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Nigeria, Afrocentrism, and Conflict Resolution: After Five Decades—How Far, How Well?

OLUMUYIWA BABATUNDE AMAO and UFO OKEKE-UZODIKE

Abstract: This article interrogates Nigeria’s interventionist role in Africa over more than half century of independence by examining the interplay between Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy drive and its conflict interventionist role in Africa. The article further reviews the essential ingredients embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy articulation, including its “much publicized” shift to citizen diplomacy. And, it argues that, having being a major force for/of peace and stability in Africa, Nigeria should strive for a balance between its commitment to Afrocentrism, and the country’s homegrown challenges; particularly, in the light of its declining socio-economic realities and the seemingly unending Boko Haram insurgency.

Introduction

Nigeria represents a major regional force in Africa, not only because of its size, but also because of its political and economic role on the continent. Apart from being the largest economy on the continent, it also ranks among the world’s major producers of crude oil. Similarly, its leaders have mediated conflicts in Africa, while its troops have played lead roles in the quest for peace and stability in troubled regions all around the globe. Perhaps, a better testimony to Nigeria’s commitment to the success of its peacekeeping endeavors is its ranking among the top five troop contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping missions. Therefore, as Alli observes, Nigeria’s approach to sub-regional security and conflict resolution in Africa is often seen as inextricably tied to its international role conception by its leaders. This role conception has become the defining paradigm for the country’s foreign policy engagement, and has conferred on it the role of a “natural leader” with a “manifest destiny” and the responsibility to promote and protect the interests of Africa.


It has equally been argued that the decision by Nigeria to make Africa the core of its foreign policy focus is also attributable to a number of other factors: a geo-political consideration that sees Nigeria strategically located within the West African sub-region; demographic explanations that credit the country as the most populous black nation in the world with an estimated population of over 170 million people; and economic arguments that view Nigeria accounting for more than 51 percent of the entire West African GDP with an estimated value of about $521.8 billion. Others have contended that this decision also stems from the need to protect Nigeria’s security, given its cultural, geographical, and historical experiences with other African states, and also because of transnational security concerns defined by the way Nigeria’s security is affected by what happens around its contiguous states.

Others have situated the argument along the camps of the prestige/national interest and the economic diplomacy/hegemonic schools of thought. Proponents of the prestige/national interest school of thought argue that Nigeria’s Africa-centered foreign policy concentration has been pursued without any specific regard to the country’s domestic interests and economic woes. The economic diplomacy/hegemonic stability group on the other hand, maintain that Nigeria, by virtue of its huge socio-economic and military resources, has the responsibility to intervene in conflicts within its immediate sub-region (West Africa) and in Africa. This group perceives Nigeria as a regional force on the continent, and as having a responsibility to lead in the promotion of peace, and in the championing of Africa’s socio-economic and political development. Such a perspective is perhaps what informs Ebohon and Obakhedo’s observation that:

“Playing such a noble role in the economic construction and reconstruction of the region presents Nigeria with an opportunity to assert her dominant position in the region as a matter of prestige; analysts argue that if Nigeria fails to do so, other credible and contending regional challengers such as Ghana, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) and South Africa would take on such responsibilities.”

Consequently, in examining Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution in Africa, proponents of the economic diplomacy/hegemonic stability school of thought view the assumption of such a role as capable of contributing meaningfully towards ending the plethora of intra and interstate crises that have become the defining characteristics of most states in the West African sub-region and Africa. Therefore, and in achieving this, Nigeria is expected to treat its sub-region as a natural base from which it is to project its national interests and by extension, further expand its regional influence. It is in view of the forgoing that this article seeks to historicize and examine the nexus or otherwise between Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution in Africa, and its foreign policy objectives; particularly, its principle of Afrocentrism over the last fifty plus years.

The article employs the interplay between regime type, and leadership orientation to explain Nigeria’s commitment to its foreign policy principle of Afrocentrism, including an extant assessment of the country’s purported gravitation towards citizen diplomacy in 2007. Furthermore, the article also undertakes an empirical analysis of Nigeria’s rising home grown socio-economic and domestic realities, and it argues the need for the country to strike a balance between its conflict interventionist role in Africa, its competing domestic realities, and the
yearnings and aspirations of its citizenry. Together with this introduction, this article has five parts. The second part undertakes a conceptual debate on the interplay between conflicts, conflict resolution, and its nexus with Nigeria’s interventionist role in Africa. The third explicates the essential issues embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy, while the fourth examines the interface between regime type, foreign policy orientation and Nigeria’s commitment to Afrocentrism, including an assessment of the country’s purported shift to citizen diplomacy. The article concludes with some empirical analyses as to why Nigeria should redefine its Afrocentric interventionist role in African conflicts. This has become particularly necessary given the country’s changing socio-economic realities, notwithstanding the recent rebasing of its economy which saw it overcoming that of South Africa as Africa’s largest economy, and also in the light of the growing Boko Haram insurgency the country has been struggling to contain.

Conceptual Clarification: Conflict

A conflict, for the present purpose is “the existence of non-compatibility or disagreements between two actors (and this could either be individuals, groups, organizations or nations) in their interaction over issues of interests, values, beliefs, emotions, goals, space, positions and scarce resources.” Accordingly, and as similarly expounded by Golwa, a conflict resolution process revolves around the “the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflicts through the use of both forcible (coercive) and non-forcible (non-coercive) instruments to stop the occurrence/recurrence of humanitarian emergency situations.” Crucial to any conflict resolution process, therefore, is the identification and resolution of the underlying causes of conflicts, through the striking of balance between common interests, and the overarching goals. These goals are what Snodderly describes as: fostering of positive attitudes, the generation of trust through reconciliation initiatives, and the building or strengthening of institutions and processes through which warring parties can peacefully interact.

Where a conflict has escalated beyond the capacity of the mediator, however, the application of a conflict management process then becomes inevitable. Wallenstein describes this process as “an attempt to bring a fighting to an end and/or the process of limiting the spread of a conflict through its containment.” In situations where a conflict is not responding positively to a non-violent resolution process, there may be the need for the application of some subtle force. Such force and its subsequent application are what Boutros Boutros-Ghali refers to as peacekeeping—a phenomenon that has been the crux of Nigeria’s interventionist mechanism in Africa. It therefore follows that in resolving conflicts different kinds of mechanisms are involved, including the use of diplomatic/military intervention. The point to note from the above is that any conflict that does not subscribe to a peaceful form of negotiation, or what Crocker calls diplomatic intervention, would have to be resolved through a military intervention, a phenomenon which has grown to becomes a central feature in Nigeria’s conflicts interventionist role in Africa.

Therefore, when located within the framework of the above elucidations, Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution in Africa is often premised on the need to protect Nigeria’s National interest, defined here in terms of Nigeria’s commitment to its foreign policy principle of Afrocentrism; a doctrine often adduced as a basis for Nigeria’s intervention in conflicts. It is however imperative to note that there are some other factors which further explains Nigeria’s frontline
role in conflict resolution in Africa. These factors are what Aluko identifies as the centripetal and centrifugal determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy; a synopsis of which is provided below.\textsuperscript{20}

**Centripetal and Centrifugal Determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

Broadly speaking, the general idea behind classifying foreign policy into centripetal and centrifugal notions is rooted in the belief that there are domestic and external issues involved in any country’s foreign policy formulation. In the case of Nigeria, the centripetal factors involved in its foreign policy formulation are generally built around its notion of four concentric circles of national interest. At the heart of this notion is the expectation that Nigeria in the course of its engagement with the international community must protect its own security, independence, and prosperity. As previously observed by Gambari, the essential arguments embedded in the first circle recognize the need for Nigeria to maintain a spirit of good neighborliness with its contiguous states—Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The second concerns Nigeria’s relations with its West African neighbors; the third emphasizes the country’s commitment to continental issues relating to peace, development, and democratization; while the fourth circle spells out Nigeria’s relations with organizations, institutions, and states outside of Africa.\textsuperscript{21} This concept is vital to the formulation of what was later to become Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust.

As similarly argued by Aluko, issues such as: the colonial heritage and the legacy the country inherited from the British, the leadership orientation of its successive governments, Nigeria’s foreign policy machinery, its post-civil war experience, and the primacy of its national and economic interests have also been adduced as some of the centrifugal factors that have helped in shaping Nigeria’s behavior towards its neighbors in Africa and the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{22} Lending her voice to the discourse, Ogwu equally identified: political considerations, the Nigerian constitution, bureaucratic tendencies, economic variables, military interests, and the idiosyncratic elements of its leaders as other probable factors that have helped in shaping Nigeria’s foreign policy direction over the years.\textsuperscript{23} Commenting further on her interrogation of Nigeria’s external relations, particularly with regards to the Western world, Ogwu noted that the ability of Nigeria to determine its productive forces and its very low reliance on foreign aid accounted for the robust state of its foreign policy between 1960 and 1980. She stated: “The improved state of Nigeria’s economy bestowed on it a leverage which it did not possess in the first decade of independence. More significantly, perhaps was the government’s ability to determine its own policies independent of external influences.”\textsuperscript{24}

The above reference was perhaps motivated by Aluko’s observation of Nigeria’s foreign policy vibrancy between 1960 and 1980, that:

> The phenomenal growth of the economy largely as a result of the oil boom has strengthened Nigeria’s influence in Africa and indeed the rest of the world, such that neither of the superpowers (US or USSR) could make use of foreign aid as a political leverage on Nigeria...heavy American dependence on Nigeria’s oil means that Nigeria is free not only to criticize the United States but also to put pressure on her.\textsuperscript{25}

In line with these assessments, it is believed that a concise elucidation of the fundamental principles encapsulated in Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives is crucial to understanding how
these objectives connect with Nigeria’s Afro-centric drive; particularly its commitment to peace building and conflict resolution in Africa.

**Fundamental Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

A first glimpse of the shape that Nigeria’s foreign policy would take was provided by Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the occasion of his country’s admittance to United Nations membership. In his acceptance speech, Balewa stated inter alia:

> It is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all the nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organizations. Nigeria, by virtue of being the most populous country in West Africa has absolutely no territorial or expansionist ambitions. We are committed to upholding the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Nigeria hopes to work with other African countries for the progress of Africa and to also assist in bringing all African countries to a state of independence.\(^{26}\)

Therefore, on October 1, 1960, Balewa upon becoming prime minister pronounced the following as the core principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy: (1) Non-Alignment with any of the then existing ideological and military power blocs, especially NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (2) respect for the legal equality, political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states; (3) respect for the doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; (4) seeking membership of both continental and global multilateral organizations based on their functional importance to Nigeria; and (5) the recognition of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s external relations.\(^{27}\) These principles were later to be adopted into Section 19 of the country’s 1960 independence constitution and have been reviewed and sustained over time in the 1999 constitution.

According to Section 19(1) of the 1999 constitution, the five essential foreign policy concerns of Nigeria are: (1) commitment to the principles of non-alignment; (2) respect for the legal equality, political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; (3) respect for the principles of non-interference in the affairs of other states; (4) seeking membership of international organizations as a means of promoting functional cooperation; and (5) Africa as the center-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy.\(^{28}\)

**Expounding the Principles**

*Nigeria’s Commitment to the Principles of Non-Alignment*

This principle was informed by the bipolarity in world politics at the time of Nigeria’s independence in 1960. As observed by Fawole, the world was precariously bifurcated into two antagonistic ideologies of capitalism, as supported by the United States, and communism which was championed by the former Soviet Union.\(^{29}\) Mindful of this situation, and informed by the desire to protect its nascent independence, Nigeria opted to be nonpartisan in the power play between the Western and the Eastern blocs. However, some scholars have argued that this principle was respected more in theory than in practice. Fawole argued that “even the government of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, the progenitor of the idea did little to respect it.” Balewa, he added was “so rabidly pro-British and concomitantly pro-Western.”\(^{30}\) He cited
Nigeria’s signing of a bilateral defense pact with Britain (a staunch US ally) in 1960, which was intended to allow the British to establish a military base in Nigeria. The defense pact, he noted, was later abrogated in 1962 following the stiff parliamentary opposition mounted against it and the overwhelming disapproval of the pact by Nigerians.  

Respect for the Legal Equality, Political Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of all States  
This principle has been interpreted to mean the expression of Nigeria’s willingness and readiness to conduct its external affairs with other states according to the civilized rules of international engagement and interaction. The principle often enables Nigeria to affirm its belief in the United Nations as the legitimate supra-national authority capable of guaranteeing a just world order, through its respect for, and execution of the decisions reached by the UN. Therefore, Nigeria believed that abiding by and adhering to the dictates of international law and civilized rules of behavior is vital to guaranteeing the security of the newly independent but relatively weaker states within its sub-region in a world laden with intense competition between the eastern and the western powers. Perhaps another motivating factor was Nigeria’s desire to assure its contiguous states (Benin, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon) and other states in Africa that the country would not at any point in time impose its authority on any of its neighbors in Africa.

As Balewa put it: “We shall never impose ourselves upon any other country and shall treat every African territory, big or small, as our equal, because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis that peace can be maintained in our continent.” Balewa’s assurances to Nigeria’s neighbors and the rest of Africa appears to have been ostensibly intended to prevent any of these nations from falling into the embrace of the then power blocs and, more importantly, to protect its hard-won independence and that of its contemporaries from the overtures being made by Kwame Nkrumah through his Pan African movement. Balewa had argued that this idea would lead to a loss of sovereignty and as such return Africa to the pre-colonial age, noting further that “Nigeria was big enough and does not need to join others and that if others wish to join forces with the country; their legal standing and positions would be made clear to them in such a union.”

Respect for the Principles of Non-Interference in the Affairs of other States  
The non-interference principle explains Nigeria’s readiness and desire not to interfere in any domestic dispute that could arise in other African countries, although the principle has often been challenged by Nigeria’s commitment to the protection of the national interest; a development which often compels the country to intervene in its quest to ensure peace amongst and within its contiguous states. However, Nigeria appears to justify its intervention in the affairs of other nations within the context of what Peen Rodt elucidates as an exercise of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). This development has seen Nigeria getting involved in what would have been a negation of its policy of non-interference, although such interventions have been largely executed in its capacity as a non-state actor, as demonstrated in its peace-keeping missions, examples of which include its interventions in the Congo in 1960, its support for a number of southern Africa liberation movements between 1970 and 1994, and its role in the resolution of the Liberian (1990-2003), the Sierra Leonean civil wars (1998-2002), among others.
Seeking Membership in International Organizations as a Means of Promoting Functional Cooperation

Nigeria’s subscription to this principle has been influenced by the overriding advantage that functional cooperation has over a subscription to an African political union which at that time could not guarantee a certain future for a newly independent country like Nigeria. Therefore, Nigeria had hoped that its commitment to working with other non-state actors would guarantee it protection, particularly given the bipolarity that existed at that time.\(^{37}\) As a consequence of this principle, Nigeria over the past fifty plus years has demonstrated its support for, and commitment to, a host of international organizations, including the UN, the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) among others.

Africa as the Centerpiece of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Following the announcement of Nigeria’s intention to make the African cause its top priority, made by Prime Minister Balewa at the UN General Assembly, the principle has over the years grown to become the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust. Nigeria’s commitment to a radical Afro-centric policy focus from independence is seen more as a product of the psychological belief in and concurrence with what Nnamdi Azikwe called Nigeria’s historic mission in Africa and its manifest destiny to rule and dominate the continent.\(^{38}\) Long before its independence and the economic/oil boom of the early 1970s which catapulted Nigeria to an enviable economic height in Africa, its leaders have always believed that the country was pre-ordained to play an important and leading role in African affairs.

This notion did not only germinate in the minds of Nigerians; it was also believed and validated by the members of the international community who saw Nigeria as being capable of making a difference in the world on account of its vast potential.\(^{39}\) Similarly it has been argued that from independence Nigeria’s foreign policy has been fashioned to meet the requirement for political stability and development in Africa, and this perhaps explains why barely one month after the country’s independence, “one of its first efforts was the dispatch of Nigerian troops to the Congo for peace keeping.”\(^{40}\) It is important to add, however, that the amalgam of this potential and the leadership aspirations of Nigeria’s past and present leaders, to a large extent have helped in sustaining and securing the continuing pursuit of this cause.

Bearing the above in mind, a tabular illustration of Nigeria’s involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa summarizes Nigeria’s commitment to this Africa-centered ideology. As shown in Table 1 below, Nigeria has participated actively in a host of peacekeeping missions in Africa both under the auspices of the ECOWAS, AU and the UN.\(^{41}\) While it could be argued that these interventions are believed to be in consonance with its adherence to Afrocentrism, there are other specific role(s) which variables such as regime type and leadership orientation play in Nigeria’s commitment in conflict resolution in Africa. This is the lacuna which the succeeding explanation aims to fill.
### TABLE 1: NIGERIA’S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL PEACE MISSIONS, 1960 – 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>June 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West New Guinea</td>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>UN Security Force in West New Guinea</td>
<td>October 1962</td>
<td>April 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>OAU Peacekeeping Force, Chad</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission I</td>
<td>January 1989</td>
<td>June 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
<td>October 1993</td>
<td>March 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad/Libya</td>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group</td>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>ECOMOG Task Force in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Organization Mission in the DRC</td>
<td>Nov. 1999</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>Sept. 2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Darfur</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UMINIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Sudan</td>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
<td>Sept. 2007</td>
<td>Dec. 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Regime Type, Foreign Policy Orientation, and Commitment to Afrocentrism**

As captured in the existing literature, the essential ingredients embedded in Nigeria’s national interest includes: national self-preservation, defending national sovereignty and independence, protecting the socio-economic and political interests of Nigerians, ensuring the defense,
preservation and promotion of democratic norms and values, enhancing Nigeria’s standing and status in Africa, and the promotion of world peace.\textsuperscript{42} Similarly, it has also been argued that Nigeria’s national interest is best considered from the perspective of its regional and continental leadership drives.\textsuperscript{43} These ambitions represent the underpinning philosophy and overriding impetus which led to Nigeria’s adoption of a policy of four concentric circles as espoused earlier. Prominent among Nigeria’s achievements include its contribution to the formation of the OAU in 1963, and ECOWAS in 1975, the attainment of independence by Angola and Zimbabwe in 1975 and 1980 respectively, including Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa and its role in the resolution of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and in the eventual demise of apartheid in Namibia in 1988 and later in South Africa in 1994, among others.

Regardless of these successes, this Africa-centered foreign policy concentration has not been without flaws. These flaws were soon to become evident in the downturn experienced by the country in its hitherto strong and viable economy and in the neglect of its own domestic responsibilities, specifically the fulfillment of the social obligations expected of a government to its people. The resultant effect of this has been a steady decline in the nation’s oil revenue owing to a culture of poor maintenance, corruption and the extensive projects executed by Nigeria in other African countries. For example, in Benin Republic, Nigeria, as noted by Osuntokun, was reported to have signed a trade agreement with the country in 1972. This was followed up with the granting of an interest-free loan worth approximately $1.2 million, to be repaid over a period of twenty-five years, and reconstructing the Idiroko-Porto Novo highway—a distance of twenty-four kilometers—uniting the two countries, for approximately $1.7 million. Also, in 1989, Nigeria provided $2.5 million to Cotonou for the payment of the outstanding salaries owed public servants by the Béninois government.\textsuperscript{44} This is besides the establishment of the two joint ventures in 1975: the Onigolo cement works and the Save sugar industry. These projects were undertaken at a time when the country was still reeling from the harsh economic effects and huge costs associated with the funding of the liberation movements in southern Africa and the cost of prosecuting its own civil war from 1967 to 1970. This earned the foreign policy of Gen. Yakubu Gowon the appellation of “Naira Spraying Diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, the period between 1976 and 1978 saw Nigeria calling the bluff of US President Gerald Ford over US recognition of and support for the UNITA rebels in opposition to Nigerian support of the OAU’s preference for the nationalist aspirations of the MPLA. Nigeria also nationalized some British interests in the country; a development that subsequently led to the transformation of Barclays Bank to Union Bank and British Petroleum to African Petroleum during the Obasanjo/Sheu Yar’ Adua regime of 1976 to 1979. The move was seen as a response to the infamous toothless dog insinuation ascribed to then British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher.\textsuperscript{46}

Between 1985 and 1998 Nigeria’s foreign policy history and practice was described as the beginning of ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, and the beginning of isolationism in Africa. However, the short lived Buhari regime (1984-1985) and that of Gen. Babangida (1985-1993), were noted for their radical ultra-nationalist and interventionist foreign policy disposition.\textsuperscript{47} The Babangida regime was particularly noted for its “zero tolerance” for conflict in West Africa, a policy which Babangida executed through the instrumentality of the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as evidenced in Nigeria’s commanding role in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.\footnote{48}

The essential foreign policy thrust of the Babangida regime was anchored on the need to protect the national interest, commitment to Afrocentrism, ensuring good neighborliness among its contiguous states, and the pursuance of greater economic integration within the West African sub-region. Notable among the defining moments of that administration were the introduction of the Technical Aid Corps scheme under the supervision of Minister of Foreign Affairs Bolaji Akinyemi, the tactical adoption of economic diplomacy as the country’s new foreign policy drive, and the renewed bite which the administration gave to the campaign against apartheid in South Africa, as well as the commencement of diplomatic ties with Israel and the overbearing role it played in the resolution of the Liberian crisis.

Nonetheless, the succeeding Abacha regime plunged Nigeria into what Osaghae and Fawole call “Nigeria’s era of foreign policy isolationism;” a “feat” achieved courtesy of the dictatorial and totalitarian nature of regime.\footnote{49} Abacha’s style of foreign policy administration was characterized by a high degree of inconsistency and incoherence judging by its ambivalence and quickness to react to international issues without taking cognizance of the cost implications of such decisions. For example, the junta expended a needless amount of energy on trying to maintain its monopoly on the country while fending off every attempt by the international community to categorize it as a pariah state. As observed by Osaghae, “Abacha saw it more as a ‘struggle for survival’ and the Nigerian state witnessed a foreign policy era in which ‘isolationism’ was the rule rather than the ‘exception’ thus seeing diplomacy being replaced by bull fighting, while the country was counting more enemies instead of making more friends.”\footnote{50}

Following Abacha’s death on 8 June 1998, Abdul-Salam Abubakar took over the reins of power, midwifed the country’s return to civil rule, and also made an appreciable impact to restore sanity to both the domestic terrain and the country’s external relations. On return to democracy on 29 May 1999, and that of Olusegun Obasanjo as presidents Nigeria’s attempt to reposition its foreign policy focus towards citizen diplomacy did not fully come into play until the election into office of Musa Yar Adua and the subsequent appointment of Ojo Maduekwe as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Deconstructing Nigeria’s Notion of Citizen Diplomacy: Political Rhetoric or a Call to Action?

Ojo Maduekwe, Nigeria’s Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Yar Adua civilian administration, justified and explained the introduction of citizen diplomacy thus:

“Our foreign policy has come of age and the age of innocence is over. We remain proud of our track record from Tafawa Balewa up till now. The country that is the largest Black Nation in the world could not have done otherwise. A world where one in every six black men in the world is a Nigerian could not have done otherwise, or where one in every four African is a Nigerian could not have done otherwise. We should ask ourselves some hard questions: to what extent has our foreign policy benefited Nigerians? To what extent has our foreign policy put food on our tables? In other words where is the citizen in our foreign policy?”\footnote{51}
Arguing further, Maduekwe noted that Nigeria carries an enormous burden which required it to be the symbol of the success of the black nation and that there could never be a black story “unless it is a Nigerian success story.” Thus citizen diplomacy, according to Maduekwe, implies ensuring that Nigeria’s foreign policy becomes the most powerful way to express who Nigeria and its people are. Following this announcement, there has been a number of scholarly attempts to define the notion of citizen diplomacy as coined by Maduekwe. For example, Eze views citizen diplomacy as the act of being people oriented through the prioritization of the overall interest of Nigeria and its people over any other sub-regional or continental considerations.

For Mbachu, the approach represents “a structured action that government takes in order to fast-track the foreign policy objectives of a state as set by policy makers.” Arguing further, he noted that these policy objectives must take into cognizance the wellbeing and aspirations of the people in whose interests they were established, and also portray a re-invigoration of Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuit in a way that the people are made net beneficiaries of its end product. In their contribution to the discourse, Okocha and Onwuka argue the central idea behind the concept of citizen diplomacy involves the protecting of the image, integrity, and interests of Nigeria and its people while also reacting against countries that are hostile to the Nigerian cause and that of its people, including those who brand Nigeria as corrupt.

Lending credence to this assertion, Ogunsanwo noted that for the approach to be successful it needs to be structured to prioritize the interest of Nigerians at home and abroad and used as a tool to further Nigeria’s national interest in its engagement with the rest of the world. Arguing further, he noted that any diplomacy that does not take this into consideration will be running contrary to the basic tenets of the concept. For Akinterinwa, the citizen diplomacy approach requires the Nigerian government to move beyond rhetoric by employing the policy to address problems such associated with the denial of entry visas to Nigerians with legitimate documentation and reasons for wanting to travel, the shabby treatment confronting Nigerians at home and abroad, and the need to ensure that Nigerian business entrepreneurs benefit from the country’s regional and sub-regional peace-making and peace-building efforts.

Inferring from these considerations, it seems apparent that at the heart of this citizen diplomacy drive is the overall prioritization of the interest of Nigerians in the country’s interaction domestically and with the rest of the world. However, when situated within the context of governmental support and execution, it remains to be seen how well this policy has been brought to bear on the Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy. Perhaps, a better testimony to this assertion availed itself in 2007, when Ngozi Ugo, a career diplomat was nominated for the position of UN Ombudsman and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in 2007. As part of the requirement for the confirmation of her appointment, she was required to secure the diplomatic endorsement of her home government—Nigeria. Unfortunately, this was not to be, because both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Attorney-General kept dragging their feet until she eventually lost the position.

This event indeed calls into question the manner of citizen diplomacy Nigeria claims to be practicing when it cannot defend the interest of its citizens. As Mahmood observes:

Dr. Ugo’s presence in the UN System would have enhanced Nigeria’s position for the UN permanent seat. Other more serious countries campaign for their
citizens and that is why the highest ranking African in the UN system is a Tanzanian woman. Go to the Commonwealth Secretariat in London you may think you are in India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the number of Indians there. And this is where our own Chief Anyaoku served for almost four decades. When is Nigeria going to stand and recognize its own? It is sad, unfortunate and indeed painful.

Similarly, while commenting on what we argue as an exhibition of a charity of foreign policy diplomacy by Nigeria, Monday noted that even at the level of ECOWAS, an institution Nigeria hosts and substantially funds, and at the AU, were Nigeria was/is a founding and strong financial member, it remains to be seen how well the Nigerian government has protected the interest of its citizens, notwithstanding the advent of its much publicized citizen diplomacy drive. The above scenario was succinctly captured thus:

Not only did the country . . . donate substantially towards ECOWAS, set up costs including the Secretariat, it regularity paid its annual contribution of approximately 32.5% of the Community’s budget which was subsequently revised upwards to 40%. In the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice only 7% of the staff are Nigerians, and it is situated here in Abuja. At the African Union since 2003 when Obasanjo fielded two female candidates from Nigeria for the same post, making the country look unserious, no Nigerian has been elected in the AU Commission for the last six years. A nation that has the largest population in Africa is not represented in the African Union Commission. Burkina Faso defeated Nigeria in 2007! Really, what manner of citizen diplomacy is this when its citizens lack representation?

A similar case in point is the plight of Nigerians who are still resident in the Bakassi Peninsula, an area which used to be part of Nigeria, but was ceded to Cameroon following the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which awarded the oil rich region to Cameroon. Following this development, it has been reported in some quarters that some Nigerians who have not fully left the region are being treated by the Cameroonian authorities in a manner not befitting of a people whose government has been more than cooperative, particularly judging by the way it accepted the ruling of the ICJ. These are just a few examples of the way the Nigerian government pursues its citizen diplomacy drive.

Equally, the Nigerian government’s seeming lack of response over reported incidences of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa in 2008 further calls into question the country’s claim and subscription to a citizen diplomacy propelled foreign policy approach if it cannot use same to defend the interest of its people as earlier advanced by Maduekwe. This scenario perhaps provides once more an opportunity for the Nigerian government to put to test its widely publicized citizen diplomacy. Evolving from these discourses, the article concludes with a consideration of some of the major social-economic challenges (poverty, unemployment, and Nigeria’s spiraling debt profile) confronting the Nigerian state, including an analysis that further reinforces the need for the Nigerian government to strike a balance between its interventionist role in conflicts and the current state of its economy.
Nigeria’s Changing Domestic and Socio-Economic Realities in Perspective

Drawing from the insights provided by a 2012 report conducted by Nigeria’s House of Representatives Committee on Aid, Loans and Debt Management, it has been reported that between 2005 and 2012, the Nigerian government borrowed a total of $4.4 billion in external loans from the World Bank. The report also notes that Nigeria has also risen to become the largest recipient of disbursements from the International Development Agency (IDA) between 2009 and 2012 and has the largest outstanding IDA portfolio in Africa, ahead of Kenya and Tanzania. These borrowings, according to the Debt Management Office, were ostensibly meant to finance capital projects and human capital development initiatives in the country. As shown in Table 2 below, Nigeria’s lending rate as at April 2013 was estimated to be in the region of $715M as against the total sum of $1,373.72B obtained as loans in 2012. If figures emanating from Nigeria’s Debt Management Office is anything to go by, Nigeria’s public debt profile appears to have taken a turn for the worse as evidenced in the 31 March, 2015 report of the country’s Debt Management Office which puts Nigeria’s external debt at over $9.4 trillion. The anger these figures portend is a possibility of the 2016 figure exceeding the amount borrowed in 2015, if not effectively contained.

TABLE 2: NIGERIA’S BORROWING BY VOLUME (IN MILLIONS OF USD—JANUARY 2009 AND MAY 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Borrowing (in Millions of USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>901.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>541.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,373.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Deducing from the Table 2 above, it the economic analogy of borrowing to finance public expenditure ostensibly to stimulate growth and improvement in human capital development in Nigeria seems to defy logic. As evidenced in Table 2, notwithstanding the obtainment of a $1,760 million loan in 2009, the number of Nigerians living below poverty level between 2009 and 2010 still stood at 77.5 million, a development which further contradicts the basic logic of a corresponding relationship between human capital development and improvement in the standard of living of the people. This much was also evident in the Adult Equivalent (poverty) rate in Nigeria, which gives a far more alarming statistic. For example, between 2003 and 2004, as shown in Table 3 below, the adult equivalent of 60 million out of a per capita 80 million adults lived below the poverty line, while between 2009 and 2010, the figures were 77.5 million out of 100 million still living below the poverty line. This official poverty line as noted by Litwack is drawn on the basis of income sufficient for per capita consumption of 3000 calories a
day plus other essential non-food items. These statistics were obtained from the headcount data gathered from a comprehensive household survey conducted between 2003-2004 and 2009-2010.\textsuperscript{57}

**TABLE 3: NUMBER OF NIGERIANS LIVING IN POVERTY (2003-2010) ESTIMATES (IN MILLIONS)**

![Table 3: Number of Nigerians Living in Poverty (2003-2010) Estimates (In Millions)](image)


**TABLE 4: UNEMPLOYMENT IN NIGERIA: 2006-2011 (PERCENT OF WORKING POPULATION)**

![Table 4: Unemployment in Nigeria: 2006-2011 (Percent of Working Population)](image)


Similarly, Nigeria’s unemployment statistics between 2006 and 2011 are by no means encouraging, as it represents a classic expression of the ailing nature of its economy and a perfect description of the internal dysfunctions confronting the Nigerian state. As depicted in Table 4 above, while the official percentage of unemployed persons in Nigeria was put at 12 percent of the working population, the actual percentage of the unemployed Nigerians within the working age population (18-65 years of age) stood at 33 percent of the entire population. This figure was soon to rise to a 22.5 percent unemployment rate and to 44 percent for those within the working age population in 2011.\textsuperscript{68}

Perhaps, a more corroborating assertion to the declining state of human and social capital accessibility in Nigeria is the report released in May 2013 by the Statistician-General of Nigeria’s
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This report according to him has put the official rate of unemployment at 23.9 percent. This implies that one out of four Nigerians are unemployed and unemployment rates have been steadily increasing, from 12 percent in 2006 to close to 24 percent in 2011 while younger Nigerians are encountering increasing difficulty in finding gainful employment. Also, the number of Nigerians living in poverty is said to be on the increase, thus revealing a sharp contrast between the nation’s economic statistics on rapid economic growth and minimal welfare improvements for much of the population, particularly in rural areas.

Similarly, and as noted in the United Nations Human Development Index for 2014, Nigeria presently occupies the 152nd position out of the 187 countries ranked in the survey with a life expectancy rate at birth put at 52.5 percent. These alarming statistics no doubt reflect the changing realities of Nigeria’s prevalent socio-economic anatomy, a fact which further reinforces the need for Nigeria to strike a balance between what the article argues as a charity of foreign policy diplomacy and the domestic needs of its people, particularly, its home grown domestic challenges. In fact, nothing more can be more compelling and justifiable for a rethinking of Nigeria’s Africa-centered conflict interventionist approach other than the seemingly unending Boko Haram insurgency which appears to be threatening Nigeria’s unity as a people, and its continuing survival as a state.

Conclusion

This article has interrogated the essential issues that have influenced Nigeria’s conflict resolution mechanism in Africa, particularly from the perspective of its foreign policy over a period of fifty years. The article also reveals an inextricable connection between Nigeria’s foreign policy and its interventionist role in Africa. Besides the constitutional provision which recognizes Nigeria’s Africa-centered ideology, the article also established that Nigeria’s conflict interventionist role in Africa can be situated within the context of its leadership orientation and the political ideology of the individual in power. However, and notwithstanding Nigeria’s commitment to peace keeping and conflict resolution in Africa, it remains to be seen how well this Afro-centric policy has helped in the protection of the interests of Nigerians both at home and abroad, particularly when located within the purview of the hate and disdain with which Nigerians are being confronted with in most of the countries that have benefited from the policy.

At the very best, what the government seems to have succeeded in achieving is a policy documentation rather than actual execution. Nigeria is encouraged to learn from the socio-economic and political considerations often attached to intervention by the likes of the US, the UK, France, and South Africa when intervening in conflicts. Given this development, this article argues the need for Nigeria to remain more proactive and responsive to the plight of its citizenry in the light of this supposed gravitation to a “people first approach” as exemplified in the cardinal objectives of its citizen diplomacy focus. More than anything else, Nigerians both at home and abroad need to be better assured that their welfare and well-being is of paramount concern to their government, both in theory and in practice.

Similarly, having spent the larger part of its more than five decades of independence, the article advocates for a major overhaul and/or expedited review of these Afrocentric objectives to
reflect the prevailing socio-economic and political aspirations of the Nigerian people as demonstrated above, through embracing a more citizen oriented and economically meaningful interventionist approach to conflict resolution. While it may be true that foreign policy gains are not usually susceptible to quantitative analysis, it is nevertheless imperative for foreign policy as US Secretary of State John Kerry noted, to reflect a continuation of a country’s economic policy, and this according to Trotsky must have strong resonance with a nation’s domestic policy.\textsuperscript{74}

The article further submits that, given the mounting threat posed to Nigeria’s stability by the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria needs to first reassure its citizenry of its capacity to protect their lives and property before focusing on securing the social, economic, and security challenges facing other African states, as its age-long Afro-centric policy seems to suggest. This much has become necessary given the fact that the Boko Haram group, as admitted by Nigeria’s immediate past president, Goodluck Jonathan, “has so far claimed over twelve thousand lives, with more than 8,000 persons injured or maimed, not to mention the displacement of thousands of innocent Nigerians.”\textsuperscript{75} And, his figure may well be an undercount due to political considerations.

More specifically, since the first quarter of year 2014 Nigeria has witnessed a tremendous escalation in attacks mounted by the Boko Haram group. Its cruelest attack (since year 2009 when the sect commenced its terrorist operations) has been the April 2014 abduction of over 270 girls from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State.\textsuperscript{76} Other such fatal attacks on the Nigerian state are the bombings of a motor park (bus station) in Nyanya, located about eight kilometers south of Nigeria’s capital city of Abuja, and on that city’s busiest shopping mall, EMAB Plaza, located side by side with Banex Plaza.\textsuperscript{77} If anything at all, these attacks have exposed the seeming incapacity of Nigeria’s leadership to handle its home-grown security challenges, a development which has been further worsened by the emerging indicators of Boko Haram’s international connections with other terrorist organizations.

Most notable among such speculations is the perceived involvement of Samantha Lewthwaite, a British-born Al-Shabab operative, in the Nyanya attack to avenge the killing of Al-Shabab’s terror leader, Makaburi (aka Sheikh Abubakar Ahmed) by the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit. Also, there is the contention that members of the Somalia militant sect, Al-Shabab, aided Boko Haram militants in carrying out the attack on Nyanya Motor Park.\textsuperscript{78} It has indeed been alleged that Al-Shabab, which has strong links with Al-Qaeda, has moved from providing technical assistance to Boko Haram to fighting alongside the insurgents in some parts of the North-East.\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, this growing international linkage has the capacity to compound the challenge of defeating terrorism in Nigeria and also to limit further the country’s capacity to provide regional leadership for other African states; a possibility which is already beginning to manifest following Nigeria’s recent recall of some eight hundred of its troops from Darfur to assist the country in its ongoing war against the Boko Haram group.\textsuperscript{80}

It perhaps bears mentioning that Boko Haram had also in March 2015 pledged its alliance to the Islamic State (ISIL or ISIS), furthered its attacks on the civilian population, and also raided a number of military formations, including the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) base located on the outskirts of Baga in Borno State.\textsuperscript{81} Perhaps a major watershed for the Nigerian government in its campaign against Boko Haram and its often touted giant-like stature in Africa
is its resort to the black market, particularly between 14 February and 28 May 2015, for the procurement of arms, and its purported employment of South African mercenaries in the fight against Boko Haram. At the time of writing this article, Nigeria has witnessed a change in leadership and government, with Muhammadu Buhari, a former military ruler, emerging as president. While the foreign policy direction of his government remains too early to call, what is clear, however, is that the evolving socio-economic and security developments as contended in this article, particularly since its return to participatory democracy in May 1999, suggests that Nigeria is struggling with a plethora of home-grown systemic challenges. Inarguably, the country needs to do more to take care of these challenges, before all other considerations.

Notes

1 See Magnowski 2014; and http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/crude-oil-production (last accessed August 4, 2015).
3 Ibid.
4 Alli 2012.
5 Ibid.
7 Yoroms 2010, p. 27.
8 Idisi and Idise 1996, p. 171.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ebohon and Obakhedo 2012, p. 163.
12 Ibid.
13 Ate 2011, p. 90.
16 Snodderly 2011, p. 17.
17 Wallenstein 2002, p. 53.
19 Crocker 2001, p. 31.
20 For more explanations on the centrifugal and centripetal determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy, see introductory chapter, “The Determinant of the Foreign Policies of African States,” in Aluko 1977.
22 Aluko 1977, p. 2.
23 Ogwu 1986 also noted these factors as central to the shaping of Nigeria’s foreign policy articulation.
24 Ibid., p. 2.
25 See also Aluko 1981, p. 1 for more on this.
27 Fawole 2004, p. 42.
29 Fawole 2004, p. 42.
30 Ibid., p. 43.
31 Ibid.
33 Fawole 2004, p. 44.
35 Ibid.
36 For more on this argument, see Peen Rodt 2011.
37 See Fawole 2004, p. 45, and Gambari 2008, p. 58 for more on this.
38 Fawole 2004, p. 47.
39 Ibid.
40 See Yoroms 2003, p. 2.
41 Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007, p. 140.
44 See Osuntokun 2008, p. 148 for more on Nigeria’s response to correct what he described as the “Benin neglect.”
45 See Gambari 1989 for more arguments on Gowon’s foreign policy era of “Naira Spraying Diplomacy.”
46 See also Fawole 2004 and Osuntokun 2008.
48 See Osaghae 1998 and Adebajo and Mustapha 2008 for more on Babangida’s approach to foreign policy issues and conflict related issues in West Africa during his regime.
52 Ibid.
54 Mbachu 2007, p. 9.
55 Ibid.
56 Okocha and Onwuka 2007, p. 3.
57 See Ogunsanwo 2007 for further analysis.
Akinterinwa 2010 provides a more comprehensive explanation.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Babatola 2012, pp. 9-10.

Matunhu 2011.


See Litwack 2013.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Boko-Haram is a Hausa language expression which literally translates to western education is forbidden. It is a name given to a radical Islamic sect cum jihadist terrorist organization was formed in 2001 by Mohammed Yusuf. The movement has been responsible for a series of destabilizing and debilitating attacks which has claimed many Nigerian lives, particularly in the Northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa.

See for instance Gordon 2013.

“Boko Haram has killed over 12,000 Nigerians, plans to take over country” (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/160942-boko-haram-killed-12000-nigerians-plans-take-country-jonathan-says.html; accessed 04 August 2015).


Soriwei and Adepegba 2014.

References


The *Okada* War in Urban Ghana: A Polemic Issue or Policy Mismatch?

MARTIN OTENG-ABABIO and ERNEST AGYEMANG

**Abstract:** In recent years the government of Ghana and a section of civil society have clashed over whether motorcycle taxis, christened *okada*, which are fast becoming a major public transport mode, should be encouraged or not. In an apparent submission to public pressure and in pursuance of sustainable urban development, the government eventually enacted landmark legislation banning the use of motorcycles for commercial purposes. Using stakeholders’ perspectives, this paper assesses the synergies and tensions between the respective claims and counterclaims. Among the issues raised against *okada* are traffic congestion, danger to public safety, and worsening environmental impact. Proponents of *okada* extol the virtues of maneuverability, compatibility with bad roads, and demand-responsiveness. This study does not discount these claims but rather posits that, fundamentally, substantial allocative and technical inefficiencies have generated large public transit deficits and severe highway congestion, thus creating a market niche for *okada*. Our study highlights three major outcomes. First, it reaffirms the importance of evidence-based policy making as a solution for sustainable development initiatives. Second, it identifies the human security risks associated with a short-term vision and how reactive regulations can prepare the ground for segregation and fragmented access to the urban landscape. Third, it highlights the role of pressure groups and policy makers in shaping and re-defining urban transportation landscapes in an isolated manner. Rather than taking a systematic approach, such groups and policy makers react with little consideration for their clients: the commuters. The findings corroborate our earlier empirical studies, which revealed *okada* as an unofficial but thriving mobility option.

**Introduction**

Efficient urban transport infrastructure and services are the backbone of any efficient city system, and the public provision of these services remains the most socially desirable option. In 2013 three international think tanks (Sustainable Development Solutions Network, High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the Global Compact) separately and collectively underscored the importance of efficient transport systems in ensuring equal accessibility to cities. Such systems are critical to reducing the risks posed by urbanization and ensuring equal participation of both the governors and the governed. In

**Martin Oteng-Ababio** is Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana. He is an urban geographer whose main research includes urban environmental management, urban infrastructure development urban housing, crime, and disaster risks reduction. **Ernest Agyemang** is Lecturer, Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, and is presently reading for a DPhil in geography at the University of Ghana and Arhus University in Denmark. His research focuses on urban transport infrastructure services and development.
general, to provide such infrastructure services, governments and policy makers have a menu of policies to choose from, such as privatization and public–private partnership.2

In recent times, however, there has been a decline in organized public transport in the face of rapidly urbanizing cities and rising numbers of private vehicles, resulting in increased congestion, reduced mobility, and more accidents.3 These negative externalities affect particularly the poor and vulnerable members of society, who are locked into a web of perpetual “transport poverty.”4 Thus, in light of government inactivity, prospective commuters are being forced to develop creative solution to address their daily travel needs. The socially unacceptable decline in organized public transport has led to a rapid growth in non-conventional transportation modes, such as the commercialization of the motorcycles popularly called okada. While positively filling the gap left by a declining public sector, and providing easy maneuverability and demand-responsiveness, okada have not escaped blame for increasing road accidents, traffic management problems, and pervasive noise.

In our opinion, the entrepreneurial inspiration behind the proliferation of okada in cities can be traced to the failure of public transport to meet commuters’ needs. This can be attributed partly to the challenges and policies adopted after the inception of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s in Ghana.5 One major outcome of these programs has been a significant reduction in wage employment in both the public and private sectors, resulting from various fiscal reforms, privatization, and deregulation. It has been argued that until the SAPs, the state-owned Omnibus Services Authority (OSA) and City Express Service (CES) bus companies provided safe, comfortable, and reliable intra-urban services; but these public transport systems later closed owing to mismanagement and stiff competition from the private sector.6 This has resulted in chaos on most urban roads, which are heavily congested during rush hours, and caused serious delays and continuous deterioration of roads.7 In the government’s quest for sustainable urban development, one would have expected policy makers to battle against the policy deficiencies that lead to such chaos on most urban roads. In fact, Ghana’s National Transport Policy (2008) identifies an effective transportation system as a sine qua non for national growth and poverty reduction, particularly in urban areas. Nevertheless, transport policies all too often tend to receive scant attention.8 As Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer noted, in the name of economic efficiency twentieth century governments adopted a posture of minimal intervention in the market, and thus “governments around the world are reducing their roles in transport.”9 Accordingly, the deficiencies in various aspects of government policy planning, financing, implementation, and management have made okada, which simply fill the void created by the public sector, the most preferred option. The resultant efforts by government to regulate the situation have placed okada onto the political agenda and caused them to be unjustly maligned—hence the promulgation of LI 2180 as a shot-in-the-dark intervention that papers over the broader issue of inefficiencies in Ghana’s public transport services.

Our study examines the possibility of successfully implementing LI 2180, a legislative instrument (LI) that bans okada operations in Ghana. The study is intended to underscore the linkages between governance failure and weak transport sector performance, which have received little academic attention. The data was compiled primarily through forty qualitative surveys, a detailed literature review, and interviews. The study also benefited from our
previous empirical research. We employ a difference-in-differences strategy that explains many of the unobserved reasons that have led to the spread of okada across cities and towns in the country.

Certainly, okada have their drawbacks, including impacting adversely on some pedestrians particularly women and children, and rendering crucial non-motorized transport infrastructure riskier. Yet, rather than seeing the service as a naturalized “resource curse,” we think the imbalances between the power of the state in the provision of the infrastructural services, the rising youth unemployment, and the need for effective multi-modal transport systems in the cities are critical catalysts that have shaped and constrained the status quo. Although okada may be an inefficient response to inefficient transport services, in all probability the government intervention will compound the problem by distorting market structures and promoting rent-seeking that favors the interests of the privileged few.

The paper is divided into four sections. The next subsection engages with the history of the motorcycle taxi in Africa and provides a context for the study. It briefly highlights some of the pertinent themes in earlier studies. The paper then turns to methodological issues and follows with an analysis. Being mindful of the inconclusive nature of the literature on urbanization, coupled with the global economic downturn and its impact on urban transportation, the final section makes a speculative assessment of the drivers of urbanization processes and of the future of okada. To achieve this end, we are inspired by Kumar’s (2011) strong argument for the need to understand the foundational drivers of okada and to adapt policy instruments to local political and economic contexts. We propose a participation framework driven by open communication across a wide spectrum of stakeholders rather than looking for the symptoms of what is obviously a policy failure. The implementation of LI 2180 is now a little over a year old. However, both the seemingly increasing numbers of okada operating turfs, in Accra in particular, and the commonalities in outcomes in other African contexts suggest that the prognosis for the Ghanaian situation can be stated with a reasonable degree of confidence.

Deciphering the Emergence of Motorcycle Taxis in Africa

Africa is urbanizing fast. Its total population is projected to nearly double from around one billion in 2010 to almost two billion by 2040, and it may well surpass three billion by 2070. Thus, the overarching challenge for Africa in the decades to come is its massive population growth in a context of widespread poverty, factors that in combination will generate complex and interrelated threats to the human habitat. The importance of efficient transport systems in ensuring the sustainable functioning of African city systems cannot be overemphasized. Investments in road, rail, and energy networks will be crucial to boosting Africa’s urban economies by unlocking sparsely populated areas for settlement and investments in agro-industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Such investments will further facilitate flows of people, commodities, and services, thus connecting Africa’s many landlocked nations to the outside world and ensuring food, water, and energy security for development.

In practice, most political authorities appear interested in developing a system that ensures easy traffic flow, mitigates congestion, and guarantees public transport subsidies. From this perspective, some of the approaches adopted by the authorities to achieve these objectives include building more infrastructure (build the problem away), introducing more traffic...
signalization (signal the problem away), improving traffic management, and making public transport more attractive.\textsuperscript{13} However, the outcomes of these interventions in recent times have been, at best, discouraging; most of these strategies do not solve the problems they are supposed to address but create additional ones and therefore are cost-ineffective. Studies show that the main features of today’s transport policies are helplessness and basic ignorance.\textsuperscript{14} Other studies reveal that what operates in current transport science is a kind of ideology rather than rationality, pointing to the fact that what “works” in transport policy is an increasing populism instead of responsibility.\textsuperscript{15} In developing transport systems, technologists and economists often give priority to fast transport modes and adopt indicators of expected benefits without taking into account the real system effects on society and urban structures.

Africa is no exception to these global dynamics, a situation compounded by increasing financial constraints, poor planning, mismanagement, and chronic corruption. The only exception on the African continent may be South Africa, which has operated its “Rea Vaya” bus system effectively since 2009 and formalized its minibus operations, together with the Gautrain system.\textsuperscript{16} In many African countries the need to coordinate land use and transport planning is widely recognized but rarely achieved. This has made all forms of public transport (which have never been particularly fast anyway) slower, less reliable, and more expensive to provide, with the ensuing externalities—congestion, accidents, pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and crime within the city—affecting the poor disproportionately. These challenges have compelled the transport-disadvantaged to search for affordable options, the most popular today being motorcycle taxis.\textsuperscript{17}

In the view of Kumar (2011), the origin and growth of motorcycle taxis in most African countries can be traced to the collapse of bus transport services either directly provided by the state or contracted for, and the deregulation of the market leading to the growth of informal operators. The preponderance (ubiquity) of motorcycle-taxi services in Africa is clearly manifested in the proliferation of local names to describe them. They include \textit{okada} (Ghana), \textit{okada or alalok} (Nigeria), \textit{kabu-kabu} (Niger), \textit{boda-boda} (Uganda and Kenya), \textit{zemidjan} (Benin), \textit{oleyia} (Togo), and \textit{bendskin} (Cameroon). In Nigeria’s most populous city, Lagos, there are over 200,000 \textit{okada} operators, providing direct employment to over 500,000 people, and such a large numerical strength gives them enormous political power.\textsuperscript{18} Digging deeper into the genesis of the practice, some studies have indicated that poor management of rapid urbanization has resulted in erratic and inefficient urban transport regimes.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, the decision by some African governments to waive import tax on motorcycles, with the intent of ensuring their affordability and facilitating easy mobility, also had unintended consequences—the proliferation of motor-taxis.\textsuperscript{20} Other contributing factors to the growth of \textit{okada} numbers include low start-up capital, low maintenance costs, high youth unemployment, and the general laxity in existing regulatory frameworks.\textsuperscript{21}

From another perspective, the growing prominence of \textit{okada} may signify people’s desire to address the dire transport poverty that defines their daily lives.\textsuperscript{22} The \textit{okada} has created a niche for itself: it provides door-to-door service easily and can access areas with poor to impassable road networks. It is also very suitable for short trips and can save time (overcoming traffic congestion), especially in the congested urban space.\textsuperscript{23}
The okada transport system has not been without safety and security concerns, however, particularly in regard to its adherence to public safety needs. Accordingly, many governments have instituted various policy initiatives to deal with the issue and its associated externalities. In Kenya, although the government continues to offer tax waivers on imported motorcycles, it has promulgated a law that bans the use of motorcycle taxis in certain areas in the capital. In Cameroon, apart from outlawing okada in the national capital, motor-taxis must also to be properly registered and the operators must, by law, have a license, insurance, and a crash helmet. In addition, the use of reflective jackets by both the drivers and the passengers is mandatory. In the case of Ouagadougou, special lanes have been constructed solely for motorcycles.

Ghanaian public opinion on okada is varied. However, there appears to be a growing school of thought that suggests the government can and must spend its way out of the okada dilemma by completely banning their use. The government’s policy response appears to side with this school of thought. We find this policy paradigm particularly baffling, however, in view of its self-proclaimed social democratic stance. The present government prides itself on its commitment to improving the economic fortunes of the vulnerable in society. Thus, for it to endorse a policy of obvious short-term benefits that may lead to popular discontent in the long run, particularly for the majority of “transport-poverty” commuters, is inconsistent with its own avowed ideology. As Kumar has strongly argued, such populist decisions are very often “taken to enhance patronage without regard to the long-term impact of the decisions taken or the need to entr”}

The government enacted LI 2180 to ban okada, yet the future of the regulation remains highly doubtful. Indeed, earlier studies have intimated that past urban transport policies have been largely shaped by entrenched political forces, leading to huge public transport deficits, severe congestion, and construction-cost overruns, and promising more of the same for the future. It is from this perspective that we consider the likely effect of the new law. In our opinion, this law is likely to exacerbate the transportation deficit and disrupt the city system’s ability to function beyond its center, creating in the process a ‘goldmine’ for unscrupulous law enforcement agencies. Policymakers ought to appreciate these tendencies, lest they erroneously assume that okada belong to history simply because LI 2180 has been passed.

Policymakers should also appreciate the fact that the desperate need for a more viable, stress-free, and sustainable public transport system appears to have made okada a transport mode of choice for commuters over the traditional mobility options, which are often owned by local politicians or socially connected and financially resourceful businessmen. Moreover, in terms of power relations, okada operators may be quite vulnerable; but their numerical strength and youthful exuberance has propelled them into a political collision with the government, while their aggressive nature threatens other road users and is losing them public support. Be that as it may, the fact remains that any deficient policy, enacted without reference to the key stakeholders and local knowledge, tends to stifle local initiative. On this score, it remains to be seen what degree of success will be attained by the landmark legislation criminalizing okada.
Interrogating the Road Safety Policy Dynamics

Methodology

In our quest to understand the on-going debates on the criminalization of okada, we draw on our previous study as baseline information with a view to placing the discussion in a broader context. In that study, we employed a mixed method approach involving participant observation, personal interviews, and stakeholder interviews. Using a purposive sampling technique in the current study, questionnaire surveys on the operations of forty okada operators were conducted at two different “turfs” in Accra (the Central Post Office and Korle Bu Hospital). Accra was selected not only because it is the national capital but also the fastest-growing (most urbanized) city and the center of economic activities in the country. It also has all public and private transportation modes: road, rail, air, and sea for domestic and international travel. In addition, it is the city where the okada saga has generated the hottest debate and reaction.

Following the promulgation of LI 2180, we conducted a further twenty-five key stakeholder interviews, including of operators, city authorities, and officials from both the Motor Transport and Traffic Department (MTTD) and the National Road Safety Commission (NRSC). Our interviews sought insight into the expectations of our respondents, the legal implications of the policy, and the policy’s future vis-à-vis the law. We complemented these interviews with a series of focus groups discussions (total of four) with identifiable groups—promoters of LI 2180, including the MTTD, NRSC, Assembly, and non-governmental organizations, and opponents of LI 2180, including okada operators and beneficiaries of the service. We also benefited from the range of literature on okada operations found in the electronic and print media landscape. Though researchers specializing in African cities strongly endorse the use of data from the media, since accounts of local journalists can provide valuable information, we were also conscious of potential bias reportage in some instances. In order to minimize this problem, the accounts were drawn from a variety of media houses—national, regional, private, and state-owned—and complemented with in-depth interviews. The resultant data were subjected to thematic narrative analysis and are presented as direct quotes, interpreting the various aspects of the research topic.

An Overview of LI 2180

In general, the enactment of policies in Ghana has traditionally been a top-down exercise, initiated by sector ministries and working through the appropriate departments and agencies. It is in this spirit that the NRSC and the Ministry of Road and Transport presented LI 2180 to Parliament for consideration and passage. On 4 July 2012, Parliament unanimously passed the Road Traffic Regulation, 2012 (Legislative Instrument LI 2180), which, inter-alia, bans the commercial use of motorbikes (okada). LI 2180 states, in part:

- A person shall not use or permit a motorcycle or tricycle over which that person exercises control to be used for commercial purposes except for courier and delivery services;
- A person shall not ride on a motorcycle or tricycle as a fare-paying passenger;
A person who contravenes the law commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than twenty-five penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days or to both.

Proponents of LI 2180 aver that road traffic offences not clearly defined by the old legal traffic laws, such as the use of mobile phones while driving and the use of motorbikes for commercial purposes, necessitated the law’s passage. In addition, the new LI enjoins motorbike riders to wear identifiable paraphernalia, including appropriate boots, reflective jackets, gloves, and crash helmets, failing which the riders commit an offence. Thus, LI 2180 took into account the shortfalls in the existing road traffic regulation (LI 956 of 1974) and Regulation 64 of the Motor Traffic Act. One fundamental defect in the LI was its loud silence on any alternative cash-based livelihood for the operators and any gap-filling transport option for distressed commuters.

Earlier studies reveal that attempts to criminalize motor-taxis makes operators easy targets for incessant official harassment (or extortion). As early as February 2011, a group of about five hundred okada operators in Accra petitioned Parliament to legitimize okada and “stop the inhuman treatment of city authorities and incessant extortion from the police.” Presenting their petition, the group leader remarked:

We are here because we hear that there is a law that motorbikes should not be used for commercial purposes. . . . We want Parliament to do something about it. . . . we didn’t know there is a law [that forbids our operation].... If there is a law that can create unemployment, then that law is a bad one.... You have to look at it. We believe Parliament can do something or we will go to our Father [the President].

This action was not “an isolated cry.” Some commuters in Accra admitted the risks involved in patronizing okadas but stressed that the practice was convenient, fast, and reliable. The Daily Graphic of 24 June 2013 reported residents in Segakope in the Volta region embarking on a demonstration against the LI, stressing that okada was their main mode of mobility. Similarly, a local radio station in Accra in late June 2013 reported on the youth in Tamale (Northern region) complaining about the ban. These developments provide sufficient reason to anticipate a strong defiance on the part of distressed commuters hoping to get to work comfortably and on time as well as the desire of unemployed youth to make a living. The ensuing “war” lends some weight to an emerging conspiracy theory allegation, which posits that some people in authority have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Accordingly, these people tend to use their economic and political power to obtain political influence and promote policies that protect their interests.

The Platitudes of the Okada War

Until 2012, there was no law that prosecuted those who use motorbikes for commercial purposes. The recent ban was occasioned by intensified calls from sections of the public and some NGOs who disapprove of the practice. It came at a time when the practice had become a major source of livelihood for thousands of urban residents, including not only the youth but also some senior public officials. During our fieldwork, it was alleged that some public officials
have procured fleet of motorbikes, which they rent out to prospective operators at a fee of
GH₵40 ($14) daily, although we had no independent means of verifying this information.
It was further revealed that the supposed enforcers of the law appear handicapped and are
sometimes compelled to tolerate the presence of okada in the absence of public policies that
provide socially acceptable, affordable, and convenient mobility alternatives in the presence of
rising youth unemployment. Several informants highlighted the problems of identification and
de-linking privately owned motorcycles that are genuinely used for personal mobility as
opposed to those being used for the okada motorcycle-taxi business. There is also the likelihood
that most passengers connive with operators, thus compounding the problem of identifying
commercial operators.

While majority (about 60 percent) of the public, and especially road safety experts and law
enforcement agents interviewed hailed the passage of the law, passionate arguments have also
emerged from all the operators and their “political paymasters.” Some of these claims and
counterclaims are worth interrogating. The leader of the hurriedly formed Private Motor Bikes
Operators Union, for example, defended their right to stay in business: “Every citizen has the
right to do something to earn a livelihood and prevent situations where the youth who are
currently idling about are forced to indulge in social vices that will not augur well for all.”
Contributing to the discussion, the Secretary of the group stated that the ban will exacerbate the
existing mobility difficulties in the city, adding that “clearly, if this law is implemented, areas
like Juapong and Sogakope, with notable mobility challenges, will be more deprived.”

While such remarks tend to suggest a livelihood war from the operators’ point of view,
others engaged with the issue politically. As it happens, the passage of the LI coincided with the
2012 general electioneering calendar; hence the policy immediately assumed political
importance and colorization, becoming a major campaign issue and receiving prominence on
political platforms. After a series of agitations in Ashaiman from aggrieved okada operators,
who threatened to derail the electoral fortunes of the ruling National Democratic Congress
(NDC) with “No-Okada-No-Vote” chants, the regional minister waded into the debate,
questioning the law’s sustainability. He stated: “So far as I remain the Regional Minister, okada
shall operate unless a stop is put to it in Tamale.... I am telling you this as the Minister; we won’t
abolish the use of okada.” The minister, who doubles as the Member of Parliament (MP) for
Kpone-Katamanso, emphasized the potential problems of the LI: “There are so many laws
passed by Parliament that have not been enforced. This law can also be put aside … till we
create enough jobs for the youth ….If we are not careful, armed robbery will rise...I have seen
people being slashed and their bags taken away.”

Supporting the minister’s position, NDC MPs for Ashaiman and Ketu South constituencies
declared their support for the okada practice. They agreed on a gradual phasing-out agenda,
insisting that a total ban would affect the only means of mobility in some areas. As expected,
members of the minority New Patriotic Party (NPP) argued to the contrary and urged the police
MTTD to enforce the LI rigorously. They described the position of the government as grossly
oversimplified and hypocritical, criticizing it for mortgaging the country’s security for its selfish
interest over an issue that had been comprehensively debated apolitically. Similarly, the NPP
MP for Bekwai expressed bemusement on the sudden ‘political gymnastics’ displayed by the

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v15/v15i4a2.pdf
NDC MPs: “the LI was presented to Parliament by government. For convenience, people will overlook everything if it will give them a vote.”

Other public officials referred to some deep-rooted problems associated with *okada*. In an in-depth interview with the Director of Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation of the NRSC, the director re-affirmed their resolve to enforce the ban from a safety perspective. She argued that countries with good transportation systems do not depend on *okada*, alleging (perhaps erroneously) that even Nigeria, which has gained notoriety in the business, had advised Ghana to ban it. The Commander of Police MTTD corroborated the stand of the NRSC, adding emphatically: “the law has come at the appropriate time and will be enforced to the letter.”

The Head of Research, Education and Training at MTTD also explained that motorbikes are licensed exclusively for personal uses and it is unlawful for any person to commercialize them. He argued:

> The use of motorbikes has now become a “curse.” Most people want to make money through criminal means at the expense of other people’s lives. In January [2012] alone, 148 motorbikes were involved in crashes nationwide out of which 62 were recorded in Greater Accra, mostly from commercial motorcycle operators.

A section of the respondents also agreed that *okada* could be problematic, at least conceptually. A resident, who appeared to have once been a victim of an *okada* robbery incident, bemoaned the current state of affairs:

> Stop this *okada* before things get out of hand. Check Nigeria and you will see what it can do to the society. Very soon, our society will become noisier, agitated and irritated; pedestrians will find it difficult to cross roads, accidents will triple; and we might as well create an *okada* ward in our hospitals.

During the focus group discussions, however, most participants opposed the LI and predicted its “doom.” In their opinion, *okada* stands tall in terms of reliability, ubiquity, access, and commercial speed. They pointed out that the service fills an important gap in urban transport demand and also provides employment for the youth. Others referred to some real consequences of the practice of using *okada*, particularly in unplanned areas where some *okada* operators and their clients veer off the main road into settlements and into alleyways at unsafe speeds. A group of women from Nima (a suburb in Accra) unanimously agreed that the use of pedestrian alleyways by *okada* travelling at top speed posed a threat to their children (who walk to school and play in these alleyways) and render crucial (and scant) non-motorized transport infrastructure riskier. Others raised concerns about how some riders display outright disregard or ignorance of traffic regulations. In addition, the question of affordability was raised, as the poor generally travel by motorcycle-taxis twice less frequently than the non-poor.

Despite these resentments, the general consensus was that while *okada* may, for now, be an inefficient response to an inefficient status quo, they do solve acute mobility issues within the metropolis and, like all transport services, have to be regulated. Clearly, the practice has become a demand–response service, and that is yet another reason why it is so important to invest in bus rapid transit (BRT) systems and non-motorized transport (NMT) modes so as to reduce the need for *okada*. A police officer in one of the forums conceded that the dangers outlined against
the use of motorcycles were not the preserve of okada operators alone, adding that there were instances where other private riders equally breached traffic regulations. In his view, such persons are as guilty as the okada operators. He noted that already (by 31 January 2012) 248 such persons had been convicted, and he pessimistically suggested:

The effort to end okada is not for the police alone; it would take an educated and well-disciplined society to succeed. The government must also provide an efficient, reliable and timely public transport system, since at times we are compelled to tolerate their [okada] presence in the absence of policies providing alternative modes for passengers as well as the lack of employment opportunities for the teeming youth.47

Our findings are in accord with a commentary in a 2010 issue of The Economist, captioned “Tame these Taxis: A well-intended governor is annoying frustrated commuters.” It read, in part:

A rush-hour commuter in Lagos can take 3 hours to cover 15 kilometers. A rare beneficiary has been the Okada rider. On his cheap motorbike taxi, he often carries an entire family or a week’s grocery…. His widely time-saving tactics include riding on the wrong side of the road and ignoring red lights. But Babatunde Fashola, Lagos’s popular governor, is clamping down on the daredevil bikes as part of his push to tame an unruly city…. Many Lagosians moan that, though he has virtually banned the bikes, the governor has failed to provide alternatives…. Many poorer Lagosians, facing long journeys from the suburbs, must now use the far slower taxis or unlicensed minibuses…. But many think the campaign against Okada is premature. Whether Mr. Fashola can enforce his curbs is another matter.48

Clearly, the okada affair requires critical apolitical analysis, not least because it has assumed epic proportions between the operators, some civil society organizations, and the police. Its repercussions for city governance and the general social and economic development of Ghana could be drastic. Such analysis must evaluate and ascertain the basis for passing the LI, which, at least at first sight, seems to be emanated from an empirical vacuum.

**Encountering Okada Realities: Assets and Liabilities**

The ban on the operation of okada has been in place for over a year, yet it remains unclear whether it will be effective and sustainable. We reiterate our earlier position that any successful policy intervention demands well-researched data as its foundation or it runs the risk of failure. Unfortunately, in this particular case, the authorities seem to have failed to first appreciate and address the fundamental challenges and causalities that have made okada the most preferred mobility option in Ghanaian cities. Clearly, the calls for their ban came hot on the heels of recent increasing road fatalities, some of which have been attributed to the over 400 percent increase in okada accidents due the aggressiveness and recklessness of operators. A review of data from the NRSC shows high rates of road accidents and increasing fatalities over ten years (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No of registered vehicles</th>
<th>No. of vehicles involved</th>
<th>Reported crashes</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>511,063</td>
<td>21,152</td>
<td>14,654</td>
<td>5,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>567,780</td>
<td>17,807</td>
<td>11,853</td>
<td>1,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>613,153</td>
<td>18,337</td>
<td>11,872</td>
<td>1,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>643,824</td>
<td>18,961</td>
<td>13,039</td>
<td>1,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>703,372</td>
<td>20,353</td>
<td>14,739</td>
<td>2,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>767,067</td>
<td>19,122</td>
<td>12,903</td>
<td>1,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>841,314</td>
<td>17,877</td>
<td>11,668</td>
<td>1,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>922,784</td>
<td>17,496</td>
<td>12,038</td>
<td>2,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>942,000</td>
<td>17,608</td>
<td>11,214</td>
<td>1,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,030,000</td>
<td>17,404</td>
<td>12,229</td>
<td>2,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,122,722</td>
<td>18,584</td>
<td>11,506</td>
<td>1,986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NRSC 2011; MTTD Quarterly Report 2010

The data show variations as the number of accidents rises and falls, sometimes more steeply than before. For example, the period 2001–2003 saw a steady decline from 14,654 crashes recorded in 2000 to 13,039 in 2003. This changed in 2004 when a 13 percent increase was reported. In terms of fatalities, the data from the NRSC show a consistent average rise of 73 fatalities per annum. Between 2001 and 2010, the rise in fatalities has been consistent though considerably lower than the 1990s, at a rate of approximately 48 fatalities per annum, a 37 percent drop in the annual rate. Nevertheless, the fatality figure of 1,986 recorded in 2010 highlights the fact that the country recorded 762 deaths more than the NRSC estimates of 1,224 for 2010.

These disturbing statistics have been used as a justification and legitimating factor in the criminalization of the okadas, though there may be more fundamental causes of the large number of fatal accidents, such as attitudinal, economic, and planning causes. One of the immediate unintended consequences of the ban has been to remove any legal authorization for the operators and thus expose them to official harassment. The MTTD arrested seventy-three okada riders, of whom twenty were fined between GH¢600 ($252) and GH¢1,000 ($420) each. In spite of the official crackdown, however, the practice continues to thrive, even increasing its geographical extent. In 2007, the Lagos State Government banned the circulation of commercial motorcycles between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. According to the state police commissioner, the move came in response to a sharp rise in the number of robberies using motorcycles as getaway vehicles. The punishment for violating the ban included seizure of the motorcycle and a fine of N50,000 ($400). The ban initially led to the disappearance of motorcycles from many parts of the city, leaving many commuters with no way to get to and from work. Transport fares tripled. The Motorcycle Operators Association of Nigeria contested the ban because no alternative emerged. Commuters, too, wanted the government to find a more appropriate solution than an
outright ban on the operation. As a result, the ban was later modified and its operation is now restricted to arterial and link roads.

Similarly, our findings show a number of inconsistencies in the implementation of the policy. First, during the study and indeed in their public discourse, some public officials made no secret of their abhorrence of *okada* and the fact that Ghana’s economic future lies in an efficient formal transportation system. There is therefore a growing suspicion that the current transportation system—directed mainly by the informal sector—is perhaps not the best growth strategy. Present urban transport policy reforms, including the World Bank-sponsored on-going Urban Transport Project, which seeks to introduce a BRT system remain conspicuously silent on the informal sector as a key stakeholder; yet, traditionally, this sector commands approximately 70 percent of the market. The official position suggests that Ghana is “overexposed to the *okada* and underexposed to faster-growing emerging systems.”

Secondly, the proponents of the LI 2180 policy have failed to recognize that the substantial allocative and technical inefficiencies, in the face of the high youth unemployment, coupled with the *okada*’s “low entry requirements” and “no technical expertise required” attractions, provide sufficient incentives for most residents to “join the band-wagon.” Indeed, operating *okada* is made even more attractive by the perceived high financial returns. Our prior studies indicate that operators earn on averagely GHe50 (about $20) per day, excluding daily rental (about $4) and operating expenses ($5). In addition, the ability to adapt to changing travel demands—convenience, door-to-door service, ability to save time and serve low-density areas, and flexibility—works positively in favor of popularizing *okada* transport.

The current retail structure of the city also creates powerful disincentives for the business community in particular to move away from the *okada*. The economy has been over-concentrated in the Central Business District (CBD) for decades. The CBD accounts for approximately 80 percent of the country’s merchandise trade and over 90 percent of the headquarters of both public and private offices, yet “less than 10 percent of road networks in the CBD have seen modification since the 1960s.” Almost all these road networks are single-lane, being fed by double-lane roads from the periphery. Furthermore, in most cases parts of the traffic lanes are taken up by pedestrians (and hawkers) and parked vehicles, which also reduce their capacity and pose safety hazards. These conditions only exacerbate the weariness of commuters, who continue to lament the government’s poor planning. Consequently, the *okada* saga needs to be understood as a response to residents’ desire to navigate the rush-hour congestion and improve mobility beyond the declining public transport systems. A comment by an interviewee encapsulates this anxiety:

> Accra today is on the edge of making a historic choice: to improve the transportation infrastructure and reduce traffic congestion or maintain the status quo. Virtually all traffic flows in and out of Accra Central remain at a standstill in the mornings and evenings. For AMA [Accra Metropolitan Assembly], the choice is clear: they need to manage the city holistically as a system, in which all the sub-systems work independently but efficiently in order to ensure sustainable development and economic growth for all.

The promulgation of LI 2180, in response to emotive criticism of *okada*, lacked a comprehensive (holistic) appreciation of the problem; and it is now likely to lead to
implementation difficulties. Presently, for example, little is known in terms of the cost to industry, traders, and commuters of the incessant traffic congestion in the city. In South Africa, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2010) estimated the costs of traffic congestion to be 15 million rand per hour, excluding costs related to items such as fuel and vehicle maintenance. To avert such implicit socio-economic costs, countries like Uganda and Togo have officially embraced the okada challenge. In Kampala, for instance, a law on the wearing of helmets is being vigorously pursued; in Togo, operators have been directed to use motorcycles with mirrors to enhance the safety of the operators and patrons. These measures bring a two-fold benefit: meeting commuters’ transport needs and providing livelihoods for the masses of unemployed youth. In 2010, there were 83,000 okada operators on the streets of Benin, 40,000 in Togo, and 2,350 in Niger.59

Judging from the current state of affairs regarding the implementation of LI 2180, and leaving aside the political dimensions of the debate, we remain quite optimistic that the future will revisit the okada issue, insofar as Accra’s mobility level (and indeed that in all urban centers) is not as reliable as it once was, in spite of the increasing car ownership.60 According to Knoflacher, “mobility can only increase if local deficits increase, which means poor urban planning, poor logistics and poor management. These deficits have to be compensated for by physical mobility.”61 We see mobility as purpose-related, and therefore each trip by car replaces a trip by another mode of transport. It follows that increasing car mobility means decreasing mobility for pedestrians, cyclists, and public transport. Failure to increase car mobility means the present modes of transport do not address commuters’ main concern (i.e. congestion). Given that peoples’ desire for flexibility in mobility remains strong, we posit that the demand for okada will continue to show robust growth as long as the public sector remains dormant. Despite strident criticisms of the okada practice, we see enough evidence to suggest that the ban will come only at the cost of restricting freedom of mobility. The government’s “deafening silence” on alternatives for navigating the city may in fact indirectly endorse the okada business, the ban notwithstanding.

The “ban-okada” posture appears to be a function of government’s perspective on causality and its failure to appreciate the city as a “system.” Similarly, the rise of the okada, when traced to its roots, is an indictment of successive governments’ shirking of their responsibility regarding transportation in general. From our results, we can affirm that the attempt to ban of okada is fundamentally based on a misreading of causality. We believe that city authorities must wean themselves from planning for “their” geographical region alone. The realities of transport affect the city as a whole, operating as it does as a unified system. The authorities’ lack of appreciation and reluctance to plan and implement policies from this perspective negatively impacts development. In the case of okada, our earlier study supports efforts to place the issue onto the development agenda and build on its less controversial legacy of participatory democracy.

Discussions with some city officials suggest that the okada problem is perceived as a minor matter in the urban economy; it is thus much less meaningful to engage with than the myriad other important infrastructural issues. This contradicts the position and expectation of representatives of the business community and the okada operators, who remain outspoken advocates of the practice. Be that as it may, the practice legally remains off the cities’ transportation radar for the time being. Whether the ban will endure and succeed remains
unclear, and its eventual impact on the functionality of the city is, at best, uncertain. We can only re-echo our earlier position that the collective public official psyche has yet to appreciate and incorporate into its mental map the raison d’être and subsequent proliferation of okada.

Lessons Learned and the Future

This study sought to examine the ability of LI 2180 to curb the operation of okada in Ghana. Our findings highlight two main issues. First, this study vindicates our earlier conclusion of the significance of okadas in Accra’s transport options, and it re-enforces our call for the re-conceptualization of the problems confronting the transport sector as part of the citywide system failure. In general, the livability of a city depends on the smooth functioning of its sub-systems, including management, finance, and good governance, whereby a society is guided toward collective outcomes that benefit all and integrate the poor into a city’s tissue. Our findings show that the antecedents of the okada issue lay in the increasing urbanization of poverty, coupled with poor planning and the growing car ownership which has overwhelmed city authorities, creating increased congestion, reduced mobility, and “avoidable” accidents. Responding to such a systemic failure through a legal framework seems to be a misplaced, miscalculated, and mismanaged intervention. Rather, we deem it more plausible and appropriate to adopt a more comprehensive and well-coordinated system of urban land use planning and city management.

The first issue dovetails into our second observation: the functionality of a city, not its size, is the metric for measuring its performance. Thus, ensuring an efficient mobility within and without a city is a sine qua non for harnessing its potential for socio-economic development. The intelligent management of the okada challenge must form a building block in ensuring future efficient mobility and economic success. The city authorities need to plan with functional territorial jurisdiction in mind. This calls for cooperation and coordination among metropolitan and regional agencies, especially where there is a mismatch between municipal boundaries and a city’s economic footprint, in order to ensure more effective service deliveries. The okada policy fiat has exposed the urgent need to create governance mechanisms that facilitate the dynamic exchange of knowledge and resources. Such exchanges can generate innovative solutions for urban governance from the local level. The authorities should map the possibilities of such effective collaboration, including in particular the informal local economic processes and activities that impact urban growth. In so doing, local governments will be able to create a forum for interaction among the key stakeholders within and beyond the city.

In conclusion, we concur with other researchers that cities are undoubtedly arenas of creativity, innovation, and learning. Fostering these attributes preserves the integrity of the city in the face of unprecedented urbanization, and city authorities must take a leadership role in promoting this course. Equally important is that corporate business entities are generally not interested in the wellbeing of a city per se. Their core business rests on well-functioning systems within and beyond the city, and they typically have significant expertise in managing the interface between their activities and the city systems on which they depend. Getting them involved in knowledge sharing with urban managers fosters innovation. There is therefore an important lesson to be gleaned from the current okada saga. The promulgation of LI 2180 was an attempt, albeit arising from an empirical vacuum, to assist local authorities tackle traffic
challenges. However, the process was devoid of participatory processes in which local stakeholders set their own priorities while at the same time more effectively engaging higher levels of governments. Hence, frustrated by the failure of policy makers to seek their consent, okada operators and their cohorts have defiantly pledged to protect their turf (i.e. livelihoods) where national-level inaction has typically prevailed. To date, there is a perceptible tension between the enforcement of the LI and the expected results, with many operators ignoring the so-called traffic regulation with impunity.

While there may be reservations about okada, their continuous operation has shown that many are prepared to do just that. Clearly, there has been a behavioral shift, particularly among those who have traditionally been focused on commercial cars. Since the okada ban is based on a fundamental misreading of causality, this paper proposes an evidence-based and cross-sectoral approach involving all the key stakeholders (including the informal operators and their clients). Only such an approach will produce an appropriate and acceptable policy with the aim of improving efficiency, innovation, and accountability, and possibly bring closer a future that does not see congested roads, bad traffic, and unnecessary road fatalities.

Postscript

Since the original submission and revision of this paper in 2014, the impact of the LI has become clearer. We can now say that the law will remain on the shelves as the number of participants and their operational turfs have expanded and extended beyond the precinct of Accra Metropolitan Assembly.

Notes

1 Winston 2000.
4 UN-Habitat 2013.
5 Addo 2002.
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8 Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez 1981.
9 Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 2001, p. 56.
10 UN Economic Commission for Africa 2014.
16 Deng and Nelson 2011.
17 Howe and Dennis 1993; Oluwadiya et al. 2004; UN-Habitat 2010; Abuhamoud et al. 2011
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22 Agyemang 2009; Oteng-Ababio and Agyemang 2012.
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My Name Will Not Be Lost: Cosmopolitan Temporality and Reclaimed History in Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s “The Headstrong Historian”

DAVID MIKAILU and BRENDAN WATTENBERG

Abstract: This essay offers a consideration of cosmopolitan temporality in Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s short story “The Headstrong Historian.” Spanning the late nineteenth century to the 1970s, Adichie presents three generations of cosmopolitans and three distinct iterations of cosmopolitanism. We argue that the cosmopolitan is a person privileged with a poly-visional sensibility and that cosmopolitan temporality is informed by multiple, often overlapping, narratives of family, heritage, and historical time. With emphasis on Grace, the eponymous historian, we examine manifestations of cosmopolitan temporality, from the village, to the mission schools, to postcolonial Lagos. Grace aims to resituate Nigerian history from a Nigerian perspective, influenced by the lives of her grandmother, her parents, and her husband, all of whom experienced Christianization and intercultural contact in radically different ways. She also writes “reports for international organizations about commonplace things.” In both endeavors, Grace reappraises colonial tracts, which once denied the true historicity of her people. As three temporalities collapse into and upon her writing and worldview, we see Grace as a “citizen of the world” and an active participant in reclaiming the history of southern Nigeria.

Citizens of the World

At the end of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s short story “The Headstrong Historian,” a young woman named Grace travels home from boarding school to visit her dying grandmother, Nwamgba. Grace has been reading “The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of Southern Nigeria,” a chapter in her history textbook, penned by an English colonial administrator. Intended to be an authoritative document, Grace instead finds the descriptions amusing and foreign: “It was Grace who would read about these savages, titillated by their curious and meaningless customs, not connecting them to herself.” Decades later, as a historian herself, Grace publishes a book entitled Pacifying with Bullets: A Reclaimed History of Southern Nigeria. Readers familiar with Things Fall Apart will instantly grasp Adichie’s resonant allusion to the final sentence of Chinua Achebe’s iconic novel, in which a District Commissioner, collecting...
material for his report on pacifying the Lower Niger, reflects on the suicide of Okonkwo, whose story merits a chapter, or at least “a reasonable paragraph.”

Spanning nearly one hundred years of Nigerian history, from the late nineteenth century through the age of independence, “The Headstrong Historian” chronicles the temporal sites where memory, language, culture, and education are in contest. As the title of Grace’s book suggests, the action of rewriting history is meant not only to correct the received version promulgated by the colonial apparatus, but also to reclaim Nigerians as the subjects of their own national narrative. Adichie follows the example of Achebe by positioning fictional characters as the torchbearers of social identity. It was Grace who, as a young academic pondering the “stories she was not sure she believed,” would make “a clear link between education and dignity, between the hard obvious things that are printed in books and the soft, subtle things that lodge themselves into the soul.”

Holding in balance the “hard” texts of the archives and “subtle” memories of her grandmother’s world, Grace, and by extension Adichie herself, illuminates the cosmopolitan temporality of historical fiction informed by the convergence of multiple, often contradictory perspectives.

Achebe states that the colonial depiction of Africa and Africans is “a deliberate invention devised to facilitate two gigantic historical events: the Atlantic slave trade and the colonization of Africa by Europe.” As such, it is the headstrong historian, who, having taken stock of these distortions, must confront the responsibility of reclaiming the histories of a people and telling the world “about commonsense things.” The historian does not fully erase the “original text” but interrogates and, finally, overwrites by placing the “new” ahead of the “old.” The historian is a type of cosmopolitan—a person privileged with poly-visional sensibility, a person in whose hands time is translated. Cosmopolitan temporality, therefore, is an active and strategic mode of looking across time in search of new definitions. Adichie was born in 1977 and did not live through the eras described in “The Headstrong Historian.” Yet, like Grace, her collaboration with memory and reclaimed history shows how cosmopolitan temporality can provide a method of reading postcolonial narratives in the millennial era.

This essay does not claim to distill a political position from Adichie’s fiction, nor, in the given space, does it rehearse the immense, and frequently elliptical, literature on cosmopolitanism. This essay is concerned with one African writer’s concept of cosmopolitanism in its utilitarian functions: cosmopolitanism as a means to a literary character’s personal advancement, and cosmopolitan temporality as a device for storytelling. In Grace, Adichie shows a woman who is at first confounded by, in the words of Achebe, a tradition that has “invented an Africa where nothing good happens or ever happened.” To repair such a disconnect, mired by “mischief and prejudice,” Achebe urges authors to “recover what belongs to them—their story—and tell it themselves.” In telling, they reclaim an accurate narrative of their histories.

Cosmopolitan temporality is a worldview, a state of mind. In the years coinciding with the rise of postcolonial studies, cosmopolitanism, a quality classically associated with men and women “at home in the world,” has become a debate, as Vinay Dharkwadker argues, “freighted with politics rather than aesthetics.” Western academics fret over the perceived cosmopolitanism of savvy intellectuals traveling abroad, skimming the surfaces of globalization and returning to the metropolis or the university armed with exotic expertise. Bruce Robbins

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v15/v15i4a3.pdf
has written extensively and from various angles on the subject, claiming that cosmopolitanism can, at times, seem “deeply unattractive” because it delivers no “remedy” for the “great historical injustices of colonialism and neo-colonialism.” Cosmopolitanism is equated with detachment from community and politics. “The cosmopolitan,” he writes, in contrast to Dharkwader, “is held to be incapable of participating in the making of history, doomed to the mere aesthetic spectatorship that he or she is also held secretly to prefer.”

In “The Headstrong Historian,” Adichie presents characters who fall into the ranks of cosmopolitan privilege, particularly Nigerians who study in the United Kingdom and return with worldly opinions, whose pretentions are greeted alternately with uncritical admiration or cold skepticism. But, the “making of history,” insofar “making” is construed as progressive action, also indicates, quite literally, the creation of history: as the cosmopolitan historian, Grace doesn’t influence history so much as write the book.

Cosmopolitanism in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first century is at odds with itself. To attain the enlightened, purportedly liberal knowledge of other cultures and other places, which can be transformed into a commodity in the service of higher education or media, necessarily entails a reckoning with the structures of capitalism. Robbins seeks to break this down. Not singular cosmopolitanism, he argues, but a plurality of cosmopolitanisms, is operative today.

[Cosmopolitans are] weak and underdeveloped as well as strong and privileged. And again, like the nation, cosmopolitanism is there—not merely an abstract ideal, like loving one’s neighbor as oneself, but habits of thought and feeling that have already shaped and been shaped by particular collectivities, that are socially and geographically situated, hence both limited and empowered. ... Like nations, worlds too are ‘imagined.’ For better or worse, there is a growing consensus that cosmopolitanism sometimes works together with nationalism rather than in opposition to it.

Cosmopolitan temporality derives both from “habits of thought” and worlds that are “imagined,” not in the sense of detachment, but in the process of definition: worlds in the making. For Grace, who was born under British rule in Nigeria, and who came of age in the 1950s and ‘60s at the threshold of independence, the very concept of imagining a world was inseparable from fostering a sense of nationalism, or at the very least inhabiting an authentic social identity at the convergence of past and present. If Robbins calls for reading cosmopolitanism in its vagaries and multiplicities, against the false opposition of local and worldly citizens, what is the work that the cosmopolitan performs? For James Clifford, the answer is the “risky work of translation.” Comparing cosmopolitanisms, as so many cross-disciplinary social theorists have attempted to do, requires a cosmopolitan view of history—a view that would activate “disparate histories.” At a distance from “its (European) universalist moorings,” Clifford states, the concept “becomes a traveling signifier, a term always in danger of breaking up into partial equivalencies: exile, immigration, migrancy, diaspora, border crossing, pilgrimage, tourism.” Translation, therefore, is essential to the cosmopolitan worldview. To question, to research, to reimagine former worlds in order to make sense of the current one—these are the self-assigned tasks of headstrong historians who exemplify cosmopolitan temporality.
The impulse to correct a perceived wrong, or to write a missing chapter, is also a quest for
renewed knowledge. One facet of cosmopolitanism, Kwame Anthony Appiah writes, “is what
philosophers call fallibilism, the sense that our knowledge is imperfect, provisional, subject to
revision in the face of new evidence.”13 The experience of revision is central to Grace’s career in
“The Headstrong Historian,” not only in her historical research, but also the revelation of the
void: the gradual process by which Grace beings to rethink her education altogether. Yet, as she
appears only in the last paragraphs of “The Headstrong Historian,” Grace is not even the story’s
lead character. That would be Nwamgba, her grandmother and her muse.

“The Headstrong Historian” is the final story in Adichie’s collection The Thing Around Your
Neck. Preceded by stories of otherwise contemporary settings, “The Headstrong Historian” is a
departure in tone and content. In contrast to “Cell One,” a harrowing account of a middle-class
family’s encounter with arbitrary law enforcement; “Jumping Monkey Hill,” an acerbic vignette
about a group of African writers at a workshop retreat in Cape Town; and several other pieces
on Nigerians in the United States that read like a sketchbook for Adichie’s novel Americanah,
“The Headstrong Historian” evokes the wide canvas of an historical narrative in a masterfully
concise form.

The story opens onto a memory of a memory: “Many years after her husband died,
Nwamgba still closed her eyes from time to time to relive his nightly visits to her hut.”14
Nwamgba’s husband, Obierika, an only child, comes from a family where miscarriages are
common. Against the advice of her mother, Nwamgba insists on marrying Obierika, with
whom she felt an immediate connection when they met as children. In payment for the bride
price, Obierika brings two cousins, Okafo and Okoye. Nwamgba’s several miscarriages trouble
their standing in the community; ultimately, after visiting an oracle, Nwamgba gives birth to a
son, Anikwena. Nwamgba and Obierika’s contented family life is destroyed by the sudden
death of Obierika, who, Nwamgba suspects, was poisoned by his jealous cousins. Sanctioned by
the elders, Okayo and Okoye wrest control of Obierika’s farmland, and the ensuing dispute
with Nwamgba sets the plot of “The Headstrong Historian” into motion.

Nwamgba seeks advice from Ayaju, a trader, on regaining her late husband’s land. A
descendent of slaves, Ayaju faces limited prospects for marriage, but accrues a form of cultural
capital through her interactions with, and observations of, multiple communities, as well as her
subsequent reports upon returning to the village. Ayaju is the character Adichie explicitly
describes as a cosmopolitan:

Ayaju’s long-limbed, quick-moving body spoke of her many trading journeys;
she had traveled even beyond Onicha. It was she who had first brought tales of
the strange customs of the Igala and Edo traders, she who first told of the white-
skinned men who arrived in Onicha with mirrors and fabrics and the biggest
guns the people of those parts had ever seen. This cosmopolitanism earned her
respect, and she was the only person of slave descent who talked loudly at the
Women’s Council, the only person who had answers for everything.15

Ayaju embodies a sense of pragmatic cosmopolitanism. Within the social world of “The
Headstrong Historian,” Adichie stages a reversal: it is Ayaju, a woman of the lower class, whose
knowledge—infomed by travel and exchange—merits a position of relative honor. According
to Ulf Hannerz, cosmopolitanism is a “matter of competence,” implying “a state of readiness, a
personal ability to make one’s way into other cultures through listening, looking, intuiting, and reflecting.” Indeed, as Ayaju persuades Nwamgba to send her son, Anikwena, to a new mission school, where Ayaju’s son is already learning about “foreign ways,” she reminds Nwamgba that “people ruled over others not because they were better people but because they had better guns.”

Unable to resolve the question of land ownership within her local judicial system, Nwamgba learns from Ayaju about the white men who have established a courthouse in Onicha. Two people, in Ayaju’s retelling, brought a land case to the court: “The first man was lying but could speak the white man’s language, while the second man, the rightful owner of the land, could not, and so he lost his case, was beaten and locked up and ordered to give up his land.” Nwamgba comes to consider the court her only recourse. She herself has no interest in learning the white man’s language, which she finds “nasal and disgusting,” but “she was suddenly determined that Anikwena would speak it well enough to go to the white men’s court with Obierika’s cousins and defeat them.” Nwamgba enrolls Anikwena in an Anglican school and takes pride in his mastery of English, particularly when, with the help of a missionary, he is able to file the paperwork stating Nwamgba’s rightful ownership of her land. But Anikwena, who is baptized and renamed Michael, is fully inculcated by the Anglican mission. Seeing in his eyes a new “ponderousness,” Nwamgba realizes that “her son now inhabited a mental space that was foreign to her.”

Achebe’s influence permeates several of Adichie’s novels and stories, none more so than “The Headstrong Historian.” The story is set in the cosmos of the “Okonkwo Generation”—premised in Things Fall Apart as the last generation in Southern Nigeria to live according to ostensibly traditional customs before the incursion of European colonial rule and widespread Christian evangelism. As Daria Tunca notes, Adichie borrows several names from Achebe’s fictional village of Umuofia: Okoye, Okafo, and Obierika. In Achebe’s novel, Okoye is a neighbor of Okonkwo’s father, a “great talker” with the habit of skirting around a subject before “hitting it finally”; Okafo is a victorious wrestler for whom the village composes a praise-song; and Obierika is the closest friend of Okonkwo and messenger from Umuofia during the seven years Okonkwo is exiled to Mbanta. While Adichie’s characters of Okoye and Okafo, Obierika’s malevolent cousins, or Nwamgba’s idealized stature of Obierika himself, don’t hew closely to Achebe’s, the appropriation roots “The Headstrong Historian” in a familiar literary world, claiming affiliation to a specific cultural perspective (Okoye and Okafo are also, as Achebe has noted, common Igbo day-names). By the story’s conclusion, the act of naming becomes, for Grace, a singular act of defiance and self-actualization.

Apart from naming and setting, among the many intertextual dialogues with Things Fall Apart, the theme of education and social alliance in “The Headstrong Historian” is the most pronounced. Nwamgba, on the advice of her cosmopolitan friend Ayaju, pushes Anikwena to learn English for a very specific, utilitarian intention. But English is yoked to the Anglican mission; in this first generation of converts, as Achebe writes, “religion and education went hand in hand.” In Things Fall Apart, Nwoye, Okonkwo’s first son, attends a meeting of
missionaries and finds himself captivated by “the poetry of the new religion, something felt in the
marrow.” Renounced by his father for joining the Christians, Nwoye turns away from his
family; he becomes known as Isaac and he is sent to a teacher training college. Mr. Brown, a
white missionary who is deeply proud of his success with Nwoye, builds a school in Umuofia
and appeals to the community to send their children:

He said that the leaders of the land in the future would be men and women who
had learned to read and write. If Umuofia failed to send her children to the
school, strangers would come from other places to rule them. They could already
see that happening in the Native Court, where the D.C. [District Commissioner]
was surrounded by strangers who spoke his tongue.27

Where Ayaju perceives English as a means to an end—a skill acquired for personal gain and
family protection—the missionaries, for their part, seek the “redemption of black heathens.” Mr. Brown similarly hopes to win hearts and minds.

In both narratives, the converts, Nwoye/Isaac and Anikwena/Michael, experience a
revelation: they hear the good news of the gospel, they see themselves anew, and their futures
become clear. Under the incredulous observation of Nwamgba in “The Headstrong Historian,”
Anikwena grows into a strict and humorless adherent, a cipher dismissive of traditional,
ancestral culture. However, the instinct toward education also represents a form of worldliness;
the search for knowledge, in this case a brand of religious enlightenment spurred by foreigners,
leads to opportunities for travel and the formation of new spiritual and social connections.
Insofar as Grace later judges her father for his complete repudiation of Nwamgba’s cultural
beliefs, it’s imperative to consider the perspective of Michael and his fellow converts who, in the
process of accepting Christian teaching—notwithstanding their profound acculturation—must
have felt themselves at the vanguard of modernity.

“The Headstrong Historian” unfolds largely from the perspective of Nwamgba, allowing
Adichie to picture the transformation of the community by the missionaries at a remove.
Nwamgba refuses Michael’s requests to participate in Christian rituals, of which she is
skeptical; she finds her son’s church marriage “laughably strange.” Crucially, she insists upon
giving her grandchildren traditional names. In contrast, Achebe allows partial access into the
conflicted social emotions generated by the presence of missionaries. After building a church in
the “Evil Forest,” the only land available to the mission, villagers are convinced that no man
would survive the ominous punishments of the gods and ancestors. However, the scheduled
doomsday passes without incident: “At last the day came by which all the missionaries should
have died. But they were still alive,” Achebe writes. “That week they won a handful more
converts.” Realizing the empty threat of their original religion, newly anointed Christians
begin to join the new religion. The mission’s ranks soon become populated by citizens who
were ostracized from the village for various reasons and who chose to build their own
community under the auspices of the church. Yet, in the example of Nwoye, conversion
requires sacrifice. Disowned by Okonkwo, Nwoye decides to attend the Christian mission
school to learn reading and writing. Later, when asked by Obierika about Okonkwo, Nwoye
responds: “I don’t know. He is not my father.” Nwoye would return to his mother and siblings
to convert them, but, unlike Nwamgba’s strained but intact relationship with Michael in “The
Headstrong Historian,” Nwoye’s severance from his father is permanent.
Amanda Anderson argues that the reconfigurations of contemporary cosmopolitanism spring from a broad, humanist sensibility: “Cosmopolitanism is a flexible term, whose forms of detachment and multiple affiliation can be variously articulated and variously motivated. In general, cosmopolitanism endorses reflective distance from one’s cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity.” Adichie’s fiction, and her intertextual dialogue with Achebe, suggests a qualified view on this idea. In Americanah, for instance, the primary character Ifemelu, a Nigerian expatriate and successful “race blogger,” visits a New Jersey salon staffed by a coterie of pan-African immigrant women. There, she meets Kelsey, a young white woman who wants to have her hair braided. Kelsey will soon be traveling to Africa and she’s reading books to get ready. “Everybody recommended Things Fall Apart,” she tells Ifemelu, “which I read in high school. It’s very good but sort of quaint, right? I mean like it didn’t help me understand modern Africa.” Ifemelu says nothing in response. In this droll and pedantic reference, which is meant to imply, by the same logic, that one couldn’t possibly learn much about modern England by reading Shakespeare, or France by reading Proust, Adichie leaves open for inquiry the question of how Achebe’s world relates to our own.

Kelsey might consider her foreign adventures and seeming curiosity to be cosmopolitan, but Ifemelu sees only the naïve nationalism of liberal Americans whose leisure travels to Africa are for the most part self-aggrandizing. Indeed, for Hannerz, “tourists are not participants,” and therefore shouldn’t be mistaken for cosmopolitans, as they don’t seek to engage in cultural relationships. Despite the dismissive judgment Ifemelu—and Adichie—levels on Kelsey, the extent to which each character sees herself as more authentically “at home in the world” is ambiguous. Moreover, the women who work at the salon, a claustrophobic, decidedly gendered place, are variously from Senegal and Mali. They, too, by Hannerz’s standard, are not cosmopolitans; they are exiles. Their concerns, apart from struggling to make a living in the United States, are largely centered on their previous lives in Africa or the lives being lived at home in their absence. For ordinary labor migrants, Hannerz argues, “going away may be, ideally, home plus a higher income; often the involvement with another culture is not a fringe benefit but a necessary cost, to be kept as low as possible.” This scene from Americanah demonstrates Adichie’s deployment of literary and cultural debates into a series of quotidian events. In another, more nimble mode, the highly fraught gradations of affiliation, detachment, and faith in “The Headstrong Historian”—in particular the transformations of Michael and Grace—resonate with Things Fall Apart, disproving Kelsey’s opinion that nothing can be learned from older narratives about modern Africa.

My Name Will Not Be Lost

In the final paragraphs of “The Headstrong Historian,” Adichie introduces an insistent rhythm: nearly every sentence beings with “It was Grace,” as a way to cover several decades in the life of Nwamgba’s granddaughter. Little over two pages in length, this sequence alone is a finely etched character study set against a backdrop with the reach of a novel. It was Grace who, through a precocious resistance to mission teachers, university professors, and George Chikadibia, her Cambridge-educated husband, becomes the enlightened, pragmatic historian. It was Grace who questions the “sanctimonies, the dour certainties” of her father and of men such
as the “eminent” scholar Mr. Gboyega, a “chocolate-skinned Nigerian” and expert on the British Empire, who, in 1950, resigns from teaching at the University College in Ibadan when West African history is added to the curriculum, “because he was appalled that African history would even be considered a subject.” Ringing out with calm assurance, this invocation enfolds Grace into the ambivalent, often turbulent, years on either side of Nigerian independence. Here, the past is reactivated and reviewed for its absurdities and tragedies, for its potential lessons, and for its regenerative possibilities.

The complex layering of historical and personal time, together with the rhetorical ascension of the closing lines, evinces what Homi Bhabha refers to as “a time of gathering.” For Bhabha, such time is defined by “gathering the memories of underdevelopment, of other words lived retroactively; gathering the past in a ritual of revival; gathering the present.” The action of “gathering the present” is the work of cosmopolitan temporality, and the vocation of Grace, who writes both a revised history of Nigeria, as well as “reports for international organizations about commonplace things.” Grace, the Janus-faced historian, looks forward by looking backward. To arrive at the amalgam of the present, however, it’s necessary to review the signs—the discourses, the other worlds—enlivened by the unexpected tonal shift in Adichie’s otherwise contemplative, highly descriptive narrative. In these lists, brought forth in a reportorial but suspenseful style, time is restless and briefly unhinged.

At Grace’s birth, convinced that she is the spirit of Obierika returned, Nwamgba renames her granddaughter Afamefuna, meaning “My Name Will Not Be Lost.” Nwamgba takes great pleasure in Grace’s interest in learning poetry and stories, but is concerned that school will diminish her “fighting spirit.” With Grace’s departure, Nwamgba soon feels as if “a lamp had been blown out,” and before dying, “before she joined the ancestors,” she desires only to see Grace once more. Nwamgba’s story comes to an end when Grace, as a teenager, leaves for boarding school. The concurrence of Grace’s return to visit Nwamgba on her deathbed, and the reference to “The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of Southern Nigeria” in her schoolbag, eases the narrative into the conditional tense:

It was Grace who would read about these savages, titillated by their curious and meaningless customs, not connecting them to herself until her teacher, Sister Maureen, told her she could not refer to the call-and-response her grandmother had taught her as poetry because primitive tribes did not have poetry. It was Grace who would laugh loudly until Sister Maureen took her to detention and then summoned her father, who slapped Grace in front of the teachers to show them how well he disciplined his children.

But Sister Maureen’s remedial instruction has the opposite effect on Grace, whose early distrust of imposed history shows a nascent impulse to believe in her own cultural integrity. Remembering the oddities of her early education, the mischaracterization of Nigerians, the incomprehensible textbook terms such as “wallpaper” and “dandelions,” Grace draws critical insight from reflecting, with a measure of distance and detachment, on the world in which she was raised.

In a similar way, the distortions of pre-independence university life in Nigeria, where African history is seen as an irrelevant subject, instill in Grace a determination to define who she is on her own terms. “It was Grace who would begin to rethink her own schooling—how
lustily she had sung, on Empire Day, ‘God bless our Gracious King. Send him victorious, happy and glorious. Long to reign over us.’”\(^{42}\) To recall the unquestioned repetition of this hymn, a memory subjected to scrutiny in adulthood, is not simply to reconsider an anodyne, youthful habit with the shame or insight provided by age. The song speaks of a political superstructure. Searching her past, Grace finds that the lustily sung songs, the odes to Empire, sound dissonant. The revelation is striking: what was learned by heart has to be unlearned by the mind; what was taken for granted has to be taken apart. It is only within these reemerging memories, which also represent the collision of colonial and Nigerian frames of reference, that a new history can be imagined.

For a woman who is naturally curious, who spends her life among books and academics, Grace is pragmatic: her righteousness finds a voice in history texts and clearheaded policy recommendations. Throughout her career, Grace’s connection to Nwamgba, who represents a rooted, perhaps idealized vision of the past, is an enduring and inspiring presence. Driving back from a visit to her aging father, “Grace would be haunted by the image of a destroyed village and would go to London and to Paris and to Onicha, sifting through moldy files in archives, reimagining the lives and smells of her grandmother’s world, for the book she would write called Pacifying with Bullets: A Reclaimed History of Southern Nigeria.”\(^ {43}\)

With her strident title, Grace takes possession of Nigerian history, and reinstates Nwamgba, who would otherwise have been dismissed, together with her call-and-response poetry, as “primitive.” The words “rethink,” “reimagine,” and “realize” connote a cosmopolitan engagement with time. Even as Pacifying with Bullets implies violence, with the momentum of Adichie’s sentences and within the context of reconfiguring social identity—including on behalf of such figures as Nwamgba, who were left behind—the reclaimed history is also a triumphant corrective.

To utilize a term from Homi Bhabha, Grace is a “vernacular cosmopolitan,” one who “makes a tryst with cultural translation as an act of survival,” and whose specific and local histories, often threatened and repressed, are inserted “between the lines of dominant cultural practices.”\(^ {44}\) Daria Tunca perceptively notes that the indefinite article in A Reclaimed History “suggests that her vision is only one among others”—and Grace’s humble, but assertive, work leads the way for these other texts to be written.\(^ {45}\) Whether or not Pacifying with Bullets would offer to all readers a coherent vision of national culture, the text is nonetheless informed by cosmopolitan temporality, by and between the multiple archives of Europe and Nigeria, by remembered and reimagined stories, by the Janus-faced worldview of a determined historian working in a moment of emergent nationalism.

In his discussion of comparative cosmopolitanisms, Robbins argues that instead of defining cosmopolitanism through its falsely universalist aspirations, “one can embrace it as an impulse to knowledge that is shared with others, a striving to transcend partiality that is itself partial, but no more so than the similar cognitive strivings of many diverse peoples.”\(^ {46}\) Grace has that “impulse to knowledge” and the tenacity to educate others. She speaks to “solemn-faced people at conferences about the Ijaw and Ibibio and Igbo and Efik peoples of Southern Nigeria,” imagining Nwamgba “looking on and chuckling with great amusement”—amusement because Grace is not offering abstract political solutions, but drawing upon what Nwamgba would consider obvious knowledge. Grace, who grows old in Lagos, is not so much an elite citizen of
the world as a cosmopolitan intermediary. Nonetheless, Adichie describes Grace’s research into Nigerian history, and her subsequent position in society, as worldly. The privileged status conferred upon Grace, as a prize-winning academic, is a consequence not wholly of her travels, but her culturally introspective work: her writing.

Tunca, Heather Hewitt, and Eve Eisenberg, among others, have each closely analyzed the intertextual relations, and shared literary heritage, between Adichie and Achebe. Adichie’s fictional and nonfictional meditations on Achebe, as much as they honor the elder writer and the worlds he imagined, also represent the fallibilism Appiah describes—the sense that knowledge is imperfect. In her discussion on Grace’s rewriting of history, Eisenberg considers “The Headstrong Historian” to be

a kind of literary thought experiment, a venue within which to consider the roles and effects of reading, writing, and recuperative rewriting; to think not only about Afemefuna/Grace’s project of remembering, but also about Achebe’s project in Things Fall Apart; and also, self-reflexively, to consider Adichie’s own place as a writer who takes up a pen in a literary world profoundly imprinted by Achebe—his oeuvre and his extra-fictional statements about why he wrote his most famous work.47

The effect of working across historical distance—and the open-minded insight gained from redefining the past and reinvigoring the present—is distinctly the work of cosmopolitan temporality: this is the work of Grace, the fictional historian, and also of Adichie herself, who looks backward to look ahead. But the territory cleared and defined by Achebe for the modern African novel is not immune from criticism. Achebe wrote Things Fall Apart to confront both the literary stereotypes of Africans in Heart of Darkness and Mister Johnson as well as, in Tunca’s view, the “historiographical blanks” of Africa in world literature. Tunca identifies Adichie’s preoccupation with Achebe as a form of appropriation, but one with a gendered angle. In positioning “The Headstrong Historian” from Nwamgba’s, and later Grace’s, perspective, “Adichie erases some of the blind spots of Achebe’s narrative, empowering women in the process.”48

A multi-generational story, “The Headstrong Historian” elaborates upon the idea of one’s home, and homeland, in personal, cultural, and historical modes. Home is the place from which one leaves to gain knowledge, and the place to which one returns—physically and in memory—with changed and challenged perspectives. By looking homeward, that is, backward into her grandmother’s time, toward a place of perceived certainty, Grace is able to distance herself from her parents, whose stultifying appeasement of colonial missionaries would seek to efface the rich traditions and systems of value held firmly in belief by Nwamgba. Although Grace doesn’t separate herself entirely from Michael, in the way Nwoye must sever ties with Okonkwo in Things Fall Apart, Adichie offers no recuperative vision between father and daughter, other than a kiss goodbye when in old age his health fails.

The lineage, the mythological homeland, to which Grace seeks connection is Nwamgba’s, hence her desire to “reimagine” the “lives and smells” of that world. Hewitt considers Adichie, as a black woman writer, part of a broader transnational literary tradition, which “enables us to see the intricacy of its intertextual connections.” In Hewitt’s view, complementing Tunca’s sense that Adichie seeks to redress historiographical blanks, the act of writing allows the author “to
transcend the boundaries of others’ making, to create connections where none existed before.”

Intertextuality, in Adichie’s fiction, is not a pattern of reference for its own, purely aesthetic performance, but an active process of reconnection—of reclaiming a home and a heritage. At her grandmother’s home, Grace is at home in the world.

In the later years of her life, Grace, feeling “an old rootlessness,” goes to the courthouse in Lagos and changes her name to Afamefuna—“My Name Will Not Be Lost.” With this decisive act of personal reclamation, Grace seeks to resolve the tension of living in and through epochs of change and distortion, settling affirmatively on a name from the past, and bringing that very name into the future. But, this future is an intellectual one: Grace hasn’t had any children; instead, her books, her “reports for international organizations” are her procreation. Inspired by her grandmother’s poetry, but troubled by the lacunae in Nigeria history, she has found success in the academy. Still, as “Grace,” she is unsettled. In this, the final action of “The Headstrong Historian,” Eisenberg sees a contemplative melancholy:

None of the headstrong historian’s writing can bring back what has been lost in the colonial encounter—the ‘roots’ that have been severed. Remembering history may be a worthy enterprise, but it cannot restore lost lives, lost generations—it cannot ‘re-member’ the body, cannot put the strong ‘head’ back together with lost ‘roots.’ There are limits, in this story, to what corrective rewriting can be expected to do; and, because the story is itself a metonym of Things Fall Apart, there is also an implicit critique of Achebe’s canonical novel and its political efficacy—or, more precisely, a critique of the metanarrative that has sprung up around that novel and Achebe himself, the metanarrative of the literary text as the restorer of lost worlds.

But how can the “political efficacy” of a literary text possibly be measured? To judge by Adichie’s international celebrity, by the embrace and promotion of her fiction at the highest levels of the publishing establishment, it’s possible to see, in “The Headstrong Historian,” a world restored. Or if not one world, Adichie offers a text for making worlds anew. Such a text is the product of a cosmopolitan worldview, a consciousness that is drawn to the archives, reaches across generations, and, critically, transforms memories of one time into the literature of another.

Heralded by the incantatory rhythm of the penultimate paragraph, “The Headstrong Historian,” having traversed virtually the whole of Grace’s life, returns to Nwambga. On that day, when Grace visits from school, she “was not contemplating her future. She simply held her grandmother’s hand, the palm thickened from years of making pottery.” In this disarming conclusion, Adichie proposes a vision of Grace and Nwambga as old women at the same time. Connected by the threads of memory, and following the long recital of Grace’s awakening, it’s impossible not to imagine this sentence delivering two dimensions of time simultaneously: first, the physical action of Grace’s visit as a teenager; and second, in her older years, Grace’s indelible image of Nwambga and herself. Such an image doesn’t recede into history; it is the material of history. Cosmopolitan temporality inhabits that space between lived realities and remembered visions, between the impulses of contemporary life and the guidance of the ancestors. “The Headstrong Historian,” therefore, illustrates how, at the confluence of multiple
generations in a country where contested versions of the national story are told and retold, a name is not lost, and a new but somehow recognizable voice can be heard.

Notes

1 Adichie 2009, p. 217.
3 Adichie 2009, p. 216.
4 Achebe 2009, p. 78.
5 Adichie 2009, p. 218.
6 Achebe 2009, p. 89.
7 Ibid., pp. 61, 66.
8 Dharwadker 2001, p. 2.
11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 Clifford 1998, p. 34.
13 Appiah 2006.
14 Adichie 2009, p. 198.
15 Ibid., p. 201.
16 Hannerz 1990, p. 239.
17 Adichie, 2009, pp. 204-05.
18 Ibid., p. 206.
19 Ibid., p. 207.
20 Ibid., p. 211.
21 Ibid., p. 212.
22 Tunca 2012.
26 Ibid., p. 147.
27 Ibid., p. 181.
29 Ibid., p. 212.
31 Achebe 1995, pp. 144, 152.
33 Adichie 2013, p. 233.
36 Adichie 2009, p. 216.
37 Bhabha 1994, p. 199.
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[Pagination in footnotes here refers to the reproduction of this essay at https://www.academia.edu/2109288/Appropriating_Achebe_Chimamanda_Ngozi_Adichies_Purple_Hibiscus_and_The_Headstrong_Historian_; accessed 18 September 2015]
To Cut and Run: Donor Approaches to Male Circumcision in
Southern Africa

KRISTA JOHNSON

Abstract: Male circumcision is being heralded in the scientific and policy communities as a highly effective intervention that could significantly reduce the number of people being infected with HIV in a number of high prevalence countries in southern Africa. However, the scale-up of male circumcision in most southern African countries has been slow. This article discusses the rollout of medical male circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy in southern Africa, and it highlights the limitations of Western-inspired approaches to HIV prevention. Through a brief history of male circumcision in southern Africa and an analysis of donor-recipient relations, it looks at the cultural and institutional features that have created resistance to the message and inhibited effective implementation.

Introduction

The last ten years have seen growing interest in and advocacy for male circumcision in Africa as a means of HIV prevention. Recent attention to male circumcision has been spurred initially by public health specialists and picked up by international organizations and Western donors including, and most notably, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNAIDS.1 Buttressed by findings from a series of scientific clinical trials that showed circumcision could reduce the risk of HIV transmission from a female to a male by as much as 60 percent, WHO and UNAIDS in 2007 recommended that fourteen priority countries in Africa rapidly implement a scale-up of male circumcisions so as to reach a circumcision rate of 80 percent, circumcising 20.3 million African men, by 2015.2 Likened to mass vaccination campaigns, the scale of the medical intervention to circumcise African males is unprecedented. Since 2007, donors have poured more than $130 million into circumcision campaigns in the fourteen African nations. Perceived as a highly cost-effective, “one-time” biomedical intervention with lasting protective benefits, male circumcision has become a priority HIV prevention strategy for donors working in southern Africa.3

The rollout of medical male circumcision programs in most southern African countries had a very slow start, however, and faced many challenges. According to the latest data from WHO and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), published in July 2014, only about six million medical male circumcisions had been performed in the priority countries, representing less than 30 percent of the targeted goal.4 Although the rollout has significantly increased its outputs since 2011, donors and their partners agree that the target of 80 percent coverage by 2015 is out of reach for most countries.5 Despite the findings of acceptability

Krista Johnson is Associate Professor, Department of African Studies, Howard University. Her current research focuses on AIDS governance and donor funding for HIV and AIDS. In 2012, she completed a Fulbright Fellowship based at the Centre for the Study of HIV and AIDS, University of Botswana.

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studies that were conducted in many southern African countries, and African governments’
support for including male circumcision as part of their HIV prevention strategy, donors have
confronted challenges creating demand for circumcision among African males, and have often
been frustrated by the pace of implementation on the part of African governments.

This article discusses the rollout of medical male circumcision as an HIV prevention
strategy in southern Africa, and highlights the limitations of Western-inspired approaches to
HIV prevention. The article is based on seven months of field work in Botswana and South
Africa in 2012 that included interviews with key informants within PEPFAR, the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control (CDC), implementing NGOs and local NGOs, the National AIDS Councils
and the Ministries of Health, as well as analysis of primary documents and participant
observation of health clinics, temporary circumcision sites, health meetings and conferences.
The interviews and field observations revealed competing approaches and priorities between
donors and recipient governments, and contested cultural frames within southern African
communities and between donors and recipient governments that significantly impacted one’s
receptivity to male circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy. Through a brief history of male
circumcision in southern Africa and an analysis of donor-recipient relations, this article looks at
the cultural and institutional features that have created resistance to the message and inhibited
effective implementation. I argue that the slow take-up of male circumcision cannot be
attributed solely to the nature of local populations. Western cultural and normative
assumptions about “good practice,” “efficacy,” and “scientific knowledge” all require critical
examination.

As the global community increasingly relies on biomedical interventions to combat
infectious diseases, from AIDS to ebola, there is a danger of minimizing the impact of vaccines
and therapeutics if we fail to comprehend the social context. Social scientific research can be
very relevant and instructive to global and Western medical campaigns by providing insight on
the geographic and social pathways of disease transmission, and local attitudes towards clinical
trials and biomedical interventions. The recent ebola outbreak in West Africa unequivocally
highlighted the need for the global public health response to understand stigma around disease
in West Africa, food insecurity, and labor shortages across the region, how cash circulates in
local economies, and local drug and medication networks, to name a few issues on which social
scientists have already amassed a wealth of knowledge.

Program evaluations of male circumcision campaigns, conducted and funded by donors,
tend to focus on resource and capacity constraints, service quality, demand creation, and
program efficiencies as factors that need to be addressed in order to accelerate scale-up. While
technically accurate in their analysis, what is missing from these evaluations is any
introspection on how the normative presumptions underlying medical circumcision roll out, as
well as the donor-recipient dynamic are impacting the scale up. Medical male circumcision is
perceived by many Africans as a donor-driven agenda and a projection of Western power in
southern African countries, in large part because it is being pushed within a cultural frame that
privileges Western biomedical knowledge and expertise over indigenous knowledge. To
Western donors and observers, it is a humanitarian effort, a component of development
assistance aimed at aiding African countries in the fight against HIV. Yet, as scholars such as
Paul Farmer and Mahmood Mamdani have warned, humanitarian efforts in Africa have a
checkered past, are easily ensnared in local and global power dynamics, and have a complex and even contentious relationship with citizen rights. In this article, I draw on historical lessons to explore the limitations of humanitarian, Western models of global health, and the pitfalls of donor-recipient relations.

Global Health and Empire: Full of “Good Intentions”

This section emphasizes the relevance of history for the contemporary practice of global health, and lessons learned for modern humanitarian health. Indeed, while global health is touted as a “hot new field,” many of the problems and debates within global health are not new, nor are efforts to affect the health of populations far from home. The Spanish Royal Philanthropic Expedition (The Balmis Expedition) to bring smallpox vaccination to the New World and Asia in the first decade of the 1800s offers an early moment in international health in which to examine the intersection of global health and empire. The first large scale mass vaccination of its kind, the historic legacy of the pioneering Balmis expedition in international health will be briefly revisited in order to highlight some important continuities as well as ruptures with contemporary global health. Male circumcision, like vaccinations, is a once off procedure. The mass scale up of male circumcision in southern Africa has largely been viewed as akin to a vaccination campaign — visionary at the time, humanitarian in its origins, and full of good intentions, like the Balmis expedition.

Smallpox infection entered the New World in the sixteenth century from the Iberian Peninsula and ravaged the indigenous population for several centuries after the Spanish conquest. Many efforts to halt the impact of the smallpox virus were made throughout the world over several centuries. But it was not until 1797 that Edward Jenner discovered that material taken from a human pustular lesion caused by cowpox virus and inoculated onto the skin of another person produced a similar infection. He then demonstrated that an inoculated individual was protected from infection with the smallpox virus. Within a decade of his discovery “vaccination,” the word Jenner invented for this procedure, was at the forefront of the medical and political world.

Responding to a large outbreak of smallpox in the Spanish colonies, King Carlos IV of Spain signed a royal edict in 1802 for a humanitarian expedition, led by physician Francisco Xavier De Balmis and Jose Salvany, to vaccinate all Spanish subjects throughout the world. In addition to providing free vaccinations De Balmis was charged with training local physicians to be able to carry on vaccination campaign, and setting up local boards that would document immunizations and keep registries. In order to preserve the vaccine during the journey, twenty-two orphaned children were brought along. Certainly unlikely to meet ethical, hygienic, and professional standards today, the passing of vesicle fluid from the ulcerated skin of one child to another child proved an effective way of carrying the vaccine at a time when refrigeration, sterile containment, and asepsis were non-existent.

While King Carlos IV was known as a humanitarian and compassionate king, economic and political motivation were surely involved in his decision to embark on such an ambitious expedition. Paul Farmer and others have correctly pointed out that historically, and especially during imperial colonial times, international health was most often advanced through, and
because of, commercial and economic interests. The expedition set off in 1803, and first stopped in the Canary Islands. However, to De Balmis’s surprise the vaccine was already being introduced in the Canary Islands by a rival imperial power, the Danes. The expedition then sailed to Puerto Rico where De Balmis suffered another disappointment. Again, to his surprise the smallpox vaccination was already being instituted on the island. But this time, it had been introduced by local physicians with the support of the government. This infuriated De Balmis, who then argued that his was the only “true vaccine,” and began to revaccinate the locals. In his “scientific reasoning” De Balmis believed that Dr. Francisco Oller and his local colleagues would have made many errors while disseminating the smallpox vaccination.

The territory covered by the expedition in the Americas and Asia was vast, and included the contemporary countries of Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, Cuba, the Philippines, and China. Over the course of almost four years, hundreds of thousands of people were vaccinated, local vaccine brigades were established, and local doctors and healers were trained. In some places, members of the expedition were welcomed and warmly received by the local population. In others, they encountered political rivalry, financial interests, cultural beliefs, and outright resistance that thwarted vaccination efforts. Resistance to the introduction of the vaccine remained in some areas, with patients having to be physically restrained in some instances in order for they or their children to receive the vaccine. The accounts of resistance often reflect more than simply a cultural or religious clash, but an acute awareness of power asymmetries, problems of agency and understanding in these loaded relationships. Looking back, however, the expedition is viewed as a relative success, and it contributed to the growth of the population in the Americas by the late 1800s. The practice of smallpox vaccination in most places, however, was intermittently continued, and smallpox continued to ravage the globe for another 150 years.

What is instructive about this early example of a humanitarian undertaking driven by the spirit of enlightenment and a faith in science is that science and good intentions alone do not guarantee a successful campaign. International health, or global health, has always been a politically charged undertaking requiring complex negotiation with potential beneficiaries and competing benefactors. If this was true during imperial colonial times where public health campaigns were imposed on subjects, it is surely even more so the case today where no formal colonial relationship exists and human rights, in principle at least, are universal. Indeed, the Balmis expedition highlights the inherently unequal contractual exchange between benefactor and beneficiaries. Learning from historical experience, contemporary donor programs must work to make them more equal, through training of local doctors and healers, for example, greater consideration of who sits on the national and international AIDS councils, the democratization of the scientific domain through more deliberative and inclusionary processes, and the like. Political negotiation and consultation with local heads of government is important but not necessarily sufficient. More attention must be paid to bring on board communities by wooing church leaders and community elders. Finally, contemporary global health requires a new participatory framework that promotes dialogue and cooperation between donors and recipients, and facilitates self-sufficiency and development for the beneficiaries.
Why Male Circumcision is Not Like a Vaccination Campaign: A Brief Social History

All over the world, male circumcision has rarely been simply a technical, value-neutral act. On the contrary, even when performed in medical settings, male circumcision is a practice that carries a host of social meanings. In a number of African and Oceanic societies, circumcision relates to manhood and what it means to be a man, and is performed as part of a rite of passage into adulthood. In Jewish and Muslim societies, but less so in Christian societies, male circumcision carries religious connotations. More recently, male circumcision has entered the field of public health and has been promoted as an aid for a range of medical and social conditions.

Crucially, however, male circumcision is almost always a political act, enacted upon others by those with power. Indeed it is often performed in the broader interests of a public good, but with profound consequences for individuals and society. Thus, while the current discussions of male circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy approach often dismisses the procedure as rather trivial or inconsequential—like a routine vaccination—a brief historical account of male circumcision in southern Africa will show otherwise.

The vast majority of circumcised men in Africa have not been medically circumcised. In communities and regions where circumcision is prevalent, it is most often done in a traditional context and as part of an initiation process into adulthood. In communities where male circumcision is low, non-circumcision often had historical roots in the rejection of traditional male circumcision practices common elsewhere in the sub-region.

At one time, most of the indigenous groups in southern Africa practiced circumcision, including all Nguni speakers and Sotho speakers. Even a small number of San groups adopted male circumcision as a result of contact with Tswana communities. The prevalence of circumcision among these groups varied in time and place, and the practice was started and stopped at various times among the indigenous populations, and as a result of a number of influences, including colonialism and Christianity.

For instance, the history of male circumcision in Botswana is documented as far back as 1874, and was practiced on young, primarily Bakgatla, boys as part of an initiation school, or bogwera, that prepared the initiates for manhood. By the early 1900s, the practice was largely abandoned by Tswana groups in part as a result of the influence of Western missionaries, in particular the Dutch Reformed Church, who discouraged the practice. The government of Botswana’s first independent president, Seretse Khama, which sought to coopt as well as curtail the power of the chiefs, further weakened the practice. In large part as a direct “tribal” challenge to his political rival Seretse Khama and the sovereign identity of the new Botswana state, Kgosi Lincwe II reintroduced circumcision among the Bakgatla around Mochudi in 1975. Ironically, the circumcisions were done at the Deborah Retief Hospital run by the very same Dutch Reformed Church that had pushed to abolish the practice.

Male circumcision is a practice steeped in social meaning. Societal socio-economic changes and specific impacts of Christianity and western education have brought about changes in the logistics of male circumcision and initiation as well as the education it confers on boys. However, the fundamental idea of marking the transition to manhood, and the link to one’s ancestors, has remained stable.
There is a substantial body of social science literature on male circumcision, particularly in the context of initiation practices, dating back to before the colonial era and peaking in the 1930s with the birth of African Studies and the evolution of the nascent discipline of anthropology. The early nineteenth century accounts by visitors and travelers were often sympathetic, but with the introduction of Christianity and colonialism, missionary and colonial writing on male circumcision and initiation tended to be more critical. Later work by anthropologists tended to view male circumcision and initiation as markers of primitive societies, and were concerned with documenting their transformation in the face of Western and capitalist influences. Deacon and Thomson recently compiled a comprehensive literature review of male circumcision and initiation covering broad topics including the duration, timing and age of boys during circumcision practices; the educational role of initiation practices; the historical relationship of circumcision to biomedicine; the importance of the instrument used for circumcision, complications and post-operative care, and the ethics of documenting such a private and often secretive practice as well as the politics of who gets to tell the story and who’s story is actually being told.

Historically, chiefs controlled initiation ceremonies and circumcision, although this varied by group and was increasingly less the case with the introduction of colonization. For example, in Botswana and parts of the Limpopo region of South Africa, centralized control of male circumcision and initiation remained important, whereas in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa, the practice was decentralized. Among the Zulu and the Swazi, it has been widely reported that circumcision was abolished by Shaka and Mswazi because it interfered with military training and rendered the boys vulnerable for an extended period of time. With the introduction of colonialism and capitalism, control over circumcision and initiations tended to shift away from chiefs to familial patriarchs and village elders. Formerly a means of mobilizing labor for chiefs, circumcision and initiation practices evolved to serve the labor needs of the family before young males would establish their own family.

A mechanism of social authority for the maintenance of social order, hierarchy and control, indigenous circumcision goes beyond the physical act, and is expected to prompt proper and responsible behavior in adult males who have now shed their childish ways. Recent scholarship, however, highlights shifts in the cultural and social meaning of circumcision among the Xhosa group in South Africa in particular, arguing there has been an erosion of the role of circumcision schools in the sexual socialization of young men, where circumcision is now associated with a right to access unlimited sex. Thus, in the contemporary context, and in southern African societies so deeply penetrated by colonialism, apartheid, and industrialization, the role of circumcision rites is clearly shifting.

In the context of the modern nation-state, indigenous circumcision practices can conflict with a liberal democratic constitutional order. As Louise Vincent demonstrates with the case of South Africa, state’s efforts to regulate such circumcision traditions are highly intertwined with broader projects to institutionalize a culture of rights, elevate the state as the sole actor tasked with ensuring social order and control, and disseminate norms of appropriateness and acceptability consistent with accepted liberal democratic values. Such regulation has not gone unchallenged, and is often viewed as being the result of foreign influences and Western values. Indeed, although ironic, it may not be surprising that southern African governments have
Donor Approaches to Male Circumcision in Southern Africa

generally shown a willingness to buy into Western donor mass medical circumcision campaigns. Medicalization of circumcision would lead to greater state regulation and control, and it has the potential to undermine other forms of social authority, including that of traditional leaders.\(^{35}\)

Recently a prominent group of South African scientists wrote an op-ed in the *South African Medical Journal* calling for the abolition of unsterile male circumcision in light of a number of initiate deaths, pitting rights against culture and tradition against modernity.\(^{36}\) Interestingly, however, a recent study has also shown that among South African communities that practice indigenous circumcision, there is low acceptability of medical circumcision, with participants stating it is against their religion or culture.\(^{37}\) Cultural complexities around circumcision abound. In 2009, King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu revived the practice of male circumcision among Zulu males as a cultural practice and to help stem the tide of HIV in KwaZulu-Natal Province.\(^{38}\) While the decision has surely contributed to greater success of the medical male circumcision campaign in KwaZulu-Natal, it has also raised a number of thorny issues over the role of the state versus communities or families in regulating the rights of children and the role of tradition in sexual education and behavior change.\(^{39}\)

In sum, male circumcision in southern Africa is fraught with a great deal of cultural and historical baggage, and it engenders a host of cultural complexities that both support and discourage its acceptance. Clearly, as a number of social scientists have argued, more research is needed on the role that gender, power, male sexual behaviors and practices, and the construction of masculinity and sexuality in African contexts will play in the outcomes of such a large scale strategy.\(^{40}\)

**Clinical Trials**

Clinical trials conducted in South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda have shown that medical male circumcision reduces the risk of HIV infection for males from a female partner by as much as 60 percent.\(^{41}\) These findings prompted WHO and UNAIDS to issue a global recommendation for male circumcision to be added as an HIV prevention strategy, especially in high prevalence countries. The trials were preceded and prompted by several observational studies suggesting a correlation between male circumcision (most often performed in a non-medical setting) and the risk of contracting HIV in several parts of Africa.\(^{42}\) Yet, the process of knowledge making around the correlation between male circumcision and HIV prevention has proceeded along typical Western scientific lines, with the randomized, controlled clinical trial as the hallmark of biomedical research, with generalizable and replicable findings, and a process that clearly distinguishes the “experts” (knowledge producers) from lay people/research subjects (knowledge consumers). Limited research on non-medical male circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy has been conducted.\(^{43}\) Furthermore, while WHO, UNAIDS, and major donors acknowledge the need to “educate” and include traditional leaders and circumcisers, the focus has tended to be on transferring knowledge on basic biomedical procedures to the community leadership, a unidirectional flow of knowledge.

AIDS clinical trials in the United States in the late 1980s and 1990s were distinctive because of the militancy of many of the patients and their ability to forge a social movement whose members demanded to evaluate knowledge claims, disseminate information, and insert lay...
people into the process of knowledge construction, thereby leveling the conventional hierarchy of power and knowledge in science and medicine. Yet, as AIDS trials flourished in developing countries, have we seen a similar leveling of the hierarchy between research experts and lay subjects? Of the just over 600,000 subjects in HIV prevention trials, over 500,000 are in Africa. What role do these subjects have in informing the construction of new scientific knowledge? Does knowledge about HIV ever flow bi-directionally or from the zones of neglect in the so-called Third World back to the citadels of science in rich Western countries?

Bastos’s study of global responses to AIDS reveals no “global unleashing” of the knowledge-making process. In fact, she concludes, “knowledge flowed throughout the world, but through limited channels and rarely in a multidirectional manner. Persuasion and hegemony, rather than a truly interactive dialogue, characterize the development and transmission of knowledge.” South Africa may appear as an exception given its large numbers of prominent medical scientists with strong connections to Western medical and academic institutions, and its capacity to conduct cutting edge research in a number of it’s own institutions. There may also be a greater degree of local accountability in some countries than Bastos suggests, particularly in countries where the government has insisted on playing a regulatory role. But the dichotomy between knowledge producers (medical experts, often Western trained) and knowledge consumers (the majority of southern African citizens) remains. As a result, often critical local information and context can get overlooked, precluding local buy-in and inhibiting policy and program implementation.

The scientific community’s willingness to take up male circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy was slow in coming. Halperin and Bailey attribute this early cautious skepticism in part to the international public-health community’s reluctance to tackle a social practice and behavior so deeply embedded in complex webs of cultural values and religious beliefs. However, by the early 2000s the climate had changed. The donor community was becoming weary with behavior change strategies towards AIDS prevention, unsure if their interventions were actually having an impact on HIV prevalence. At the same time, evidence-based, biomedical interventions were increasingly being pushed within the international public-health community. The clinical findings that short, targeted treatments of anti-retroviral medicines dramatically reduces the transmission of HIV from mother to child during labor, as well as the more recent findings that antiretroviral drugs can also prevent HIV infection in HIV negative persons have emboldened the scientific community to believe that with the global scale-up of such biomedical interventions the goal of an AIDS-free generation is within our reach.

Similarly, the scientific community pushed for rigorous evidence, through randomized, controlled clinical trials, to demonstrate the efficacy of male circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy. The Southern Africa Orange Farm trial, which enrolled 3,274 uncircumcised men, aged eighteen to twenty-four years showed a 61 percent protection against HIV acquisition. The trial in Kisumu, Kenya, of 2,784 HIV-negative men aged eighteen to twenty-four years showed a 53 percent reduction of HIV acquisition in circumcised men relative to uncircumcised men. The trial of 4,996 HIV-negative men aged fifteen to forty-nine years in Rakai, Uganda showed that HIV acquisition was reduced by 51 percent in circumcised men. The trials provided conclusive proof that male circumcision offers a partial protective effect for HIV prevention. They also proved instrumental in reframing male circumcision as a
biomedical/public health intervention, positioning it as a modern health discovery rather than a social and cultural practice steeped in historical meaning.

The reality is that male circumcision is both a biomedical intervention and a cultural practice. Yet, the debate and discourse surrounding male circumcision quickly became polarized (public health vs. social and contextual perspectives). Medical male circumcision has been pitted against indigenous male circumcision, seen to have a more limited effect on HIV prevention because it often takes place after sexual debut and generally less foreskin is removed than with medical male circumcision.\textsuperscript{53} Randomized, clinical trials have provided conclusive evidence that medical male circumcision can reduce men’s risk of contracting HIV. However, in areas where high numbers of males have been non-medically circumcised, the correlation between male circumcision and HIV status is not always demonstrable in survey data.\textsuperscript{54} Rather than seek to understand some of the underlying causes of this, or consider some of the ways social science research can be made integral to clinical trials, international organizations such as the WHO and UNAIDS along with donors pushed a process of limited engagement with indigenous male circumcision practitioners focused on providing them with basic biomedical education.\textsuperscript{55} This paternalistic, one-way information transfer approach has not been productive in creating common ground, collaboration, or trust between scientists and non-medical practitioners and indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{56} Instead, the dichotomies in how we think and talk about male circumcision are reinforced by the narrow focus of randomized, clinical trials that claim objectivity and value neutrality. The end results are global health programs that are Western designed and perceived to be Western imposed.

\textbf{Cutting to the Chase: Scaling-up Male Circumcision in Southern Africa}

But the promise of hard evidence, value for money, and tangible results is understandably very appealing to the international development sector.\textsuperscript{57} Evidence-based interventions and policymaking have been embraced as a means to improve clarity and outcomes in development.\textsuperscript{58} Backed by scientific evidence, and a renewed sense of urgency to identify novel and efficacious methods to reduce HIV transmission, the WHO/UNAIDS 2007 recommendation for scale-up of male circumcision in countries with high HIV prevalence and low prevalence of male circumcision, including all of the countries in southern Africa, set a target of circumcising 80 percent of all uncircumcised adult men by 2015. It was projected that achieving this goal would avert one in five new HIV infections by 2025.\textsuperscript{59}

The process of planning and implementing such a massive scale-up of male circumcision in southern Africa followed a rather familiar course. Once a scientific and public health consensus was forged around the benefits of circumcision, African country policy programs and initiatives were expected to come in line with the accepted international formulations. African governments took their lead from international donors and “expert advice” and incorporated male circumcision into their National Strategic Frameworks for HIV and AIDS. With the reauthorization of PEPFAR in 2008, the United States began to develop five-year Partnership Frameworks with African governments that included male circumcision as part of HIV prevention. The strategic plans and partnership frameworks are impressive, with the requisite emphasis on multi-sectoral, integrated, and the standardization of internationally endorsed principles and practices. Indeed, the overarching structure of the programs established were in
line with directives from WHO, UNAIDS, and major international donors. From the donors’ perspective, this was the outcome of lengthy consultative processes. We should not underestimate the power imbalance between donors and recipient countries, however, and the agenda-setting power of donor governments such as the United States. In all southern African countries, donors sit on the internationally mandated National AIDS Councils, the bodies responsible for providing strategic direction, establishing guidelines and policy, and funding proposals for the AIDS response. Donor and international “experts” also have been substantially involved in consultations and planning to develop countries’ national strategic frameworks. \(^{60}\)

Initially, donors were receptive to the idea of integrating male circumcision into existing health services and infrastructure. However, it quickly became apparent that adult male circumcision could not be prioritized in that way, and that countries would not be able to meet their targets. Overworked doctors and under-staffed clinics resisted prioritizing what, in effect, is a voluntary, non-emergency procedure. According to the mathematical modeling, the benefits of an adult male circumcision program would only be realized if the vast majority of males could be circumcised in a short period of time. Expediency was critical. As a result, donors began to design a model for male circumcision that would be implemented similar to a vaccination campaign. Driven largely by public health CDC experts, the argument was made that the campaign did not require a long-term investment in health infrastructure but rather could be run as a once-off investment in temporary health services. This greatly appealed to U.S. lawmakers who liked the idea of a short-term investment with dramatic, long-term results.

Thus, in 2010, the WHO released “Considerations for Implementing Models for Optimizing the Volume and Efficiency for Male Circumcision Services” (MOVE) that laid out a framework to standardize a temporary, mobile surgical model that could be applied to male circumcision services. \(^{61}\) Today, the vast majority of circumcisions continue to be performed using donor funding, and at donor operated MOVE sites. For example, during October 2009–September 2012, a total of 1,924,792 male circumcisions were performed in fourteen countries using PEPFAR funding provided through U.S. government agencies; of this total, 1,020,424 were conducted at approximately 1,600 U.S. government-supported sites. \(^{62}\) These are temporary tent structures that can easily be assembled and disassembled and moved to different locations. The MOVE model typically uses one doctor or surgical staff along with four supporting staff. It is estimated that eighty male circumcisions can be performed per team per day using the MOVE model. \(^{63}\)

In addition, the donor model of male circumcision uses well-established nongovernmental or development partners such as Population Services International (PSI), Jhpiego (an affiliate of Johns Hopkins University), I-TECH (affiliated with the University of Washington), and the Futures Group who have been awarded contracts to implement various aspects of the male circumcision campaigns, including marketing, training, and implementation. Since the intent is not health systems strengthening, interviews conducted with PEPFAR and ACHAP staff confirmed that the bulk of these contracts are spent on highly paid consultants and temporary international staff, many of whom are seconded to the Ministries of Health. In Botswana, for example, PEPFAR supports over 150 personnel based within the Ministry of Health, and the Gates Foundation funded ACHAP supports an additional one hundred personnel. \(^{64}\)
often highly skilled and highly paid personnel—over $100,000/per year. In Swaziland, over half of the PEPFAR contract to Futures Group was spent on hiring expatriate surgeons to train clinicians.65

Overall, international donors have invested well over $130 million in male circumcision, with the largest annual expenditure of $42 million coming in 2012.66 Despite the significant investment in resources, progress in implementing the scale-up of male circumcision has been slow until very recently. As of December 2013, 5.82 million African men in the designated priority countries had been circumcised. This figure constitutes around 27 percent of the goal to circumcise 20.3 million African men by 2015.67 Furthermore, progress in scaling up circumcision has varied from country to country, with Kenya and Ethiopia achieving 85.3 percent and 98.4 percent respectively of their national goal. South Africa has circumcized the most number of adult males, 1.4 million. Yet, this constitutes only 32 percent of their national goal. Others like Malawi and Namibia have yet to achieve 5 percent of their national goals.68

WHO, UNAIDS, and international donors all expressed a degree of surprise and frustration at the slow progress. Not only does the science demonstrate the efficacy of circumcision as an HIV prevention strategy, but subsequent surveys conducted in several countries suggested broad acceptability of adopting circumcision as a prevention strategy among the population.69 Explanations for the slow uptake in circumcisions are multiple and complex. In their program evaluations and reviews, donors have tended to focus on improving programmatic efficiencies through task shifting and task sharing, the introduction of new technologies such as non-surgical methods of circumcision, and improving management capacity of governments.70 Program reviews also emphasize the importance of tailoring demand-creation interventions and service delivery models to specific age group of clients.71

Yet program evaluations offer little introspection on how the donors’ approach to male circumcision and the assumptions implicit in that approach may have thrown up barriers to its implementation. The push for expediency and the framing of male circumcision as a once-off medical procedure contributed to poor marketing, messaging, and buy-in among the recipient populations. In the smaller, more homogenous societies where HIV prevalence is the highest and expectations for the male circumcision campaign were most ambitious, the programs proved most disappointing. In Swaziland, PEPFAR’s goal was to circumcise 80 percent of all men fifteen to forty-nine in one year. But mixed messaging, entrenched local customs, false rumors, and gender imbalances all contributed to the program falling far short of its goal.72 Marketing for the national campaign “Soka Uncobe” (Circumcise and Conquer), handled by the Futures Group, linked circumcision with masculinity. Was the message intended to be circumcise and conquer HIV? Or circumcise and conquer women? Other messaging such as “lisoka lisoka ngekusoka” (literally, “the lover boy is a lover boy thanks to circumcision”) appeals to the young playboy but is off-putting to married men.73 Similar campaigns were observed during the seven-month research trip in Botswana, where billboards read “Banna tota” (real men) circumcise.

The macho, male-centered messaging also explicitly excluded women from the conversation around circumcision. This was odd, given women’s influence as mothers and as partners. In fact, in Kenya, one of the few countries that has almost hit its target to circumcise over 80 percent of the male population, studies suggest women’s support of male circumcision
was instrumental in the program’s success. In many southern African countries, women were targeted for infant circumcision but largely left out of the messaging for adult male circumcision. Also, given that the majority of those contracting HIV in southern Africa are women, a prevention program that excluded women and appeared to appeal to men’s macho desires had the effect of alienating many AIDS activist organizations and groups that could have been natural supporters of the circumcision campaign.

Mixed messaging has also been impacted the acceptability of male circumcision. Scientists and public health experts from the outset stated that as circumcision does not offer full protection against HIV, the message to African males must be “circumcise but still use a condom.” However, many males reported not seeing the value of medical male circumcision when continued condom use was still recommended after the procedure. Furthermore, information about the benefits of male circumcision was not disseminated in a clear and understandable way. A law student from Swaziland complained, “First they told me that circumcision will not really protect me against HIV. Then they tell me that I cannot have sex for some weeks or months after circumcision.” In the end, he declined the procedure.

Mixed messaging and hurried information opened the door to numerous false rumors and speculations in a number of countries. Many men were turned off from medical circumcision because of the supposed pain of the process, and the perception the circumcision would decrease their sexual pleasure and may even make them sterile. At focus group discussions in Swaziland men were reported saying; “A real Swazi man is defined as someone who has a wife and children, and is able to take care of family. In order to have a wife and children, a man has to be sexually functional—the issue of circumcision introduced a threat to this.” Rumors in several countries also began to abound about what happens with the foreskin after the procedure. Some men feared it would be sold to traditional healers who could use it to bring back luck to them. In sum, the circumcision campaigns were ill-prepared to deal with the dilemma of getting Western, scientific circumcision messages across in communities with different health care systems that rest on different truth claims.

Donors’ push for expediency also created friction between themselves and recipient governments. In Swaziland, where PEPFAR insists the program was initiated and driven by the Swazi government, some Swazi AIDS professionals described the campaign as “an exercise in bullying.” While PEPFAR points to extensive consultation in the form of weekly and monthly meetings, prominent AIDS activists said the regular meetings were used by Futures Group to rubber stamp decisions, rather than consult. Even within Swaziland’s National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS, the perception was the PEPFAR and its partners had their own agenda, and would not listen to the input of others.

In Botswana, the push to quickly rollout male circumcision clashed with the more deliberative decision-making process of the Botswana government. An elite-driven, stable democracy, Botswana has been highly successful politically and economically, in part because of a culture of consultation, enshrined through the Kgotla system dating back many generations, which allowed the Botswana state to coopt key societal constituencies to support its agenda. In addition, the importance of equity and uniform coverage in the provision of social services has been key to successful, long-term development planning. Thus the Botswana government was initially reluctant to quickly establish stand-alone clinics in select
communities. It instead sought a holistic, consultative process that would offer equitable access to male circumcision services through integrated health clinics. Responding to donor demands for expediency, one senior health official remarked: “Scientists can get ahead of themselves by not fully appreciating the policy process. Within government there are a lot of things that need to click right. We have our own pace of doing things. Safe male circumcision requires a logistical change in the way the healthcare system is oriented.”

The Botswana government did eventually agree to adopt the MOVE model of stand-alone clinics, but only after consider political pressure was brought to bear on it. Ambassador Eric Goosby, former head of the U.S. Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, paid a visit to Botswana’s President Ian Khama during his March 2011 visit and specifically appealed to President Khama to ensure a quick uptake of male circumcision. Others suggested it took a follow-up letter from the U.S. Ambassador to the Minister of Health later that year to really get the government moving on male circumcision. In the end, donor prioritization of expediency and efficiency led to the bulk of resources being spent on skilled experts and technical assistance without the requisite investment in community advocacy and mobilization, and a rocky implementation in the crucial early years.

Conclusion

“Basic and clinical science have provided us with highly effective interventions to treat and prevent HIV infection. If we markedly scale-up globally the implementation of these interventions, we can dramatically alter the trajectory of the pandemic towards the ultimate goal of an AIDS-free generation.” – Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director, NIAID, July 23, 2012 (AIDS2012 Conference)

Medical male circumcision is one of the biomedical interventions the scientific community is counting on to help curb new HIV infections and significantly reduce its impact on communities. Such scientific interventions are appealing in that they offer a one-off intervention that theoretically can be replicated in multiple settings. They supposedly produce a beneficial effect without requiring a change in behavior on the part of the recipients. Thus donors have been pumping increasing amounts of funding into global health research in the past decade, with the assumptions that scientific advances can dramatically alter disease trajectories and the scale of epidemics.

But as this article has argued regarding the case of male circumcision campaigns as an HIV prevention strategy in southern Africa, the translation of scientific advances into public health policies and their implementation is not linear, and can be a rocky and contentious process. There is a role for social scientific research to lend insight and context, leading to improved outcomes. The assumption that scientific knowledge will be embraced as ‘the truth’ in all communities, and will trump other ways of knowing ignores the fact that knowledge exists at many different levels, and is contextualized differently. The scientific and public health communities have framed medical male circumcision as a technical issue. But it can also be deeply political and cultural, and in these contexts other “knowledges” and incentives can be more compelling. Thus, while male circumcision has demonstrated efficacy under ideal conditions, it will only be effective in real-world settings and in certain circumstances when contextual factors including social networks, political debates, and cultural values are favorable.
From the outset, not enough attention was paid on the part of biomedical researchers and public health experts to how male circumcision will operate in real people’s lives. The assumptions that evidence pertains only to verifiable and measurable facts, and that scientific knowledge is generalizable, does not take into account the fact that context-specific factors contribute to ensuring validity and applicability of evidence in real world settings. At the level of communities, even in societies with little recent history of circumcision, male circumcision was being introduced and overlaid onto existing cultural and societal hierarchies, social norms about gender relations and generational relations, and political dynamics and contestations. There was an expectation on the part of donors that male circumcision could be expeditiously introduced without sufficiently educating local communities on the merits of scientific evidence and interventions, or fully considering the social and cultural context in which male circumcision would be conducted. This contributed to a climate of misinformation at times, and the misuse of alternative understandings of male circumcision to promote particular political agendas in certain local contexts.

At the level of government, global health experts and donors underestimated the extent to which translating the scientific evidence on male circumcision into policy and implementation is not just a technical problem of knowledge exchange or translation, but is also a political challenge. Policymaking is a complex and essentially political process that is influenced by several factors and involves trade-offs between competing interests and values. Donors paid little attention to the ways in which male circumcision would be politicized, and the extent to which such policies would involve budget and priority considerations as well as social considerations beyond clinical outcomes—such as questions of equity, justice or morality—all of which can influence decision-making.

The failure of donors to consider the social, political, and cultural context led to male circumcision being perceived in many southern African countries as part of a donor driven agenda. Resistance to male circumcision became part of a broader challenge to donor dependence and influence in many societies. Moving forward, if scientific and biomedical health interventions are going to play the transformative role they are capable of, greater attention must be paid early on to ensure culturally sensitive and relevant implementation.

Notes

2 Auvert et al. 2005; Gray et al. 2007. WHO and UNAIDS identified thirteen priority countries for scale-up of VMMC: Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. PEPFAR is supporting activities to implement VMMC in these thirteen countries and also in Ethiopia, making a total of fourteen priority countries. See WHO/UNAIDS 2011a.
3 Sgaier, Reed, Thomas, and Njeuhmeli 2014.
Male circumcision has been a defining marker of hierarchy and social difference. "During the Ottoman and Moorish Empires, in Nazi Germany, in India at partition and in the recent genocides of Bosnia and East Timor, a man’s circumcision status had serious consequences for how he was treated: with violence, torture and death being the consequence for those who fell short of the mark." Ibid. p. 15

At a WHO/UNAIDS consultative meeting, male circumcision was described as “just a little snip.” Ibid.

A Botswana study also highlighted tension between medical science and Setswana tradition in the practice of circumcision. See Sabone et al. 2013.

See Ncayiyana and Rehle 2014.

Mark 2012.

accessed January 5, 2015); McQuoid-Mason 2013.
39 Duval Smith 2010.
43 Deacon and Thomson 2012.
44 Epstein 1996.
45 HIV Vaccines and Microbicides Resource Tracking Group 2014.
46 Epstein 2002.
49 At the 2012 International AIDS Conference in Washington, DC, Dr. Anthony Fauci proclaimed, “Basic and clinical science have provided us with highly effective interventions to treat and prevent HIV infection. If we markedly scale-up globally the implementation of these interventions, we can dramatically alter the trajectory of the pandemic towards the ultimate goal of an AIDS-free generation.” (July 23, 2012) (Conference attended by the author). Fauci is the head of the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
50 Auvert et al. 2005.
51 Bailey et al. 2007.
52 Gray et al. 2007.
54 Connelly et al. 2008.
57 Eyben 2013.
58 Elsewhere, I demonstrate that while this approach can be very useful, it can also be misused and have perverse consequences when used in an organizational environment in which hidden and invisible power determine what knowledge counts and hierarchical ways of working block communications and dialogue. See Johnson forthcoming 2016.
59 UNAIDS 2013.
60 PEPFAR 2010.
61 WHO 2010.
62 U.S. Centers for Disease Control 2012. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is the second largest donor of male circumcision.
63 Edgil 2011.
64 Mtg with ITech official in Gaborone, Botswana, June 21, 2012.
65 Smith and GlobalPost 2012.
66 As a result of budgetary cuts across the board, $32 million was spent on male circumcision in 2013. HIV Vaccines and Microbicides Resource Tracking Working Group 2014.
67 “Scale-up of Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Africa: Update

68 WHO 2014.

69 Westercamp and Bailey (2007) compiled MC acceptability studies conducted in East and Southern Africa from 1998 to 2006. They comprehensively reviewed thirteen acceptability studies among traditionally uncircumcised society and concluded that MC is very well accepted. The data revealed that; uncircumcised men willing to be circumcised were 65 percent, women favoring circumcision for their partners were 69 percent, men willing to circumcise their sons were 71 percent and women willing to circumcise their son were 81 percent.

70 Sgaier et al. 2014. In many settings, lack of skilled healthcare workers has been a challenge, as have interrupted supplies of necessary medical supplies and equipment. Historically male circumcision has been a surgical procedure performed by doctors. However, in many African countries, doctors are in short demand, and governments and doctors have been reluctant to divert their time away from caring for critically ill patients to perform what in essence is a voluntary procedure on well patients. To address this challenge, several companies have devised a non-surgical method of performing circumcisions. Prepex, one such non-surgical medical device, has just recently been approved by the FDA, and pre qualified by the WHO for use in low-resource settings. (See WHO 2013). In addition, donors are increasing funding in several countries to train thousands of nurses to perform circumcisions, and African governments are putting in place task shifting policies. (See 2014. “Zimbabwe Nurses to Undergo HIV Mentorship Programme.” The Herald. February 10, 2014. http://allafrica.com/stories/201402100483.html; accessed December 5, 2014).

71 Macintyre 2014; Hatzold et al. 2014.

72 Smith and GlobalPost. 2012.

73 Ibid.

74 IRIN NEWS 2013; Gonzalez 2013. Similar campaigns were run in Botswana, where billboards read “Banna tota” (real men) circumcise.

75 IRIN NEWS 2013.

76 Gonzalez 2013.

77 Smith and GlobalPost. 2012; Kedikilwe 2012.

78 Ibid.

79 See Johnson forthcoming 2016.


82 Mtg. with ITech staff, June 21, 2012.

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Book Reviews


In recent decades, scholarship on post-conflict states in Africa has expanded exponentially as scholars voraciously document the recovery efforts of countries despoiled by wars, among them Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and South Sudan, to name only a few. In the case of the West African states of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the recent Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic that hit both countries with thousands of deaths after it originated and spread from neighboring Guinea in December 2013 has only compounded the challenges of post-conflict recovery. The epidemic, just like the postwar reconstruction effort in Liberia following its thirteen-year civil war, caught the attention of the international community, the World Health Organization (WHO), Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs, both local and international, all of them seeking to restore normalcy in the war-torn country. Paradoxically, the goodwill behind such humanitarian interventions notwithstanding, most of the programs implemented, more often than not, fell short of addressing the specific mental health needs of Liberians who had experienced the brunt of the war.

This backdrop is the point of departure for Sharon Abramowitz’s Searching for Normal in the Wake of the Liberian War, which zooms in on the early post-conflict reconstruction, from 2003 to 2008, “to examine the relationship between individual and collective trauma and the project of postwar social repair...through the lens of the massive global humanitarian project of trauma healing and psychosocial intervention” (p. 4). As Abramowitz puts it, she aspired “to study mental health and psychosocial intervention in a multiscalar and processual way, using a multisited ethnographic approach” (p. 35). And in so doing, she had to draw on archival research, NGO documentation (or grey literature), interviews, both formal and informal, participant observation, and “a careful process of cross-validating informants’ accounts with NGO, local informant, documentary, and international sources” (p. 35). This plethora of sources combining a proactive ethnographic investigation and methodical documentation, together with the author’s incisive interpretative repertoire, gives the book a multilayered texture that is intriguing and puts it above standard narratives about the Liberian civil war and its dehumanizing violence.

According to Abramowitz, her book’s eight chapters are written to capture “the discordance of the phenomena being studied—violence and its effects—albeit in a different register” (p. 31). In Chapter 1, she lays out her frame of reference centered on trauma and psychosocial rehabilitation within the context of post-conflict reconstruction and a “decentralized project of humanitarian social engineering” (p. 25). This involves initiatives at mass education, radio shows to raise awareness, and communal engagement with issues such as human rights, gender-based violence, and peace building. Chapter 2 then takes the reader through the years between 1994 and 2013 to offer a “history of the present” in which the author addresses international health policy, psychosocial and mental health services coordinated by
NGOs, and Liberian national politics. Abramowitz explains that the country’s mental health infrastructure crumbled during the civil war. But in the postwar period, Liberia witnessed “an effective ‘scaling up,’ or nationalization, of basic mental health services” (p. 58). Chapter 3 concerns the author’s conception of normality and trauma (italics used by author) in Liberia, which takes into account how those most affected by the civil war grappled with the “new normal.” As the author notes, “Social life in postwar Liberia was in many ways ‘normal’ and not ‘normal’ at the same time” (p. 63). This contradiction is the crux of the chapter’s discussion. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, together, cover postwar Liberia’s major sites of mental and psychosocial interventions, which included “individual and group counseling, gender-based violence, and ex-combatant rehabilitation and DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, Reintegration)” (p. 31). The final chapter then documents the lived experiences of Liberian psychosocial workers, focusing on what they made of their occupation and its challenges in the postwar period.

Indeed Abramowitz’s anthropological research in Liberia reveals extensive fieldwork that put her in touch with government officials, humanitarian leaders, and local NGO employees. Through such interactions, she gained access to patients, program activities, and program documents that enrich the book’s narrative and analysis. Interviews with patients, social workers, mental health care providers, and ordinary Liberians count among the monograph’s unique features that move it beyond theoretical musings and propositions. The reader gets first-hand accounts from Liberians who experienced the trauma of war and needed psychosocial catharsis to regain their lives. While specialists of violence and its effects on society will find it easier to relate to the book’s subject matter for obvious reasons, non-specialists will also be pleasantly surprised by the ease with which they can follow Abramowitz’s complex thought process that seldom wavers in its attempt to reenact the chaotic nature of a dysfunctional Liberian society reemerging from its troubled war-torn recent past. Still, the average educated Liberian seeking readable material on her/his country’s civil war and its costs will find Searching for Normal in the Wake of the Liberian War intellectually perplexing and emotionally disquieting because of Abramowitz’s erudition and brutal honesty.

Tamba E. M’bayo, West Virginia University


The Yoruba have been well-written on since the 18th century, a development that earned them the description as “a locus classicus of African civilization and philosophical achievement” (p. 34). This is not surprising because the Yoruba people had an early contact with western civilization in Nigeria. This fact was reflected in the volumes of publications on the anthropological and cultural realities of the Yoruba people which Professor ‘Wale Adebanwi utilized effectively to construct his theory of elitism and the impact of same on the atmospherics of political life in Yorubaland. He identified the ideological impact of Chief Obafemi Awolowo on the political consciousness of the Yoruba and viewed the definitive role of his political values as one that shaped and is still shaping Yoruba politics even after twenty-eight years after the death of this great Yoruba patriarch.

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v15i4a5.pdf
Adebanwi’s book focuses on the politics, values, and beliefs of Awolowo, and it is indeed an attempt to explain the political life of the entire people through the prism of its highly revered son—the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The author’s assumption, I believe, is that the politics of the Yoruba people can be understood through a careful perusal of the different manifestations of Awolowo’s leadership values, actions and policies evident in the different epochs of the socio-political affairs and indeed challenges of the Yoruba in the Nigeria’s multi-ethnic political landscape.

The book was originally a Cambridge University doctoral thesis re-worked into its current form. The author has also published articles on aspects of Yoruba anthropological realities in leading scholarly journals, which has established him as an authoritative theorist in that field of scholarship. In a two-part book with seven chapters and a rich bibliography, the introductory chapter lucidly clarifies the theoretical and conceptual import of “elite,” “agency,” and “corporate agency of the elite” in the discourse on Yoruba politics, using Awolowo as the explanatory variable. The author depicts Awolowo as the essence of the past and continuing agency around whom the Yoruba modern life world is configured. He describes Awolowo as the corporate agent, the modern embodiment of the Yoruba progenitor, thereby affirming an earlier historical association of Chief Obafemi Awolowo with Oduduwa, the real progenitor of the Yoruba (pp. 38-40.)

Utilizing the political values and ideas of Awolowo, Adebanwi assesses the politics of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Republics and the roles of different politicians, religious groups, political associations including Egbe Omo Oduduwa, Afenifere, political parties, and traditional power wielders in Yorubaland in relation to the national politics to determine to what extent the different Yoruba actors in the country’s politics demonstrated their “Awoness,” “yorubaness,” or Omoluwabi-ness. He does so even though her admits that “the burden of Omoluwabi-ness, Awoness, or proper yorubaness would require different things in different contexts, he, however, strongly opined that true Awoists are proper Yoruba” (p. 187). Those Yoruba politicians in opposing political parties who were critical of Chief Awolowo and his political party and ideas were described as improper Yoruba. The explication of the concept of “proper Yoruba” is the main subject of chapter six (pp. 184-223). This treatise on how (not) to be a proper Yoruba is bound to generate enthusiastic commentaries and rebuttals from different quarters, especially across the scholarly audience and public intellectuals in Yoruba land. Adebanwi’s description of former President Obasanjo “as the most evident example of how not to be a proper Yoruba” agrees with the belief of most Awoists. But, such a position is a value-laden assessment that could have resulted from a misjudgment of Obasanjo’s political values and actions.

In the same chapter six, Adebanwi tries to equate “omoluwabi-ness” with “Yorubaness,” and adjudges Awolowo as a perfect personification of the ethical system that ‘omoluwabi’ portends. It stands to reason therefore that if there cannot be any one perfect replica of Awolowo than Awolowo himself, as our author would like us to believe, then nobody in the whole of Yorubaland, dead or living, is qualified to be an “omoluwabi” of the Awolowo’s brand. That explains why despite our author’s seeming preference for the politics of Asiwaju Bola Tinubu in comparison with other political personalities in Yoruba land as portrayed in chapter seven, nobody was categorically endorsed by him as Awolowo’s successor.
In the concluding chapter, Adebanwi posits that the “ethno-nationalist project (Modern Yorubaness) is fluid, despite sometimes being represented as rigid, static and even essentialized” (p. 246). It is this perspective that births the erroneous belief that the degree of Awoness of an individual can be determined in terms of the nature of his relationship with Awolowo-professing groups. Political association is different from political consciousness, and that explains why it is possible for an Awoist to decamp from an Awolowo-professing group to another group while still retaining his Awoist consciousness, orientation and beliefs. “True Awoists” can exit a group of professing Awoists on grounds of personal disagreement, but that action might not result in the extirpation of Awoness from his consciousness. That presupposes the reality of the existence of “true” and “fake” Awoists, which was not broached by the author in his book.

Overall, this book is well written. It contains invaluable resources on Yoruba life and shows evidence of in-depth research which makes the book an authoritative ethnographic and historical piece on the Yoruba, albeit, with particular emphasis on the exemplification of Yoruba values of good character in all ramifications by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. This book is a very useful addition to the literature on politics in ethnically diverse and sharply divided plural societies like Nigeria. It is recommended to social science students, professional ethnographers, and scholars with interest in the politics of developing societies.

John Olushola Magbadelo, Centre for African & Asian Studies, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria


Africa’s Peacemakers has fourteen contributors including several renowned Africanists, and is dedicated to the memory of Nelson Mandela (1918-2013). The editor and author of two of the book’s fifteen chapters has served as the executive director of the Center for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town. The book is divided into six parts: an introduction, followed by two sections on the three African-American Nobel Peace Prize winners, Ralph Bunche, Martin Luther King Jr, and Barak Obama, and it concludes with four sections on the ten African Nobel Peace Laureates: Albert Luthuli, Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela, and Frederik Willem de Klerk from South Africa, Anwar Sadat and Mohamed ElBaradei of Egypt, Kenyan Wangari Maathai, Ghanaian Kofi Annan, and Liberians Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee.

Africa’s Peacemakers is the first book to offer a comprehensive look at people of African descent who won the Nobel Peace Prize between 1950 and 2011. It highlights interactions among the prize winners, such as Bunche and King marching together for civil rights, Luthuli and Mandela working jointly to end apartheid, and Obama meeting and honoring Tutu. The individual chapters devoted to the Nobel Laureates are largely laudatory, but the introduction includes some concerns with individual recipients including Sirleaf for her “ambiguous role in Liberia’s first civil war” (1989-1997), the fact that she was given her award “four days before a presidential election” that she won, and de Klerk having viewed apartheid as morally wrong only in a “qualified way” (pp. 9, 30, and 22).

The authors also raise the issue of the politics behind the Nobel Prize, noting that Gandhi was nominated for the prize five times and shortlisted three times, but never won, due to British
opposition to Gandhi and Britain’s close ties with Norway, the country that awards the prize. Of note is that although Gandhi never won the Nobel Peace Prize, he inspired eight of the thirteen Nobel Laureates featured in *African Peacemakers* in their efforts for socio-economic justice, civil rights, and women’s rights.

In 1950, Ralph Bunche was the first person of African descent to win the Nobel Peace Prize. He received it for his skillful mediation in arranging a ceasefire between the Israelis and Arabs following the creation of the state of Israel. Egyptian Anwar Sadat also won his Nobel Peace Prize (1978) for his success in making peace with Israel. Albert Luthuli was born in 1898 and was the first of the African peace laureates and the first South African. Luthuli reached his mid-forties before he became active in politics, but then served as the president of the African National Congress from 1951 to 1967. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961 for his role in the non-violent struggle against apartheid.

It took another forty-three years for the first African female, Wangari Maathai, to win the Nobel Peace Prize for her contributions to sustainable development, democracy and peace. Of the ninety-seven individuals that received the Nobel Peace Prize prior to Maathai in 2004, only twelve were women. Dr. Maathai is noteworthy in that she was not only the first African woman and first Kenyan to receive the prize, but also the first person of any gender or nationality to receive it for contributions to the protection of the natural environment.

Some may wonder, given the book’s title, why F.W. de Klerk, a white South African, has a chapter devoted to him. One contributor to the volume, Kenyan historian Ali Mazrui, offers two groups that qualify as people of African descent: “Africans of blood” who identify as African by ancestry and “Africans of the soil,” people who by birth or adoption identify as African (p. 46).

*African Peacemakers* is quite comprehensive and well researched, but lacks a concluding chapter that brings together theoretical or conceptual concerns. As such the book falls short of its objective of drawing lessons from the thirteen Nobel Peace Laureates lives “for peacemaking, civil rights, socio-economic justice, environmental protection, nuclear disarmament and women’s rights” (p. 4). Nonetheless, this book should be read by all those interested in Nobel Peace Prize winners of African descent, for its own sake, or to better appreciate the anti-violence struggles against oppression, human rights violations and injustice the eminent people featured in *African Peacemakers* participated in or led.

*African Peacemakers* is an interdisciplinary work that is appropriate for use in undergraduate seminars on Africa. The writing style also makes it appropriate for general audiences. The book is a welcome contribution to the still rather limited literature on African successes.

Heidi G. Frontani, *Elon University*


The key word in the title of this collection is diaspora. In the introduction, Afe Adogame notes that while a fair amount of research regarding African New Religious Movements (ANRM)s has been conducted on African soil little has been written about what happens when such groups
are scattered, establishing outposts in other parts of the world. This book is a solid contribution to the modest literature on the topic.

Chapter 1 details the worship of the orixás (African deities) in Brazil, while Chapter 2 recounts the celebration in Minnesota of Irrecha, a traditional Ethiopian thanksgiving ritual. Chapter 4 examines the precarious status of Black Jews in France and Chapter 9 shines a light on the use of maraboutage (divining) by Senegalese boat refugees fleeing to Spain. The remaining nine chapters (3, 5-8, 10-13) address neo-Pentecostal churches—African Independent Churches (AICs)—originating in Africa but working in countries such as Sweden, Brazil, China, Canada, and Britain. Attention is given to the zealous preaching of the so-called “Prosperity Gospel” and the nexus between the sometimes controversial Pentecostal view of spiritual warfare and traditional African understandings of witchcraft. Of special interest is the often negative reaction that such teachings have evoked.

_African New Religious Movements in Diaspora_ is a scholarly but engaging work. Written by well-qualified and degreed contributors, bibliographies at the end of each chapter give evidence of broad study. In many cases, writers go beyond the library, engaging in field research. The result is an effective presentation, taking the reader on a fascinating journey to the locations explored. By meeting a host of characters and hearing their words, the reader acquires a new appreciation for the challenges African immigrants face when practicing their religion.

One recurring theme is the perceived threat in more secularized settings (such as Québec) that exuberant African expressions of Christianity may present to the host culture. In a chapter chronicling some painful adjustments of Congolose Pentecostals in Montréal, Géraldine Mossière notes the “strong public calls for secularism” that have emerged in Québec in response to the “cultural practices of minorities” (p., 147). The reader is caught up in the drama of elders keen to maintain African languages and practices (such as the dowry) and younger Congolese who wish instead to assimilate more fully to the culture of their new home.

A second theme is the dynamics behind the rapid growth of African Independent Churches (AICs). In a helpful chapter, Laura Premack compares Brazil’s Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus with Nigeria’s Redeemed Christian Church of God. Premack maintains: “Millions of Nigerians believe that Nigeria has a special relationship with God and are invested in the project of ensuring and proving the vitality of the Nigerian nation through making it (appear to be) an international centre of evangelical Christianity” (p. 223). However, the limited evidence the author provides is suggestive rather than conclusive. Further research is needed to establish this provocative thesis.

A third area touched upon is the role of women. Anne Kubai examines African churches operating in Sweden. The WFGCI is Nigerian in origin and has carefully circumscribed roles for women in worship, not allowing them (for example) to preach to a congregation containing both women and men. On the other hand, the Salem Church, founded by an Ethiopian pastor, is led by her and (presumably) is open to women serving more expansively in leadership. Speaking as one who belongs to a tradition that enfranchises both women and men for lay and ordained ministry, more development of this point than the one paragraph the author allots would have been appreciated. What are the factors that in one instance forbid female preachers yet in another permit it?
While *Africa New Religious Movements in Diaspora* largely succeeds in its objective, it can be scarred by uneven editing. A glaring example appears in the first paragraph, where Afe Adogame speaks of “a tendency that may have probably shaped the public mental picture…” (p. 1). This is apparently a cut-and-paste error, one that better proofreading would have detected. These weaknesses aside, Afe Adogame has provided an intriguing and variegated look at the interaction of African New Religious Movements (ANRM)s with host cultures abroad, underscoring both the positive contributions and tensions that such interaction creates. As a work more anthropological than theological, the collection makes a scholarly and timely contribution to its field.

**Gregory Crofford, Africa Region, Church of the Nazarene**


The volume under consideration is a quantitative study of the European slave trade in the Indian Ocean world. Allen outlines and estimates the scale of a phenomenon that, almost fifty years after Philip Curtin’s groundbreaking Atlantic census, remains largely understudied. Chapter 1 examines the state of the scholarship and estimates that “Europeans were directly involved in trading at least 954,000 to 1,275,900 slaves within and beyond the Indian Ocean between 1500 and 1850” (p. 24). In East Africa, which accounted for the bulk of the trade, Europeans were responsible for about half of the total trade, with Arab-Muslim traders responsible for the other half. Chapter 2 considers British slave trading at the hands of the East India Company, “a corporate state willing and able to exercise a comparatively high degree of centralized control” (p. 29). Chapter 3 sheds light on the French slave trade centered in the Mascarene Islands between the early 1600s and early 1800s. The author paints a convincing picture of the islands as the “center of a dynamic slave trading network that stretched not only from one end of the Indian Ocean to the other but also deep into the Atlantic” (p. 67). Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that, although East Africa and Madagascar were the primary sources for the trade, British and French slavers active in the region stretched their areas of operations deep into the Atlantic both to procure and sell.

Chapter 4 covers the trade in the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, from where traders from various European nations shipped between “360,000 to 484,000 Indian and Southeast Asian men, women and children” (p. 136), with shipments to VOC colonies in the Indonesian archipelago attracting the lion’s share. Chapter 5 considers the onset of abolition for the Mascarenes, where clandestine trading continued well into the 1830s due to a variety of conditions: powerful commercial and agricultural interests in the islands, French-British imperial competition standing in the way of an effective implementation of the abolitionist treaties, and lack of naval resources. Chapter 6 examines the East India Company’s commitment to abolition and the concomitant emergence of networks of migrations for indentured servants and convicts across the British Empire.

Allen offers important insights that are likely to inform the debate on the Indian Ocean slave trade for years. He successfully argues several crucial points. First, that despite the “Africa-centric” nature of much scholarship, an appreciation of the multidirectionality (p. 25) of
the slave trade in the region is key to understanding the phenomenon. Second, that European trade in the Indian Ocean was not a sideshow to either European trade in the Atlantic or Arab-Muslim trade in the region and that it was deeply intertwined with the former. Moreover, the volume’s annotated tables alone speak to several years of painstaking research on a variety of sources whose data has been duly parsed and cross-referenced, leaving as little as humanly possible to guesswork.

The author, who admits to an Anglo-French “emphasis” (p. xii), mostly focuses on French trade in the Mascarenes and British trade in India, whereas Dutch and Portuguese trade are only cursorily treated in Chapter 1 and hardly mentioned again. In light of this choice, titling the volume the “European Slave Trading in the Indian Ocean” seems somewhat misleading. By the same token, the title’s chronological delimitations (1500-1850), also do not reflect the focus on the long 18th century. The volume offers scant treatment of the 17th century, whereas the 16th century almost does not feature at all, except in Chapter 1 where the Portuguese and Dutch cases are briefly discussed on the basis of secondary sources. While reading the volume, one has the impression of having in hand a collection of thoroughly researched stand-alone essays rather than a structured monograph, a sensation that dovetails with the author’s own admission (p. xii) that much of the content is revised from previously published articles and book chapters. While the effort to bring together in a single volume over a decade’s worth of scholarship is to be commended, one would have wished for more integration. This is something that could have been achieved, for example, with a proper overarching conclusion, as opposed to one page of concluding remarks added to the last chapter. Regardless of these minor drawbacks, Allen’s is a significant contribution that should find a place in the library of any scholar of the slave trade.

Matteo Salvadore, Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait


Conflict is a perennial problem in Africa. The dire need to assuage conflict should not be undermined. When attempting to alleviate conflict, finding root causes of conflict should be the prerequisite. Whilst most pieces of work illuminate the root causes of conflict from a largely economic, ethnic, and external factor perspective, this well-designed volume, and a must read for development practitioners, brings in a fresh paradigm and perspective with regards to the approach of Africa’s internecine conflicts as being based upon development strategies. It demonstrates the close link between the development strategies that a government implements and the escalation or de-escalation of group violence. The volume falls in line with the works of Paul Collier and Amartya Sen, among others, who have explained conflict occurrence in Africa. The volume consists of a Preface and ten chapters chronologically and logically presented. This multi-authored volume presents a concoction of case studies derived from the length and breadth of the African continent. The chapters are bound by a central theme that illustrates the close relationship between development strategies and intergroup violence. Focusing on eleven African countries, the volume explores the development strategies that have been implemented in relation to violence.
The first chapter by William Ascher and Natalia Mirovitskaya provides an introduction emphasizing the need to frame the richness of the linkages between development strategies and conflict. They argue that governments are not neutral entities and so are affiliated with other groups making the likelihood of development-related violence higher. Robert L Tignor and Clement Henry look at North Africa in Chapter 2 and 3 respectively. While Tignor gives an account of Egypt, Henry provides a comparative analysis of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. They both allude to the fact that the Arab Spring revealed the need for development strategies that encompass inclusive growth as exclusion leads to mayhem.

Chapter four by Nzinga Broussard is on Ethiopia. The Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) policy, which was launched by the Ethiopian government, resulted in the urban sector being side-lined and feeling excluded from the economic process leading to violence and protest. Michael Lofchie’s review of Tanzania explains how the country, despite its tremendous ethno-linguistic diversity and poor economic performance, has long demonstrated deep-rooted peace. Authoritarian rule in Tanzania enabled the government to eliminate any opposition, thereby promoting a unity despite ethnic differences.

In chapter six, John McCauley gives a comparative analysis of the different development strategies implemented in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. The export-led and export-dependent strategies in Cote d’Ivoire provided significant growth and stability, which was short-lived as evidenced by deeper political divisions and ethnic strife later. In Ghana, however, nationalization promoted national unity and evaded collective violence.

Darren Kew and Chris Kwaja provide an overview of development efforts in Nigeria. The authors find that despite many development strategies, the government has done very little to implement policy reforms. Human development indicators have remained appalling fuelling intense intergroup competition and igniting several conflicts. Amy Poteete gives an account of intergroup relations in Botswana. She points on how intergroup violence has been limited despite significant social divisions. Poteete observes that in Botswana, “losing” groups on some issues often see themselves among the “winning” groups on other issues thereby minimizing the occurrence of conflict (p. 183). Takako Mino documents development strategies in South Africa. Mino notes that policies designed to deal with inequalities have reduced the government’s fiscal capacity to devote enough resources to urban-targeted poverty alleviation. The scarcity of employment opportunities has generated intergroup conflict between South Africans and the immigrants seeking economic betterment.

The volume ends with a concluding chapter from Ascher and Mirovitskaya. They note the multiple constructive and destructive pathways connecting economic development to intergroup relations in African context. This brave and wide in scope volume manages to give a rich understanding of how development strategies can be destructive or constructive.

There are however a few weaknesses inherent in this piece of work. Firstly, the book has way too many scholars implying different dynamics, which might prove difficult to comprehend. Secondly, in the introduction the authors criticize Paul Collier’s greed and grievance theory as if it is of little significance in explaining conflict occurrence (pp. 4-6). This is despite the appreciation it has been given in several academic disciplines. In the final analysis, other than these few weaknesses, the book is an excellent piece that is different from other books, which explain conflict occurrence in Africa. This book highlights an under-discussed
dimension, which sees the link between development strategies and conflict escalation or de-escalation.

Elinah Nciizah, Midlands State University


At a time of intense global search for answers to numerous health, economic, social, and other varying challenges that continue to evolve or mutate to face humankind, a book on African local knowledge on livestock health and treatment is a progressive development. The word “African” in the context used in the book, however, is not a sampling of the rich knowledge pouches that exist across the continent. African knowledge, as used by Beinhart and Brown, is restricted to that obtainable among Africans resident in South Africa, from where a sample of a little over two hundred interviews were conducted among rural, mainly smallholder, livestock farmers. Though very minimal by way of representing what is the huge body of veterinary knowledge that lies unexplored, and mostly unrecorded among the one billion residents of Africa, *African Local Knowledge and Livestock Treatment* still makes an important contribution.

Beinhart and Brown are clear in their definition of the local as more to do with the existing reality of veterinary medical practice as against that knowledge that is indigenous to the area and is traceable to the “ancestors.” By expanding a definition of local veterinary knowledge to include “plural practices, hybrid understandings of disease and treatment” (p. 18) among rural farmers, the authors empower the term local and acknowledge local innovations that derive from global influences. This is important as what is indigenous to Africa has evolved over the years and much has been lost, hybridized, or retained, or might not have existed at all. One informant in his seventies when asked about any indigenous plant remedies for ticks replied that he never learnt of medicine for ticks from his father. This can be because since the early 20th century, compulsory and universal dipping of livestock against dipping was enforced in that part of the country. Another informant in his nineties replied likewise (p. 65).

The fact that most rural farmers interviewed simultaneously subscribe to indigenous herbs and western medicine in livestock treatment establishes the reality that is the Africa of today. Across sectors and fields, Africans have mostly embraced western knowledge, but they have not completely let go of that which is indigenous to the continent. In essence, for conversations that center on African development to remain relevant it is necessary to recognize an indigenous, hybrid, and modern Africa, with influences that cuts across the west, the east (China, India, etc.), and the south (Brazil, etc). The emphasis for researchers interested in indigenous knowledge in various sectors should be in understanding that which is indigenous to Africa, but within the context of other existing and emerging influences.

Several of the several interviews conducted by the authors indicate that studies on Africa’s indigenous knowledge in a modern era will have to grapple with the fact that such knowledge is fast eroding. While older Africans blame younger Africans for being “no longer interested in inheriting traditional knowledge” (p. 141), younger men complained that “the old were secretive” (p. 143). The small sample of rural farmers in South Africa represents the reality across Africa. The continent’s indigenous knowledge is dying as fast as the older generation,

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[http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v15i4a5.pdf](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v15i4a5.pdf)
and the young people are strongly attracted to the lure of city life, the trappings of modernity, and the perceived promises of ultra-capitalism.

The title *African Local Knowledge and Livestock Treatment* raises the expectation of an in-depth exposition about the utilization of locally obtainable herbs in livestock disease treatment. While that was highlighted and given some attention, the core message of the book appears to be more of an overview of the state of veterinary medicine among rural African smallholder farmers in South Africa. Lacking is an in-depth exposition on the use and efficacy of the several mentioned herbs and local practices and how the rest of Africa and the globe can benefit from such knowledge. Perhaps, that might be asking too much of the authors, neither of whom have any evidence of formal training in veterinary medicine, and who may have set out to provide only an overview in the hope that it will spur the needed more in-depth research among scholars.

Chika Ezeanya, *University of Rwanda*


Neville Alexander was born in Cradock in the Eastern Cape in 1936, of an Afrikaans-speaking father, David James Alexander, and English-speaking mother, Dimbethi Bisho. His paternal grandfather was Scots and his maternal grandmother a freed slave, raised in the London Missionary Station in Bethelsdorp, on the outskirts of Port Elizabeth. In his youth he would also have heard and spoken isiXhosa, and he was at school with German-speaking nuns, from whom he learned the language. He took a B.A. at the University of Cape Town, where he met, among others, the writer and academic A. C. Jordan, with whom he seems to have shared a passion for bilingual, dual-medium education (p. 50), and went on a Humboldt scholarship to the University of Tubingen for his doctorate. At UCT he had found the study of German both “analytical and inspirational” (p. 44), and his disciplinary allegiance remained continental rather than Anglophone (recalling Rick Turner, perhaps). He became active in the resistance to apartheid on various fronts, and soon after his return to South Africa in 1961 he was imprisoned on Robben Island for ten years. When Neville Alexander died in 2012 he had achieved a distinguished career of progressive activism, which combined the political, the academic, and the educational in a very distinctive way. Recalling his resignation, in the face of heavy-handed ANC bureaucratization, from the Pan-South African Language Board, as it shifted from multilingualism to ethnic representativity, Neville Alexander described the move as “the reaction of an activist, of an alternative person who didn’t accept the ruling paradigm” (p. 152). The impression is borne out by this volume as a whole.

Although entitled “interviews,” Neville Alexander’s “language biography” (p. 1), which forms the first part, seems rather to have been generated by a series of conversations, conducted over a number of years, between the subject and two of the editors, Brigitta and Lucijan Busch. In any event, it gives us a lively and sympathetic picture of an observant and enterprising South African citizen, as he was at least after 1994. The second part of the book offers us a selection of Neville Alexander’s academic and policy papers (chapters from books, speeches), which are all
welcome examples of clarity and precision, as lively in their own way as the autobiographical soliloquy with which the book opens.

Neville Alexander seems never to have been a member of or particularly sympathetic towards the ANC: “this trap of neoliberal hegemony…that compromised negotiated settlement…” (p. 119). He writes that “if it hadn’t been for the suppression of 1976, there’s no doubt that the Black Consciousness Movement rather than the ANC, or the PAC even, would have become the major force” (p. 106). His first allegiances were to the Unity Movement and the Teachers’ League, and while a student at Tubingen he published in the Trotskyist (Fourth International) Labour Review, and under a pseudonym (he used the name of his uncle), a paper on developing “a revolutionary mood and revolutionary potential in South Africa” (p. 61). Back home, having refused job offers from Germany, Ghana and India he was convinced that “we had to start a guerrilla army” (p. 67). Although he seems to have died believing that “a genuine world revolution [is] centuries away” (p. 174), my impression is that Neville Alexander’s principles and programs were Marxist and Trotskyist. “I became a socialist, a genuine radical socialist” (p. 173). Thus the working class gives us “the people who are going to change the world” (p. 186). In 1979, as today, national liberation requires “nothing else than the abolition of capitalism itself” (p. 199).

Neville Alexander’s “linguistic” activism—“I’ve never approached language from a purely linguistic angle, I’ve never been a linguist in that sense” (p. 172)—was both focused and adventurous. He fostered many positive and progressive initiatives: among them the South African Council for Higher Education, the Language in Education in Africa Project, and the National Language Project. He was concerned for the empowerment of indigenous languages, rather than for their local color or decorative possibilities, for the recognition of Afrikaans as an African language, and he strove for “mother-tongue based bilingual education” (p. 297). Now, as much as ever, Neville Alexander’s voice should be heard: “what is conducive to the humanization of men and women – international culture – is the product of the classes that are committed to liberation. In the modern capitalist world these classes are the working classes” (p. 186). We can be grateful for this excellently produced book.

Tony Voss, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University


Many conservation experts have characterized Southern Africa as the laboratory for global conservation efforts. The southern Africa region is one of the world’s most delicate landscapes, consisting of a mosaic of peoples, plants and animals species; characterized by desert, hyper arid, arid, semi-arid, and sub-humid areas. The delicate nature of the landscape is further complicated by the region’s troubled colonial land policies. Land rights and ownership are arguably southern Africa’s most sensitive political topics. The delicate nature of the southern African landscape, together with its complicated history of land rights and ownership has attracted the attention of expert conservationists and political ecologists around the world. One such expert is Bram Buscher, a land use and sustainable development expert with extensive experience in the region. Buscher has written this fascinating book that explains a fairly new
conservation paradigm—the peace parks concept—to show that transboundary conservation can be a powerful tool in resolving the longstanding conflicts over land rights and ownership. Employing different neoliberal conservation frames such as socio-ecological dynamics, political economic realities, contradictory realities, and reified representation, to name but a few, Buscher examines the different governance structures that influence land management and conservation planning in southern Africa. Buscher begins the book by clearly outlining the merits of the peace park concept and referring to them as “the new telos of conservation” (p.2). Buscher’s strategy is meant to captures the reader’s attention, making sure that the reader ventures deeper into the book. Buscher’s next efforts are to establish, using the Moloti-Drankensburg Transfrontier Project, the different modes of political conducts underpinning the politics of peace parks in the southern African region.

Given the lack of clearly demarcated borders during and after independence, one would expect Buscher to delve deeper into the history of the region’s land crisis, which is rooted in its colonial land policies, to explain the essence of the transboundary park initiatives in the region. Buscher did not do that. Instead, Buscher focuses more on the region’s contemporary land management issues. Although Buscher devotes two chapters in the book (chapters 1 and 2) to colonial and postcolonial issues, the focus is on the role of colonial and postcolonial political economy with regards to neoliberal conservation. Buscher fails to properly inform the reader about the erstwhile colonial and postcolonial administrations’ infamous land policies in the region. Buscher, nevertheless, in five chapters (chapters 3 to 7), brilliantly explores the semantics behind the workings of the region’s ethnographic structures as they relate to neoliberal conservation. Buscher relies on a variety of methodologies and technics to emphasize the ethnographic interventions, including observation, narration, enumeration, reason, and example. Although Buscher only brushes over the land crisis issue, the use of a nexus approach that integrates ethnography and political economy to understand the operational process of peace parks and the politics of neoliberal conservation is what sets this book apart from related works.

Not only is this work a treatise for students of conservation, political ecology and political economy of land management in southern Africa; it is also, because of its practical approach, that is, project focus, a guide to policy makers and land managers around the world. Buscher’s work shades light on a new conservation paradigm—the peace parks concept, in a complicated geopolitical setting—the southern Africa region.

Richard Mbatu, University of South Florida St. Petersburg


Prior to reading Stones of Contention: A History of Africa’s Diamonds, my knowledge of the history and role of Africa’s diamonds was informed primarily by my classmates’ strong position to purchase only “conflict free” diamonds, my limited reading, which almost always associated diamonds with conflict, and by the movie “Blood Diamond.” This book has provided me with the requisite information to be able to depart from my mostly one-sided, conflict-only view of
the history of diamonds in Africa. Granted, my opinions are still as strong as they were vis-à-vis the colonial master’s role in setting the stage for conflict in Africa.

The author’s presentation of the history of diamonds in Africa was very succinct and well balanced. The book is a modest one hundred and ninety nine pages spanning nine chapters. The chronological format (in terms of history) of the book makes for a very good read. The first chapter serves as the introduction and chapter nine serves as the conclusion. The author makes it clear that his aim is to present information for the purposes of helping readers understand rather than presenting the information in a good-versus-bad-for-Africa manner.

Chapter two presents the history of diamond mining in Africa prior to the late nineteenth century “scramble” for Africa. Essentially, the intrusion into Africa by European explorers prior to 1867, fueled by perceptions of Africa as a precious stones haven, was a bust, the rush for slaves overshadowed the rush for gold and precious metals. It further presents the relationship between European explorers and Africans and shows how in the early years “Africans were able to protect their mineral wealth with little trouble” (p. 38).

Chapter three goes deeper into the history of the discovery of the Eureka diamond in South Africa and the ensuing rush by both foreigners and Africans that inevitably resulted in discord between the parties involved. This discord led to the enactment of laws which unfortunately limited the role of Africans “to migrant laborers and/or extra-legal participants” while creating large organizations which controlled mining in South Africa (p. 49). Chapter four presents the compelling story of the birth, rise, and dominance of the De Beers enterprise. With the rise and dominance of De Beers also came the increased marginalization of black African workers who suffered “corporal abuse, a form of pain and suffering from which white employees were exempt” (p. 75).

In chapter five, Cleveland shifts the focus from South Africa to the entire continent. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 divvied up Africa on paper among six colonial masters. The result was the further marginalization of the African mineworker through “schemes that obligated Africans to work in order to earn the wages necessary to satisfy these levies” (p. 99). The rest of the chapter shows the confluence between the politics and economics of mining and the African laborer.

A book such as this would be incomplete without the lived experiences of the African mineworker. In chapter six, Cleveland presents the experiences of black African mineworkers. The inclusion of this piece of history, from the horse’s mouth, brings an extra dimension of compassion for their working conditions. Meanwhile chapter 7 discusses how diamonds and other precious mineral resources have been at the center of most conflicts in the African continent since the age of independence from colonial masters. For the most part, rebel leaders and dictators used these diamonds to hold onto power and foster repressive regimes. While chapter 7 focused on conflict in the African continent, particularly Sierra Leone, Angola, and Zimbabwe, chapter 8 focuses on the contrary, peace. It discusses how revenues from diamond mining have been used in Botswana and Namibia to bring about development, prosperity and peace.

This book draws from a wealth of sources to present a poignant and often disheartening story of the history of diamonds in Africa. The inclusion of a study guide section along with discussion questions makes it an appropriate book for students studying African history. As
someone of African origin, this book has enlightened me on this subject. What is lacking in this book is a section on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Nevertheless, I highly recommend the book to anyone interested in a balanced and well-researched history of diamonds in Africa. I also recommend the book to Africanist scholars, teachers, and professors of African history, practitioners in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, and anyone interested in Africa.

Nkaze Chateh Nkengtego, Nova Southeastern University


Bye words like work is worship or work is virtue are known to all, and there have been many writings on work ethic or occupation and the role of religion or faith, unfolding how faith serves as a significant motivator to people while choosing or continuing their professions. Even today many Asian Muslims rear goats and take pride in this job due to the belief that Prophet Mohamad in his childhood had reared goats. Laura Cochrane’s extensive ethnography of seventeen months based on her sociological study unfolds the similar notion and explains how faith inspires people’s occupation while studying Senegalese society, particularly the Muslim communities known as Thie’s and Ndem. In her jargonless and lucid paperback edition she crisply presents a Muslim setup in six brief chapters, highlighting different themes purely in a dissertation format like introducing the societies of Thie’s and Ndem along with their social relationships and traditions. Further, she also narrates the belief systems of the two communities and then discusses religious pluralism in terms of Sufism in north and West Africa along with the historical continuities and indigenous faiths, etc. Cochrane also depicts how social history and religious personalities influence peoples’ lives in Senegal and her finding can be representative of most of the traditional societies even today who sustain their legacies and art. She explores the weaving world of the communities in chapter three and summarizes shared and religious beliefs in chapter four. Chapter five contains her notes on community history along with weaving lineages, and in the final chapter she talks of weaving work as a focal point of peoples’ beliefs and explores its economic realities that the people face while continuing this craft.

Cochrane’s universe of the study is central Senegal, where she observes how weavers not just craft cotton but live their lives in the yarn of Sufism towards which they show tremendous reverence. She carefully observes peoples’ religious beliefs and practices and how such practices and beliefs influence their daily lives. She talks about other faiths as well; however, Sufism and its influence on peoples’ work and practices becomes her central argument, which she continues till end. This work brings out a picture of weavers/artists and their established patterns of behavior and belief. She also correctly brings out that beliefs of such people (artists/weavers) are not exclusively religious beliefs but also based on familial, ethnic, and regional bonds which also motivate them for their weaving profession. Not only this, but people, especially the Ndem community, are committed to the craft out of their spiritual beliefs and they even relate it to charity or treat such efforts as the service to Islam and are firm about the idea that art based
local developmental work is a religious act. They also treat their work as an effective tool to
confront poverty (p. 66).

The author has rightly titled the book “Weaving through Islam in Senegal,” as the
communities studied demonstrate an inside look into them and displays a staunch connection
between belief and art. The book provides a valuable and absorbing window into a region
which is less known and less explored as far as such anthropological/sociological themes or
areas are concerned. The book may not match Max Weber’s classic The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism or Emile Durkheim’s masterpiece The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life, however, it sociologically demonstrates the significance of a religion (Islam) in peoples’
lives and also tells us that there is something archetypal about people’s craze for art work that
also is a part of their religious belief. The book is useful for social sciences, to humanities, to
travelers, to researchers, etc. Apart from anthropology the book is a masterpiece for the students
of the sociology of religion and Muslim studies and Sufism experts in particular.

Adfer Rashid Shah, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

Claire Laurier Decoteau. 2013. Ancestors and Antiretrovirals: The Biopolitics of HIV/AIDS in

Claire Laurier Decoteau explores HIV/AIDS through a critical lens that incorporates an analysis
of neoliberalism, politics, gender, sexuality, and health in post-apartheid South Africa. She uses
the term “postcolonial paradox” throughout the book to describe South Africa’s position as
competing in a neoliberal world and attempting to address structural inequalities and poverty,
while also struggling to create a national identity (p. 7). Through ethnographic fieldwork she
connects broad, macro-level theories and world events to the micro-level experiences of citizens
living in two South African informal settlements, Sol Plaatjie and Lawley.

Decoteau discusses the daily lives of people living in squatter settlements such as Sol
Plaatjie and Lawley and the complex realities they must live with, especially if they are HIV
positive. One barrier that citizens face in an increasingly neoliberal South Africa is the
privatization of electricity and water. Because many residents living in squatter settlements are
unable to afford pre-paid electricity and water, their health deteriorates more rapidly than it
would if the government provided these fundamental services.

Decoteau utilizes Michel Foucault’s theory of “thanatopolitics” to explain the South African
government’s abandonment of its citizens. In the context of this book, “thanatopolitics” refers to
the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, who allowed 365,000 South Africans to die because of his
failure to rollout anti-retrovirals (ARVs) (p. 83). Because Mbeki was occupied by forging an
“African Renaissance” in which South Africa would emerge as a competitive neoliberal market,
he adopted a mindset of entrepreneurialism in which poor South Africans would either take
responsibility or be left behind to die (p. 99). By placing the responsibility of economic
participation in the post-apartheid state on the citizens, the government avoided being held
accountable for providing basic services such as water, electricity or health care. During his
presidency, Mbeki encouraged HIV-positive citizens to use indigenous forms of healing for
treatment, in order to oppose what he saw as a racist system of biomedicine and public health,
despite his desire to compete in a neoliberal world market.
Decoteau argues, however, that the struggles concerning HIV/AIDS and anti-retrovirals have deeper meaning in the identity formation of South Africa and its citizens (p. 115). In order for South Africans to emerge in the globalized world they have to grapple with the tropes of modernity and traditionalism, both in the context of medical treatment and gender. She explains how the tropes of modernity and traditionalism have been introduced to make biomedicine and traditional healing seem incommensurable, although both South African citizens and indigenous healers alike have been integrating the two treatments to form a hybrid regimen (referred throughout the book as “hybridity”) since apartheid. In the framework of medicine, Decoteau introduces the term “biomedical citizenship” to describe how the West has forced the global South to accept a biomedical hegemony in order to gain social citizenship (p. 137).

Using a gendered lens, Decoteau focuses on the presidency of Jacob Zuma, and his enactment of “traditional” masculinity to re-shape the national identity of South Africa (p. 163). She argues that sexuality and gender performance, much like the struggle over medicine and treatment, is a symbolic battle incited by the “postcolonial paradox” of attempting to compete in the world market while also managing national identity formation.

Throughout her book, Decoteau complicates the topic of HIV/AIDS by examining both the daily lives of residents in South African informal settlements and the global political economy in which they reside. She uses various theories of previous scholars to expand on ethnographic excerpts in order to provide a complete representation of the complexities of HIV/AIDS within systems of structural inequality. The themes of modernity, traditionalism, and hybridity consistently emerge throughout the book to demonstrate how South Africans deal with the “postcolonial paradox” and national identity formation.

The strength of this book is Decoteau’s approach to situating the experiences of South African citizens within the contexts of poverty, informal settlements, gender, and HIV/AIDS within a larger global context. Each chapter features a brief history of the topic at hand in order to provide a better contextual understanding of the complexity of the issue. A weakness of this book is the occasional introduction of theoretical/ideological topics without further background or explanation in the context of what she is discussing. One example of this is on page 170, where she uses the term “crisis of social reproduction” from Mark Hunter, but does not provide an explicit clarification on what this term means. Because of this, the book may be difficult for a layperson to read. However, this book is an important addition to the current literature on HIV/AIDS, poverty, medicine, neoliberalism, and national socio-political structures. Decoteau provides a contextual view of the issues South African citizens face, and allows an opportunity for interdisciplinary discourse on the topic of HIV/AIDS in South Africa.

Natalie Dickson, University of California, Los Angeles


This volume aspires to examine education, languages, literatures and music as a means of economic and political agency. The editors indicate in their introduction that the book’s key
inquiry is: “How do Education and the Arts promote equity and empowerment across African political economic landscapes?” The contributors approach this by “calling for action” or telling “stories of agency” (p. 2).

The first section, “Education as Empowerment: Enforcing Rights and Building Community,” calls for action in claiming that education is key in combating poverty. The authors make this case by stressing the implementation of the fundamental right to education by law and the necessity to enforce it (Adam in Chapter 1), but also by arguing for the potential of adult and community education (Akande and Ogunrin in Chapter 4) as well as for rural education (Simeon-Fayomi and Akande in Chapter 5). Musa and Umukoro as well as Hasaba apply their backgrounds in education and political science in an attempt to both uncover and explain shortcomings of current education programs such as the Education for All by 2015 (Chapter 2) or the problem of gendered poverty in Uganda (Chapter 3).

Section two “Messages of Empowerment in Languages and Literature” introduces three stories of empowerment that demonstrate how current orders and developments are contested. Albuhyeh (Chapter 6) illustrates how minority language speakers challenge imminent language death by innovation. Adam (Chapter 7) highlights the communicating power of a novel by the Nigerian author Ben Okri, in which he addresses corruption and poverty in his country. Tchouaffe’s contribution (Chapter 8) describes how Cameroonian musicians and journalists practice resistance against the Biya regime, the “politics of the belly” and the official propaganda. Despite being harassed by state authorities, they have created an autonomous public sphere in the fight for democracy and human rights in Cameroon.

The “call for action” section, “Art Empowerment for the Economy’s Sake,” argues for the arts’ potential to contribute to the development of the economy. Whereas Enamhe (Chapter 9) campaigns for more professionals in arts management as a means of economic empowerment, Owoeye (Chapter 10) describes how Adire textile already contributes to the economy in Nigeria as it creates markets and employment.

The last section, “Music: Economic and Political Empowerment Venues,” again calls for action. Oikelome shows in Chapter 11 the timelessness of Fela’s lyrics articulation of social and political problems in Nigeria. The last three chapters, especially Akombo in Chapter 12, suggest possible measures to exploit musical potential for economic purposes. Along those lines, Olusujo (Chapter 13) recommends government investments in professional musical training for Youth, and Babalola (Chapter 14) argues for the promotion of Youth musicians.

In summary, Education, Creativity, and Economic Empowerment in Africa attempts to engage a broad selection of topics from experts in anthropology, arts, education, ethnomusicology, history, law, linguistics, literature, and political sciences. That is precisely why I would have expected the book to provide a multidisciplinary survey on how African agents modify and deal with the structural conditions they find themselves in on the basis of empirical data from various fields of study. The book contains both topical and regional redundancies; so does every contribution in section one deal with poverty and its consequences and ten of all fourteen chapters focus on Nigeria.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of the contributions formulate big claims and recommendations for improvement, and also provide rich empirical material, but in the end inadequately develops their arguments. The first section is especially disappointing in that
regard: all five contributions emphasize the severe effects of poverty, rather than elaborating on evidence-based outcomes that demonstrate the value of education. The contributors’ general claim that education is an effective means in the fight against poverty states an assumption rather than a strong argument. Chapters 12 to 14 ambitiously promote music’s potential for economic empowerment, but their claims lack evidence. The value of Oikelome’s claim of Fela’s lyrics being prophetic is generally questionable. However, the contributions in section two successfully make their cases by applying the data and in-depth descriptions convincingly to the overall argument.

Susann Ludwig, University of Basel


In Transitional Justice for Child Soldiers, author Kristen J. Fisher brings to the fore a refreshing paradox and debate with regards to the child soldier phenomenon. Whilst most literature on the phenomenon focuses on the general plight of child soldiers as being innocent victims, the author brings in an interesting anti-thesis to the discourse that challenges the non–responsible child narrative. Throughout the book, Fischer argues that child soldiers must not be looked at as innocent victims of war but as capable agents of harm and atrocity who must be found accountable for their actions. This is a necessary prerequisite for a smooth transition and the attainment of positive peace.

The book is built of an introduction, seven chapters, and an overall conclusion. The introduction illuminates the major line of argument, which challenges the non-responsible child narrative given to child soldiers and how this narrative is detrimental to peace. Chapter one is more of a conceptual framework, as terms such as child soldier are conceptualized from various angles including that of international institutions and the general. It also gives an overview of the experiences that child soldiers go through. In chapter two, the author shows how the non-responsible child narrative leads to rejection at the point of reintegration as receiving communities do not at all view child soldiers as innocent victims but want them to be accountable for their crimes. In chapter three the author questions the moral and legal responsibility of child soldiers. The enigma brought out in this chapter is whether it is moral or legal to hold accountable child soldiers due to their age, collective pressure, mental maturity and circumstance of actions committed under duress. The most interesting concept questioned in this chapter is that of mens rea (p. 72), (whether child soldiers committed acts with the psychological and conscious will to do so).

The next three chapters were crafted to give major validation to the notion that child soldiers should go through the process of transitional justice. In chapter four, the author buttresses her thoughts in earlier chapters that despite the various sociological forces that portray the prosecuting of child soldiers as being wrong, there are societal benefits for doing so as this post atrocity accountability creates an expressive value to communities that suffered at the hands of these child soldiers. It communicates a retributive-expansive justification to both the perpetrator and the community. In chapter five, the author further upholds the importance of holding child soldiers accountable. Although child soldiers are not the architects of wars, it is...
of great value to social reconstruction to ensure that their actions are not ignored and extreme 
wrong doers are brought to book. In chapter six, the author alludes to the importance of 
restorative justice as a way of dealing with trauma and truth telling. This chapter employs an 
interesting debate that challenges the African thinking, which frowns on truth telling and other 
forms of restorative justice. The African culture upholds the simple notion that wrong doers 
should just apologize and the community should forget about the past so as to move on.

Chapter seven discusses the practical element of accountability for child soldiers. The 
chapter argues that the choice of accountability mechanisms should be expressively significant 
but also take into consideration elements of age, severity of crimes, and the will to commit the 
crimes. A mixture of hybrid mediation (African and Western styles) and truth telling might be 
used to hold child soldiers accountable. Chapter eight discusses the plight of girl child soldiers 
and the major line of argument is that, such children deserve justice, as they are not innocent 
victims of wars but also major perpetrators of violence. International legal institutions largely 
view girl child soldiers as helpless victims of war and do not allow them any chance to access 
post conflict rehabilitation and recovery ideals. The author argues against this completely.

This book is a refreshing piece that provides a boisterous stance against the conventional 
means of dealing with child soldiers employed by international legal institutions. It opens up 
the mind to new ideas that encourage fellow academics to challenge African cultures and their 
benefits to the attainment of positive peace. It in fact calls for the establishment of a hybrid 
system of post conflict justice that infuses both Western and African thought in the design of 
accountability mechanisms for child soldiers. It provides readers with new insights into the 
child soldier phenomenon, challenging the range of literature that portrays the child soldier as 
an innocent blameless victim. It is a logically framed masterpiece that would be of much benefit 
to political scientists, peace practitioners, anthropologists and sociologists.

Ramphal Sillah, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe

Felix Gerdes. 2013. Civil War and State Formation: The Political Economy of War and Peace in 

Civil War and State Formation contains five chapters, which is consistent with Gerdes’s five-
chapter dissertation that culminated in this book. Chapter one is the introduction. In chapter 
two, he addresses war, peace, and young states. He moves into chapter three where he 
addresses the first Liberian civil war by describing the rise of Charles Taylor. The fall of Taylor 
becomes the subject of the fourth chapter, which also addresses the birth of Liberia’s modern 
democracy, the rise of the first African female president and her present rule. Finally, chapter 
five concludes the book and situates the journey of Liberia in the theory of statehood, 
democracy and bureaucracy.

Gerdes uses the first chapter of the book as the foundation of Liberia’s wars in light of 
economic gain for both warlords and governments. He traces these wars to neo-liberal 
economics and provides hope for the reader when he describes not just Liberia’s failures but her 
successes in terms of political progress demonstrated in democratic elections. In a circuitous 
manner, the author is finally able to delineate what the other chapters will cover. In the second 
chapter, the writer uses sub-topics to delineate specific topics, albeit in a convoluted manner.
He expatiates on domination in terms of Africa’s traditions, the influence of colonization, and their combined effect on modern-day Africa with its propensity towards corruption.

The third chapter returns to the history of Liberia as a land for freed slaves; and how the presence of these freed slaves (with their superiority attitudes) antagonized the indigenes already occupying the land. The author shares with readers on how this antagonism led to the seemingly never-ending conflicts. The author then debunks media sensitization of the Liberian-Sierra Leonean conflict, and, basing it on data, positions it in light of society, economics, and bureaucracy. The author finally situates the Liberian crisis within former colonized Africa and the consequent loyalties to particular warring factions, thus explaining how the Liberian war spilled over to Sierra Leone and the not so strong effects on Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, and Libya. Gerdes describes the rise of Taylor based on the principles of domination and statehood discussed in the previous chapter. He further addresses the economic gain not just from diamonds (which received a huge outcry from the international community because it was contingent on conflict in Sierra Leone), but from iron ore, timber, rubber, coffee, cocoa, and even racketeering and looting of national assets. The writer finally describes the transition of Taylor’s war lordship to democratic rule. Gerdes traces the informal nature of Taylor’s rule into the next chapter where he argues for the pros and cons of Taylor’s strategies.

The fourth chapter explains Taylor’s fall as a disintegration of leadership as he tried unsuccessfully to appoint ministerial positions in post-conflict Liberia. This is an era characterized by brutalities unleashed on the unfaithful. The disintegration within Taylor’s camp allowed new warring factions to overpower Taylor in the second Liberian war. Additionally, the African community ensured disarmament while Taylor sought asylum in Nigeria. The writer posits the history of Liberia in terms of the current leadership and therefore allows the reader to know a little bit of history as well as its connection to present day Liberian politics.

The author concludes the book by summarizing the role of the wars in Liberia’s journey to statehood. He situates the story and statehood of Liberia in past and current literature and proposes democracy and bureaucracy as foundational to state building with its connection to accountability, election, and reelection.

Gerdes establishes the fact that his book is the result of his dissertation. Thus, readers will see sub-topics that address specific topics, which invariably tie into the whole subject of statehood. At the beginning of each chapter, the author provides an overview of the whole chapter as it connects with previous chapters. A limitation about the book is that it is not an easy read. Whereas a reader with a sociology background will identify with the author’s expressions, a lay reader may find it a bit cumbersome as Gerdes weaves an intricate web into statehood and Weber’s concepts of bureaucracy and democracy. Overall, the book provides in-depth literature on Liberia.

Hannah E. Acquaye, University of Central Florida

The Story of the Nigerian Civil War from 1967-1970 has been revisited time and again from various perspectives. In *The Biafran War*, Gould uses archival information coupled with interviews and personal knowledge of key players in the war to clarify the events that led up to and prolonged the war. The first half of the book, Chapters 1-4, chronologically details events before and during the war. The second part of the book from Chapters 5-7 revisits the same narrative of the war topically, addressing the factors that contributed to the longevity of the war like the two leaders Gowon and Ojukwu’s personalities. He also uses the opportunity to dispel popular myths about the war including clarifying the number of casualties and the international influences on the war. The result is a well-crafted historical account of a young Nigeria struggling to define its own future while burdened by colonial legacies.

The book demonstrates the role colonial legacies played in Nigeria’s internal conflicts that caused the civil war. Chapter one details how Britain’s indirect rule through the Northern region ignited tensions among Nigerians that would later cause the war. After the colonial era, afraid to lose power to other regions, especially people from the East whose higher levels of education had granted them senior positions in the North, Northerners began to attack Easterners who were residing in Northern territory. This attack on Easterners compounded by other issues spurred the Eastern Region or Biafra’s choice to secede from the Nigerian Federation.

One of book’s major contributions is its analysis of the international influences on the war. In chapter five, as Gould discusses factors that contributed to the longevity of the war he speaks to the role the international community played in the war. Gould provides in-depth explanation of the British government’s strategy during the Biafran war. Though, they remained an avid supporter of the Nigerian Federation, the British also courted Biafra at times in an effort to protect their economic interests, mainly in Nigeria’s growing oil industry. France and Russia sponsored the Eastern Region’s accruement of arms in hopes of furthering their goals for partnership. Still, international media proved to be an equally powerful player in prolonging the war as it skewed mass opinions from one side to the other especially exaggerating the number of war casualties and the showcasing starving Biafran children, which caused a flood of support in the form of humanitarian aid.

In its highlighting various international governments’ opportunism as the Nigerians battled, the book borders on depriving Nigerian leaders of agency in determining their nation’s future. On one hand, Gould emphasizes Gowon and Ojukwu’s personal profiles in chapter six, presenting them as change agents whose actions dictated the trajectory of the war. On the other hand, these leaders’ control of Nigeria’s future seems to wane in comparison with outside parties’ power. Gould shares that shortly after the war began, the British discover that they had greatly underestimated their previous valuations of Nigeria’s oil reserves and use the classified information to manipulate war activities. In its account of the role outsiders played in Nigeria’s civil war, the book leads readers to question the extent to which Nigerians were in charge of their nation’s destiny.

If there were any aspect of the book that could have been improved, it would be that the book lacks a description of regular Nigerians during the war, especially the minority groups.
that constitute over forty percent of the Nigerian population. What concessions were these minority groups making and how did that influence the war? Telling this part of the story would have further developed his accounts concerning the reasons war broke out and ended. Furthermore, it would have helped to convince readers that Nigerians played a heavier role than the international community in determining the course of the war.

Overall, Gould presents the Biafran War as one that plays out on different stages both within and outside Nigeria. This book is able to weigh in on the broader topic of how African nations arrived at their current state by presenting the case of Nigeria. Thus the book will be a welcomed addition to any African History or Politics course readings. With this book, Gould combines thorough research with storytelling skills that result in an intimate narrative, which makes readers feel as though they have joined the Biafran War’s major players for a deep discussion over tea.

Domale Dube Keys, University of California Los Angeles


Adam Habib is the right person to have undertaken the task that has issued in this book, which he describes as “a culmination of at least two decades of debates, reflections and thoughts about resistance in South Africa, its political and socio-economic evolution, and the conundrums and dilemmas relating to the making of this society.” (p. ix) He has managed “to bridge academic and public discourse” (p. x) while speaking truth to power. The “Introduction” sketches a sad picture of what South has become twenty years into what Professor Habib calls the country’s “suspended revolution.” A “high-stakes leadership drama” has led Jacob Zuma to “the presidential throne.” (p. 1) While the royal seat sounds wrong for a republic, it suits with polygamy, “reciprocal altruism,” a palatial kraal, nepotism, and the peddling of place. Paradoxically the ANC has followed “the Marxist revolutionary tradition that sees the state as merely an agency for capture by the party” (p. 66) and become “a grubby instrument of enrichment that speaks the language of empowerment and democracy, while its leadership and cadres plunder the nation’s resources and undermine both the judiciary and the media” (p. 3). While Professor Habib’s title looks for “Hopes and Prospects,” he is surely right that “through the prism of its leaders…the country’s future looks fairly bleak” (p. 3), given the grim picture of “governance, political accountability and service delivery” painted here. While there has been an at least apparent shift to the left there have been few gains for the poor, in fact “the primary victims of apartheid’s distributional regime have now become the underclasses of post-apartheid South Africa” (p. 17). Even union workers are no closer to joining the middle class.

It would be too easy to extend this gloomy account, but Professor Habib seeks to explain how South Africa has become what it is. The first two phases of the construction of the post-Apartheid state were achieved by the Interim Constitution of 1993, followed by the Constitution of 1996. Under Thabo Mbeki structural reform placed “the presidency at the heart of governance and public management” (p. 53). One aspect of South Africa’s history since then has been an intermittent attempt to forge a sustainable social pact, in which development is balanced with growth. Professor Habib’s judgment, however, is that “the social pacts
unraveled, the unions’ political influence was weakened, and poverty and inequality increased” (p. 122). Professor Ashwin Desai’s 2002 judgment—“It is extremely unlikely that open confrontation with the repressive power of the post-apartheid state can be avoided”—seems to have been borne out.¹ Marikana may not be the last confrontation. There has been at least a failure of will in the need to reconcile state-civil society relations so that post-apartheid South Africa has been “normalized” in the neo-liberal capitalist environment, like other transitional democracies. This has complicated foreign policy, as South Africa is caught between insulating itself against and enlisting itself in globalization.

Professor Habib concludes with a characteristic collocation of chapters. Chapter 7 is “aimed at activists and political leaders, detailing an alternative political agenda and programme for democracy as well as inclusive development” (p. 32). The political elites must be made “more accountable and responsive to the concerns of citizens” (p. 201) by facing “substantive uncertainty” generated by mobilized citizens and extra-institutional activism on the one hand and elite competition on the other. The overall objectives of the constitution need to be upheld especially when individual clauses seem to be in conflict. The conclusion considers the lessons of South Africa “for theories of democratic transition, social change and social justice traditions” (p. 32). Is “a progressive nationalism” possible, or should we be callous about nationalism, as capitalism is, or look beyond it, as Trotskyism does, to the working class as a world-changing force?

Professor Habib’s book offers a clear narrative, accessible academic analysis and a fair report on the state of the nation. Although the word “revolution” is in the title, the term, as Steve Lebelo argues in a forceful review, “has no enduring explanatory value throughout the narrative.”² One of the few references in the book to the idea comes in a quotation from a South African Communist Party document of 2006: “if it is to have any prospect of addressing the dire legacy of colonial dispossession and apartheid oppression, a national democratic strategy has to be revolutionary, that is to say, it must systematically transform class, racial and gendered power” (p. 205). How close have we come?

Notes

Tony Voss, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University


Human history has been marked by endless struggles for freedom. Although the 1996 Constitution of South Africa protects academic freedom, the exclusion of the humanities by reform policy makers constitutes a big challenge for humanists and social scientists. Therefore, Higgins’ Academic Freedom in a Democratic South Africa is a scholarly book, bringing to the
readers’ attention the limitations of academic freedom and the humanities under apartheid and the African National Congress (ANC).

The way the book is presented enables the readers to quickly interpret its contents as a fight between the universities and the State, and a competition between the STEM disciplines and the NAIL disciplines. In reality, it is about the marginalization of the humanities, and what caused it is not perceived until one gets to chapter five, where the author argues that “the force of this excluding consensus was strong enough to inhibit arguments and insights generated within two key institutions most associated with the globalisation of higher education policy, the World Bank and the OECD” [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] (p. 170). These institutions are therefore seen as the proponents of scientific disciplines, excluding the humanities. The governments are just agents of these institutions.

The author proves to be a defender of the humanities. In the well researched, enlightening, most important, and formal concluding chapter five, the author has indeed accomplished his intention of “making the case for the humanities” (p. 141) giving evidence of the tremendous contributions of the humanities worldwide. Therefore, this very chapter may make a book on its’ own. Higgins argues that “the advanced forms of literacy” (p. 80) cannot be found in science and technology, but in the humanities and social sciences, and they “constitute the very ground of educational possibility, the substance of both efficient and reflexive communication, as well as a significant element in critical and creative thinking” (p. 80). Other strengths of the book include the presentation of historical analyses of concepts such as academic freedom, institutional culture, and neo-liberalism as well as writing. Higgins argues that the humanists help “to train new generation of intellectuals, civil leaders and change agents for building a just democratic society” (p. 142). He carefully corrects spelling errors from other sources. The success of the book also lies in the clear distinction between academic freedom and freedom for everyone, and the prospect for a change for an equal opportunity as can be seen in Higgins’ suggestions, and in the resistance of humanists to “policy internationalism” (p. 170) or “the globalization of higher education policy” (p. 170) which has a scientific bias.

However, the unnecessary part two of the book which is about Interviews is the author’s weakness as he asked many questions that are answered by such humanists as Terry Eagleton and Edward Said to complete his book, while he is also a humanist who is familiar with critical literacy and holds the Arderne Chair in Literature. In other words, John Higgins, Terry Eagleton and Edward Said would have co-authored this book. Since the book highlights both the national and international dimensions of academic freedom, the author would have given global solutions not limited to a democratic South Africa. In addition, Higgins did not mention whether the restriction of academic freedom in South Africa also concerns non-government founding institutions of higher education.

Easy to read and interesting, the book is divided into two parts preceded by an introduction. Part one entitled Essays, comprises five chapters: “The Scholar-Warrior versus the children of Mao: Conor Cruise O’Brien in South Africa,” “Academic freedom in the New South Africa,” “It’s literacy, stupid!’ Declining the humanities in NRF research policy, institutional culture as keyword,” and Making the case for the humanities.” Part two, which is about Interviews, includes three chapters: “A grim parody of the humanities’ – Terry Eagleton,” “Criticism and democracy – Edward W Said,” and “Living out our differences’ – Jakes
Gerwel.” These eight chapters are bound together by critical literacy, which Higgins describes as “the analysis and interpretation of ideas and representations in the necessarily intricate combination of their historical, theoretical and textual dimensions” (p. 103). The picture at the back of the book can be interpreted as the forced submission of academics-humanists to a totalitarian state that prevents humanists from enjoying academic freedom. The book has no bibliography at the end, but each chapter has a rich list of notes and references which may make the book easier to understand, and an index indicating the end of the volume.

_Academic Freedom in a Democratic South Africa_ is highly recommended for anybody who is interested in literature, history, sociology, philosophy, pragmatics, political science, critical discourse analysis, journalism, communication, and for academics in the countries, the Constitutions of which have no provisions for academic freedom.

Voudina Ngarsou, Emi Koussi University and the University of N’Djamena


Denmark boasts a significant historical scholarship on colonial history today, including the history of the slave trade. This scholarship, however, has not yet integrated the close family connections, which for many generations since the 16th century have existed and developed between Danish men and Ghanaian women, and which have made the history of Denmark and that of Ghana intimately and inevitably interrelated. *Daughters of the Trade* addresses this gap by telling the story of interracial marriages of Ga, Osu, and Aka women to Danish soldiers, officers, administrators, and traders between 1700 and 1850 at Christianborg, the Danish slave trading post and the major slave trade center in West Africa in the context of the Atlantic World.

Mixed marriage or _cassare_, as it used to be called, a Portuguese practice, not only connected Europeans to Africans when the Atlantic slave trade was at its zenith, but was part and parcel of the economic, cultural and power dynamics of the Atlantic world, where interests, cultural commodities, practices, and mores, and social status, position and race interplayed. The encounter between local western African culture on the one hand and European culture on the other, which started on mutual terms, where Danish men and African women married, had families, and shared their world without having to convert to the other’s culture, was in the course of the Atlantic slave trade transformed into an imbalanced, unequal and power-relation based one, where race was core social marker.

Ipsen’s book tells the narratives of Sensitive Brock and Edward Carstensen, Koko Osu and Frantz Boye, and Ashiokai Wondo and Frederick Reindorph. Their stories are part of a larger history of the racialization of social difference that took place in West Africa during the slave trade period. Class and gender, which first characterized the relationships of these first generations of married men and women at Christianborg, soon mellowed and gave place to a new stratification where Africans and Euro-Africans were perceived as different and where social hierarchy was more defined by race than anything else.

Because of their mixed heritage, Euro-Africans gained on all grounds. They had an easier access to the slave trade and many of them made fortunes. At the fort they had all the privileges of the Danish, especially status and position. These marriages developed indeed into important
social and political networks. More significantly, Euro-Africans became grounded in two
cultures and were free to move and profit from both. Their hybrid position was robust and
allowed them even certain excesses. The Christianborg chaplain, an authoritative figure at the
fort could only bow when Euro-Africans did not attend the church, drink excessively or
entertain other African women.

This is not to suggest that Ga and Aka women were losers. They also had their share in the
whole enterprise. Interracial marriages helped them integrate the economic and social
institutions of the Danish and Europeans. They learnt the Danish language and culture and
attended the church. Similarly, they had access to all the commodities brought about by
Europeans to the Gold Coast, which made their lives by far more comfortable than the rest of
African women. Socially, many of these women and especially those who married high-rank
officials and rich slave traders, gained into the social hierarchy within their local communities.
More significantly, these African women protected themselves, and their relatives and kin from
the slave trade, its horrors, and violence at a time when the line between a free African and a
slave was really thin.

How fair African women’s share of the interracial enterprise was, nevertheless, is
profoundly questionable. That share was uneven and the more intense the slave trade became,
the further the dynamics of power shifted favorably to the Danish white husbands. The
increasing strength of the European colonial system fashioned the individual lives and families
of generations of Africans and Europeans to the advantage of the latter, since the spatial
organization of the material culture of these families moved into a European direction and the
old and popular impressions and stereotypes, which lumped all Africans as one and all African
women as inferior and docile, came back in force and determined the ultimate position of these
in the interracial marriages. This explains why Danish husbands were reluctant to take their
African wives with them back to Copenhagen and why they tried hard to conceal this part of
their lives. This also explains their absence from the whole narrative.

This history of a Euro-African cultural encounter is part of the new, more inclusive and
comprehensive historiography of colonial Europe and slave trade history

Adel Manai, Qatar University

Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku. 2015. Governing the Nile River Basin: The

Recently, at the request of Dr. Fred-Mensah (professor, Department of Political Science, Howard
University), I served as an outside reader/external examiner for Benjamin Akwei who defended
his doctoral dissertation titled: “Hyrodropolitics, Hydro-hegemony and the Problem of Egypt’s
Securitization of Eastern Nile Basin” (on April 6, 2015). At his oral defense, some difficult
questions about governance and the politics of equitable allocation/utilization of the rich Nile
River water resources were raised and discussed in passing. Not until I received and read this
Governing the Nile River Basin), however, that I became hopeful about any possibility to avert the
conflict over Nile water resources that threaten regional stability and socio-economic
development in this important part of the world. This is an important book with excellent
analysis and outstanding discussions, as it grapples with the critical issue of sustainable African
socio-economic development in the context of an equitable allocation/utilization of Nile water resources and the effective management of the Nile River Basin in ways that advance the general interests and wellbeing of riparian states and their key stakeholders. The book, as its title suggests, is divided into two. The first deals with the existing governance structure and the problem of the prevailing arrangements that seem “contentious and not tenable” (p. ix). The second focuses on the rigorous discussion and a recommendation for an acceptable (alternative) and viable legal framework that the riparian states can equally behold and use cooperatively in their collective best interest.

The Nile River is the world’s longest river and affects the lives of about 437 million Africans living along its pathways in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Republic of Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. These countries are “relatively underdeveloped and poor” with agriculture as the mainstay and source of employment (pp. 11-12). Escaping poverty requires that people realize full agricultural potential and engage in cross-border trade activities to “enhance specialization based on comparative advantage” supported by a well-coordinated irrigation system (p. 16). Yet people, their governments, political leaders, and the international community continue to experience a fractured history of conflicts, disputes, and lack of cooperation resulting from the failure to have acceptably negotiated and binding agreements by all the riparian states (including Egypt and Sudan).

Kimenyi and Mbaku examine the sensitive issue of governance of the River Basin, and argue that the existing legal agreements are both contentious and untenable. There were bilateral agreements: the 1929 British-Egyptian treaty and the 1959 Egypt-Sudan treaty, and both were called into question by groups in the upstream riparian states. The authors recommend that the states collaborate to “engage in inclusive negotiations,” develop negotiated agreements to increase the level of water resources available to the riparian states for prosperity and peaceful coexistence. They make a significant contribution regarding the future of Nile River which they rightly assert “is a shared resource, a public regional public good whose management requires joint and coordinated efforts among its beneficiaries and those likely to be adversely affected by its exploitation” (p. 74). They advocate dialogue, mutual trust and trans-boundary cooperative management to enable the stakeholders to achieve lasting peaceful coexistence and sustainable socio-economic development via equitable resources and effective management of the Nile water resources.

Kimenyi and Mbaku have written a timely, informative, and thought-provoking book that provides a pragmatic roadmap for the riparian states’ stakeholders to use, and they challenge all the parties to work together to advance the interests and protect the rights of everyone. Developing new and alternative cooperative agreements sets aside the contested “colonial” treatises that gave Egypt hegemonic control, but needed to prevent future conflicts and regional instability. In their last chapter, “A Way Forward,” the authors highlighted the benefits and advantages in having an inclusive (participatory) and consultative process that makes it possible for the parties to build a trusting relationship and trans-boundary cooperative-joint management leading to equitable allocation and efficient use of the Nile River resources. A coordinated management of the Nile water resources would promote regional stability,
sustainable socio-economic development and peaceful coexistence. This book is worth reading by people interested in using effective water management to achieve lasting global peace.

Benjamin Arah, Bowie State University


The dictator novel emerged much later in Africa than in Latin America, and has consequently received considerably less critical attention. In addition, African dictator novels have often been read as historical novels, experimental novels, or novels of disillusion. Therefore, the genre of the African dictator novel has not been clearly defined, and the strategies adopted by African writers in their negotiation of the relationship between oppression and aesthetics have been under-explored. The publication of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s *Wizard of the Crow* in 2010 stimulated renewed attention to African dictator fiction, and his foreword is therefore a welcome addition to *Unmasking the African Dictator*. As Ngugi acknowledges in his foreword, African dictator fiction combined the tragic, the comic and the absurd as a challenge to the “parrotry that became poetry” to the ears of the dictator (p. vii).

*Unmasking the African Dictator* is impressively broad in coverage, exploring the postcolonial realities of Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, the Congo, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. The chapters also examine an impressive range of Anglophone and Francophone African fiction including Nuruddin Farah’s *Variations on the Theme of an African Dictatorship*, Henri Lopès’s *Le Pleurer-rire*, Goretti Kyomuhendo’s *Waiting*, Chinua Achebe’s *Anthills of the Savannah*, Ahmadou Kourouma’s *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages*, Ousmane Sembène’s *Le Dernier de l’Empire*, Ngugi’s *Wizard of the Crow*, Alain Mabanckou’s *Broken Glass*, Emmanuel Dongala’s *Johnny Chien Méchant*, and *La Vie et demie* by Sony Labou Tansi. However, while the volume makes a welcome addition to this emerging area of research, it does not attempt to define the genre of the African dictator novel, nor does it draw explicit links with the tradition of the Latin American dictator novel. The volume is also a little unbalanced, with an introduction and two chapters by the editor Gĩchingiri Ndĩgĩrĩgĩ, two chapters by Magalí Armillas-Tiseyra, and individual chapters of varying length and substance from the other eight contributors.

The introduction provides a useful overview of critical work on dictatorship and the performance of power, drawing particularly on Achille Mbembe’s insightful analysis of the postcolony. The individual chapters then go on, the editor remarks, “to fill out some of the gaps in Mbembe’s study” (p. xxi). Four chapters stand out in particular. Ndĩgĩrĩgĩ’s reading of Nuruddin Farah’s *Variations on the Theme of an African Dictatorship* through Foucault’s “panoptic modality of power” offers an insightful analysis of the ways in which Farah reveals the production of regimes of truth by Siyad Barre’s dictatorship in Somalia. Magali Armillas-Tiseyra’s chapter “The Unfaithful Chronicler: On Writing about the Dictator in Henri Lopès’s *Le Pleurer-rire*” proposes that the dictator novel is a space in which we can begin to think of a literary engagement with politics beyond the exigencies of particular political agendas. Robert Colson’s focus on the body of the dictator in Ngugi’s *Wizard of the Crow* argues that the representation of the Ruler’s illness and attempts to diagnose and treat it, offer a satirical
critique of the excesses of his power. Finally, Joseph McLaren’s chapter highlights the internal-external dynamic of African political power revealed in John A. Williams’s novel *Jacob’s Ladder* and Chinua Achebe’s *Anthills of the Savannah*.

While some of the introductory information to the chapters is a little repetitive, coherent theoretical links between the chapters and some high quality contributions make this a valuable contribution to the emerging body of critical work on African dictator fiction. The volume will be of particular use to literary specialists, but is also accessible to students and general readers interested in African literature, history, politics and culture.

Charlotte Baker, *Lancaster University*


On June 16, 1976, thousands of young students in Soweto, South Africa, left their classrooms and converged onto the streets, marching against apartheid education and displaying a new spirit of defiance against white minority rule. The students’ uprising marked a turning point in South African history by reigniting black protest politics after a period of relative calm. This new book highlights the key role Soweto students played in challenging and ultimately undermining apartheid.

The book is part of the Ohio Short Histories of Africa Series, which has published concise studies of Steve Biko, South African epidemics, and the African National Congress and others on non-South African topics. The author of this volume, Noor Nieftagodien, holds a chair in local history at the University of the Witwatersrand and has published widely on South African urban history. His latest book, divided into five chapters, is a worthwhile contribution to this useful series.

Nieftagodien assumes readers are already familiar with apartheid in South Africa, and so he does not provide extensive background on South Africa’s history, racial groups, or the origins of Soweto. Instead, he begins by discussing the 1960s, when apartheid seemed entrenched and resistance crushed. He explains Bantu Education, the deliberately inferior system of black education established by the apartheid government to limit black skills and aspirations. As he moves into the 1970s, Nieftagodien frequently draws upon oral testimony from students who experienced this education system first hand. By placing their accounts at the center of his narrative, he enriches it significantly.

The author sheds considerable light on the rising political consciousness among Soweto youth in the 1970s. Most were too young to have had extensive experience with the ANC or the Pan Africanist Congress, both of which had been banned in 1960. But a decade later, the philosophy of black consciousness began spreading from universities to high schools, particularly those in Soweto, which became “a hub of youth and student dissent” (p. 38). Nieftagodien charts the growing political awareness among students and their organizations and shows how the network of activists had spread despite government repression.

In his third chapter, “To hell with Afrikaans,” Nieftagodien explains the growing opposition to the government’s plan to make Afrikaans a medium of instruction in Soweto’s high schools. The policy was perceived as a direct threat to students’ education, because most students were proficient in English, not Afrikaans. “Overall, there was a growing sense that the

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[http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v15i4a5.pdf](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v15i4a5.pdf)
apartheid state wanted to destroy the already limited educational opportunities for black youth,” Nieftagodien writes (p. 58). When the new language policy was implemented in early 1976, students requested meetings with government officials and began boycotting classes on a fragmented basis. Once it became clear that the government would not back down, opposition to the Afrikaans policy spread and galvanized the disparate student groups in Soweto. Nieftagodien notes that in many cases, it was junior students who organized the early protests, not their more senior counterparts. He goes on to describe how students carefully planned the June 16th protest days in advance. He argues that even though the protest that day surprised many South Africans, it was not a spontaneous outburst of student anger, but a manifestation of grievances that had been simmering for more than a year without redress.

Nieftagodien draws upon oral and written testimony to reconstruct how the June 16th protest became a riot. Quoting from student participants, he illustrates the initial mood of joyful defiance as students marched, sang freedom songs, and held signs denouncing the Afrikaans language policy. Once police confronted the students and opened fire, a peaceful protest became pandemonium. Amid teargas and gunfire, students realized that they were not just opposing the language policy, but they were engaged in a long-term struggle against apartheid itself. In the days ahead, students attacked government property and vehicles as police escalated their onslaught on the township. Student protests spread to other black schools in the Johannesburg area and beyond and by September, nearly three hundred Sowetans had been killed. This was the most sustained and militant resistance South Africans had seen for decades.

After the Soweto uprising of 1976, the Afrikaans language policy was rescinded, but apartheid, of course, remained. The intensified police repression led increasing numbers of students to flee the country and join exiled liberation movements to support the armed struggle. As the June 1976 rebellion wound down, students and their organizations were more determined than ever to resist apartheid. Nieftagodien argues that the Soweto uprising served as both an inspiration and a template for a second wave of unrest in the 1980s, which eventually led to apartheid’s demise. His assessment is both lucid and compelling. It reminds us that the struggle against apartheid did not just revolve around the ANC or famous leaders, but gained strength from young people who worked for change at the grassroots and who fought against great odds.

Steven Gish, Auburn University at Montgomery


Resistance takes many forms; from huge public demonstrations and individual acts of defiance, to anywhere in between. The majority of the literature has been consumed with understanding how the politics of mass demonstrations work, mostly when facilitated by mediating or amalgamating groups of civil society. However, the authors of this thoughtful book seek to understand smaller modes of resistance that may not result in outstanding changes of government or in statehood, but rather on the minor modes of resistance that bring less a grand
change but rather, minute changes in social attitudes that slowly build power amongst the subaltern.

The book’s major contribution is in its identification of the diverse forms of resistance (and compliance) across contemporary Africa. Rather than viewing Africa as a site of the perpetually oppressed, this collection moves beyond the typology of victimhood that taints many understandings of resistance. Particularly stimulating is Basile Ndjio’s chapter on West African hustler’s development of criminal enrichment opportunities. These hustlers are not prey to the typology of victimhood; instead they identify potential victims to steal from. Susan Thomson argues that apparently powerless Rwandans exercise tactical compliance to subversively develop and sustain dignity. Although this everyday resistance is yet to translate into collective political consciousness, tactical compliance and everyday resistance undermines our assumptions of victimhood in Post-Genocide Rwanda.

Contemporary South African democracy is strongly represented over four chapters where scholars examine civil society groups, stand up comedians, and political commentators. The chapters show the diverse forms of resistance that are underway in the nascent democracy. The two chapters examining stand-up comedy are revelatory in their understanding of contemporary South African democracy. Recognizing that stand-up comedians largely relate to middle class and elite audiences the authors of both of these chapters note that comedians can both undermine and contribute to larger debates on democratic politics. Comedians, through their invocation of laughter, can offer catharsis, but can depoliticize, neutralize and dilute political exchange. Comedy can be a necessary tool in making democracy work, but it can also undermine politics either through domesticating political commentary. The chapter on Zapiro’s political illustrations underscores the continued struggles of a developing democracy and the role of popular media in criticizing government.

The strengths and weaknesses of this book are one and the same—its breadth of case study material combined with its multidisciplinary approach. Chapters that include examinations into sites of popular culture including stand-up comedy, political analysis, music, and talk radio find themselves (sometimes) at odds with chapters that examine mandated movements of informal marketeers, criminal activities amongst so-called hustlers, and the development of resistance mentalities amongst the apparently powerless in Post-Genocide Rwanda. The chapters on popular culture pose difficulties in their classification as subaltern—popular culture by its nature accesses sites of power through access to media outlets. Side by side with chapters exploring the development of personal resistance strategies by a PTSD sufferer and prisoner in rural Rwanda, and mandated informal market hawker movements in Nairobi, the breadth of topics and methods of analysis made this edited book feel very much like a sampler publication at times. What would have helped very much would have been a concluding chapter by the editors to tie together the diverse strands of argumentation and approaches across this collection to make it more cohesive.

Despite these reservations, this book offers a thoughtful and important contribution to the ways in which we view and approach resistance across Africa. Resistance is not only ascribed to outstanding events. It is nuanced and shaped according to the localities it is espoused in, “in the more grassroots and unstructured acts of disobedience and avoidance” (Chabal, p. xiv). This localized development of resistance interpretations and strategies perhaps helps to account
for the problems of cohesiveness identified in this book. Africa cannot be condensed into a singular understanding; neither can African resistance.

Ciara McCorley, University of Limerick


This book’s thesis is that truly sustainable African economic growth and development can only be achieved through self-reliant home grown strategies compatible with local conditions and realities, because no African country since independence has ever achieved such development under an externally driven arrangement and that any choice of the latter (short of Homegrown Development) could only result in Africa’s perpetual dependency and servitude.

The book’s objectives are to identify and assess the extent of the “indigeneity” and effectiveness of programs pursued by African governments following independence; assess/analyze the successes and failures of economic development alternative plans such as Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) during the “new wave” of development; and to determine the extent to which the Home Grown Development (HGD) when compared with the SAP, which were successful, which were not, and why.

The authors drew from post-independence experiments of Ghana, which adopted the “scientific revolution” Kwame Nkrumah; Tanzania’s Ujamaa under Julius Nyerere, which emphasized self-sufficiency in agriculture and cooperative society; and Kenya’s “Harambee” under Jomo Kenyatta, which focused on self-reliant economic development. The authors acknowledged that three approaches dominated the debate about the appropriate type of sustainable development for Africa. The consensus was a brand of missed economy rooted in African socio-economic thought, which most referred to as “African Socialism.” But, within this broad vision, three different approaches emerged. One was the brand popularized by Kwame Nkrumah that emphasized “modernization” anchored in massive infrastructural development. The second was favored by Kenyan leaders Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya and argued for a synthesis of self-reliant economic development and imported factor inputs such as capacity and equipment from abroad. The third approach was that of Julius Nyerere, who pushed for a pure and self-sufficient agriculture and local cooperative society, all in the name of achieving indigenous, county-led or country-owned growth.

According to the authors, even though this period of African development registered mixed results, it was truly home grown economic development in both design and implementation. However, it was followed by a period of “lost decades” between 1980 and 1999 when all the progress in economic development was reversed. This was the time when Africa followed the road map of Bretton Woods Institutions, which was an externally crafted and imposed development plan and program. Hence these experiments failed to improve Africa’s economic development because African leaders and citizens failed to take full ownership of its development agenda or direct its own political social and economic future.

Among the reasons African leaders failed to achieve real and sustainable economic development was because they were not totally committed to the principles of a HGD strategy because they failed to grasp the scope and complexity of the internal and external development.
challenges facing them. Further, they were both insincere and self-centered and so could not completely extricate themselves from Western interests and influences for fear of losing political power. Rather, they were operating a dual strategy combining a self-reliant approach with an externally oriented Western prescription by donor and development agencies and driven by ideas shaped by classical modernization theories. Hence, they aligned with the West for personal political expediency and protection against the masses. As they authors argued, “The results of these pressures was that African leaders did not fully break from the externally oriented economic policies that they inherited at independence” (p. 28).

The obstacles to policy ownership, which are capital intensive and are associated or linked to numerous conditions, such as capital flight by multinationals and local companies, limited internal revenue stream, and increasing population and debt burden. Such conditions drive African nations into massive borrowing and a bigger “strangulating” debt liability (p. 157). A case in point was Nigeria’s failed SAP under General Ibrahim Babangida, with its set of stipulated or prescribed conditions in return for loans, debt relief, and financial aid to rejuvenate its ailing and declining economies. Hence there was a call for a new economic development paradigm for Africa.

Another segment of the book examined how colonial policies and the post independence policies undermined indigenous self-reliance and HGD. These included the continual importation and distribution of cheap commodities via the colonial transport networks, which undermined local manufacturing goods. Also, colonial policies had led to a loss of self-sufficiency in food production, as land and labor were reallocated for export-oriented production.

Next, the authors identified the essential features of HGD strategies to include economic diversification and sensitivity to local imperatives; broad stakeholder consultation and participation; building local capacity and institutions; and social and human development. They identified four levels of HGD. Placed in a hierarchical order, they are: Imposed Development Strategy (IDS: countries do as external donors and development agencies tell them with little or no say in the design or implementation of the development agenda, as with the SAP in the 1980s); Adopted Development Strategies (AoDS: development agendas are modeled after the strategies of development and donor agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, leaving countries with limited ownership of policy and little or no coordination of aid strategies; though suggesting a lack of creative, visionary, and dynamic leadership, it equally indicates recipients negotiating from a position of weakness given their limited internal revenue and massive public debt overhang); Adaptive Development Strategy (ADS: recipient countries receive a menu of choices, plans, and conditions from donors, leaving it to them to tailor development programs to their unique local imperatives, which allows them to negotiate, redefine and bargain around loan conditions; although accepting the rules, they nonetheless help define and set them in contrast with IDS and AoDS they are mostly “rule takers”); and Homegrown Development Strategies (HGDS: recipient states are characterized by complete policy autonomy, effective institutions, diversified economy, faithfully incorporated local imperatives, and the presence of advanced social development).

The authors concluded that the “new wave” of development initiatives, such as SAP, failed partly because they focused on macroeconomic growth rather than the basics, lacked genuine
national ownership, and operated mostly under donor prescribed terms. Hence, the entire concept/premise of a national ownership and a policy of homegrown economic development by African leaders remains an illusion.

The authors painted a promising picture or outlook for Africa in the 21st century, based on trends denoting what the authors term an “African Renaissance” (p. 161): about one in three of countries have GDP growth rates above 6 percent; Africa’s collective GDP per capita was at an all time high of $953 in 2013; Angola, Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana are among the fastest growing among countries in the world; Africa is projected as the continent with the fastest growing economies in the decade, surpassing China and India. Nevertheless, the authors cautioned that certain economic indexes show a drag. They include a poverty rate that remains high; a widespread “infrastructural deficit” exacerbated by institutional corruption and patronage; insufficient education and healthcare services; inadequate and irregular electricity generation; external meddling and control; undiversified economies; jobless growth; and inequitably distributed wealth with a concentration at the top. The authors put forth their antidote, including people and countries embracing HGD, good and responsive national leadership, donors providing more and better policy space (flexibility) to give for African leaders better policy in which space to operate; donor nations and institutions to develop less intrusive forms of aid, thereby avoiding the “debt trap”; African leaders committing to fighting institutional corruption; and moving away from “institutional mono cropping” and rapid liberalization.

The criticism I have is that the authors place too much blame for African development failures on African leaders, whom they accused of making too limited a commitment to Homegrown development strategies and not extricating themselves from colonial entanglements for fear of losing their grip on power, and on donor agencies for giving more intrusive forms of assistance, rather than on colonial history and its vestiges—neocolonialism—that have shaped and distorted African education, traditions, and development till present. Regardless, this book contributes to a rich body of literature available on the successes and failures of development programs initiated by the World Bank and other donor and international development agencies in Africa. It is also useful in helping to provide an analytical framework to measure the failures and successes of country-focus experiments from diverse parts of Africa in terms of colonial experiences, (Anglophone or Francophone); types of regimes (military or elected); and religion (Muslim or Christian dominated). Furthermore, this book developed an integrated approach of examining African development to include leadership, comparative political analysis and case study perspective.

Home Grown Development in Africa makes for interesting and thought-provoking reading. It has a multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary application in terms of usage to inform policy makers, legislators, planners, and students in a variety of disciplines including African politics, comparative politics, public administration, comparative public administration, and development administration.

Ngozi Caleb Kamalu, Fayetteville State University

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v15i4a5.pdf

Political scientist Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome is a prolific author and professor at Brooklyn College, CUNY. Her wealth of knowledge of African social and governance processes makes her a well-qualified editor of this important book. Her contribution to the text is in chapters one and two, which challenge the widespread notion that African states, Nigeria in particular, are in the shadow of state fragility and may remain there forever. Therefore, as she notes, “African states have experienced structural and functional deterioration, and have consequently failed, but they can also be resuscitated” (p. 3). Okome questions the appropriateness of the term “state fragility” as used by the West as a concept to apprehend state failure from a universal rather than a contextual perspective, which is the strength of her proposition. For example, disgruntled citizens have used various social movements in Nigeria such as the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), and Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) to fill the governance gap. Therefore, these groups do not portend state failure but a way of appropriating a self-help approach to bring better governance to the forefront. Okome’s position is seconded in chapter three by Adebayo Oluwakayode Adekson, an assistant professor of international Studies at Michigan State University, who interrogates Western interpretation of the term “civil” or “uncivil” Society. These coinages explain what can be considered as “legitimate” and “illegitimate” forms of social movement and self-help processes, which complement Okome’s argument for contextual approach to understanding state fragility.

Chapters four through six are essentially the book’s empirical findings. In chapter four, Olawale Ismail, a political scientist, engages readers with the transition of a youth social movement from “Area-Boyism” to a more sophisticated “Junctions and Bases” in Lagos. While acknowledging that social movements can sometimes be violent in their approach, he also asserts that they are part of the cog in the wheel of progress Nigeria sought through the angle of self-help. He also admonishes that this will facilitate a critical reflection and understanding of their existence as seen in history (p. 104). In a similar vein, Ben Naanen (a professor of history at university of Port Harcourt) and Kiałee Nyiayaana (political science teacher at the university of Port Harcourt) in chapter five address the surge of radical social movements in the Niger Delta. The social movements are the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that are fighting for the rights of less privileged in the Niger Delta. Their contribution foregrounds the reason for the rise of the social movements against the backdrop of state inattentiveness to the plight of the people in the Niger delta, Nigeria’s oil and gas producing region. Also, Nnaemeka Okereke, a political scientist, in chapter six presents the case of Northern Nigeria, which has experienced a long history of deadly conflicts that resonates with insurgency and extremist religious group known as Boko-Haram.

In chapter seven, Dapo F. Asaju (a professor of theology at Lagos State University) and Harriet Seun Dapo-Asaju (a lawyer/librarian at Lagos State University) bring another dimension to the self-help approach through the lens of the Christian church and its social obligations in society. Their contribution is complemented in chapter eight by religious studies professor (University of Ilorin), Rotimi Williams Omotoye, and Elizabeth DeCampos, a linguist...
at the University of Ibadan. The authors reasoned that the Christian church remains a critical component of civil society building in Nigeria. The book was rounded up in chapter nine, where Ayokun Fagbemi, a political scientist, guides readers through “an assessment of conflict transformation and peace-building” capabilities in Nigeria.

Although *State Fragility, State Formation, and Human Security in Nigeria* might not be considered as a rigorous and path-breaking text on Nigeria’s postcolonial condition, it is nevertheless a bold attempt to offer multi-vocal and unique perspectives to the state fragility concept. Starting from conceptual interrogation of the concept in the first three chapters to empirical evidence in chapters four, five, and six and to the rest of the chapters, a vigorous intellectual attempt is made to put context at the heart of understanding the state fragility concept—through a self-help approach—when government retreats, as seen in contemporary Nigeria.

Emeka Smart Oruh, Brunel University


Rebecca Richards’ book attempts to break relatively new ground in academic literature about the statebuilding process. Focusing on the de facto state of Somaliland, rather than Somalia, conventionally described as a failed state, Richards looks to uncover positive narratives of creation in the midst of an area long marked by destruction. The book begins with an overview of previous literature on the nature of defining a state and the act of state creation, focusing largely on the interplay between internal and external demands for control over the state-building process.

Somaliland, unlike other areas of recent conflict and state construction like Iraq and Eastern Europe, has largely been a self-contained project, much to the chagrin of international donors and aid workers. This has led to a uniquely hybrid political system for Somaliland, with a blending of traditional clan-based conflict resolution and electoral democracy. The traditional Somali dispute resolution system, or *guurti*, involves convening a meeting of a council of elder clan leaders who attempt constructive dialogue on matters ranging from grazing disputes to retributive murder cases and everything in between. In the Somaliland political system, the *guurti* has been enshrined as an official arbiter of the law, with a House of Elders as the upper body of the Somaliland parliament.

*Understanding Somaliland* travels through a historical overview of the Somali people from before the colonial era, with appropriate time given to the differences in development between Italian-governed Somalia and British-governed Somaliland, which would fundamentally impact the running of the post-colonial, ostensibly united Somalia. Richards uncovers that differences in administrative style meant that the Italian-backed government in Mogadishu had much better infrastructure than the British-administered government in Hargeisa, as well as a preexisting centralized governance structure lacking in the loosely controlled British protectorate that would eventually become Somaliland. Such a disparity in resources meant that after the British and Italians relinquished control, most of the political power in the newly combined state rested in the south, which was not looked upon favorably by the residents of the
north, long accustomed to being left to their own devices. In this way, resentment slowly built up between the artificially combined territories, which would only grow worse moving forward.

In particular, the guurti was seen as the antithesis of the personalistic dictatorship of Mohammed Said Barre, a warlord who gained power in Somalia following a coup in 1969 and who would rule until his ouster in 1991. To Barre, the guurti represented clannism, a unifying factor for Somalis based on common ancestry that he saw as divisive and destructive. His turn at the nationalistic project of creating a Somali state involved dismantling the clan system at every turn in attempts to bring allegiance closer to Somalia as an entity. However, for many Somalis, especially those in Somaliland, the clan system was the thread running through their entire society keeping it together, and nowhere was this more manifest than the concept of the guurti, which Richards makes clear was the main engine of governance in Somaliland.

Following Barre’s fall, the collapse of the government, and the descent into warlord-dominated anarchy, the main objective of Somaliland has been to continue doing what it has always done, in the same way it has always done it. Practically, this has meant combining hybrid theories of democratic governance with traditional political models, which has meant implementing the guurti on a national scale.

Despite Western skepticism, the project has been relatively successful, with remarkable levels of social cohesion, political participation, and stability. However, Richards makes pains to correctly point out that the Somaliland model is not a model at all. It is a uniquely tailored approach to one situation that works because of the particular history of the people in that one situation, and thus she cautions scholars of statebuilding from putting too much stock in Somaliland’s success. Her main point rests in the lessons statebuilding scholars can learn with regards to internal and external dynamics of recognition and legitimacy. Despite Somaliland’s successes at the empirical processes of states, it receives no external recognition as a state from other countries, due to the Western stake in the ongoing project of their neighbors to the south. Such a contrast could have been explored more by Richards, who mentions Somalia only as a means for telling history, not as a comparison point in governance structure. More could be said about the role of the clan in post-Barre Mogadishu, as the narrative feels a bit incomplete. However, this text remains valuable for theoretical and regional specialists alike, showing a side the region often unseen and bridging the gap in literature between the traditional and the modern, much like what is happening on the ground in Somaliland.

Berent LaBrecque, Boston College


Kimberly Wedeven Segall’s Performing Democracy in Iraq and South Africa is an informative and scholarly text. The book has eight chapters: chapter one focuses on “Radio Songs, Kurdish Stories, Videos;” chapter two is on “Televised War, Poetry, and Shiite Women;” chapter three deals with “Sectarian Media, Nine Women, and Stage;” chapter four is about “Baghdad Blogs and Gender Sites;” and chapter five concentrates on “Media and Iran’s Forgotten Spring.” In addition, Chapter six centers on “Guerrilla Fighters, Televised Testimonies;” chapter seven
touches on “9/11 media;” and chapter eight focuses on “Bewitched Democracies.” There is also a “Conclusion.”

Kimberly Segall is professor of English at Seattle Pacific University. Her expertise and knowledge of language and political process as well as how the media, art, and popular culture (see the book’s blurb) can be used to engender change including contesting the public sphere is well known. In the book, she brings to bear some of the saliencies of engaging the goings on in the polity via the media and art for human renaissance and freedom, which are continually imprisoned by leaders’ excesses globally, particularly in Iraq and South Africa. The book offers a revolutionary opinion on how groups use cultural norms to tear down disconcerting and numbing reminiscences of human violation and (psychological) violence in order to create a new political identity via the media, including other forms of art.

The thematic preoccupation of this book is basically premised on the concept of “Cultural and Forgotten Spring” with impacts on political science, culture, gender, ethics, democracy, and new media (the Internet and social networking applications) in the Middle East and South Africa. Thus, the book “summarises the most important findings of two decades of research and live experiences within and outside … politics and culture in areas of Forgotten Spring” (p. xxiv).

Consequently, Performing Democracy in Iraq and South Africa attends to alternate sites of creativity—emotional forums—that simultaneously record violence and imagine community after atrocious and oppressive modes of governance has been meted to the people of South Africa (apartheid) and Iraq (oil war). It can be said that while for most books, writing and discourses on similar themes harp on reconstructing or recreating a new world after violence, conflict, and war, this book rather takes a new approach to this distillation. It does so by carefully and logically synthesizing various numbing mindscapes that can limit human striving towards freedom as well as offering a window of escape through the instrumentality of art and media enterprise. In addition, the book is an addendum to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed 91970) and similar works that point a finger to human destruction but also offer a roadmap to escape dehumanizing praxis.

Although, Performing Democracy in Iraq and South Africa is a well-researched and somewhat innovative scholarly effort, it is beleaguered with some issues. One of such encumbrances is that it is short on practical steps to ensure that humankind finds solace via contemplating renaissance via the media and art. It is rather long on theory and abstractions. Though this book is encumbered by this remark, it is nevertheless a bold attempt to recreate the mindscapes of the South African and Iraqi worlds that were under the jackboot of tyranny and repressive governance.

Chigozie Agatha Ugwoji, University of Huddersfield


The First World War’s Centenary has ignited a welcomed reexamination of the 20th century’s greatest political calamity from many angles, including the war for Germany’s African possessions. While the campaign to wrest German East Africa from General Paul von Lettow-
Vorbeck’s Schutztruppe has received substantial scholarly analysis, the South African-led operations against German Southwest Africa (GSWA) have attracted far less attention. In his study of the Swakop River Campaign, retired soldier and diplomat James Stejskal applies a practitioner’s eye to archival and archaeological evidence to reexamine this obscure expedition.

Stejskal’s account traces the campaign from the British decision in early August 1914 to neutralize GSWA’s usefulness to Berlin, through the South Africans’ invasion in September of that year, and to the subsequent surrender of the German defenders in the summer of 1915.

For the British, the German foothold in present-day Namibia was always problematic. Even if the colony’s garrison was small, its useful ports and powerful wireless stations could support German naval raiders operating against vital British sealanes. For the Union of South Africa government, the German presence was no less worrisome. German forces might infiltrate the long and sparsely settled Cape Province frontier to support Boers unreconciled to the British accommodation or possibly to incite rebellion amongst the sizeable indigenous population. Stejskal points out the South Africans also had their own imperialist visions. And so when London asked the Union government to seize the German colony in August 1914, the South Africans cooperated as much for their own expansive aims as they did for the defense of the Dominion. Awarded administration of the former German colony by the League of Nations after the war, the legacy of this largely forgotten campaign reverberated through the Cold War and independence period, with traces still evident today in Namibian society.

The book’s presentation is clear and the organization thoughtful. Stejskal largely employs traditional tactical appreciation methods, though this work is far from dry, thanks to a welcome literary style and vivid descriptions of operations. His short chapter on intelligence preparations for this campaign is the best available in a secondary work. Orders of battle, a useful chronology and casualty lists round out the book’s favorable features. A deeper discussion of the geopolitical importance of Germany’s colonies and the threat they posed to the British Empire, especially regarding long-range radio communications capabilities, would have made the book’s objective shine more brightly. Nonetheless, this element does not detract from an otherwise superb tactical study. Moreover, although this volume will appeal mostly to the military student and practitioner, its contemporary pictures of historic battle sites and rarely seen archival photographs have much to offer the material culturalist.

Stejskal’s biggest contribution to our understanding the campaign may be his topographic maps with original tactical overlays, prepared by the author after conducting numerous archaeological field trips in conjunction with the Namib Desert Archaeological Survey. Not only do they help the reader visualize the engagements, they will also serve as important guides for future battlefield preservation.

In the historiography of the Great War, it is unfortunate the word “sideshow” ever became a metaphor for the campaigns fought on the imperial fringe. Apart from trivializing the hardships and sacrifices endured by the participants of all color and nativity, the term carries with it a conceit coined in the afterglow of the Allies’ 1918 victory in Europe. James Stejskal’s analysis of the Allied campaign in German Southwest Africa reminds us that in those early and uncertain months of the war, victory was where one found it.

Colonel P. Michael Phillips, U.S. Army War College

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*Collision of Empires* is an anthology of the political situation surrounding the Italo-Ethiopian crisis of the 1930s written by scholars who researched in eight different languages. Edited by G. Bruce Strang, it represents a compilation of research and ideas that describes the international community of the period. It also discusses how that community failed both Ethiopia and Italy during the crisis, resulting not only in conflict, but also the loss of Italy as a deterrent to Germany.

At the conclusion of World War I, the international community formed the League of Nations with the principal mission of preventing wars through collective security and disarmament and by settling international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. It lacked its own armed forces and depended on the Great Powers to enforce its resolutions and sanctions, and supply its soldiers. According to Strang, when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the League of Nations still did not have experience in handling significant crises. He calls this time the League of Nations’ greatest opportunity, as well as its greatest failure, to act as a “diffuser” of conflict.

In the 1930s, the only independent entities in Africa were Liberia (under American pseudo-protectorate status) and Ethiopia. The rest of the continent was divided among European powers, particularly the United Kingdom and France, two major guarantors of the League of Nations. According to Strang’s in-depth discussion the League’s support for Ethiopia against Italy was crippled not only by European colonial interests but also by a desire to support Italy as a bulwark against Germany and a concern that the “cost” of real confrontation with Italy over Ethiopia was too high.

Early chapters of *Collision of Empires* delve into the way Social Darwinism affected international relations during the period. Time and again, nations such as the United Kingdom were unable to comprehend that Ethiopia—an empire that existed from Biblical times—could possibly be an equal to a European nation, even one such as Italy, which had only become a political entity in 1861 and had lost a war against the Ethiopians in 1898.

Chapter 5, written by Martin Thomas, is an important one as it discusses the European security dilemmas that drove French policy during the Ethiopian crisis—many at the time considered France culpable for the conflict—and the African and colonial dimensions of the Ethiopian Crisis. Later chapters provide insight into how the League of Nations managed to score a strategic loss by failing to stop the conflict, while at the same time, playing into Germany’s hands in allowing Italy to be removed as a “guaranteeing nation” for more serious conflicts in the future, such as World War II.

Chapter 10, “An Alliance of ‘Coloured’ Peoples: Ethiopia and Japan,” provides timely exploration of racism in the world of the 1930s and how it affected foreign relations leading up to and during World War II. J. Calvitt Clarke III writes that Japan viewed Ethiopia as a potential market and a site for colonization. That the Italians also desired Ethiopia caused significant resentment amongst the Japanese who accused the Italians of waving the “Yellow Peril” flag. Clarke claims the racial angst reached a boiling point in August of 1935 when Mussolini called up new divisions to send to East Africa, rousing colored peoples against Italy and whites and threatening racial war.
The strength of *Collision of Empires* is that it is not limited to standard topics related to the major European powers of the time that were involved in the Italian-Ethiopian conflict of the 1930. Rather it provides analysis on broader international relations issues. As such, it is best suited for students of political science and international relations.

Karsten Engelmann, *The Center for Army Analysis & US Africa Command*


In *The Fair Trade Scandal*, Ndongo S. Sylla persuasively argues that Fair Trade perpetuates the free trade system to which it claims to present an alternative, thereby helping the rich marketing Fair Trade rather than the poor. Chapter 1 discusses the inequalities in the global trade system in order to lay a foundation for the later exploration of Fair Trade. Though it is short, Sylla provides an effective overview of inequalities in both the results and processes of trade. International trade has resulted in primary resources specialization in developing countries, in turn leading to slow growth, low returns, high volatility, poor transmission of final prices to the producers, and high environmental costs. The biased processes involve developed countries promoting a liberalization they eschewed during their own development; they then hypocritically enforce this through tariff escalation (to dis-incentivize the processing of primary products) and through subsidies, tariff barriers, and non-tariff barriers to protect domestic industries. For those unfamiliar with trade, the chapter is a concise and sobering primer on a number of important topics like value chains, unequal exchange, tariffs, and subsidies. Chapter 2 contains a brief history of Fair Trade going back to solidarity trade in the post-World War II era. It also provides an introduction to major contemporary actors in Fair Trade. Unfortunately, the chapter suffers from its brevity, with the numerous acronyms and actors introduced in a short time becoming confusing by the end; it would have benefitted from an organizational chart or table.

Chapter 3 discusses controversies surrounding Fair Trade. Sylla first establishes a historical context by discussing British abolitionism and varying interpretations of Adam Smith’s views on free trade. Then, he presents three differing camps with unique critiques of Fair Trade, specifically proponents of neoliberalism, alterglobalism, and degrowth. The book takes a particularly harsh tone towards neoliberalism. For example, while noting that neoliberals rightly demand more thoroughness and transparency of Fair Trade proponents, Sylla goes on to write, “whatever the facts around Fair Trade, neoliberal critics have no intention of departing from free trade dogma. They delivered a verdict even before trying Fair Trade” (p. 72).

Ultimately, Sylla notes all three camps approach “the issue of Fair Trade essentially from the point of view of rich countries,” prompting the extensive discussion of the ineffectiveness of Fair Trade for poverty alleviation in Chapter 4 (p. 84). That chapter explores numerous tensions and problems, among them the tradeoff between market efficiency and sustainable pricing, the difficulties in calculating a fair cost, the perpetuation of North-South power asymmetries, and methodological weaknesses in the assessment of Fair Trade’s impact on communities.
Ultimately, he concludes, “Fair Trade protects producers and their families against extreme poverty rather than lifting them out of poverty” (p. 119).

Sylla is most effective in Chapter 5 when he uses empirical evidence to demonstrate that, contrary to the rhetoric of Fair Trade, the financial gains from Fair Trade are small and unevenly distributed, disproportionately benefitting the Global North and countries that are already relatively wealthy and not dependent on commodities (e.g., India, South Africa, and Mexico). He suggests “the alleged success of [Fair Trade] lies more with the efficiency of the rhetoric of its protagonists than with a thorough demonstration of the benefits generated thus far” (p. 121). Indeed, it is this chapter that most clearly explores the book’s sub-title “Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich.”

The book makes a compelling argument, and its credibility is bolstered by the author’s experience working for a prominent Fair Trade labeling organization. At just 154 pages for the body of the text, it is incredibly concise. The book’s effectiveness is reduced, however, by a frequent lack of specificity and examples. For example, the author’s claims like “In the case of West Africa, I personally witnessed cases of failure” would be more impactful if they were elaborated on in full sections, even chapters. It is possible the author wants to avoid the carefully selected, non-generalizable, and sometimes anecdotal evidence of Fair Trade proponents. It is also plausible he is limited in the information he can share about his previous employment. Regardless, readers would benefit from pairing this book with a more detailed ethnographic account, such as Paige West’s From Modern Production to Imagined Primitive: The Social World of Coffee from Papua New Guinea (2012), for a fuller picture. Overall, Sylla provides a concise and approachable primer on and critique of Fair Trade.

Brad Crofford, University of Oklahoma


Discussions on U.S.-Africa relations receive a lot of attention in the literature; see for example, Robert Waters’ Historical Dictionary of United States-Africa Relations, Adebayo Oyebade’s The United States’ Foreign Policy in Africa in the 21st Century, and Donald Rothchild and Edmond Keller’s Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters. Thus, whenever one comes across a new book on U.S.-Africa relations, one must ask: “what is its value-addition?” In this case, one needs to ask, “does Veney add value to the literature?”

While U.S.-Africa relations have a long history as sufficiently instanced by Morocco becoming the first country to recognise United States in 1777 and the 1798-1808 period that saw approximately 200,000 African slaves brought to the United States, they assumed greater importance during the cold war, post-cold war period, and post-11 September 2011 attacks. At the same time, the US is facing stiff competition from China, India, and other members of the BRICS family such as Brazil and South Africa as well as Japan in what Pádraig Carmody calls the “The New Scramble for Africa” (also the title of Carmody’s 2011 book). All these factors, particularly ‘the new scramble for Africa’, mean that U.S.-Africa relations have to be re-defined least the US loses ground to emerging super competitors such as China (NB; during the 2000 presidential campaign, George Bush stated that China was a “strategic competitor,” not a
“strategic partner”). Following the tradition of books on U.S.-Africa relations, Veney’s book explores U.S.-African political, economic, diplomatic and cultural relations. It uses various lenses: cold war, neo-liberal economic policies, the U.S. war on terrorism and the expansion of Africa’s trading relations with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, to refract the issue. The book argues that political, economic, diplomatic and cultural relations “... provide an opportunity and challenge for the United States to craft new economic and diplomatic initiatives toward Africa” (p. 1).

The book examines U.S.-Africa relations by focusing on U.S. relations with Africa’s regional powers such as Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. Relatedly, it discusses conflicts in the Great Lakes region and the Arab Spring in North Africa, particularly, Egypt. In addition, it discusses topical issues such as the siting of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the role of African American celebrities and Africans in the Diaspora in forging U.S.-Africa relations. The book tries to answer the overarching question; what drives U.S. engagement with Africa? It states that the promotion of democracy is the universal ideal that underpins engagement by both the U.S. government and U.S. non-governmental organizations. Related to democracy promotion is the emphasis on good governance (NB; see Obama’s address to the Ghanaian parliament on 11 June 2009 when he said “Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions”). The U.S. is said to be wedded to the “trade-for-development” ideal; therefore, it has established legislations such as African Growth and Opportunity Act. Thus, it is argued that improved trade will bring about development and fight development challenges such as poverty. The siting of AFRICOM is said to be another controversial issue. Overall, African governments are not persuaded that there are non-security benefits from the AFRICOM instrument, hence, their refusal to house it in Africa. To this end, the U.S. is yet to successfully sell AFRICOM to African governments. Regarding the Arab Spring, the U.S. engagement is said to be confusing as instanced by its variegated reactions to uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Particularly, the way it handled the crisis in Egypt belies its commitment to the upholding of the ideal of democracy. Regarding U.S. relations with Africa’s regional powers; being Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia, it is stated that this does not depart from the norm because its engagement is calculated to promote its interests. Regarding the troubled Great Lakes Region, the U.S. is said not to have provided leadership because it has not resolved security issues there. Lastly, diasporans and African American celebrities are said to play an important role in highlighting and responding to African problems.

To conclude, the book has many strengths: short length, rich content, easy read, and the authors are subject specialists. In addition, although it transverses a familiar terrain, it adds new dimensions such as the role of diasporans and African American celebrities in shaping U.S.-Africa relations. Despite these positives, the book leaves the reader hanging; it does have not a conclusion. This is serious omission, for various issues need to be brought together here.

Emmanuel Botlhale, University of Botswana

In the wake of the media’s stifling reports of proliferating reactions of Islamic fundamentalist groups from Boko Haram to al-Shabab to Houthi and ISIS, *Paths toward the Nation* presents another facet of Islam for genuine national cause. Joseph L. Venosa radiantly discusses the collective and binding force of Islamic communities in solidifying the Eritrean national cause. The seven-chapter book starts with the deferred dreams of the current state and delves into the historical context that culminated in today’s Eritrea. The book is an important addition to one of the least studied and marginalized areas of Africa. Repeatedly forgotten from the bigger colonial map as it was colonized by Italy, Eritrea is inhabited by around six million people divided into a population that is roughly half Christian and half Muslim. The past history and the recent political developments have not motivated independent scholars to explore the area. As the country is surrounded either by predominantly Muslim or principally Christian countries, Eritrea presents a myriad case of peaceful religious co-existence. Eritrea was first colonized and demarcated by Italy towards the end of the 19th century, then administered by British Military Administration for ten years (1941-1951). It was later federated with Ethiopia (1952-1962) until Ethiopia slowly started abolishing the federation. The Eritrean independence movement that was gaining momentum throughout the federation and before waged an armed struggle that lasted for thirty years (1961-1991). Therefore *Paths toward the Nation* can be considered as a pioneering work that solidifies the scant scholarship that has been being published independently.

Based on primary sources, mainly the newspapers being published by the leading actors in local languages, combined with other sources of the British documents and selected interviews, the book covers two formative decades (1941-1961) of Eritrean nationalism. As the book discusses, the six predominately Muslim Eritrean ethnic-groups do not share the same language and universal cultural values. However, they solidified their respective cases and articulated it using Islam as umbrella that stood against colonial subjugation. As one leading scholar of the region, Jonathan Miran, describes, the “kaleidoscopic historical configuration” (cited on p. 25) helped the different ethnic groups to coagulate their foundation. In doing so, they used Islam and the unifying language of the Qur’an, Arabic, to articulate their cause. Although Islam was in frequent contact with peoples who lived in what is now Eritrea from the 8th century onward, it was mainly during the 13th century the predominant Tigre ethnic group embraced Islam (p. 26).

As *Paths toward the Nation* broadly discusses, Islam was the driving force of two intertwined struggles among the Tigre of Eritrea. As the Tigre were serfs of the Shumagule, their first struggle was against their masters. This struggle was led by some of the Italian educated intelligentsia like Ibrahim Sultan. The successful liberation of the Tigre was later proliferated against Ethiopian domination. Slowly, as it was also endorsed by the highest religious authority, it became inclusive of other ethnic-groups like the Saho. Ibrahim al-Mukhtar who was a graduate of al-Azhar University of Cairo and the first mufti from Saho ethnic-group, also influenced such developments by helping make such localized movements into national case among the Muslims of the country. The continuous pressure by Ethiopia and Eritrea’s Unionist Party helped the movement crystallize its struggle. Fortunately, the Muslim League movement
was also supported by another growing movement of the predominantly Christian Independent Bloc.

The publication of the Arabic newspaper, *Sawt al-rabita*, was another strident factor that amalgamated the movement as national cause (p. 65). The newspaper served in articulating the views as broad national cause that was shared by movements elsewhere in places such as Pakistan and Somalia. Overtime, the movement that was mainly confined in particular Muslim-majority cities such as Keren and its vicinities spread across the country.

As the movement gained momentum, internal political struggles, lack of means, and changing positions of some of the key figures -combined with discontinuity of the newspaper- negatively affected the movement. Ultimately, the assassination of Muslim League leader Abdelkadir Kebire while preparing to go to the UN General Assembly re-ignited the movement. It was also combined with beginning of another newspaper, Wahda Iritriya.

*Paths toward the Nation* is a momentous work and milestone of this underexplored area of Eritrean history. Few additional things would have added in making the book suppler. In addition to the excellent archival works explored, Alemseged Tesfai’s extensive first-hand sources of the same historical epoch would have added flavor. Although it is understandable that book’s theme is the role of Islam, a lighter sparkle of their Christian coalitions would have freed it from sounding the struggle was carried singlehandedly by the Muslims. Last but not least, although Ibrahim Sultan is an iconic figure of the struggle from its inception, some other prominent figures like Abdelkadir Kebire were overlooked in general. Kebire’s role is evident from the wider outcry after his death.

Abraham T. Zere, Ohio University


Weatherby’s *The Sor or Tepes of Karamoja*, published nearly four decades after it was written, provides a fascinating account of a fast-changing culture. The fieldwork for the book, which was facilitated by close relationships with an elderly consultant from Mount Kadam and a young consultant from Mount Moroto, took place from 1964 until 1972. In the forty years between the writing and publication of the text, external pressures on the Sor have mounted. Much of the oral history related by Weatherby has been forgotten. Many of the cultural practices described by Weatherby have fallen out of use. As such, The Sor or Tepes of Karamoja represents a valuable snapshot of a moment in Sor history that is otherwise unrecoverable.

The book includes an introduction, six chapters, and a series of appendices. The introduction situates the study within a broader research agenda and describes both the obstacles faced in the study and the methods employed to overcome these obstacles. Chapter one provides an overview of the Sor, including descriptions of their physical and cultural environment. Chapter two reconstructs interactions between the Sor and the surrounding plains communities beginning in the early eighteenth century. Chapter three surveys the culture of the Sor, devoting particular attention to homestead organization, the rhythm of the agricultural year, the spirit cult, and rainmaking. Chapter four is a more in-depth account of the rainmaking practices of the Sor, detailing separate rituals associated with raindrums and the raintree.
Chapter five tracks movements of Sor clans from the late 18th century through the 19th century, focusing on the fallout of the Ngwolema famine of the 1780s. Chapter six describes the Sor spirit cult, which is taken to be an important factor in the maintenance of Sor identity in the face of external pressure. Appendices include clan charts with historical notes, genealogies of twenty-one families, and transcripts of several interviews, many of which are recorded in both English and Sor.

The closest relatives of the Sor are the Nyangea, Teuso (Ik), and Nkuliak, each of which Weatherby takes to have split off from a single ethnic group, proto-Nkuliak. The Sor live on three mountains (Kadam, Moroto, and Napak) in northeastern Uganda. The more prestigious Pokot and Karimojong occupy the surrounding plains, and the Sor have assimilated to these cultures to varying degrees. Additionally, Weatherby argues that both oral history and several cultural practices, including the rainmaking institutions, indicate now-ceased contact with Paranilotic (Western Nilotic) groups such as the Labwor, who share similar institutions. Contact between the Sor and the other descendants of proto-Nkuliak is limited.

Weatherby’s cultural notes focus on two institutions: rainmaking and the spirit cult. Structural differences between the two institutions lead Weatherby to posit different origins for them. Whereas the spirit cult is centralized, with unified initiations for Sor from all three mountains, the rainmaking institutions are fragmented, featuring five or six drums scattered around Mount Moroto and Mount Kadam. Weatherby argues that this structural difference reflects a difference in origin between the two institutions: rainmaking practices are taken to have an external source (the Labwor), while the spirit cult is taken to have been an internal development. Weatherby speculates that the spirit cult may date to the time of a unified proto-Kuliak on the basis of preliminary reports of a similar institution among the Nkuliak and Teuso (Ik). These reports have not been investigated further in the four decades since Weatherby’s research.

At times, the book reads more like a collection of papers than like a coherent whole. Admittedly, the study is not intended to serve as a comprehensive ethnography; however, no principle is invoked to account for which topics are covered and which are omitted. For example, chapters two and five deal with clan migrations, while chapters three, five, and six deal with cultural topics, but no motivation for keeping the migration chapters separate is given, and the lack of transitional material makes for a choppy reading experience. Extensive transcripts of interviews in the underdocumented Sor language may offer valuable resources for linguists; however, the Weatherby’s transcriptions neglect to indicate a number of significant contrasts. For example, the contrast between implosive and plain voiced stops is neutralized, ATR contrasts are neutralized, and tone and stress are omitted. Additionally, no morpheme-level or word-level glossing is present. Nevertheless, The Sor or Tepes of Karamoja is a valuable resource for historians, anthropologists, and linguists alike, offering fresh data and analyses regarding the cultural history of the Sor—in many cases, data, and analyses that fieldwork today could not hope to uncover.

Samuel Beer, University of Colorado Boulder

Interviews with leaders of student political movements in Zimbabwe and Senegal form the basis of Zeilig’s argument that structural adjustment programs led to the disintegration of African universities as functioning institutions and disempowered African university students, both as individuals and as a political block. *Revolt and Protest* traces specific universities as they change from institutions producing the inheritors of the political kingdom to institutions producing opportunities for financial diversion and a disillusioned class of unemployed but educated young people.

The argument is, to some extent, familiar. Teaching as an adjunct at the University of Nairobi, I often witnessed structural adjustment programs (SAPs) used to explain all sorts of things. It was interesting though, how these financial regulations introduced decades earlier were still to blame for the university not being able to provide anything from salaries paid on time to working bathrooms (an issue which Zeiling also raises). It was also interesting that even when SAPs blocked hiring processes at times, they seemed to not be a problem when politically connected applicants wanted to join the department. As much as SAPs may have created massive destabilization when they were introduced, by now African universities have had decades to restructure and adapt, and, as Zeilig admits, many have. One common adaptation has been to create parallel programs, in which the highest performing students continue to receive loans or scholarships, while students with lower marks pay tuition. Through these types of systems, and due to the high demand for university education in many African countries, many universities are making lots of money, and could invested in their staff, facilities, student support and research, but find other uses for their revenue. Zeilig would do well to complement what he is told in his interviews with a look at university audit reports.

Other parts of Zeilig’s argument are more novel. From the works of early African intellectuals and metropole observers, he identifies differences between the generation of intellectuals and political leaders emerging during the transitions to independence, and the generation that followed. For the earlier generation, intellectuals and politicians temporarily formed a relatively cohesive political class; in the second, political leaders took a very different stance towards intellectuals, and students could no longer reasonably aspire to joining either group. Nevertheless, he cautions against a simplistic division between the two generations, and the “political vanguard” and “economist” (p. 191) labels respectively assigned to them.

To be fair, Zeilig also looks at how students, and African middle classes in general, were affected by neoliberal forces of globalization and their intersection with the democratic movements in the 1990s. He gives an impressive array of examples from around the continent of student attempts to demand reform, and government attempts to cripple or coopt student organizations, or in severe cases in Zimbabwe, student life in all forms. He charts frequency of student protests, which reach a crescendo in the early nineties, and then subsided and become more sporadic, with notable exceptions in North Africa. He also examines the various trajectories that student protests have taken since, such as those that have been distracted by “donor syndrome,” those that have strayed towards “newer desperate activism” (p. 149), and those that are shaped by religious structures within their universities.
This book should not be interpreted as merely a historical explanation of the diminishing job prospects for African graduates however. Recently, Revolt and Protest by young people across the continent has taken on new forms. Zeilig explains how African universities bring together young people on the premise that through dedicated study they can earn a place and a voice in their society, but then slowly, through repeated frustration, and too often exposure to violence, take away that dream. If they manage to graduate, they still struggle to find opportunity to apply the education in which they have invested so much effort, perseverance, and family finances. Frequently, they do not even find a way to attain basic trappings of adulthood, much less entry into intelligentsia. Zeilig’s extensive first-hand experience within Senegalese and Zimbabwean universities offers a nuanced perspective of how African educated youth decide when and how to respond to the violence, physical and structural, directed at them.

Note:
The views expressed in this review are entirely those of the reviewer.

Devon Knudsen Ochieng, Africa Center for Strategic Studies