The Rise and Fall of the Rwanda-Uganda Alliance (1981-1999)

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Abstract: This paper argues that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance began in the early 1980s as a pact of survival between Ugandan rebels and Rwandan exiles then living in Uganda, through the Rwandan and Ugandan military occupation of Congo, and concludes with the alliance’s violent breakup in late 1999. Using different alliance theories, this paper helps explain that the success of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance against the Mobutu regime had generated a “bandwagon” effect in the region. But the speed and success of this war paved over serious disagreements in strategy and clashes of personality within the Rwanda-Uganda alliance. It was not until the second war in Congo that these disagreements came to the surface; the alliance encountered fierce and unexpected resistance from states in the region, which joined together to “balance” and ultimately stymy the Rwanda-Uganda alliance’s second attempt at regime change in Congo. Drawing from interviews with high-ranking Ugandan and Rwandan officials, as well as numerous secondary sources, this paper argues that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was beset by personality clashes between major players in the alliance, strategic disagreements over the ubiquitous “Congo question,” and zero-sum economic conflicts of interests, exemplified by the fighting between the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries at Kisangani, which marked the end of the alliance.

Introduction: Some Key Questions of Alliance Theory

How do states choose between allies and enemies? What forces bring states together or push them apart? Which level—systemic, domestic or individual—should we emphasize when understanding alliance dynamics? This paper examines the factors that brought Rwanda and Uganda together and ultimately which drove them apart, from their first cooperation as guerrillas in the early 1980s, culminating with their ugly breakup at the turn of the twentieth century as occupiers in a foreign land. But first, some theoretical points must be clarified.

First, what is an alliance? Here I use Walt’s definition from his seminal work on alliance theory; an alliance is “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” which “assumes some level of commitment and an exchange of benefits for both parties; severing the relationship or failing to honor the agreement would presumably cost something.” I modify the definition only as it relates to sovereign states; I argue that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance actually existed before either side represented incumbent power in their countries. I argue further that it was their intimate cooperation as

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guerrillas and exiles fighting for their survival that constituted an alliance. Following Dittmer’s alliance logic, neither side could achieve its goals without the other.3

Second, why do alliances form? Schroeder identifies three causes: to oppose a threat; to accommodate a threat through a “pact of restraint”; or to provide great powers with a “tool of management” over weaker states.4 The first cause endures throughout the life of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, but the other two do not—either because Uganda had enormous difficulties in restraining its ally Rwanda or because the relative distribution of power between the two allies was not significant enough for one to be able to manage the other.

Third, how do states respond when confronted by a serious external threat? According to realist theory, states can essentially choose from two options: to “balance”—self-strengthening or forming alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them; or to “bandwagon”—to align with the foreign threat itself.5 This question is obviously crucial to understanding the formation and duration of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, but it also influences how states in the region responded to the actions of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance itself. And here is where it gets tricky for the policymaker: a mistaken hypothesis—for example, expecting other states to bandwagon but which actually balance—can doom a grand strategy, jeopardize a state’s security and, in the most nightmarish of possibilities, result in being dominated or wiped out altogether.

Fourth, does aggression become easier with each new conquest, or does resistance harden at a faster rate? The bandwagoning school of thought no doubt believes that, to use one of its proponent’s expression, “nothing succeeds like success.”6 By contrast, the balancing school of thought, to paraphrase neo-realist godfather Waltz, winning leads to losing; in other words, states generally oppose rather than join aggressive powers.7 The latter group sees balancing as the rule and bandwagoning as the exception.

Fifth, which factors cause a state to bandwagon or balance? Here a short critique of the literature is needed. The collective goods literature is useful in explaining the distribution of burdens within existing alliances, but fall short on questions of why states form alliances in the first place.8 Game theory faces a similar weakness, focusing on the distribution of power and the structure of possible payoffs, but, as Snyder admits, “game theory does not predict who will align with whom.”9 Both overlook several key variables, such as geographical proximity, ideological affinity and elite perceptions. So, it’s not merely a question of relative gains, as realists stress, but also one of the amorphous perceptions. As we will see, elite perceptions—and relations between elites themselves—were crucial in determining the direction and actions of not only the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, but also reactions to the Rwanda-Uganda alliance.

Some Methodological Issues
A paper analyzing the evolution and dynamics of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance inherently runs into a number of methodological challenges, and so requires a necessary dose of modesty from my part. First, the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, like so many in international politics, was never formalized or delineated in an official document, and so is open to debate. I define it by the substance of its cooperation, especially in war-making from the early 1980s to nearly the end of the twentieth century.

Second, does the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, the idiosyncratic product of its unique environment and history, actually provide any insight to the existing literature on alliances? Or does this focus on a singular case study in a particular region where the sovereign state’s
capacity is inherently weak, executive power excessively concentrated, and the lines between interstate and intrastate muddled, present an insurmountable barrier? Then again, much of these limitations apply European diplomatic history, which nevertheless provides the bread and butter for most international relations theory.

Third, how to deal with the relative dearth of literature on central Africa when compared to other regions? Likewise, connecting the alliance theory with central African facts also proved challenging, and as such, I generally avoided the confusing practice of lunging to make historical and inter-regional parallels; the paper thus has a heavy narrative base, with theory and analysis injected therein.

Fourth, and perhaps most challenging, how reliable are these primary sources? I’ve tried to treat the elite testimony provided to me with caution, aware of the Kiswahili proverb that “one does not kill oneself for what people say” (hawamfii mtu kinywa). While in Rwanda and Uganda, I conducted interviews principally with what could be called decision-makers—presidential advisers, diplomats, generals, and cabinet ministers—as well as the journalists, academics, and opposition members who tirelessly sought to keep them honest. The constant need to cross-reference interviews through published materials and other interviews required constant vigilance. Their testimony is not cited blindly. I am satisfied to say that a heavy portion of this work draws on interviews with high-ranking military, political, and diplomatic officials whose names I can cite openly, and so avoiding the infuriating practice of repeatedly citing “author’s confidential interview” without providing any further details—a practice that only serves to summon the reader’s skepticism anyway.

Origins of the Alliance, 1959-94

“The central pattern that recurs time and again is one in which ethnic polarization paves the way for political exclusion, exclusion eventually leading to insurrection; insurrection to repression, and repression to massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, which in turn become the vectors of further instability” — René Lemarchand,11

With this concise analysis, Lemarchand successfully identifies the self-generating force behind many of the region’s gravest security headaches at the time—Rwanda’s many refugee crises (1959-94), Rwanda’s cataclysmic genocide of 1994, Burundi’s semi-genocide and civil war (1993-2003), nagging insurgencies in Uganda and Sudan, and both Congo wars. This pattern of ethnic polarization, persecution, and population flow together provided the necessary conditions for the Rwanda-Uganda alliance to take form.

This paper argues that, in the early 1980s, the foundation of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was laid, not between sovereign states, but rather between a group of Rwandan exiles and the tiny guerrilla force of Yoweri Museveni in the Ugandan hinterland. It was an alliance born out of the common necessity of self-preservation. Although the highpoint of the alliance and sudden collapse happened just years apart at the end of the twentieth century, the alliance’s roots actually reach back decades to the early independence period.

Persecution of Rwanda’s minority Tutsi population, starting with the so-called “Hutu Revolution” in 1959 on the eve of Rwanda’s independence, sparked the mass exodus of Tutsi into neighboring states. Without this ethnic cleansing masquerading as a revolution, the series of cataclysmic events that would later afflict the region, none more ghastly or well known than Rwanda’s genocide of 1994, would have been impossible. So long as the
majority Hutu dominated Rwanda’s government and economy, the minority Tutsi could never feel safe or welcome in Rwanda. In Uganda, after a relatively secure existence under the otherwise calamitous regime of Idi Amin (1971-79), the Rwandans suffered severe persecution under Milton Obote’s second regime (1980-85). Persecution from the “Obote II” regime naturally drove Rwandan Tutsi exiles, many living in Uganda since their expulsion from Rwanda in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to join Museveni’s guerrilla force, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). During Uganda’s “bush war” (1981-85), this force astonishingly grew from a dozen bush warriors to a formidable organization of many thousands, and ultimately seized power in 1986. It was during this baptism by fire that the sons of Rwandan refugees not only fought for their survival, but also gained valuable guerrilla experience, which they would later use for their armed return to Rwanda.

Among Museveni’s very first recruits were two talented Rwandan Tutsi, Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, the latter the son of a Rwandan Tutsi refugee. It was only natural, therefore, that the Rwandans, some of whom had fought with Museveni since the beginning, were rewarded with high positions in Museveni’s security establishment after 1986: Rwigyema became Museveni’s de facto number two, Kagame became Museveni’s spy chief, and various other high-ranking positions were filled by more of Museveni’s Rwandan brothers-in-arms. But the government’s high-profile inclusion of Rwandans—no matter how long they had been in Uganda and no matter their sacrifices in the “bush war”—was bound to provoke a clash among Uganda’s xenophobic segments, who had a very negative answer to Museveni’s famous rhetorical question—“What’s wrong with being Rwandan?” In the late 1980s, it was clear that the Rwandan “refugee warriors”—the vast majority of whom were Tutsi—had outlived their welcome in Uganda. As a result, they organized themselves as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and in late 1990 invaded Rwanda. Taking with them gear from Ugandan military depots, it seemed that Museveni had decided it was better to turn a blind eye for the sake of allegiance to his former comrades-in-arms as well as to maintain plausible deniability with the Hutu regime in Rwanda.

The goals of the RPF invasion were modest: force the Hutu dictatorship into reform and allow Tutsi exiles back into the country. But this Tutsi-led invasion re-ignited Hutu fears of Tutsi enslavement, which the well-oiled Hutu propaganda machine had disseminated effectively for years. The war dragged on for nearly four years as a protracted, low-level guerrilla struggle, with the RPF relegated to pockets in Rwanda’s mountainous northwest. In the meantime, anti-Tutsi violence within Rwanda spiked, stoked by Hutu supremacist propaganda. These assassinations and small-scale massacres eventually culminated in the hundred days of genocide from April to July 1994 in which some 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed.

Amid the chaos and carnage, the RPF seized the capital Kigali in July 1994, halting the genocide and driving the Hutu supremacists from power. As a result, the defeated Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), genocidal militias, and government officials together fled Rwanda during July-August 1994 behind a shield of terrified peasants, about two million Hutu in all. This confusing mass of refugee, rebel and murderer together settled into what soon became mega-camps just beyond the Rwandan border in the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo (known as Zaire until 1997). From these camps, they organized an invasion to recapture power in Rwanda. By late 1994, it was clear that neither Rwanda’s civil war nor genocide was over, but instead dangerously paused, waiting for the next bout of violence.

True to Lemarchand’s description of the general pattern of armed conflict in the African Great Lakes, this dangerous cycle of ethnic polarization leading to political exclusion, then
to armed insurrection, and finally to armed repression was thus also a major driving force behind the Rwanda-Uganda alliance. At the same time as the defeated forces of the Hutu dictatorship fled Rwanda into eastern Congo-Zaire and into Tanzania during mid-1994, Museveni’s government in Uganda was facing its own rebel threat. The motley of rebels fighting along Uganda’s 765-kilometer-long border with Congo-Zaire—a conflict with no connection to the Hutu-Tutsi apocalypse in Rwanda—held grievances against the “southerner”-dominated Christian government of Yoweri Museveni. Even years after Museveni’s bush warriors succeeded in taking the capital Kampala in January 1986—with substantial help from Rwandan refugees in Uganda no doubt—Museveni’s government nevertheless had failed to control large swathes of Uganda’s northern and western regions.

Uganda’s anti-government rebels, grouped together as the inappropriately named Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), received training and matériel from Sudan and shelter in Congo-Zaire. Both of these sources of support were easy enough to explain: for Sudan, it had long been engaged in a proxy with Uganda, who had supported Sudan’s southern rebels in that decades-long war; for Congo-Zaire, the vast expanse of territory was largely beyond the administrative grip of the country’s dysfunctional regime of Mobutu Sésé Seko. Whatever the case, the ADF in the mid-1990s brought terror down on Ugandan civilians and stymied the government forces sent to squash them. Through the mid-1990s, Uganda’s insurgent problem in the west was getting worse. This threat is crucial to understanding Uganda’s interest in a continued alliance with Rwanda, especially Uganda’s eventual participation in Rwanda’s war in Congo-Zaire.

Close Allies, Different Worldviews

Before moving on to discuss the alliance’s fateful move into Congo-Zaire, we need to elaborate on how the RPF and NRM, despite many of their leaders’ intimate ties since the early 1980s, saw the world in very different ways. For the RPF, no event was more impacting than the genocide of 1994. To this, we must acknowledge that it was the RPF that stopped the genocide, not UN peacekeepers or any intervening foreign power. Western media broadcast images of forlorn Hutu refugees streaming across Rwanda’s borders, never explaining that some of these “refugees” had earlier jettisoned their bloodstained machetes. So Western viewers, generally unencumbered by any grasp of the region’s idiosyncrasies, naturally came to believe that these two million “refugees” fleeing Rwanda were themselves the victims of genocide. With the plight of the refugees the new focus of international attention, a monumental aid operation was mounted by UN agencies and hundreds of NGOs. The world’s altruism suddenly poured into the refugee camps around Rwanda’s borders in the form of food, blankets, syringes, and tents—not into Rwanda itself, where whatever Tutsi survivors remained.

All this served to exacerbate the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s profound sense of victimization, which had begun with the tragic “Hutu Revolution” and widespread persecution of Rwandan Tutsi in 1959, and continued through the trauma of living in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The sense of victimization became unique to ethnic Rwandans living in Uganda as a result of unremitting discrimination, which culminated in anti-Rwandan pogroms under the second Obote regime of the early 1980s. So, fearing for their lives, many of Uganda’s ethnic Rwandans joined Museveni’s NRM. They later formed the core of the RPF. Despite having contributed to the NRM’s bush war victory in 1986, Museveni apparently reneged on an alleged promise of Ugandan citizenship for his
Rwandan comrades-in-arms—still a matter of debate and rumor. As a result, these ethnic Rwandans’ sense of distrust could only get stronger. When, in response to the RPF invasion in late 1990, France, Belgium, and Mobutu’s Congo-Zaire came to the rescue of the Hutu dictatorship, the RPF leadership only naturally believed that the world was against them.

But all of these betrayals and conspiracies, real or perceived, could not compare to the traumatic climax that was the 1994 genocide. Through the RPF lens, the international community did nothing to stop the murder of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi. It was not an altogether inaccurate judgment, but it was the RPF’s victim complex that simplified a profoundly complex issue—humanitarian intervention—into essentially one of “us versus them.” It was not just that, though. After the genocide, foreign donors exorcised their guilty demons by lavishing food, medicine and clothing not on the survivors of genocide, but on the Hutu mass murderer “refugees” in the camps. The RPF worldview understandably grew more suspicious—and their behavior more and more violent. This tendency to see violence and self-help as the best means to achieving goals would inject a dangerous and divisive element into its alliance with Uganda.

By the time the RPF took Kigali in early July 1994, three-fourths of Rwandan Tutsi, well over half a million in all, had already been murdered. That meant that, in a country whose territory was slightly smaller than that of the state of Maryland, the family and friends of these young and impressionable RPF soldiers were inevitably among the victims. Seeing the corpses scattered along the routes of Rwanda’s hinterland was no doubt a devastatingly personal ordeal for RPF soldiers who had come down from the hills. As many who lived through it told me during my interviews in the country, the feeling was almost beyond comprehension for the outside observer. The piercing anger and thirst for revenge inevitably broke through walls of discipline; revenge killings after the genocide were very common.

The unparalleled horror of the genocide—Hutu brutality, Tutsi collaboration, and international indifference—together formed the fundamental reference point for the RPF worldview. The RPF came to expect betrayal in every interaction and saw enemies at every turn. Self-help, already in the genetic makeup of the Tutsi-dominated RPF, now became the organization’s guiding principle. This mistrustful worldview inevitably infected the RPF’s perception of its oldest ally, Uganda, too, and thus influenced the bearing of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance.

For the NRM, there was no cataclysmic event like Rwanda’s genocide or any singular moment that defined its worldview. Instead, the unique dynamics of Uganda’s bush war (1981-85) forced Museveni’s tiny rebel outfit, fighting in the lush countryside not far from the capital Kampala, to utilize a flexible guerrilla war strategy in which the rebels ceaselessly communicated and compromised with local leaders as means to win popular support against what had become at best an incompetent and at worst a ruthless Obote regime. Without any meaningful foreign support and having only opened a foreign front in the final days of the war, Museveni had succeeded in transforming the NRM, true to its name, into a genuinely popular resistance movement. After seizing power in 1986, Museveni then moved to bring Western powers, including the international financial institutions that they dominate, into his broad coalition. So successful was Museveni’s transition from guerrilla strategist to statesman that Uganda’s prolonged macroeconomic success turned the country into one of Africa’s handful of success stories. This political capital with Western powers would serve the Rwanda-Uganda alliance during its later campaigns in Congo-Zaire.
Highpoint of the Alliance, 1994-98

While the first forms of collaboration of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance were initially between refugees and guerrillas, after the RPF victory in July 1994, the alliance came to represent incumbent power, binding two sovereign states determined to extinguish security threats to their rule.

As Uganda’s insurgent problem worsened into the mid-1990s, Rwanda’s civil war was stuck at a dangerous pause. And eastern Congo-Zaïre was at the center of both problems, providing shelter for the armed enemies of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. Facing down these acute security threats, the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, now representing government power as the NRM in Uganda and the RPF in Rwanda, again found sufficient reason to cooperate. This time, however, they would cooperate beyond their borders. From mid-1994 onward, the alliance was bound to gravitate toward the unresolved “Congo question,” while all the complicated personal histories lingered beneath the surface.

The Rwanda-Uganda alliance must be put into the unique context of a region in the midst of profound—and often violent—change at the time. Refugee crises, guerrilla insurgencies, and state failure in the African Great Lakes region all took place within a broader context of instability and violent conflict. In the 1990s, a rash of civil wars stretched from the Horn of Africa in the northeast all the way to Angola and Congo-Brazzaville in the southwest. Congo-Zaïre, a territory four times the size of France, acted as the vast and decaying center.29 Of Congo-Zaïre’s nine neighbors, no less than seven were beset by armed insurgencies or embroiled in outright civil war.30

Among central Africa’s broad zone of conflict, nowhere was more volatile or more violent than the region’s vortex: the dense “triangle” of Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo-Zaïre’s Kivu provinces. Altogether a micro-region no bigger in size than Cambodia or the state of Washington, it was nonetheless a turbulent regional crossroads with a violent past and seemingly all the ingredients for more violence. The population of the triangle was not only young—the majority under twenty years-old—it was also desperately poor, with per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 below $400 US, their individual national economies all heavily indebted, and negative economic growth everywhere. At nearly twenty million people—by far Africa’s most densely populated micro-region—the vast majority of the population consisted of small-scale peasant farmers.31 With land pressure ubiquitous in the triangle, land pressure was the greatest in resource-poor Burundi and Rwanda with virtually every cultivable piece of land under hoe.32 This neo-Malthusian explanation of the 1994 Rwandan genocide became particularly influential in the German-speaking world.33 For Collier, champion of the controversial “greed and grievance” school of thought, the micro-region’s high poverty levels, low incomes, and low education levels, all within an agrarian setting, made the opportunity cost for violence high.34

By the mid-1990s, the region was submerged in violence and human suffering: Rwanda was decimated by genocide and an unfinished civil war; Burundi was embroiled in ethnic war and state failure; and the Kivus were inundated with arms, aid, and refugees—Rwandan ex-military and génocidaires among them—and a central government in far-away Kinshasa with neither the will nor the capacity to do anything about it.35 Being so close to this cauldron, Congo-Zaïre’s multilayered crisis was doomed to grow more convoluted, more extensive, and considerably more violent. The huge influx of refugees into the Kivus—50,000 from Burundi in 1993 and 1.2 million from Rwanda in mid-1994—brought these tensions to a boiling point. It also meant that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, complicated as
they were by historical baggage and differing worldviews, would feel the tremors of a region in the midst of tectonic change.

Ethnic Tutsi, though this time in eastern Congo-Zaire, would again provide the catalyst for change—or at least the pretext, in this case. The Rwandophones (speakers of Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda) living in the Kivus, had long been suspected of being loyal only to Rwanda. During this Hutu-Tutsi tumult then, these Rwandophones in eastern Congo-Zaire became targets of harassment and killing, mainly done by the ex-FAR and génocidaire militias who had inundated eastern Congo-Zaire after the genocide. It seemed like murderous distraction when compared to their greater goal of returning to power in Rwanda, but nevertheless one that they deemed necessary. It was not long before the threat of genocide of Congolese-Zairian Tutsi became real, especially for a previously obscure, tiny minority group called the Banyamulenge (people from Mulenge), a people apparently of Rwandan Tutsi descent.

For the RPF regime in Rwanda, convinced that their only hope lay in self-help and ready to deal the fatal blow to the ex-FAR and Hutu militia just across the border in eastern Congo-Zaire, now was the time to act. If the pretext of genocide against Congolese Tutsi emboldened the Tutsi-dominated RPF regime to act, we cannot overlook what African Great Lakes scholar Reyntjens cynically called the “genocide credit,” which the RPF had earned as a result of the international community’s inaction during the Rwandan genocide just a few years before. Now was the time to cash in. Under the skilled military strategist and de facto Rwandan strongman, Paul Kagame, the RPF seized the pretext of the so-called “Banyamulenge rebellion” in eastern Congo-Zaire to get down to the real business of waging war on ex-FAR and Hutu génocidaire militias in the nearby mega-camps. For Uganda, eyeing its own threats across the border in eastern Congo-Zaire, it was clear the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was ready to get imperialistic in the region.

Careful of what it could mean to send its troops across sovereign borders, however artificial and undefended those borders may have been, the propaganda machines in Kigali and Kampala sent out shameless denials throughout late 1996 that the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries were in fact the mind and muscle behind the “Banyamulenge rebellion” in eastern Congo-Zaire. The reality was more nefarious. Over the final months of 1996, Rwandan forces hunted hundreds of thousands of ex-FAR, militia and Hutu refugees fleeing west through the dense and hostile Congolese rainforest, committing atrocities of all sorts along the way. If Rwanda’s genocide of Tutsi was ever avenged, it was avenged in the Congo basin, beyond the cameras of Western media and the sight of aid workers.

Meanwhile, the Ugandans were busy with their own cleanup operation, sweeping through northeastern Congo-Zaire and sending ADF insurgents scrambling toward southwest Sudan. Anticipating this breakout, the Ugandans called on their southern Sudanese allies, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), who, at the other end of this broad pincer movement, were ready to deal a knockout blow to the Sudanese-supported ADF.

But it was not enough for Kigali and Kampala to say they weren’t involved, even if events on the ground were clearly trending in their favor. To forestall allegations of violating Congo-Zaire’s sovereignty, Rwandan and Ugandan forces, together with their Congolese Tutsi and anti-Mobutu allies, organized their own liberation outfit, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). In fact, the AFDL was formed weeks after fighting began in eastern Congo-Zaire—and formed in a hotel room in the Rwandan capital no less. Nevertheless, the AFDL was the crucial legal fig leaf for the Rwanda-
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Uganda alliance’s invasion of Congo-Zaire, furthering the necessary fiction that the Congolese alone had organized and revolted against the Mobutu regime.

So, in late 1996, the unsettled conflicts of the Rwanda-Burundi-Kivu triangle micro-region spilled into one big, bloody, and confusing war. And the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was at the great war’s very center. The Rwandan and Ugandan militaries occupied eastern Congo-Zaire, having effectively regionalized the war, operating beneath the Congolese façade of the AFDL. In late 1996 and early 1997, the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was running on all cylinders—military, political, and diplomatic.

At this point, the alliance faced the tempting possibility of revising its goals. Thus far, the war could justifiably be understood as a war of self-defense, with the Rwanda-Uganda alliance having carved out a cordon sanitaire in lawless eastern Congo-Zaire. But the lure of territorial conquest was not to be underestimated. The three decade-old regime of Mobutu Sésé Seko was no doubt a thorn in the sides of Museveni and Kagame, even if for different reasons. During Rwanda’s civil war, Mobutu had responded to a call for help from the Hutu dictatorship under Habyarimana, against whom Kagame and the RPF had been fighting. By contrast, the source of Mobutu’s guilt with Museveni and the NRM had more to do with Mobutu’s passive acceptance of Ugandan rebels, most notably the ADF, in its far east. As then Ugandan defense forces commander told me: “Anybody could do literally anything in eastern Congo.”

For Museveni, Mobutu’s unholy, though largely ineffective, alliance with Sudan, long-time Ugandan enemy, did not make Museveni see Mobutu in a more positive light either.

The blueprint for overthrowing the decrepit Mobutu regime was apparently drawn up when Museveni first convened secret talks in November 1994, with many of Mobutu’s regional enemies in attendance. Now, with Rwandan and Ugandan forces occupying a large swathe of eastern Congo-Zaire, and with the AFDL providing a Congolese veneer, the plan finally appeared workable. Mobutu, that corrupt and ineffectual ulcer on Africa’s new, supposedly democratic image, contrasted with what Reno called “reform rebels” as represented by Museveni and Kagame.

Aside from the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, whose grievances against Mobutu have already been mentioned, the other most important anti-Mobutu force chomping at the bit for regime change in Kinshasa was Angola. Its MPLA regime in the capital Luanda, then in its third decade of war against the indefatigable rebel group UNITA, wanted to deal the fatal blow to Mobutu, who had long provided bases and supply lines for UNITA across the border in Congo-Zaire.

For the realist in international relations theory, perennially focused on the balance of power, a trend of “bandwagoning” seemed to be catching on. As alliance theorist Stephen Walt put it: “states are attracted to strength: the more powerful the state and the more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with it.” Bandwagoning with the Rwanda-Uganda alliance then seemed both defensive and offensive in nature; for the former, it meant preserving one’s independence in the face of a potential threat, whether the RPF against the continued Hutu threat, the NRM against the ADF rebels or the MPLA in Angola against UNITA. For all of the above, a successful war against Mobutu held the promise of sharing in the fruits of victory, in particular replacing Mobutu with a more compliant leader in an expansive state with which all of these participants shared a border.

Actually, the war against Mobutu, led by the Rwanda-Uganda alliance but blessed by Angola, turned out to be anything but a regional heavyweight bout. To the advancing anti-
Mobutu forces, Mobutu’s bloated Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), decimated by decades of corruption, indiscipline, and ineffective leadership, simply refused to fight. In fact, Congo-Zaïre’s state structures were in the process of their final yet total collapse, a process begun arguably over a decade before. So Rwanda and Uganda found themselves at the center of a broad regional alliance determined to overthrow Mobutu. The formidable anti-Mobutu coalition made it clear that, after over three decades in power, Mobutu had made far more enemies than friends. It took only seven months of war to overthrow his thirty-three-year-old regime.

Let us make it clear: the First Congo War (October 1996-May 1997) that overthrew the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko was not the product of some Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, engineered in Washington and carried out by its clients in the region. Neither Kagame nor Museveni nor dos Santos nor Kabila were Washington’s puppets or proxies. As Julius Nyerere, Tanzanian president and de facto godfather of a reformed Africa, proudly called the war that overthrew Mobutu the work of Africans, not outsiders. Rather than a grand conspiracy, a deeper phenomenon appeared to be at work: “Africans solving African problems” in the form of classical territorial imperialism, which had become fashionable—or at least permissible—by the mid-1990s. Thus, the final years of the twentieth century, just like those a hundred years earlier, was a period of imperialism in Africa. Only this time it was African states invading and conquering other African states.

Although the First Congo War—often called Congo’s “War of Liberation”—eventually took on an interstate appearance, the real sources of instability were undeniably intrastate in nature, exploding from the real cauldron of central Africa: the micro-region of the Rwanda-Burundi-Kivu triangle. These domestic conflicts combined to cross borders and spill into the region, thus becoming international, and splitting into what in effect became two broad camps—those fighting for Mobutu and those fighting against Mobutu. And the latter far outweighed the former. This melting of conflicts into a broader bipolar division certainly made it easier for Rwanda and Uganda, already with a history of cooperation in violence, again to band together with common goals: first, to pacify security threats in eastern Congo-Zaïre; and second, to topple Mobutu and install a reliable partner in Kinshasa able to secure the country’s eastern borders with Uganda and Rwanda. However, these common goals binding the Rwanda-Uganda alliance were far from obvious; disagreements over strategy and conflicts of interest were lurking just beneath the surface.

Several commentators on the international relations of central Africa and the Congo wars have accurately identified this seemingly magnetic bipolar alignment as “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” But each participant never lost sight of its true enemy: the RPF against the Hutu threat, the NRM against the ADF, the MPLA in Angola against UNITA, and so on. That also meant that the core conflict of the First Congo War—that is, the RPF’s inconclusive war with ex-FAR and génocidaire militias—actually had nothing to do with who ruled Kinshasa. That changed when Hutu murderers sought refuge in eastern Congo-Zaïre and received some sort of blessing, first from Mobutu and later from Laurent Kabila. It was this development that convinced the RPF and their Ugandan allies, whose own insurgents continually found refuge in eastern Congo-Zaïre and supplies from Sudan, to push for regime change in Kinshasa and squash the problem at its source.

Lemarchand correctly elaborated on that hard-core realist principle, but with an important ethnic tinge: “the friends of the Tutsi are our friends, and the friends of the Hutu are our enemies.” This became a guiding principle for all participants—state and non-state alike—involved in the wars of the Great Lakes. During Uganda’s 1981-85 bush war,
although certainly not the central cause of that war, this ethnic element was again apparent as Rwandan exiles swelled the ranks of Museveni’s Tutsi-friendly guerrilla force to fight the anti-Tutsi Obote regime. By the 1990s, from the tightly compact triangle of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Kivus, political and ethnic violence spilled across borders, inevitably creating a broader game of cross-border alliances with much greater stakes in which the ubiquitous need for survival increasingly outweighed all other concerns and thus created alliances of all sorts.\(^52\)

In the First Congo War, Rwanda and Uganda again made common cause, this time as incumbent regimes seeking to disperse security threats from their turbulent frontiers with Congo-Zaire. Rwanda used the pretext of protecting minority Tutsi—the Banyamulenge people—to intervene militarily in eastern Congo-Zaire. But let us not getting carried with official narratives from Kampala and especially Kigali, which justify this as exclusively a war of self-defense. Instead, the tempting possibility of projecting power into Congo-Zaire, their rich and pitiable neighbor, was part of the calculation from the beginning—if the opportunity presented itself. What is more likely is that imperial conquest, however modest, was always secondary to the overarching goal of dealing completely with the génocidaire threat and ending Rwanda’s civil war once and for all. Mobutu’s overthrow in May 1997 was the welcome byproduct of this invasion.

The successful conclusion of the First Congo War marked the highpoint of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance. It turned both Rwanda and Uganda into important regional actors in the mid-1990s, whose alliance could apparently decide the leadership of territorially bigger and economically richer states and an alliance with which other states in the region would bandwagon. But their history of cooperation in violence was not yet finished, and it soon became clear that removing Mobutu had actually created as many problems as it had solved.

**The Alliance in Quagmire, 1998-99**

Rwanda and Uganda, despite being landlocked, poor, heavily indebted, and peripheral in the international system, had become the core of the broad regional coalition that overthrew the Mobutu regime. Congolese scholar Nzongola-Ntalaja captured the greatest irony of the Congo wars: “Lilliputian states the size of Congo’s smallest provinces, such as Uganda, or even that of a district, such as Rwanda, [could] take it upon themselves to impose rulers in Kinshasa and invade, occupy and loot the territory of their giant neighbor.”\(^53\) How was this possible?

The comprehensive decay of Congo-Zaire’s state structures and economy—the handiwork of three decades of Mobutu rule—provided the opportunity for Rwanda and Uganda to extend their influence well beyond their borders. More disturbingly, though, state failure in Congo-Zaire allowed the incandescent conflicts of the African Great Lakes, a region of highly heterogeneous populations whose distributions do not fit neatly within border limits, to spill into the Congo basin and ultimately result in a dizzying series of cross-border alliances between state and non-state actors. Central Africa in the 1990s thus proved what has essentially become a truism of intrastate war: a collapse of governance is likely to cause civil conflict just as civil conflict is likely to cause a collapse of governance. Its consequences, especially in eastern Congo-Zaire, were disastrous.

With Rwanda and Uganda as the eminence grise behind the anti-Mobutu AFDL coalition, the hard-bitten Marxist bush warrior Laurent-Désiré Kabila became the new Congolese president in May 1997.\(^54\) That the relatively obscure Kabila became leader of post-Mobutu
Congo was no foregone conclusion—and did not happen without a fair amount of byzantine intrigue.\(^5\) After having been invited by Rwandan and Ugandan leaders to participate in the Congolese façade for the anti-Mobutu rebellion, by the time the capital Kinshasa fell to the rebels, Kabila had effectively clawed his way to the top of the rebel alliance. Also among the rebel leadership was ardent Congolese nationalist André Kisase Ngandu—widely recognized as “Kampala’s man” in the AFDL. From the outset, Kisase Ngandu was regarded as the only real threat to Kabila’s dominance of the rebel alliance. But Kisase Ngandu’s fierce nationalist streak, not to mention the open secret of his connection to the Ugandan intelligence apparatus, apparently left his Rwandan minders ill at ease. Gérard Prunier believes that Kisase Ngandu’s assassination was apparently done by Rwandans with Kabila’s approval.\(^5\) And that suspicion was widely held in Kampala, too, as my interviews with Ugandan officials indicated.

So, in a case of perception trumping reality, Kisase Ngandu’s assassination was seen as exemplifying just how far Rwanda would go to control the rebels—even at the expense of their Ugandan allies. Rwanda’s behavior in the war against Mobutu had shown that it would leave no meaningful task to the Congolese—or to the Ugandans for that matter. When Rwanda wanted something done in Congo-Zaïre, they would do it themselves. So, it shouldn’t surprise us that the RPF’s self-help nature, born of betrayal and distrust, would steadily contaminate its alliance with Uganda, the latter which seemed repeatedly relegated to a position of junior partner.

To make matters worse for Rwanda, the Faustian pact it had brokered with Kabila was not without its own troubles. Rwanda continued to do the heavy lifting while Kabila cashed in, first as AFDL spokesperson and then as rebel leader and ultimately as Congolese president. It was not long before Rwanda felt that Kabila was not holding up his end of the bargain. Thus, what began as Rwanda’s violent investment to cultivate a pliant post-Mobutu successor, ostensibly to defend Rwanda’s interests in Kinshasa, increasingly appeared more like a case of the client skillfully manipulating his patrons for his own gain.

Regardless of their differences on the Congo question, it soon become abundantly clear that neither Rwanda nor Uganda—nor Kabila, for that matter—had yet fully appreciated the monumental postwar task of resurrecting Congo’s state structures, a task that was absolutely essential to restore regional stability and economic development. The alliance was quickly learning in Congo that, to paraphrase an old Chinese dynastic saying, one cannot administer on horseback. Actually, getting rid of Mobutu was just one of many problems within the bigger, more daunting “Congo question.” So, to the chagrin of the Rwandan and Ugandan leaderships, the myriad of security cancers in eastern Congo continued to fester—the Hutu threat to the RPF regime first among them.

As if that was not enough; the alliance’s client, Congo’s new president Laurent Kabila, now felt the time was right to strike an independent course. Kabila soon became another source of tension in the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, whose leaders were divided over how to deal with their hardheaded client. Only later would it become known that, early on, there were deep strategic differences between the Rwandan and Ugandan leadership over how to deal with Kabila—disagreements that actually stretched back to late 1996.\(^5\)

How did the Rwandan and Ugandan leaders, successful military strategists and state-builders themselves, understand Kabila’s role in resolving the key questions of post-Mobutu Congo? Here again, both Kagame and Museveni drew from their own experiences of guerrilla war and alliance-building. Ugandan president Museveni made no secret that he feared that too much foreign influence on the Congolese rebels would obviate the need for
the rebels to make tough choices, learn from their mistakes, and work for popular legitimacy; in short, too much foreign influence would doom the rebellion, a point repeated to me by several of his military deputies. Museveni was informed by his own experience during the Ugandan bush war in the early 1980s in which he tirelessly brokered compromises and cultivated grassroots support for the sake of internal cohesion. Unsurprisingly then, in Congo Museveni preferred to help Congolese develop their own rebellion, win popular support, and eventually liberate their own country. A part of this interpretation is no doubt historical revisionism from Uganda’s official establishment, sugarcoating what was at times a ghastly civil war. But for a rebel outfit that began with less than twenty bush warriors, including a few Rwandan exiles, and ultimately grew to a force of many thousands capable of overthrowing an internationally recognized government, there must be some secret to Museveni’s success.

By contrast, Rwanda saw every problem in Congo as a nail that needed to be hammered—and Rwanda would naturally be the one doing the hammering. It was no doubt a product of the RPF’s own experience—that not even allies can be trusted and that, when something needs done, better to do it alone. A Congolese rebel leader captured this difference in strategy: “Uganda is [in eastern Congo] as a mid-wife to Congolese liberation. The Rwandans want to have the baby themselves!” Again, a grain of salt is needed; to claim the key difference in the alliance’s Congo strategy as Rwanda wanting to invade and occupy, while Uganda wanted to cultivate and liberate Congo is a careless oversimplification—and likely a propaganda triumph for Kampala. Nevertheless, in general terms, Rwanda’s penchant to control its Congolese allies against Uganda’s preference to guide the Congolese rebels indeed existed—and its existence gradually deepened the rift already present within the Rwanda-Uganda alliance.

Relations between Kabila, his Ugandan, and especially Rwandan backers met their moment of truth in July 1998. Just over a year after taking power, Kabila, fearing a Rwanda-inspired coup, expelled all Rwandan soldiers and personnel from Congo. The Rubicon now crossed, Kabila reflexively began supporting Rwandan and Ugandan insurgents—the same insurgents against whom he was chosen as rebel leader to fight. Rightly sensing the existential threat to his power from the Rwanda-Uganda alliance, Kabila impulsively moved to balance against his patrons: for his internal balancing strategy, he expelled the ubiquitous Rwandans and fervently began building up his own forces, especially his fiercely loyal kadogo (child soldiers).

For his external balancing strategy, he supported the Ugandan and Rwandan rebels, especially ex-FAR and the Hutu militias, to weaken his former patrons’ relative power.

So, central Africa’s ethnic bipolar alignments—enemies of the Hutu on one side, enemies of the Tutsi on the other—were flipped almost overnight. Sensing the window of opportunity closing fast, a group of Congolese mutineers and Rwandan commandoes, led by Kagame’s de facto number two James Kaberebe, embarked on a daring cross-country blitzkrieg of Kinshasa. But their attempt to decapitate Kabila’s government was in vain. The Second Congo War (August 1998-July 2003) had begun.

Why did Uganda make the fateful decision to support Rwanda and again follow Rwanda into the fray? From my interview with former Ugandan army commander Gen. Jeje Odongo, Uganda’s leaders feared that their gains from the First Congo War would be lost if they left Rwanda alone to overthrow Kabila and install a new leader in Kinshasa. Rwanda would presumably have absolute control over Kinshasa’s new leaders, leaving Uganda voiceless and, more importantly, its western border insurgent problem unsolved.
Following Odongo’s line of reasoning then, it seemed that Uganda believed, firstly, that the Rwandan blitzkrieg would succeed and, secondly, it needed to move fast to join the winning coalition. This rationale seems in line with international realist theorist Rothstein, who said: “Small powers [e.g. Uganda] ... were forced to play a perilous game: moving quickly from the lighter [e.g. Kabila’s] to the heavier [e.g. Rwanda’s] side of the balance as soon as an apparent victor ... could be discerned.”

To use the nomenclature of alliance theory, Odongo’s interpretation implies a logic of bandwagoning, which in this case appears both defensive and offensive. Odongo’s explanation also clarifies, as if there was any doubt, which side of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was more willing to seize the initiative and take—often violent—action.

So, Rwanda was again leading war in Congo, and Uganda was again following Rwanda’s lead. And again, Rwanda’s heavy involvement in planning and fighting was the result of its leaders’ insatiable desire to control their Congolese rebel allies, whatever the cost those rebels would then inevitably pay in terms of legitimacy with the local Congolese population. But unlike during First Congo War a few years earlier, this time the Rwanda-Uganda alliance profoundly underestimated the reaction from states in the region. If the war against Mobutu was seen as a war of liberation, this was doomed to be seen as a war of conquest. Instead of a swift and decisive victory over a demoralized army and bankrupt treasury like the war against Mobutu, the outcome of the war against Kabila was very different—longer-lasting, far bloodier, and far more complicated.

This time the Rwanda-Uganda alliance provoked stiff and unexpected resistance from states in the region; the armed forces of Angola, Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent Angola’s “godson” Namibia, answered Kabila’s desperate plea for help in a big way, supplying the manpower, the firepower, and the money needed to keep the Rwandan and Ugandan invaders at bay. The eleventh-hour rescue operation stymied the Rwandan blitzkrieg at the gates of Kinshasa and saved Kabila from certain defeat.

Here, we need to pause to reflect on the core question of alliance theory: when facing a significant external threat, is it more common for states to balance—to form an alliance in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them—or to bandwagon—to align with the source of danger? As Walt argued in his seminal book on alliances, “balancing is far more common than bandwagoning.” The Rwanda-Uganda alliance would learn this the hard way.

Why then did Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia decide to intervene and balance against the Rwanda-Uganda alliance? First, let us apply some alliance theory: these three countries came to Kabila’s defense, no doubt the weaker side in relative terms, which thereby increased the influence of the three countries—Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia—within the alliance in both absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, their participation made the alliance stronger. In relative terms, because their capabilities (e.g. military, resources, competence) were unquestionably greater than Kabila’s government, they were more influential in the alliance. By contrast, to ally or bandwagon with the Rwanda-Uganda alliance—the stronger side in relative terms—would have given these three countries little influence, since they would contribute comparatively little to the coalition. Kenneth Waltz captured the logic of the Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian leaders facing the threat from the Rwanda-Uganda alliance: “Secondary states [e.g. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia], if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side [e.g. Kabila’s government]; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated
and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they form achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.”

On another level, the joint intervention from Angola, Zimbabwe, and to a far lesser extent Namibia was seen as the ironic opposite of what apparently motivated Uganda’s decision to support Rwanda in the second war. Whereas Uganda sought to preserve its influence in what seemed certain to be a Congo without Laurent Kabila as its ruler, by contrast, Angola and Zimbabwe wanted to preserve their investment in the Kabila government. For one, Kabila had mortgaged his rebellion against Mobutu with Angolan and Zimbabwean funds, including renegotiating lucrative mining contracts to the benefit of his new patrons. Thus, Kabila’s overthrow very likely would mean a loss in both money and influence for Angola and Zimbabwe in resource-rich Congo.

So, what logic guided Rwanda’s seemingly impulsive decision to rush across the Congo basin and topple the Kabila government? One factor was the speed of power projection, crucial to balance of power theory. Simply, the siege on Kinshasa was designed to overthrow Kabila before he could effectively balance, either internally by mobilizing forces inside the country or externally by finding allies in the region. Another factor was a basic assumption of bandwagoning, which as Walt puts it, “states are attracted to strength: the more powerful the state and the more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with it.” Or, to use a bandwagoning proponent’s explanation: “... nothing succeeds like success. Momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement. The appearance of irreversibility of his gains enfeebles one side and stimulates the other all the more.” Using this rationale then, Rwanda sought to make such a speedy and effective show of force so as either to cower states of the region into neutrality or inspire them to join what appeared like the winning side. But this time only Uganda followed.

So, instead of awe and what Healy and Stern called the “ingratiation effect” accompanying the Rwanda-Uganda alliance’s muscle-flexing, the Rwanda-Uganda alliance now led to genuine concern—and ultimately resistance—from states in the region. The source of this fear was the perception that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was an offensive imperialistic alliance, hunting bigger game in central Africa under the banner of the so-called African Renaissance.

On this point, to understand the balancing behavior of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, we need to elaborate on a broader trend in African international relations in the late 1990s. A general reformist trend, first thrust upon the continent in the early 1980s through the now infamous Washington Consensus and structural adjustment policies, had been gaining momentum over a decade. In the 1990s, this phenomenon brought forth a homegrown byproduct, which became known as the African Renaissance, epitomized by the end of apartheid and birth of a “New South Africa.” This phenomenon wishfully anticipated a buzzword potpourri of democratization, market reforms, and good governance sweeping through Africa. It would be too ambitious to elaborate on the well intentioned but ultimately disappointing evolution of this movement in this paper. Suffice to say, however, it never lived up to expectations.

What is important to this study is how the United States, Britain, and post-apartheid South Africa swooned over the possibility of Rwanda and Uganda, both apparently reformist themselves, bringing this supposed renaissance to the Congo basin. After all, the alliance had already succeeded in eliminating one of Africa’s oldest blights, Mobutu Sésé Seko. The tacit support from the great powers also recognized that Laurent Kabila “had lost his way” and was not the right man to lead post-Mobutu Congo to the promised land of...
democratization and market reform. This recognition also made the United States and Britain far more hesitant in again encouraging the Rwanda-Uganda alliance as a catalyst for change in Congo.

Conspiracy theories of a wicked Anglo-American plot using the puppet Rwanda-Uganda alliance to carve into Congo and keep it weak are without evidence and so not worth elaborating, although such theories are wildly popular in Congo’s thriving rumor mill. What must be said, though, is that the so-called African Renaissance was inherently antagonistic to the old order of state-led development and “big man” rule, which was represented by the de facto one-party states of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Thus, it was not so much Kabila’s regime that Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia had come to rescue; much more cynically, it was to defend Africa’s incumbent big men from foreign-led regime change. Mobutu’s overthrow, so it seemed, was only the beginning.

Museveni and Kagame had profoundly underestimated the resistance that their invasion of Congo—the second one in less than two years—would provoke among leaders in the region. The echoes of falling dominoes in and around the Congo basin, kicked over by the boots of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers, caused Angola and Zimbabwe—and to a far lesser extent Namibia, Chad, Sudan, and Libya—to take action. The coalition that rallied to Kabila’s defense saw the status quo under threat from the revisionist Rwanda-Uganda alliance. Not just that, but this status quo alliance saw bandwagoning with the Rwanda-Uganda alliance as simply too dangerous. It would have required an excessive amount of faith that Rwanda and Uganda, which had already proven unafraid to fight, would humbly discard their aggressive ambitions after overthrowing Kabila. By contrast, joining with Kabila, for all his imperfections, was a safer bet because his survival would depend on the generosity of his allies, especially from Angola and Zimbabwe.

The Rwanda-Uganda alliance’s willingness to take risks to improve their position in the regional pecking order and alter the prevailing distribution of power—in this case, imposing their will on Kinshasa, capital of the biggest and potentially richest country in the region—provoked stiff resistance from states in the region. Rwanda’s blitzkrieg to overthrow Kabila only served as conclusive proof that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was indeed hegemonic. Beneath the surface, though, the alliance was already beginning to split at the seams. For Kabila’s protectors, the exorbitant cost in manpower and resources to resist the Rwanda-Uganda alliance was apparently a price worth paying compared to the perceived costs of conceding to the headstrong alliance, which they saw as committed to extending its influence throughout the region.

A few words must be written on Angola’s critical role here. Despite the heavy lifting from the Rwanda-Uganda alliance in the First Congo War, it was the MPLA regime in Angola that acted as Kinshasa’s real gatekeeper. Not only did Angola share with Congo-Zaïre a porous border of over 2,500 kilometers, but UNITA rebels, the MPLA’s archenemy, had for decades found shelter on Congolese territory. And the MPLA had no qualms about fighting in foreign lands against any government that supported UNITA. This became obvious when, not long after the MPLA regime blessed the Rwanda-Uganda alliance’s campaign to overthrow Mobutu, they were punishing another of UNITA’s supporters, this time on the other side of the Congo River in the civil war of Congo-Brazzaville. Angola, which had once served as lead frontline state—and battleground, for that matter—against hegemonic apartheid South Africa through 1980s, was a state whose enormous resource endowment and decades-long civil war gave it the military capability to project power in the region. More so than any state in the region then, Angola was capable of preserving the
region’s balance of power in some African version of Britain’s long cherished “splendid isolation” foreign policy. To superimpose Churchill’s explanation of this foreign policy onto Africa, it was therefore Angola’s duty “to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent.” Likewise, Angola’s decision to oppose the Rwanda-Uganda alliance seemed to be acting out Vattel’s centuries-old explanation of the balance of power dynamic: “The surest means of preserving this balance of power would be to bring it about that no State should be much superior to the others ... to make a stand against a very powerful sovereign and prevent him from dominating.” The Rwanda-Uganda alliance then, at least as it was seen through MPLA eyes in Luanda, was a threat to this balance.

But it was not only the grand strategy of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance that was fundamentally flawed. Both sides—those for and against Kabila—drastically underestimated the strength of their adversaries. As interviews with high-ranking Ugandan and Rwandan military officials revealed to me, the Rwanda-Uganda alliance wrongly predicted a relatively quick overthrow of Kabila. Considering the magnitude of disarray in post-Mobutu Congo and Kabila’s inability to rectify any of its major challenges, this miscalculation is understandable. What is shocking, though, is that leaders of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance believed their invasion to overthrow Kabila would actually be supported by regional leaders.

The Rwanda-Uganda alliance seemed unable to disconnect itself from its own experience that violence could cure all evil and the misperception that states in the region would fall in line.

It must be said, too, that regional forces intervening to defend Kabila, with Zimbabwe in particular, gravely underestimated the challenges and costs of training the hapless Congolese armed forces, resurrecting the Congolese state and economy, and most challenging of all, repelling the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels in the unfamiliar terrain of eastern Congo. In many ways, the war became a quagmire for both sides and a victory for neither.

**Death of the Alliance, 1999-2000**

By early 1999, the Second Congo War had become a multi-layered quagmire with no end in sight for the Rwanda-Uganda alliance: the prospect of outright military victory was all but impossible; the costs of war had become unbearable; the border areas were no more secure; and donor pressure to withdraw from Congo continued to grow. Ultimately, the stress on the alliance was too much to bear. The breaking point came in August 1999, when differences over strategy, control of resources and personality conflicts erupted in heavy fighting in the Congolese city of Kisangani.

Nzongola-Ntalaja has rightly called the Second Congo War a “war of partition and pillage.” As structures of the Congolese state thoroughly decayed and all functions of sovereignty in eastern Congo passed into private hands, holding a loaded gun was sufficient means to tax locals and control civilian populations. Rebel groups, bolstered by Rwandan and Ugandan firepower, set up predatory administrations in the occupied territories to bleed resources from hapless peasants through crushing taxes and unending harassment. In a cruel stroke of irony, Congolese resources paid for Congo’s occupation by foreign armies with all their accompanying brutality, while lining the pockets of many well-connected Rwandan and Ugandan officers. A series of shocking publications from the United Nations named names high up in the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries for their rampant plunder of Congolese resources—or “trade with our Congolese brothers,” as one
Ugandan general shamelessly said to me. With the reports, the euphemism “elite network” entered the vocabulary of central African warfare. As it became clear that political objectives—Kabila’s overthrow, in particular—could not be readily achieved, economic objectives—generally plundering in the interests of self-enrichment and making the war pay for itself—grew in importance.

In the stalemate, vague lines of battle essentially divided Congolese territory from the northwest to the southeast. Meanwhile, persistent instability in eastern Congo presented these Rwandan and Ugandan elite networks with an apparently irresistible opportunity to expand their private war rackets, though at the expense of unparalleled human suffering and millions of innocent lives. Perrot rightly categorized these elites as “entrepreneurs of insecurity” whose rational cost-benefit analysis recognized that war, instability, and the absence of a functioning state were more profitable than peace, stability, and state reconstruction. But it may be the double entendre of another scholar that really captured the macabre reality of the mighty forces driving the Congo wars: these elites were “making a killing” out of war. Plundering Congolese resources proved self-sustaining and lucrative, allowing the Rwandan and Ugandan armies to continue to operate without subjecting their national treasuries to pressure from foreign donors or parliamentary scrutiny.

Was this practice of plunder, however, actually official policy? Did Rwandan and Ugandan leaders encourage and even systematize the exploitation of resources in the Congolese lands they occupied in an attempt to finance their war effort? Unfortunately, this question holds no definitive answer. My interviews with Ugandan military officers all yielded the same, predictable response—that there was no official policy of resource extraction—but this should not leave the analyst at ease. By contrast, several reports have mentioned Rwanda’s mysterious “Congo Desk,” which became the nerve center for Rwanda’s Congo operations. Again, though, this doesn’t provide a definitive answer to the plunder-as-policy question.

As mentioned above, not only was the Rwanda-Uganda alliance deprived of their goal of another regime change in Kinshasa, but the dogged resistance that the alliance provoked actually helped aggravate tensions between Rwanda and Uganda to the point that these apparently steadfast allies eventually became bitter enemies. This violent breakup took place at Kisangani, the major trading hub in Congo’s northeast, a city best known for the diamonds scattered in its riverbeds. Because the Rwanda-Uganda alliance died in one of Africa’s most lucrative diamond centers, the battles only served to confirm that Rwanda and Uganda were just in Congo for the spoils. And considering the nefarious behavior of the Rwandan and Ugandan occupiers, it’s not an altogether inaccurate claim.

From my interviews with high-ranking Ugandan and Rwandan officials, however, it became clear that the fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers at Kisangani was just as much about greed as it was about personality clashes and disagreements over strategy. The Rwanda-Uganda alliance was simply too complex—and too personal—for mere economic motives to suffice as explanations. Three main causes account for the alliance’s clash at Kisangani: zero-sum economic disputes, personal feuds and disagreements over strategy.

Let us take a closer look at why Kisangani turned into the alliance’s graveyard. For nearly a year after the second invasion of Congo in August 1998, the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries had essentially fought on different fronts, Rwanda in Congo’s east and southeast, including on the fringes of the crucial mineral-rich province of Katanga, where resistance was strong; Uganda in Congo’s vast and largely unpopulated north, where resistance was
weak but the territory’s strategic value low. What is important to this analysis is that Kisangani, with all its abundant natural wealth, was the fault-line of these de facto occupation zones. Although supposedly under joint command, Kisangani was in reality divided between Ugandan and Rwandan spheres of influence.

The reality of split occupation did not faze the provocative Ugandan commander in Kisangani, Brig. Gen. James Kazini, who preferred to make decisions on his own. Nor did Kazini bother to hide his sense of superiority toward the Rwandans. This is somewhat understandable since Kazini, who over a decade earlier had led ethnic Rwandans in Uganda’s bush war, and thus considered the Rwandans “a bunch of bush fighters.” When the Rwandan exiles left Uganda to invade Rwanda in late 1990, Kazini was a colonel while the Rwandans were mostly privates. A former UPDF army commander told me: “Kazini used to call them [the Rwandans] ‘boys’ and they didn’t like it.” Kazini’s condescending attitude only helped harden Rwandan resolve to prove they were not mere bit players in Uganda’s civil war. In Kisangani, for example, the different radio stations of Rwandan-backed and Ugandan-backed rebels soon became tools to sound off and swap insults. Pickup trucks with anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine-guns sped through Kisangani’s potholed streets, just one of many shows of bravado and brinkmanship.

But let us not forget about the diamonds. In the early months of the occupation, industry insiders estimated that Rwandan and Ugandan officers had bought up to $20 million in uncut stones a month for export. The trade was immensely profitable, but extremely divisive. Each side dealt with their own traders, the Rwandans with Ali Hussein and his Lebanese network, and the Ugandans with the infamous Belgian “Papa” Philippe Surowicke. Although there was plenty of wealth to go around, the zero-sum nature of the diamond trade was bound to drive these chauvinistic tendencies to the brink.

In mid-August 1999, the pressure overflowed. After a three day-long battle between the Rwandan and Ugandan forces, the battle-hardened Rwandans succeeded in controlling much of the city. The Rwandans were simply better-organized, more motivated and more experienced in the unconventional warfare that the city demanded. By contrast, the dismal fighting performance of the Ugandans may be explained by, among other factors, their soldiers’ questioning of why they were fighting their Rwandan allies in the first place. The Rwandans and their Congolese allies celebrated their victory by parading in Ugandan uniforms and vehicles captured during the fighting. They even showed the cadavers of Ugandan soldiers on Congolese TV as a warning to potential opponents that this was the consequence of challenging them.

But the war of egos, one of the main causes of the first battle, was enough of a reason to fight again. Kazini, his pride injured, felt personally offended by the Rwandans’ upstaging of the Ugandan military; thus, the need to return the Rwandans to their subordinate place as “boys among men” made the second—and third—battles inevitable. By building up Ugandan forces in the city, Kazini had, as later Ugandan forces’ spokesman told me, provoked another battle.

The now infamous “Kisangani wars,” three in all, obliterated the pretext that the militaries of Rwanda and Uganda were in eastern Congo for security reasons, or at least, that they were in Congo for other reasons as well. Only an eleventh hour intervention from the British foreign secretary staved off a disastrous war between British allies and supposed Renaissance representatives. In Kisangani, the high-minded rhetoric of fighting for self-defense, democracy and development in the region gave way to a more sinister reality of
plunder, personality conflicts, and disagreements over strategy. Kisangani was merely the site where this volatile dynamic burst into the open.

Conclusion

The speed and success of the war against Mobutu hid the deep strategic and personal disagreements within the Rwanda-Uganda alliance. By the mid-1990s, Congo-Zaire had become so decrepit and dysfunctional that the RPF’s war against the Hutu génocidaires and, to a lesser extent, Uganda’s war against Sudan-backed rebels in northeastern Congo-Zaire, had the beneficial side effect of leading to Congo-Zaire’s “war of liberation.” But this is not to say that the goal of overthrowing Mobutu had not already been in the minds of Museveni and Kagame, each long harboring regional ambitions that primarily related to their dysfunctional neighbor.

Regardless of these latent ambitions, though, to say that the initial Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of eastern Congo-Zaire was to overthrow Mobutu is to simplify what was a rather complicated strategic picture. After the Rwandan and Ugandan forces secured eastern Congo-Zaire in late 1996, the alliance prudently tested the international waters. America, Britain and South Africa turned an encouraging blind-eye, all with their own reasons for wanting to see Mobutu’s overthrow and the guilt of the Rwandan genocide cleansed. Conversely, France and Sudan scrambled in a ham-fisted attempt to defend Mobutu, the former fighting the boogeyman of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, and the latter focused on its proxy war with Uganda. But it was the militarily robust MPLA regime in Angola that acted as Kinshasa’s real gatekeeper, ultimately giving their crucial blessing to the Rwanda-Uganda alliance’s war against Mobutu.

The Second Congo War, in which the Rwanda-Uganda alliance tried to overthrow Kabila—ironically the alliance’s choice for Mobutu’s successor—took a very different path than the first war. Once Kabila had cut the Gordian knot with his former patrons and supported their rebel enemies, especially the Hutu génocidaires, another Rwanda-Uganda alliance invasion of Congo was inevitable. However, in light of the alliance’s long—and successful—history of war stretching back to the early 1980s, it was no surprise that war was the preferred means of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance to achieve its goals. But unlike the wars that the Rwanda-Uganda alliance had fought before, the war against Kabila became a nightmarish, seemingly inescapable quagmire. Already by 2000, some sixteen months after entering the war, the periodical The Economist accurately commented that Museveni’s government was eager to pull out of Congo, but was “too deeply involved to get out easily.”100 The same could be said for Rwanda, whose fig leaf government of national unity was gradually stripped down with high-profile resignations and protests, finally showing its true authoritarian colors. Meanwhile, eastern Congo descended into an abyss of misery, poverty, and warlordism. And for the RPF regime in Kigali, the Hutu threat remained.

When success in the war against Kabila was not forthcoming, the towering egos of old bush warriors Kagame and Museveni came to the fore. Even the three battles between at Kisangani did not seem cathartic enough, and throughout 2001 Rwanda and Uganda nearly went to war on their own soil.101 But, as this paper argued, all of these strategic differences over the complex “Congo question” were present as early as late 1996; it was merely the speed of their success on the battlefield that provided the veneer of a strong alliance. Learning from his rebel experience during Uganda’s bush war, Museveni sought to export his model of a grassroots rebel coalition with a moderate political philosophy, appealing to a
wide range of anti-Kabila elements. But the Congolese rebels, in late 1996 just as in late 1998, were helplessly disorganized and divided among themselves, making Rwanda’s top-down, hands-on solution seem unavoidable—though equally ineffective. Simply, there was no one who could effectively unite the disparate voices and administer the chaos of post-Mobutu Congo.

The victim complex of the Tutsi-dominated RPF leadership, the product of its persecution by the Hutu dictatorship, the Obote regime, and finally the inaction of the international community during the 1994 genocide, only made the RPF see a world of enemies around them. Thus, anything that the RPF needed done, it would do alone—even if it meant organizing and executing an entire war in Congo. This ethic of self-help explains the distinct power shift within the Rwanda-Uganda alliance in late 1996, in which Rwanda effectively assumed the mantle of regional leadership and relegated Uganda to a junior partner in the alliance. A psychologist may see an inferiority complex driving the RPF, which seemed determined to upstage their former mentors by using force, their most trusted instrument. That same psychologist may also see in the RPF a deep sense of distrust, in which violence and control were the only effective means of survival. An international relations scholar would likely see the cardinal realist principles of self-help and survival. With the Rwanda-Uganda alliance again having reverted to armed force to bring about regime change in Congo, the alliance unexpectedly learned a tough lesson of international relations—that states generally oppose rather than join aggressive powers.102

Greed cannot be overlooked as a cause of the alliance’s eventual breakup. But, contrary to popular perception, it was definitely not a long-term cause. However admirable the spartan values of Museveni and Kagame, cultivated during their years fighting in the bush, the NRM and RPF were the masters of resource-poor and desperately underdeveloped countries. Once these armies occupied resource-rich eastern Congo, the lure of booty—for war and for personal gain—was eventually too great to resist. Thus, the question of whether either Rwanda or Uganda made plunder an official policy during the war, which my interviewees unsurprisingly denied vehemently, actually seems irrelevant; the irrefutable fact was that plunder had become widespread on all sides—among Kabila’s enemies as well as among his allies—and, most tragically of all, caused the occupation of Congo to be self-financing.

These three factors—personality conflicts, strategic differences and economic clashes of interest—held different degrees of importance in bringing about the fall of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance. However, when combined with pressure from international donors and Congolese resistance and, most importantly, a failing war effort in late 1999, the alliance seemed bound to break up. And the breakup of that alliance, true to its very nature and history, was bound to break up violently.

Notes

1 For a good discussion of the various definitions of alliances, see Dingman 1979, pp. 245-50.
4 Schroeder 1976.
5 These definitions are from Waltz 1979, p. 26, though he credits them to Stephen Van Evera. Also see similar terminology in Wolfers 1962, pp. 122-24.
6 Thompson 1977.
8 See Olson and Zeckhauser 1966.
9 Snyder 1984, p. 463.
10 Because of the sensitive nature of the topic—whether regarding refugee experiences, war experiences, or accusations of plunder or atrocities—each interview was in itself a delicate act of balancing courteousness with insatiable curiosity. As endnotes will show the reader, some of my interviewees preferred to remain anonymous.
11 Lemarchand 2009, p. 31.
14 On Uganda’s “politics of indigeneity” and how it related to the Rwandan exile question, see Mamdani 2001, pp. 159-84.
18 Prunier 1999.
19 Woodward 1988, pp. 224-38. The SPLA was careful to maintain good relations with the Museveni government, mindful that Uganda had become a vital transit point for humanitarian aid shipped overland from the Kenyan coast into SPLA-occupied Equatoria. Prunier 2009, p. 81.
21 On the so-called “Hutu Revolution” or “Social Revolution”, see Mamdani 2001, pp. 103-31.
23 Interviews with various Rwandans in Kigali, Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and Cyangugu, October-November 2011. Many preferred to remain anonymous.
24 For example, see Mujawamariya 1994; Human Rights Watch Africa 1999, pp. 713-14, 719.
28 Veteran Africanist Young writes of “two interlocked zones of civil conflict,” the other extending along the west African coast from Liberia to Senegal. Young 2002, p. 13.
29 These included Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo-Zaïre, the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Rwanda, and Uganda.
30 By contrast, the population of Washington state was around six million and
“overpopulated” Cambodia was just over eleven million during the same period.

32 Rwanda’s swelling population—from two million inhabitants in 1940 had risen to seven million by 1990—inevitably exacerbated pressures on the land. According to Meredith’s estimates, a typical peasant hill community in Rwanda in the 1950s held about 110 people per square kilometre; by the 1970s, that number had risen to about 280 and by the early 1990s, it stood at a staggering average of 420 people per square kilometre. Meredith 2011, p. 490.

33 For an English-language example, see Diessenbacher 1994. For the German-language literature, see Bächler 1995, pp. 135-59; Molt 1995, pp. 845–52.


35 For more details on the politics of Kinshasa toward the rebellion, see de Villers and Omasombo 1997, pp. 259-80.

36 La Nouvelle Relève 1996; Musoni 2003.

37 On the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, see Willame 1997.

38 Reyntjens 2009.

39 Reyntjens 2000, p. 10. Kagame later told Belgian journalist Braeckman: “In a way we were lucky. They even gave us a pretext for this war.” Braeckman 1999, p. 27.


42 This fact of the AFDL as the alliance’s creation is widely confirmed in the literature. For example, Prunier 2009, p. 396. However, exact details remain imprecise.


47 Walt 1987, p. 20.

48 There is thankfully a very rich literature on Mobutu and his regime. Some of the best evaluations include Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Willame 1985; and Wrong 2000, though this last work is less scholarly though nonetheless compelling.

49 Leymarie 1997; Bassir 1997.

50 Reyntjens 2009, p. 44; Prunier 2009, p. 414.

51 Lemarchand 2001, p. 93.

52 Reyntjens 2009, pp. 42-44.


54 Upon becoming president in May 1997, Kabila returned “Zaire” to its former name of “Democratic Republic of the Congo” (DRC).

55 Schatzberg 1997, pp. 70-84. For the most thorough biography of Kabila to date, see Kennes 2003, pp. 57-59; for the evolution of Kabila’s rebel career, see Willame 1999, pp.
16-29.

56 Prunier 2009, p. 403.
57 Interview with (ret.) Ugandan People’s Defense Forces Gen. Muntu, September 2011.
58 Interview with former Ugandan army commander Gen. Jeje Odongo, Mbuya, Uganda, October 2011; interview with (ret.) Gen. Muntu.
60 Unnamed Ugandan journalist quoting Congolese rebel leader Wamba dia Wamba in Stearns 2011, p. 240.
61 On the child soldier or “kadogo” element in Kabila’s army, see Cheuzeville 2003, pp. 173-296; Amnesty International 2003.
63 Interview with former Ugandan army commander Gen. Jeje Odongo, Mbuya, Uganda, October 2011.
64 Rothstein 1968, p. 11.
65 This borrows from Prunier’s claim that, due to its rich history of cooperation against apartheid South Africa, the MPLA had become “godfather” to Namibia’s independence. Prunier 2009, p. 93.
66 Walt 1987, p. 5.
67 Waltz 1979, pp. 126-27.
70 Walt 1987, p. 20.
71 Thompson 1977, p. 843.
73 For a concise and balanced introduction to structural adjustment policies, see Thomson 2004, pp. 183-92.
74 On the African Renaissance, see Makgoba 1999; Kornegay et al. 2001.
75 ICG 1999.
76 For a short discussion on the dynamics between the Mobutu regime, UNITA and the MPLA in Angola, see Leslie 1993, p. 158-60.
77 Winston Churchill’s explanation of Britain’s traditional alliance policy also applies to Angola in the context of the Second Congo War: “[I]t would have been easy … and tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong powers.” Churchill 1948, pp. 207-08.
78 Vattel quoted in Gulick 1995, p. 60.
81 “The war of partition and pillage” was the name of a section in Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, pp. 227-40.
83 Interview with (ret.) Gen. Elly Tumwine, Kampala, Uganda, October 2011.
84 See for example Reno 2000.
85 For more details on how the early years of the Second Congo War developed on the ground, see ICG 2000.
In one of his many shows of brinkmanship, Kazini ordered Ugandan tanks to parade through the Rwandan parts of town for three hours after midnight, thundering an artillery barrage into the surrounding forests. Stearns 2011, p. 240.

91 Interview with UPDF spokesperson Col. Felix Kulayigye, Mbuya, Uganda, October 2011.

92 A Ugandan journalist quoted in Stearns 2011, p. 240.

93 Interview with former UPDF army commander Gen. Jeje Odongo, Mbuya, Uganda, October 2011.

94 Santoro 1998.


96 Stearns 2011, p. 240-41.

97 Interview with Col. Felix Kulayigye, Mbuya, Uganda, October 2011.

98 For a sharp French-language analysis of the Kisangani conflict, see Leloup 2004.


100 Economist Intelligence Unit 2000, p. 8.


References


La Nouvelle Relève. 1996. No. 325, 15 August.


