in 2008. Because the unit for receiving food aid is the "village," people sought to receive more aid through segmenting the villages to smaller scale. Therefore, the village does not have a strong meaning as a social unit, and social relationships are spread widely in the region. In terms of inheritance, the Tonga practice matrilineal descent, but some other features, such as residence and bride-price, echo a patrilineal system. Even in terms of inheritance, however, half of the land held by households were inherited by the father. Additionally, the land tenure system in the study area is that each individual or household that wants to cultivate new land needs to ask the headman and the chief for an allotment but instead only need to report after cultivating the land. The Tonga, especially in study area, therefore live within a loose and moderate matrilineal society.
Livelihood Situations in Study Area

Agriculture and Food Security

Even with inadequate conditions for productive agriculture, such as fluctuating rainfall and poor soil fertility, all households studied were engaged in farming for subsistence food production. Though some households had other sources of income, they had not abandoned agriculture. Maize is the primary staple food in most parts of Zambia. It is widely produced throughout Southern Province, both commercially and for subsistence. However, the sparse and fluctuating precipitation in Lusitu makes the region problematic for maize production. Instead, people primarily cultivate sorghum and pearl millet, which are more drought tolerant than maize. Mixed planting of different types of sorghum, pearl millet and maize can disperse the risks of production failure. Farmers commonly plant various kinds of cereals including five varieties of sorghum, pearl millet, and maize. These crops vary in maturation period, required amount of water, and taste. Each household studied had chosen a different combination of crops. Because of low rainfall, some households changed their plans from sowing maize to sorghum in the beginning of the rainy season in 2006/07.

Figure 2 shows the months that each household could keep the food from their storage in 2006/07 and 2007/08.
It is apparent that most households were unable to supply sufficient amounts of food throughout the year in 2006/07 (480 mm rainfall). Only thirteen were able to feed themselves successfully throughout the entire year. In the following 2007/08 season (780 mm rainfall), however, stored food in most households lasted for eleven or twelve months. In both years, however, there were some households that could keep their food more than a year. On the other hand, some households reported that they typically experienced hardship even when rainfall was relatively high. Therefore, they felt the need to obtain additional food or to earn cash to maintain their livelihood.

In the study area, farmers combined multiple kinds of food crops, and this flexibility is one method of risk divergence and management in this challenging agricultural environment. From the point of food security, it was indicated that food production and self-sufficiency in the study area were greatly influenced by rainfall, but there was some critical variation among households.

**Various Ways to Earn Cash and Coping Strategies for Drought**

Cotton is a major cash crop in the study area. Planting cotton has a low initial cost, because cotton companies lend seed and agrochemicals to set up the crop. They then deduct the costs from farmers’ earnings at harvest. Households that planted cotton receive their income in May or June. In 2007/08, the average income from cotton was 928,764 Zambian Kwacha (ZMK), which was equivalent to 265 US dollars. However, income varied substantially among planting households, ranging from 23,000 to 5,049,000 ZMK (7 to 1,442 US dollars). Income from cotton also tended to vary year to year because of rainfall fluctuation. In addition, cotton requires more labor than other crops in terms of weeding and spraying. Therefore, some households fail to harvest enough cotton to cover their costs. Villagers reported that they commonly began planting cotton in one season, but stopped in the following season if they did not earn enough profit.

Remunerative employment was the most stable and secure income source reported in the study area. There were three general types of employment in the area: formal, casual, and self-employment. Teachers and millers are examples of formal and casual employment. Millers, for example, could receive about 100,000 ZMK (29 US dollars) monthly. Examples of self-employed workers include carpenters, shop owners, and traditional beer sellers.

Wage labor, termed “piecework,” was the most common way for villagers to earn cash. Piecework is a system in which comparatively wealthy households (e.g., those with a regular or seasonal salary, or growing a large area of cotton) employ others when they require workers for agricultural or non-agricultural work. For example, weeding, picking cotton, collecting poles and brick-making for building, and construction of houses and shops were
all considered piecework. In addition, some respondents suggested that if someone experienced financial trouble or a shortage of food, they were likely to visit wealthier households and request work in exchange for either money or food.

Piecework was considered open to every person with a desire to work. However, there were some differences in the amounts paid for different types of piecework. For example, weeding was accessible to anyone, including children and old women, but it was considered the lowest-paid and most labor-intensive work. Some villagers felt that frequent weeding piecework caused competition for labor between subsistence farming in preparation for the following year and working for cash or food to meet short-term needs. On the other hand, some higher-paid piecework jobs required technical skills and knowledge, such as construction and painting buildings and welding. Because these jobs are specialized, only some households could engage in higher-paid piecework.

In addition to the requirement of specialized skills and knowledge for certain jobs, social relationships and negotiation were reported as key factors in gaining access to piecework. When wealthier households were also facing financial difficulty and were unable to employ as many workers as usual, piecework was difficult to obtain. Social networks in the study area extend beyond the village boundaries. People frequently visit relatives and friends living in other villages. This expanded network of relationships served as a means of providing and gaining piecework over the wider area. Therefore, people with wealthy relatives, in-laws, and close friends enjoyed an advantage in obtaining piecework.

The pursuit of a livelihood, particularly in times of drought, included selling livestock, requesting food from relatives or neighbors, hunting and gathering, and obtaining food aid. The Zambian government, international organizations and nongovernmental organization (NGOs) provide various types of aid in the study area. Governmental aid to rural areas, especially to small-scale farmers, increased following the establishment of the Poverty Reduction Programme in 2001. Moreover, many programs have focused on Lusitu, both because it is drought-prone, and because it is easily accessed from the capital. Food aid has been directed to this area in the past during times of drought. However, only two to three households in each village were able to receive food aid of a sufficient quantity to maintain livelihoods.

**Differences among Households**

Various ways to earn cash and cope with drought were found in the study area. Households combined these strategies. At the same time, there were indications that some strategies were restricted by certain factors. Households using multiple strategies were analyzed by dividing them into four categories, according to whether they had a reliable
income source and cash crops. Table 1 shows how the four groups were classified in this study. Table 2 lists characteristics of each group.

### Table 1: Classification of household group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-agricultural income</th>
<th>No reliable income source</th>
<th>With reliable income source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only for family consumption</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash crop production</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Characteristics of each household group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of households (Female headed)</th>
<th>Ave. age of head of households</th>
<th>Ave. number of household members</th>
<th>Mean size of land holdings (ha)</th>
<th>Number of cattle holders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>28(14)</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>7(0)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>5(2)</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5(1)</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45(17)</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unit of land holdings was by the household and it was measured by using GPS. A – D show the classification of household group (see Table 1).

Group A, households engaging only in subsistence agriculture, accounted for approximately 60 percent of the studied households. Households in this group had the lowest number of household members and the smallest area of land. Some households did not produce enough food to be self-sufficient. It was thus necessary for these households to
supplement their food supply by earning cash. They also required cash to purchase everyday commodities such as soap, salt and cooking oil. Thus, these households were typically engaged in frequent piecework and other coping strategies to obtain food and cash. Households in group C also did not plant cotton. However, they stabilized their livelihoods through a reliable income source. None of the households in this group were engaged in piecework in 2007 to 2008. Some group C members even became employers of pieceworkers.

Groups B and D possessed larger areas of land and largest size household. This enabled these households to plant cotton as a cash crop. However, because income from cotton was still influenced by rainfall and the input of labor, if households in group B failed to harvest enough to make profit, they were required to engage in piecework, livestock selling and other strategies. In contrast, households in group D were the most stable households among the groups. These households typically combined cotton cultivation and a reliable income source with subsistence agriculture in large fields. They were distinctly differentiated from other households in terms of income, which enabled them to provide other households with employment opportunities.

In summary, it is evident that not all households were able to access reliable non-agricultural income sources, which is considered the most secure way of guaranteeing livelihood. There were substantial differences in livelihood stability between groups A and B, and C and D. For example, group A can be considered as the most vulnerable group in terms of assets and access to ways of earning cash because there was no guarantee that they would be able to earn enough from piecework alone. On the other hand, access to non-agricultural reliable income sources enabled group C and D households to maintain stable livelihoods. However, it was clear that these differences in livelihood activities and income could provide the opportunities to earn cash in the village.20

**Characteristics of Labor Migration from the Study Area**

**General Characteristics**

Of all the cases (N=88) described by informants who had experienced labor migration, 77 percent were male and 23 percent were female. The average age at their first departure was twenty-two. Figure 3 shows the destinations of migrants by year.
In the 1960s and 1970s, most migrants travelled to large cities in the Southern Province, such as Mazabuka, Choma, and Kafue (cf. Map 1). During this time, the data shows that employment in the formal sector and public works accounted for approximately 60 percent of employment.

Since the 1980s, the number of migrants to Siavonga has increased. After 2000, migrant destinations were almost completely confined to three major cities: Siavonga, Lusaka, and Chirundu. Transportation from Lusitu to Lusaka is relatively convenient, taking three hours by bus. Despite the convenience of transportation to the capital, however, Lusaka has never been the most common destination. Siavonga and Chirundu have attracted increasing numbers of migrants in recent years.

Of those who had migrated to Siavonga in the 1980s, 50 percent were engaged in fishing, but after the 1990s, housekeeping and gardening became an increasingly common source of employment for migrants. Of the cases that had migrated to Chirundu, 64 percent were engaged in daily employment, such as drawing water and carrying commodities to market. Figure 4 shows the length of stay in three major destinations, Siavonga, Lusaka, and Chirundu since the 1980s.
It can be seen that cases where migrants stayed less than one year constituted nearly or over 50 percent in 1990s and since 2000. On the other hand, half of the migrants in this study stayed more than one year at their destinations.

**Small Towns as Destinations: Siavonga and Chirundu**

Labor migration to Siavonga from our study area started to increase since the 1980s and to Chirundu especially since 2000. What attracts people to these small towns?

Siavonga is the district capital and functions as the center for administration and post and banking services. In 2000, the population of Siavonga was 9,690. Buses running from Lusaka to Siavonga meant that Siavonga was easily accessible from Lusitu. Migrants frequently travelled by bus, which cost only 15,000 ZMK (four US dollars), which is less than half of the fare to Lusaka, at the time of research.

Fishing was the largest industry in Siavonga, primarily located along Lake Kariba. Small sardines (*Limnothrissa miodon*) known as “kapenta” in Zambia and Zimbabwe, were imported to Lake Kariba from Lake Tanganyika in 1968. Kapenta fishing has become a lucrative industry since the 1980s, and there are also some white entrepreneurs. At the time of fieldwork there were approximately thirty kapenta fishing companies registered with the Ministry of Fisheries. The major kapenta companies provided substantial employment in Siavonga. In addition to the Tonga people, some people from the Lozi and Bemba groups (from the Western and Eastern Provinces) who were previously engaged in fishing along the Zambezi River also migrated to Siavonga.
In 1992, Siavonga was separated from Gwembe district and became its own district. With the transfer of the administrative function, the number of formal workers living in Siavonga increased. With the increase of relatively wealthy Zambians working at the district council, the bank, and the electricity company, the demand for housework and gardening labor also grew. Such employment opportunities became abundant. Migrants could regularly obtain this type of work by going door to door. In addition, the tourism industry has recently expanded, which in turn led to increasing of work opportunities in the service and construction sectors.

The proportion of migrants to Chirundu increased from the late 1990s. Chirundu is located on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its population was 9,540 in 2000 census. It is at a distance similar to that from Lusitu to Siavonga. Chirundu is a major border town in Zambia where trucks carrying materials from South Africa and other countries stop. Development in Chirundu as a town began after 1991, when the new government introduced market liberalization. It has banks, a post office, and a large market. Many employment opportunities exist in Chirundu—workers can earn small amounts of money by drawing water and carrying commodities to market. For this reason, the proportion of female migrants is higher in Chirundu when compared with other urban areas. Even widows and young girls with limited education are often able to obtain employment without difficulty.

Informants commonly referred to two major differences between Siavonga and Chirundu. The first relates to transportation. Some migrants mentioned that if they did not have money for transportation, they could go to Chirundu on foot or by bicycle using a local unpaved road. The second concerns the environment. Some migrants reported a preference for Siavonga because Chirundu is noisy due to traffic. Moreover, HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Chirundu because of prostitution associated with truck drivers. On the other hand, Siavonga is adjacent to Lake Kariba and is seen as having a calmer atmosphere. Siavonga currently attracts an increasing number of foreign and national tourists who come to enjoy sightseeing and holidays beside the lake.

In addition, Siavonga has a number of advantages with regard to housing and employment. People in the study area generally have relatives and friends living in Siavonga, who can sometimes help newcomers with food and housing while they find employment. Furthermore, the presence of numerous relatives and other migrants from the same area already in the town means that migrants may obtain employment and information more easily through social networks. This is particularly true in the case of housekeepers and gardeners, where employers typically ask workers leaving their jobs to find a replacement. Thus, employment opportunities are commonly accessed through social networks.
Furthermore, people in study area have often visited Siavonga and Chirundu before they first migrate. School-aged boys and girls visit their relatives in towns during from school holidays. In addition, many single women visit towns when they are released from agricultural work. From this daily mobility, migrants often know neighboring towns well before they depart. People are commonly familiar with the future destination of their labor migration, and they have often developed social relations in neighboring small towns through previous visits. Respondents reported that this reduces anxiety about where to sleep and how to navigate these small towns when they arrive.

**The Variability of Duration: What Made Migrants Stay Longer?**

The research pointed out that both short-term and long-term labor migration are regular occurrences within the study area. Short-term labor migration reflects an increase in migration to neighboring towns. Migrants to these towns can easily quit their jobs and return to their homes for farming if they wish. Some migrants reported the concern that if they travelled to cities far from home it would be difficult to find transport money to return home if they lost their jobs. Another factor affecting the length of stay is the increase in housekeeper and gardener employment. If workers decide to quit their jobs, or obtained information about friends of employers searching new workers, they could introduce other migrants and newcomers to jobs. Migrants may be able to find employment through this type of social network, meaning that employers do not need to search actively for new workers, since former employees find replacements, and newcomers come to them requesting employment. Thus, employers typically do not prevent workers from leaving their employment, and the arrival of substantial numbers of migrant workers contributed to the loosening of employment restrictions. This in turn generates a labor market in which migrants can circulate between village and town, or change their jobs at short-term intervals.

What then made their duration of stay fluctuate? One reason appears to be related to the economic situation migrants experienced in towns. All informants interviewed in Siavonga (N=9) had resided in the town for at least five years. The average worker had been engaged in 2.4 jobs since migrating. Respondents had typically changed their jobs to seek more favorable conditions. Of these types of employment, housekeeper and gardener accounted for 45 percent, and jobs at hotels and guesthouses for 27 percent.

Salaries were found to vary according to occupational category and the number of years of continuous work. For example, for housekeeping and gardening positions, the number of years of continuous employment correlated with increases in salary. Thus, employers tended to set lower initial salaries, and, after identifying workers as reliable, they improved the conditions of employment. In hotels and guesthouses, on the other hand, employees are
required to have additional skills and knowledge. In this sector, English language proficiency and experience in service industries impact on salaries to a greater extent than the length of continuous employment.

Life in towns, as distinct from the village, brings a greater requirement for money, since the food eaten each day must be purchased. In the case of household No. 3 in Siavonga, the respondent reported household earnings of 154,000 ZMK (forty-four US dollars) a month, with expenses calculated as 120,000 ZMK (thirty-four US dollars) in the same period, not including school fees required seasonally. To sustain a comfortable life in town, it is perceived to be crucial to extend opportunities by collecting information about vacancies and new employment possibilities. The length of stay in these destinations strongly depended on whether migrants were able to find appropriate employment sufficient to sustain their livelihoods. If not, decisions were often made to return home where food can be provided from their land. If sufficient employment was obtained, however, stays were commonly longer than expected at departure. In addition to this practical reason, changing attitudes and feelings of identity regarding home villages also impact on the duration of stay in migrant destinations. Cliggett's anthropological work in the Southern Province indicated that the duration of migrant stays is indefinite and variable. She argues that as stays in the destination become longer, responsibilities to assist home become lower. This is further reinforced in the event of spouses and children also shifting to the destination town. Informants reported that they first migrated alone and then brought their wives and children to town once they could earn a reliable income. 37

Relationship between Livelihood Possibilities in the Village and Labor Migration

This section presents a further analysis of the results of the previous two sections with a focus on access to earning a livelihood.

Labor Migration as a Coping Strategy with Drought

Figure 5 shows the proportion of types of migration associated with each category of household which was indicated in Table 1.
Households with reliable income sources, groups C and D, generally did not experience labor migration. Most migrants were from groups A and B, who engaged in subsistence agriculture, cash crop production, and other irregular income sources. Figure 6 shows the number of cases sorted by year of departure, along with rainfall data in study area.

It can be seen that the number of migration cases increased both in 1994/95 and 2001/02.38

In circumstances where a population's livelihood largely depends on natural resources,
ecological risks and shocks such as drought or soil erosion have a great impact on socioeconomic systems. Such a situation can generate a large incentive for migration.\textsuperscript{39} Especially in arid and semiarid areas, increases in the number of migrants are evident from both short-term and long-term consequences of drought.\textsuperscript{40} In the present study area, precipitation was 330 mm in 1994/95. Farmers still recall how poor the harvest in this season was. Similarly, in 2001/02 the rainfall was only 324 mm. Respondents who migrated in these years typically gave reasons related to drought and lack of food as motivations for leaving in search of work. Drought and crop failure clearly seem to be the key motives for migration. Of my study groups, it was primarily households in group A that migrated to cope with harsh situations.

However, there are other livelihoods for coping with these aversive events, as explained above. Piecework, livestock selling, hunting and gathering, mutual assistance, and food aid were all reported as coping strategies in this study. In fact, even when drought occurred, some households in group A were not distressed enough to induce migration. Selling livestock is one important coping strategy commonly seen in times of drought. Household No. 10 reported the sale of five goats and thirteen pigeons in 2007 for this reason. Because of these sales, they were then able to purchase enough cereal to avoid food shortage. Household No.3 was given food aid from November to March, meaning they did not need to leave the village. Thus, differences in the necessity and importance of labor migration as a coping strategy arise with variation in the level of access to other coping strategies conducted inside the village.

Of those coping strategies, labor migration appears to be seen as the easiest and least restrictive option. Figure 7 shows the reported motives for migration to three major destinations: Siavonga, Lusaka, and Chirundu.
It is clear that when migration was associated with drought-related motivation, migrants tended not to choose the capital, but preferred neighboring small towns. As mentioned above, the choice of neighboring small towns was seen to enable people to migrate at the lowest cost both economically and mentally, due to the geographical closeness, social networks, consequent benefits in terms of employment opportunities, and familiarity through daily mobility. Therefore, labor migration, especially to neighboring small towns, was revealed to play a critical role for coping with drought, especially for those who were lacking access to other coping strategies in the study area.

**Decision Making Process for Labor Migration**

It remains evident that a number of cases of migration to neighboring small towns in this study cannot be solely explained by ecological causes or harsh economic circumstances. Some households migrated away from the village even when the harvest was good. Apart from drought-induced migration, other motives presented in Figure 7 were "need for cash" and "asked by relatives and friends." The motive "need for cash" includes cases where respondents were seeking money for bride-price, or for buying clothes and other commodities. From these interviews, those cases were typically related to an unexpected and unusual social event, such as a marriage or the sudden death of family member, and lack of support from parents. Some decisions to migrate resulted from a sudden need for...
cash caused by these types of social affairs and accidental events. The motivation “asked by relatives and friends” includes cases where a person was asked by relatives or friends to move to destinations to work, or where employment was arranged in advance in another town. Some informants responded that they did not plan to leave, but they decided to do so after being asked by relatives or friends. This can be considered as a problem of opportunity and a result of access to urban employment through their social relationships.

The above two types of labor migration conducted in unusual situations, however, should be considered in relationship to other methods of obtaining cash in the village. For example, in the case of household No.19, the eldest son was able to get non-agricultural wage labor in both the dry and rainy seasons. He has barely found it necessary to ask wealthier households for jobs but rather has been offered work by them. He responded that he does not need to go to town, because he can get piecework in the village. In addition, the respondent in household No.11 reported an earlier labor migration, but he now had connections with a piecework provider locally and so no longer needs to go to town to work. These stories indicate that working in towns does not necessarily have a special place in the lives of all villagers. Rather, labor migration can be a selective process through the interaction of specific problems, accidental events, or requests by relatives or friends.

Migration to nearby towns carries advantages in terms of sending remittances and maintaining relationships at home. When working in a nearby town, migrant workers can send money through acquaintances returning to their home village. Additionally, family members from the village can visit and request money relatively easily from migrants. In the current study, there were a limited number of households receiving remittances regularly. Keeping children in town can still function as a safety net, however, which may help at home in times of hardship. People engaged in short-term and low-wage jobs sometimes cannot send remittances to their homes. In these cases, migration still has an indirect effect of reducing consumption at home. Smoothing household consumption can be a consequence of labor migration, and an increase of short-term migration in times of drought is partly because of such a household strategy.

Lastly, it should be noted that recent changes in lifestyles are affecting the changing status of labor migration to small towns. In the study area as well as in other rural areas in Zambia, the number of cellular phones has increased dramatically in recent years. In 2006, when I first visited the study area, few people owned cellular phones. In 2009, however, this proportion had risen to 13 percent of the population, and this prevalence continues to increase. The growing number of cellular phones enables people to communicate more easily and frequently with relatives and friends in towns. Consequently, information
regarding employment can rapidly reach people in the village, and people are able to move with greater assurance.

Conclusions
Agriculture is not the only source of livelihood in Africa’s rural areas. As such, increasing research attention has been paid to non-agricultural income sources and their relationship to urban areas. Despite the importance of rural labor migration, however, it has been examined as separate from the rural context. This paper examined labor migration in relation to conditions of livelihood in rural areas, an issue that has not been adequately addressed in former migration studies. In this study, special attention was paid to the role of neighboring small towns.

In such a variable situation, local people have developed many strategies for earning money and coping with food shortages. Labor migration is one of these essential strategies. In particular, migration to neighboring small towns such as Siavonga and Chirundu was found to be important for vulnerable households that could not use other strategies inside the village because of a lack of assets or access to local employment.

Another role of labor migration is one of influencing livelihood choices. Even in group A, the main participants in labor migration, some households did not experience migration. This was possible because of the existence of other income sources even in rural areas. In the study area there was an income gap between households perpetuated by the reliable non-agricultural income sources available to some households. Wealthier households did, however, provide others with cash earning opportunities. Households that were able to secure high-paid piecework through social interaction with wealthier households had less need to leave the village for work. Thus, in usual conditions, labor migration was not the only way to earn cash but rather is selected in relation to other strategies and circumstances, for example, marriage, lack of support from parents, and contingencies such as the sudden death of family members or relatives who they had relied on. This type of labor migration did not essentially correspond with household strategies but rather was an individual choice for making conditions better. Therefore, considering livelihood diversities in rural areas, labor migration is an important coping strategy in terms of drought for vulnerable households. At the same time, however, it was selected in relation with access to other livelihood activities and circumstances people faced at that time.

The factors that appeared to make labor migration accessible were also examined in this paper. First, the development of regional towns offered rural people opportunities for employment. Zambia’s national development policies, such as market liberalization and decentralization, affected the development of Siavonga and Chirundu since the 1990s.
Second, the wide social networks of local people and daily mobility between rural areas and small towns lessened the stress migrating to these towns and remaining in them. Lastly, the geographical location of the study area is critically important. These three factors were perceived as enabling workers to migrate at the lowest cost, both mentally and economically, and made the option of labor migration easily accessible to rural people.

It is clear that labor migration, especially to neighboring small towns, has been deeply connected with rural society. It is essential to analyze all of these factors together with livelihood conditions and to assess access to each strategy in rural areas. Doing so indicates that it is necessary to consider a wide range of influential factors to gain any adequate understanding of labor migration. Additionally, the central focus of Zambia’s internal migration studies has been on labor migration to the large cities of Lusaka and the Copperbelt. This study, however, suggests that these new types of urban-rural interaction and the presence of a regional labor market should be recognized and reflected in a regional development policy.

Lastly, there are some issues that need further research and analysis. For example, this study has not analyzed how access piecework and labor migration are regulated by Tonga social organization such as the matrilineal uncle-nephew relationship. Moreover, the inheritance of assets such as land and cattle in the study area tended to be more along patrilineal lines. Ongoing research will be conducted to understand better such social relationships.

Notes:
1 Bryceson, 2002; Bryceson and Jamal, 1997; Ellis, 1998.
2 De Haan, 1999.
4 Bryceson and Jamal, 1997, p. 3.
5 Adepoju, 1995.
6 Ibid.
7 For remittances, see Lucas and Stark (1985), Hoddinott (1994), and Cliggett (2005), and for the response to labor drain from rural areas, see Richards (1939), Mabogunje (1989), and Hampshire (2006).
12 Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; Reardon, 1997.
14 This paper defines “household” as a unit of consumption of food from the storage, therefore, households would refer both to the nuclear family and the extended family, depending on each sample case.
15 Copperbelt is now the name of the province where copper and other metals are found. Before the copper mines opened, Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia) had been considered a labor supplying region to Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and South Africa.
16 Potts, 2005. According to Potts (p. 588), from the 1960s to 1980s, Zambia had maintained the highest urbanization level among other southern and eastern African countries except for South Africa.
17 Ibid. Actually, the Zambian government set aside the Structural Adjustment Program in 1987, but after the change of government in 1991, the new government has implemented SAPs, and their impact has become pronounced.
18 Nchito, 2010; Ogura, 2009; Potts, 2005.
19 The total resettled population was approximately 70,000. For information about the effect of resettlement on Tonga society, see Colson (1960).
20 For information about the livelihood and environment of people in Lusitu before construction of the dam, see Scudder (1962) and Colson (1960).
22 Ibid. In the study area, I found the same characteristics in food security as this report.
23 Colson, 1951, p. 41.
24 Cliggett, 2000, p. 127.
25 Of course, it is clear that many factors are considered to influence agricultural production, including the size of land holdings, the stability of labor inputs, and related social events.
26 Some households sell an improved type of sorghum to the seed companies, but a number of households cannot sell their harvest because they need to keep sorghum for consumption and also generally have an insufficient surplus.
27 All Zambian currencies were converted at the exchange rate in August 2008; one US dollar equaled ZMK. The price of cotton was 1220 ZMK/kg in 2007/08.
29 Note that these results are based only on observations in the 2006/07 period. Further research and quantitative analysis are needed to show transitions in social and economic status over time.
CSO, 2003. According to CSO, the annual population growth rate of Siavonga District over the period 1990-2000 was 4.6 percent, which was the highest growth rate among the Southern Province districts.

Some major companies owning many boats were founded by whites (generally from South Africa and the United Kingdom). After 2007, the number of small fishing companies founded by Zambians increased, but employment opportunities provided by these new companies remained limited.

The separation from Gwembe District was related to the amendment of the Local Government Act No. 22 in 1991 by the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), which won the election in 1990.


According to Raballand et al. (2008), most of the trucks operating on the international routes via Chirundu are owned by South African and Zimbabwean companies.

There were two reasons why Chirundu as a border post had not developed by 1991: the border was closed because of the war in Zimbabwe until its independence in 1981; and, after 1980s, Zambia had descended into economic crisis.

Family Health International(2000) reported that the largest sources of informal income in Chirundu was sex work, which supports about 500 people (including visiting sex workers).


In this study, cases left in 1995 were considered as the result of the effects of the 1994/95 rainy season.

Henry et al., 2004.


The Tonga have a common practice of bride-price whereby the groom’s family gives cattle to the bride’s family, especially to the father. Nowadays, it is paid even in cash.

Cligget (2000) also indicated that conflict with parents, especially fathers, could affect sons’ departure from the village.


References:


The Role of Labor Migration to Neighboring Small Towns in Rural Livelihoods

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BOOK REVIEWS


In 1963, some fifteen years after the first edition of Alan Paton’s internationally acclaimed *Cry the Beloved Country*, historian Phyllis Lewsen and the Van Riebeeck Society (VRS) teamed up to publish four volumes of selected letters of South Africa’s most eloquent late nineteenth-century liberal, John X. Merriman. In 1972, shortly after Paton received honorary degrees from Harvard and Edinburgh, historian Harrison Wright and the VRS brought out selected letters of James Rose Innes, who like Merriman was in Cecil Rhodes’ “Ministry of All the Talents.” The publication of the Merriman and Innes letters during the entrenchment of grand apartheid quietly underpinned Paton’s literary and political writings in defense of the liberal tradition in South Africa. Peter Alexander and the VRS have now teamed up to give Paton an epistolic voice equal to his liberal predecessors.

Alexander, who published a biography of Paton in 1994, selected about 330 letters from some 2,500 extant for this volume. Alexander provides a helpful chronology of Paton’s life and then divides Paton’s correspondence into five periods: early life (1922-35), era of the Second World War (1935-45), *Cry the Beloved Country* and the rise of grand apartheid (1946-52), liberalism in South Africa (1953-68), and Paton’s last years (1969-88). Alexander contributes brief, helpful introductions to the sections and provides explanatory footnotes to many letters. The book concludes with short biographies on Paton’s major correspondents, a bibliography of works by and about Paton, and an index.

Alan Paton was ten when the African National Congress was created, twenty-three when Merriman died, and forty when Innes passed away in 1942. More like Innes than Merriman, Paton found politics ”repugnant.” Paton also followed Innes into law. From 1935 to 1948, Paton served as a progressive warden at Diepkloof Reformatory. Prior to his years at Diepkloof, Paton taught at a school in Ixopo where he flogged pupils for their misbehavior. Given liberal opposition during the Rhodes era to proposed legislation to cane transgressors in lieu of serving jail time—the so-called Strop Bill, I wanted to read more about Paton’s views on corporal punishment at Diepkloof. Neither Paton’s letters nor Alexander discuss the caning that did take place during Paton’s wardenship.

Paton’s international notoriety, gained from the popularity of *Cry the Beloved Country*, first published just months before the National Party (NP) was elected in 1948, provided him with a public voice to oppose the NP’s policy of grand apartheid. Paton used his fame to help found the opposition Liberal Party during 1952-53. Given this, readers would expect Alexander to discuss liberalism in South Africa at some length, but he does not. Opponents of apartheid...
have often criticized liberalism in South Africa, and Alexander could have strengthened his work by placing Paton within this debate. Still, readers can see Paton’s evolving liberalism and opposition to apartheid through a careful reading of his letters and familiarity with his life’s work.

Alexander develops Paton’s friendship with Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, the verligte Cape Afrikaner Paton met in 1927, and whose patronage Paton sought. The editor also conveys the growth of Paton’s liberalism through his letters to and conversations with Nobel laureate Albert John Luthuli, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Mary Benson, Peter Brown, John Collins, Trevor Huddleston, and Uys Krige. Paton’s first wife, Doris Olive Lusted, shared Paton’s opposition to grand apartheid. In 1955, she helped found the courageous group of heroines, the Black Sash. In his fifties and sixties, Paton became even more committed to the rights of Africans. Paton’s 20 November 1964 letter to G. Selwyn Moberley in 1964 illustrates this. He wrote:

The true liberal, by which name I would call my closest associates, desires the emancipation of all South African people from the humiliations and sufferings caused by white supremacy laws.

...All I can say is that I was born into a privileged society, and that my privilege was based on the colour of my skin, and that I no longer wish to retain it. That this may be dangerous, I understand, but I would rather face those dangers than make one of the chief purposes of my life the perpetuation of a society which I believe to be unjust in its very foundations. (p. 311)

That same year Paton appealed to the judge in the Rivonia trial to spare the lives of Nelson Mandela and his co-conspirators and predicted that the NP would eventually have to negotiate with Mandela. By publishing Paton’s letters, Alexander and the VRS have restored one of South Africa’s great treasures and returned a much-needed tolerant, liberal voice to our homocentric world.

Kenneth Wilburn, Department of History East Carolina University


In fifteen chapters, organized into five parts, William Ascher explores how to improve our ability to forecast and plan for the future, particularly in developing countries, since most people and organizations tend to be, in practice, shortsighted and reluctant to make short-term sacrifices in order to get long-term benefits. The approach draws on a number of different disciplines (e.g., behavioral economy, psychology, political science, and sociology), incorporating values and institutional designs, among other dimensions, in an attempt to identify and discuss the best strategies to promote farsightedness. However, as the author emphasizes, the book is not intended to be a “how to pursue farsighted action” manual.

Part one, “The challenges and hopes of farsighted action,” provides ample evidence of shortsightedness in development policy alongside an enormous potential for farsightedness,
and identifies numerous strategies and policy instruments to overcome such shortsighted thinking and practice. Ascher identifies the challenges and the obstacles to farsighted action, arguing that each barrier requires specific strategies and instruments, with some of these being able to address more than one obstacle. The author identifies challenges that these strategies have to face (e.g., family economic security, conservation and environmental protection, health and security risks, community self-help, productivity, and physical infrastructure) and explores the reasons why people are shortsighted (e.g., impatience, selfishness, analytic limits, uncertainty, and vulnerability). This part ends with an exploration of those conditions that allow some form of optimism (e.g., our capacities and motivations to think and act in the long term are, he argues, stronger now than in previous periods).

The second part, “Structuring rewards and risks,” explores how to highlight the tangible consequences of pursuing shortsighted strategies (e.g., wealth, physical well-being, skill, and enlightenment) and discusses how to apply strategies to create tangible benefits. The main constraint that strategies involving welfare values have to face is the fact that benefits to be created are in general more expensive than those created by other strategies and have more political costs. In other words, the creation of a tangible benefit, as an incentive for a farsighted effort, means someone has to pay for it now and anticipating the costs has frequently negative political consequences (e.g., non electoral support by those affected negatively by the decision). This is followed by the exploration of non-material benefits and costs, suggesting that rewards can come from the quality of social relations (e.g., respect, affection, righteousness toward society, and power) and psychological satisfaction as well, and not only from welfare benefits. Several strategies for the creation of social and psychological rewards are discussed, including: the promotion of family economic security; the conservation and environmental protection; the prevention of health and security risks; the improvement of physical infrastructure; the promotion of productivity; community self-help; and charitable contributions. In short, Ascher, suggests that social and psychological rewards coming up from group participation tend to reinforce farsighted commitments, a point that planners and policy makers in all fields and in both developed and developing countries should consider seriously.

In the following chapters, the author discusses evaluation procedures, strategies for performance evaluation, indicators to assess the performance of decision makers, and other policy instruments. For Ascher, performance evaluation provides special opportunities to consider both tangible and intangible benefits and costs, a moment in which long-term consequences should be given greater importance than the short-term ones. In other words, if performance evaluation rewards farsighted performance (e.g., welfare and social and psychological rewards) it may act as a powerful incentive for choosing farsighted over shortsighted options.

“Improving Analytic Frameworks,” the third part, argues that the assumption according to which the major barrier in making rational decisions is the uncertainty that brings into doubt whether specific consequences will materialize can be contested by empirical studies, theoretical insights, or intuitive judgments. He shows why and how analytic exercises about the future can be useful for policy makers and citizens in general, since these exercises can shed light on the need for short-term sacrifices, and how they can be transformed into long-term benefits. In other words, if citizens are engaged in planning exercises, their time horizons will
enlarge and they will probably be more responsive to long term consequences of present actions, a point that planners in all policy fields, in both developed and in developing countries, should take into consideration.

The last two parts explore the design dimensions for the communication of farsighted perspectives and options and examine the institutional arrangements that affect whether farsighted decision makers and farsighted proposals will be able to resist the egoism of numerous stakeholders active in each policy arena.

In sum, as William Ascher suggests, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the evidence available is that there is a large number of strategies and policy instruments available, for planners and policy makers, and for the promotion of farsightedness within development policy and spatial planning. Some of these strategies are likely to be more difficult to sustain in developing and in less developed countries, since supporters of farsighted policies in these countries have less support to maintain their proposals than their counterparts in more developed countries. Many of these strategies require changes in the subjectivity of those whose cooperation with farsighted projects are being asked for, and since this subjectivity is seen as context specific, which requires continuous adaptation of the planning or policy process to the local conditions, William Ascher’s approach seems to have been influenced and inspired by post-rational planning theories. For all these reasons, Bringing in the Future is a timely and valuable contribution for researchers, students, and decision-makers working in the field of sustainable development policy and spatial planning in developing countries.

Carlos Nunes Silva, University of Lisbon, Portugal


The eleven-chapter book discusses one of the world’s topical issues, namely Sino-African relationships. As amply instanced by the abundance of literature, for example, Robert Rothberg’s China into Africa (2008), Chris Alden’s China in Africa (2007), and numerous conferences, China’s breath-taking rise and its consequent role as a global player is a subject of intense debate, speculation, and intrigue. Hence, this book is a welcome addition to the burgeoning pool of literature on China’s ascendancy and answers the question “is China a predator or malignant development partner?” Overall, Brautigam answers in the negative and argues that there is need to refract China’s engagement through a prism that does not summarily condemn it as a predator.

The book is organized as follows: the prologue delineates the universe of the discourse by, chiefly, discussing the changing face of Chinese engagement in Africa by walking the reader through the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and foreign aid as seen from the eyes of China (it reportedly prefers the term, mutual aid). Very importantly, Brautigam provides justification for embarking on the project by asserting that “this book responds to the lack of systematic analysis of China’s aid and state-sponsored economic...
cooperation activities in Africa” (p.19). Following the prologue, the following issues are prominent in Chapter 1: that Chinese foreign aid strategy is grounded in Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; particularly, equality and manual benefit, the zenith of China’s aid to Africa, particularly, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, and flagship projects such as the 1967 Tazara railway project that the West demurred from financing.

The following ten chapters that discuss varied subjects such as Deng Xiaping’s experiments with aid, the “going global” crusade (export of Chinese capital abroad, particularly to Africa), the Asian tsunami (the effects of Chinese imports on Africa’s nascent manufacturing sector), Chinese investments in agriculture, and, importantly and perhaps controversially, China’s role as a rogue donor in the sense that it is seen to be propping up “rogue” states such as Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Notably, Brautigam marshals arguments to rebut the argument that China’s aid is meant for rogue states; she holds that the same is given to non-rogue states. Damningly, she argues that there are other players in the rogue states; for example, Russia once supplied Sudan with military aircraft and both Japan and India bought oil from Sudan.

The conclusion, an extension of the “Rogue Donor” chapter [eleven], begins by answering the question “is China a rogue donor?” Brautigam’s answer is unambiguous: “I do not believe so” (p.307). Thus, she argues that while China’s ascendancy in Africa should be a matter of grave concern, this should not be used as a carte blanche to paint China’s engagement in Africa as inveterately bad. At the same time, while acknowledging the deleterious effects of China’s engagement, for example, on the manufacturing sector, she asserts that African governments can through appropriate policy choices harness the engagement “…in ways that will benefit their people” (p. 311).

Overall, the major strengths are: jargon-free language, extensive sources and endnotes, and objectivity and candor in dissecting the body of the Sino-African relationship. To this end, the objectivity dimension deserves further mention in the sense that Brautigam labors under no illusion that it is all wines and roses when it comes to China’s engagement in Africa. Thus, she concedes that there are vexing problems; for example, the displacement of people to make way for agro projects, the despoliation of the environment, cases of disregard of local labor laws, the displacement of the local manufacturing sector, and, very worryingly, the secrecy that surrounds aid and export credits. Thus, while she holds that these problems cannot be exclusively ascribed to China (the same can be placed on the doorstep of non-Chinese players), she asserts that with proper policy choices, the Chinese engagement can be beneficially harnessed. Thus, to employ a common cliché, she is saying, “do not throw away the baby with the bathwater.” Very importantly, the data collection methods are in accord with the gold standard in research methodology: methodological triangulation. Thus, she employs case studies, field work, and secondary data (reports) to found her conclusions regarding debunking some myths pertaining to Chinese aid and economic cooperation. Lastly, is she qualified to speak to this subject? Yes. Given her vast work experience with the World Bank, the UN, and other development agencies and residence in China and West and Southern Africa, she is favorably circumstanced to write on the subject. This is one of the major strengths of the book. Arising from the foregoing strengths, the book should serve as a reference source for those
interested in Sino-African relations and should appeal to those within the academia and without (it is largely jargon-free).

The foregoing strengths notwithstanding, the book could do with the following improvements. The Prologue should be shortened and rather than conflate it with the Introduction, the latter should be a stand-alone item. In chapter eleven, the author liberally uses value-laden terms such as “rogue states” and “dictators.” While the use of such descriptors is unavoidable in some instances, there is a danger one that may grope for the slippery slope when one overdraws the account; hence, circumspection is key. In one instance, the author talks about “going to Africa” and besides creating ambiguity, these kinds of statements may unintentionally reinforce the impression in the minds of the not-so-geographically suave that Africa is one giant country. Hence, specificity is key.

To conclude, Brautigam convincingly sells the other side of China’s aid and economic cooperation to the reader. This side being that China is not an emerging threat that purposes to exploit Africa’s resources to the neglect of environmental and human rights concerns and governance issues. Nonetheless, she holds that China is no angel investor; it has flaws.

Emmanuel Bothhale, University of Botswana.


The book under review examines the role played by Sudanese politician and Islamist scholar Hasan al-Turabi in Africa’s first Islamist government and its emergence from the margins of the Arab world to lead and protect the international Islamist movement in the 1990s. Burr and Collins exhaustively track Turabi’s activities from the 30 June 1989 coup d’état by a small cadre of his military and civilians followers, his falling out with the government of President Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and dramatic dismal as the speaker of the Sudanese parliament, and his subsequent periodic detention from 2003 to 2009. This book is not intended as a biography of Turabi, nor is it a comprehensive account of recent Sudanese history. Nonetheless, it is recommended for those readers interested in the central figure in the contemporary Sudan’s Islamist movement.

Turabi is deserving of more analysis than has been completed to date. Any understanding of Sudanese politics is impossible without reference to Turabi’s political activities and his influence over a generation of Sudanese political, military, and bureaucratic leaders. Similarly, Turabi wielded significant influence over Islamist revolutionaries from around the world during the 1990s and helped provide sanctuary and support for fugitives such as Osama bin-Laden.

The book under review was originally published in 2003 as Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamic State, but has now been re-issued by a new publisher and updated to bring the narrative up to 2009. The authors are well qualified. Burr is a former US Agency for International Development officer who served in Sudan, and Professor Collins, who died in
2008, was a noted authority on African history. Together, the authors have written several books on Sudan, and their *Alms for Jihad* (2006), was controversially withdrawn from circulation by its publisher, Cambridge University Press, after a Saudi citizen they had accused of funding al-Qaeda threatened to sue for libel.

The authors’ mastery of their subject is well demonstrated in this book. Sudan’s political machinations in the aftermath of the 1989 coup, and Turabi’s often clandestine dealings with infamous terrorists, mujahideen, financiers, and spies are notoriously convoluted and ambiguous. In such an environment, rumor often substitutes for fact, and deniable plausibility is the modus operandi for all actors. Yet, Burr and Collins have judiciously shifted through secondary sources, media reporting, and what appears to be a vast network of unattributed but well-placed sources to write a remarkably clear and concise narrative, although a trifle sensationalist in places.

Burr and Collins argue that Turabi is a flawed revolutionary, and that his Islamist project has failed. The authors begin their book by briefly narrating Turabi’s emergence as a scholar in the 1970s, using his unrivalled learning, charisma and oratory, to enthuse a generation of educated elites to build his vision of an Islamist Sudan, governed by *Shari’a* and at the center of a revived Islamist community, the *umma*. The opportunity for Turabi’s vision to become a reality came in 1989 when his followers led by then Brigadier Bashir deposed a democratically elected but floundering government. Yet, when Turabi’s supporters in the new government looked to him for guidance on how to implement his vision, “he had no practical answers except his rhetoric, the example of the Sudan as the new Islamic model, and his association with a network of unsavoury terrorists.” Burr and Collin’s damning evaluation of Turabi’s career concludes that for all of his brilliance, Turabi lacked empathy for the majority’s Sufi heritage and was callously indifferent to the suffering of minorities in Sudan’s periphery, thereby costing him any chance to grow his power base beyond a small group of urban followers.

Unfortunately, the limited scope of this book does not extend to analyzing how Turabi’s political opponents, notably President Bashir (whom the authors have little regard for), out-maneuvered their former *murshid* (political guide) and retained control over the military and bureaucracy. If Turabi’s vision for Sudan is discredited, what is Bashir’s alternative? With Sudan approaching a referendum in 2011 on southern independence, it is more critical than ever that Bashir develops a new national narrative that unlike Turabi’s Islamist vision encompasses all Sudanese as equals.

Sonny Lee, Independent Scholar


Wayne Dooling begins with an evocation of the wine country of the Western Cape: Boschendal, Spier, and Meerlust. We are sometimes tempted to believe that these farms and their founding families have always been there—Meerlust has been in the Myburg family since 1757—but this
“landed ruling class . . . was not timeless – it was made” (and re-made), and this book’s first subject is an account of its making and its exercise of a power which rested primarily on imported slave labor. The indigenous people, “as so many European settlers discovered in other parts of the world . . . were notoriously difficult to enslave” and had to be “killed conquered or domesticated,” although eventually imported slaves and indigenous survivors were proletarianised together. Slavery enabled people without noble pedigree to accumulate wealth quickly, but eventually they had to face challenges--demographic, social, technological--similar to those faced by the great landowners of Europe. The longevity of this South African class of landowners cannot be taken for granted, and its historical explanation is the second subject of this book. The third subject is the making of the settler colonial state, which both modified and nurtured the wine-growers of the Western Cape.

Chapter One takes the story up to the British annexation of the Cape during the Napoleonic wars. For founding members of the Cape gentry the first step had been to leave the service of the Dutch East India Company to be granted the status of landholder and free burger. To maintain the integrity of their estates and families, in the face of Company pressure, the laws of partible inheritance, fluctuating weather, unstable markets, and mortality itself, these slaveholders developed a moral economy in which personal honor and reputation were more powerful than bankruptcy, and marriage or re-marriage could ensure the continuity of name and property. The British brought with them the ideology of free trade and humanitarian zeal that sought “equal justice’ and ‘equal protection’” for all, a combination which proved “bitter-sweet” for the wine farmers. The British set about bringing order to the frontier and the trekboer economy, and opening the Cape trade to world markets, but the legal amelioration of the conditions of the Khoi, the abolition of the slave trade, emancipation and apprenticeship which followed, raised labor problems for the Cape gentry. Nonetheless the Dutch elite forged a partnership with the British colonial state, as they had with the Dutch. Eventually their post-emancipation settlement was born of negotiation, rather than emigration.

Chapter Four, “Problems of Free Labour,” gives an account of the fortunes of the gentry in the nineteenth century: the continuing high cost of labor, drought, recession, the expansion of South Africa. Although many more farmers suffered insolvency, many survived and prospered by turning to trade as “capitalists.” Dooling is particularly interesting on the mechanization of agriculture and on the question of the backwardness or otherwise of South African farming in the nineteenth century. Before the British occupation the gentry had managed to maintain credit as “a moral dimension outside the market,” but the commoditization of money set slave-owners against merchants: the primary borrowers against the primary lenders. The cumulative effect by the late nineteenth century, as recounted in Chapter Five, was “The ‘unmaking’ of the Cape gentry”: “The rules of commercial capitalism had triumphed over those of moral community.” Yet Wayne Dooling goes on to show that partly through “formal political activity” the Cape gentry were remade, in, for example, boereverenigings, the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners and the Afrikaner Bond, which, with Rhodes’s support, “sought to restore to the Cape countryside the kind of reactionary personal rule that the master class had known under slavery.” The mind-set survives in pockets.
The Epilogue takes us through initial industrialization and the war of 1899-1902 into the twentieth century. The war was never “a white man’s war,” neither white nor a man’s, yet from its ashes emerged the Union of South Africa “a unified white racist state,” to be “ruled exclusively in the interests of a reconstituted white ruling class.”

*Slavery, Emancipation and Colonial Rule in South Africa* maintains a clear balance between the crises and the continuities of South African history. Its use of archival resources, particularly farm records, is exemplary, and its exploitation of illustrative anecdote keeps a lively sense of individuality and personality (of both master and servant) before us, enabling us to see that emancipation is an ongoing process, rather than an achieved status.

Tony Voss, *Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University & University of KwaZulu-Natal*

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*Managing African Portugal* is a well-developed ethnographic account of migrant experiences in Portugal. Kesha Fikes’ political economic perspective brings to light the performative interactions involved in the fashioning and refashioning of citizens and migrants alike. Fikes opens with her initial encounter of the study’s small population of immigrant *peixeiras* (fishmongers), Cape Verdean women who, without a license, negotiate the purchase of fish from wholesale vendors and then sell these fish on the streets of Lisbon. This scene at the Santa Apolónia train station occurs just two years after Portugal entered the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. From the outset, Fikes begins to weave a tale of changing positionality and shifting cultural identity for her select sample, four Cape Verdean immigrant fish mongers who she names Bia, Djina, Patrícia, and Manuela. The bulk of her research among these women was conducted from 1994 to 1998 and then again in 2002 and 2003.

The opening chapter focuses on “Portugal’s shift from an emigrant to an immigrant nation” (p. 8) as the state entered the burgeoning European Union (EU). By 1996, Portugal’s economy was fully integrated into the EU, and by 1998, Portugal had adopted the Euro. Accompanying these political economic shifts were changes to the more mundane social milieu. It is this transition or point of rupture that Fikes documents from the inside, noting how the racial imaginaries or colonial lusotropical ideology of racial miscegenation is replaced in Lisbon by a sentimentality that treats the migrant populations as signifiers of a modern civil society. In other words, Fikes describes the sociality of what she calls the “citizen-migrant connection.” She writes, “The inhabitance of citizenship as a social category occurs because of, not in spite of, Otherness such as migrant status” (p. 164).

In her discussion of methodology, Fikes acknowledges the difficulties in documenting “potentialities” and cultural change since it is something that must be viewed through the long lens of time. Her creative solution is to focus on three different locales in a single day (a wholesale market, street vending, and domestic work as a participant observer) and by temporally extending her research over almost a decade. In this way, the reader is left with both
a comprehensive or thick story of everyday nuance, something she often video-recorded, as well as an unfolding and localized history from the perspective of her key informants.

The chapters are organized according to her methodology. Chapter two is set at the fish wholesale market of Docapesca in the port area of the Tagus River. This chapter shows the ever changing relationships between the male Portuguese wholesalers and the Cape Verdean peixeiras. Chapter three is all about the interactions between the Cape Verdean fish sellers and both the state apparatus (through the police) and their clients. Chapter four picks up with the same four women several years later when the state in collusion with host-country nationals has renegotiated the Cape Verdean migrants’ status; the women are no longer able to make a living as independent fish sellers on the streets of Lisbon. Wage domestic work becomes the only appropriate niche for African migrants as part of the new civil society dichotomy between “black migrants” and “white citizens” (p. 29). The women of this study, as meticulously demonstrated by Fikes, become dependent on their white Portuguese female employers for both job security and residency papers.

One significant contribution of Managing African Portugal is that it documents both the migrants and the host-country nationals lived experiences of citizenship in relation to one another, something that is often lacking in most migrant studies. In this way, Fikes provides a new approach to the study of citizenship. In her attempts to “theorize citizenship” (p. 15), she demonstrates how marginality can inform the processual realities of belonging. In addition, Fikes demonstrates how ground level economics influence the experiences of EU modernity, a model that should be transportable to other EU nations dealing with similar ideological shifts. At the same time, parallels can be drawn with the immigrant Hispanic populations in the U.S.

Fikes nuanced discussion of gender, race, transnational migration, and citizenship helps demonstrate the value of ethnography. What I appreciate most about this book is its accessibility as an English cultural description of a Portuguese-speaking part of the world. This is also my primary criticism; the most logical audience for a work such as this, Portuguese-citizens and African-migrants, are excluded from participating in this important conversation around nation- and person-hood. At the same time, as a localized account of transmigrants negotiated positionality, this case study is useful for an audience well beyond the Lusophone world. In fact, we have already recommended Managing African Portugal to several colleagues and students interested in immigration issues.

Brandon D. Lundy and Jessica Lopes, Kennesaw State University


Rescuing a Fragile State is the product of a conference held at Wilfrid Laurier University in 2007. The conference was able to assemble Sierra Leoneans from various factions (academics, military officers, diplomats, and so forth) to review the past, present, and future. As a result, the perspective of this volume is diverse and reflects a broad spectrum of facts and experiences.
The volume commences from the present state of affairs (après the war) and thrusts us back into the events which acted as a catalyst to the war and the war itself. As a political journal of actual events, the transcript is neither ghoulish nor sentimental. It is nonetheless tragic and appalling. Many factors contributed to the depreciation of Sierra Leone. Ian Smillie’s contribution entitled “Orphan of the Storm: Sierra Leone and 30 Years of Foreign Aid” provides the stark reality of the condition(s) of foreign aid. Sierra Leone is seen as just another casualty of postcolonial affairs. Sierra Leone was once a hallowed haven for former slaves. The descent of this hallowed state is chronicled well in this text. Ozonnia Ojielo attempts to explain the unexplainable in “Beyond TRC (“Truth Reconciliation Committee): Governance in Sierra Leone.” He attempts to explore the “how” and “why” Sierra Leone waged war against itself. How did civil rights fall victim to corruption in this nation? Ojielo is brave to raise the issue of how the youths of Sierra Leone became “sacrificial lambs” in the cause of greed and personal gain. The answers/rationale for these events is not so simple. In fact, Ojielo resolves that international forces can be held accountable for witnessing the horrors and acting as mere “accidental tourists” in the face of the destruction of a people. Lastly, Mark White’s segment “Security and Development in Sierra Leone: DFID’s Approach” speaks of the theory and reality of the UK’s (and other nations) commitment to conflict resolution in Sierra Leone. The issue, he states, is one that involves the inability of the facilitators of order—to orchestrate administrative order. This post-war truth is one that existed in pre-war Sierra Leone as well.

In short, Rescuing a Fragile State is an earnest depiction of the state of Sierra Leonean and African affairs. One wonders if the true tragedy was never really the war alone. The real tragedy is knowing that the war did not have to occur. The international community needed only to care.

Rosetta Codling, Independent Scholar, Atlanta Georgia


William D. Grant was an administrative officer in Northern Rhodesia in 1958-61. He left the colonial service three years before this British colony became independent with the new name of Zambia. This book is partly a memoir of his service in the country and partly an analytical report on post-independence Zambia. The book is based mainly on the author’s field experience in 1958-61 and on a one-month tour in the summer of 2006. Books and reports by international organizations and non-governmental organizations were also used as sources.

The book is divided into fifteen chapters. Chapters One through Eleven are memoirs of the author’s years in the colonial service; Chapter Twelve is an outline account of Zambian politics from pre-independence years till 2006; Chapters Thirteen is the diary of his 2006 visit; Chapter Fourteen is a brief view of Zambia’s economy; Chapter Fifteen contains his concluding remarks.

Grant wrote in detail about how colonial officers were recruited and trained. He stated that the officers, believing that independence would be “many years away,” hoped that they would spend all their working lives in the colonies. He also described Mwinilunga and Kasempa, the two (rural) stations where he served. He stated that the former was a “by-word for

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v12i1a4.pdf
unsophisticated remoteness.” He described the administrative setting in Zambia and talked briefly about the work and behavior of other Europeans there (missionaries, traders, and mineral prospectors). Among other things, he asserted that, contrary to much speculation, he did not know of homosexual relations among unmarried white men. He added that he knew only of their “frustrated heterosexuality.” We might add a comment the author failed to make: that there was “frustrated heterosexuality” because Europeans, especially officials of the colonial government, had been brought up to believe that they would lose the respect of “natives” if they took African wives or mistresses.

Much of the book dealt with the work of the administrative officer and, by extension, of the colonial government in Zambia. According to Grant, the main business of colonial administration was the maintenance of law and order. He added that this was necessary because, in his view, “progress in African standards of living depended above all on stability.” He also wrote about other useful activities: uniting several ethnic groups, developing infrastructure, introducing western education, improving healthcare, and developing the economy. Grant noted that the colonial rulers were very small in number vis-à-vis those they ruled. He argued that “bluff” was largely responsible for their ability to maintain their rule in spite of the lopsidedness in numbers. He asserted that the powers of the administrative officer were considerable. He defended indirect rule, insisting that it was much more than “paternalism.” Grant wrote extensively about the Africans he met in his days as an administrative officer. Among other things, he expressed admiration for their system of justice, which, in his view, emphasized compensation rather than punishment and did not enable criminals to use legal technicalities to escape punishment.

Grant wrote briefly on the race question in colonial Zambia. He asserted that there was equality before the law. He added, however, that there was an “informal color bar.” He further stated that the white settlers in Zambia wanted to establish white minority rule in the country, as their compatriots had done in Southern Rhodesia. However, he continued, the whites were, relatively, too few to succeed. Grant noted that colonial officers were opposed to the nationalist movement. He described the leaders of the movement as “so-called nationalists.” He added that he and his colleagues believed that independence was coming too early, and feared that “unscrupulous” politicians, rather than those groomed by the British, would take over and ruin the place. But, he noted with a tinge of regret, the tide of nationalism was too strong to be stopped. Summing up on British colonial rule, Grant held that it was based on “trusteeship” rather than “ownership,” and that it did much to modernize Zambia and improve the lives of its citizens. He is convinced that while foreign rule is bad in principle it helped Zambia to a much greater extent than its people could have done during the twentieth century. He hinted that, under an indigenous empire, progress would have been much slower and oppression probably much greater.

Grant made several remarks about post-independence Zambia. Among other things, he observed that, under its first president Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia paid a heavy price for supporting liberation struggles in neighboring countries. Sadly, rather than commend Kaunda for living up to his worthy convictions, Grant held that he was not “pragmatic.” The former colonial officer is however more persuasive in his assessment of the domestic policies of
Kaunda. His account left no doubt that Kaunda’s dictatorship (as president of a one-party state, from 1973) and left-inclined economic policies were wrong-headed. But Grant conceded that Zambia, both under Kaunda and his “pragmatic” successors, has not been among the very badly governed states of post-independence Africa.

Among Grant’s several comments about the situation in Zambia today is the view that Zambia is under another kind of imperialism: that of foreign donors (who fund about 52% of its annual budget). According to him, foreign “experts” take decisions Zambians should be taking themselves. Besides, he added, the “experts” (unlike the officials of the colonial government) are not well informed about the country.

Zambia, Then and Now is written in felicitous prose. It is easy to read, yet it is serious. Besides interesting stories of the author’s days in “the bush” as an administrative officer and of his one-month tour forty-five years later, the book engages in the important intellectual debate about colonial rule, neocolonialism, and development in Africa. The documentary sources he cited are rather scanty but adequate for his purpose. Both the academic and the general reader would find it interesting and intellectually stimulating.

Okechukwu Edward Okeke, Abia State University


Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia is the result of Messay Kebede’s quest to understand the modernization process promoted by Haile Selassie since the sixties, and more specifically its failure which, apparently, led to its overthrow and to the 1974 Revolution.

Multiple factors help to explain the Ethiopian radicalization process in the decade and a half prior to the revolution, the shift of the regime being its culmination. Usually, the structural ones have been underscored, pointing to a question of degree rather than of form to make clear why, suddenly, Haile Selassie’s reign broke up in the middle of the seventies. Following this point of view, the events appear as something natural or even logical in the Ethiopian historical process: having reached a decisive point, the economic and political problems became unbearable for the society; reform was not an option, the autocratic regime had to come to an end.

Nevertheless, in contrast with this explanation, Messay Kebede comes back or rescues the fundamental question from which the historical analyses may start afresh, namely: why? Transmitting, in a certain way but not explicitly, a kind of braudelian notion of history (maybe the fruit of his personal experience in Ethiopia and of his knowledge of the French Academy), Kebede offers a critical account of the 1960-1974 period. Analyzing the modernization process promoted by Haile Selassie in the education system and its social consequences, the author looks for new answers to an old issue.

Even if the revolution in the seventies is not something new, it can be understood from a renewed point of view. From this perspective, the question is not any more how the 1974 break-up was possible, as why the radicalization which allowed it, prescribing the reformist option,
has been possible. Messay Kebede points to the cultural dislocation undergone in Ethiopia at the educational level as the fundamental explanation for this shift towards extremist options, and specially its impact on students and intellectuals. His hypothesis is that when culture stops working as a cohesive element for the society and there is a strong rejection of traditions and past values, radicalization and receptivity towards foreign cultural and ideological models are more probable; structural factors may be important to explain the Ethiopian revolution, but they make little sense without taking into account the role of culture and ideology.

Messay Kebede confronts the complexity of the cultural-ideological process that he describes, and the conjunction with the material and political and political factors that have been usually underlined, in nine chapters dealing with the appearance of student radicalism, as a consequence of the modernization of the education in Eurocentric terms that was a product of Haile Selassie’s political project, engendering uprootedness and extroversion. The impact of those policies in a concrete social sector, the new educated elite, and the way this one tried to focus its new western lenses on the Ethiopian situation, caused a profound dislocation reaffirming their opinion about the necessity of a radical social change in the country.

In short, social and cultural dislocation produced by the sudden shift from the traditional education to the Western one, created a void which came to be filled by a radical ideology—Marxism-Leninism—embraced by a small sector of the society. This educative process originated a generational conflict. The new elite should have been following Haile Selassie’s objective, the key to consolidate its autocratic rule. Instead, the introduction of Western analytical tools and concepts, and specially its evolutionary lecture of the history, denigrating as backward other cultures that do not seem to have reached the “same stage of development” than the one marked by Western countries, generated a rejection of the customary values, and a questioning of the government and parental authority.

The traditional came to be seen as the cause of the underdevelopment, validating in this way the Western values as the norm to follow, to imitate, instead of creating a model adapted to local realities. The moderate position, which existed in the sixties, more favorable to liberalism and advocating for a political reform, lost its appeal in favor of the marxist-leninist radicals who found in this ideology a way to fill the lacuna caused by the rejection of their cultural values and principles. As Messay wonderfully explains, the substitution was possible because Marxism-Leninism had common points with their former mental map.

The rejection of their traditions, strongly marked by the Christian beliefs, was appeased by the adoption of a credo that had similarities in its objectives and promises with the traditional messianic role of the Ethiopian state, appeasing their sense of guilt because of the betrayal committed against their elders. Moreover, even if Marxism-Leninism was a product of the West, it was also critical of liberal and capitalistic values and, apparently, it offered an explanation and a solution to the identity, cultural, and generational crisis.

The Ethiopian paradox stems from the fact that, despite resisting European colonialism, the Western dominance finally came in through the back door, opened by Haile Selassie himself. Cultural dependency arrived in Ethiopia; and this happened precisely when physical colonization was being questioned in the entire African continent. This cultural dislocation permitted an ideological process favorable to radicalization, which constitutes for Messay...
Kebede the cornerstone that allowed the interpretation of the structural conditions (economic, ethnical, political, and international) in revolutionary terms; the structure did not lead to a radical ideology, a radical ideology led to questioning the entire structure, although we can wonder if it is necessary to emphasize the preponderance of one factor over the others. Anyhow, Messay shows how the attitude and decisions of a well positioned social minority can be powerful enough to have an impact on the entire society, even if it is true that the author keeps us in suspense, leaving for another occasion the analysis of how the Derg managed to control the Revolution, relegating the new educated elite.

A good point of Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation is the manner in which Messay Kebede illustrates punctually his reasoning with examples of the way other countries faced similar situations. Avoiding the big pretensions of huge comparisons, the Japanese, Hindu, Russian, or Chinese examples consolidate his study with an international perspective about the impact of Marxism-Leninism in this period and of the westernization and modernization processes in other countries. If Japan is a good example of how past and present could be harmonized, the Russian case, as the Ethiopian one, show the opposite.

In continuity with his earlier Survival and Modernization–Ethiopia’s Enigmatic Present (1999) the author in Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation furthers the understanding of the country’s present situation from an historical and cultural point of view. It is worth saying that for those who did not read the former, this book will motivate one to do so, and for those who are interested in the immediate history, this book will be a good proof of the necessity of the historical perspective in order to make sense of the current time, specially if we consider that the consequences of the process analyzed by Messay Kebede are still felt today.


Any research on the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria should be viewed with great caution because of the difficult task involved in dealing with the Igbo subject. The origin of people is a research subject most historians have become fed up with. Chigbu (2009: p. 4) described it as a historical “headache yet to respond to any known analgesic.” Echeruo (1979) noted that the Igbo are a people best described with two words, “headstrong” and “ambitious”—because this “quality in Igbo character... has been its primary source of strength and of disaster.” Afigbo (1981) therefore called for a “commonsense approach” in dealing with any of the Igbo questions for lack of a more functional approach. In enlightening his readers on the History, Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria, Korieh has adopted this approach in The Land Has Changed.

The book is based on the author’s study of gender relations among the Igbo. With an introduction and conclusion, it is divided into seven chapters. Each chapter chronologically deals with a specific ethno-historical issue. Chapters one and two constitute an exposé of their late pre-colonial political, cultural, and economic set-up. The third chapter deconstructs their societal transformations from its virgin agrarian nature to a “western gendered ideology of
male farmer” (p. 25). Chapter four provides insight into their colonial rural revolts. Chapters five and six discuss their reaction to major structural changes and colonial policies. Chapter seven elaborates on the post-colonial agricultural policies of the region.

In terms of methodology, the author relied on primary and secondary sources. The book provides information on socio-economic and political issues pertaining to the Igbo. Its analysis is based on data collected through face-to-face interviews. The volume is rich with a quality literature review. The use of illustrations, tables and photos in the book provide for the broadening of readers’ perspectives in the subject. The book’s breadth cuts through multi-disciplinary lines. It merges colonial history, ethnography, rural economy, African traditional politics, agriculture, and rural development of the people in one volume. It serves as a literary megaphone for the usually silent voices of the rural people in the Igbo part of Nigeria.

The book provides an in-depth look at the emotional makeup of colonial Igbo life. The various responses from the rural voices of the region reflect a mixture of the agony and opportunity (not love) with which the people viewed colonial intrusion in their sociopolitical and economic life. In fact, the author acknowledges quite vividly that the Igbo were part of the making of their colonial history, although not “under conditions of their own choosing” (p. 275). It serves a diverse readership. Researchers and practitioners with potential interests in Nigeria’s rural and regional development will find the book very informative. Lecturers and students of African sociology, rural economics and regional politics will find it helpful. Nigerian policy makers will find it an invaluable piece of research, especially as a way of learning from the past.

Although providing very important information about the political and cultural struggles in colonial eastern Nigeria, the author could have done more by describing rural life in more expansive and narrative terms rather than viewing it mainly from the perspective of agricultural change alone. However, considering that the main objective of the book is to expose the “British attempt to transform a colonial society through the modernization of agriculture…” the author probably had no other choice but to adopt the “agricultural change” path (p.4). As Afigbo (2000) has already noted, the problems which have faced Igbo studies can be grouped under three heads –lack of interest in the subject by the Igbo themselves, lack of financial support, and lack of an institutional base. By presenting a well researched work in this volume, the author has contributed in providing a solution to the first problem.

References


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“Genocide studies” has emerged in recent years as an interdisciplinary field in its own right, drawing upon the methodologies of history, political science, psychology, and sociology in an effort to answer the question as to why groups of human beings pursue the wholesale extermination or extirpation of other groups. Not only has this blossoming field produced countless books on the subject, in addition to several journals (such as the Journal of Genocide Research and Holocaust and Genocide Studies), but now several universities across the globe have established centers, or offer programs, devoted to the subject. Unfortunately, however, twinned with this increased desire to understand the mechanics of genocide is the growing willingness to employ the label for political purposes, so that the true meaning of the word is forgotten amid accusations and counter-accusations launched across the world in our twenty-four-hour news cycle. Too, the commercializing of genocide manifest in movies like Hotel Rwanda popularly reduces the etiology of such crimes against humanity to mere original sin or man’s inherent inhumanity to man.

All of which make this particular issue of Development Dialogue—devoted to genocide and mass violence, with a particular focus upon the African continent—a most welcome addition to the literature. Arising from papers presented at two different conferences in Scandinavia in 2006 and 2007, this issue tackles both the broader questions of the definition and archaeology of genocide while, at the same time, offering analysis specific to the Congo, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and more. Opening the issue is Jacques Depelchin, who links modern genocide with European colonialism in the question, “what if the evil which has so often and unquestioningly been associated with Nazi Germany, or, today, with believers of Islam, were to be seen as deeply imbedded in a way of thinking which is actually more associated with the triumph of the West, its economic, political and social models?” (p. 18). Contributor Gerald Krozewski follows up this question by asserting that violent conflict in Europe’s African colonies must be contextualized within the doctrines of the nation-state then being debated in Europe at the time, while Jürgen Zimmerer provides a comparison of the Holocaust and colonial genocides, concluding that they are different only in levels of organization, centralization, and beauracratization. Dominik Schaller—contrary to writers such as Adam Hochschild of King Leopold’s Ghost fame, who insist that European colonial violence cannot be dubbed genocide despite the fantastic death count—applies to the colonial project Raphael Lemkin’s original definition of genocide, which can cover the deliberate destruction of cultural and political institutions as well the elimination of targeted populations, and concludes that “the situation coloniale in Africa was not only violent but inherently genocidal” (p. 86).
Coupled with these and other papers that embody much of the theorizing at the center of genocide studies are four papers which zero in on specific events of mass violence in post-colonial Africa. Mohamed Adhikari explores the Rwandan genocide through the lens of the popular movie *Hotel Rwanda*, offering not only a contrast of the real-life experience of hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina with that of the character played by actor Don Cheadle, but also presenting the deep context of Belgian and German colonialism, Hutu-Tutsi relations through history, and the post-independence regimes of Gregoire Kayibanda (during which thousands upon thousands of Tutsis were massacred) and Juvenal Habyarimana (widely seen as a traitor by Hutu extremists). While recounting this bigger picture, Adhikari takes to task the film’s unnecessary simplification and decontextualization of events. Iam Phimister recalls the largely unknown massacre of some 20,000 Ndebele speakers in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, during the early 1980s—a crime directed largely at a population known to have antipathies toward Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF political party. The author argues in conclusion that such violence, “as regionally bound as it was undiscriminating,” could well fall under the UN definition of genocide (212). A second case study centered upon Zimbabwe is Mary E. Ndlovu’s paper on the 2005 “Murambatsvina,” the central government’s notorious attack upon the infrastructure of informal trade and informal housing, an event for which Ndlovu offers several possible explanations, including the government’s desire to suppress or pre-empt urban opposition to ZANU-PF rule or to reassert control of a black market economy that deprived the state of revenue. Finally, Elina Oinas and Katarina Jungar examine the HIV activism of the organization Treatment Action Campaign and its indictment of both the South African government and multinational pharmaceutical corporations on the charge of homicide for their respective failures in addressing the AIDS crisis in the country. Examining the struggle from the perspective of Foucauldian body politics, the authors conclude that the government, largely on the basis of inaction, has “played itself into a corner where it can be defined as a perpetrator of mass violence and lethal biopolitics on a mass scale” (p. 256).

Closing this issue is a handful of shorter papers that link colonialism and genocide with modernity, explore the economic interests behind mass violence, ask the question as to whether or not there exists a unique global south perspective on genocide, and report from a panel debate on what constitutes genocide. The whole package, coming in at just over 300 pages, has the feel more of a scholarly book than it does a single journal issue, and it practically demands employment as such—for this volume has both the philosophical heft and general accessibility to serve as a primer to the fields of genocide studies. While its modern historical case studies are limited to a meager handful of sub-Saharan nations (with two of them focusing upon Zimbabwe), they are all excellent works that provide a useful template for further inquiry. Moreover, the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre generously makes this issue, along with others in the *Development Dialogue* series, available for free download at its website. If this volume is indicative of the broader work of the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre, then people of goodwill across the world have a valuable ally in their struggle against inhumanity and violence.

Guy Lancaster, *Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & Culture*

David Newbury lui-même caractérise probablement le mieux l’apport essentiel à l’historiographie de l’Afrique de ses articles parus entre 1974 et 2001. Il décrit ainsi le courant contre lequel il avance depuis bientôt quarante ans :

« … they identified culture with race, they assumed that broad cultural/racial groups acted as single (internally homogenous) agency, and they took it for granted that racial/cultural groups were organized in a hierarchical fashion. There is an implicit assumption in these works that the structures of African societies observed during colonial rule could simply be extrapolated into the distant past, thus effacing the effects on African societies of both colonial influences and African agency within that colonial context. […] what is most surprising is that these assumptions seemed to intensify over time, as researchers became further removed from local testimony […] a rigid intellectual framework (which also increasingly reinforced colonial administrative thinking) became self-perpetuating. » (pp. 9-10).

Introduire de cette façon en 2009 un article cosigné avec un historien congolais trente ans auparavant (en 1980), ne revient-il pas à combattre de vieux démons ? Malheureusement, ce n’est toujours pas le cas. Les changements apportés à la conceptualisation des sociétés africaines par les universitaires, semblent avoir eu peu d’effet sur la perception générale de l’Afrique. Elle est encore dominée par l’idée que « broad cultural/racial groups acted as single agency ».

Newbury insiste sur le danger de s’éloigner trop rapidement des modes locales de mise en représentation autant du passé que du présent. Il remarque que la conviction faisant loger à la même enseigne le pouvoir et le savoir fait conclure que le savoir produit dans les universités l’emporte nécessairement sur le savoir local. Les nationaux qui, comme David Newbury, persistent à mettre en valeur les représentations locales contre les dogmes politiquement soutenus par un pouvoir paient parfois de leur vie s’ils n’ont pas eu le temps d’opter pour l’exil. Ce fut le cas du coauteur de l’article de 1980, Bishikwabo Chubaka.

David Newbury nous a habitué à l’extrême rigueur de sa démarche, ses recherches sur place, ses enquêtes dans les archives et leurs analyses sont exemplaires. À cet égard, chaque texte repris dans ce recueil est une perle du métier, un exemple de la recherche historique à son meilleur1. En disposer en un seul volume est précieux pour l’enseignant de l’histoire de l’Afrique, un cadeau pour celles et ceux qui envisagent entreprendre une thèse en histoire de l’Afrique. La finesse des analyses de David Newbury, sa sensibilité aux contextes temporel, social, culturel et, évidemment, politique lorsqu’il récolte, puis analyse, les traditions historiques locales sont sans pareils. Historien attaché aux normes de son métier, il est néanmoins aussi très sensible à ce que nous qualifions aujourd’hui des usages du passé. Il sait que les traditions orales sont transmises non pas par souci de conservation d’un savoir antiquaire, mais parce qu’elles permettent d’interpréter le présent et d’envisager l’avenir. L’histoire écrite par des historiens et les traditions que ces derniers interprètent constituent dans la région où il travaille un enjeu politique important. Newbury nous explique pourquoi il

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1 Dans son « Foreword », Jan Vansina écrit à propos de l’histoire que pratique David Newbury : « history rests on fundamental concepts that have been carefully scrutinized and probed rather than merely assumed. », p. XII.
en est ainsi et il fait tout en son pouvoir pour éviter d’être à son tour capté par les enjeux et les jeux politiques.


Cette observation m’amène à exprimer un autre regret, en particulier par rapport au dernier chapitre, paru à l’origine en 2001. Ce long texte de grande importance, écrit après le génocide de 1994 au Rwanda, est paru pratiquement en même temps que le livre de Jan Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien (traduction américaine de 2004 Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, Madison, 2004). Et même si Newbury ne pouvait pas avoir lu ce livre sous sa forme finale alors qu’il rédigeait son article, il n’ignorait pas ce travail compte tenu de ses relations avec Vansina. Il s’y réfère marginalement, un débat de fonds aurait été de grand intérêt pour le lecteur. Également, même s’il mentionne dans sa bibliographie la synthèse (Afrique des Grands Lacs, disponible aussi en anglais) que Jean-Pierre Chrétien a fait paraître en 2000, il n’engage aucune discussion avec elle, pas plus qu’avec les synthèses d’Augustin Nsanze (Le Burundi ancien: L’économie du pouvoir de 1875 à 1920, 2001), ou avec le volume de Chrétien et Banegas, The Recurring Great Lakes Crisis: Identity, Violence, and Power, 2008. Il en est de même avec les livres de Prunier (Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, 2008) et de Lemarchand (The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa) parus plus tard. À mes yeux, le dernier chapitre du livre justifie l’opinion de Vansina qui écrit dans son avant-propos : « … violence in the middle of Africa since 1994 [...] was the outcome of several centuries of historical developments, and anyone who wants to understand the present situation of this region would do well to read this book… ». Je regrette donc que David Newbury n’y ait pas ajouté une note prolongeant ses analyses afin de débattre avec les auteurs des travaux parus au cours de la première décennie de ce siècle, même s’il s’agit plutôt des synthèses. Tous ces travaux sont inévitablement marquée par la plus récente explosion de la violence extrême, violence qui ne finit pas de ronger la région depuis au moins une génération. On m’objectera soit que ces livres sont politiquement engagés, soit que couvrir la littérature de la dernière décennie demanderait tout un livre. Cependant, pour ces mêmes raisons, une extension des analyses du dernier chapitre, à la lumière des livres cités, mais aussi des publications de Claudine Vidal et d’autres, aurait pu, avantageusement, clore cet important livre.

Bogumil Jewsiewicki, Université Laval

*Going to School in the Middle East and North Africa* is the sixth volume in a series on comparative education by Greenwood Press. In this particular volume, which is organized by themes, the location is “MENA countries,” including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Emirates, and Yemen. The author begins his study with a general background on the MENA region in the first chapter, specifically noting the early writing forms by the Sumerians, Egyptians, and Greeks and the schools known as “edubbas” or “tablet houses” for Sumerian students. His very brief history emphasizes the long tradition of schooling in the MENA region, the male only education system, and the rote learning form of pedagogy.

Chapter Two follows the introduction of Islamic schools called *kuttabs* (for the younger students) and *madrasahs* (for adolescents), which were established, in order to teach Islamic religion, values, and culture. According to Ofori-Attah, the modernization of education in the MENA countries was the result of European cross fertilizations, among them the French who were active in Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, and Syria, and the British who worked in Egypt, Lebanon, and The United Emirates. The chapter concludes with a section on education in Israel and the type of schools: state schools, state religious schools, Arab and Druze schools, and independent private schools. All of these institutions follow the Ministry of Education’s common core curriculum, which is mandated by the state.

Since independence for the various MENA countries, the respective curricula have undergone changes that reflect regional and country interests, values, and student goals. Among the Arab states, the core curriculum generally includes language arts (Arabic, French, or English), maths, sciences, computer education, religious education, and national/social studies. Curriculum tracks, such as scientific, commercial, literary, and technical, are common among all MENA countries. Interestingly, the technical and vocational tracks are important in Kuwait and Libya, as specifically noted by the author. Yet, the author provides evidence from the World Bank (2005) that students do not find the vocational and technical tracks attractive for a number of reasons including the poor quality vocational streams for students who continue from basic to secondary education, limited access to post-secondary education, over-representation of lower socio-economic students, and a growing mismatch between educational outcomes and skills needed. Other topics touched on in Chapter Three are the locally published and distributed, free textbooks, the increasingly influential use of technology, and the approval process involved in all private educational institutions from a curriculum planning committee.

In Chapter Four, preprimary education is examined and examples of the purpose, subjects, and curriculum are provided from Oman, Israel, and Bahrain. Primary education, which is free and compulsory in all MENA countries, is also discussed, as is secondary education. Other topics that are covered include the variable school year from country-to-country, class size, school uniforms at public, religious, and private schools, requirements for teacher education, classroom management and co-education. Overall, the chapter spans a very wide range of topics and only briefly engages the reader on any one topic, thus the information tends to be
general and of limited use to someone interested in depth for a particular issue. More detailed background on the development, progress, and status of higher education in the Middle East and North African is given in Chapter Five. Short synopses are provided for Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Specifics are provided on admission requirements, programs of study, enrollment, grading and libraries.

The final two chapters address Special Needs Education and Gender and Schooling. Ofori-Attah attaches great emphasis to the 1994 United Nations conference in Spain that resulted in the Salamanca Statement, which aims for schools to include all children irrespective of their physical, intellectual, social, emotional, and linguistic conditions. Although countries are discussed individually by section, the overall progress in special education is difficult to ascertain, as only broad statements of improvement are provided. Likewise the gender and schooling chapter is organized by country and the theme of female illiteracy, due to a traditional male-dominated society, is presented. Of note are the laws that have been established in many MENA countries to help minimize the gap between male and female education opportunities and subsequent jobs. Also noteworthy is that many MENA countries do not support coeducation after the third grade. Most often, foreign schools, such as the Dubai British School, offer the only coeducational possibilities. The curriculum for males and females differs in many MENA countries as well, and there are inroads being made in many places to improve opportunities for females, particularly in the last decade.

In sum, this text can serve as a basic introduction to the schools in the Middle East and North Africa for undergraduates in comparative and international education. Among the many themes, it is difficult to find strong arguments for specific issues that affect particular countries, as the supporting material is discussed so briefly. Several themes do occur throughout the text, such as the under-education of females, the ubiquitous pedagogical use of rote learning, and the authoritative role of teachers. While some chapters do include very short theoretical frames, the overall text lacks theoretical arguments as the basis for different educational perspectives. Perhaps the original direction of this series, which focuses on countries rather than themes, is more effective for a comparative analysis. A quick flip through the text would suggest that while there is information provided in short segments, charts, and lists, the sum of the text lacks a compelling narrative for the various themes, which would help in making substantive comparisons.

Sonja Darlington, Beloit College


This volume brings together archaeologists working on various aspects of Africa in the trans-Atlantic world. A wide range of issues is covered: Africa’s incorporation into the international trade networks of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries; the impacts of the slave trade and the influx of new goods on African societies; and the incorporation of enslaved Africans into the
Americas, both as slaves and free persons. Two of the chapters discuss the past in the present and/or the practice of archaeology, namely Brempong Osei-Tutu’s chapter, which examines the complexities of cultural politics, tourism and memory at Ghana’s “slave castles,” and Anna Agbe-Davies, who discusses the history of African-American archaeology in the United States and the role of descendant communities and African-American archaeologists in the sub-discipline. Agbe-Davies particularly highlights the empowering potential of archaeology in questioning the naturalization of the status quo and by engagement with marginalized communities.

The book opens with an insightful introduction by the editors, which situates the chapters and the book within the trends present in the study of trans-Atlantic Africa. Although the chapters are then divided into two main sections: “Atlantic Africa” (comprising of seven chapters) and “African Diaspora” (comprising of twelve chapters), thematically they might be described as falling into three groups: Africa, the African Diaspora, and what might be described as “Africa in the Diaspora.” In the “Africa” grouping, chapters by Ann Stahl, Akinwumi Ogundiran, J. Cameron Monroe and Aribidesi Usman discuss ongoing research on the impact of the Atlantic trade on everyday African life in the Banda region (Ghana), the Yoruba-Edo hinterland (Nigeria), the kingdom of Dahomey (Benin), and Northern Yorubaland (Nigeria) respectively. A perspective on the collapse of coastal city-states in East Africa as a direct result of the imposition of Portuguese colonial interests is provided by Chapurukha Kusimba, while Alioune Déme and Ndèye Sokhna Guèye compare the impact of the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Saharan slave trades in the Middle Senegal Valley.

The “African Diaspora” chapters cover diaspora populations and sites in both North and South America and touch on a number of themes in African Diaspora archaeology including the creation of households and the use of space by enslaved Africans at the Hermitage (Whitney Battle-Baptiste) and the Isaac Royall House in Medford, Massachusetts (Alexandra Chan). Mary Beaudry also discusses the use of space, this time by free blacks at the African Meeting House on Nantucket. She argues that it is possible to identify a “culturally distinctive way of organizing and maintaining communal space” (p. 405), most particularly in the form of the well-swept yard that opened up the space for a variety of activities. Mark Hauser, in contrast, examines the role of the enslaved and free African population in commercial activities in eighteenth-century Jamaica, reporting on the trade networks that spanned urban and rural contexts, revealed to us by the chemical analysis of the clay used to produce the traded yabba pots. Fred McGhee’s chapter discusses the potential of maritime archaeology for informing our understanding of the African Diaspora. Two chapters serve as a reminder that the populations with which diasporic Africans would have interacted were not limited to European-Americans. Terrance Weik’s chapter highlights the history of African Seminole Communities in Florida, which grew out of the connections forged between African Maroons and Native Americans, and Kofi Agorsah discusses Maroon communities and their links to Native Americans in the Caribbean. Both of these chapters serve as ample warning against the practice of assigning too narrow an ethnic label to sites based solely on their material culture.

The African Diaspora in the South American continent is generally under-represented in this volume. Daniel Schávelzon’s chapter provides some fascinating insights into the now almost forgotten presence of Africans in the settlement of early Buenos Aires, a presence that
has almost been written out as a result of the “whitening” of Argentina. Pedro Funari situates the archaeological study of the African Diaspora in Brazil with reference to the archaeology of Palmares, a runaway slave settlement established in the early 1800s.

The two chapters that fall into the third grouping, that of “Africa in the Diaspora,” are studies by Christopher Fennell (on “Bakongo Identity and Symbolic Expression in the Americas”) and Candace Goucher (on “African Metallurgy in the Atlantic World”). Many of the other authors reference material symbols or the use of space that are possibly reflective of African origins, but Fennell and Goucher self-consciously interrogate symbolic, cultural, and productive practices that may have originated in Africa and that re-appear in the Diaspora in a variety of forms. In Fennell’s case he discusses the “symbolic composition” of the BaKongo belief system and how this may have been interpreted by Africans more familiar with other symbol systems in a way that made sense to them. Goucher examines issues relating to technology transfer and the retention of African ritualistic and symbolic components in Caribbean iron-working.

On the whole this book is exemplary of the role of archaeology in enhancing our understanding of the human experience and in laying bare the history of how our globalizing, unequal world came to be. Chapters such as those by Hauser, Schávelzon, and Fennel also illustrate the true potential of archaeology and material culture to inform on broader questions of economy, society, and religion that are not illuminated by documentary or oral accounts. The different geographical foci of the book also highlight the regional differences between archaeologies focusing on the same time period. There are definitely differences—the chapters set in West Africa, for example, are more likely to refer to the broad brushstrokes of decades and centuries at the regional level, in contrast to some of the chapters focused on the western side of the Atlantic where minute details are given about fairly shorter periods of time at a smaller geographic scale (often at the level of a site). These differences arise from the numbers of archaeologists doing research in the respective areas, as well as the scale and qualities of the source materials that each are dealing with. Also, to some extent, it is because the chapters in this volume are not fully representative of the full range of the African archaeology of this time period that is currently being done. The African chapters do, however, provide a solid base with which to forge new directions in the study of the Africa in the Atlantic World and to re-examine what the archaeology of Africa and the African Diaspora have to teach each other. Indeed, the true value of this book perhaps lies in its ability to acquaint very different readerships with a wealth of sources and research with which they may hitherto have been unfamiliar with.

Natalie Swanepoel, University of South Africa

The thesis of the book “is a historical-theoretical analysis of: contemporary issues within continental and diasporic African cultures and my positionality in relation to mass popular culture and politics” (p. 139). Based on this declarative epistemological guidepost, Peterson’s study takes him on a scholarly enquiry starting from the United States, through the Caribbean and continental Africa using interdisciplinary explorations of W.E.B. DuBois, Franz Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral in an attempt to enter into a thick description underpinning their theoretical and practical thoughts on the subject.

Tracing the background of DuBois from Great Barrington, Massachusetts, to Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, Peterson argues that DuBois was far removed from his people. Peterson contends that DuBois had little or no sustained connection to a larger Black community (p. 36). He was particularly alienated towards blacks from the south. He was a black bourgeoisie who had disassociated himself from his own people because of his “eliteness.” Peterson attacks DuBois’s academic discipline, sociology, which he argues exposed him to the Afri-US life. However, he did not step in to help; instead, he became more of a pet negro relying upon a belief in colonial and historical evolution as a linear progression form.

Peterson evaluates the colonial elite with mass-popular culture and deploys it as the undergirding platform to anchor his critique challenging the credibility of DuBois as a black person in America vis-à-vis his relationship and communal identity with his fellow blacks. His work is also an indictment of DuBois pointing particularly to his philosophical worldview expatiated in *The Talented Tenth* (1903) and his concept of “Double Consciousness.” Peterson notes, “DuBois’s formulation of his ideas of Black underclass pathology revealed this conflicted racial-class position. His concept of the Talented Tenth sought to formulate a social-political relationship between an elite and the Black majority” (p. 54). For Peterson, DuBois is trapped in a colonial mentality of superiority that impels him to look down upon his own people based on a socially engineered class dichotomy that conferred on him an elite status due to having been able to ascend the academic ladder. This theme is recurrent throughout the entire book even as he surveys DuBois’s attitude toward Afri-US people from the south who moved up north. Through a comparative lens in which he appraises his relationships with other diasporic Africans, Dubois is seen as being caught-up in internal colonialism where he aligns himself with the colonial master and evaluates others through that prism.

DuBois’s attitude of aligning himself with the colonial master was a reason for his conflict with the Jamaican Marcus Garvey as Garvey became a threat to DuBois’s leadership. Garvey stood for the working class and the welfare and gained popular legitimacy to the detriment of DuBois, who stood for and aligned himself with the middle class.

Mass-culture especially in jazz and the blues and folklore existed among Afri-US people and was very much enjoyed by the lower class. Duke Ellington and Zora Neale Hurston, in spite of their Talented Tenth status, both stood with and among their people and were not alienated from them. They identified with their people in tone, language and attitude (p. 70). In a sense, this was a form of their collective social resistance against the very structure that put them in the so-called Talented Tenth status.
In answering the question of what should have been done, perhaps, Peterson brings in Franz Fanon and Cabral Amilcar, whose activities became even more amplified in the post-DuBois era. Unlike DuBois, Cabral from the African continent and Fanon from the French Martinique made a clear distinction between being used as a tool for colonial manipulation and being liberated from the chains of colonialism. Fanon and Cabral were able to resist what DuBois could not, hence, with their overt resistance to imperialism and colonialism they were able to win the trust of their people. Fanon and Cabral were both what Dubois would term the Talented Tenth (in their case petite bourgeoisie). However, they determinedly resisted the system that they found themselves in even as they took advantage of the education that the entrenched structures offered. Indeed, it is through this education that the structural social inequities would be unveiled exposing to them the “other” status that existed. As Peterson quotes B. Marie Perinbam, “Fanon chose the peasants because, like the nineteenth-/early twentieth century European Proletariat, they were ‘outsider’…Low social status, and lack of education, technological skills, and capital had denied the dubious advantages of ‘colonial oppression’” (p. 101). These were the revolutionary force of resistance. These were the same masses that, for instance, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana also used to successfully establish his political agenda.

Just as Fanon’s travels brought him in proximity to the ordinary people and their cultural values and belief systems in North African and other places, so did Cabral’s trade as agronomist expose him to the masses and cultures that had not suffered the external intrusions of colonial ideology and domination. However, as Peterson aptly points out, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) leadership began to unravel when Cabral demanded an erasure of privileged identities or class positions (something DuBois could not do); as it was the policy of the Portuguese colonial master to do away with the indigenous culture while enculturating them with their own.

Both Fanon and Cabral understood colonialism and its twin evil of racism differently from DuBois’s era and so were successful in using it toward the advancement of their people. Essentially, the problems were different. Living in their own countries, both Fanon and Cabral were able to move beyond certain points, whereas most of Afri-US or African Americans, because of their luminality, could not in their borrowed spaces.

In characterizing DuBois as an elite black outsider (as a substantial portion of the book suggests), we should not lose sight of the fact that Peterson, with his higher education, also fits the DuBois status in a way as he expressed in the introduction (pp. 1-10) and conclusion (pp. 139-45). Although DuBois, Fanon, and Cabral came from different parts of the world, they should also be studied within a sociopolitical contextual historicity of time and space.

Peterson’s work is a massive read and offers tons of information worthy of study. He does not merely cite footnotes; he also very well explains the footnotes, giving differing opinions where necessary. He has also proffered a different intellectual interpretation and analysis of DuBois’s works. His analysis of Cabral’s “re-Africanization” and “Return to Source” are excellently done. However, this book is not too palatable for the general reading consumer because many details are needed across disciplines to fully understand the problematic embedded in most of the issues discussed. I was hoping that he will define “Afri-US” in the
introduction, but the reader has to figure that out. Having said this, the book contains useful information that would expose graduate students to the interpretation of many theories and ideas from different (probably more radical) points of view.

E. Ofori Bekoe, *The College of New Rochelle; Rosa Parks Campus*


There has been an ongoing dichotomy between retributive and restorative approaches to transitional post-conflict justice in modern Africa. Scholars and practitioners from within Africa and beyond participated in the May 2007 “Peace versus Justice? Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and War Crimes Tribunals in Africa” seminar, organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, South Africa.

The volume *Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa* is based on a collection of essays that were originally presented at the 2007 seminar. The co-editors—Chandra Lekha Sriram, Professor of Human Rights at the School of Law, University of East London, and Suren Pillay, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa—worked in conjunction with the CCR to develop this book as a comprehensive examination of previous and existing transitional justice mechanisms in the African context. It contributes toward the restorative vs. retributive justice debate by discussing challenges and prospects of accountability through expert and insider critiques of both specific African case studies, and of the continent as a whole. In addition, many of the authors refer to previous transitional justice experiences in Latin America and Europe that have influenced similar African initiatives.

The volume offers a unique insider analysis by practitioners who have participated in developing or implementing the justice mechanisms discussed. Authors such as Kenneth Agyemang Attafuah, who served as Executive Secretary of the Ghana National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), and Alex Boraine, who served as Deputy Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), explain the challenges of establishing transitional justice within the realities of modern Africa. Other chapters provide critical analyses from leading transitional justice scholars, such as Ambassador John L. Hirsch who offers a comparative analysis between the reconciliation processes that took place in Sierra Leone and Mozambique, and Charles Villa-Vicencio, who examines limitations of implementing either trials or truth commissions as solitary justice mechanisms in the African context. The majority of the book’s authors are Africans, which provides critical perspectives into the actual challenges and needs of the local people.

In the introduction Sriram establishes the existing “peace versus justice debate” but argues that it has become an over simplistic dichotomy. “In reality the choice is seldom ‘justice’ or ‘peace’ but rather a complex mixture of both” (p. 1). She explains that often African states have implemented a hybrid of both restoration and retributive justice approaches through a combination of truth commissions, domestic trials, international and/or hybrid tribunals, and
traditional justice mechanisms. The determination of what type of mechanism is used, and at what time it is implemented remains context-specific.

The book consists of seventeen chapters, including experiences and lessons learned from case studies in South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. It is structured into five sections, first looking at the broad debate of peace vs. justice in Africa, and then more narrowly focusing on specific justice mechanisms.

Section one discusses challenges to African peace and justice through a political and theoretical framework and considers the context of transitional justice in Africa through a comparative approach. Section two is about truth and reconciliation processes that have taken place in Africa. It mainly focuses on the significant impact the South Africa TRC had in establishing a model for the rest of the continent, but it also includes insider analyses of the Ghana and Nigeria truth commissions. Section three focuses on war crime tribunals in Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Section four looks at traditional justice practices, specifically Mozambique’s spiritual rituals and healings, and Rwanda’s Gacaca court process. Section five discusses the emergent role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa briefly touching on the four existing investigations in addition to a closer examination into the case of Darfur.

Overall the structure of the book seems to have a fluid flow from the general debate into the restorative and then retributive justice approaches. However, it would make sense to have the war crime tribunals section directly prelude the ICC section instead of skipping from tribunals to indigenous practices then back to international criminal trials.

A reoccurring theme throughout the volume is the significance of local participation in developing transitional justice mechanisms. This is particularly evident in the case analyses of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the Ghana NRC, the Rwanda Gacaca courts, and the South Africa TRC. A reoccurring question, which remains unanswered, is if international justice through hybrid courts or the ICC is perceived as an external imposition or valid justice by local Africans?

The insider analysis in many of the essays adds a unique perspective to the volume, but at times is also limiting. This was most problematic in Chapter eight, “Peace vs. Justice? A View From Nigeria,” written by Matthew Kukah who was a member of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Committee (HRVIC) in Nigeria. Although he did provide some interesting insight about the challenges of the Human HRVIC, in the conclusion he becomes somewhat defensive of the investigation, and fails to have an objective view of the committee’s work. Fortunately this was a rare weakness in the essays—most of the insider analyses provide unbiased critiques and feedback.

The editors’ hope to contribute toward “…the understanding among both specialists and the general public of the importance and role of truth and reconciliation processes and truth commissions in Africa” (p. xii). Overall, Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa offers a comprehensive look at transitional justice mechanisms in the African context and provides adequate background as well as critical analyses that could be informative to both the general public and experts alike. It proves to be timely due to the rising number of transitional justice mechanisms in Africa as well as the overwhelming attention the ICC has focused on.
Africa since its inception in 2002. The more recent ICC indictment for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, as well as the recent investigation into the 2008 Kenya election violence, could provide the editors with a basis for a second edition.

Tracy Fehr, North Carolina State University


For many, the 2005 election of President Peter Nkurunziza finally signaled the successful transition from Burundi’s decade-long civil war, a conflict characterized by unconscionable violence and ethnic politicization that resulted in the deaths of over 300,000 people, many of them civilians. By 2007, the country had disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated most rebel factions, successfully integrated the army, established requirements for gender and ethnic parity in the public sector, and by all accounts had a developing democracy, an independent media, and an active civil society. In this sense, the Burundian transition was a successful one.

*Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi*, Peter Uvin attributes much of the credit for this transition to the international community. State actors, multinationals, and private organizations all worked tirelessly to resolve the conflict. They brought about successful negotiations between the various rebel factions and developed imaginative transition mechanisms, all the while taking considerable risks to fund Burundi’s peace-building agenda. At the time of Uvin’s research, Burundi received about $300 million per year in international aid, accounting for around 39 percent of its GDP. In turn, much of this aid was funneled into the development enterprise itself, funding top-down projects in good governance, rule of law initiatives, transitional justice programs, community-based economic empowerment efforts, and the like. While it is certainly true that international efforts were central to ending the war, what is less clear is whether these post-conflict aid initiatives have actually helped the thousands of Burundians—returned refugees, internally displaced persons, former rebels—still living in poverty, dying of treatable diseases, and struggling each day to survive.

Uvin contends that such efforts by the development community have largely failed. By juxtaposing the international post-conflict agenda in Burundi with the lives of ordinary Burundians, Uvin shows that the assumptions that underlie international development and inform the policies and practices of post-conflict and peace-building endeavors are often at odds with the hopes and dreams of the people of Burundi. For Uvin, the overarching post-conflict agenda has failed to account for a Burundian worldview in the wake of such violent conflict. How do regular Burundians view their lives? What are their goals? What are their priorities? In what ways have their lives changed since the end of the conflict? What are the gendered implications of these changes? How have the youth coped following the war? Do young men pose a threat to Burundi? These are the types of questions that Uvin argues must be factored into development, post-conflict, and peace-building initiatives in Burundi, and which he sets out to answer in this book.

Relying on 388 in-depth interviews with regular Burundians throughout the country, Uvin examines Burundian post-conflict popular opinion on topics such as peace, governance,
development, and gender expectations. Through these interviews Uvin highlights the
distinctions between the assumptions of the international community and the attitudes and
ideas held by ordinary Burundians on these issues. The results of this exercise are often
surprising. These findings shed light on both the misunderstandings of international
development and peace-building organizations, as well as the areas in which these
organizations and everyday Burundians share common goals.

With respect to peace, Uvin discovers that Burundian views are very much in line with
recent peace studies discourse that equates peace with human security. As well, this notion of
peace calls into question literature that criticizes the post-conflict agenda (security, governance,
development, and justice/reconciliation). Such critiques portray the agenda of the international
community as a neo-colonial import without allowing for the possibility that local populations
might have similar views. Uvin’s findings seem to counter these critiques. Though the language
used by Burundians may be different, nearly 80 percent of those interviewed stressed the
importance of security, development, and improving economic and social relations in
promoting peace.

Surprisingly absent from the Burundian conception of peace is governance. Rarely did
Burundians discuss issues of governance (democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc.) with
Uvin. Echoing Roland Paris’s contention that states must be institutionalized before being
democratized, Uvin explains that national politics and elections matter little to Burundians in
improving life chances. What is important is a safe environment in which economic progress
and social relations can flourish. Interestingly, this does not mean that Burundians do not care
about governance. While they may not speak in terms of Western notions of human rights and
good governance, values such as equity, respect, and a desire to end corruption remain vital to
Burundian life. As Uvin notes of the interviews, “A deep adherence to values of truth, justice,
[and] non-discrimination appeared everywhere in our conversations” (p. 78). For the author, the
presence of such values in everyday speech calls into question the current peace-building
processes utilized by international donors. This points to a systemic inability of the international
community to understand the nuances of Burundian society.

Equally surprising are the ways in which Burundians understand economic development.
While all of Uvin’s respondents stressed the many negative impacts of the war on their
economic well-being, many still hold firm the belief that their lives can improve. Interestingly,
this hope is very often conveyed through an adherence to values that Westerners equate with
capitalism. Burundians believe they can improve their lives so long as they are smart, work
hard, and persevere. Further, contrary to much of the economic development literature that
stresses the importance of “collective development” and “community empowerment,”
Burundians see economic improvement in individualistic terms. During Uvin’s interviews
people were far more concerned with job creation and individual access to credit. The sorts of
community development mechanisms so popular in international development were rarely
mentioned.

Critical of the absence of discussions of gender in most post-conflict literature, Uvin finds
that gender norms in Burundi are shifting as a result of the war. Economic constraints have
altered traditional marriage requirements and blurred gender roles. The hardships placed on
Burundian men—particularly young men; ex-combatants and those still internally displaced—make it difficult for them to live up to traditional Burundian notions of masculinity. Yet while Burundian men acknowledged these hardships, they also expressed the importance of values associated with traditional male responsibility: hard work, self-reliance, providing for one’s family. In terms of development policy, such shifts challenge the widely accepted causal linkages between poverty, the constraints it places on masculinity, and subsequent violence. As it turns out, at least in Burundi, young men do not necessarily turn to violence when confronted by economic, political, or social hurdles; rather, many work harder, find creative solutions to solve their problems, or relocate in search of better opportunities. In short, these young men respect social norms and do what they can to survive. This, then, should be cause for development scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to reassess their conceptions of conflict and post-conflict in Burundi, which almost always paint young men as agents of violence.

Through this examination of the lives of ordinary Burundians, Uvin’s Life After Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi questions conventional approaches to peace-building and development. In doing so, the book by challenges normative post-conflict policies, which far too often rely on totalizing macro-level solutions to solve nuanced micro-level problems. As such, Uvin departs from much of the development literature that tends to focus on the development enterprise itself in order to evaluate the efficacy of its policies and practices. Instead, he presents a “view from below,” that is a socioeconomic and political analysis of a post-conflict Burundi as described by its people, particularly its youth. Uvin asserts: “I wanted to know the ideas of the international development and peace-building community, the aims it seeks, the agendas it sets: do they make sense to regular people? Or are [development practitioners] basically living in a totally different world, unrelated to the real lives of the poor and the excluded in whose name [they] claim to speak?” (p. x). The interplay between these dynamics—the goals of everyday people on the one hand, and the policies and practices of international development organizations on the other—provides the foundation upon which Uvin’s argument rests.

A well-crafted and well-researched effort, Life After Violence does what many books about development in Africa do not—it listens to the concerns of everyday people and gives them a platform from which to speak. Through these voices, Uvin presents a rather convincing argument for the need of more studies like his own. If the international community wants to improve the lives of ordinary people in post-conflict states than it should start by knowing those people, how they view their lives, and where they want their lives to go. Uvin’s first book, the Herskovits Award winning Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (1998) forced the international aid community to reevaluate its role in creating many of the structural conditions that helped precipitate the violence of the Rwandan genocide. Through Life After Violence, Uvin again challenges us to think differently about international development. This book represents a fresh take on the role and impact of development aid. It should be required reading for any development scholar or practitioner working in the field today.

Sean Fairchild, University of California, Los Angeles

This tiny, readable book consists of fifteen short chapters averaging six pages, each arranged according to a thematic that flows directly from Harry West’s ethnographic encounters with people living on the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique and with his scholarly musings regarding questions of theory, epistemology, sorcery, truth-claims and discourse – in other words, about knowledge. In this book—which initially formed part of an earlier draft of his important book *Kupilikula* (2005)—West sets out to “explore the epistemological paradox arising from the ethnographic encounter of sorcery” (p. xi). He takes the reader on a number of brief but forceful encounters with debates within anthropology on the question of knowledge and sorcery: from the positivists and Evans-Pritchard’s view of sorcery as subjectively true but objectively false, to Tambiah’s use of a context-independent notion of reality and the symbolists focus on symbols and meaning, to the phenomenologists’ emphasis on the kind of reality sorcery would produce, ending with more recent discursive theories of knowledge. Skillfully combining ethnography and theory in his writing, West demonstrates some of the key differences between these varying theoretical positions, not only through “objectively” analyzing their basic tenets and arguments but also by attributing theoretical positions to real-life characters. The Catholic nun, the revolutionary socialist, the sorcerer and the anthropologist thus become, at times too neatly, characters in this “theoretical narrative.” Adopting a decidedly perspectivist position, which allows him to present various theoretical position with fairness and from “within,” West does not pretend to present the reader with clear answers but instead raises important questions: If everyone in Mueda contributes to sorcery discourse, is not everyone a sorcerer? Who can imagine such a thing as sorcery without doing it? What is then the difference between what is imagined and what is real, between what is visible and invisible? Can we separate theory and ethnographic practice? Beautifully recounting a number of encounters during fieldwork—such as falling sick, being treated by a healer, and being dreamt of—West adopts a discursive position, treating sorcery as a language through which Muedans comment on the workings on power (p. 8) and as a “perspectival space” (p. 44) through which they make their life-worlds and understand the discourse and practice of liberal democracy. After reading this book, having enjoyed the witty descriptions of intimate ethnographic encounters (such as the one about the Boers in the lumber camp and the encounter with Chombo), one is left with the feeling that West’s own theoretical position—that ethnographic knowledge is a form of sorcery and that everyone is really an anthropologist—has as much to do about searching for “interpretative transcendence” than about the weight of history his own position carries. While his stance ostensibly solves questions about representation, authority and positionality for the individual anthropologist, it begs other (including structural) questions which no amount of ethnographic sorcery can make disappear.

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The “Prologue” to James Zug’s history opens, like a mystery, with a funeral by the sea. In the autumn of 1963, two men buried a newspaper in a garden above a Cape Town beach. They were hiding, and hopefully preserving, years of back issues of the *Guardian*, whose entire staff had just been condemned to house-arrest by the National Party government. After more than a quarter-century of hounding and harassment, the editors declared defeat. Reading James Zug’s lively, detailed and committed book is like opening up those ammunition trunks in which the back numbers were interred, releasing the spirit of the *Guardian* like a genie from a bottle. Now, nearly half a century after its last banning, the *Guardian* (to give it its first name) seems as relevant to post-apartheid South Africa as it was to the struggle.

The *Cape Guardian* first appeared on 19 February 1937 in Cape Town, a city which, then as now, had a distinctive social and political character and history in the South African context. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the so-called Mother City had been the birthplace of important progressive organizations. Political speakers still drew crowds to the Grand Parade. Fascism was rising in Europe and tempting some South Africans. Although many of the *Guardian*’s staff were members of the Communist Party of South Africa, it was not an organ of the party: it was, rather, “an independent paper” and “a Party newspaper, not in letter but in spirit.” This was crucial to the *Guardian*’s survival when the party was banned by the Nationalist regime in 1950.

As a weekly the *Guardian*, as it became on 18 June 1937, appeared at first every Friday, and then every Thursday for twenty-six years, interrupted for only five months during the 1960 state of emergency. Although remembered as the *Guardian*, in order to survive banning the paper appeared altogether under five other names—*Clarion*, *People’s World*, *Advance*, *New Age*, and *Spark*—each name suggests a distinct function of the paper. The sequence reflects its intellectual history: *Guardian* recalls the New Left origins of the 1930s, *Iskra (Spark)* was the name of Lenin’s newspaper in exile around 1900, and *Spark* had been the name of a duplicated news-sheet of the Trotskyist Workers’ Party in the late 1930s.

The *Guardian* was always a progressive publication which valued “intellectual richness and depth”: “Read the *Guardian*, feed the mind.” It covered both South African and international news, and it maintained its democratic, socialist, and non-racial principles throughout. At times it was felt to be “a white man’s organ,” written by but not for Africans, and at times it ran up against the complexities of the struggle itself, the contradictions of South African ethnicity, and the equivocations of Soviet communism. By the time the *Guardian* was ruthlessly and grotesquely cut down by apartheid (“the warfare state,” “the jackboot state”), it had become itself “a battlefield,” but it could claim to be “the conscience of South Africa.”

In all its life the *Guardian* had only two editors. The first was Betty Radford, the English-born wife of George Sacks, a Cape Town medical doctor, who became a leading communist intellectual. In 1948, the year of the National Party’s electoral victory, Radford resigned her editorship and the couple left South Africa and settled in London, gradually dissociating themselves from the South African liberation movement. At the invitation of the Communist
Party leadership Brian Bunting became the editor, a place he filled until the Guardian’s last and fatal banning. He was the son of S.P. Bunting, who with Bill Andrews had been the founder of the International Socialist League in 1915 and its successor, the Communist Party of South Africa in 1921.

In both its coverage and its management, the Guardian was a community paper, locally and nationally. It relied heavily on sales by individual sellers in suburbs and townships, direct to readers and to neighborhood shops, and it organized and generated social and community-building events and institutions: concerts, Christmas and New Year parties, an annual birthday party at the home of Bram and Molly Fischer, and beauty contests. For many years it operated a Christmas hamper scheme, and throughout its life it took its educational responsibilities seriously, particularly the publication of pamphlets, beginning with “The Munich Swindle,” which appeared in 1938, attacking the handing of the Sudetenland to Germany and the implicit aggression of Britain and France toward the Soviet Union.

Early in its life the Guardian dealt courageously with the Spanish Civil War, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, the plight of Jews and others under the Nazis, and the Second World War itself. At the same time it was covering the continuous crises of South Africa: the pass laws, factory conditions of women workers, the Ossewa Brandwag, and racial intolerance. On the day of the Normandy Landings, Betty Radford hung a red flag from the window of her editor’s office in Barrack Street Cape Town. By the end of the war, Brian Bunting believed that the Communist Party and the Guardian itself could claim to be “a valuable part of the grand alliance whose heroic efforts had brought about the defeat” of Nazi Germany. Circulation had risen from 6,000 to 50,000, the staff from three to twenty-four, and it was talked about “on the floor of Parliament and in the muddy streets of shantytowns.”

Post-war optimism was soon crushed by the political backlash in South Africa. The Miners’ Strike of 1946, which split the South African left and launched the Guardian on the collision course with white power, which it followed until the end of its days. In the wake of the strike Smuts targeted both the Communist Party and the Guardian and mounted a Sedition Trial that prefigured the Treason Trial of a decade later. There followed the Langa riots and Bethal prison labour scandal of 1947. The government’s harassment of the newspaper was continuous and only intensified under the National Party after 1948.

James Zug’s narrative takes his reader through six stages of the Guardian’s history: the “Cape Town childhood” of 1937-1939; the war years; a time of departures and the initiation of apartheid from 1945-1950. In these years the Guardian had a foot in the door of political power; both Radford and Sam Kahn were on the Cape Town City Council. (Sam Kahn was also the Guardian’s racing tipster.) The first years of banning lasted from 1948 to 1954. James Zug calls the years 1950-1959 the Democracy Decade: this was a time when the Guardian was closest to the Communist Party of South Africa and its post-banning transformation into the South African Communist Party, when some South Africans (always a minority) were living democratically and non-racially. The promise of that example roused the insane fury of the apartheid state and initiated the decade which saw the final gagging of the Guardian: Sharpeville and beyond 1960-1963. After an uneasy start the Guardian was fully identified with the alliance that now rules South Africa: “The paper, especially in those last days, was the
movement.” As Harry Gwala said, “After 1963 it was gone, but it was never banned in the minds of the people.”

The post-

Guardian

life of the newspaper’s important figures is exemplary. Betty Radford and George Sacks, and Harold Baldry (who as “Vigilator” had written on foreign affairs), ended their days in England, alienated from the paper and the struggle. Michael Harmel, the intellectual and theorist of South African communism, died in Prague. Brian Bunting returned to South Africa and became a member of parliament. James Zug gives us lively and often detailed portraits of these big names and many others. We meet such headline figures as Ruth First, Govan Mbeki, Sam Kahn, Dennis Brutus, Moses Kotane, Albie Sachs, Harry Gwala, Helen Joseph, and many others. But we also meet the sellers, the beauty contest organisers, the reporters, and the readers. Of all these people we can say with James Zug that “They had done their part. They had stood up.” Douglas Manqina, who was exiled for a quarter-century to a remote farm and returned in 1994 to “all those places where I used to sell New Age,” said that the paper “was the seed that we sowed.” The young plant still needs nurturing: South Africa still needs The Guardian.

James Zug has written an absorbing book, which all South Africans should read: the detail is gripping and the history will be a revelation. I think the publishers could use a good proof-reader.

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