# African Studies Quarterly

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## *Executive Staff*

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# What is in a Coconut? An Ethnoecological Analysis of Mining, Social Displacement, Vulnerability, and Development in Rural Kenya

## WILLICE O. ABUYA

**Abstract**: Studies have shown that corporate-community and state-community conflict in mining communities in Africa revolves around at least four issues: land ownership, "unfair" compensation practices, inequitable resource distribution, and environmental degradation. These issues underpin conventional discourses on equity and compensational justice. A relatively obscure line of analysis concerns the meanings that communities attach to the biogeophysical environment, whether this can be fairly compensated, how these intersect with local experiences of natural resource extraction, and how they structure conflict. This relatively obscure theme is at the heart of ethnoecology—the interdisciplinary study of how nature is perceived by human beings and how the screen of beliefs, culture, and knowledge defines the community-environment nexus. Based on a deconstruction of local cultural symbolisms and narratives about the 'ordinary' coconut palm, this article unveils the intricate web of attachment that the local residents of Kwale District, a titanium-rich community in Kenya's Coast Province, have to the environment. The community was displaced from, and ostensibly "compensated" for, their ancestral land to make way for titanium mining. The article shows why local residents remain unappeased and agitated, and, more importantly, how ethnoecological insights could help leverage the economic benefits of mining development in Kenya's natural resource-rich rural communities. This article is based on field research carried out in 2009-2010 among the displaced community members in Kwale, Kenya.

## Introduction

The residents of Kwale, a tiny village tucked away in the southeastern part of Kenya, lost their homes and lands in 2007 when Tiomin-Kenya began titanium-mining operations. The local residents, however, resisted the seizure of their land right from its inception in 1995 when prospecting on their land began. They filed several cases in court in which they questioned the legality of the forceful acquisition of their land (by the state), and the "unfair" compensational offer (by the extractive company). They lost the cases, however, and on a rainy night of 25th April, 2007, the farmers were bulldozed off their land.[1]

The official basis for the forceful acquisition of land in Kwale District, situated about 65 km south of Mombasa, was the provision in the Kenyan Mining Act that all subterranean minerals belong to the government (Cap 306) and the Land Acquisition Act (Cap 295, Section 6 (1) (a)) that provides for government acquisition of private land for public good.[2] Over three thousand residents were consequently displaced to make way for titanium mining. To mitigate the impact of displacement, the Kenyan government offered a compensation package (to be paid by the extractive company, which included monetary

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payments for land, crops, and physical structures lost, plus compensatory land, among others) to the local Kwale community.  The compensation offered did little to appease the community, who resisted the displacement through a series of court cases from 2001 (when Tiomin began prospecting for titanium in Kwale) until 2008.[3] The farmers' last case in 2008 led to a lengthy suspension of the mining project.[4]

The fate of Kwale that pitted the company and/or the state on one side and the local community on the other, is similar to conflicts that can be found elsewhere around the world. Examples abound: oil in Nigeria's Niger Delta, copper mining in Japan, coal mining in Colombia, oil and diamond mining in Angola, and gold mining in Peru.[5]  These studies have shown that such conflicts revolve around at least four issues.  The first, land ownership, involves the conflict over who is the rightful owner of the land from which the minerals will be extracted.[6]  In other words, does the "ancestral" land belong to the community or does it belong to the state?  The second is over perceived "unfair" compensation practices—that is, contestations over the issue of "fair" market value vis-à-vis lost subjective value and aspirations.[7]  The third is over inequitable resource distribution—in particular, feelings among communities about being "cheated" in the sharing of mining benefits and burdens.[8]  The fourth is conflict over environmental degradation, as communities are often exasperated by the damage inflicted on the environment by the on-going extractive processes.[9]

These issues underpin conventional discourses on equity and compensational justice. However, an analysis of the "roots" of community-enterprise conflicts is largely not offered. The meanings that communities attach to the biogeophysical environment, how these intersect with local experiences of natural resource extraction, and how they structure conflict generally is not analyzed. This relatively obscure theme is at the heart of ethnoecology—the interdisciplinary study of how human beings perceive nature and how the screen of beliefs, culture, and knowledge defines the community-environment nexus.[10]

Literature on mining-related conflict in Kenya is scanty. Existing studies do not provide a clear understanding of the fuller dynamics of conflict. Abuodha and Hayombe (2006), for instance, focused more on the environmental risks around the titanium project, but they did not touch on the inadequacy of the Mining Act (Cap 306) of Kenya, which vests all mineral rights in the state and links land compensation to the original agricultural value of the land before the discovery of the mineral.  The study though, did recommend that valuation of assets should consider structures, trees, and other viable land use systems to calculate correct compensation rates. However, what these structures represented to the local communities was not considered.

Another study on a displaced dam community in Kenya focused more on the negative effects of social displacement.[11] It, however, acknowledged that compensation practices never take into cognizance the local community's perception of the value of their land.[12] This recognition may have led to better management of the conflict that arose.  Another study examines the rona mining conflict between the local Maasai community and the extractive company (Magadi Soda). However, this study only highlighted the fraudulent acquisition of land from the Maasai by the British.  It nonetheless noted that lack of payment of mining royalties to the community was of particular concern to the local community.[13] However, the deeper ethnographic meaning of land for the Maasai community, which triggered a conflict that would last an entire century, was not considered.

From the above, it is clear that studies in Kenya (and others around the world) on mineral-related conflict or social displacement have not explored important issues for

understanding such conflict.  What is called for is an approach that would move beyond conventional sociology of mining and enable one to unveil the "hidden" dimensions of mining-related social displacement and conflict, such as why communities may harbor animosity towards the government and mining corporations even when they have ostensibly been compensated. Thus, the central focus of this article is to examine through an ethnoecologial approach, the meanings that communities attach to "nature" and social displacement, and how these meanings are constructed and mobilized in the face of major economic/industrial projects. This article therefore brings into focus the meanings that communities attach to the biogeophysical environment (otherwise known as ethnoecology) and how such meanings intersect with local experiences of resource extraction and social displacement.  The loss of these resources that bear meanings for displaced communities leads to community vulnerability as individuals or social groupings are unable to respond to, recover from, or adapt to external stress as a result of this loss.[14] Compensation programs that do not take into cognizance a community's perception of compensable assets run the risk of not meeting the desired objective, as the community may consider the compensation paid as unfair.

**Ethnoecology, Social Displacement, and Vulnerability**

As an interdisciplinary method focusing on how human beings perceive nature through a screen of beliefs, culture, and knowledge, and how humans, through their symbolic meanings and representations use and manage resources, ethnoecology is especially pertinent to the issues that this article addresses.  An ethnoecological approach will, through the various uses that that particular aspects of the environment are put to demonstrate the value attached to these aspects of the environment.  Insights from various studies indicate that the environment bears meanings that provide identity, continuity, and fulfillment to individuals and groups, and alienation of these spaces can disorient and make inhabitants vulnerable.[15] The power of the state to take over land for public good (also known as eminent domain) often ignores such meanings.[16]  This then raises the following question: can people be adequately compensated in the event of displacement?

The emergence of land compensation can be traced to feudal England.[17] In more recent times, compensation is normally considered in anticipation of the negative effects that social displacement portends. T    he issue of land compensation, especially in Africa, has become quite contentious, as communities have been disaffected mainly by what may be termed "unfair" compensation practices, as these practices do not include lost subjective value and aspirations.[18]  In the case of the community in Kwale, cash and compensatory land were extended to the residents (this is sometimes referred to as environmental compensation, which is a "complex" issue, as it is always viewed differently by the provider and the recipient).[19]  However, this was insufficient to douse disaffection among local residents, hence the continuing conflict between the community and the government. The conflict goes to the heart of the question: can loss of land ever be justly compensated? Some authors do not think so.[20]  It is argued that this may be difficult to achieve as adopted economic compensation criteria normally do not take into cognizance the intergenerational economic and cultural importance of the socio-ecological resources for which compensation is paid.[21]

It is against this background that the present research examines the ethnoecological narratives in Kwale, with specific regard to titanium mining and social displacement. Based on a deconstruction of local cultural symbolisms and narratives about the 'ordinary' coconut

palm, this article unveils the intricate web of attachment that the residents of Kwale District, a titanium-rich community in Kenya's Coast Province, have to the environment. Though ostensibly "adequately" compensated, the article shows why local residents remain unappeased and agitated, and, more importantly, how ethnoecological insights could pinpoint the inherent problems of such compensation.

Compensation that fails to address the risks associated with displacement thus runs the risk of making a community vulnerable.[22] As stated earlier, vulnerability emerges when individuals or social groups are unable to respond to, recover from or adapt to external stress exerted upon them. Vulnerability thus describes states of susceptibility to harm.[23] Among the various strands of vulnerability (the biophysical, human ecological, political economy, constructivist, and political ecology perspectives on vulnerability) the constructivist view offers a relatively higher potential in analyzing community vulnerability in instances of displacement. The constructivist perspective focuses on the role of human agency and culture and emphasizes the role that culture plays in shaping definitions of and exposure to risk.[24] The special appeal it had was that it enabled the researcher to assess local constructions of the environment and local narratives about vulnerability to socio-ecological risks in the face of titanium mining.

## Study Methods

This study was carried out among the displaced residents of the condemned villages of Maumba and Nguluku.[25] These respondents were now scattered all over the district and could be found in any of the five Divisions (Matuga, Kubo, Msambweni, Kinango, and Samburu).[26] Those who had opted to settle at the host site at Mrima-Bwiti were also interviewed. Kwale District was the main site where titanium mining would take place.

In addition, it was chosen for the reason that this is the site of the first anti-commons act (large scale social displacement) in the post independent Kenyan mining industry. Social displacement had yet to take place in Mambrui, Sokoke, and Vipingo, for which Tiomin (K) was issued a mining license, but beyond prospecting nothing tangible has taken place at these sites. For these reasons, these sites were left out.

The first study technique used was in-depth interviews. This technique was used to uncover everyday narratives about the environment or "nature" (which in this case is the coconut tree) and how such meanings relate to mining and social displacement. A total of seventy one in-depth interviews were conducted. Snow-ball and "convenience" sampling were the main sampling methods adopted, as most of the residents were "moving targets" scattered all over Kwale District, with most still in a state of transition between their condemned land and their new areas of resettlement. To elicit ethnoecological narratives in the displaced communities with regard to the compensation practices, forty-seven in-depth interviews were carried out among a purposive sample of household heads (who had not yet received compensation). In both cases, an interview schedule was used to lead the discussions.

Key informants interviews constituted another technique. It was used to examine the dominant community-targeted compensational practices in Kenya's mining industry through key informants at Tiomin (K) Ltd (four in total) and at Kenya's Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (three in total).

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were also used to collect data. Eight FGDs, two each at Mwaluvanga, Kikoneni, and Ukunda Locations, and one FGD in Mrima-Bwiti of

Msambweni Division and another at Mvumoni Location, comprising of between nine to twelve participants, were conducted in the study site to collect data.  Snow-ball and convenience sampling were used to select participants.

Ethnography was also adopted as it allowed the researcher to immerse himself in the community and gain an "insider's view" of the issues under study.  Ethnographic data was collected over a period of five months in Kwale District. Finally, ethnoecology was adopted as a method.  Through this method, meanings that community attached to "nature" (in this case the coconut tree) were obtained.[27]  These meanings were derived from the multiple uses of the coconut tree.  The worth of the compensation offered was thereafter measured against these constructed meanings.

The research took cognizance of the fact that working with vulnerable communities bears inherent dangers.  One such danger is the possibility that the affected persons may exaggerate their present circumstances in an attempt to seek sympathy and/or support.  To mitigate this, the researcher, from the onset made it clear to the displaced that he was not holding brief for any party; but rather, his motive was to unveil the social dynamics relating to the displacement.  Further, triangulation of methods, conducting of several repeated interviews with the same respondents, post-field checking of interview transcripts with respondents, and constant peer consultation ensured that the data collected was both valid and reliable.

**The Very Essence of Life**

It was once argued that for people living in tropical Africa, the most valuable tree would unanimously be the coconut tree.[28]  This view is justified by its numerous uses, making it the most important member of the palm family.[29]  This is further justified by the fact that it fulfills five of the principal requirements of human existence—that is starch, sugar, oil, fiber, and building materials.[30]  The coconut palm has a long history with the coastal people of Kenya, especially the Mijikenda (the main community living in Kwale), who planted the first coconut trees in the mid-18th century.[31]  In fact there was a time in Mikjikenda history when the coconut trees were of more value than the land on which they grew.[32]
The coconut palm is extensively used in Kwale. Given the area's long association with this tree, it was not surprising that people had an established close relationship with the tree and now made extensive use of it (see Table 1). As the table demonstrates, the coconut is no ordinary tree in Kwale.  A fifty-four year old farmer described it as follows: "*Mnazi ndiye baba na mama ya jamii. Bila mnazi hakuna maisha* (The coconut tree is the father and mother of the community.  Without the coconut tree, there is no life)." Another sixty year old farmer described the tree as follows: "*Mnazi ndiyo maisha*! *Hakuna mtiyeyote* (sic!) *mwengine ilio na umuhimu kama mnazi*! (Coconut tree is the giver of life. No other tree is as important as the coconut tree!). These two statements essentially summarize the ethnoecological importance bestowed on the coconut tree, which has been noted over time.[33]  In sum, it was the very essence of life, the giver and sustenance of life and was embraced as the most important tree in the community.

## TABLE 1: PARTS OF THE COCONUT PALM TREE AND THEIR USES AMONG THE KWALE COMMUNITY

| | |
|---|---|
| **Roots** | • Medicinal purposes (e.g., to ease stomach pains).<br>• Animal feed. |
| **Trunk** | • Building huts, storage facilities, and other physical structures.<br>• Furniture construction, coffin making, and canoe building. |
| **Branches** | • Construction purposes. |
| **Fronds** | • House roofing material (*makuti*); mattress and pillow stuffing; can be used to weave mats, make brooms, make fish traps. |
| **Fruits** | • The sap is used to make a local brew for domestic and cultural practices such as marriage gifts and negotiations, and ceremonies such as funerals, births, and offerings to ancestors.<br>• Shells used for cups, plates, and ash trays; fiber for cloth making.<br>• Coconut milk (*madafu*) as a soft drink and is believed to cleanse the stomach of its impurities.<br>• Coconut fiber is used as spice for the making of practically all foodstuffs, such as rice, beef, vegetables and chicken.<br>• Coconut fiber are squeezed and turned into milk for a baby supplement.<br>• Residents believed that sap from the fruit can also be used to cure yellow fever, cure mental illness for the aged ("spill a few drops on the ground then the patient walks over it and he gets cured" a respondent explained). |
| **Tree** | • Planted in homesteads to mark the beginning of the homestead and therefore serves as a marker of history.<br>• Planted as a sign/symbol of good luck, and to ward off evil spirits from the homestead.<br>• Trunk is used to make wood products, such as timber for domestic and commercial purpose, tables, chairs, bracelets, and ash trays.<br>• Marking of boundaries between homes/property; also used for aesthetic purposes.<br>• Used for crafting of grave posts (*kigango*), an important cultural practice. |
| **Others** | • Coconut oil can be used as oil for the skin and for the hair.<br>• Sap can be used to make mosquito repellent.<br>• Bathing soap and cooking oil is obtainable from the coconut tree |

**Source :** Field data (2009)

The coconut palm also bore important social significance as providing the traditional drink, *mnazi*, which was derived from it and served several cultural purposes. For instance,

a man has to deliver at least a drum of *mnazi* to his in-laws as part of bride wealth. For it to have meaning, the wine ought to have been tapped from one's own trees. It is equally essential to serve *mnazi* during funerals and on other important ceremonies such as the birth of a new baby. For some families, planting of a coconut tree to symbolize such events (death and birth) was equally important. One is also expected to use his own coconut palm trees to construct one's shelter, thus further cementing one's attachment to this tree. The coconut tree was thus described as the "giver of life" and as the "mother and father" of the community, for as one other respondent stressed, when one nurtures a coconut tree, "one cannot 'sleep' hungry, be without shelter, or have no income."

Coconut fiber is used in the cooking of practically all types of foodstuffs: rice (popularly referred to as *wali*), maize and beans, vegetables, and various meat and chicken dishes (*ugali*). A meal is therefore never complete without having been spiced with coconut fiber. Another thing that makes the coconut tree very important is the fact that it is an intergenerational tree—a tree could be used by the farmer, the farmer's children (once the farmer passes on), and even by the farmer's grandchildren. So although the coconut tree may look "ordinary" to a visitor, in Kwale this tree is actually the community's lifeline—literally.

> *Kwa sisi watu wa pwani, mnazi una umuhimu kibwa sana!* (to us people living in the Coast, the coconut tree is very important). *Mnazi* is very important because it very many uses. It is said to have over one hundred uses! If you have *mnazi* then you are secure in life because *mnazi* provides one with food, income, and shelter among other things. That was the reason why when we were first informed that we were to be relocated I asked if there were *mnazi* where we were going. This is because I know the difficulties we would face if we have no *mnazi*.[34]

Coconut trees were also used to craft grave posts (*kigango*) which bore important cultural value.[35] A widow would remarry only after the installed grave post on the husband's grave rots and falls.

Social displacement alienated the community from "this giver of life," and therefore, individuals and communities were left vulnerable as it denied them the relationship that the two entities have enjoyed over generations. One respondent remarked in a focus group discussion that "land without *mnazi* is a difficult land," suggesting that land without coconut trees was land without value or "respect."

When community members were asked to state what the coconut trees, now abandoned on the condemned land, meant or represented, many were visibly angry. One forty-seven year old farmer, after carefully lighting a cigarette, commented as follows: "I feel very bad about my coconut trees. In fact I really hate passing anywhere near 'our' [possessed] land as I hate looking at those trees. How would you feel when you see your trees just standing there in the wilderness, heavy with fruits, and yet you are not allowed to harvest! I feel very very bad."

A farmer, who also happened to be an opinion leader in the community, captured the mood of the community on what the coconut trees now represented. The respondent remarked that the abandoned coconut trees now only served as a source of *wivu* (which literally means "envy"; but the manner in which it was expressed the feeling was equated to "jealousy"—the kind that a protective husband would have over his wife). In other words, they now envy the new (which to them meant the "illegal"') owner of the coconut trees, who

had seemingly "eloped" with their beloved "wife." The loss of this tree and its associated meanings left the community feeling rather vulnerable. The constructed meaning (that has been derived through the ethno-ecological approach) demonstrates the community's attachment to this resource, but following its loss, the "roots" of vulnerability were planted.

**Compensational Practices in Kenya's Titanium Mining Industry: Compensating for 'Lost' Coconut Palm Trees**

Kwale community residents received compensation for their land and other assets within a framework largely established by three government acts.[36] These are:

- *The Mining Act (Cap 306):* Section 4 of the Act makes the government the owner of all minerals, including minerals discovered during the process of prospecting (this is covered in Section 24 (1) (a)). This Act has been in existence since colonial times and was enacted to "bequeath all minerals to the Crown for ease of exploitation and repatriation to the parent country."[37] It was only in 2011 that the government contemplated redrafting the Mining Act, a process that is still ongoing. The amendment, however, will not affect the Kwale relocatees as they were compensated under the old act.
- *The Land Acquisition Act (Cap 295):* Sections 6 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act give the Minister of Lands the power to compulsorily acquire land for public good (and commercial mining of minerals is considered as one such act of public good). Section 8 of the same Act provides for full and prompt (there is no mention of "fair") compensation to all persons who hold interest in the land.
- *The Agriculture Act (Cap 318):* The Act determines compensation rates for crops. Section 7 of the Act gives the Minister for Agriculture the power to fix prices for what is termed 'scheduled crops' (the coconut is listed under this category), which are crops recognized to be of economic value.
- *The Forest Act (Cap 7):* The Department of Forestry enforces this Act and is charged with the rational utilization of forest resources for the socio-economic development of the country, including determining the compensation rates for trees and tree products. In the Kwale case, the Department came up with the compensation rates for the various indigenous and exotic trees.

While there are several other acts that one would need to take into account when considering the compensating for expropriated assets, the above four acts were the those directly relevant to compensation for the coconut tree.

The Ministry of Lands was charged with coordinating the relocation and compensation program in Kwale after the extractive company and local residents failed to reach a compromise. The government formed the Compensation and Resettlement Committee to manage the compensation process, and to come up with rates acceptable to the farmers. In order to ensure the acceptability of the proposal, the committee included farmers.

With specific reference to plants (and this is where the compensation of the coconut palm tree was affected), the Compensation and Resettlement Committee first recommended that annual crops (such as maize, legumes, rice, sorghum, millet, vegetables, etc.) would not

be compensated as the farmers would be allowed time to harvest them. Compensation for perennial and tree crops (such as coconuts, citrus, mangoes, cashew nuts, etc.) would be compensated on the basis of the report provided by the Director of Agriculture (see Table 2), who now introduced three categories of "young," "medium," and "old," which differed from Fairlane's (a consulting firm earlier contracted by Tiomin (K) to come up with compensation criteria for lost assets) two categories of "young" and "mature," with the modification that the rate to be used for purposes of compensation would be the average of the recommended rates for the three categories. It was decided that the value of palms and other related species (such as bamboo and sisal) would be based on their uses as these species "provide a reasonable array of products like baskets and mats, traditional wine, fruits, boundary marking, and ropes."[38]

**TABLE 2: DRCC'S COMPENSATION RATES FOR SELECTED CROPS**

| Crops | Young (in Kshs) | Medium (in Kshs) | Old (in Kshs) | Cabinet Approved (in Ksh) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coconut | 242 | 400 | 255 | 299 |
| Cashewnut | 104 | 150 | 100 | 118 |
| Mangoes | | | | |
|   Apple | 2,927 | 3,165 | 2,665 | 2,919 |
|   Ngowe | 2,927 | 3,165 | 2,665 | 2,919 |
|   Dodo | 2,927 | 3,165 | 2,665 | 2,919 |
|   Exotic | 2,927 | 3,165 | 2,665 | 2,919 |
| Mangoes (Local) | 50 | 300 | 720* | 356 |
| Oranges | 1,816 | 2,286 | 1462 | 1,854 |
| Lemons | 1,816 | 2,286 | 1462 | 1,854 |
| Lime | 1,816 | 2,286 | 1462 | 1,854 |

**Note**: In 2005, US$1=approx. Ksh79. **Source**: DCRC (2005)

Despite the fact that farmers were represented in the national Compensation and Resettlement Committee, however, some farmers were still dissatisfied with the various compensation awards and in 2004 challenged the matter in court. The farmers were convinced that they were the true owners of the condemned land, and hence the government had no right to acquire it by force. Studies show that communities all over the world, and especially those in Africa, are uniquely attached to their land as these spaces bear multiple meanings to them.[39] Evicting them from these spaces is therefore usually a traumatic experience. The farmers also saw little evidence that the rates (especially with respect to the coconut tree which elicited the greatest indignation) were based on the multiple ethnoecological uses of the tree as promised in the DRCC report.

**Community Response to Company/Government Compensation Award**

Angry sentiments such as "no compensation was as bad as that of the coconut—the rates offered were very abusive," to "*malipo ya mnazi haikuridhisha kamwe* (compensation for the coconut was most unsatisfactory)!" were very common. Residents were incensed that the compensation offered did not reflect the "true value" of the tree. In their eyes, its value

must be based on its multiple ethnoecological uses, as illustrated in Table 1. The cultural importance of the tree (which included it being used for birth, wedding and burial purposes, among others) not only gave it its cultural value, but also determined its economic worth.[40] In their eyes, the failure to adopt this ethnoecological approach was what triggered the conflict.

To begin with, the rates made little sense from an economic perspective. Many were baffled by the compensation offered, which they felt was unfair as it was below market value. Said one resident:

> The compensation rate for the coconut tree was very bad! Ksh299 [ca. US$3.80] per tree? That was very bad. This is an intergenerational plant, and it can grow for up to a hundred years! And look here, every three weeks, from the sale of the fruits per tree, one can get Ksh300. How can one then peg a one off payment at Ksh299 per tree? Wasn't this madness? If they were to be fair, per tree, they should actually have paid us at the minimum, Ksh3,000![41]

The displaced residents indicated that they were amazed at the compensation paid for the coconut, and wondered whether government valuers were indeed qualified—"where were these people 'picked' from?" one respondent asked incredulously. The resident asserted that even when one simply cuts down the branches of the coconut tree and burns them into charcoal, one would earn much more than the Ksh299 paid out as compensation. Indeed, the undervaluation of the coconut tree was surprising given that in its own assessment, the Forest Department had indicated that its value would be based on its numerous uses. From an economic perspective, it was doubtful if the culturally "insensitive" rates did satisfy market value or whether it did "counterbalance" the loss suffered, which are arguably the aims of compensation.[42]

Community members further contended that as an intergenerational plant, the coconut tree should have been awarded a reasonably higher value; and that ought to have then been multiplied by the lifetime of the tree to obtain a realistic compensation since in losing the tree, one loses a lifetime of sustenance from it. One resident declared that the compensation paid was "a day's income from the tree" and were unanimous that the rate paid was "very unfair." This "unfair" payment elicited angry sentiments from the farmers:

> Compensation for coconut was very annoying! We all had these trees but we received very little money as compensation. The coconut has many uses…how then can one determine that it is only worth Ksh400 as its maximum offer? Now that I have to purchase coconuts at Ksh20 per fruit, I feel very infuriated because my own coconuts were poorly paid. If I had been fairly paid I would not be feeling as bad as I now do. I now have to wait for five years before I can have my own coconuts (lamented a 49-year-old displaced woman).

Community members were also baffled as to why other "less essential" crops such as mangoes, oranges and passion fruits fetched a higher compensation rate than the coconut tree. For instance, exotic mangoes were valued at Ksh2,919 (ca. US$37) per tree, while a coconut tree was valued at Ksh299. Respondents said they were at a loss on how these rates were arrived at. The only explanation they could come up with was that the company and the government were out to unfairly compensate them for the coconut, as they stood the risk

of running out of money were they to offer competitive rates for the coconut trees which dotted every homestead.  One forty-seven year old displaced farmer reasoned as follows:

> The company and the government are not stupid.  During the time that we were haggling over appropriate compensation, they flew all over our farms in their helicopters and I believe all they saw were coconut trees.  They therefore figured out that if they were to compensate us fairly for this, this would 'finish' their money—hence their decision to pay us ridiculously low rates for our coconut trees.  What they did not see in plenty were other crops such as oranges, for which they decided to give premium value.  I wish I knew this would happen.  I would then have only cultivated mangoes and oranges on my farm.  Had I done that, I would now still be collecting my compensation money from the bank in a wheel-barrow.

This is not to say that all were satisfied with the rates paid for cashew nuts, mangoes, passion fruits, oranges, and other crops.  Though most of these crops were compensated at a higher rate than the coconut, 92 percent of those interviewed were of the view that these crops were equally under-compensated.  A sixty-five year old displaced resident who was a community leader during the time of the displacement remarked:

> The company and the government paid us very poorly for our coconut trees.  This mistreatment was extended to other crops. Look at the payment for cashew nuts for instance, which they approved at Ksh118. Yet from November to March of every year, one can get Ksh1,000 [ca. US$13] per tree every month. Why then should one compensate it at Ksh118 per tree?  Same with oranges which was approved at Ksh1,854 per tree and yet yearly one can get Ksh5,000 [ca.US$63] per tree.  The compensation paid out was simply fraudulent.

Community members were also quite incensed by the manner in which their most valued tree was categorized into "young," "medium," and "old."  This categorization made little sense to a community in which a coconut tree was a coconut tree.  In their view, this categorization was a ploy to undercompensate them for their trees.  One displaced resident captured the mood of the community with the following remark:

> A tree is a tree, and as such there was no reason for the government and the company to categorize our crops, especially the coconut tree, in the manner that they did.  Since most of us had old coconut trees on account of the fact that we had lived in this environment for a long time, we obtained very little compensation as these old trees were given the lowest values.  This categorization meant that we therefore received pittance for our trees.  I see this as just a grand plan by the government and the company to defraud us.  Who says that an old tree produces less coconut yield?  In fact, the older the tree, the better the *mnazi* it produces!  The government and the company used semantics to con us of our rightful dues.  This was just a ploy to pay us less money!

Another respondent, a fifty-two year old farmer, remarked thus: "The manner in which they categorized coconuts into young, medium, and old was akin to categorizing one's own children. Would anyone in his proper mind undervalue his last born [child] on the basis of his young age? Certainly not!  Wouldn't that last born not also grow up and be productive?

That is what they did to our coconut trees." In the eyes of the community, the tree is a "being," one that has to be nurtured and respected. So in cases of compensation, it must be given its true value, which must be based on its cultural and economic uses, an approach that may serve to help define a tree's "true value." The categorization simply ensured the company made a saving. Since most had old trees, the farmers received very little compensation.

Another respondent questioned the rationale of compensating below market value:

> Look at the compensation for mangoes. They paid us Ksh300 for "local" mangoes and yet in a year one can collect Ksh3,000 from the same tree. This categorization of mangoes into "improved" mangoes and "local" mangoes was just another way of cheating us from obtaining a fair compensation for our crops. A mango is a mango! Why did they place a higher value on "improved" mangoes while it is the "local" mango that fetches a higher price in the market? Why wasn't this categorization not extended to other crops? Wasn't this because everyone had mangoes and only a few people had these other varieties?

Yet another respondent added a twist to this argument, emphasizing that in matters of forced displacement, compensation should not be pegged at market value:

> There must be a difference between compensating at market rate, that is, the price I would get when I sell my goods for profit, and compensating because you are evicting me from my land! This is because when I sell for profit I retain my trees, but when you evict me from my land, I lose not only the fruits, but the entire tree. You are therefore driving me into poverty and because of that, you need to pay me more!

From a cultural perspective, the displaced residents were equally displeased with the compensation offered. Indeed in one FGD, participants initially angrily remarked that we could talk about everything and anything else but not "the coconut compensation." One participant afterwards wondered aloud how a government could pay Ksh400 (the highest amount recommended for the categories given) for a tree that not only feeds an entire family, and one that has immense cultural values. Many weighed the compensation paid out against the cultural effects of not having coconut trees, which affected much of their socio-cultural practices. The farmers were forced to buy coconuts at the market and this was culturally "shameful." Whereas in the past they would tap their trees and make *mnazi* to meet cultural needs, they were now forced to buy the same *mnazi* from the market as if they were tourists in the area. Not only was this shameful, but it also made the particular solemn cultural occasion lose much of its color. This negatively affected their social status as they were now referred to as "those who bought *mnazi* [at the market]." With diminished social status, they now took a back seat in social functions. This kind of disruption of socio-cultural activities is also documented among the communities Huli and Paiela in mining areas of Papua New Guinea.[43]

One resident remarked that although his daughter had now come of age (eligible for marriage), he was forced to keep postponing the bride-wealth discussions as he awaited the maturity of his new trees.

> This titanium project has really strained relations between me and my daughter and her in-laws. As per our Mijikenda tradition, I am expected to

serve foodstuff made from coconut products and serve *mnazi* tapped from my own trees to my in-laws. Afterwards, I am expected to give them fruits from my farm as presents. Now, with this displacement, I cannot provide these things and am forced to postpone bride-wealth discussions as I wait for my trees to mature—which will take five years! My daughter does not talk to me anymore because of this; but how can I go against tradition and serve *mnazi* bought at Ukunda [shopping center]? Do you know what that will do to my social status? What about that of my daughter?

He could not envisage serving wine bought from the market to his future in-laws as this was against tradition, and doing so would diminish his daughter's status in her marital home; his conscience could not bear this. Therefore, although people may drink traditional beverage for pleasure, as "incantation drink" and as a social beverage at funerals, initiation rituals and indigenous festivals, the beverage cannot be substituted in matters of bride wealth. Hence economic worth is tied to cultural values.[44]

The displaced residents painfully narrated how they were now unable to offer agricultural presents (at weddings, funerals, or to visiting relations) consisting of bananas, local mangoes, and coconut fruits, as they presently had none of these in their fields. Consequently, they felt completely vulnerable not only physically in terms of unavailability of food, but socially as well. This reinforced the observation that displaced persons slip into a lower socio-economic status.[45] This may then lead them to alter their cultural behavior and/or practices, and even alter the way they interact with the environment.[46]

The community read mischief in the entire compensation process. This was further evidenced by the fact that the approved document reflected the same rates that the community had earlier rejected in the initial offer floated by Fairlane, Tiomin's consultants on compensation matters. The residents wondered how these rates found their way back into the final document. Following the displacement, many viewed their now abandoned crops wasting away in the fields as source of anguish to them. This was the new cultural meaning that the trees now assumed.

Commenting on how the compensation framework affected community-state/company relations, one interviewee remarked:

Look, in the past when I would go home after a long day, I would settle down under the shade of the coconut tree and drink *madafu* to quench my thirst. This action would take me to another state of being—to a higher level of being. Next I would eat its white meat and wouldn't I now be well nourished? Now with this displacement I will never again enjoy this! And then the government came along and rubbished this tree and paid us coins for it. Do you think I will ever be happy again? (bangs his fist on the table)!

Clearly, the residents harbored immense animosity against the company and the government. The researcher thus sought to know from the company representatives why these crops were undervalued. Their response was that they paid rates as presented to them by the government. Indeed, the displaced wondered why the government would want to undercompensate while the cost of displacement was being borne by the company. One official in the Ministry of Lands, disclosed to the researcher that the agriculture rates employed in the Kwale compensation program were admittedly low, and should have been first revised before compensation was determined.

Though noting that the government was largely to blame for the "unfair" rates, the displaced were also quick to blame the company for paying rates which they (the company) knew were faulty, or so they claimed.  In their considered opinion, the compensation for the coconut or the cashew nut neither fulfilled the "fair market value" principle, nor complied with government's promise that it would determine compensation in line with the varied ethnoecological uses of the plants.

## Discussion and Conclusion

The findings in this article provide useful insights on matters relating to social construction and attachment to "nature," ethnoecology, mineral extraction, and social displacement as well as resource conflict.   First, the results highlight the realization that indigenous communities develop and maintain close ties with the environment within which they subsist, and in so doing, develop an intricate web of relationships, ties and attachment that characterize them as a component of a dynamic and socio-cultural and environmental system.[47]  As observed, the study community had developed close ties with the environment (in this case the coconut tree) and now largely depended on it for sustenance.  The land was their wealth from which they derived oranges, mangoes, maize, pawpaw and especially the coconut on which they became heavily dependent.  The coconut tree was referred to as the "mother" and "father" of the community, and as "the giver of life."  It can be argued that in the long run, mining activities are short-lived with shorter lifespan compared to the lifespan of the sustainable economy that it dismantles.[48]  For instance, a coconut tree, as one respondent said, could last for over a hundred years, while the titanium project is projected to last a mere twenty-one years.  But since governments will continue to permit mining, there is a need to draw a delicate balance between the two economies.

Second, this article highlights how attachment to "nature" and displacement can lead to states of vulnerability.  Vulnerability comes about when individuals or social groupings are unable to respond to, recover from, or adapt to external stress placed on their livelihood and wellbeing.[49]  Social displacement was the external stress that was placed on the community, and this made them vulnerable for they were now unable to cope with the attendant consequences arising from the displacement.  The loss of their land, their crops (especially the coconut trees), and their graves through the act of eminent domain left them helpless and almost unable to overcome the "shock."  Many were living in poverty following their inability to adapt to the new circumstances in which they now found themselves.  This study thus highlights the relation between ethno-ecology, displacement, and vulnerability.

According to the constructive perspective, landscapes are "the symbolic environments created by human acts of conferring meaning to nature and environment, of giving the environment definition and form from a particular angle and vision and through a special filter of values and belief."[50]  Communities then go about giving meaning to "nature" and cultural artifacts through the management and use of these assets (which is defined as ethno-ecology) as can be seen in the Kwale case and the coconut palm.  It has been demonstrated how a community attached to its landscape becomes vulnerable when this landscape is suddenly absent.[51]  Similarly, the deep attachment that the community had with its environment is what led to their vulnerability.  The sudden absence of this landscape which bore meanings to the community left them disoriented and vulnerable, and barely able to face up to the perturbation (social displacement).

Similarly, we have observed how the lack of coconut trees was a cause of concern to the community. Through the ethnoecology approach, it is observed that a sudden alienation from the landscape that a community is attached to can lead to community vulnerability. Compensation failed to cushion community members against the effect of displacement, mainly because it was viewed as inadequate, as an ethnoecological approach in this process was not adopted. Since "assent" in the compensational process was missing, "fair" compensation could not be achieved. Further, as demonstrated, compensation was "structurally" unable to resolve the task of restoring incomes and livelihoods.[52]

Third, this study offers insights in community-enterprise/state resource conflict. At the beginning of this article, it was indicated that conflict between communities and extractive enterprises/governments usually revolve around five issues, that is, "unfair" compensation practices, land ownership, inequitable resource distribution or in other words the unequal sharing of benefits, environmental degradation, and abuse of human rights. This article progressed beyond these prevailing notions and examined the roots of such conflict, by highlighting the meanings attached to what was being 'fought' over. It has been argued that research should go beyond the economic considerations that dominate such studies and take into account the idiographic narratives of the affected communities.[53] This article adopted this approach. Local narratives revealed that indeed, the ethnoecological meanings that are attached to "nature" and to cultural artifacts do play a crucial role in these conflicts. As observed in the Kwale titanium mining conflict, the community failed to see the correlation between the compensation offered by the company/government and the ethnoecological value of the social reality being compensated. This disconnect stoked the conflict.

Fourth, this article observed that the meanings attached to the various representations of "nature" makes compensation quite troublesome. Any compensation program that does not take into cognizance a community's perception (lost subjective value) of what is being compensated is bound to fail. The overarching protest of a displaced community in Muranga (Kenya's Central Province) was because non-quantifiable or intangible assets were not compensated.[54] It is therefore evident that "current struggles are increasingly over meanings."[55]

Finally, the findings suggest that the titanium conflict in Kwale has more to do with compensation than with just "uprooting" people from their cultural abodes (such as land, crops, graves and residential structures, among others). The findings indicate that the community in Kwale was attached to "nature" as these provided meanings to their lives. However, the findings appear to indicate that at a fair cost, people are willing to be "uprooted" from their cultural attachments. This contradiction points that people may be cultural animals, but that they are also economic beings. It appears that at the right price, everything, including things sacred or culturally revered, is compensatable, albeit for only a brief period (things such as the coconut tree—and also graves).[56] Weighed again against cultural attachment and loss of their coconuts without compensation, many "accepted" the compensation.

This again shows the contradictions that arise when people who uphold or proclaim certain cultural values and attachments are faced with specific economic choices under particular circumstances. For fear of losing it all, residents accepted compensation; but assent was never fully present to justify just compensation.[57] In any case, fair market value was in the first place never met, hence compensation at "non-commodification" level was never met.[58] Residents are therefore expected to go on demanding for a fair compensation.

In conclusion, this article demonstrates that government action can lead to or exacerbate vulnerability among rural communities, hence the need for appropriate mining policy frameworks that would minimize vulnerability and conflict. It is now possible, on the basis of the findings of this study, to argue with greater confidence that vulnerability is as much an objective reality as it is constructed experience that is mediated by socially held meanings. Specific development interventions can eventuate vulnerability in local communities in so far as such interventions impinge upon "nature" and specific cultural objects that communities hold dear. However, the experience of vulnerability is dependent on what subjective meanings are attached to such assets. An ethnoecological approach stands a better chance of highlighting these meanings and minimizing the conflict that may arise.

**Notes**

1    Mines and Communities 2007.
2    Soft Law Ltd. 2008.
3    *Daily Nation* 2001.
4    Tiomin Resources (operating through its local subsidiary, Tiomin (K)) , was the leading titanium mining firm in the region at the time of the displacement, that is, between 2002 and 2010. It changed its name to Vaaldiam Resources in early 2010 following a series of bad publicity and withdrawal of financial support from investors, which also led to suspension of the Kwale operations. Its operations in Kwale have since been acquired by Base Iron Ltd of Australia, who bought this concern on 30th July, 2010.
5    For the Niger Delta, see Bob 2002 and Akpan 2006, 2007; for Japan, see Martinez-Alier 2001; for Colombia see Richani 2004; for Angola, see Frynas and Wood 2001; for Peru, see Haarstad and Floysand 2007.
6    Akpan 2005.
7    Hilson 2002a.
8    Frynas and Wood 2001; Turner and Brownhill 2004.
9    Turner and Brownhill 2004; Eccarius-Kelly 2006; Muradian et al. 2003.
10   Barrera-Bassols and Toledo 2005.
11   Syagga and Olima 1996.
12   Ibid., p. 68.
13   Hughes 2008.
14   Kelly and Adger 2006.
15   See Syagga and Olima 1996; Pedroso-Junior and Sato 2005; Howard and Nabanoga 2007.
16   Heller and Hills 2008.
17   Benson 2008.
18   Beideman 2007, p. 280.
19   Cowell 1997.
20   For instance, Hilson 2002b, p. 68, and de Wet 2002.
21   Akpan 2005, p. 143.
22   See Cernea 1988 for a discussion on these risks.
23   Rygel et al 2006 p. 743; Adger 2006.

24   See McLaughlin and Dietz 2008, and  Greider and Garkovich 1994, for this discussion.

25   Following the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010, provinces were done
     away with and districts were converted to counties.  Districts (previously referred to as
     divisions) were created under counties butl were retained as they previously
     appeared in the old constitution.  Kwale District is now known as Kwale County, with
     three new districts (Kwale, Msambweni and Kinago) under it.  However, for the sake of
     clarity and for ease of reference, and in view that these were the administrative units
     that existed during the time of the field study, the study site will be referred to as Coast
     Province, and Kwale District, as the case may be.

26   See GoK 2002.

27   See earlier discussion on ethnoecology and how it was used in this study.

28   Searles 1928.

29   Moore 1948 and Weiss 1973.

30   Cook 1946.

31   Herlehy 1984.

32   Ng'weno 1997, p. 63.

33   See Moore 1948 and Weiss 1973 for earlier writings on the coconut palm.

34   Comments from a displaced person who declined to relocate to the identified host area
     as the land had few scattered palm trees Mnazi is the Swahili term for coconut tree.  The
     same term is also used to refer to the wine derived from; one has therefore to be aware
     of the context within which it is used.

35   See Brown 1980.

36   The various acts mentioned here are available at
     http://www.kenyalaws.org/klr/index.php?id=7.

37   Ojiambo 2002, p. 12.

38   DRCC 2005, p. 5.

39   For discussion on African communities' attachment to land, see Abuya 2010 pp. 60-63.

40   Akpan 2009, p. 114 also makes the same argument that the economic  value of a coconut
     palm is tied to its cultural values.

41   In 2005, the exchange rate was US$1=approx. Ksh79.

42   Nosal 2001; Goodin 1989.

43   Biersack 1999.

44   Akpan 2009, p. 114.

45   Downing 2002.

46   See Moretti 2007 on how mining operations affected the cultural patterns of the
     Urapmin and Hamtai peoples of Papau New Guinea.

47   Pedroso and Sato 2005.

48   Downing 2002.

49   Kelly and Adger  2006.

50   Greider and Garkovich  1994, p.1.

51   Murphy 2001.

52   For elaboration see Cernea 2002, p. 28.

53   Akpan 2008, 2009.

54   Syagga and Olima 1996.

55   Haarstad and Floysand 2007, p. 304.

56    This author examines this issue in an article under preparation, entitled "Let Whoever Disturbs the Dead be Responsible for the Consequences: An Ethnoecology of Graves and the Matter of Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Compensation in a Kenyan Mining Rural Community."

57    Brätland argues that compensation can only be "fair" in instances where consent is given freely by the affected individual.  He dismisses the notion of "just compensation" as unachievable in instances of takings (eminent domain), primarily because in cases assent is never present.

58    Radin (1993 pp. 56-86) contributed to the discussion on compensation by introducing the concepts of "commodification," in which governments conceive everything people value as if it were a commodity subject to market exchange, and "noncommodification," otherwise equated to rectification.  "Noncommodification" entails restoring the status quo ante (as before the 'injurious' action) or a state of affairs equivalent in moral value to the *status quo ante*—in this sense, pecuniary interest, such as attachment to land, houses, graves, etc.  In the former sense, harm to a person is equated with a dollar value and thus can be compensated at market value, while in the latter sense, dollars and commensurability (which compensation aims to achieve) are incompatible.  Simply put, one can compensate harm resulting from loss of a car, for instance, but one cannot compensate a loss of an ancestral grave, or in this case, an intergenerational and culturally significant plant.

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# A Critique of the Concept of Quasi-Physicalism in Akan Philosophy

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**Abstract:** One important feature of recent African philosophical works is the attempt by writers to interpret some key concepts from within the context of specific African cultures. The interpretations of such writers, however, particularly in connection with Akan thought, have not been without problems. One such concept is the concept of a person. From the largely general position that a completely physical conception of the person is inconsistent with Akan cultural beliefs, the precise characterization of the non-physical constituent of the human being has been a source of great controversy. An expression that has of recent times been put forward as descriptive of that constituent is the "quasi-physical." The notion of quasi-physicalism is the brainchild of an Akan philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, and is strongly held also by Safro Kwame, another Akan philosopher. This article attempts an explanation of the notion and argues that it is conceptually flawed in diverse ways, and as such philosophically indefensible.

## Introduction

The philosophical ideas of any culture, including the Akan, may be obtained from the language, beliefs, and practices of that culture. In this regard, an examination of some Akan cultural beliefs and language should aid in the understanding of the Akan concept of a person. In Akan language, the human body is referred to as *honam*, but there are two other expressions, *ōkra* and *sunsum,* which, together with *honam*, seem to suggest belief in the existence of two distinct components of the human being. These expressions are sometimes translated as "soul or mind" and "spirit' respectively and designated as being spiritual. Akan thinkers who hold spiritual conceptions of these entities include Asare Opoku, Peter Sarpong, and Kwame Gyekye.[1] Even though Sarpong, for instance, correctly translates *sunsum* as "spirit," he nonetheless sees it as deriving from the father—an error that Gyekye points out.[2] It is also held in Akan thought that the *ōkra* does not, just like the *sunsum*, form part of the brain or the body because of its complete spirituality. It is nonetheless believed to play some role in the person's ability to live, as it is seen to be a life force with spiritual attributes. It is these spiritual conceptions of *ōkra* and *sunsum* that Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame reject. They argue—for reasons that I will explain in detail in the next section—that *ōkra* and *sunsum* are not spiritual but are rather quasi-physical.

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The assessment of beliefs as evidence for the existence of these spiritual entities by contemporary Akan philosophers has chiefly been based on the logical implications of specific cultural beliefs regarding the activities of those entities. But, it is these same sources of evidence (language, beliefs, and the practices that those beliefs underlie) that have ironically led some to argue against the metaphysical conceptions of *ōkra* and *sunsum*. Wiredu and Kwame, to be specific, explain that these entities are spoken of in physical terms and are capable of partially assuming spatial properties.[3] Thus, *ōkra* and *sunsum* should accurately be described as "quasi-physical," since they are not believed, in these philosophers' view, to be purely physical either.

This article aims at resolving the controversy surrounding the interpretations offered by the metaphysical theorists and the quasi-physicalists in connection with *ōkra* and *sunsum.* The article is a sustained critique of the doctrine of quasi-physicalism, which it considers seriously blemished. Ultimately, it affirms the metaphysical in an indirect manner. The article, therefore, rejects the quasi-physicalist's argument that the *ōkra*, especially, cannot be regarded as spiritual because (i) it falls in between the physical and "the so-called spiritual" realms and is closer to the physical, (ii) it is believed to accept offerings, (iii) it is capable of rendering itself visible to medicine men, (iv) medicine men use physical or partially physical means to reach to the *ōkra*, and that (v) the *ōkra* is thought of as a person's double.[4] The article finally argues that aspects of the doctrine of quasi-physicalism itself are utterly inconsistent with some basic Akan beliefs. Hence, the spiritual conception of *ōkra* is not wrong.

The multidisciplinary appeal of the subject matter of this article is not surprising at all. Matters regarding the constitution of the human being have not only been explored by thinkers of varied cultures, but also are a subject of study across a number of academic disciplines such as philosophy, religion, psychology, anthropology, and comparative cultural studies. This article intends to influence contemporary debates about African or Akan thought, thereby providing possible ways of enhancing the understandings (in the academic fields mentioned above) of the constitution of the human being. It corrects the misinterpretations of the quasi-physicalist, highlighting the part-spirituality of the human being. The spiritual aspect of the person, which is also believed to survive death (that is, the *ōkra*), is the subject often mentioned in the traditional Akan religious practice of libation pouring. It  is also believed to be capable of enforcing morality in the physical human community. Also, the clarity that this article gives to the concept of the *ōkra* (mind) provides useful information for scholars interested in (i) the question of whether or not *ōkra* (mind) differs from *adwene* (thought) and *amene* (brain), and (ii) the issue of whether or not any relationships exist among the three. It could, for instance, be observed that the article does not point in the direction of the mind being part of the body or the brain; nor is the mind shown to be physical or quasi-physical. Studies of Akan psychology and culture, and indeed African studies, could thus benefit from the philosophical analysis embarked upon in this article.

Finally, the postulation of quasi-physicalism, amidst its many problems, is an interesting exercise in contemporary Akan philosophy. It even offers some ideas that compare with aspects of Western philosophy. Its rejection of the spirituality or, rather, part-spirituality of the human being is, in some respects, consistent with the conventional attitude toward the metaphysical in some Western conceptions. In modern Western philosophy, discussions on personal identity often go back to Descartes who, in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, postulated a metaphysical mind in addition to the body. Yet,

the mind is seen by anti-metaphysians such as D.M. Armstrong and U.T. Place as not different from brain processes, which to them is quite empirical.[5] D.M. Armstrong notes, "The mind was not something behind the behavior of the body, it was simply part of that physical behavior."[6] He calls this a "Materialist or Physicalist account of the mind."[7] What distinguishes Wiredu and Kwame from the Western anti-metaphysians, however, is their apparent admission that the *ōkra*, for instance, is indeed an entity distinguishable from the body and capable of existing after death. But, while Gyekye accepts the idea of the immortality of the *ōkra*, he seems to suggest that at death, the surviving entity is a union of *ōkra* and *sunsum* which, together, constitute one spiritual component of the human being.[8] Therefore, Gyekye's position, although not necessarily Cartesian, is ultimately dualistic; and I am more inclined toward it than toward Wiredu's and Kwame's.

Some conceptual clarifications, however, have to be made now. It can be drawn from the above criticisms, first, that Armstrong and Place reduce the mind to the physical or material. And, that the mind is seen by them as fundamentally bodily and perceptible. But it is instructive to note that materialism may not mean the same as physicalism. Thus, conscious efforts must always be made not to conflate them. Before I explain why, however, I should acknowledge that even though Armstrong does not make any careful distinction between materialism and physicalism in the preceding paragraph, he calls elsewhere for such a distinction.[9] It is consistent with the doctrine of physicalism to affirm as an existent anything which is "a physical object" or, at least, describable "in a language of physics."[10] This implies that in certain cases an intangible object would pass for the physical provided what is said about it is compatible with the laws of physics. Materialism, on the other hand, "misleadingly seems to conjure up a Newtonian account of matter."[11] That account admits of only the tangible, as inherent in Newton's theory of gravitational fields where matter attracts matter. Materialism and physicalism are, therefore, not the same.

Quasi-physicalism: A Critique

Quasi-physicalism is the philosophy that considers as existent objects "belonging to a category between the realm of the obviously physical, i.e. those objects that obey the known laws of physics, and the realm of the so-called spiritual or completely immaterial objects …"[12] In line with this philosophy, therefore, the *ōkra* of a living or dead person is deemed to be quasi-physical.[13] For, that is the form in which the *ōkra* (of a dead person for instance), when it reveals itself to the living, is thought to be.

On the contrary, John Mbiti and Gyekye would consider such "perceptions" of the *ōkra* (of the dead) as quasi-physical at all.[14] For instance, even though Mbiti reports people "seeing" and "hearing" certain figures (such as *mizimu*—the living-dead among the Baganda), he still refers to them as "spirits," as spiritual beings. Similarly, Gyekye argues that even though such spiritual beings "can make themselves felt in the physical world" and, "by the sheer operation of [their] power[s], assume spatial properties," they are neither physical nor quasi-physical.

The object of this article, then, is to examine this controversy about the spirituality or otherwise of the *ōkra* in particular. It focuses, nonetheless, on establishing whether the arguments advanced by the quasi-physicalist are defensible. Unlike Mbiti and Gyekye, Wiredu's preference for his coined term "quasi-physical" appears to be based on the strength of the fact that *ōkra* is "perceptible."[15] Secondly, he also maintains that there are

several other qualities often attributed to some parts of a person that stand those parts out as quasi-physical. He cites the instance of the common Akan belief that when someone eats a kind of food which his *'kra* is allergic to, he or she falls sick so that "the *ōkra* may need to be pacified with offerings of appropriate food and drinks."[16] He suggests that the *ōkra* is portrayed to have some amount of physical desire, the ability to choose and enjoy food, and the ability to receive. But if his evidence is granted, his conclusion can, with some reflection, still be rejected. Since a person's *'kra* is believed to be linked or subsumed with his body, and the person lives in a world which is both physical and spiritual, he or she is possibly not prevented in the physical realm from reaching to the nonphysical side. The problem probably is "how" this reaching is done.

Indeed, it would be difficult not to start with or, at least, include the most obvious (i.e. the physical realm) in the exploration or explanation of the spiritual realm, if the explanation is to convince anybody of the existence of a spiritual entity or event. In any such case where the metaphysical is postulated, the rationality or acceptability of the postulation would most likely be based on the possibility of a mutual, cross-realm affectation or causation. That is, the strength of the evidence for a causal relation between the physical and the purported metaphysical realms would be crucial for a possible understanding of the metaphysical. But this role played by the physical does not in any way call for the description of a metaphysical entity itself as para-physical. If it is granted, for the sake of argumentation, that an illness originates from the *ōkra* or that the *ōkra* is badly affected by the eating of food, it appears that only a cross-realm causation is implied, not necessarily the quasi-physicality of the *ōkra*. Again, assuming that a spiritual being could be made perceptible with some invocation done with the aid of material objects, or that certain physical effects can be predicted with some degree of certainty whenever some items are allegedly offered to *spirits*, then, those objects would rather become just channels of interaction.

The lack of understanding regarding the last point has led to the situation where the wrong sorts of questions are sometimes asked in the analysis of traditional African beliefs. It is a bit easy, for instance, to ask and stop at the question whether some material object has been used or whether some reference has been made to anything physical in someone's explanation of a spiritual event or experience. Such a question is often asked with the one-sided hope that an affirmative response to the question would make unlikely the existence of the supernatural. It is then assumed to be awkward why everything cannot be regarded as physical or potentially physical, since even the alleged *metaphysical* realm cannot be explored without any aid at all from the physical world. This attitude tends not only to reduce in advance a researcher's willingness to consider the metaphysical, but also it deprives him or her of the opportunity to develop any interest in investigating the reality or otherwise of "the spiritual itself." The right questions to ask, then, would be whether there is anything beyond the phenomenal world, and whether and how such realities may connect with the physical (especially, to produce some effect). This way, the researcher shows his or her readiness to accept the spiritual if it can be or is found. With any alleged cross-realm-generated effect, for example, it would have to be examined whether one specific situation obtains: i.e. whether the effect is radically different from what the physical objects used in the process can produce on their own – both individually and collectively. If it is, then the bringing into being of the effect would understandably be traced to the (other) nonphysical component. Indeed, this is a rational approach. It is an application of J.S. Mill's "method of difference" and, more specifically, "method of residues." Such an attribution to the nonphysical might not mean that the physical objects were not part of the set of things that

were considered to be the cause of the effect, except that they were not the probable cause. This is why Safro Kwame's recommendation below is quite misplaced: "To test the existence or non-existence of completely non-physical entities and methods, the traditional African healers would have to be barred from employing any physical entities or methods in their therapies and procedures. They never are."[17]

In the first place, it has been indicated already how of little value it is to ignore the claim of a cross-realm effect or interaction, only to confirm the obvious fact that (i) the metaphysical and material are completely different in constitution, and (ii) some amount of the physical is involved, at some stages, in the art of reaching to the spiritual realm. Secondly, it is a portrayal of lack of understanding of the worldview of medicine men to suggest that they do not understand that the concept of "the spiritual," by definition, completely excludes anything physical. For if an object is believed by them to be capable of being inhabited by an invoked spirit, for example, the object is not misunderstood to be the spirit itself at all. Nor is the spirit believed to have become material. Thirdly, the medicine men believe, instead, that the spiritual and the physical do interact, or that events in one realm can affect the other. This is evidenced in their use of objects in many of their healing techniques. It is thus possible, they would agree with John Perry, for the material world to form the "evidential base" for *something* that is "well beyond the material world."[18] Indeed, finally, the belief that a person has a spiritual component and that this component can affect the body (and vice versa) renders untrue S. Kwame's view that the mind-body problem does not arise at all in the Akan concept of the person.[19]

The seeming near-physicality of the *ōkra* merely on the basis of the offering of sacrifice of food and other items, and even the pouring of libation to the living-dead (an act which Wiredu regards as utterly irrational), would be difficult to deny only if it is understood within the ordinary context that these offerings are meant for the consumption of the spirits.[20] It would be irrational indeed for a traditional Akan thinker to believe that a drink just poured on the ground, food placed at a section of the house or an object left on a crossroad have actually been eaten or taken by the spirits. For, the items "offered" do not necessarily vanish at all. The drink sinks into the ground and dries out; the food stays in the bowl until it is taken away or replaced by humans; and, the item left on the crossroads remains there and gets rotten, eaten by insects, or just displaced through some unintended human or natural action. The significance of such sacrifices could only be to show human attempt to commune with "the spirits." Such that, they (the spiritual entities) would be willing to return some favors as they witness the premium human beings place on the relationship with them. The premium being, among others, the latter's parting with those items in memory of the former. In the case of the pacification of the *ōkra*, it still does not appear there is any basis to suggest that it engages in any physical or quasi-physical act of eating any portion of the food and drinks that are allegedly offered to it. The alleged pacification sometimes involves nothing but the eating of a particular food by the individual to correct some imbalance in his system. Usually the imbalance is believed to be between his *'kra* and *honam*, caused originally by the ingestant that was bound to disturb the body and the harmony between it and the *ōkra*.

Wiredu makes reference to Debrunner's statement that the *ōkra* is a person's double, "conceived in his material image complete with a head, hands, legs and all."[21] But Debrunner's claim is a bit inaccurate. He seems to have been misled by the personal or rationalistic terms in which the *ōkra* is described to conclude that it has the same parts as the physical person. But this notion is completely absent in Akan language. It makes no sense to

use phrases like "my *ōkra*'s leg," "my *ōkra*'s head;" or even say that "her *okra*'s chin is like this" or that "his *ōkra*'s hand has done that." Simply put, the *ōkra* has no such parts as claimed by Debrunner. It only makes sense to conceive of the *ōkra* as a person's double when it is interpreted as a spiritual aspect of an individual who has a particular physical shape. This is far from saying that the *ōkra* has that same shape. In cases where, as Wiredu suggests, the *ōkra* is "seen" by medicine men, there is still the question of whether the *ōkra* is "seen" in human form. While Wiredu seems to hold that this is the case, it is not quite clear whether the shape is the actual shape of the *ōkra* itself. Given the absence of expressions in the Akan idiom compartmentalizing the *ōkra*, it is quite doubtful whether Akan thinkers would actually consider any such shape, assuming the *ōkra* is indeed seen, to be its own shape. It is conceivable that it takes on the shape of the person it was known to inhabit just for the purposes of easy identification of its bearer.

Wiredu, in denying the spirituality of the *ōkra*, also remarks that "any theory of souls or spirits can only be an empirical theory" because "if a determinate and coherent definition can be given, the question whether such things actually exist can only be answered by empirical research." [22] I have already conceded some role for the empirical in the study of metaphysics, but only because such a role is a matter of procedural aid. The concession is also to show how inadequate the empirical is in explaining certain phenomena. This is not to suggest, as Wiredu does now, that only purely empirical research can confirm the reality of things, spirits included. Continuing, he states that "to say everything is spirit, even if only "ultimately," is to advance a wild empirical claim which any slight empirical reflection must discourage."[23] I question why spirits cannot be conceived to exist as essentially nonphysical beings, or why a theory of spirits is thus "an empirical theory." He seems to put the method of investigation ahead of the object to be investigated, because he chooses a method of investigation and intends to make the object of investigation take on the core feature of the method. But the method of investigation cannot determine for a researcher the nature of what it is that he or she wants to investigate. This is because any object of human enquiry is expected to be one of two things: that, it either admits of one's chosen method of investigation or it does not. Indeed, the existence of a thing is not only independent of its being an object of investigation, but also of any chosen method of investigation. In the case of the essential nature of *ōkra*, it seems that it does not admit of Wiredu's criterion.[24] Empirical means is not the sole or permanently exhaustive medium for humans to acquire knowledge because there are other credible ways of knowing. These include logical deductions (from self-evident propositions) and paranormal cognition. To proclaim panpsychism is to induce everybody, the empirically- and metaphysically-inclined, to some sort of investigation. It is to make an open claim that is to be investigated by any philosophically acceptable method, except that different success rates are to be expected whenever largely different methods are employed. To say, therefore, that everything is (or contains) spirit or is ultimately spirit is not necessarily to advance any empirical claim, let alone a wild one.

There are obvious difficulties with the notion of quasi-physicalism itself. I must admit, however, that the difficulties are mainly as a result of the complex nature of the notion of personal identity in general, and the challenge this presents to anyone attempting to give a comprehensive account of the identity of persons. This is shown clearly when (i) quasi-physicalists are compelled to recognize that certain existents (such as *ōkra*) do not yield fully to physical laws, which they regard as the sole arbiter of truth, and (ii) dualists also admit that the spiritual can be physically perceived. Why then, one would ask, does the quasi-

physicalist not prefer to be called a quasi-metaphysian, and the metaphysian to be called a physicalist of some sort? There are no indications that the two groups of philosophers actually characterize themselves in the manner just suggested. I will now go ahead to make a few remarks bearing this in mind.

According to Wiredu, the *ōkra* is believed to be capable of rendering itself visible to some medicine men although it is not material or tangible.[25] Assuming this is true, the resort to it by Safro Kwame and Kwasi Wiredu to claim that it is quasi-physical makes their interpretation appear to ignore the essential quality of spirits. It is not clear why, for instance, from the occasional visibility of "spirits" quasi-physicalists describe them only in terms of features exhibited on those occasions. Again, with the traditional Akan belief in the potential visibility of spirits, and possibly on multiple occasions, it is only fair to ask what the identity of those spirits are when they have not allegedly revealed or are not revealing themselves to human beings? Are they nonexistent? If they are, how possible is it for nonentities to know when and who to appear (or even reappear) to? How can medicine men, for instance, receive inspiration from and be able to invoke nonentities in their practices? The very ideas of the occasional exposure and visibility of particular "spirits" (as held by quasi-physicalists), the invoking or re-invoking of specific spirits in various cultural contexts, and the very concept of the living-dead suggest that spirits are always existent. They are believed to exist whether or not they are being felt by humans. I do not dispute that at the very moment when a spirit is believed to have revealed itself, it is most probably quasi-physical. After all, it can, at least, be "seen" (by whatever means). But sight alone does not define the physical; so, the *ōkra* cannot be regarded as quasi-physical based on fleeting visibility alone. Whereas a hologram can be described as quasi-physical, the same description cannot be given of *ōkra* because its category of existence does not by nature admit of physical attributes. For it is non-physically natured and remains so at most of its normal times. And, given the belief that spirits do not die, one more thing can be said. That, there might not be strong reasons to deny that what comes to be quasi-physical occasionally would *ceteris paribus* relapse to its original state, anytime the quasi-physical manifestation ends. It appears more acceptable then that spirits, including the *ōkra*, are essentially metaphysical in nature, even though they have some capacity for quasi-physical manifestation. The difference between the essential nature of spirits and their capacity to be quasi-physical can be likened to water and ice. Water is essentially liquid but it also has the capacity to turn to ice under certain conditions. It will be most inappropriate to claim that water is solid or half-solid just because the ice which it occasionally turns to is solid.[26]

The quasi-physicalist is a physicalist in disguise. His claim to allow for things that are not entirely subject to the laws of physics is misleading. This claim initially seems as if it recognizes metaphysical realities which many Akan thinkers actually see *ōkra* to fall within.[27] But, in reality, what the quasi-physicalist means by something not being "entirely subject to the laws of science" is that it is something "which current laws of physics do not explain, but might be proved by physics in future." For instance, S. Kwame, who can be called a "modern" quasi-physicalist, declares that: "the modern or contemporary quasi-physicalist does not deny that as our discovery of physical laws proceeds and our scientific knowledge increases, we may come to accept some or all the quasi-physical objects as bona fide physical objects. The quasi-physicalism of today may then turn out to be the materialism or physicalism of tomorrow."[28] There is every indication in the preceding quotation that the purported quasi-physical entities would not have been affirmed as real if they were not capable of becoming (known as) physical objects in future. So, given that all physicalists,

quasi or not, already affirm the reality of physical objects, the quasi-physicalist becomes both today's physicalist and tomorrow's physicalist today. That is, he is a physicalist today who has the foresight of knowing what might become physical tomorrow. He therefore becomes somebody like a prophet who hopes that his predictions come true in future. But, like any act of prophesy, failure is an important possibility.

Even the statement that "the ōkra is a quasi-physical object" is one which the quasi-physicalist would regard as confirmable on physical or empirical grounds. Otherwise, how else can he claim to know such an object, since the claim is not *a priori* and, also, "metaphysics" is a taboo word for him. This confirms he is a physicalist today, not only tomorrow. It can therefore be said that the empirical criterion of knowledge, whether with regard to entities perceived today or ultimately in future (or to objects scientifically explicable today or in future) is quite useful to the quasi-physicalist. But this may not be construed to mean that the quasi-physicalist would want to be seen as an empiricist. For being someone who brings to bear the empirical character of (especially) the Akan belief system, Wiredu, for instance, would prefer to be called "an empiricalist," not an empiricist.[29]

The quasi-physicalists' interpretation of "what defies the laws of science" cannot also be seen as consistent with the Akan conception on the ōkra because it (ōkra) is regarded as incapable of scientific proof. In future, therefore, the ōkra (which the quasi-physicalist admits is incapable of proof only for today) will not cease to be metaphysical. It is very much doubtful if the ōkra will ever be subject to the physical laws which the quasi-physicalist suggests. It is with the same skepticism that I view Teffo Lebisa and Abraham Roux's rejection of metaphysical thinking in the "African accounts of the person." In their understanding, such thinking "has to do with a lack of scientific knowledge."[30] The tension between metaphysics and science, seen essentially as between the belief in the reality of spiritual entities and the requirement of scientific proof, is of such a nature that one of them cannot be expected to collapse into the other. It is, however, possible to have a little bit of both, as found in such experience as the manifestation of the ōkra. It would thus be beneficial to recognize that the existence of spirits (such as the soul or God) as held in Akan and other religions does not take away anything from the distinct role and importance of science itself. In fact, "both religion and science are concerned about our understanding and interpretation of reality, even though their interpretations generally differ."[31] Reality should not just be explored from only the scientific or metaphysical angle, but ought to be understood as "a complex phenomenon that can be grasped from different approaches."[32] These approaches include the physical, metaphysical or a combination of both.

Conclusion

The notion of quasi-physicalism has been examined from the Akan philosophical perspective. The idea held by Wiredu and Kwame that the ōkra is quasi-physical (but not spiritual) has been found not to possess enough logical grounds for its postulation. Indeed, the very nature of ōkra, as this article has attempted to explain, appears rather spiritual. It has also been pointed out that even though the spiritual realm in Akan thought is difficult to explain, it is, just like the physical, true to the Akan. Thus, the spiritual is relevant to the understanding of Akan cosmology and person, which are both not entirely physical.

The Akan expression *sunsum mu nsɛm* and *sunsum mu ahintasɛm* translate respectively as "matters of the spiritual realm" and "the secrets (or mysteries) of the spiritual realm." The former is used in reference to questions of metaphysical concern, while the latter is used in

connection with the esoteric nature of the objects and happenings of the metaphysical realm. In both there is some evidence for the Akan belief in the existence of a spiritual realm. What requires to be noted, also, is the Akan belief that the human being (*onipa*) has *sunsum* (spirit), and that *sunsum mu nsɛm* also involve him or her. Some of the difficulties inherent in quasi-physicalism results from the failure of its advocates to recognize this aspect of Akan thought.

The *ōkra* is deemed in Akan thought as a spiritual entity. As such, the capacity of the medicine men to "see" it—as a result of their spiritual potency— does not negate the conception that it is fundamentally spirit. The quasi-physicalist's argument that the *ōkra* is not spiritual is therefore not quite defensible. In any case, it is surprising how the quasi-physicalist would deny the 'reality' of the spiritual realm, but would approve or adopt the claim of a possible perception of the *ōkra* by the medicine man whose capacities were in the first place developed by spiritual means. The spirituality of the *ōkra* also suggests that it cannot accept and eat offerings as the quasi-physicalist suggests. Although, finally, the *ōkra* might be spoken of in personal terms, Wiredu's endorsement of the idea that it is a person's "double" has been proven mistaken because of the complete nonexistence of any references to parts of the *ōkra* in Akan language. Quasi-physicalism, therefore, does not appear to get it right on such areas of Akan thought as discussed in this essay.

Notes

1    See Opoku 1978, pp. 94-95; Gyekye 1995, pp. 93-94; Sarpong 1974, pp. 37-38.
2    Gyekye 1995 pp. 89-94) argues that it derives from God.
3    Kwame 2004, pp. 345-36; Wiredu 1983, p. 120.
4    For the sources of these five claims, see respectively Kwame 2004, pp. 345-46; Wiredu 1983, p. 120; Wiredu ibid, pp. 119-20; Kwame ibid, p. 348; Wiredu ibid, p. 120.
5    Armstrong 1970, p. 70; and Place 1970, p. 86.
6    Armstrong 1970, p. 70.
7    Ibid. p. 73.
8    Gyekye 1995, p. 98.
9    Armstrong (in Gregory ed.) 1987, p. 491.
10   Kwame 2004, pp. 343-44. He accepts Anthony Flew's (1984, p. 267) idea that statements constituting such a language are those that can be "formulated as statements about publicly observable physical objects and processes."
11   Kwame ibid. p. 348.
12   Ibid. pp. 345-46. He calls this definition the "limited version of physicalism,"' comparing objects here approved of as equivalent to"'atoms, fields, energies, sets and numbers."
13   Wiredu 1983, p. 120.
14   See Mbiti 1997, p. 86 and Gyekye 1995, p. 93. It is important to note that Gyekye is also Akan and carries out his analysis from an Akan cultural perspective.
15   Even when the *ōkra* is seen through some "medicinally heightened perception," that does not impair the empirical argument. "However heightened," he remarks, "the powers of an eye may become, if it sees something, that thing will have to be in space. In regard to any claim to see something, it must make sense to ask 'Where is it?'" (See

Gbadegesin 2002, p. 183).

16   Wiredu 1983, p. 120.
17   Kwame 2004, p. 348
18   Perry 1975, p.153.
19   Kwame 2004, p. 349.
20   Wiredu 1980, p. 42.
21   Wiredu 1983, p. 120.
22   Ibid. p. 127.
23   Ibid. p. 129.
24   The essential nature of spirit beings, in general, is discussed shortly.
25   Ibid. pp. 119-120.
26   An objection might be raised here that for someone ignorant of water's capability to turn to ice, all there is, is just ice. The point then, might be made that such a person is not wrong in stopping at ice. My response is two-fold. First, since that person knows no connection between water and ice, he is not in the position to assert that water is solid or semi-solid. He would not be party to our current debate which requires knowledge of the connection between water and ice. All he knows is that ice exists. In any case, we also do not deny that there is ice; the point is, we are simply not interested in whether or not there is ice. Secondly, if he insists that, because he knows of no such connection, there is not any between water and ice, he would be doing something inappropriate. His ignorance of the connection does not make it right for him to deny the connection. His position would be uninformed and wrong, although his ignorance of the connection is pardonable.
27   See Wiredu 1983, pp.119-120, and also in Gbadegesin 2002, p. 183. There are some traditional African thinkers, however, who reject God, deities, and generally, spirits. They think that these entities are a figment of human imagination but not, most importantly, because of the physical or paraphysical nature of those entities (see, for instance, Gyekye 1995, p. 48).
28   Kwame, p. 346. He refers to Gregory.
29   Wiredu 2009, unpublished. He thinks it is erroneous to call his philosophy 'empiricism'
30   Teffo and Roux 2002, p. 171. They argue that "[w]ith more knowledge of anatomy, and particularly neurology, these views [that is, the metaphysical-related] will change or simply vanish."
31   Gyekye, 2008, unpublished.
32   Ibid. Wiredu argues that traditional Akan religion is empirically oriented (Wiredu 1980, particularly the chapter "Philosophy, Mysticism and Rationality"). This means that religion would not necessarily be opposed to (empirical) science. His interpretation of Akan religion, nonetheless, is not in complete agreement with the sense in which religion is generally discussed here.

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# Ethiopia's Role in South Sudan's March to Independence, 1955 -1991

## BELETE BELACHEW YIHUN

**Abstract:** The historical processes leading to the emergence of the states of Eritrea (1991) and South Sudan (2011) have yet to be satisfactorily reconstructed. The extended conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan since the late 1950s and the resultant war of attrition and vengeance they have waged against each other is considered among the primary factors. Allying with regional and global powers-to-be, the two states engaged extensively in actions designed to bring about the disintegration of the other. This article attempts to recount the retaliatory measures both the imperial regime and the Derg have executed against Sudan's intervention in Eritrea. The policy lines persistently adopted by Ethiopian governments reveal the fact that if Sudan could not refrain from meddling in the Eritrean conflict, then they had to respond in kind.

## Introduction

The existing literature on South Sudan's march to independence ascribes this development to the internal problems in the Sudan and successive rebellions of the subjugated southerners. Power politics at the regional and global levels, often associated with the Cold War interplay, assumed a crucial role in the progression of the turmoil in the Sudan. Departing from this customary trend, this article attempts to analyze the situation in the context of the conflict between Ethiopia and the Sudan and how the process ultimately led to the disintegration of the two major states in northeast Africa.

Both the imperial regime and the military junta (the Derg) have accused Sudan of intervening in the internal affairs of Ethiopia by sponsoring the cause of Eritrean secessionism. Various steps were taken to persuade successive Sudanese governments to refrain from supporting the cause of the rebels. When this approach failed to bear fruit, then a progressive action plan was envisaged and put in place to respond in kind. This article seeks to demonstrate the extent of Ethiopia's retaliatory measures by way of exploiting the existing unrest in South Sudan.

The two neighbors have sustained an extended period of animosity and mutual suspicion since Sudan's independence in 1956. The nature and extent of the conflict is not well recorded, primarily because of the absence of first-hand information on the behind-the-scene developments. At some point the tension escalated to the level where Ethiopia labeled the Sudan its number one enemy in the region. The archives in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs shed a new light on the actual conflict and the role each country played in destabilizing the other. Ethiopia avenged Sudan's active role in the secession of Eritrea by progressively sponsoring South Sudan's bid for independence.

The major foreign policy thrust of post-1941 Ethiopia had been the reinstatement of Eritrea into its domain. Diplomatic missions launched to realize this agenda often resulted in

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headlong confrontation with the outside world. In this regard, Cold War powers, the Arab world, and, particularly, immediate neighbors had posed the ultimate challenge. Successive Ethiopian governments perceived Sudan as a frontline state representing the Arab/Islamic goal of controlling the Red Sea region and thus as a primary policy issue that required careful handling. This article argues that the Eritrean question is behind the tumultuous relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan in the period under discussion.

The dispute began in earnest soon after the federation formula, which had created the basis of Ethio-Eritrean union, was abrogated in 1962. This year marked the beginning of armed resistance in Eritrea, which later evolved into the creation of various rebel groups including the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Sudan's intervention can be traced back to early 1963, as can the genesis of Ethiopia's contact with South Sudan rebels. The two states, which had failed to address meaningfully their respective local problems, then started to seek solutions on the other side of their borders. This article outlines the progression of events leading to the fateful partial disintegration of Ethiopia and the Sudan.

## Evolution of Ethiopia's Involvement in South Sudan

Ethiopia's association with the situation in South Sudan can be traced back to the August 1955 Torit mutiny that heralded the beginning of armed rebellion in the Sudan. The imperial regime was sympathetic toward the government of Sudan on the ground that it "both in principle and in fact, opposed to any kind of fragmentation of a national territory on the basis of religion or tribalism."[1] Accordingly, with the outbreak of the rebellion a set of measures were taken.

When the South Sudan army mutinied in Juba in August 1955, the imperial government provided aircraft to transport northern troops to the area to suppress the rebellion. Similarly, an order was issued to the governors of Ethiopian provinces adjacent to South Sudan "to prevent armed fugitives from coming in and to drive those who had already entered back to where they came from." Consequently, the rebels either gave themselves up or fled with their arms to Uganda, Congo, and Kenya. Those who came to settle in Ethiopia as refugees were allowed to reside under the strict condition that they lay down their arms and "cease and desist from carrying out subversive activities against the Sudan."[2]

The apparent cordial relations between Ethiopia and the Umma Party and military governments from mid-1956 to early 1964 led to their collaboration against southern Sudan rebels. This was particularly true during the governments of Sayid Abdulla Kahlil (1956-1958) and even more so under Maj. Gen. Abboud (1958-1964). A set of agreements aimed at strengthening mutual economic and political/defense ties were signed at the time. The major ones were the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance (August 1957), the non-ratified Trade and Commerce Agreement and the Cultural Agreement (January 1960), and the Extradition Treaty (March 1964).[3]

To this end, Imperial Ethiopia pursued a policy of unconditional support of Sudanese regimes till late 1964. In January 1964, for example, soon after the beginning of the Anya-Nya guerilla movement, a Sudanese delegation came to Ethiopia and requested that when Sudanese troops undertook mopping up operations in the coming months, Ethiopia should close her borders with the Sudan along the Nasir-Pochalla line. In addition to sealing the border, Ethiopia sent the governor of Gambella, Col. Lemma Gebre-Maryam, to Khartoum. In company with high-ranking Sudanese military officials, the colonel proceeded to the area

of conflict and rendered his services in an advisory capacity in the mopping up operations undertaken by Sudanese troops.[4]

Demonstrating the extent of the country's cooperation was the silence it maintained when, under the pretext of undertaking hot pursuit operations, Sudanese government troops, aided by heavy artillery and military aircraft, penetrated deep into Ethiopian territory and indiscriminately inflicted heavy damage upon the lives and property of Ethiopian nationals. Similarly, Ethiopia rejected the offer of assistance and service by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in June 1963 with respect to South Sudan refugees in its territory. It allegedly did so "in order to avoid being instrumental to internationalization of the Southern Sudan problem and in order to safeguard Ethiopia's long existing friendly relations with the Sudan."[5]

In spite of the above developments, Ethiopian authorities were increasingly becoming apprehensive of the South Sudan situation. They were closely monitoring the establishment in exile of the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU), and the extensive campaign of its chief officers, J.H. Oduho (President) and William Deng (Secretary-General), to bring Southern Sudanese grievances to the attention of the world by way of submitting memoranda to the UN, to the Pan African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), and to African political associations.[6]

A range of factors caused Ethiopia to monitor closely the situation in Southern Sudan. These included the 1945 Fabian Colonial Bureau report (*The Sudan: The Road Ahead*) that came out strongly in favor of Southern Sudan as a separate entity from the north; the subsequent debate in the UN and widespread press coverage of the matter, particularly after the summer of 1962; and the establishment in Britain of an unofficial organization called "the International Committee for the Study of Group Rights" and the pressure it exerted for the consideration of the demands of Southern Sudan. In addition, the apprehension that the issue would be discussed, in private and/or public, during the May 1963 OAU Summit contributed to the policy reorientation.

More importantly, the deteriorating bilateral relations after the October 1964 popular uprising in Sudan had contributed to the revision of Ethiopia's position on the Sudan in general and the South in particular. With the termination of the federal arrangement in Eritrea (1962), Ethiopia's internal politics witnessed the emergence of armed resistance. Soon afterwards, the shift in the Ethio-Sudan political equation led to the commencement of the latter entertaining secessionist elements particularly from Eritrea. Troubled and murky episodes started to emerge under the pro-Egyptian and pro-Arab governments of Sir Katim Khalifa (1964-1965), Ismail El Azhari (1965-1969), and Gen. Nimeiri (1969-1985).

The call for reprisal measures against Sudan for its assistance to secessionist elements was intensifying within Ethiopia. The government of Katim Khalifa had officially announced its sympathy and support for the rebel groups, released all Eritrean prisoners, and agreed to allow Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) cadres freedom of movement in the Sudan. It had also facilitated the delivery of material and financial shipments from the Arab/Islamic states in the Middle East to the rebel groups in Eritrea.[7]   A set of proposals outlined a list of measures to be taken. These ranged from approaching rebel groups in South Sudan to discreetly preparing the UMMA party for acts of sabotage within the north.

The 1963 proposed plan of action, for example, considered the case of South Sudan as a "possible pressure on Sudanese government mainly as retaliation should it consider to support subversion in Eritrea." This plan envisaged the maintaining of a series of contact with South Sudanese, "who should be given assistance on a selective basis" and that

"regular exchange of information and opinion be held on south Sudanese affairs."[8] Ethiopia's association with South Sudan began in earnest afterward. The first contact occurred in December 1963 following the request of the representative of the Kampala-based Sudan African National Union (SANU, the new version of SACDNU), William Deng, to the emperor for financial assistance.

The fact that the 1964 Extradition Treaty remained on paper, and more specifically Ethiopia's refusal to comply with Sudan's request to deport Southern Sudanese refugees demonstrated the imperial regime's intentions. The directive prepared for Ethiopia's goodwill mission to the Sudan that would discuss the deteriorating relations (November 1964) authorized the delegation to imply that, unless the latter refrained from supporting Eritrean secessionist elements, thereby intervening in the internal affairs of the country, it would be obliged to respond in kind.[9]

Accordingly, memos submitted to the emperor and the state minister for foreign affairs, Ketema Yifru, designed the aggressive policy that Ethiopia should assume in the process. This included sponsoring the South Sudan rebels through supplying arms to the fighters and financial assistance to the leaders in their propaganda campaign within the continent and the wider world. The strategy stipulated the condition that Ethiopia could easily use the southern problem as a counter measure against Sudan if the latter would not desist from sponsoring the Eritrean rebels.[10]

The contact with South Sudan factions became more frequent after 1965. In February, the secretary general of the Nairobi-based Sudan African Freedom Fighters Union of Conservatives (SAFFUC), Alphonse Malek Pajok, discussed a previously arranged plan concerning "the future relationship or link between the independent Southern Sudan and the Imperial Ethiopian Government." He proposed that the link could be defined either by him, for he was mandated by the party, or by the president and chairman of SAFFUC, Dominic Muorwel. Pajok also requested urgent financial and military assistance as well as special treatment by Ethiopia's embassy in Nairobi.[11]

The vice-president of SANU, Philip Pedak Lieth, similarly underlined the need to maintain friendship and cooperation between his faction and Ethiopia; and requested around five thousand arms to be secretly delivered via Gambella and financial assistance to the amount of US$120,000. Pedak was invited to come to Ethiopia, and he convinced the officials regarding SANU's armed struggle and the assistance they desperately needed from Ethiopia. He was instructed to bring all the military and political leaders of his faction to Addis Ababa for implementation talks, which he did by June 1965. In addition, Ethiopia arranged for Pedak to meet higher officials of the OAU. In spite of the split within SANU and the subsequent creation of the Anya-Nya Liberation Front (Azania) around June 1965, Ethiopia decided to continue supporting the faction militarily and financially.[12]

More expressive of Ethiopia's stance on South Sudan was the response it gave to Sudan on the return of refugees in June 1965. Following the failure of the March 1965 Round Table Conference (RTC) sponsored by the central government and the subsequent escalation of the war in the south, Sudanese rulers issued a general amnesty declaration in June. Subsequently, they approached Ethiopia to repatriate all refugees currently present in its territories. The Ethiopian response was a categorical denial of the presence of southern refugees inside Ethiopia and the country's association with any of the factions.[13]

Nonetheless, the two countries managed temporarily to resolve the matter after the July 1965 talks in Addis Ababa. In the Memorandum of Agreement that was signed, they agreed that "neither party should engage itself or allow its own nationals or nationals of the other

party or any foreign state or any other person or institution within its jurisdiction to engage in any type of activities that are harmful or designed to harm the national interests of the other party."[14] Using the lull, the two parties exchanged the list of refugees-cum-rebels to be expelled; this, however, was not implemented.

The accord between the two governments coincided with the internal political divide within SANU and its apparent weakness in 1966. Ethiopian authorities were troubled by the dismissal of Philip Pedak from his vice-presidency in April and particularly the latter's decision to go to Khartoum for peace talks without prior consultation. The report prepared on the matter specially advised caution on the possibility that Pedak and his close allies were spies of the government of the Sudan. In the meantime, Ethiopia was strengthening its contact with the Azania Liberation Front. In a letter addressed to the emperor, the faction's representative in Congo, Akuot Atem de Mayen, appealed for secret aid in arms that could be channeled through its branch office in Addis Ababa.[15]

Sudan's official statement on the growing number of Eritrean refugees (about 300,000) in its territory and its appeal to the UN High Commission for Refugees for assistance since March 1967 (which Ethiopia considered was an intentional act to internationalize the cause of the rebels) again changed the equation. Irrespective of Ethiopia's protests, both to the government of Sudan and the UN, the former had received funding to the amount of 1,000,000 dollars for 1967 and 2,125,000 dollars for 1969. Sudan's intentional violation of the rule of reciprocity guiding the conduct between the two countries had for long angered the imperial government. As a result, a policy directive was issued whereby Ethiopia would publicize the issue of around twenty thousand South Sudanese refugees in its territory and seek assistance from the international community. The ministry of interior was instructed to prepare their list and gather them in refugee camps along the Ethio-Sudanese border.[16]

Following the executive decision regarding reprisal measures against Sudan, Ethiopia intensified its assistance to South Sudan rebels. The nature of support was so visible that the embassy of Sudan could easily trace the activities of prominent rebel leaders, including Philip Pedak, Steven Lam, and David Goak. These included the attack they launched on Pochalla and Tedo districts from their bases in Gambella and the involvement of the embassy of Israel and British journalists in the process. The response of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Sudan's accusations betrayed a sinister motive of frustrating the other party. It claimed of not knowing the whereabouts of Pedak and his friends, requested the copy of *The Daily Telegraph* in which the British journalists published "malicious anti-Sudan propaganda," and promised to investigate the attacks on Pochalla and Tedo emanating from inside Ethiopian territory.[17]

Ethiopia's contact with rebel activities was further strengthened after the May 1969 coup that brought Nimeiri to power and the status of first-rate-enemy was accorded to Sudan soon afterwards. A range of measures taken by Ethiopia facilitated the clandestine mission of the rebels. These included the establishment in 1969/70 of Gambella refugee camps for about twenty thousand South Sudanese; the UN aid Ethiopia secured (not only for the period stated above, but the back payment to the amount of one million US dollars for earlier dates); and the creation of provisional secretariat for South Sudan refugees that would coordinate security issues and aid distribution.[18]

Through a joint Ethio-Israeli venture, selected South Sudanese refugees were sent to Israel for special military training. After completion, they were deployed into South Sudan via the Gambella refugee camps. On one occasion, for example, the government of Sudan discovered the presence in the refugee camps of ten returnees. Ethiopian officials had to

relocate them before the joint investigation committee arrived in the designated area. The fact that the Sudanese side knew about the presence of Israeli trainers in rebel training camps inside Ethiopia and rebel-held Sudan and that they found out about the military operation plans that designated May 1971 as the starting date of a general attack against government forces made the Ethiopian authorities equally nervous.[19]

The November 1970 military incursions of Sudan into the Akobo district (Gambella) under the pretext of hot pursuit of the rebels further aggravated the situation. Outraged by the resulting attacks on its nationals, the imperial government sanctioned the deployment of a special army unit to secure the frontier region in addition to issuing a formal diplomatic protest. The Ansar revolt of 1969/70 and the intensification of southern rebel military missions against government forces, coupled with Ethiopia's role in the process, could be considered as synchronized measures targeting the Nimeiri regime. The truce the two countries made following the March 1971 agreement and the reciprocal state visits of Nimeiri and Hayla-Selassie, in November 1971 and January 1972, respectively, temporarily cooled tensions.[20]

The Addis Ababa Accord of March 1972 between the Nimeiri government and the Anya-Nya, also known as the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), has to be viewed within the above general context. Ethiopia's role was limited to arranging the venue and applying pressure on the negotiating parties. In this regard, Emperor Hayla-Selassie's personal diplomacy deserves special credit. The Ethiopian sovereign employed his aura and the respect he enjoyed within African circles (as was manifested during the mediation efforts of the Algeria-Morocco boundary conflict of 1964 and the Nigerian Civil War of 1969). The emperor particularly persuaded Nimeiri's Sudan to accept the initiatives for peace talks of the World Council of Churches, the All African Council of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.[21]

Apart from the presence of Foreign Minister Menasie Haile and the emperor's personal respresentative, Nebiye-Le'ul Kefle, in the formal procedures and the emperor on the occasion of the signing of the agreement, together with the separate audience he gave the two sides, however, Ethiopia's role was minimal. Contrary to the belief that Nimeiri and Hayla-Selassie had arranged for the peace deal beforehand, the talking points prepared for the state visits did not in any way refer to the upcoming negotiation. The premonition that the semi-autonomous arrangement between north and south Sudan might reflect negatively on Ethiopia's intricate relation with its northern province, Eritrea, effectively deterred both the emperor and his government from taking an active part in the negotiation process. One document, for example, simply put Ethiopia's role as an effort of a good neighbor to sustain the national unity of the Sudan, comparable to its contributions to the independence of that country and the 1958 mediation role in the boundary conflict between Egypt and the Sudan.[22]

Within two years of the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord, signs started to emerge indicating the crumbling of the deal. According to Ethiopian authorities, the continuing backwardness of the south, the indifference of the central government at a time of massive flooding, the disarmament of the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) army without integration into the national force as was promised by the 1972 Accord, the unilateral benefit reaped by SSLM leaders like Joseph Lagu in the process, and the rejection of the Addis Ababa agreement by some rebel factions in the South were among the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the accord.

The reaction in the south against the joint Egyptian-Sudanese plan to construct the Jonglei Canal in October 1974 was considered by the Ethiopian side as the immediate cause for the bloody student uprising in Juba (14-16 October 1974) and the army mutiny in Akobo, Upper Nile State (March 1975). The harsh reprisal measures of the central government against the mutinous Anya-Nya and the subsequent mass exodus into Ethiopia revived the old tension between the two countries.[23] Ethiopia's plea for humanitarian assistance was considered by the government of Sudan as an act intended to internationalize the incident.

The February 1976 mutiny in the town of Wau (Bahr al Gazel), the assassination of northern officers, and the subsequent desertion of one hundred fifty South Sudanese members of the army was, according to Ethiopian sources, the turning point in the relation between the north and the south. Simultaneously, the growing association between Sudan and Egypt as was manifested by the Mutual Defense Agreement (July 1976), the deployment of huge Sudanese military force along its frontiers with Ethiopia, and the increasing assistance Nimeiri's government rendered to Eritrean rebels afterward heavily strained bilateral relations between the two countries.[24]

## The Derg and South Sudan

The conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan first flared up following the antagonistic stance that Nimeiri's government assumed immediately after the September 1974 Revolution in Ethiopia. Nimeiri's retreat from his role as mediator in the conflict between the Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government together with his integration plan with Egypt alarmed members of the Derg. Soon afterwards, Nimeiri started to court, train, and arm "anti-revolutionary" and separatist elements, notably the Eritrean ones, irrespective of the Derg's Nine Point Peace Initiative on Eritrea (issued in May 1976), which requested Sudan's assistance. In addition he launched an intensive propaganda campaign via the state media, Radio Omdurman.[25]

The Derg started to organize politically South Sudanese refugees in Gambella and Addis Ababa as early as April 1975. But no meaningful operation was planned and staged for the coming couple of years.[26] The Ethio-Sudan rapprochement from the late 1970s to the early 1980s seemingly contributed to the lack of joint ventures with southern rebels. Following the decline of friendly relations between the two governments, however, Ethiopia continued openly to support the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement and its armed wing (SPLM/A) from the mid-1980s on. In fact, it had a role in the creation of the Movement in June 1983 and significantly contributed towards its crystallization thereafter. Under the general supervision of the Ministry of Defense, Ethiopia rendered material, financial, and moral assistance to what it dubbed "Project 07." The project trained the military wing of the Movement, fully equipped it, and supervised military operations conducted in Sudan.[27]

Ethiopian officials equally monitored the propaganda campaign of SPLM/A. In a bid to pressure Nimeiri's regime to assume a similar position in relation to its contact with Eritrean rebels, the policy of SPLM was designed to emphasize its commitment towards the national unity of Sudan. Through such assistance, the rebels managed to stage an all front attack on Nimeiri's Sudan. By early1984, to the delight of Ethiopian officials, SPLA intensified its attacks and managed to disrupt crucial projects like the construction of the Jonglei Canal and the oil exploration in South Sudan. Simultaneously, Sudan's denunciation of Ethiopia's involvement in the conflict increased. The growing presence of the US in the Sudan and the commitment of the Reagan Administration to supply arms, coupled with Sudan's

permission to allow the former to use its airfields and ports, pushed "socialist" Ethiopia to intensify its assistance to SPLA.[28]

More expressive of Ethiopia's stand on the matter was the alarm felt at the discovery of Sudan's plot to assassinate SPLM/A commander Col. John Garang and his followers while they were in Addis Ababa in March 1984. Even more alarming was Nimeiri's reconciliation talks with a SPLM/A splinter group, Anya-Nya 2, in October of the same year and the establishment of a Peace Committee (with thirty members both from north and south) in March 1985. The assurance that came from its embassy in Khartoum dismissing the latter measures as insignificant and as acts of desperation on the part of Nimeiri came as a relief to the officials. Ethiopia thereafter increased its involvement in the south. It commenced an open propaganda mission through Radio Ethiopia in support of the rebels and contributed its share in the release of West German, French, and Swiss nationals kidnapped by the SPLA.[29]

The downfall of the Nimeiri regime in April 1985, however, failed to alter the equation of Ethiopia's relations with SPLM/A. The new government in Khartoum, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, soon approached Ethiopia's rulers for rapprochement talks and proposed the immediate reactivation of all joint ministerial commissions. The vice chairman of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) voiced his government's disappointment at Ethiopia's failure to take its own steps to set right their troubled relations. The foreign affairs division of the central committee of the Ethiopian Workers Party (EWP) came out with a strong response to this accusation. Ethiopia insisted that the above measures were futile unless Sudan took the initiative to set the record straight and revise its anti-Ethiopian position (i.e., recognition of the cause of Eritrean secessionists). Sudan was requested to initiate policy lines to this effect as well as fully implement them in order to resolve the existing problem between the two.[30]

The military solution the TMC preferred to solve the South Sudan problem and the anti-SPLM/A rally in Khartoum, allegedly co-sponsored by the TMC and the National Islamic Front (NIF) in a bid to isolate the former and its supporters in the north as well as to bolster the morale of the disillusioned national army, were indicative of the upcoming relation between Ethiopia and the Sudan. The establishment by the TMC (October 1985) of the Ministerial Committee on Southern Sudan that would organize a national reconciliation conference on Southern Sudan, as a result, was interpreted among Ethiopian circles as a futile gesture.[31]

Likewise, the January 1986 proposal of Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the UMMA party, to the government of Ethiopia to amend the troubled relations and enter into dialogue with SPLM/A was dismissed as political manipulation on the part of the former in light of the upcoming general elections in April. In the meantime, Ethiopia intensified its logistic and propaganda assistance to SPLA, its planes parachuting deliveries and conducting air surveillance deep inside southern Sudan.[32]

Regarding the reconciliation talks, relatively better attention was given to the initiative of the National Alliance for Dialogue with SPLM/A with the aim of negotiating a ceasefire in the civil war ahead of the April elections. The delegation of around twenty members, assembled from various northern parties, was allowed to come to Ethiopia for the talks scheduled for mid-March 1986. Ambassador Yelma Tadese, Acting Foreign Minister, heralded the beginning of the Koka Dam Talks (19-24 March), named after the lakeside resort where they were held. After applauding the first formal meeting between the

representatives of SPLM/A and the National Alliance for the Salvation of Sudan, Ambassador Yelma went on recounting the essence of the occasion:

> The gathering is historic in that it brings together the popular and patriotic forces of the Sudan who had the courage not only to resist the now defunct regime of Gaafar Nimeiri but also to go beyond and challenge that dictatorial and oppressive system to the very end. Some had no option but to take up arms in a militant struggle to resist the oppressive tentacles of the "Nayo" regime while others had to resort to tactics of protest in order to paralyze and dismantle the machineries of the Government presided over by Gaafar Nimeiri. One fact is clear to us here – that without the courageous, combined and selfless struggle of the popular and democratic forces in the Sudan, its people would no doubt have continued to languish in deprivation and instability and our region would also have continued to suffer from the absence of peace and harmony therein.[33]

The Koka Dam Meeting got off to a poor start, however, when Col. Garang questioned the credentials of the informal alliance to negotiate such a deal, and accused the government of Gen. Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dahab of escalating the fighting in the south to coincide with the talks. The rebel leader presented conditions to be met for the meeting and any future reconciliation talks to succeed. These included terms that the leadership in Khartoum, present and future, should recognize that the SPLM rebellion was not a southern problem but a national one, that it lift the current state of emergency ahead of any talks on a ceasefire, and that it repeal all defense agreements with foreign nations.

The remaining two conditions demanded the abrogation of the Islamic Sharia laws introduced under Nimeiri and that the TMC led by Gen. Dahab commit itself to the convening of a national constitutional conference prior to relinquishing power. When pressed by a Sudanese journalist whether Ethiopia was playing the "SPLM card" to counter Sudanese support for separatists in Eritrea, the colonel wittily replied "I didn't know that Sudan was supporting the Eritreans, thank you for the information." On the probe regarding the genesis of the SPLM insurgency, Garang again elusively denied any involvement on the part of Ethiopia at any level in the evolution of the movement. On the other hand, the inclusion in the SPLM delegation of Dr. Mansur Kahlid (a prominent northern politician and former member of the Nimeiri cabinet) angered members of the National Alliance, resulting in the walkout from the Koka talks of the Islamic Socialist Front and the Peoples' Revolutionary Committee.[34]

 In spite of the murky start, the negotiating parties, the SPLM and the National Alliance for Salvation (NAS), agreed to hold a constitutional conference in Khartoum the following June and formed a follow up committee that would oversee matters until the conference took place. Their joint communiqué called on the political forces and the TMC to take into consideration that the objective of the constitutional conference was to discuss the main problems of the Sudan and not the so-called southern problem. The SPLM/A, in return, agreed that even though it would not contest in the upcoming general election it would recognize the government to be elected and continue the reconciliation talks afterward.[35] Ethiopian authorities deemed the occasion historic and a huge success irrespective of the mixed reaction it faced among the leading political parties in Sudan. Particularly, the confused position displayed by the UMMA party, which was the major proponent of the

Koka declaration but chose to assume a nonchalant position in its official statements afterwards, was considered typical of Sudanese unpredictability.[36]

Sudan's general election and the talks between Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and Col. Garang in April and July 1986 were perceived by Ethiopian officials as constructive steps to resolve the civil war. The al-Mahdi government dispatched successive delegations to the region as well as other parts of the continent and the world in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. One document reveals that in all of these missions, Ethiopia was referred to as the prominent actor in the civil war and that al-Mahdi's government would not accept its involvement in the negotiation process. This was interpreted as a strategy to isolate Ethiopia and wrench Col. Garang from its influence. In the meantime, Ethiopia's support to SPLA in its drive to control the territories of the south vis-à-vis the growing military missions of the central government was intensified. The resultant conflict between the two countries continued to further afflict their relations so much that Sudan decided to recall its ambassador in November 1986.[37]

In the face of the growing discord between the two governments, the Ethiopian side apparently preferred pressuring the SPLM/A into continuing its dialogue with the National Alliance for Salvation (NAS) on the proposed constitutional conference. The attempt on the part of Sudan to drag President Mubarak of Egypt into the conflict, particularly the latter's willingness to approach the Ethiopian leader "in a bid to put an end to the rebellion in Southern Sudan," demonstrated the extent of the problem. According to the Sudanese foreign minister, Sharif Zein al-Handi, Mubarak was "disgusted over the recent Ethiopian violations taking into consideration that the strategic threat of rebellion in Southern Sudan poses a threat to Egypt as well."[38]

In April 1987, Sudan took the initiative to mend its troubled relations with Ethiopia and proposed a set of measures to be taken by both sides. The proposal, among others, required that the two assert their respect for the unity and sovereignty of each other and abide by the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Irrespective of its assurance for good neighborly relations, Ethiopia continued to support the SPLA's intensification of its offensive towards the towns of Akobo and Kurmuk in Upper Nile region. In July 1987, Sudanese authorities again extended their readiness for peace talks with Ethiopia through their ambassador in Nairobi. In particular, they proposed face-to-face talks between Ethiopia's President Mengistu and al-Mahdi.[39]

In September, the SPLM/A leader expressed his readiness for a ceasefire and reconciliation talks if the Sudanese government showed a willingness to implement the Koka Declaration of March 1986. The Ethiopian government similarly agreed to facilitate a meeting between the two leaders during an upcoming OAU summit in Addis Ababa in October. Mengistu and al-Mahdi met for the first time in Kampala, Uganda, on the sidelines of the East and Central African Countries Preferential Trade Area (PTA) summit conference. In the two days meeting, they agreed "to step back from the brinkmanship that could easily lead to war between them" and decided to focus on peaceful means to resolve their differences and to contain the problems that confronted them on their common borders. The two leaders also entrusted the Joint Ministerial Committee with the task of identifying the root cause of the existing problems between Ethiopia and Sudan and recommending solutions.[40]

In the meantime, the effort to reconcile SPLM/A and Anya-Nya II in a meeting held in Gambella in mid-November 1987 had failed, allegedly because of the former's preconditions, including the merger of the two movements under the leadership of John

Garang. The intense battle between the SPLA and the central army in early December 1987 and the alleged involvement of Ethiopia (and Cuba) on the side of the SPLA continued to mar the possibility of restoration of good relations between the two countries.[41]

In spite of the above setbacks, the leaders of the two countries again met in Djibouti on 22 March 1988 during the second summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Even if no substantial agreement was concluded, the fact that they did manage to affirm their commitment towards peaceful coexistence and to exchange views on possible items that could be included in the agenda of the next meeting (scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa in April) was considered promising.[42] However, Sudan's unilateral peace effort to solve the civil war in the south, as was demonstrated by the Harare and Nairobi missions (February 1988), and even more significantly the shuttle diplomacy of Nigeria's Gen. Obasanjo and Francis Deng (March 1988) were not accepted by Ethiopian officials.

The Harare inter-governmental forum on African problems, in its discussion on Sudan, failed to bring about any result other than urging the warring parties to find immediate peaceful solution to the conflict and facilitate the efforts of Obasanjo and Deng. Rather, the occasion was exploited by the warring parties to propagate their political agenda; as was demonstrated by the composition of their carefully assembled delegation. The SPLM/A was represented by Mansur Khalid, a northern Muslim and a high level official during the Nimeiri regime, while the central government chose the southern Christian, Mathew Obur.[43]

Ethiopia particularly rejected the mediation efforts of Obasanjo and Deng based on a number of considerations. First, the initiative was originally forwarded by the Woodrow Wilson Center (which Ethiopia considered was a CIA affiliate) with the aim of resolving the crisis in the Sudan independent of the secessionist struggle in Northern Ethiopia. Obasanjo confided to Ethiopian diplomats that the purpose of his mission was to personally reconcile Garang and al-Mahdi. Thus, the authorities perceived the effort to be detrimental to Ethiopia's national interests. Second, the selection of Deng itself was not accepted. According to the document, during the Freetown Talks of December 1977, for example, Francis Deng (leader of the Sudanese delegation) ridiculed Ethiopia's position on Eritrea and argued that Ethiopia should not use the case of Southern Sudan to resolve the war in Eritrea. The Ethiopian side in turn claimed that he was a CIA operative disguised under his current position as a research associate at the Wilson Center.

As a countermeasure, Ethiopia hosted a meeting in Addis Ababa between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and SPLM/A from18 to 20 August 1988. The DUP was represented by its deputy secretary-general, Sayid-Ahmed el-Hussein, and the SPLM/A by Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, alternate member of the political-military high command. Discussions were held on the 'national' problem (for SPLM/A insisted its cause should not be considered a South Sudan problem) and possible practical solutions to push forward the peace process. They agreed to arrange a meeting in the near future between Sayid Mohamed Osman el-Mirghani, the patron of the DUP, and Dr. John Garang.[44]

The meeting took place in a cordial atmosphere in Addis Ababa in November 1988. Ethiopian officials were delighted and, to the dismay of religious hardliners in Sudan, both parties deemed the occasion a success. They signed an agreement, the Sudanese Peace Initiative, which included terms like the convocation of the proposed constitutional conference and all the related articles of the September 1983 laws, cancellation of military agreements signed between Sudanese governments and other countries, lifting the state of emergency, and imposition of a ceasefire between the warring sides in the south.

Irrespective of the opposition the agreement met from the National Islamic Front (NIF) and other hardliners, Ethiopia continued to pressure Sudanese officials, including the UMMA leader and Prime Minister, al-Mahdi, into adopting it.[45]

A high level delegation led by Fekre-Selassie Wegderes, the prime minister, was dispatched to Khartoum in a bid to further capitalize on the positive developments. The Sudanese premier promised to convince the Eritrean rebels to open dialogue with the delegation without any precondition and requested an audience for a high level Sudanese delegation with Mengistu and Garang regarding the designated constitutional conference to be conducted well before December 1988. The response given tacitly declined arranging any contact with the Ethiopian leader and Garang, apparently to pressure the Sudanese side into fully committing to the reconciliation process.[46]

The latter were fully disadvantaged following the withdrawal of the DUP from the coalition government in late December and the growing political isolation it subsequently faced. The prime minister confided to the Ethiopian ambassador on his party's readiness to accept the Addis Ababa Agreement (Sudanese Peace Initiative) of November 1988 as well as the commitment to convene all Eritrean factions for peace talks under the principle of Ethiopia's territorial unity. According to al-Mahdi, all of them accepted the proposal except Isaias Afwerki, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) leader. The Sudanese premier promised to take strong measures against him and his faction unless he accepted the offer immediately. Al-Mahdi's special envoy, Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi, reaffirmed these points in his meeting with Mengistu and the Ethiopian foreign minister in early January 1989.[47]

The intensification by the SPLA of its military offensive and its apparent success in controlling strategic towns such as Nasser around January 1989, however, distracted the two states from the positive course of reconciliation. Soon, the Sudanese side resumed its accusation of Ethiopia regarding its involvement in the civil war and meddling in party politics, particularly in favor of the DUP. The Ethiopian side, however, continued to host reconciliation talks among the Sudanese parties. In early February, for example, it organized the Ambo consultative conference composed of the SPLM/A as well as academics and intellectuals drawn from the northern part of the country. This conference ended up calling for the convocation of a constitutional conference, observance of immediate ceasefire and justice and equality for all the people of the country.[48]

Ethiopia hosted yet another peace talks between the Peace Ministerial Committee of the central government and the SPLM/A in Addis Ababa (10-11 June 1989). The major objective of this meeting was to establish "peace corridors in order to guarantee relief flow to needy people in the south."[49]   In a parallel development, Prime Minister Fekre-Selassie Wegderes visited Sudan in June 1989. Afterward, the two countries strove to improve their relations. As was always the case in the region, the new regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir (June 1989) pushed towards an immediate resolution of the common problems in Ethio-Sudan relations. The two leaders met for the first time during the 25th OAU Summit in Addis Ababa and decided to negotiate immediately with all the rebel groups in their territories. The letters they exchanged showed their eagerness for such an undertaking in the near future.[50]

Nevertheless, they soon returned to the old practice of destabilization missions as the means of realizing their objectives. Bashir's unilateral ceasefire that lasted till September and the unsuccessful efforts of the steering peace committee he established failed to convince the Ethiopian side. Rather, the latter perceived them as a deceptive strategy designed to camouflage the opening of comprehensive military missions against the SPLM/A and the strengthening of Khartoum's contact with the Eritrean rebels. The consequence of this

understanding was the intensification of SPLA military attacks on the army of the central government. One intelligence report, for example, requested the destruction of the vital bridge leading to Juba town; and instruction for the immediate execution of the mission was passed to concerned Ethiopian authorities.[51]

The customary accusations started to flare up from both sides. To the frustration of the Ethiopian authorities, though, Sudan resorted to its original claim that the problem in Eritrea was different from the one in their southern region. Ethiopia began to indifferently follow up the US-sponsored mediation talks between the SPLM/A and the central government held in Nairobi from 30 November to 5 December 1989. The fact that the two parties failed to reach a consensus on most of the talking points must have come as a relief to Ethiopian officials. Ethiopia's displeasure over Sudan's open assistance to Eritrean rebels was conveyed to Al-Bashir on December 1989, and the latter at the same time condemned Ethiopia's involvement in the SPLA offensive that ended up capturing the strategic town of Kurmuk.[52] In the following years, till the fall of the military regime in Ethiopia (May 1991), relations between the two countries remained at their lowest level. They continued to unreservedly support each other's rebel groups.

## Conclusion

The imperial regime and the Derg mostly felt that their counterparts in the Sudan were intent on destabilizing Ethiopia and were readily cooperating with forces having a similar agenda. Sudan's support to Ethiopian secessionist elements and anti-government forces remained the central points of disagreement between the two countries.

The understanding that the Sudanese regimes willingly availed their services to the traditional enemies of Ethiopia in North Africa and the Middle East further aggravated the situation. In a bid to appease Sudanese rulers and to discourage their negative activities, the imperial regime went as far as collaborating in the mopping up missions of South Sudanese rebels. The Derg equally sought the mediation role of the Nimeiri regime, which it believed was one of the major sponsors of Eritrean rebels.

In the face of Sudan's persistent support of the Eritrean rebels, the two successive regimes engaged in activities they deemed necessary to protect Ethiopia's vital interests. Apart from labeling the Sudan the number one enemy of the state, the imperial regime went as far as being involved in a plot to topple Nimeiri from power. The Derg's response came by way of giving unconditional support to the SPLM/A.

The end result was the chronic internal turmoil in the two countries and their ultimate partial disintegration, as was witnessed by the birth of the states of Eritrea and South Sudan. In retrospect, what has happened in the region, specifically, the independence of Eritrea and South Sudan (May 1991 and July 2011 respectively) was in part the result of this extended conflict and had the blessing of the two states.

## Notes

1   Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Folder Number: Sudan, File Number: 36-D2 (Hear afterwards, MoFA Sudan 36-D2). Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967.  See also Poggo 2009, pp. 40-47.
2   MoFA Sudan 29-D2 5. Report on the Realities of South Sudan: 3 February 1963. MoFA

Sudan 36-D2. Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967. For the nature of Sudanese regimes in this period and their policy towards the South see Poggo 2002, pp. 67-101.

3   MoFA Sudan 26-D2 11. Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance: 1 August 1957 and the Cultural Agreement of 6 February 1960. MoFA Sudan 1 B and Sudan 26-D2 11. Extradition Agreement of 29 March 1964.

4   MoFA Sudan 36-D2. Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967.

5   Ibid. Felix Schnyder (High Commissioner for Refugees) to MoFA: 27 June 1963; Berhanu Bahta (Director General, MoFA) to Felix Schnyder: 8 July 1963.

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7   MoFA Ertra 68-D5 20. Memo on Sudan's Support to the Eritrean Rebel groups. Dej. Kefle Ergetu (Chief of Public Security) to the Emperor: 18 & 20 January and 12 April 1965; MoFA Sudan 28-D2 130. Memo to Ketema Yifru (Foreign Minister) on Rebel Activities in the Sudan: 24 April 1965.

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11  MoFA Sudan 28-D2 112. Alphonse Malek Pajok (SAFFUC Secretary General) to Ketema: 2 February 1965.

12  Ibid. Philip Pedak Lieth to Ketema: 5 April 1965. Memo to Ketema on relations with SANU: 17 June 1965; Memo to Ketema on SANU: 28 June 1965; Memo to Ketema on Helping SANU: 30 June 1965.

13  Ibid. Memo Regarding Talks with Sudan official on South Sudan Refugees in Ethiopia: 30 June 1965. The RTC had played its role in the split of SANU, for some southern politicians like Philip Pedak had succumbed to the ploy of the government. See below.

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# Prognosis of Land Title Formalization in Urban Ghana: The Myth and Reality of Awareness and Relevance

## KWASI GYAU BAFFOUR AWUAH and FELIX NIKOI HAMMOND

**Abstract:** While land title formalization is still useful in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana like many other countries in the sub-region, continues to experience low rate of compliance with the legal title formalization requirement. This is in spite of over a century and half duration of its practices. Administrative inertia, complex title formalization procedures, and the high cost of formalization are usually adduced for this low compliance rate. That notwithstanding, it is suggested that lack of awareness of the legal title formalization requirement and poor perception of relevance for formalization are additional major determinants. Yet the relationship between these factors and compliance with the requirement still begs empirical examination. This study examines the link between awareness of the requirement and relevance for formalization on one hand, and compliance with the requirement on the other. The primary aim is to establish the extent to which these independent variables determine compliance with the title formalization requirement. Data was collected from residential property owners in Kwabenya, a suburb of Accra, Ghana. The study established that awareness of the requirement and relevance for title formalization are not strong predictors of compliance with the requirement. It also found that low compliance with the requirement stems from the fact that the current title formalization system favors the highly educated formal sector employees who can manipulate the system. As such, it is recommended that the on-going Land Administration Project should seek to review the system to make it effective and efficient, and ultimately receptive to all and sundry.

## Introduction

Following the economic crises in the mid 1970s, various alternatives to economic development have engaged the attention of national governments and international development agencies. For example, extensive interest has been shown in informal economic activities with huge volumes of literature on their appropriateness to economic development compared to orthodox models.[1] The role of land policy and management in development has also engaged the attention of national governments and international development agencies in the last two decades or more.[2] As such, they have in the course of this period instituted a number of initiatives in this regard. These include: the launch of World Bank's Land Policy Report in 2003; the promulgation of European Union Guide Lines on Land

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Policy (2004); the FAO Agrarian Reform and Rural Development International Conference (ICARRD) on land policy intervention held in Brazil in 2006; the launch of UK's Department for International Development (DFID) Land Policy in 2007; the launch of Natural Resources Tenure Policy of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency in 2007; and passage of the new Global Land Policy of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 2008.[3]

In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a number of countries like Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Cote D'Ivoire, and Niger, among others, have also embarked on land tenure reforms under the auspices of the World Bank.[4] These initiatives have stemmed from the need for efficient use of land along with other factors of production to promote development as postulated long ago by economists such as Malthus (1798), Ricardo (1817), Ratcliff (1949), Alonso (1964), and Muth (1969). Additionally, there has been a need to address issues of land scarcity, land conflicts, excessive pressure on land caused by rapid urbanization, and land grabbing.[5] Given the foregoing imperatives, land tenure reforms over the years in the sub-region have among other things sought to vigorously promote land title formalization as a means to secure titles, stimulate land markets, and motivate investment.[6]

To date title formalization in SSA is still very low.[7] This is generally attributed to high cost of title formalization and complex procedures for implementation of its processes.[8] However, in Ghana the literature further suggests that it has been partly determined by lack of awareness of the legal requirement for property owners to formalize their titles and poor perception of relevance for title formalization.[9] Yet there has been little or no empirical work on the relationship between these factors and compliance with the requirement.

This study employs empirical evidence from urban Ghana to examine the link between awareness of the legal title formalization requirement and relevance for formalization, and compliance with the requirement. The primary aim is to establish the extent to which these independent variables predict compliance with the requirement. The study uses residential property owners as a unit of analysis. It proceeds on the argument that though awareness of the legal title formalization requirement and relevance for formalization are important, they are not enough to promote title formalization in Ghana. The second section examines the basis for the promotion of land title formalization in SSA. The following section discusses title formalization in Ghana, while the fourth outlines the research methodology. The fifth section 5 presents the study's results and their discussion. The final section draws the conclusions of the study.

**Promotion of Title Formalization – The Arguments**

Official registration including issuance of title certificates over tenure in housing and other land-related assets is said to reduce poverty and promote economic development.[10] This argument had long been in existence, but was put on the "back burner" in the early 1990s.[11] However, following de Soto (2000) there has been a recent burgeoning interest in land title formalization particularly in developing economies such as those of SSA.[12] This interest in title formalization is premised on several assumptions and implied predictions.

Initially, it was argued that landholding systems in SSA, which were often termed "traditional, customary or communal systems," were static and inflexible. Thus, they were not responsive to changing economic conditions as development unfolds. The changing economic condition was conceived as the need to sustain larger populations or make use of economic opportunities associated with trade. This required investment in land that

cultivators were prepared to make only if they had secured land rights.[13] Connected to this was the need for smallholder farmers to have sufficient access to land and control over it.[14]

It was explained further that one of the characteristics of landholding arrangements in SSA was the imposition of property rights by outside forces and local overlords. However, this arrangement tends to affect the nature of such rights. To the extent that the rationale was to gain surpluses from local smallholder populations or force independent smallholders into wage labor, it prevented them from having independent land rights. Consequently, landholding arrangement in the sub-region was said to create disincentive for investment. Therefore, there was a need for change in tenure arrangements to provide incentives for investment particularly for farmers to permanently cultivate their lands and make conveyances. Title formalization was perceived to ensure security of tenure and provide an answer to the incentives question.[15]

Following the abandonment of the initial thesis a new orthodoxy, which somewhat resonates with the old order, emerged. This orthodoxy, sometimes referred to as the evolutionary thesis, contrary to earlier claims suggests that landholding systems in SSA are not static and inflexible. Rather, it is presumed that these traditional forms of land arrangements undergo transformation to modern landholding systems as dictated by market conditions.[16] This transformation is said to associate ultimately with assertion of more individualized rights in land by landholders as land values appreciate. However, they are not protected under the customary system. As such, disputes over land and huge cost of litigation arise resulting in production inefficiency. Title formalization is seen to protect these emerging individualized land rights and put to rest costly litigation. Thus, title formalization provides incentive to invest in land, transfer of same, and stimulate land market for improvement in production.[17] Beside this argument is the claim that title formalization enhances access to credit from financial institutions—using titles as collateral to secure loans for several outcomes such as commencing a new business.[18]

Theoretically, this title formalization thesis is inspired by property rights economics thinking popularized by economists such as Coase (1960), Demsetz (1967), Alchian and Demsetz (1973), North (1981), Barzel (1997), and more recently de Soto (2000). The underpinning tenets of this economic thinking suggest that the market as an institution fails to allocate society's scarce resource efficiently to ensure development. This is due to a lack of clearly defined property rights and it's associated high transaction cost. Thus, a lack of well-defined land and property rights hinders the efficient use of land and property. To advocates of this economic scholarship, there is a need to fix what is broken with the market to allow it to do the magic of ensuring development.[19] It is in this vein that de Soto (2000) suggests that the lack of systems of property rights and information on property, which have national application and are understood by outsiders, explains why non-western economies have not benefited from capitalism. De Soto reiterates further that these economies are sitting on dead capital and the answer to resurrecting such dead capital is formal title.

Aside from this intuitive argument, there is empirical evidence in the developed capitalist economies to support the claim. For example, in the United States it is estimated that up to about 70 percent of the credit new businesses obtain results from using formal titles as collateral for mortgage.[20] Even in Asia and Latin America some evidence points to a correlation between formal title and higher productivity. The famous study by Feder et al. (1988) in rural Thailand, for instance, established that farmers with formal titles are offered

more institutional credit (50 percent-52 percent), invested more in land, used more inputs, and generated higher output.

In SSA there have been mixed suggestions and outcomes regarding the functions of title formalization. It has been argued by some scholars that title formalization does not provide security of tenure in the sub-region but may instead create insecurity of title. Atwood (1990) notes that indigenous land tenure systems in SSA by themselves offer some form of tenure security. However, the introduction of modern property rights regimes promoted by title formalization without recognizing traditional or informal land rights increases the extent of rent-seeking activities by outsiders. As such, members of an indigenous community comparatively are liable to fewer risks of losing their lands under an indigenous land tenure system than are outsiders while title formalization increases the risks of these indigenes and reduces those of outsiders. Thus, title formalization could be an anathema.

Platteau (1996) also observes that under indigenous land tenure systems, several distinct claims can co-exist for the same parcel of land. However, the focus of title formalization on registration of exclusive individual rights can create uncertainties for people who depend on the indigenous system to protect their land claims. Additionally, Abdulai (2006), addressing the question as to whether land title registration is an answer to insecure and uncertain property rights in SSA, concluded that title formalization per se does not confer certain and secure land rights in the sub-region.

Some empirical studies also further question the functions title formalization is claimed to perform. Roth et al. (1993) established that only about 6.6 percent of 228 households surveyed in a study of a pilot land registration scheme in Rukungiri District (Uganda) had acquired loans from commercial banks in the previous five years. Abdulai and Hammond (2010) in their study on Ghana also found that land registration is not a pre-requisite in mortgage transactions, but rather a post-requirement. Payne et al. (2008) also established in both Senegal and South Africa that formal title does not ensure access to credit and has no effect on land transferability, government revenue, and investment in land. Furthermore, Jacoby and Minten (2007) found similar results regarding access to credit by rice farmers and land transferability in Lac Alaotra Region of Madagascar.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Payne et al. (2008) reported that though most of the residents in informal settlements already enjoyed de facto tenure security, title formalization had positive impact on tenure security particularly for women. Also, the findings in Senegal established that tenure regularization impacts the improvement of properties. In the Dalifort neighborhood of Dakar it was found that 90 percent of dwellings of respondents were shacks built with non-permanent materials prior to regularization in 2000. However, after regularization 48 percent of the houses were reconstructed with permanent building materials. This figure increased to 68 percent in 2007, albeit 70 percent of the respondents indicated they would have done the improvements even without formalized titles.

In the same vein, Jacoby and Minten (2007) established that of the 1,700 households surveyed, 90 percent indicated that title formalization provides security against the risk of land expropriation. Besides, it marginally increases land values, productivity, and promotes investment. Again, in a study on economic impact of real estate policies in SSA, Hammond (2006) established a positive correlation between title formalization and land value appreciation in urban Ghana. Beyond that, title formalization is a source of valuable land records, which can be used to reduce transaction cost in the property market and address land conflicts.[21] For example, Musembi (2007) observed that title formalization experience in eastern Kenya, which dwells on local practices to establish and record land ownership

boundaries, help in addressing land ownership conflicts. Thus, land ownership or title as a social fact can be certain and secured through combination of practices such as formalization and attestation by community members, especially adjoining landowners.[22]

Given these discussions, it can be surmised that title formalization is still useful in the context of SSA, particularly where programs to that effect are carefully designed and executed in an appropriate manner. Perhaps it is in the light of this that the World Bank (2006) submitted that title formalization has potential benefits. Yet title formalization in the sub-region continues to be low despite over three decades of World Bank promotion of such policy under land tenure reforms. Available statistics show that title formalization in SSA is between 15 percent and 20 percent.[23] With the exception of East and Southern Africa where title formalization is comparatively higher due to the long history of occupation of land by large commercial farmers, the situation is disappointing in other areas of the sub-region. The rate of title formalization in West Africa is, for example, estimated at 2-3 percent.[24]

This rather low title formalization rate is usually attributed to high cost of formalization, complex procedures associated with its implementation, and anticipation of not receiving the desired benefits.[25] In Madagascar, for example, apart from the country's dysfunctional land administration system Jacoby and Minten (2007) further established that the marginal cost for formalizing a medium-sized plot of land would have to fall by a factor of six to make economic sense.

## Land Title Formalization in Ghana

It is imperative as a starting point to state that land registration system in general can be categorized into two. These are deeds registration and land title registration systems. Perhaps the main difference with registration under the two systems is that while the deed system registers an instrument affecting land, title registration system registers actual title (ownership) to land with state guarantee of indefeasible title.[26] The two systems operate in Ghana.

According to Asiama (2008) formal land registration in Ghana dates back to 1843 when the country was then known as Gold Coast. This was based on English conveyance laws and practices though it is unclear where the early registered documents were kept. However, in 1883 the Land Registration Ordinance (No. 8) was passed by the then British colonial government to superintend the formal registration system. This was succeeded by the Land Registry Ordinance 1895 (Cap 133), which was also revised in 1951. All these legislations established deeds registration system. The rationale was to reduce land ownership disputes and ensure security of title.

After independence, a Land Registry Act (Act 122) was promulgated in 1962 to replace Cap (133). Act (122) also prescribed a deed registration system. The Deeds Registry, which had been established to register deeds, was formally connected to the Lands Department. This was the main department for administration of land resources carved out from the Survey Department as Boundaries Section in the mid-1920s. The mechanics of land registration was such that applicants submitted their deeds, prepared by a solicitor or a conveyance, at the Lands Department for plotting (recording) and stamp duty. Subsequently, they were sent to the Deeds Registry for registration. However, some land documents also somehow found their way directly to the Deeds Registry for registration.

In 1986, a compulsory land title registration system was introduced pursuant to the promulgation of Land Title Registration Law (Provisional National Defence Council Law

(PNDCL 152)). This meant that the operation of the deeds registration system should automatically cease in declared title registration districts. The rationale for title registration was to address the inadequacies of Act (122) noted as its inability to grant certainty and security of title.[27] Currently, the title registration system operates in two regions of the country—Greater Accra and Ashanti.

What is noteworthy is that the Lands Department was extinguished in 1986 after a split of the Department into Lands Commission (LC) and Land Valuation Board (LVB) by virtue of PNDCL (42). A Land Title Registry (LTR) was also established in pursuance to PNDCL (152). However, the practices relating to deeds registration (at least up to the plotting stage) that were executed by the defunct Lands Department and taken over by the Lands Commission operated side by side with or served as a starting point to the title registration system in declared title registration areas. This practice continued until halted by a government ministerial directive in 2006. Thus, registration under the deeds system required plotting at LC, noting of the transaction, and payment of outstanding rent at the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) if it is a stool/skin land transaction, and stamp duty at LVB.[28] Apart from stool/skin land transactions, which require concurrence or consent of the Lands Commission, a deed for title registration also requires stamp duty at LVB, cadastral or parcel plan from Survey Department, and title search at the LC. In addition to this are the usual administrative protocols at LTR.

Despite over a century and half practice of land registration in Ghana, land registration is low.[29] In fact, land registration rate in the country is estimated at about 5 percent.[30] The percentage (8 percent) land registration rate in the country estimated by the World Bank, though comparatively higher, is still not encouraging.[31] Several studies on land policies and land administration in Ghana have one way or the other attributed this to dysfunctional land administration system.[32]

These studies identify factors such as: weak public land sector institutions; duplication of functions among these institutions and lack of logistics; and high cost of registration in terms of statutory fees, delays, travel time and cost, and extra-out of pocket payment made towards facilitation of registration as part of the causes. The World Bank (2005) estimates that on average it takes 382 days for registration to be completed in Ghana with a cost of 4.1 percent of the value of the property. A more recent study by Hammond and Antwi (2010) also established that the social cost of land title regulative policies on 0.23-acre residential plot of land in Ghana is $US 5,320. Studies like Kuntu-Mensah (2006) and Sittie (2006), and some anecdotal evidence have also suggested that lack of awareness of the legal requirement for land title formalization and poor perception of relevance for formalization are also major determinants of the low title formalization rate.

It is in recognition of the foregoing and other land tenure related problems that the country adopted the land tenure reform program under the National Land Administration Project (LAP) in 2003. The land reform program has led to the merger of LC, LVB, LTR and the Survey Department into a new Lands Commission following the passage of the new Lands Commission Act 2008 (Act 767). These departments as per the dictates of Act (767) have been reconstituted as divisions under the new Commission. However, virtually nothing has changed with respect to the procedures for title formalization.

Of grave interest is that the link between awareness of the legal title formalization requirement and relevance for title formalization, and compliance with the requirement to date has received little or no empirical examination. The whole land tenure reform taking

place in the country is not predicated on empirical baseline studies. It is to this end of examining this relationship that the study is set.

## Research Methodology

A quantitative research methodology was used with cross sectional survey strategy. Data for the study was collected between September and November 2011. Residential property owners were used as a unit of analysis. Given that Accra, the capital city together with its surrounding areas referred to as the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (GAMA), is the largest urban agglomeration in Ghana, it was purposively selected for the research. Within Accra, the research focused on Kwabenya, a community on the eastern fringes of the city. The community is located within Ga East Municipality, one of the municipal/metropolitan areas that constitute GAMA. The others are Accra Metropolitan Area, Tema Metropolitan Area and Adentan, Ashaiman, Ga South, Ga West and Ledzokoku Municipal Areas. It is also about 25km northeast of Accra Central. Kwabenya was selected because it aptly mirrors the current urban growth and transition that is taking place in Accra, which has a direct connection with the phenomenon under inquiry. Accra's massive growth and expansion is manifested by rapid development of residential properties—mainly two to four bedroom single story buildings—on the fringes of the city majority of which are not covered by formalized titles. These developments, also a characteristic of most communities in Accra (except prime government residential areas such as Airport and Cantonments), are common in Kwabenya. The developments in the prime government residential area, which are by far in the minority, are predominantly plush properties covered by some form of formalized titles. Developments in Kwabenya therefore mirror most developments in Accra and as such, the community passes the test as a case study for the research.

The choice of Kwabenya was reinforced by the ready accessibility of requisite data in the community, time and resource constraints, and the in-depth knowledge of the researcher pertaining to the urban development processes in the area. For example, unlike accessing data on properties in areas developed long ago such data can comparatively be easily accessed in Kwabenya where developments occurred not long ago or are currently taking place.

The data was obtained using questionnaire instruments. The total number of residential property owners residing in the community was not known. However, administration of the questionnaires was undertaken by face-to-face interviews and dwelt on insights from systematic sampling procedures. Two research teams undertook the administration of the questionnaires from two key points of the main Dome-Kwabenya-Brekuso Road, which divides Kwabenya—Atomic and Abuom Junctions (see Figure 1). At these junctions, each team was split into two and from their starting points each splinter group used branch roads along the main artery road as a guide to administer the questionnaire instruments. At a branch road, which usually has developments on both sides of the road, the first residential property of one side of the road was selected and the instrument administered upon the availability of the property owner. Subsequently, every third residential property was selected. In the event that an instrument could not be administered (e.g., the owner was not available or the property was not owner-occupied) then the property became the reference point for the selection of the next property. This administration procedure continued until the end of the road after which properties on the other side were accessed backwards to the main artery road and then to the next branch road. The administration of the instruments

continued until the two teams met at a common point. The questionnaires solicited information on respondents' gender, educational level, occupation, and awareness of the legal title formalization requirement. The remainder was their perception of relevance for title formalization and compliance status with the legal title formalization requirement.

Drawing on Hammond (2006) title formalization was taken to mean registration of title at the LTR or plotting at the LC. To prevent confounding variables, properties in the indigenous part of the study area, which were known to have no formal titles, were excluded from the survey. Similarly, two gated communities (Kwabenya Housing Estate and Balloon Gate Estate developed by Regimanuel Gray Estate Limited, a private real estate company) covered by omnibus formal titles were excluded.

## Data Analysis

The data obtained was coded and entered in a computer. Subsequently, it was cleaned and analyzed. Firstly, the analysis examined the numerical tendencies of the responses obtained. Secondly, relationships were tracked between the independent and dependent variables using cross-tabulations. Finally, the strength of the independent variables in predicting compliance with the legal title formalization requirement was ascertained by means of binary logistic regression (the logit model - see Appendix 1 for details). The logit model was used because the responses elicited from respondents were nominal and categorical. Therefore, it required a model fitting known as maximum likelihood since linear regression models usually give misleading outcome for such variables.[33] Though often used in the field of medicine, logistic regression has also seen tremendous application in the field of social policy.[34] Winter and May (2001), for example, used it to analyze compliance with agro-environmental regulation by Danish farmers, while Boohene and Agyepong (2011) recently used it in Ghana's telecommunication sector.

**Figure 1. Sketch Plan of Kwabenya Community**



Source: Authors' own construct

## Results and Discussions

### Background Characteristics of Respondents

One hundred residential property owners were surveyed. This sample size was enough to undertake the required analysis and more so, under the circumstance where there was no reliable sample frame. Respondents' properties were mainly two to four bedroom houses. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents were males and 31 percent females. This finding is not strange. Perhaps it is even better considering the limited global women's property ownership estimated at about 1 percent and in SSA for that matter.[35] The relative majority of the respondents (34 percent) had received a tertiary level of education while 2 percent had no formal education, 4 percent a primary education, 11 percent a junior secondary/elementary education, 22 percent a post-secondary education, and 27 percent a secondary/technical/vocational education.

Sixty percent of the respondents were engaged in formal sector employment, and 40 percent were in informal sector employment. Again, 56 percent of the respondents were aware of the requirement to formalize titles to their properties while 44 percent were unaware of such requirement. Moreover, an overwhelming number of the respondents (87 percent) perceived title formalization as relevant compared to 13 percent who indicated that title formalization is irrelevant. As to the question of why title formalization was perceived as relevant, 82.3 percent of the respondents who perceived formalization as relevant reported that title formalization assisted in preventing future disputes over property ownership. This finding reinforces findings from the study by Jacoby and Minten (2007) for Madagascar, which reported that 90 percent of respondents surveyed indicated that title formalization enhanced title security. More importantly, the findings reaffirm the argument that security of title may also be enhanced through formalization.[36] Conversely, it appears to beg the claim that title formalization insures access to credit and leads to investment in land.

*Title Formalization Requirement*

It was established that 35 percent of the respondents had complied with the title formalization requirement compared to 65 percent who had no formal titles and were not even in the process of formalizing titles to their properties. The large number of respondents who had not complied with the requirement and the equally substantial variance (30 percent) between non-compliant and compliant respondents appear to support the view that title formalization is low in Ghana. Besides, the finding questions the claim that title formalization promotes investment in land given that majority of the respondents (65 percent) invested in their land without formal titles. What is even more compelling is that 91 percent of the 35 percent who had formal titles obtained them subsequent to construction of their properties.

Tables 1 and 2 display the cross-tabulation results on compliance with the title formalization requirement and the independent variables. Within the variable groups, more of the male respondents had received a tertiary level of education, engaged in formal sector employment, were aware of the title formalization requirement and perceived formalization as relevant complied with the requirement. This is in comparison with their female counterparts who had obtained below tertiary level of education or without formal education, engaged in informal sector employment, were unaware of the title formalization requirement, and perceived formalization as irrelevant respectively (Tables 1 and 2).

The reverse of the above was the situation for non-compliance with the requirement except for gender and perception of relevance for formalization. Male respondents and those who perceived formalization as irrelevant within their variable categories instead constituted the larger proportions of the non-compliant respondents. Even so, expressed in terms of percentages more of the female respondents (74.2 percent as against 60.9 percent of the males) and the respondents who perceived title formalization as irrelevant (100 percent as against 59.8 percent) had no formal titles to their properties.

**Table 1: Cross-Tabulation Results on Gender, Educational Level, Occupation, and Compliance of Title Formalization**

|  | Gender | | | Educational Level | | | Occupation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Male | Female | Total | Tertiary | Below Tertiary | Total | Formal | Informal | Total |
| **Compliance** | 27 (39.1%) | 8 (25.8%) | 35 | 18 (52.9%) | 17 (25.8%) | 35 | 30 (50%) | 5 (12.5%) | 35 |
| **% of Compliant Population** | 77.1 | 22.9 | 100 | 51.4 | 48.6 | 100 | 85.7 | 14.3 | 100 |
| **% of Surveyed Population** | 27 | 8 | 35 | 18 | 17 | 35 | 30 | 5 | 35 |
| **Non-Compliance** | 42 (60.9%) | 23 (74.2%) | 65 | 16 (47.1%) | 49 (74.2%) | 65 | 30 (50%) | 35 (87.5%) | 65 |
| **% of Non-Compliant Population** | 64.6 | 35.4 | 100 | 24.6 | 75.4 | 100 | 46.2 | 53.8 | 100 |
| **% of Surveyed Population** | 42 | 23 | 65 | 16 | 49 | 65 | 30 | 35 | 65 |
| **Total of Compliant & Non-Compliant Populations** | 69 (100%) | 31 (100%) | 100 | 34 (100%) | 66 (100%) | 100 | 60 (100%) | 40 (100%) | 100 |

Source: Field survey (September–November 2011)

Again, within the variable groups the male, tertiary level educated, and formal sector employed constituted the larger proportions of the compliant respondents compared to their opposite counterparts. Such was the situation with respondents who were aware of the requirement and perceived formalization as relevant. Similarly, within their variable groups, the below tertiary level educated, informal sector employed, and those who were unaware of the title formalization requirement respondents constituted the larger proportions of the non-compliant respondents. Conversely, the male and the respondents who perceived title formalization as relevant accounted for the larger percentages of the non-compliant respondents within their variable groups (Table 1 and 2). Finally, 53 percent of the respondents were aware of the title formalization requirement and perceived formalization as relevant. Of this grouping, 50.9 percent had complied with the requirement compared to 49.1 percent who had not complied with it. The compliant respondents within this category constituted 77.1 percent of the compliant population while those who had not complied accounted for 40 percent of the non-compliant respondents.

**Table 2: Cross-Tabulation Results on Awareness, Relevance, and Title Formalization Compliance**

| | Awareness | | | Relevance | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Aware | Unaware | Total | Relevant | Not Relevant | Total |
| **Compliance** | 27(48.2%) | 8(27.2%) | 35 | 35(40.2%) | 0 | 35 |
| **% of Compliant Population** | 77.1 | 22.9 | 100 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| **% of Surveyed Population** | 27 | 8 | 35 | 35 | 0 | 35 |
| **Non-Compliance** | 29 (51.8%) | 36 (81.8%) | 65 | 52 (59.8%) | 13 (100%) | 65 |
| **% of Non-Compliant Population** | 44.6 | 55.4 | 100 | 80 | 20 | 100 |
| **% of Surveyed Population** | 29 | 36 | 65 | 52 | 13 | 65 |
| **Total of Compliant & Non-Compliant Populations** | 56 (100%) | 44 (100%) | 100 | 87 (100%) | 13 (100%) | 100 |

Source: Field survey (September–November 2011)

A number of possible reasons can be inferred for comparatively high compliance level among the respondents with a high level of education and who engaged in formal sector employment, who were aware of the requirement, and who perceived title formalization as relevant. First, title formalization is a formal sector activity. As such, people in formal sector employment are, comparatively, expected to be aware of the legal title formalization requirement and ascertain its relevance, all things being equal. Secondly, highly educated persons in formal sector employment usually occupy managerial and sensitive positions at their workplace and in the Ghanaian society in general. Therefore, such people may have influence and connections at title formalization institutions, which could have ensured facilitation of formalization of titles to their properties.

*Strength of Independent Variables as Correlates of Title Formalization*

The logit model determined the strength of the independent variables in predicting compliance with the title formalization requirement. Tables 3 and 4 give summary statistics of the model and its results respectively. The -2Log Likelihood of the model, which provides indication as to how accurate the model predicts compliance with a title formalization requirement is 105.17 (Table 3). The model's chi-square, which determines this accuracy or potency of the model, is an analogue of the *F-test* of the linear regression sum of squares, was 24.32. The chi-square figure was also statistically significant at 5 percent ($X^2=24.32$, *p=0.000*). This means that the model predicts the outcome variable fairly well. The overall

percentage prediction of the model was 69 percent indicating that the model classified 69 of the cases correctly.

**Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Logit Model**

| Items | Statistics |
|---|---|
| -2Log Likelihood | 105.17 |
| Cox and Snell R² | 0.22 |
| Nagelkerke R² | 0.30 |
| Over all percentage prediction | 69.0 |
| Model Chi-square | 24.32* |

(* for p<0.05)  Source: Field survey (September – November, 2011)

From Table 4, property owners who had knowledge of the title formalization requirement were 2.01 times more likely to comply with the requirement while those who perceived title formalization as relevant were 3.86 more likely to comply with the requirement. However, both cases were not statistically significant at 5 percent. This signifies that though there is a positive relationship between property owners' awareness of the title formalization requirement and formalization of titles to their properties such relationship is not more than what could have happened by chance. Therefore, property owners' awareness of the requirement is not a strong predictor or determinant of compliance with the title formalization requirement.

The possible reason for this finding is the comparatively high level of non-compliance with the requirement among the respondents who were aware of the requirement compared to those who were aware and complied with it (48.2 percent against 51.8 percent). Similarly, perception of title formalization as relevant per se is not a strong determinant of compliance with the requirement. This finding is also not strange given that 80 percent of the respondents who perceived title formalization as relevant had not complied with the requirement. In general, these findings controvert the literature, which suggest that awareness of the title formalization requirement and relevance for formalization are some of the major determinants of low title formalization rate in Ghana.

Table 4 further shows that male property owners were 1.16 times more likely to comply with the requirement while property owners who had attained tertiary level of education were 1.02 times more likely to comply with it. Both results were also not statistically significant at 5 percent. This suggests that both factors are not strong predictors or determinants of compliance with the title formalization requirement. These findings may be attributed to the comparatively high level of non-compliance with the requirement among these groups of respondents (60.9 percent as against 39.1 percent for male property owners and 47.1 percent as against 52.9 percent for tertiary educated respondents).

Strikingly, formal sector employment had a strong positive association with compliance with the requirement. Formal sector employed property owners were 3.81 times more likely to comply with the formalization requirement. This result was statistically significant at 5 percent meaning formal sector employment is a strong predictor of compliance with the legal land title formalization requirement. The possible reason for this finding is the substantial number of property owners within this variable group who complied with the requirement (50 percent), which also constituted 85.7 percent of the compliant population.

**Table 4: Summary Results of the Logit of Compliance of Title Formalization Requirement**

| Variables | B | S.E. | Exp(B) | 95.0% C.I. for EXP(B) | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Male Property Owner | .147 | .550 | 1.16 | .394 | 3.406 |
| Tertiary Level Educated Property Owner | .020 | .548 | 1.02 | .349 | 2.985 |
| Property Owner engaged in formal sector employment | 1.337 | .675 | 3.81* | 1.015 | 14.283 |
| Property Owner Awareness of Formalization Requirement | .699 | .537 | 2.01 | .702 | 5.766 |
| Perception of Title Formalization as relevant | 19.771 | 1.090E4 | 3.86 | .000 | . |
| Constant | -21.699 | 1.090E4 | .000 | | |

Statistical significance is between property owners who comply with Title Formalization Requirement and those who do not (* for $p<0.05$). Source: Field survey (September – November, 2011)

**Conclusion**

Over the past three decades or more, there has been a vigorous promotion of land title formalization in SSA. The rationale is to ensure tenure security, stimulate the land market, enhance access to credit, motivate investment and reduce poverty, among others. Though some evidence, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that land title formalization per se in the sub-Saharan region does not accomplish the above goals, it is still useful. For example, it serves as a source of land records, which can help reduce transaction costs in the property market and address land ownership conflicts. However, in Ghana and many other SSA countries land title formalization is very low despite the duration of over a century and a half of its practice in the country. While this is attributed to administrative inertia, including complex formalization procedures and the high cost of formalization, it is also suggested that a lack of awareness and poor perception of relevance for formalization are major determinants.

This study examined the link between awareness of the legal title formalization requirement and relevance for formalization on one hand, and compliance with the requirement on the other in urban Ghana. Based on empirical evidence from Kwabenya, a suburb of Accra as the case study, the study found that awareness of title formalization requirement and relevance for formalization are not strong predictors of compliance with the legal title formalization requirement. It further established that low compliance with the requirement stems from the fact that the existing land title formalization system favors the highly educated formal sector employees who for one reason or the other have what it takes to manipulate the system. This means that the current system serves only a small minority in society.

Based on the foregoing, there is a need for the ongoing Land Administration Project in the country to review the existing system to make it more effective and efficient, and ultimately receptive to all and sundry. In so doing, the project should not place too much emphasis on promoting awareness of the legal title formalization requirement and relevance

of land title formalization. Rather, attention should be focused on the fundamental issues identified in the literature such as weak public land title formalization agencies and the high cost of formalization due to an excessive time lag for undertaking formalization activities and extra out of pocket payments at formalization agencies for facilitating these activities among others. It is therefore suggested that to ensure widespread land title formalization in both urban and rural Ghana, the project should ensure survey and mapping of the whole country. Land title formalization should also be decentralized and formalization agencies strengthened in terms of human and material resources while streamlining their activities to eliminate duplication of functions. For example, the extensive use of modern technology to fast track processing of land title documentations by public land title formalization agencies should be promoted. Upon implementation of these measures, it is expected that the title formalization cost will be reduced drastically through a reduction in time and extra out of pocket payments. Inconveniences associated with the procedures for undertaking formalization will also be reduced, making it friendlier to undertake. This will then provide incentives for land and property owners to formalize their titles. Furthermore, given that the fundamental issues that underlie the low land title formalization rate in Ghana are similar to most SSA countries, the recommendations offered in the case of Ghana may be useful for these countries as well.

**Appendix 1: Details of the Logit Model Adopted for the Study**

The logit model as applied to this research was based on the idea that a property owner with a certain characteristic $(X)$ complies with the title formalization requirement $(Y)$. Therefore, the probability that a property owner with that characteristic $(X)$ complies with title formalization requirement $(Y)$ can be written as:

$$P(x) = E(Y/X) \qquad\qquad \text{Equation 1}$$

Where $\qquad -\infty \leq x \leq \infty$

This can be written as:

$$P(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-Z_i}} \qquad\qquad \text{Equation 2}$$

Where $Z_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_i$

This means $1 - P(x)$ is the probability that a property owner will not comply with the title formalization requirement if he or she has the same characteristic. This can be written as:

$$1 - P(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{Z_i}} \qquad\qquad \text{Equation 3}$$

Where $Z_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_i$

Since a linear equation model is unable to estimate the parameters in $Z_i$ the ratio of the probability that a property owner complies with title formalization requirement to the probability that he or she will not comply with the title formalization requirement is used to achieve an estimate of the parameters in $Z_i$. This is the odd ratio and is denoted as follows:

$$\frac{P(x)}{1-P(x)} = \frac{1+e^{-Z_i}}{1+e^{Z_i}}$$   Equation 4

Where $Z_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_i$

The natural log of the odd ratio is the logit model and constitutes an estimate of $Z_i$ and can be written as:

$$Z_i In[P(x)/1-P(x)]$$   Equation 5

Where $Z_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_i$

The compliance with the title formalization requirement status of property owners was recorded as "Yes" and "No" where there is compliance and otherwise respectively. This was subsequently dummied as Yes=1 and No=0. The independent variables were also dummied as 1 and 2. That is, where property owners are aware of the title formalization requirement, it is noted as 1 otherwise 2. Similarly, if a property owner perceives title formalization as relevant it is dummied as 1 otherwise 2. The other independent variables namely gender, education and occupation were added to the model. These additional variables were categorized as: gender; male=1, female=2; education; tertiary level of education=1, below tertiary level of education=2; and occupation; formal occupation=1, informal occupation=2. Formal occupation was defined as white collar jobs while informal occupation was interpreted as blue collar jobs. Based on the foregoing, prediction of the dependent variable by the independent variables was modeled as:

$$Log[P(x)/1-P(x)] = \beta 0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + .... + \beta_n X_n + \varepsilon$$   Equation 6

Where $P(x)$ is the condition that a property owner with a particular characteristic complies with the title formalization requirement; $1-P(x)$ is the condition that a property owner with the same characteristic does not comply with the requirement; $\beta 0$ is the normal regression intercept; $\beta_1 .... \beta_n$ are the coefficients; $X_1 .... X_n$ are property owners; and $\varepsilon$ is the stochastic error term. Therefore, based on the literature review, it was expected that awareness of the title formalization requirement and perception of title formalization as relevant will predict compliance with the requirement; title formalization.

**Notes**

1    See Diamond 1988; de Soto 1989; Meagher 1995; Heinonen 2008; Günther and Launov

2012.

2    See Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Larbi et al. 2004; Borras Jnr. and Franco 2010.

3    Borras Jnr. and Franco 2010.

4    Yngstrom 2002; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Hammond 2006; Joireman 2008; Toulmin 2008.

5    Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; FMECD 2009.

6    Abdulai 2006; Jacoby and Minten 2007; Musembi 2007; Bromley 2008; Payne et al. 2008; Toulmin 2008; Abdulai and Hammond 2010.

7    See Fourie 1998; Toulmin, 2008.

8    See Deininger 2003; Hammond 2006; Toulmin 2008.

9    See GoG 1999, 2003; Kuntu-Mensah 2006.

10   See Deininger 2003; Asiama 2008; Bromley 2008.

11   See World Bank 1989, 2003; Deininger and Binswanger 1999; Yngstrom 2002; Musembi 2007.

12   Jacoby and Minten 2007; Asiama 2008; Bromley 2008; Toulmin, 2008.

13   World Bank 1989; Deininger 2003.

14   World Bank 1989; Deininger 2003; see also Yngstrom 2002; Platteau 1992.

15   World Bank 1989; Deininger 2003; Yngstrom 2002.

16   See Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Platteau 1996; Yngstrom 2002; World Bank 2003; Hammond 2006; Hammond and Antwi 2010.

17   World Bank 1989; Deininger 2003; see also Platteau 1996; Yngstrom 2002.

18   de Soto 2000; Deininger 2003; see also Bromley 2008; Abdulai and Hammond 2010.

19   Joireman 2008.

20   de Soto 2000.

21   Abdulai 2006; Abdulai and Hammond 2010.

22   Bromley 2008; Toulmin 2008.

23   Fourie 1998.

24   Toulmin 2008.

25   Atwood 1990; Jacoby and Minten 2007; Payne et al. 2008; Toulmin, 2008.

26   For detailed discussions on deeds and land title registration systems see Simpson 1978; Larsson 1991 and Abdulai 2006.

27   See Memorandum of PNDCL 152.

28   Article 267(1) of Ghana's 1992 Constitution for defines stool/skin lands as community lands that are vested "in the appropriate stool [the physical symbol of chiefly authority] on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and usage."

29   See Kuntu-Mensah 2006.

30   The statistics on land title formalization was obtained from the records at Land Administration Project (LAP) Office in Accra, Ghana.

31   See Hammond and Abdulai 2011.

32   See Brobby 1991, Larbi 1994, Kasanga and Kotey 2001, Kuntu-Mensah 2006, Sittie 2006, Asiama 2008, Arko-Adjei 2011, and Hammond and Abdulai 2011.

33   Winship and Mare 1984; Mathews, 2005.

34   Field 2005.

35   See Gray and Kevane 1999; Bugri 2008.
36   Toulmin 2008.

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# Global Opening for Hungary: A New Beginning for Hungarian Africa Policy?

## ISTVÁN TARRÓSY AND PÉTER MORENTH

**Abstract:** Following the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union it held between January and June 2011, the Hungarian government introduced a new foreign policy strategy of "Global Opening." As part of this strategic concept, Hungary intends to revitalize linkages with countries of sub-Saharan Africa with which it once had intensive relations, in particular during the bipolar era. For the first time since the change of the political system in 1989, Africa-related concepts also have been included in plans fostered by the government that has held office since 2010. As one of the very few scholarly articles addressing the issue of relations between Hungary and Africa, the present paper aims first of all to give an overview of historic ties. Second, it analyzes the current potential for Hungarian involvement in Africa, especially after the Budapest Africa Forum of June 2013, with a fuller insight into Hungarian–South African relations as the most thriving framework of cooperation. Finally, it touches upon issues of a long-term strategic Hungarian policy towards Africa.

## Introduction

Hungary as a central European country without a record of having colonized territory in the Global South but as a member of the European Union with an extended history of research across countries of the developing world, formulated a global foreign policy strategy in 2011. While keeping a strong Euro-Atlantic orientation at the heart of its diplomacy, the country's conservative government (led by the party Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union since the 2010 elections) declared its firm intention to intensify relations with countries and regions beyond the European continent.

This intent seems to be a first pragmatic step considering that after the change of the system in 1989, Hungary's first non-communist government led by Prime Minister József Antall clearly set the foreign policy agenda: the country's top priority was to integrate into the European and Atlantic organizations. Therefore, gaining full membership in the European Union (EU) and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represented the unanimous aspirations, as well as the related tasks. In addition, major attention was paid to the bigger Hungarian diaspora community in the Carpathian Basin and beyond (in a non-revisionist but undoubtedly cultural-nationalist way).[1] A third pillar of Hungarian foreign policy and a high priority has been improving relations with neighboring countries, in

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v14/v14i1-2a5.pdf

particular with Slovakia and Romania where large Hungarian-speaking populations have been living for a long time, together with strengthening good-neighbor relations with all the countries sharing borders with Hungary.

In the official approach not much was talked about the rest of the world, including mention of the African continent. Furthermore, as far as Africa was concerned, one thing was for certain: not to continue supporting countries from the continent, which had been on good "friendship"' terms with the former socialist regime. A rather localized foreign policy was beginning to emerge, which did not really mention the significance of a more globally involved national participation. In 2010, however, the second Orbán government established an individual deputy state secretariat for global affairs within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The concept of "global opening" has unquestionably gained momentum since 2010.[2] A previous government led by Ferenc Gyurcsány of the Hungarian Socialist Party, however, had already realized in 2008 that "Hungary needs to intensify its global presence, and the country needs to address issues of global importance with an increasing visibility."[3]

This article has four main aims. It first intends to offer an overview of earlier Hungarian Africanists, their contributions to the universal "Africa knowledge corpus" and their significance for present-day foreign policy aspirations. Second, Soviet-bloc-era linkages and their implications will be discussed to provide a better understanding of the political heritage of the bipolar era. Third, the article will look at what has happened since the change of the system, which, then, in 2011 resulted in an expanded foreign policy that includes Africa. In particular, it will provide a detailed discussion of Hungarian–South-African bilateral relations because the Republic of South Africa has become Hungary's fourth largest market outside Europe after the United States, China, and the Arab Emirates. Finally, it will critically examine whether or not all the efforts the government has made so far can present a real hope for a (new) Africa policy for the country.

### In the Footsteps of Major Hungarian Africanists: The Revival of Past Achievements and the Launch of New Types of Cooperation

Several Hungarians (or people of Hungarian descent) are known for their contribution to the global corpus on African studies, which in fact resulted in a wider and better understanding on the flora, fauna, and peoples of different parts of the continent. Some of them left a legacy for today's generations with an interest in Africa. Their scientific achievements have been revisited, as we will see in the case of some fieldwork and expeditions in the recent decade.

Emil Torday (1875–1931) was among the few Hungarians with a significant international reputation. He first moved to Belgian Congo in 1900 as a bank clerk and spent four years there, devoting substantial time to studying the local cultures and to collect cultural objects. When he returned to Congo he was working for the British Museum and continued visiting different ethnic groups and collecting thousands of objects and photos, which was relatively easy for him as he spoke fifteen languages, among them eight African.[4] Torday was a leading scholar of the Congo River Basin. His scholarly stature is due to his extensive work among the Bushongo in the capital of the Kuba Kingdom and among the Bangongo on the east side of that kingdom.[5] His works included sixty articles, nine books, and more than three thousand material objects and photos, all of which were featured in a 1990 British Museum exhibit entitled "Emil Torday and the Art of the Congo, 1900–1909."[6] Torday and his fundamental work in the Congo have been experiencing a revival in Hungarian public dialogue thanks to the efforts of young Hungarian Africanists and the

African-Hungarian Union (AHU). Their efforts led to financing major chunks of the 2009 expedition of the centenary of Torday's last African journey.[7] The younger generation of Africanists in Hungary tries to draw on the works of their predecessors and by revitalizing the legacy to get closer again to Africa and to the mainstream of international scholarly research.

Another major representative of Hungarian involvement with Africa was László Magyar (1818–1864), who was originally trained as a naval officer who then became intrigued with Africa and lived for seventeen years in Angola. He "made important contributions to the study of the geography and ethnography of equatorial Africa."[8] He was the first European to travel through and describe some southern African areas, namely the borderland of present-day Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1850–1851) and in southeastern Angola (1852–1854) at the divide of the Zambezi and Congo basins.[9] "He did not only explore one area, but also described the life of the people living there. He . . . recorded geographical and especially ethnographical data."[10] His legacy also stimulated renewed interest in this part of the African continent. In June 2012 two young Hungarian Africanists launched an expedition following Magyar's routes with the aim, as they stated it, to "rediscover Angola." The two-month, 7,000-kilometre-long journey was to commemorate the great Hungarian traveller, promote Angolan tourism, and develop Angolan-Hungarian bilateral relations.[11] It was well received on the Angolan side, too, and helped raise awareness about the potentials of a reconfirmed cooperation between the two countries. Angola has an embassy in Hungary, and the first resident Angolan ambassador to Hungary also wanted to use the expedition to develop economic cooperation.[12]

Count Sámuel Teleki (1845–1916) and his expeditions across East African regions during the late 1880s, in particular into the Rift Valley, and was the first European together with his travel mate Ludwig von Höhnel to set foot on Mount Kenya or to reach Lake Turkana, meeting with various Maasai and the Kikuyu entities in the process. This constituted yet another major Hungarian individual presence in Africa. Others on a relatively long list would include influential figures such as Gábor Pécsvárady, Móric Benyovszky, Anne Baker alias Flóra Sass, Aurél Török, István Czímermann, to Ferenc Hopp, and László Almásy, to name a few.[13]

More than twenty years ago, however, it was Teleki's activities that encouraged a group of scholars (geographers, ethnographers, geologists, philologists, and economists) to pay tribute to his decisive works while following the routes he had taken in 1887–1888, thus contributing to widening the knowledge about Africa as seen from Hungary. The Hungarian Scientific Africa Expedition of 1987–1988 then offered a solid ground for researchers at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest (ELTE) to launch an Africa Studies Program.[14] Bantu philologist Géza Füssi Nagy (1946–2008) gradually became the engine behind the scenes until his sudden death in 2008 at the age of sixty-two. He was also advocating for a "long-expected Hungarian research center or other kind of academic program, even institution on Africa," as did some of his predecessors, especially Endre Sík,who "remains to be the most influential [and rather controversial] Africanist of Hungary [whose] greatest mistake was that he failed to established his own school of Hungarian Africanists."[15] Géza Füssi Nagy did several study and research tours to East, Cdntral, and West Africa, and as a linguist-anthropologist he translated many local ethnic tales, collected stories, and after his visiting professorship at the University of Dar es Salaam during 1986–87, wrote the first Hungarian–Swahili grammar book and compiled the first Hungarian–Swahili dictionary. He always devoted himself to "our job to understand Africa and teach about Africa," as he said to his

colleagues.[16] At present, the Africa Studies Program at ELTE itself has ceased to exist, while the Hungarian Accreditation Board has been accredited a Master's program in African Studies, which still awaits its official launch in the course of 2014.

In the meantime another group of young Africanists started establishing their base at Hungary's oldest university (dating from 1367), the University of Pécs. In cooperation with Publikon Publishers they founded the second Hungarian scientific journal on African Studies, *Afrika Tanulmányok* (African Studies), which is in its seventh volume in 2013 and provides a national forum for African issues four times a year.[17] Pécs has also established an Africa Research Center at its Humanities School.[18] It is an interdisciplinary unit with the potential to launch BA level training in African Studies as part of the university's new degree program in International Studies. The program has been launched but does not yet have a specialization in African Studies. The center in the meantime organized its second international Africa conference in June 2012 with the participation of scholars from the Visegrad region (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) and beyond. The conference was entitled "Emerging Africa – Old Friends, New Partnerships and Perspectives for the 21st Century" and hosted over fifty researchers from Central and Eastern Europe and Russia along with with Africanists from Western Europe.[19] Pécs clearly wishes to foster and therefore to participate actively in a new type of regional networking among Africanists. One set of the results is manifested in the first ever Central European African Studies Network (CEASN) with its permanent seat at the West Bohemian University in Plzen and two other founding institutions from Cracow and Pécs. The network will hold its first international conference in May 2014. Another output of this initial networking is the formulation of the potential involvement of research centers in think tank activities that among other activities provides advice for the respective ministries of foreign affairs of the Visegrad countries. The Pécs center was able to contribute effectively to a "new Hungarian Africa concept."[20] The center cooperated with NGOs and played an active role in compiling some fundamental strategic recommendations for the Hungarian government. It held workshops and conferences (two in the fall 2010, first in Pécs and then in collaboration with the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs in Budapest, and a third one in spring 2011 again in Budapest), which were followed by some additional meetings coordinated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The government subsequently channeled the contributions of these scholarly exchanges into its foreign policy strategy document, acknowledging that the existence of academic Africa programs are important for the re-designed African engagement of Hungary and how Africa can reappear on the country's foreign policy maps.[21]

**Is Africa Back on Hungarian Maps?**

As member of the Soviet bloc until 1989–1990 the Hungarian People's Republic was active in partnerships with then third-world countries along ideological lines determined by Moscow. Attention needs to be drawn here to the practice that did not offer the newly independent African countries much in real support beyond rhetoric.[22] Hungary later on programmed an aid policy in its five-year plans and drew the circle of target countries. In 1962 an operative unit under the name Tesco (International Technical and Scientific Cooperation and Trading Office) was set up with the aim of managing bilateral intergovernmental technical agreements, receiving students holding state scholarships,

sending national experts abroad as part of technical assistance, and organizing aid activities in the fields of education, healthcare, agriculture, and water management.[23]

After the democratic transformation in 1989–1990 Hungary practically withdrew from sub-Saharan Africa (among many other parts of the increasingly global world) and focused on its new concerns with European and trans-Atlantic integration. This seemed an obvious step on behalf of the government that finally felt the momentum to get "back to Europe," and became the country's top foreign affairs priority. Nowadays it is mostly the civil organizations that give substance to the relation with Africa instead of the official presence of the state. NGOs working with African issues in different parts of the continent (e.g., the African-Hungarian Union, the Foundation for Africa, and the Taita Foundation) try to fill the void left by Hungarian foreign policy. An example is the humanitarian involvement of the Foundation for Africa in Kinshasa, Congo. Its long-term humanitarian education-focused project, College Othniel and a recently acquired orphanage, provides schooling and vocational training for about five hundred children of poor families.[24]

Hungary's integration into the European Union in 2004 meant an inevitable turning point in its international relations. While joining the community of fellow member states in "playing the game" of the European Union the country has been trying to pursue its interests in the most effective way possible. In addition to its pursuit of a national-interest-based foreign policy, the country must endorse the "Whole-of-the-Union" approach to a common development policy. Although harmonization is still difficult among all its members, the EU cannot do anything else but foster its presence in the international arena as a "global actor." Hungary, as a member with "limited historical experience of development, and who [was itself a] recipient of EU development resources" arrived at a historic moment.[25] Due to the Joint Africa–EU strategy (JAES) adopted at the second Africa–EU Summit in Lisbon in December 2007 a new scope of involvement with Africa became available. "Hungary can only participate actively and take initiatives in [any community programs], if we have our 'own' Africa policy at hand: a network of connections, well-defined interests, clear goals, ideas on development policy, and based on all these, firm positions that we can harmonize with other member states," thinks Ambassador Balázs Bokor, Chief Coordinator of the Budapest Africa Forum.[26]

As part of this, special attention can now be given to the reshaping of Hungary's international—in this case pointedly African—relationships. Hungary has the chance to participate more intensively in the Community's development policy, as since January 1, 2010 Hungary has had access to the European Union's Development Fund (EDF). This means that the country can and is expected to play an active role in EDF programs. This is also an alternative opportunity for Hungarian enterprises to diversify beyond the European markets. For some Hungarian companies, the sub-Saharan region can be a takeoff point to boost Hungarian ideas regarding economic development. The region offers a new market and an investment target for large, small, and medium size Hungarian enterprises. For example, an entrepreneur might prosper in some East-African countries selling (under a revitalized brand name) Hungarian Hajdu washing machines with a rotating disc, a very popular household item across the Eastern Bloc during Soviet times.

There has been a boost in Hungarian economic activism in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa since April 2013. The Hungarian Trade and Cultural Centers (HTCC) in Accra and Kampala were created for interested businessmen, investors, and entrepreneurs from Hungary in hope of launching business projects all across the region.[27] Parallel to developing foreign markets and increasing Hungarian exports, sub-Saharan cooperation can signify

multilateral political successes for Hungary's government. This bids several new economic possibilities that would not be feasible in the Asian or European markets. One good example is the Economic Cooperation Agreement with the Republic of South Africa (RSA) signed on 26 November 2009. Almost 50 percent of Hungary's total African exports are with the RSA, Hungary's number one African partner. Among all of Hungarian–sub-Saharan relationships the South African partnership is the most extensive up to the present day. The Hungarian–South African bilateral context will be discussed more fully later in the paper.

As György Suha, President of the Honorary Consular Corps Accredited in the Republic of Hungary, noted in 2007: "Hungary's sub-Saharan involvement in Africa [was] still confined to passively support or even contemplate from a distance the Africa-policy determined by the former colonial states across Africa. […] At the same time political and economic relations with North African states show an explicitly developing tendency."[28] This statement has chronological importance, for although Hungary joined the EU in 2004, as of 2007 there was only a passive government approach to Africa. The shift to a more active approach started in 2010, when governmental ideas regarding Africa slightly shifted towards a positive direction. Several events and exchanges of ideas furnished the necessary background. This can be explained by the fact that Africa has become a central target for the EU's joint foreign policy, especially concerning the EU–ACP partnership and international development cooperation. Hungary has several direct serious security policy and geopolitical concerns and interests, for instance, with migration, peacekeeping, and NATO commitments. Events of the Arab Spring and the revolution in Libya proved how successfully such a central European state (i.e. Hungary) can act on behalf of the entire Community by keeping its embassy working as the key diplomatic mission in Tripoli during the conflict. Maja Kociancic, spokesperson for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, said at a press conference that the Hungarian embassy was the only diplomatic mission of an EU country still open in Tripoli and still providing official information during the conflict.[29]

In economic terms Hungary is not present on the African continent and above all not in the sub-Saharan region to the extent it was in the decades preceding the political transformation out of the Soviet bloc. With the lack of active governmental activity at the moment it is often that the Hungarian–African relationship is divided between alleged or real representatives of particular individual, economic, and civil interests. Taking into account the geopolitical reality of a country in central Europe, the government of Hungary acknowledges that any Hungarian strategy should encourage territorial attitude to prevail. After having looked at Hungary–Africa relations on a national basis, one should also look at them in the regional context of the Visegrad Group of countries as a further way of gauging the potential for a fuller engagement with Africa.

It is not new for the Visegrad Group to play a role in African development because under communism all of these countries provided substantial support to African states under the cloak of solidarity and ideology. In the course of political transformations these relationships were immediately curtailed and they often precipitated setbacks, which have even caused long-term disadvantages for the former "friendly supporters" in every Visegrad country. What we see today is the reduction of their diplomatic presence and the lack of promoting other kinds of presence. There is a perceptibly increasing rhetorical tendency to speak of the commitment of the countries of the region to aim at realizing the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations and reducing poverty in general terms across Africa. As far as diplomatic relations are concerned, Hungary's interest lies both in intensifying bilateral ties and contributing to the international agenda within the United

Nations. As a member of the European Union Hungary has taken part in European policies and schemes, but each member state can foster its own external affairs aspirations in bilateral terms. This is what has been reduced to a minimum since the change of the political system in 1989.

Nevertheless, examining the "Africa-content" of certain aid and development policies, we recognize a completely different picture: the question of Africa has been marginal, and there does not seem to be a serious chance for it to become a priority in the near future.[30] The scope of diplomatic presence varies in the Visegrad group: Poland maintains five embassies (Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), the Czech Republic seven (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Congo, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe), Slovakia four (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), and Hungary only two (Kenya and South Africa).[31] It is beyond doubt that reestablishing diplomatic posts will not be enough to spur more Hungarian official interest; some political or economic incentives are needed to get more involved in Africa. Economic activities from the private sector can offer good ground for a new phase of building relations.

In a geopolitically changing transnational world the mutual political trust of the past regimes does not have much significance. New channels of collaboration can be formed on the ground of economic activities, first and foremost, and Hungary has the potential to reformulate its past image as an exporter of technologies, in particular in the fields of agriculture, water purification and management, and cartography.[32] In addition, as Suha says, Hungary's positive image as a non-colonial power and the good experience of Africans with former Hungarian products—such as the Ikarus buses or the already mentioned Hajdu washing machines, and even the Elzett locks and Globus meat cans—hold extra credits for fostering and refining relations.[33] Up until 1935 Ganz and Company of Budapest built several streamlined diesel rail cars for the Egyptian State Railways, which carried passengers between Cairo and Suez.[34] From the MÁV M40 series (nicknamed as Humpback) built between 1966–70, thirty were sold to Egypt.[35] Still today many people refer to the older type of rail cars as "magari," which in Hungarian is "Magyar;" also indicating a nostalgic feeling and sense of reliability.[36]

Since 2010, some diplomatic developments have occurred and others have been promised by the government (for instance, opening and/or re-opening embassies in West Africa and at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa), but so far there is limited coherent thinking about where to foster what type of presence, and for what reasons. Therefore, Greg Mills' (2006) suggestion that Hungary's Africa policy could serve as a model for new EU members today (in six years' time) resonates with quite different tones. First of all, we cannot yet talk about an existing "Africa policy" as it is still in the making and not yet accepted as the government's official policy about concerted Hungarian involvement in Africa. Although the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has published its document on Hungarian foreign policy after the Hungarian EU Presidency, which contains sections on Africa, it is still a foreign policy approach, not a coherent government policy about the continent and related Hungarian presence. In the last couple of years Hungarian economic figures worsened, undoubtedly partly due to the global financial turmoil and the ongoing euro crisis, resulting in a more unstable environment, for instance, in terms of foreign investments. Therefore, other central and eastern European countries (CEECs) seem to be more competitive than Hungary in a number of ways, including making themselves attractive for African partnerships. Today, other central European countries might seem to offer better solutions and frameworks for collaboration with African entities compared with

Hungary. Second, Hungary is advised to learn from its past achievements on the continent, together with the successes of its neighboring countries' involvement in African development. But the major task is to define what it wishes to engage with as far as African cooperation is concerned. As mentioned in the introduction, the first government since the change of the system in 1989–1990 with a fresh and strategic vision on Hungary's place and role in the global arena is the current one, which is rather an inevitable step as long as Hungary's EU accession put the country into a much wider context as far as relations with the world is concerned. Third, Hungarian civil organizations (both NGOs and NGDOs) active in Africa agree that the country needs to learn more about Africa and African ways of thinking about their needs and aspirations for cooperation.[37] A "learning by doing'" approach, which rests upon the activism of civil society and the business community, is an appropriate one for a successful Hungarian involvement in the long run.

## Building Bridges: Africans in Hungary

To be able to understand more of African everyday life, Africa and the Africans themselves need to be part of public discourse. This can be supported by those African immigrants who for various reasons chose Hungary as their second home and settled in the country. For almost ten years, African immigrants have been seen among Hungarian intellectuals as potential bridges between Hungary and African states. Setting up a database of the Africans who earned their university degree in Hungary during the 1970s and 1980s has been defined as a central task for any government wishing to foster African relations. So far, no such database exists. During the course of 2011 the Pécs-based think tank ID Research realized a project entitled "Black and white – Here we are!" supported by the European Integration Fund, conducting a survey about the legal African communities in Hungary.[38] The project had its fourth phase between March and July 2013 with a special summer school designed for university students aiming at meeting with African migrants (and others of other cultural and ethnic backgrounds) in Budapest. These legal African migrants are active in the cultural and NGO sectors as well as taking part in humanitarian and philanthropic activities—for instance, trying to collect money and in-kind support for schools and orphanages in different African countries (mostly their countries of origin). Most of them arrived in Hungary as students with state scholarships during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, married Hungarians, and established their families in Hungary. Their children refer to themselves as "white coffee" rather than the outdated term "half-blood." Although they are few in number (less than 3,000 in a total population of about ten million), their partial Hungarian identity and commitment toward their new home country serves as a good ground for fostering bilateral ties between Hungary and their countries of origin. "The thousands of African professionals who graduated from Hungarian universities in the 1970s and '80s form an unbreakable link between our country and the continent," advocates the Budapest Africa Forum.[39]

According to the data of the last two years published by the Central Statistics Authority the number of the African immigrants to Hungary has considerably increased. The number of African citizens having a permit to stay or establish themselves in Hungary reached 2,513 persons on January 1, 2010, showing an increase of. 26 percent compared to 2009 (1,998 persons according to the then-statistics); 1,080 persons, 43 percent of the African migrants, came to Hungary from North African countries. As for the regions south of the Sahara 739 persons migrated from Nigeria to Hungary—this is more than half (51.6 percent) of the

entire sub-Saharan migrant community. In 2011, the total number increased to 2,779 according to the latest census from.[40]

Tendencies show that the majority of the immigrants came to Hungary with the purpose of studying. This kind of mobility is "a very important part of migration as a whole, which does not mean settling down definitively, but results in a stay for a long time, which also supposes getting to know one's environment, eventually for the person to learn the language and/or feel comfortable in other domains, compare the possibilities of his actual and earlier domicile, it increases the intention to definitively migrate and the person might settle down."[41] From this point of view a clear governmental concept, intention, and strategy is even more necessary concerning the question how one "could make the most of" the person about to settle, along with the interests of the receptive nation. Fostering such bilateral links is crucial for policy-making, as bilateral links in general or targeted to specific countries are in line with other policy and business goals and objectives. These days one of the most heated debates in the European institutions is the issue of migrant communities, the diaspora, and their active contributions to economic development of the receiving countries, in particular where migrant entrepreneurs are concerned. In Hungary the debate is not yet heated, but the issue has been put on the political agenda. A future Hungarian Africa policy can surely utilize these diaspora-related ties.

### Hungary–Africa Relations: Tasks, Obligations, and Possibilities

This section turns attention to Hungary–Africa relations from the Soviet Bloc period onward, discussing some important moments during the political regime change at the end of the 1980s. Today, Hungary as a donor country gives money to international organizations as well as for humanitarian purposes. The European Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) then disburse this money to states in need in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean (ACP countries). Hungary also needs to align itself with the "norms and principles of the international development aid regime."[42] Between 2008 and 2013 Hungary has contributed 125 million Euros to the 10th Development Program of the European Development Fund, with the expectation that a considerable part of this amount would go to Africa. All this is not only important from the aid point of view. Thanks to this program Hungarian civil associations have opportunities to participate in EU projects in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific regions. However, as members of the roundtable debates held in Pécs and Budapest between September 2010 and June 2011 pointed out, the contribution is only "rewarding" if the Hungarian economic, trade, and civil organizations actually apply for ACP–EU programs that have become accessible to them with Hungary's joining the EU.[43]

Participation in industry-related developments relevant to Hungarian engineering skills and expertise is an option for Hungarian associations. It has potential today, though after the political transformation Hungarian missions in Angola and Mozambique were closed, and the intensity of bilateral relations has decreased accordingly, which makes it hard to encourage participation. In the last few years, however, Angolan–Hungarian relations have developed, and the aforementioned Magyar-expedition could also contribute to further expansion. According to the first Angolan ambassador to Hungary, João Miguel Vahekeni, "areas of interest [in 2010] were civil engineering, railway, energy, agriculture, and air-condition specialization," but a Hungarian company in wood processing and furniture built

ties with Angolan counterparts in the course of 2010.[44] All these efforts are also supported by the Angolan-Hungarian Economic Association established in Hungary.

International aid programs are coordinated in the Department for International Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in November 2002. According to the ministry, Hungary's OECD- and EU-conforming donor activities began in 2003. Quite independently, there were international development and support programs earlier, which were not handled uniformly, and for which Hungary spent between USD 17.8 million to USD 24.8 million. At the same time in 2010 Hungary's entire available development funds, including Asia, South America, and Africa, amounted to only (about USD 391,000. As noted earlier, before the political transformation Hungary used to take a considerable share of Soviet Bloc development cooperation, providing technical-professional support mainly through the Hungarian Tesco Company. By the 1980s, it was present (therefore, Hungary was present) in fifty-seven third world countries. This is also an asset in terms of redefining potential future cooperation. Thanks to active civil organizations and individual initiatives, Africa is on the way to be (positively) reevaluated in the coming years, which is predicted to increase wider attention in the 2010's.

In addition to all these, a new type of "race (or even scramble) for Africa" needs mentioning, i.e., the latest worldwide trend in which the leading Asian powers (China, Japan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia) as well as Russia, Brazil, and other emerging economies (e.g., Turkey) have become the most serious challengers of the EU and the USA. First and foremost, this is a race for natural resources, their locations, and the exploitation rights of raw materials. Comparing investment portfolios it leaps to attention that while, for example, China participates in African development and investment in a much more diversified way and in several different regions, Europe keeps speculating on investments in connection with the continent's natural resources.

In the course of investigating a potential and viable Hungarian Africa policy in the making, there is yet another dimension to examine: educating society about Africa. It seems a prerequisite to speak more sensibly and without bias about Africa to Hungarian society at large. "Educating" is therefore to help enable Hungarian society "to the reception and better understanding of Africa." In the light of these commitments, during the Hungarian Presidency of the European Council of the EU NGOs the umbrella organization HAND (Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid) compiled a package of strategic recommendations for reconsidering and reshaping Hungarian foreign political and economic strategy and development policy and to, lay the foundation of an effective and proactive Hungarian contribution to the EU Development Policy. [45] For the first time since the change of the system these recommendations were channeled into a new government approach, which includes a separate chapter on African relations.[46] The document emphasizes: "Hungary is connected to Africa through the EU's common foreign and security policy, as well as the EU programs for cooperation and humanitarian aid. Hungary can only participate actively and take initiatives in these, however, if we have our 'own' Africa policy at hand: a network of connections, well-defined interests, clear goals, ideas on development policy, and based on all these, firm positions that we can harmonize (or eventually clash) with other member states."[47] This constitutes a substantive basis for an emerging view that Hungary is indeed increasing attention on Africa.

The "African issue" is not merely a foreign relations or a foreign economic question but rather a complex government mission for Hungary. In the last few years—among other instances the 2004 Africa Conference held in Budapest—the idea originally formulated by

former State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs László Várkonyi has been repeated several times: "The time has come to reconsider our objectives and interests concerning the African continent and give new perspectives to our endeavors. We have to situate Africa in our foreign relations' system rationally and with the future in mind. As a matter of fact, we should point out why a relatively small Central European country with practically no colonial background needs an Africa policy."[48]

At the same time Hungary cannot isolate itself from the problems of the sub-Saharan region. For the economic and political refugees streaming from this region, Hungary is about to gradually become a target country instead of a transit country. Parts of Africa have faced continued crises for several years and are not exempt from problems with international impact. Organized crime, international terrorism, AIDS, etc., all reach Hungary too. To reduce poverty and create political stability is in Hungary's best interest and is also a moral obligation.

A 2007 document of the former African Research Unit of the Hungarian Geopolitical Council highlighted four areas were as important items to be considered when drawing up a national Africa policy: aid programs linked to economic activities (investment); close working relationships with the scientific-professional network of the country; maintaining constant contact with voluntary and civil organizations; and launching social awareness programs.[49] The current strategic approach in foreign affairs builds upon these and states that "it is a priority for [Hungary's] Africa policy to closely follow the humanitarian issues, including food aid, along with agricultural, environmental, water-management and health issues, and to assess the needs for sharing [Hungarian] experiences related to democratic transition, if possible, in connection with involvement in relevant international projects."[50]

While opening windows to various parts of the world as part of a global approach (in Hungarian *globális nyitás*), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offers some examples of Hungarian-African co-operation to be considered for repositioning itself. South Africa seems to be the best example from a number of angles.

### Twenty Years of Diplomatic Relations: South Africa and Hungary

Hungary and South Africa have had diplomatic relations for more than twenty years.[51] Hungary's most important commercial partner in Africa is the Republic of South Africa.[52] It is not surprising therefore that as part of the new strategy backed by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the position of Economic and Commercial Counselor at the Embassy of Hungary in Pretoria was created in August 2011. The counselor's report about the first half of 2012 points to a stable increase in trade with a gradually diverging interest in bilateral cooperation from actors in various sectors including environmental protection, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, financial solutions, cars, and car parts.[53] South Africa has become Hungary's fourth largest market outside Europe after the USA, China, and the United Arab Emirates. The volume of exports in 2011 was USD 840 million, with USD 186 million in the first quarter of 2012. Former South African Ambassador to Hungary, Esther Takalani Netshitenzhe, noted that trade between the two countries has increased over the years and the percentage annual average growth rate indicates that exports from South Africa to Hungary increased by about 54 percent per annum compared to imports at around 19 percent per annum over the last ten years.[54] The trade balance is currently in Hungary's favor. "Trade is dominated by large corporations in the automotive, ITC, electronics and medical sectors. In order to widen and stabilize trade relations and to boost contacts among

SMEs [small business enterprises], business networks were launched in the second half of 2011 in both countries. By now monthly [there are] 20-25 business offers, projects are intermediated primarily in the ITC, medical, bio-health, energy efficiency, clean tech, and agribusiness sectors with dozens of contracts already signed and scores in the pipeline."[55]

Ambassador Netshitenzhe also underlined the importance of the Hungarian diaspora that settled in South Africa after 1956 in terms of contributing to the economies of both countries. Hungarian Ambassador to South Africa Béla László considers the Hungarian community in South Africa "as an important connecting link between the two countries. … Several South African-Hungarian businessmen are active in the Hungarian market," and with their active involvement the South Africa–Hungary Joint Economic Commission was established on May 13, 2013.[56] In the protocol of the inaugural session of the commission the parties identified the fields and sectors of mutual interest to develop and diversify bilateral relations—ranging from industrial automation, machine tools, and safety and security equipment to the exchange of experience and technology in the field of coal, copper and uranium mining, to waste and water management and tourism.[57]

Not only Hungary but other central and eastern European countries (CEEC) were important for South Africa, and as Mills indicates, CEEC were also "the site of the beginning of the end of Pretoria's diplomatic isolation."[58] Hungary in particular became a significant scene for South African direct investment. SABMiller, for instance, has become a success story for both countries. The first major RSA investment was the purchase of the Kőbánya Brewery for some USD 100 million.[59] According to management estimates, SABMiller has 30 percent of the total share of the Hungarian beer market and has a steady presence in central Europe.[60] As long as South Africa has a regional approach in its foreign policy toward central Europe, it makes more sense to compare the Visegrad states from the point of view of "close and comprehensive cooperation," which seems to be more important than "competition in concrete business deals."[61]

In the field of education and research, Ambassador Netshitenzhe contributed to African Studies programs to be launched in the near future at universities in Budapest and Pécs with public lectures and book donations to new sub-libraries on African topics.[62] There is unanimous agreement within government, business, and academic circles about the changed situation, within which Hungary can foster its relations with the world after its EU Presidency period in the first six months of 2011. As is stated in the foreign policy document of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Hungary's Africa relations were nonetheless strengthened during [the] EU presidency, as a result of staging many joint events with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries."[63] In terms of further events, a clear commitment is seen in the government sponsored "Budapest Africa Forum" (June 6-7, 2013). Events are important tools for a successful foreign policy but not sufficient on their own to argue that a country has an individual policy for any of its relations—in this case, African relations. It is too early to state anything about what the Africa Forum can bring to revitalizing Hungary–Africa relations in general, but to the 'South African connection' it can add more projects, in particular. What then to expect from 2013 on as far as a potential Africa policy is concerned?

**After the Budapest Africa Forum: Real Hope for a New Africa Policy?**

There is an obvious change in the communications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about Africa and other parts of the world, suggesting that Hungary has tasks, duties, and opportunities in these realms. Beyond official rhetoric, however, steps of action will be

tested from 2013 onwards, and even with the new EU planning period, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020, not to mention the results of national elections scheduled for spring 2014. Will there be more Hungarian diplomatic posts across sub-Saharan Africa or not? This is not an issue to neglect. Kopinski rightly underlines that "embassies and consulates and their personnel do play a strategic role in development cooperation across the world. It is infinitely more difficult to coordinate and implement aid, particularly project aid, from overseas without officials and trusted people on the ground."[64] Hungary's only current sub-Saharan African embassies are in Kenya and South Africa. There is, however, a strong likelihood of reopening the embassy in Nigeria, which "could happen as early as this year" according to former Deputy State Secretary for Global Affairs Szabolcs Takács.[65] Building and maintaining trust is ever so crucial, and rebuilding trust is always more difficult in diplomacy. Therefore, more efforts and financial means need to be mobilized.

The present paper gives an overview of what Hungary has as a pool of academic assets from previous centuries of African contacts and involvement, which can support its current government's foreign policy strategic concept to open up more globally, including also the African continent. In the course of 2010 and 2011, following a joint initiative of the academic and civic circles having an interest in African engagement and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, more workshops and conferences were organized in Pécs and Budapest with the aim of encouraging nation-wide discourse on Hungary's possible Africa policy. As of December 18, 2012, when another important roundtable was held in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Szabolcs Takács stated that Hungary first "needs to change at home in order to become a global player, and therefore, needs flexible and innovative thinking."[66] To construct a functioning Africa policy, the ministry decided to organize a milestone international event, the "Budapest Africa Forum" in early June 2013, which was planned to channel all documents, thoughts, and plans into a coherent strategic document for the long run. Since its political transition Hungary had never hosted such a forum, with more than two hundred delegates representing governments, academics, civil society, and businesses from over twenty-five African countries.

The main speaker of the Forum, African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was the first to call for closer cooperation and collaboration between Hungary and Africa. By enumerating indicators of Africa's great potentials and a litany of challenges she advocated for renewed engagement for Hungary. She also spoke at the education panel, stating that "Hungary and other Central and Eastern European countries played an important role during our anti-colonial struggles and our early years of nation formation and state building in the development of African human capital, with many of our leaders and professionals passing through your universities."[67]

Concurring with the AUC Chairperson, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs János Martonyi said that "Africa has taken its new place in the world and that the rest of the world should adjust to it."[68] The minister confirmed Hungary's commitment to contribute to prosperity, peace, and security in Africa through multilateral and bilateral relations and cooperation. As an EU member state, Hungary, according to Martonyi, will actively participate in reshaping relations with Africa and will increase its role in education by increasing the number of African students wishing to study in Hungary. He also promised increased potential for sports diplomacy and academic and business forums as well.[69] Ghana's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hanna Tetteh, the child of a Ghanaian father and a Hungarian mother, born in Hungary, and a graduate of the Medical University in Szeged, reassured the Forum that "Africa is not asking for handouts, but looking for partnerships."

She noted that what local Africanists repeatedly say: Hungarian trade with Africa has more potential than trade with other regions. She called on the Hungarian government to open all doors to students again as it did in the 1960–80s.[70] Alongside the Forum there were about thirty related events such as film shows, art exhibitions, receptions, etc. The Budapest Declaration read out and approved by acclamation at the end of the Forum charts the way forward to enhance new engagement between Hungary and the African continent.[71]

In conclusion, the present analysis showed that since the change of the political regime in 1989–90 Hungary has the intention, and at the appropriate level of the government, to implement an expanded foreign policy that includes Africa. To do this the country already has an exemplary framework of such relations with South Africa, which is Hungary's fourth largest market beyond Europe, following the USA, China, and the Arab Emirates. The most recent developments of Hungarian–South African bilateral ties signal a mutually growing interest in further expansion. When discussing what assets Hungary has for the construction of an Africa policy, human relations and the network of Africans with a Hungarian university degree is pertinent. Many of the former students are in leading political or business positions, thus providing considerable social capital for Hungary to foster its Africa policy. Developing Hungarian "soft power" via this network has considerable relevance for the country. Drawing upon Nye's power theory, the development of the educational-cultural relations, scientific-technological cooperation, and the enlargement of the institutional network into a position to represent Hungary and make it (more) attractive seem fundamental tasks.[72] Should these factors be of great(er) importance in a prospective Africa-strategy/policy, Hungary will certainly be able to bring other, more specific areas (e.g. those of the economy, trade, security policy, etc., and their Hungarian actors) into a more favorable position, thus reinforcing and further developing its "smart power."

Although there are perceptibly more and more young Africans (better still their parents and family) who are able to study at European universities as "tuition fee-paying students," it is of relevance for the Hungarian Africa policy that the government draws up and offers a new Hungarian State scholarship program focusing on Africa. The emerging economies of our global world annually offer an increasing number of state grants to young Africans. With this kind of support Africans can gain professional training and knowledge, in possession of which—and this is supported by the most recent research and surveys—they establish contacts with the state that provided the grant for them plus business and other sectors' actors. The result is that they join intensively in the long-term development of bilateral cooperation, since they have the necessary qualifications and correctly speak the language of the state providing the grant, which has crucial importance in the development of relations in general terms.

All these are to be coupled with high-level (President of State, Head of Government, Speaker of the House) and other official and state delegations' visits. In addition, to implement a relevant Africa policy Hungary should take a more efficient part in the activities of the African Union. Furthermore, in overall terms, Hungary needs to become more attractive for African investors, since by now they exist in an increasing number. Ad hoc policies and policy formulation need to be avoided, and a strategic planning with long-term efforts and developments must take over. There are obvious resources available, but these need to be channeled into a coherent and visionary national policy that is in line with the long-term strategic interests of Hungary in Africa. This also makes sense in the closer vicinity of Hungary, in the Visegrad region, as well as in a broader context of EU common foreign, security, and development policy concerns. In this respect, Hungary's global

opening is timely and the reformulation of an African strategy makes sense, especially in a broader European context. To stay critical in a constructive way about the implementation and how this new approach of repositioning the country on the world map will actually happen, however, is crucial for success.

**Notes**

1    Non-revisionist here means not in the "post-Trianon" way. The Treaty of Versailles signed with Hungary in the Grand Trianon Palace of Versailles (called therefore the Trianon Treaty) on 4 June 1920 resulted in the loss of more than two thirds of its original territories (72 percent) and 64 percent of the total population of the country (21 million), which was for aligning with the defeated Axis (Central) Powers led by Germany. The total number of Hungarians living beyond the borders of the Republic of Hungary (today Magyarország) is about 5.2 million out of which 2.6 million ethnic Hungarians can be found in present-day  neighboring countries (about 1.5 million in Romania), 1.8 million in North America (about 1.5 million in the USA), and the rest all across the world.

2    For more on this topic, see Tarrósy and Vörös 2013.

3    Rácz 2012, p. 6.

4    Búr 2007, p. 161.

5    More on his life and research can be read at the 2009 Torday-Congo Expedition's website: http://kongoexpedicio.hu/torday/index.php/en/who-was-emil-torday

6    This was organized by social anthropologist professor John Mack, University of East Anglia, UK.

7    About the expedition: http://www.kongoexpedicio.hu/. See also: Szilasi 2010.

8    For more see World Digital Library, http://www.wdl.org/en/item/2925/ (accessed June 15, 2012).

9    Bartos-Elek and Nemerkényi 2009.

10    Búr 2007, p. 157.

11    The field trip is documented in the magazine *Földgömb*, 2012/9, pp. 18–31.

12    In an interview Vahekeni talked about his focus on his mission to encourage more Hungarian economic actors to get engaged with Angola in a number of ways. See the interview at: http://africannewshungary.blogspot.com/2010/12/i-want-more-hungarian-economic-actors.html.

13    For more, see Régi 2007a, pp. 147–156, and Vidacs 1984, pp. 119–129. Count Móric Benyovszky, "Emperor of Madagascar" as he called himself in addition to his numerous commitments such as military officer, adventurer, and born aristocrat, through his diary of his years in Madagascar between 1772 and 1776 contributed to the understanding of the island's people. For more on him and other Hungarian Africanists, travellers, and scholars see Búr 2007, pp. 157–62.

14    It may seem interesting that this took place during the last years of the Soviet-backed one-party system. However, it was the 100th anniversary that motivated all the scientists to commemorate Teleki's unquestionably achievements in African research. See: Vojnits 2013a and 2013b.

15    Búr, 2007. pp. 165–166. See also: Darch – Littlejohn 1983

16    More on him at: http://old.integralakademia.hu/en/school-of-integral-
       psychology/faculty/geza-fuessi-nagy/

17    The first journal was *Africana Hungarica*, the journal of the then Hungarian Africa
       Society, and was published only twice in ten years.

18    Szabó 2013.

19    Its official homepage is: http://www.africa.pte.hu/?page_id=1057

20    Morenth and Tarrósy 2011.

21    Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p. 49. Available at:
       http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/default_eng.asp (accessed June 4, 2012).

22    Paragi 2007, pp. 145–46.

23    Ibid. pp. 146–47.

24    For more, see Tarrósy 2013.

25    Mangala 2013, pp. 124–25.

26    Interview with Balázs Bokor, April 14, 2013,
       http://budapestafricaforum.kormany.hu (accessed May 9, 2013).

27    As reported on the day of the opening of the center, "there was no need for interpreter
       . . . as the Ghanaian participants, among them Dr. LaurenceTete, Anglican clergyman,
       Mr. Francis Kwasnyi, doctor colonel, Mr. Benjamin Dagadoo, deputy minister for the oil
       and gas industry, all got their degrees in Hungary." Available at :
       http://afriport.hu/index.php/angol-nyelv-hirek/17463-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-
       hungarian-trade-center-in-ghana--in-hungarian-.html (accessed May 25, 2013).

28    Suha 2007, p. 8.

29    http://www.acus.org/natosource/hungary-has-eus-last-functioning-embassy-tripoli
       accessed on May 28, 2013

30    See also Kopinski 2012, pp. 33–49.

31    The third one Greg Mills mentions in Abuja in his 2006 article closed after his article
       appeared, but the Hungarian government stated in early 2013 that it would in 2013.

32    Interview with György Suha about the system of Hungarian–African relations. See
       Földi 2010, pp. 69–75.

33    Ibid. p. 71.

34    http://mikes.railhistory.railfan.net/r050.html (accessed May 30, 2013).

35    See www.railroadforums.com (accessed September 10, 2013).

36    See Hungarian Ambassador to Egypt Dr. Péter Kveck's address on the official website
       of the Hungarian Embassy in Cairo at:
       http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kulkepviselet/EG/en/en_Koszonto/welcome.htm; and
       http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1008/sk4.htm (accessed September 5, 2013).

37    Their opinion was elaborated upon during the series of workshops and conferences
       organized partly by the Africa Research Center of the University of Pécs in cooperation
       with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between September 2010 and April 2011, as
       documented in the minutes of the meetings. Source: Africa Research Center, University
       of Pécs.

38    More on the project and its results can be found at www.ittvagyunk.eu.

39    "Hungary and Africa." Opening page of the Budapest Africa Forum at:
       http://budapestafricaforum.kormany.hu accessed May 9, 2013.

40    Data obtained from:

http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnvn001b.html (accessed May 4, 2012).

41   L. Rédei 2007, p. 11.

42   Szent-Iványi 2012, p. 65.

43   From the records of the roundtables. Notes were taken by the authors.

44   Interview with Joao Miguel Vahekeni. Source:
     http://africannewshungary.blogspot.com/2010/12/i-want-more-hungarian-economic-actors.html (accessed May 20, 2013).

45   See Morenth and Tarrósy 2012.

46   Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, pp. 47-49.

47   Ibid., p. 48.

48   Várkonyi 2004, p. 5.

49   For more see Régi 2007b, pp. 13–16.

50   Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p. 49.

51   South African Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation 2011, pp. 12–13.

52   It is worth noting that other Visegrad countries also nurture flourishing ties with South Africa. With Poland, which was the fastest-growing member state of the European Union in 2012, "bilateral trade totalled $941.8-million in 2011, an increase of 27% over the past three years, according to Polish government data." (for more, see: http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2012/12/02/prosperous-poland-boosts-ties-with-south-africa [accessed May 28, 2013].) In its 2012-2020 Export Strategy, the Czech Republic considers South Africa as one of the "Countries of Interest" with which the Czech Republic intends to develop bilateral ties in the long run. (For more see: http://oldsanews.gcis.gov.za/rss/12/12092612251001 [accessed May 28, 2013].)

53   Received in an electronic circular on June 26, 2012.

54   The interview was made on September 10, 2012 with the involvement of Judit Bagi, research assistant.

55   Interview with Ambassador Béla László, May 29, 2013.

56   The interview was on May 29, 2013. More about the joint economic commission at: http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2013/05/closer-economic-and-trade-relations.html (accessed May 28, 2013).

57   Protocol of the First Session of the South Africa–Hungary Joint Economic Commission (May 13, 2013), pp. 1-4.

58   Mills 2006, p. 171.

59   "Hungarian–South African Relations" 2005, p. 1.

60   Data accessed June 22, 2012from http://www.sabmiller.com/index.asp?pageid=1065.

61   Interview with Ambassador Béla László, May 29, 2013.

62   See the program of the conference at which the South African Ambassador gave an opening speech and presented a book donation to the Africa Research Center of the University of Pécs: http://www.africa.pte.hu/?page_id=543

63   Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p. 47.

64   Kopinski 2012, p. 44.

65   http://www.dteurope.com/politics/non-eu-countries/opening-towards-sub-saharan-africa.html (accessed May 30, 2013).

66   From the official notes of the roundtable taken by Ildikó Szilasi (accessed 25 December

25, 2012). On October 29, 2013, State Secretary Péter Szijártó informed the Hungarian News Agency MTI that Hungary reopened its embassy in Abuja. See: http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungary-reopened-its-embassy-in-abuja accessed November 6, 2013.

67    Notes taken by Péter Morenth.

68    Ibid.

69    Ibid.

70    Ibid.

71    See: http://budapestafricaforum.kormany.hu/download/e/61/70000/BAF-Declaration.pdf.

72    Nye 2011. Good examples come from various different parts of the world: the German Goethe Institute, the French Alliance Française (AF) network, the Chinese Confucius Institutes worldwide, and the Russians' Russkiy Mir Foundation opening of Russian Centers. This means that it can have relevance that the network of the Hungarian cultural institutes should be enlarged and could be widened by incorporating civil actors on the model of AF.

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# AT ISSUE

# What is the Matter with African Agriculture?

## HENK J.W. MUTSAERS AND PAUL W.M. KLEENE

**Abstract:** The views of forty veterans on sixty years of African agricultural development, published recently in book form, are analyzed against the background of René Dumont's epochal publication "*L'Afrique noire est mal partie*." Although some of Dumont's opinions and recommendations are no longer valid, it is striking how many of them are as relevant today as they were fifty years ago. This paper reviews the recent history of agricultural development comparing Dumont's visions and those of the veterans from a number of angles, viz. the all-important issue of the strengths and weaknesses of subsistence and family farming, the development pathways of the forest and savannah zones, and the disappointing adoption record of new technology during the past fifty years. Next, future prospects are reviewed, as well as the conditions for significant progress, in respect of land ownership, farmer organization, education in the widest sense, "chain development" and, perhaps most importantly, dedication, honesty and discipline at all levels. Finally, the often unfavorable role of international aid is reviewed and recent developments are highlighted, in particular the dangerous trend of massive land acquisition by "outside" parties.

## Introduction

This paper was motivated by two seemingly disparate events, which turn out to be closely related: the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of René Dumont's 1962 *L'Afrique noire est mal partie* and the appearance of our collection of forty veterans' essays on the state of African agriculture (Mutsaers and Kleene 2012), in which they describe what they see as the causes and possible solutions for the apparent stagnation of smallholder and family farming. These two events respectively deal with the beginning and the end of an era, that of heavily western-dominated agricultural development approaches in Africa, the main roots of which extend into the end of the colonial and the beginning of the post-colonial eras.

The forty veteran authors in our collection, twenty-two anglophones and eighteen francophones, were asked to address three questions:

- Why have we not been more successful in our attempts to help agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa move forward?

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- What are essential social, economic, political, and technical changes needed for farmers to become more efficient and more prosperous producers?
- What kind of external assistance and changes in international policy could help?

In this paper we will show the many links between Dumont's early visions and the development approaches that the veterans, including ourselves, have been involved in during the past fifty years, as reflected in their answers to these questions. We will also examine whether their experiences can explain why so little of the grand visions of the 1950s and 1960s, of which Dumont was one of the most outspoken protagonists, has been realised, and to what extent these visions have weathered the storms and remain valid today, half a century later. We have concluded this paper with a quotation from each of the authors' contributions, to convey the flavor of their wide ranging views.

## The Key Question: Does Family Farming Have a Future?

One of today's crucial dilemmas for African farming is whether the future will be with small and medium size (family) farms or rather with large scale farming enterprises. This dilemma has arisen (again) at the end of a fifty year process, during which practically all attention has gone to uplifting Africa's smallholder farming, with relatively poor results, as many of our authors show. Nevertheless, a majority of them still consider a vitalized and suitably enlarged family farm as the only real option, because of its accumulated experience, its resilience to the vagaries of the climate and the fragility of the soil, and the vast numbers of rural dwellers (and their town relatives) depending on it.

The only way to feed the ever growing urban populations, compete with cheap imports, penetrate regional and international markets, and, very importantly, retain young people on the land, will be for family farming to evolve into small and medium-scale suitably mechanized and diversified farming (if that happens, the fate of the remaining subsistence farmers will become a major concern, unless alternative employment becomes available). Land and labor productivity must increase steeply, while safeguarding the production base, by integrating trees and cover crops as well as livestock, efficient fertility management, and a host of other measures. This was Dumont's vision in the early sixties and it remains the unfulfilled ideal of most of the present authors. Some significant modernization has taken place in the savannah areas, driven by cotton and maize and in some irrigated rice/vegetable schemes, notably the Office du Niger in Mali. In the forest zone, however, smallholder farming has stagnated, in some areas to a near-comatose state, with the notable exception of cocoa farmers in Ivory Coast and to a lesser extent Ghana. Dumont thought that the opportunities were much better in the forest zone due of its potential for industrial crops such as cocoa, oil palm and rubber, but the opposite has happened. We will come back to that contrast later.

Meanwhile, recent developments seem to run counter to the strengthening of smallholder farming, viz. the acquisition of large stretches of African land by foreign and local investors (called land grabbers by some). for large-scale production of food and biofuel. Apart from the nefarious effect on land security of the African family farmer and other societal implications, the lessons from the bad experiences with large scale arable farms in the late colonial and early post-colonial days are being forgotten. They succumbed to a combination of poor agronomy, poor management, and above all unawareness of the

devastating effects of temperate zone farming methods, when applied on a large scale under African conditions.

That is not to say that none of our authors see a future role for large arable farms, in particular in the savannah zones. Even if they do, they stress the need for caution to avoid the considerable damage which will result from injudicious land use through massive erosion and soil degradation and from pest and disease outbreaks. Medium and large-scale farming must mimic the adaptation, resilience, and sustainability of small-scale farming, which is often less vulnerable to such calamities. That means, for example, that it should use effective means of soil conservation and improvement, with appropriate tools, equipment and soil amendments, including organic manure produced on the farm or obtained from elsewhere. Even though the principles are well-known, there is yet very little experience in their application on a larger scale.

### Forest and Savannah Farming

Dumont's views on the state of African farming in the early sixties were highly relevant, his elements for a balanced development appropriate, but his blueprint for the 1980s ("twenty years from today") have turned out to be an illusion. Like many workers with him, he envisaged an ideal division of tasks between forest and savannah, each according to its ecological potential, whereby the forest zone would specialize in tree crops (cocoa, oil palm, rubber, bananas) while the savannah would produce food as well as arable cash crops such as cotton. He thought that it would be relatively straightforward to develop forest zone agriculture, while addressing the challenges of the savannah would need more time. The opposite has been the case. The few success stories are all from the wet savannah ("francophone" cotton, maize in West and East Africa, to some extent irrigated rice), while smallholder tree crops in the forest zone, with the exception of Ivory Coast, have at best remained where they were, with little effort to raise them to a higher level of organization and production. While the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) with its research centers on four continents has paid little or no attention to them, French research institutes in several countries have continued to work on the physiology, breeding, and agronomy of coffee, cocoa, rubber, and fruits. However, no tight organizations were set up around these crops, in support of the entire product chains, comparable to those for cotton. The semi-autonomous Marketing Boards, set up in the fifties and sixties in anglophone countries for several commercial crops (e.g. coffee, cocoa, cotton) could have played that role (they were much admired by Dumont), but eventually they succumbed to state intervention and usurpation after independence.

Generally, aid agencies have also shown little interest in forest-zone industrial crops, perhaps with the exception of coffee, which Dumont considered the least promising. Aid has been extremely skewed towards small subsistence food crop producers, perhaps due to ideologically motivated predilection for poverty alleviation, with severe neglect of the potential of cash earning crops for that same purpose. Another reason was probably the lack of expertise among western development workers, who would rather direct their attention to "easier" commodities.

### The Wet Savannah and the Case of Cotton

If anywhere, then things have been happening in the wet savannah zone, exemplified by successful intensive smallholder cotton and maize and irrigated rice, especially in some of

the francophone countries, and more recently fruit and vegetable production for the local, regional, and international markets. Let us look at the cotton sector for clues about the factors which condition agricultural development, as several of our francophone authors have done.

Since Dumont's days, commercial cotton growing has been one of the showcases of economic development in francophone West Africa, which has contributed to the emergence of quite prosperous medium size farms. The successes have been conditioned by three factors: a complete set of services provided by a dedicated and uncorrupted organization, cost recovery through deduction on delivered cotton, and vertical integration, all the way from production, through processing to marketing by a French organization the Compagnie Française pour le Développement des fibres Textiles (CFDT) and its affiliates, such as the Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles (CMDT) in Mali whose roots extend into the colonial era. In other words, it has resulted from solid chain management in today's parlance. This resulted in what Dumont called a "disciplined" crop sector, where everything was done more or less by the book, at the price of strong regimentation by a monopolistic CFDT. In the 1980s, the World Bank pushed some of these national cotton parastatals, such as the CMDT (one of the largest) to extend services to cover other commodities in the "cotton-based system" as well, in particular, maize and livestock. While this was perhaps an understandable move considering their success and the inefficiency of the state-run extension services, it was also bad policy because it burdened commercially successful organizations with unprofitable tasks. Before it could have destroyed them, the policy was reversed again in the present century, by the same World Bank, that master of grand but ill-conceived ideas carried out on a grandiose scale with other people's money.

The Cotton Marketing Boards of anglophone Africa, set up before independence as semi-autonomous bodies in support of the cotton sector, initially were also quite successful. After independence, however, they rapidly degenerated under state control into exploitation mechanisms, serving the interests of politicians rather than of the farmers, which eventually left them in a semi-comatose state.

Are the farmers in the francophone countries better off then, because of the continuity provided by French-dominated parastatals? That remains to be seen. Several of our authors, some of them looking back with critical pride at a life-long career in cotton, express grave concern about the sector. Erstwhile successful parastatals, after having been drained of their resources by the politicians and further weakened by low cotton prices, are being dismantled in favor of yet hardly existing private enterprise, as stipulated by the same World Bank. It is hard to predict where this will take the sector in the next ten years and what structures will emerge in replacement of the moribund parastatals.

**The Forest Zone and its Unfulfilled Promises**

Around 1960 West African cocoa was booming and Ghana became independent with an impressive current account surplus thanks to its cocoa exports. Successes like this suggested to Dumont that progress in the forest zone would be easier than in the savannah, because of very well adapted perennial crops such as cocoa, oil palm, rubber, and bananas. He hoped that tree crops would become the engines of development in the forest zone, with the savannah supplying the food for the industrializing urban centers. It did not happen. Cocoa is still a major cash crop in the West African "cocoa belt," in particular in Ivory Coast and

Ghana, but it has declined in Cameroo,nand especially in Nigeria, once the region's largest producer, to a pitiful level of yield and production volume. And even in Ivory Coast and Ghana it is far from the "disciplined" sector envisaged by Dumont, because of the absence of strong, uncorrupted, producer-oriented support organizations. Contrary to Dumont's expectations, coffee has continued to do fairly well as a smallholder crop in the highlands across the African continent, even without dedicated support structures or producer organizations, but other perennials (rubber, oil palm, sugar cane, bananas). have essentially remained plantation crops (oil palm is also an important smallholder crop in West Africa, with an elaborate village processing "industry," but it plays only a minor role in the palm oil trade). So, the promise of the forest zone has only been partly fulfilled, to say the least; and not for lack of potential.

Traditionally, bilateral aid has had little interest in export crops, for one thing because there were few experts around who could have staffed development projects dealing with commercial tree crops, and perhaps also because of some anti-capitalist tendencies in development circles. Contrary to cotton, there were no strong organizations with activities extending all the way from the production sites to the European trade and processing industry in support of these crops. It is telling that perennial crops are rarely mentioned by the veterans for their development potential. Some of them instead mention a recent shift away from industrial crops to food crops, because under the circumstances the latter are more profitable. Cassava for example has become a major traded commodity in Nigeria, with a fairly efficient indigenous processing industry developed around it, and good potential for further development.

**Production Systems, Production Technology, and Processing**

There has been a steady flow of new varieties of the major (arable) crops coming out of international and to a lesser extent national research institutes, and the adoption of several of them are counted among the scarce successes by many of our authors. Otherwise, the take-up of new production technology (fertilizer, pest control, animal traction) has largely been limited to cotton and (intensive) maize-based systems. The highly regimented cotton schemes in some francophone countries also stand out because of the diversified farming systems, which have evolved around them, including (beef) cattle, grain-legumes, and various crops besides cotton and maize.

In the early sixties, Dumont was lyrical about potential new crops for the savannah like Jatropha (an industrial oil producing crop of the Euphorbiaceae family, supposedly suitable for marginal soils) fodder species, and jute-like fiber crops. He also had high hopes for a host of new technology which was already available or being elaborated and which would be needed for peasants to become efficient middle-class farmers. In fact, he predicted an agricultural revolution, which eventually did happen, in Asia that is, but not in Africa, unless you want to see the advances of intensive maize production (in systems with or without cotton). in the West African savannah as a mini-revolution.

It is amazing how much of the Dumont's 1960s technological wish list is repeated by our authors fifty years on: "integrated" management of the fragile soil resources; abolition, replacement or improvement of the fallow; integration of crop growing and livestock, light mechanization, efficient use of scarce water; and introduction of new crops. Jatropha also features in both lists, which may be an example of what Richard Lowe (see Appendix) said about failed development approaches: "if their logic is appealing, [they] tend to be repeated

after 25 years." It is not as if no innovation had been happening, though. It has, for instance in some cotton growing areas as already mentioned, and in intensive and innovative small scale vegetable gardens and poultry farms that have sprung up around and within several urban areas for decades, albeit largely unaided. The concern is about the traditional smallholder "subsistence" sector where innovation has not occurred at the scale and the rate we would like to see. The bulk of aid has gone to that sector, which is lacking in dynamism and has progressed but little and in many cases not at all. Finding out why that is so and why so little of the shopping lists of agricultural development has materialized was one of our motivations to solicit the views of forty veterans on the matter.

A remarkable favorable development has been the emergence of small and medium scale agricultural processing, mostly autonomous and unburdened by development aid, as observed by several authors and fully in line with Dumont's recommendations. In part they evolved from traditional village processing, like gari production in Nigeria and oil extraction from a range of crops in several countries. Others have risen from the ashes of large state-run enterprises (tomato paste and fruit juice factories, rice mills, cashew processing plants, and many others), which collapsed due to illusory expectations or mismanagement, and usually both. The urban demand for convenience food is stimulating the development of small production units for dry "instant" foodstuffs derived from local products (cassava, sorghum and millet flours, dried fruits and nuts, etc.). However, the traditional export crops coffee, cocoa, timber, cotton, and more recently mangoes continue to be exported in unprocessed form, just as they were in Dumont's days, to his annoyance.

## What Future for Family Farming?

Generally, the veterans hardly venture into speculation about what the future will have in store, as Dumont would probably have done, but they do point out some elements that a viable smallholder agriculture would need. Many are disappointed about the lack of progress and the poor adoption of innovations, while at the same time realizing that wide-spread innovation is unlikely unless profound changes take place in the farming "environment" first: appropriate land laws, strong farmer organizations, quality agricultural education, effective linkages along the entire production chains and a profound change in mentality. Again, it is a list that is remarkably similar to Dumont's.

### *The Land Rights Dilemma*

The importance of the land rights issue has recently come to a head with the appearance on scene of the "land grabbers," while a reform of land ownership laws, now more urgently needed than ever, has kept receding. Dumont stressed that land laws should ensure that farmers begin to see investment in the land as a profitable option and feel confident that the land will not revert back to the common pool after a few years, as was the case in most traditional societies, especially in the savannah. He is very critical, however, about undiluted private ownership, based on what he calls "Roman" land laws, because it would involve the owner's practically unlimited *jus utendi et abutendi,* that is the right to use or abuse the land. The argument of its advocates, which include a minority among our authors, is that full ownership will allow farmers to "convert a rock into a garden," as Dumont quoted from the 1793 tract *The Example of France a Warning to England* by Arthur Young, the influential English writer on agriculture, economics, and social statistics. The full quotation is: "Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock, and he will turn it into a garden; give him a nine

years' lease of a garden, and he will convert it into a desert." While it is true that no farmer, whether in Africa or elsewhere, will invest in genuine land improvement unless he is convinced that the gains will not be taken away from him or his children, things are not so straightforward in Africa.

Dumont saw two dangers facing agricultural land use in Africa, which turned out to be only too real by 2012. The first, already apparent in the sixties and more so today, is over-exploitation of the land in many areas, by smallholder farmers who do not invest in land improvement and fail to transform into efficient market producers. In fact, the common attitude of farmers in many areas is still one of exploiting natural fertility and leaving its restoration to nature. This will not change easily, even with better land laws.

The second danger is appropriation and abuse of land by powerful parties which may result from full liberalization. This started to happen as early as the sixties, subsided for a few decades and recently has again picked up serious momentum. Under the easily corruptible circumstances found in many African countries the people who will gain most from freely tradable land rights may be powerful parties intent on appropriating large tracts of land for productive or speculative purposes. The stagnation of smallholder farming may even be serving as an argument in favor of land acquisition by indigenous and foreign investors as the road to modernization.

### Farmer Organization

The cooperative movement in Africa of the early post-independence period quickly lost its credibility as it degenerated into a tool for governments to control and extract wealth from the rural populace. Dumont's high expectations of the catalytic role of the state in the early stages of Africa's agricultural development has turned out to be an illusion.

In spite of the tarnished image of the cooperative concept, many of the authors have come to the conclusion that without strong self-governed farmer organizations significant progress will not be possible. Weak governments have turned out to be incapable to provide essential services such as input supply, meaningful extension, credit, vocational training, etc., in spite of massive external aid with which many veterans have been associated. Farmer organizations are now looked to as potential future providers or contractors of farm services, as well as powerhouses to advocate for farmers' rights and interests, much like they did in Europe in the twentieth century. Although many farmer organizations have emerged in recent times, most of them have very limited capabilities, but hopes are for them to rise to the challenge of playing such roles as the state withdraws from service provision.

The relative success of semi-commercial farming in the "disciplined" environment created by parastatals around cotton and other crops testifies to the potential for progress of the African family farm. It is to be expected that effective farmer organizations will also have the best chance when associated with marketable commodities such as cotton, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, fruit crops, dairy, vegetables and cut flowers (for the European market), etc., much like their counterparts in Europe. Broad, general purpose cooperatives are unlikely to be viable in the near future.

One essential ingredient needed for a successful farmer organization movement will be education. Since strong farmer organizations need well-educated farmers (or at least farmer leaders), good primary and vocational schooling is a crucial requirement. Several of the veterans make a strong plea for good vocational education, whereas surprisingly few of them have been actually involved in such education.

*Education, Training, and Extension*

A large part of the agricultural development effort of the last 50 years can be labeled as capacity building: training and coaching of farmers, extension workers, ministry staff, and more recently NGO staff, traders, and would-be entrepreneurs. Much of that has been done through large state-run dinosaurs, in which massive amounts of aid money were idly invested, and which have since collapsed or are on the verge of collapse. The exception are the strong organizations around successful crops like cotton mentioned earlier, with extension embedded in a "disciplined" environment, as Dumont called it. These paratstatals are now also in danger of disintegration with national governments and donors distancing themselves from the kind of "services" they used to provide.

In spite of the overall dismal record of state-run capacity building, many of the authors remain strong believers in the power of education and good vocational training. Successful entrepreneurship requires a literate, numerate, hardworking, and honest workforce. Effective farmer organizations need young well-educated leaders, and future extension personnel must be oriented to the realities of the existing, not an imaginary, farm and taught respect for local farmers.

Several authors also argue that agricultural training institutions should associate themselves with research and extension to form an integrated training/extension/research system in order to mend the present weak linkages among the three, improve the often very poor knowledge of extension personnel, and reorient the entire research, extension and education system to address the real development challenges.

This is all easier said than done. The traditional state-run extension services are a lost cause, vocational training has degenerated into a theoretical textbook affair (usually without the textbook), and research pursues academic rather than development targets. And, with the bankruptcy of Training and Visit Extension (T&V) and the decline of Farming Systems Research (FSR) the links between the three have again been broken. A thorough shake-up and new thinking at all levels will therefore be needed.

*Chain Development*

"Chain development," a relatively new basket term in development speak, is rarely used by the veterans.  They still use the old sub-categories, subsumed under chain development: input supply, credit, processing, quality control, marketing, etc. But the term is indeed useful as shorthand for the idea that one cannot stop at one element of the production chain in isolation if progress is to be made. Many of the veterans are of course keenly aware of this, as was Dumont, but few can claim to have successfully used an integrated production chain approach. What conditions need to be satisfied for chain development to stand a chance of success? It is clear that the best chances are for programs set up around a major commercial commodity, with a strong "disciplined" and non-corrupted organization and a reliable mechanism to recover credit and costs, as testified by the few success stories: cotton and irrigated rice and vegetables in Mali, small scale dairy farming in several countries, and perhaps vegetable production under contract for the international market, where the contractor intervenes in (or controls) all stages of the production, conservation, transport and marketing process (and perhaps smallholder coffee in Eastern Africa, although none of the authors mention this).

Smallholder commodities which could benefit from the approach are, for example, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, and export fruit, but also cassava for industrial flour production as

some of the authors describe. Nor does the organization necessarily have to be a parastatal or a foreign company. The cocoa and cotton Marketing Boards set up as semi-autonomous bodies after the war in most anglophone countries played that role effectively, until politicians pillaged them. Well-organized farmer organizations or cooperatives around specific commodities could in the future play that role, but hardly any are in sight yet which possess the necessary capacities.

### *Societal Values and Governance*

At a higher level of abstraction, agriculture as much as with any other productive activity can only flourish in an environment where all actors play their roles more or less effectively and with dedication, not just to their own personal interest, but also to their organization's goals, or those of their societies at large. In the final accounting, as some of our authors argue, real development needs good governance, eradication of state corruption and reliance on local initiative and leadership and on people's own dynamism. This requires strengthening of moral and civil values, which René Dumont and several of the veterans have variously called dedication, entrepreneurial drive, perseverance, work ethics, political will, and assertiveness of local farmers and their leaders. These are more important than external assistance and can only be brought about by a new breed of African leaders at all levels.

Dumont was particularly exasperated by the decline in moral values, the increase in alcoholism in the coastal states, and the corruption and selfishness of politicians and civil servants at all levels so early after independence. Many of the veterans point to the same problems, but less forcefully than did Dumont. One wonders to what extent that is due to their perception of actual improvement, false hope, or politeness and political correctness. The former can hardly be the case, since the scale of corruption and other abuses now exceeds the value of all development funds taken together many times.

### Has Aid Helped?

Many of the authors are extremely critical of bilateral and international aid, the fickleness of aid policies, and the frequent incompetence of aid administrations and personnel. They also point out that donors vainly tend to counter the corrupt practices of often dictatorial regimes by complex bureaucratic control mechanisms. Apart from this, many interventions in agriculture are considered failures for a range of other reasons and the relatively small successes as not commensurate with the sums spent. It is sobering to look at the list of complaints:

- unrealistic timeframes, with the time estimated by politicians almost always being far shorter than what field workers consider feasible
- development trends and fashions reflecting the donors' home politics rather than the interests of the aid country that disrupt momentum in the field
- short memories (or no memory at all) leading to a replay of the same mistakes
- lack of continuity, with each administrator wanting to plant his own flag rather than strengthen existing projects
- rigidity and therefore poor adaptation to changing conditions

- poor judgment and inability to distinguish the good from the poorly performing projects
- loss of donor interest in agriculture around 2000 and sudden discontinuation of projects
- unilateralism of donor policies, and absence of a real development debate and policy formulation in the recipient countries
- lack of professionalism of donor personnel and field staff
- poor donor coordination
- prejudiced or ill-informed attitudes towards farmers and failure to involve them in policy debate on matters that affect them
- favoring cronies, who know how to manipulate donors

There are also concerns that aid has perpetuated the "dependency" syndrome; interfered with the development of national capacities by enticing the best people to come and work for them; hindered market and enterprise development, private initiatives, and farmer organization; and allowed local elites to dodge their responsibilities.

In spite of all this, only a minority reject the idea of aid entirely, while a surprising number still see a potential role, although there is no clear consensus about the fields where aid would be most needed. The ideas range widely, from functional and integrated research, extension, training and agricultural education, through rural infrastructure, including irrigation works, dams, and reservoirs, to affordable credit for farmers and agricultural entrepreneurs. If aid is provided there should be real long-term commitment (fifteen to twenty years or even longer is mentioned)., agreed between well-coordinated donors and local institutions, with budgets allocated for the whole life span of the collaboration, funds spent flexibly at the right time, and knowledgeable staff kept on the job for many years, while avoiding the pitfalls of the past.

Two recent trends in international aid are worth mentioning, the first one unfavorable in our opinion, while the second potentially favorable. The former is the choice which bilateral donors are increasingly making for international aid delivery channels such as the World Bank. This seems to be motivated more by convenience than by the proven competence of international organizations. In fact, their record has been even more dismal than that of bilateral donors. A (potentially) more favorable trend is the growing aid flow through NGOs, western farmer unions, charities, immigrants (the African diaspora) and western private citizens and some of the direct investments made by commercial parties. Such "community-to-community" flow may eventually help build more equal relations, because it involves a *rapprochement* between cultures. It is, however, also not free of the paternalism and cultural arrogance that has characterized conventional aid.

## Conclusion

Sixty years ago African agriculture had two faces. One was essentially that of peasant or subsistence farming, which in some cases included commercial crops like cocoa or coffee in the wet zones and groundnuts and cotton in the drier zones. The other sector was highly successful European plantation agriculture, with oil palm, rubber, tea, and sugarcane. The hopes which most of us shared with Dumont were for the subsistence sector to evolve towards middle class commercialized and semi-mechanized farming, which would ensure Africa's food supply, while gradually taking over the cash crop sectors as well. The stories told by many of the veterans are an illustration of the failure of development aid to help this

come about. It is obvious that the failure cannot really be explained from technological shortcomings. As Felix Nweke remarked, sweepingly, in his contribution: "The question why African agriculture remains undeveloped . . . is part of a bigger question namely why is Africa undeveloped . . . " He and many other contributors preferred not to deal with this bigger question but rather with the phenomenology of the underdevelopment of agriculture. This of course does not make the bigger question go away, but elaborating on it exceeds the boundaries which most contributors have set for themselves.

In the current euphoria about what is seen as Africa's final take-off, especially among economists, the continuing dismal state of Africa's agriculture is usually ignored, and so is the almost complete absence of non-extractive industrial development. It is beyond the scope of this paper and the skills of its authors to analyze this situation adequately, but we do wish to make a few cautionary remarks on the matter, which reflect the concerns of several of the veteran authors. The first is that without solid industrial development the current and future outflow of people from the rural areas cannot be absorbed and will lead to further swelling of the ranks of unemployed urban youths, with all its concomitant dangers. The second is that the new national and international actors who are after Africa's (mineral) riches will also want to penetrate the agricultural sectors and try to industrialize agriculture on a large scale. The industrial exploitation of mineral resources may not be much affected by the physical conditions in Africa (it is by societal conditions, though, see for example the French concern about the safety of West African uranium mining). But attempts at the transformation of farming into large-scale production have left a legacy of costly failures that are financial, ecological, and social. It is clear that African family-based agriculture has not been and will not be developed through a succession of fads, fashions, and miraculous innovations. Nor will rapid industrial development of agriculture be the panacea in which many politicians seem to put their hopes.

What stands out in many of the veterans' views is the conviction that the development of African agriculture will have to pass through the emergence of suitably commercialized small and medium scale family farming rather than a quantum jump into big industrialized farms. Bringing about a balanced development based on dynamic family farms requires the vision, self-criticism, and skills on the part of Africa's own leadership, which have been severely lacking. The picture is not entirely bleak, though. There are examples of successful development, in particular in the wetter parts of the savannah. The forest zone has clearly lagged behind, contrary to Dumont's expectation that development would be easier there because of the potential for smallholder tree crops like cocoa, rubber and oil palm. In fact these crops have been shamefully neglected, a situation that calls for vigorous catch-up programs.

Strong farmer organizations, considered essential by many, stand the best chances when built around marketable crops, as exemplified by cotton. They should also play a key role in "product chain development" and extension. Quality vocational training, oriented towards the real, instead of an imaginary "modern" farm, has too long been neglected by governments and donors alike. It will be an essential ingredient for future development.

Several authors are hopeful that modern communication technology will bring a new dynamism to agriculture. It may, however, also discourage the younger generation, when they compare their conditions with those in the outside world, and reinforce their drive to escape. This will be unstoppable unless really significant improvement is made in economic and living conditions in the rural areas, which can only come about if African leaders start to

take a genuine interest in the advancement of their communities, rather than just pursuing their own narrow interests.

Perhaps René Dumont would turn in his grave if he found out what little has been achieved. Should we perhaps admit that he may have to rest for another fifty years before Africa and its agriculture really take off?

## References

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## APPENDIX

### Quotations from the Veterans' Essays

The following are quotations are from the contributions to a collection of essays by forty authors on which the present paper is based (Mutsaers and Kleene, 2012). The page numbers given with the authors' names refer to this collection.

"What has happened now that we should sit back and expect our District Officer to create [the things we need] for us by magic?" (Godfrey Allen on Community Development, quoting a local leader, p. 39).

"Eventually private agricultural R&D will come to play a strong role in SSA but meantime countries must rely primarily on public agencies" (Jock Anderson, p. 318).

"Instead of using the money from oil exports to purchase weapons or having it disappear due to corruption, a significant portion should go to agricultural and social development, thus preventing its misuse" (Facho Balaam, p. 265).

"How can we explain [those disastrous results], in spite of the billions of CFA francs spent, of all the economic theories tried out, of the countless development projects undertaken?" (Hervé Bichat, p. 98).

"Considerable amounts of development money end up in tax havens, due to illicit manipulation and common accounting practices used in the world of large companies" (René Billaz, 324).

"Market opportunities should have predominance over supply factors" (Dirk Bol, p. 73).

"African farming would have been better off without the aid monies and endless waves of foreign experts persistently identifying the wrong causes for their problems" (Peter Bolt, p. 207).

"Too little attention was paid to indigenous learning systems based on farmer to farmer exchange of experience and experiments" (Alain Bonnassieux, p. 290).

"Agricultural development should not focus on the poorest of the poor, one does not win the war with disabled troops" (Henk Breman, p. 185).

"Agriculture is not only the business of farmers and agronomists!" (Dominique de la Croix, p. 245).

"I think the real question is: why have achievements been erased so quickly, why there is this socio-economic stagnation, even worse, this decline?" (Jean-Pierre Derlon, p. 247).

"Let other organisations do what they are good at" (Peter van Doren, p. 220).

"I have seen many smallholders individually or collectively making the most of the resources and opportunities in their environment" (Adri van den Dries, p.227).

"With the steeply rising cost of chemical inputs in recent years, increasing the farmers' access to organic manure is an issue of paramount importance" (Marc Dufumier, p. 112).

"A real change in mentality takes a couple of generations" (Harry Franssen, p. 179).

"Africa is littered with failed model farms" (David Gibbon, p. 303).

"[Due to factors external to the farm] agricultural extension professionals, in spite of their closeness to researchers and technicians, have rarely succeeded in their own personal projects of intensification of livestock production" (Hubert Guerin, p. 271).

"Summarizing African agriculture as stagnant and backward is encouraging the alienation of large stretches of African land to foreign owners, under the rubric of 'foreign investment'" (Jane Guyer, p. 189).

"We have been slow to realise that development is far more complex and insensitive to our methods of technical and socio-economic engineering" (Paul Kleene, p. 204).

"Regarding the extension approach, we must recognize that a farm has to be considered as a whole" (Youba Koné, p. 257).

"The notion of sustainability of "mixed systems" combining livestock and crop production continues to be at the forefront today and my interest in this area is unabated" (Philippe Lhoste, p. 283).

"Failed development approaches such as the farm settlements remain un-publicised (nobody wants to publicise their mistakes), and, if their logic is appealing, tend to be repeated after 25 years" (Richard Lowe, from an e-mail commenting on farm settlements in Nigeria).

"Farmer organisations in Tanzania should be encouraged to emerge with little state interventions" (Sizya Lugeye, p. 137).

"Donor assistance has perpetuated the dependency syndrome" (Dejene Makkonen, p. 151).

"Small farmers are nearly always competitive when given equal access to resources and markets" (Peter Matlon, p. 122).

"The traditional subsistence agriculture that is widespread in much of sub-Saharan Africa cannot feed present, let alone future, generations" (Fred Muchena, p. 84).

"Cultural change can only be brought about by local people and their leaders, who find gratification in the progress of their own communities" (Henk Mutsaers, p. 94).

"Export of honey from Africa is being promoted among honey packers, driven by the ambition to join the world market, while there is a shortage of honey in Africa itself" (Marieke Mutsaers, p. 280).

"Large-scale agriculture may increase agricultural production but it will not contribute greatly to development" (David Norman, p. 145).

"The question why African agriculture remains undeveloped [...] is part of a bigger question why is Africa undeveloped" (Felix Nweke, p. 152).

"High and increasing rates of rural to urban migration with farming being left to aging men and women is an increasing problem in agricultural development" (Bede Okigbo, p. 297).

"The introduction and the widespread use of animal traction have increased cultivated area, yields, and incomes" (Amadou Sow and Abdoulaye Traoré, p. 233).

"There will everywhere be changes in African agriculture, but often not in the form or the speed that Western aid workers would have planned for" (Willem Stoop, p. 333).

"I have not been 'fabricated' by any NGO or organisation, so they cannot lecture me or force me to say what they want" (François Traoré, p. 161).

"Many projects are based on solutions looking for problems—not the other way around" (Brian Van Arkadie, p. 67).

"One simple question which was not addressed was why the land chosen was uncultivated –evidently African farmers knew something the scheme planners didn't" (Brian Van Arkadie on the Tanganyika Groundnuts Scheme, p. 48).

"I would propose to spend at least 2% of any project budget for cultural purposes" (Jos Verdurmen, p. 107).

"It was a serious mistake to deploy so much scarce manpower in extension, instead of allocating most resources to training rural youth" (Ed Verheij, p. 310).

"For me, agricultural development only starts once farmers have means of transportation, which often coincides with some cattle ownership" (Frits Wegerif, p. 170).

"Farmers should consider the 'land factor' as of crucial importance: land is valuable and scarce" (Jan de Wolff, p. 197).

"Only where work ethics plays a preponderant role will knowledge, practice, supporting services and even co-operations bloom" (Dirk Zoebl, p. 79).

# REVIEW ESSAY

# The "White House" of Judaism: Under Renovation, New Hues May Apply

## WILLIAM F.S. MILES

**Edith Bruder and Tudor Parfitt, eds. 2012.** *African Zion: Studies in Black Judaism.* **Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 368 pp.**

**Tudor Parfitt. 2013.** *Black Jews in Africa and the Americas.* **Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University. 238 pp.**

There is an ancient ivory manor, sturdy in structure but with some weather-beaten façades. It is occupied by several branches of a venerable family who get along fitfully but co-exist nevertheless. But now new folk are clamoring at the gates for entry. They claim that the property belongs to them, too. They also say that the walls are in need of repair, and they are prepared to undertake the renovations. Some of them are clutching newly printed deeds; others say they are previous occupants, about whom the current dwellers have either forgotten or pretend to have forgotten. The befuddled gatekeepers of the house need to decide whom of these claimants, if any, to admit.

Such is the parable of the "white house" of Judaism, whose fractious residents (ranging from Ultraorthodox to Secular Humanist residents) have overwhelmingly, if unconsciously, shared one epidermal trait: whether Ashkenazi, Sephardi, or Mizrachi, they are on the pallid side of the pigmentation spectrum. Increasingly, however, tenancy rights to the ancestral Jewish abode are being claimed by new Jews of color. As for the gatekeepers who by convention choose who gets into the "house of Judaism": please read on.

Each of the two books under review constitutes an essential contribution to two complementary streams of scholarship that previously have been advanced with relatively little overlap: the one on established and emerging Jewish communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, the other on Black American Jews, Hebrews, and Israelites. Constituted from different types of building blocks—the 2012 book is an edited collection of papers, the 2013 one a compilation from a lecture series—together the two books significantly advance and reinforce the budding literature on the growing importance of Judaism among various African peoples and within a small but noteworthy segment of the African-American diaspora. This synergy is not surprising, given the collaboration of both books' authors on *African Zion* and the integration of their previous findings in *Black Jews in Africa and the Americas*. Cumulatively, Bruder's and Parfitt's scholarship is particularly important for African studies and religious studies, both of which appear slow to acknowledge African Judaism. Case in point: a supposedly comprehensive overview on "Religion in Africa in the

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Past Fifty Years" at the 2012 Roundtable at the Centre of African Studies conference at the University of Edinburgh made no mention whatsoever of any Jewish phenomenon on the continent. When I tried in the Q & A to elicit some such acknowledgment or discussion, the effort was met with as much enthusiasm as a plate of pork chops served up on Yom Kippur.

The major aim of *African Zion* is two-fold: to provide an historical (two-century) overview of the evolving representation, conceptualization, and reconfiguration of black Jews in both Africa and the United States, and to explicate how a distinct black Jewish identity has emerged out of Africans' and Europeans' understanding of Judaism and Jewishness in the African and African diaspora contexts. To do this, editors Bruder and Parfitt provide a three-part structure for the wide-ranging essays of their book. Part I, after Tudor Parfitt's presentation of the "(de)construction" of black Jews (evolving perceptions of African Jewish identities from the peak of the African slave trade in about 1800 to the genetic testing of the Lemba in the mid-1990s), focuses on West Africa: three chapters on Nigerian Igbos who have adopted Judaism or have otherwise identified with the Jewish state of Israel, and one on an even newer community of African Jews in Ghana. Part II is the most wide-ranging section of the book. Here we read of Nahum Slouschez's early twentieth-century attempts to retrospectively create a trans-African Jewish proto-empire in antiquity, and equally creative (albeit more scholarly-based) arguments for an Israelite tradition of origin for the otherwise emphatically non-Hebraic (not to mention non-Zionist) cradle of the Hausa people of northern Nigeria and Niger Republic. (Given the virulently violent nature of the Hausa-dominated Boko Haram movement, in league with Al-Qaeda and currently wreaking havoc in Nigeria, the putative Israelite Hausa myth of origin is bitterly ironic if not outright provocative.) This middle section of *African Zion* also contains chapters on Judaic scriptural, liturgical and cultural practices among the Beta Israel of Ethiopia and the Lemba of Zimbabwe and South Africa. The final section of *African Zion* presents the most challenges for actual Africanists, at least as narrowly defined. Here we shift hybridic gears to delve into the otherwise fascinating communities of Jewish, Israelite, and Hebrew-identifying descendants of African slaves (each with its own nuances) from New York City to Dimona in the Negev Desert (with a welcome stopover in the Caribbean, courtesy of Marla Brettschneider, for post-colonial and diaspora studies novelist Jamaica Kincaid.) The concluding chapter focuses on "black" Jews who have no genealogic connection to Africa at all: Dalits ("untouchables") in Andhra Pradesh, India.

If, by the very nature of an edited collection, the constituent parts of *African Zion* vary by tone, length and quality, *Black Jews in Africa and the Americas* is uniformly exemplary in its evenness of form and excellence in substance. Originally conceived as a series of presentations at Harvard University (the 2011Nathan I. Huggins Lectures), the book recapitulates Tudor Parfitt's more than two decades of investigations, from the 1984 exodus of the "Falashas" via Sudan to genetic testing of the Lembas in the mid-1990s, into Jews in sub-Saharan Africa and the African diaspora in the U.S. and West Indies. (Parfitt is Emeritus Professor of Modern Jewish Studies at the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies [SOAS]. Edith Bruder, who under Prof. Parfitt's supervision wrote her dissertation [later published as *Black Jews of Africa* and reviewed in this journal in volume 11:2-3] is Research Associate at SOAS.) Parfitt's deep historical and theological knowledge affords a contextualized understanding of the sensitive topic of race in Judaism, beginning with post-Biblical interpretations (Christian as well as Jewish) of the story of Ham, the son of Noah who was (somewhat inexplicably) punished by having his descendants (later identified as African) "cursed" with black skin. By the nineteenth century, proto-

anthropology had transformed this myth into the pseudo-scientific Hamitic hypothesis, according to which the more "evolved" of African tribes were of Hebrew/Israelite origin. From there, it was a short theo-historical hop to discovering Lost Tribes of Israel in the most unexpected corners of Saharan, Sahelian, and Sudanic Africa. Parfitt's eminently readable exposition is as much about the internalization by (some) Africans of this belief in Jewish origins as it is about the projection of the construct by (mostly) European missionaries and early ethnologists. In the context of descendants of black Africans in the New World, appropriation of Chosen People and Zionistic paradigms vied with Hamitic internalizations to give rise to self-identifying Black Jewish, Israelite, and Hebrew communities and synagogues in America. What remains inexplicable is why the common nineteenth-century "knowledge" (or expectation) of ancient Israelite descendants across the African continent should have been lost, subject to recovery today as a "new" and "surprising" phenomenon. Parfitt gamely moves in his book from colonial Africa to contemporary Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe where (some) Sefwi, Igbo,, and Lemba emphatically claim Jewish ancestry. Why are these communities so energetic today? Given what Parfitt has documented about real and imagined African Israelites from time immemorial, why do students of Africa, Jewish and not, learn of them today with *de novo* surprise?

We are living in an era in which the color of Catholicism has been turning steadily darker. In Europe, for example, priests are increasingly being recruited from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Evangelical Protestantism is also expanding mightily in these regions. Is the darkening complexion of Western Christianity a precursor to the future of Judaism? The two books under review do not raise the question directly, but do provide incontrovertible elements to engage it. At the very least, the growing phenomena of black African Jews and Jews of African descent ought to be considered through comparative religious studies lens as NRMs (New Religious Movements).

To return to the parable of the "house of Judaism": traditionally, the gatekeepers—the deciders of admission to Jewry and Judaism—have been the rabbis. Yet of all the diverse perspectives honored through publication in these otherwise inclusive treatments of Jewish identity, it is the *rabbinic* voice which is most conspicuous in its absence. It is as if the authors and editors posed the question "Is Judaism too important to leave to rabbis?" and provocatively (if not problematically) answered in the affirmative.

Not that there will ever be inter-denominational rabbinic consensus on the contentious question "Who is a Jew?" One conundrum that these books brings to mind is that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to practice Judaism in order for the Chief Rabbinate of Israel—the single most influential rabbinic authority that does exist—to consider somebody as Jewish. A vociferously anti-rabbinic overt American atheist is still considered a Jew if her mother was Jewish; a Judaism-devout African who regularly prays, in Hebrew, in a *minyan* (Jewish prayer quorum) would not be considered a Jew by that same Rabbinate, absent maternal lineage or formal conversion. For sure, different rabbis of different denominations will apply different standards and come to different conclusions. Still, the unmediated voice of Judaism's longstanding "gatekeepers" is relevant, even if disagreement among them about "Black Jews" and "Black Judaism" is inevitable. May future treatments of these emerging African and African diasporic communities provide room for rabbinic voices as well.

In the meantime, *African Zion* and *Black Jews in Africa and the Americas* represent significant additions both to the longstanding fields of African studies, Jewish studies, and religious studies, as well as to the budding one of diaspora studies.

# BOOK REVIEWS

**Akin Adesokan. 2011. *Postcolonial Artists and Global Aesthetics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. xix, 230 pp.**

In *Postcolonial Artists and Global Aesthetics*, Akin Adesokan considers how the processes of globalization and decolonization have shaped the careers of six postcolonial  "artist–intellectuals" (p. xii): C. L. R. James, Caryl Phillips, and Arundhati Roy, known primarily as writers; and Ousmane Sembene, Tunde Kelani, and Jean-Pierre Bekolo, known mostly for filmmaking. In the preface and introduction, Adesokan makes the case that analysis of art in any form must consider the "aesthetic typology" (p. xi) that constructs its genre but then press beyond to consider how genres are contoured by global forces. He suggests the West African marketplace as a model: the marketplace is a social space where people and ideas mingle, a crossroads where the trajectories of locals and outsiders intersect and drift apart, and a site where commerce thrives. Conceived broadly, the marketplace brings artists of all stripes into a worldwide conversation with other artists, with political actors, and with larger publics. Yet, these actors must also attend to economic considerations that color the motives of creators and patrons and to globalization's uneven spread of wealth and technologies, which shape genre expectations and force artists to make do with disparate local realities.

Each of the remaining chapters considers the work of one artist–intellectual, melding careful readings of key works into discussions of the postcolonial contexts that shaped them—and showing how each oeuvre critiques those conditions. In "Toward the Seventh: The Pan-African Congress—Past, Present and Future" (1984) and other works of writer/activist C. L. R. James, Adesokan sees a call for a broader concept of Pan-Africanism that targets not only discrimination based on race but also class and gender. In contrast, Adesokan argues that Ousmane Sembene's critique of power in the novel and film versions of *Xala* (1973 and 1975 respectively) paradoxically segregates middle-class women from the poor and thus fails to see the groups as potential allies. In chapters on Tunde Kelani and Jean-Pierre Bekolo, Adesokan shows how both filmmakers negotiate local expectations and global financial forces. While Kelani's *Thunderbolt: Magun* (2001) adheres to Nollywood genre expectations of moral didacticism, it also became the first Nigerian video film to play the international film circuit—making Kelani's career a critique of both neoliberalism's inequitable distribution of resources and of the assumption that commercial entrepreneurialism is incompatible with auteur cinema. Bekolo's *Aristotle's Plot* (1996), in contrast, presents the director in multiples: expatriate and urbanite, African filmmaker, and dependent of the European art film system that funds him. Finally, Adesokan considers the non-fiction of Caryl Phillips and Arundhati Roy. In Phillips's *The Atlantic Sound* (2000) and other works, Adesokan sees a paradox; Phillips leaves Europe for the United States, which he finds more welcoming to a minority expatriate, yet he eschews association with the African Americans whose struggles made that environment possible. Adesokan then explores how Roy's sarcasm-laden attacks on globalization in *An Ordinary Person's Guide to Empire* (2004) help her navigate her complex position within both the commercial realm of book publishing and the global network of anti-capitalist activism. As the

only artist in the book who has no direct link to the African Diaspora, Roy's inclusion also underscores another of Adesokan's calls: for a more wide-ranging Pan-Africanism à la James, one that recognizes its debts to the anti-imperialist project of tricontinentalism as well as the political work of contemporary cosmopolitan aesthetics, extending its purview to anywhere suffering from the inequalities of globalization. A short conclusion recapitulates his broader theoretical claims.

Readers interested in only some of the artist–intellectuals Adesokan treats may be tempted to read those selected chapters alone. However, to not consider the whole book is to miss the author's larger point: that no matter where they live or work, these artist–intellectuals are subject to the same forces of globalization and decolonization, forces that have shaped the very genres in which they work and made them critics of the postcolonial condition. The resulting admixture of writers with filmmakers can prove jarring at first, but Adesokan is right to point out that such segregation is an academic convenience, and juxtaposing them better conveys how postcoloniality allies these artist–intellectuals in a common struggle. Adesokan's choices also allow a comparison of the projects and genres of two generations of postcolonial artists, from James and Sembene during the transition from colonial rule, to the others, who more directly confront the neoliberal reforms of post-independence. The book's most obvious omission is any consideration of other types of artists: musicians, dancers, painters, and sculptors. But this minor oversight does not detract from Adesokan's compelling argument; instead, it calls for his approach to be extended. In sum, *Postcolonial Artists and Global Aesthetics* makes a much-needed contribution to conversations in comparative literature, film studies, and African Studies.

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**Allan Aubrey Boesak and Curtiss Paul DeYoung. 2012. *Radical Reconciliation: Beyond Political Pietism and Christian Quietism*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. x, 196 pp.**

Alan Boesak, a theologian and former leader of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, joins Curtiss DeYoung, professor at Reconciliation Studies at Bethel University in Minnesota, as co-author of *Radical Reconciliation: Beyond Political Pietism and Christian Quietism.* For Boesak and DeYoung, "reconciliation" is often equated with political expediency—some limited accommodation by the rich and powerful who accept only cosmetic changes that do not touch at the deeper issue of justice. They call this "political pietism." When Christians buy into this superficial reconciliation, or cheap grace, denying the demands of the gospel for solidarity with the powerless and oppressed, they fall prey to "Christian quietism." The eight chapters that comprise the book develop this theme, with examples from both South Africa and the United States, and a conclusion charts the path toward radical reconciliation.

The authors analyze reconciliation from a Biblical point of view, drawing from the Old Testament scriptures about the prophets, the New Testament verses about the life and ministry of Jesus, and the record of the first century Church. The Hebrew prophets were called by God to chastise the powerful who deprived the poor of justice and a dignified life. Like the prophet Isaiah, Jesus also puts the poor at the center of God's concern. For these authors, reconciliation

is inextricably linked with justice for the downtrodden.  True reconciliation requires not assimilation of the underclass with the powers that be, the lifting up of the weak, but rather the casting down of the mighty.  They argue that the first century Church understood the radical challenge of the gospel.

The story from the book of Luke about tax collector Zacchaeus is instructive.  Viewed as instruments of exploitation and collaborators with the occupying Roman Empire, tax collectors were roundly despised in Jericho where Jesus was preaching. Though rich, Zacchaeus knew he was alienated from God and his neighbors.  When he encountered the preaching of Jesus, without prompting he offered half of all his wealth to the poor, and to those he had defrauded, he promised to pay four times the amount he had taken.  Zacchaeus was willing to "give up his status" in order to "do restitution, to make right what he has done wrong, in order to restore his relationship with his neighbors" (p. 67).

The example of Zacchaeus could have been a model, Boesak argues, for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which operated in the 1990s to deal with apartheid-era crimes.  Led by Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the proceedings relied on Christian notions about forgiveness, and victims were offered the chance to forgive their oppressors as God has forgiven them.  Boesak takes issue with the fact that the TRC did not go far enough: "Why is the biblical demand for forgiveness, because it is a demand set for the victims, welcomed and praised, if not to say demanded, but the biblical demands for justice, because they are set for the beneficiaries of apartheid, are 'setting the standard too high?'  If one says 'forgiveness,' one must also say 'justice'" (p. 63).  He does not fault Tutu. He says that white South Africans "hear only 'forgiveness,' [but] Tutu speaks of conversion, repentance, and change" (p. 136).

Inversion of status is a theme taken up by DeYoung in his chapter on American churches. Contrasting the first century church with the twenty-first century churches in the United States, he finds the latter lacking.  The strategy of the apostle Paul was to set up Jewish communities, an oppressed minority within the Empire, who then invited Romans and Greeks, members of the dominant culture, to join them as co-worshipers in Christ.  When the privileged Romans and Greeks joined these congregations, they became identified with a socially stigmatized group.  Since Jews were in leadership, status inversion invariably took place, and the result of reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles was both healing and redemptive.  (DeYoung notes also that status inversion occurred for men, as women took positions of leadership, challenging sexism and furthering reconciliation.)

In the twenty-first century American churches, a very different model prevails. Congregations are defined by race and ethnicity: "Rather than transforming society through a process of reconciliation, congregations have overwhelmingly conformed to a racialized, patriarchical, and class-based society" (p. 85).  DeYoung laments that the church reflects a "white, male, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual, exclusive viewpoint.  Too many congregations are fashioned on a model of privilege, exclusion, and prosperity" (p. 86).   Even multicultural churches that are committed to reconciliation "find their vision and ministry shaped by a dominant culture perspective" (p. 86).  Whereas the first century churches aimed, first, to make the oppressed communities comfortable, the exact opposite takes place in the twenty-first century churches which aim to make whites comfortable in attending. Black

members are asked to participate in a process of assimilation, not reconciliation, and certainly not the inversion of status we saw in the early church.

This book is well written and accessible to the general reader. Despite being the work of two writers, it flows seamlessly from one chapter to another. It would be of particular interest to theology students and scholars of transitional justice.

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**Sakhela Buhlungu. 2010. *A Paradox of Victory: COSATU and the Democratic Transformation in South Africa*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. xii, 210 pp.**

Trade unions have actively participated as social movements in processes of regime change throughout the continent of Africa, which have, in some cases, resulted in more democratic societies (Kraus 2007). However, because of the dual transitions of political and economic liberalization that became common in transitioning states, trade unions have increasingly been faced with what Buhlungu calls "a paradox of victory," whereby the new institutional framework that trade unions create through popular mobilization in a transitioning state latterly serves to weaken them and often results in fractured and dissolved unions. This phenomenon has occurred in many late developing states, and Buhlungu argues that the factors observed in his study can be applied to a range of states across Africa.

In order to explore this issue, Buhlungu examines the case of COSATU, the largest trade union in South Africa. COSATU's involvement in the democratic transition has been widely documented (Adler and Webster 2000), and Buhlungu focuses on the factors that contributed to the formidable nature of trade unions in this period, and the factors that led to its decline since the formation of a democratic state in South Africa. In this sense, a tale of two unions is forged, a successful union and a union in decline. In the first part of the book, a positive depiction of the manner in which trade unions became strong and contributed to the decline of the apartheid state is portrayed. From chapter four however a grim picture of the state of unions is depicted, as he illustrates the impact of the double transition of political and economic liberalization on South Africa's organized workers. Chapters five, six and seven give a damning indictment of the manner in which COSATU has developed since the transition through an examination of its rank and file membership as well as the changing composition of its leadership in the context of a global economic paradigm. Buhlungu argues that COSATU's organizational culture has shifted from one based on worker solidarity to individualism that fails to take broader workers' goals into account. This changed composition is argued to have damaged COSATU's base, leaving it either unwilling or unable to engage with other types of workers, as well as with the state and employers, a feature that he argues is to the union's detriment. Chapter eight consolidates the argument and contends that COSATU has become a victim of its own success in the post apartheid era with fault lines appearing across the federation.

The strength of the book lies in the rich empirical data throughout, which is broken into thematic areas that explore the development and demise of COSATU including global economic restructuring, generational change of membership, leadership, and race. As a sociological analysis it offers insights into the new institutional framework of COSATU in the post-

transitional society that might be difficult through other disciplines as it attempts to pull these diverse themes together in order to paint a coherent picture of the paradoxical nature of trade union power. The book sets out to explore the political nature of trade union organization "whose implications go well beyond the workplace and the economic sphere" and is "interested in explaining why these unions maintain a keen interest in [the] politics…of liberation and development" (p.1). Although we get an answer to this in the initial part of the book where the author explores COSATUs contribution to South Africa's transition to democracy, this question is not interrogated to a great extent throughout the second part of the book, which focuses more on the factors that contributed to the decline of unions. In chapter one Buhlungu seeks to locate COSATU within the broader sphere of trade union organization in Africa in order to show that the paradox of victory could be transposed to other countries in the region. However, this comparative point is not returned to at all, a regrettable move, as it may have offered a way to evaluate the post-transitional accounts of other African countries. Despite these critiques, the book is well thought out and brings together a wide range of themes that one should bear in mind when analyzing the modern development of trade unions. Because of its accessible style, this book would be of equal use to an academic audience as well as trade unionists, activists and those from civil society groups as well as the interested lay person.

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**Eric Charry, ed. 2012. *Hip Hop Africa: New African Music in a Globalizing World.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 390 pp.**

The second major publication to take a continental approach to African hip hop brings in some well known scholars on the topic from diverse disciplines; with music, ethnomusicology, and anthropology heavily represented. The volume impressively details hip hop's evolution throughout Africa, for example, Charry's introductory discussion of hip hop's evolution in West Africa via Europe and the United States. The volume presents important arguments in African hip hop scholarship, including discussions on African hip hop's linkages with US hip hop, and debates over authenticity and imitation. Several authors present strong evidence of African hip hop's indigenization.

Debates over hip hop's origins are also tackled. The debate is whether hip hop is a solely American music genre that Africans adopted, or if hip hop's roots are indeed African. Authors argue both sides of the debate. Charry, Schulz, and Watkins argue the former. While both Shonekan and Kidula present evidence of the latter, defining hip hop as having definite African origins.

There is also a discussion over African identities. Dorothea Schulz puts forth that African hip hop artists claim a more authentic African identity than African Americans. This topic is controversial, and Schulz's oversimplified examination of African identity is out of place. Given the topic of the chapter, it would have been better served in a separate work that could adequately discuss this complex debate. Similarly, Schulz and Watkins examination of race v. economics, and linkages between Africans and African Americans is misplaced. Both discredit racial linkages, arguing that economic ties are more appropriate. By divorcing race from economics, they discredit links between racism and poverty, links that bind people of color.

Much of the volume's strength lies in its examination of local hip hop scenes. Jesse Shipley's detailed account of hiplife's history in Ghana examines early connections between Diasporic music and highlife, and some of the criticisms that highlife faced. He connects that to contemporary criticisms of hiplife. John Collins includes a section that combines Ghanaian hiplife and Ghanaian hip hop, acknowledging that Ghanaian hip hop is its own distinct genre.

Lee Watkin's overview of South African hip hop's elements including graffiti and breakdancing, steps outside of Cape Town and takes a broader examination of hip hop in South Africa, going from Cape Town to Johannesburg, to Durban, Grahamstown, and Port Elizabeth. Watkins addresses the direction of South African hip hop and the debates over authenticity that label English-speaking and commercial artists as unauthentic, while artists that rap in vernacular are seen as authentic.

Stephanie Shonekan provides an excellent look at Nigerian hip hop as a product of both African American hip hop and Afrobeat. While some of the artists, such as 2face, may not be classified as hip hop, she effectively links Nigerian hip hop to urban, inner city Black hip hop culture in America and the Caribbean as well as to urban, post-colonial realities and experiences expressed in highlife and Afrobeat music.

This volume looks primarily at hip hop, but five of the twelve chapters focus on other genres. These chapters (by Reed, Perullo, Collins, Seebode, and Polak) cover African pop, reggae, and drumming. Daniel Reed's chapter, for example, examines reggae as an expression of political protest in Cote d'Ivoire. Reed focuses on reggae, but parallels to hip hop do exist. Reed only mentions one parallel in the area of sampling. The chapter would have been better served if it had included a more extensive discussion of the links with hip hop.

Both Alex Perullo and Jean Ngoya Kidula focus on pop music in Tanzania and Kenya, respectively. While Kidula offers a simplistic breakdown of the different rap genres in Kenya, and inaccurately categorizes pop music as hip hop, his inclusion of the Kenyan Diaspora provides information on an often overlooked phenomenon: the relationship between African artists and their Diasporas. Perullo, a well-known scholar of Tanzanian hip hop, examines Bongo Flava in Tanzania. Perullo provides an account of the evolution of Bongo Flava, its innovations in production and fashion, and a discussion of Bongo Flava "camps"; collectives in which urban youth can improve their skills and share advice.

As a growing sub-field of research, African hip hop scholarship is still finding its way and defining its parameters. The authors in the volume provide extensive background information on hip hop's evolution throughout Africa. Again, much of the volume's strength lies in its examination of local hip hop scenes. While there are some concerns regarding some of the

authors' claims, the book provides a good look urban music in Africa. The book is also a solid contribution to scholarship on African hip hop.

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**Robert Crawford. 2011.** *Bye the Beloved Country? South Africans in the UK, 1994-2009.* **Johannesburg: UNISA Press. 182 pp.**

Robert Crawford's *Bye the Beloved Country?* discusses South African immigration to England, primarily using information from newspapers and databases. This work may contribute to general knowledge on both why South Africans leave home and why they re-home in the UK.

Crawford begins his Introduction by highlighting the problem of numbers in South African migration. Scholars have widely debated and disagreed as to just how many South Africans are leaving the country, as well as how many are entering the UK. This is due, in part, to discrepancies between the numbers of people who leave on tourist visas and stay out permanently, those who intend to emigrate permanently but return to South Africa, and a number of other factors. Additionally, Crawford points out, the number of South Africans arriving with their UK citizenship papers in hand as a result of having forebears from the country, further complicates the "magic million" who supposedly are now living in the UK—a figure which could be off on either side by about a half-million people.

Chapter One discusses some of the motivating factors for "chicken runners" leaving South Africa, with a focus on the usual suspects: high crime rates, affirmative action/black economic empowerment schemes, family issues, and relocating for employment opportunities. Crawford also attempts to compare the attitudes of "stayers" and leavers, surveying the wide range of emotions that both people who choose to leave and people who choose to stay in the New South Africa experience. Chapter Two, titled "Greener Pastures" discusses various mechanisms for immigration into the UK, including ancestry visas and temporary work permits. It assesses the attitudes of South Africans in the UK toward their country of origin and ultimately concludes that most South Africans chose to relocate out of a desire to improve their (usually financial) lot in life. Chapter Three expands upon a theme mentioned in previous chapters: the Brain Drain. After mentioning the effects of a mass exodus of skilled workers on South Africa, Crawford discusses here the skills that South Africans bring to the UK. Unsurprisingly, most settle in London, particularly its leafy southern reaches. By 2008, Crawford argues, new visa schemes began making the UK less accessible for South Africans, though the longer-term implications of that are of course presently unclear.

Chapters Four and Five focus more on South African life in the UK—finding community and forging identity, respectively. Crawford focuses on categories of identity, including race, that have been important to immigrating South Africans and discusses how those play into the search for community and belonging in the United Kingdom. In Chapter Six, Crawford discusses how South Africans abroad view the possibilities of returning home. He discusses various efforts, including the Coming Home campaign, to draw expatriates back and engages in a discussion over "prodigals or pariahs"—investigating how returning citizens may view themselves or how what views they might elicit from stayers. Crawford concludes by assessing

the views South Africans both in and outside of the Diaspora hold toward their country and wondering what the nation's functionality level will be, as well as what it might have been had it not suffered the brain drain. He notes that the tightening up of visa laws and regulations may soon stem immigration to the United Kingdom.

*Bye the Beloved Country* is an impressive qualitative work. Crawford presents a good amount of survey information and assessments on the demographics of South Africans who are emigrating. Most of his quantitative data, however, comes from newspapers or secondary works rather than from interviews, making it a little difficult to assess how representative the included comments are. Perhaps a future study could work to expand upon this and to evaluate some of the claims Crawford makes regarding the demographics of those emigrating, including that large numbers are young people who leave to travel or see the world rather than to leave home due to political or economic issues. The book's periodization lends itself to generalities about chicken runners, but Crawford does not fully distinguish between white flight in the early 1990s and the adventures of youth fifteen years later, and it would have been helpful to see him engage more with comparative migration studies or analyses of other countries/regions, in order to wholly contextualize patterns of South African movement.

Myra Ann Houser, *Howard University*

**Ashley Currier. 2012. *Out in Africa: LGBT Organizing in Namibia and South Africa.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 255 pp.**

In the last two decades, international debates over the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals have led to fierce political clashes. In sub-Saharan Africa, local LGBT activists draw on universal human rights claims in their appeals for civil liberties, while opponents invoke tropes of tradition and frame calls for international LGBT rights as neocolonial impositions. Despite abundant media, academic, and political attention paid to these debates and their sometime violent outcomes, little attention has been paid to the specific strategies that African LGBT activists employ when navigating this complex ideological field. They make strategic choices that impact their organizations and the lives of their constituents, but their actions remain under-researched.

Ashley Currier's book is part of a growing attempt to put LGBT activists at the center of analysis. She delivers a well-crafted ethnography of activists in four NGOs in Namibia and South Africa, focusing on the strategic choices they make concerning the public visibility of their organizations and their constituents. Supplementing extensive participant observation and interviews with archival research, Currier offers critical insight into LGBT activists' choices about organizational membership, donor relationships, lobbying efforts, and who can access the NGO headquarters. She also draws attention to the ways in which race, class, and gender shape access to and experience of LGBT organizations, drawing attention to internal debates surrounding identity and belonging.

Currier's introduction provides an overview of the literature on power and visibility within social movements. Rather than seeing visibility and invisibility as beyond the control of activists, she discusses them as context-driven strategies. She argues, for example, that the

persistent association of invisibility with a lack of power offers little in the way of analysis of moments in which organizations *choose* invisibility. Chapter 1 frames activists' decisions about organizational visibility within the historical and political economic contexts of South Africa and Namibia. In South Africa, decisions about LGBT visibility have been shaped by the legacy of apartheid and constitutional equality, and more recently, by violence against lesbians. LGBT organizing in Namibia, on the other hand, emerged in response to outspoken political homophobia. Currier sheds light on the ways in which sociopolitical fields shape, but do not determine, organizational visibility. Rather, she shows how activists deftly negotiate competing expectations, values and norms in their advocacy.

Throughout the second and third chapters, Currier examines visibility strategies that organizations in Johannesburg and Windhoek employed when faced with moments of both political hostility and opportunity. Lesbian activists at a South African NGO adopted an intentional invisibility in the wake of a string of corrective rapes and maintained this discretion through intensely monitoring membership and access to the organization. When faced with politicians' virulent anti-LGBT political stances, lesbian activists in Namibia adopted a strategy of public visibility and became fierce critics of such rhetoric. Currier argues that such strategic orientations must be analyzed with other factors in mind, including interruptions in funding and internal debates about organizational priorities. Challenging the notion that organizational invisibility is always forced on activists, Currier argues that researchers of social movements, particularly those engaging vulnerable populations such as LGBT individuals, must exercise care to avoid deploying assumptions about what invisibility says about organizational development.

Chapter four follows activists' negotiation of the discourse of homosexuality as "un-African." For example, activists were accused of being "gay for pay" because they received funding from Northern donors. Thus, while funding enables continued programming it simultaneously aggravates the homosexuality as "un-African" discourse, which activists seek to counter, thereby shaping decisions that they make about organizational visibility. The book concludes with an argument for a nuanced and human-centered approach to research on LGBT organizing, suggesting that visibility strategies offer insight into how and why social movements make seemingly contradictory decisions about their public visibility. Visibility, she argues, can tell us about activists' intentionality as well as about the structural constraints placed on LGBT mobilization in various contexts.

Ultimately, *Out in Africa* reminds us that nonprofit organizing is comprised of individuals and groups situated within shifting political and historical contexts that shape their work. By examining activists' decisions about organizational visibility in context, Currier places the power within the hands of those driving LGBT organizing without overlooking the structural constraints they face. The book's methodology and overall argument will be useful for students and scholars of sexuality and post-colonial studies. It is particularly well suited for graduate level seminars in the social sciences focused on the complexity of sexuality, globalization and activism.

Matthew Thomann, *American University*

**Souleymane Bachir Diagne. 2011.** *African Art as Philosophy: Senghor, Bergson and the Idea of Negritude*. **Calcutta: Seagull Books. vi, 210pp.**

Souleymane Bachir Diagne explores in detail Léopold Sédar Senghor's philosophy of Negritude as a product of Africa and its diaspora in an important historical period of transition marked by the questioning of Western values and the breakdown of colonial rule. Negritude is presented in the wider context of resistance to colonialism and affirmation of difference influenced by Black American ideology and Marxism. But the author also presents Senghor's personal philosophical exploration of what he calls Africanity, within universal questions of what it means to be human, drawing from diverse sources of inspiration from Jean-Paul Sartre, Henri Bergson, Lucien Lévy-Brühl, Karl Marx, and Friendrich Engels, to Ferdinand Georg Frobenius, Pablo Picasso, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin among others.

The book makes an interesting analysis of Senghor's reflections on Africanity and African art as a form of philosophy to reject contemporary colonial views of Africa as a cultural tabula rasa, void of civilization. As Diagne explains, "Senghor is a Nietzschean philosopher: like the author… he declares (and it is the matrix of his thought) that we have art so that we may not die of truth. More precisely, he claims that we have the truth of African art, of what was called 'Negro art', so that we may not die of a narrow and reductive rationalism. And, even before this, so that we may not die of the colonial negation" (p. 6).

Senghor (1906-2001) was indeed part of an elite group of African students who lived in Paris in the twenties and thirties at the height of colonialism when African art was beginning to be recognized as "Art," galvanizing the movements of Primitivism and Modern art. Léopold Seghor, Aimé Césaire, and Léon Damas began by writing mainly poetry as a form of self-expression and assertion of difference as blacks. It was Jean Paul Sartre who in 1948 wrote the essay *Black Orpheus* as an introduction to Senghor's *Anthology of New Negro and Malagasy Poetry* identifying Negritude as a major political movement and a philosophical criticism of colonialism. But Diagne also suggests that Sartre criticized Negritude by denouncing it as a nativist discourse, "that its idea of African philosophy amounts to an essentialist racialism employing a process of invention (from the whiteness of Being to the Negritude of Being, from reason to emotion, etc.)" (p. 41).

Key to Diagne's analysis of Senghor's writings on Negritude and his reflections on African art as philosophy is Henri Bergson's idea that one must find the initial intuition from which philosophers develop their thoughts. Diagne writes: "Senghor himself consistently maintains that what permitted the multifarious undertaking of bringing to light an *alternative* African thinking was the intellectual revolution marked by Bergson's first book, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la coscience* (1889), which revealed an *alternative* way of seeing, a direction for philosophy radically *alternative* to that which, until then, in order to save reason from the sophistry of the Eleatics, Aristotle had set for it" (pp. 5-6). Senghor's "initial intuition" was that there is a truth in African art which is itself a form of philosophy.

Bergson's ideas of intuition and Senghor's link with African art and aesthetics as essentially "intuitive," at best highlight the sources of Senghor's writings on Africanity, but at worst reduce African art to a mythical and exotic past. What Diagne excludes from his analysis, is the fact that the influx of African art (which was almost exclusively sculpture) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe, was selected to perpetuate colonial ideas of Africa as primitive. The

Benin Bronzes, for example, caused debate for their naturalistic or "European" aesthetics, putting into question their African origin. It is within this context that Senghors' philosophical ideas inspired by African art needs to be historically read. Diagne nevertheless preludes Senghor's ambiguity when he says: "The initial intuition—that African art is a philosophy and a humanist one—Senghor never stopped expressing throughout his life in his theoretical texts, most times successfully, sometimes in ways that proved to go nowhere or with formulations that were at least awkward" (p. 9). Although Diagne's thesis on African Art as Philosophy is more focused on Senghor's explorations in the wider theoretical context of philosophy, it is less analytical within the field of African art history.

Léopold Sédar Senghor's writings and Negritude have always been subject to literary criticism, contradiction, and misunderstanding. Despite this challenge, Souleymane Bachir Diagne achieves a quality analysis in the field of philosophy where perhaps he lacks in expertise in African art discourses. The book is an inspiring read with excellent bibliographical references and notes for readings on Negritude that will attract a wide audience of readers. As such, African Art as Philosophy makes an important contribution to African studies from a multidisciplinary perspective.

Helena Cantone, *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*

**Martin Evans. 2012.** *Algeria: France's Undeclared War.* **Oxford: Oxford University Press. xxxv, 457 pp.**

Martin Evans structures *Algeria* around three "analytical threads": long-simmering hatred engendered by colonization beginning in the 1830s, the rise of Algerian nationalism from the 1920s, and third-way reformism leading to the failed reforms of the 1930s and culminating in the Special Powers Act of 1956. Evans argues these set the stage for the Algerian War, contextualizing the legitimization of violence on both sides as well as the global political *enjeux* that make the war not just a chapter in Franco-Algerian history but a turning point in the break-up of empires and the emergence of new transnational alliances like pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism. It is a clear thesis well supported by this weighty tome's persuasive arguments and wealth of evidence.

These three factors are largely chronological in nature, and the book follows a linear structure through the first century of colonization, the onset of conflict in the postwar era, and the dramatic apogee of the war in the period 1959-1962. With regard to why the French lost the war, Evans argues it was due to the strength of Algerian nationalism. This was a phenomenon he traces to a variety of Islamic and secular movements developing from the 1920s, and thus he suggests it owed little to the FLN. This organization's success was instead due to its ability to capitalize on existing nationalist sentiment, a force that had its ultimate roots in widespread land dispossession and the social, political, and economic marginalization of Muslim Algerians during the first century of the colonial project. Consequently the book decentres the FLN's role in the conflict while simultaneously explaining its political legitimacy as an organization with its finger on the popular pulse. Evans also contends that the events of 1956 are central to understanding the immediate causes of the war, as the conflicting forces of reform and

repression embodied in the Special Powers Act greatly aggravated Algerian grievances and at the same time testified to the Fourth Republic's paternalistic folly and global aspirations.

The book's strength lies in its methodical, detailed, and comprehensive treatment of the conflict, and in its even-handed appraisal of all parties. Making use of a great variety of French and British archival sources, newspapers, interviews, and secondary literature, Evans marshals a compelling account that transcends the war per se and serves as a history of the Algerian colonial undertaking as a whole. And with its balanced and nuanced treatment of the forces involved in the complex history of the war—running the full spectrum from pro-French Algerians to pro-Algerian French—*Algeria* will serve as a reference for those with an interest in Algeria in its own right as well as its influence on France and beyond in the 20th century.

While the book is eminently fair to Algerians, this is a work focused on "France's undeclared war." Consequently, those seeking an account of the conflict squarely centered in Algerian points of view will need to look elsewhere. This, however, is not a fault per se, and is in keeping with the book's aim. If the work does have a weakness, on the other hand, it might be a tendency for undue charity toward certain Algerian actors who are at times undeserving of it, and a concomitant willingness to lay unrestricted blame at the feet of the French for evils new and old. Evans seems ready to accept, for example, that the FLN's ethos of violence only had the momentum it did in postcolonial Algeria because the French drew the conflict out for so many years (p. 335). This allows the FLN to avoid responsibility for the prevalence of violence in the postcolony, a phenomenon for which it was surely a partial cause. There is equally tension between Evans's argument that "in resorting to torture and summary executions, the Algerian army was modeling its counter-insurgency tactics on those of its erstwhile enemy" (p. 358), and his characterization of pre-colonial Algerian society as being oriented toward the cult of the violent warrior and "highly dictatorial" (p. 230). These, however, are minor points. Generally the work is unflinching in identifying hypocrisy on both sides of the Mediterranean, and in holding violent parties, whatever their provenance, accountable for their actions.

*Algeria* combines excellent scholarship with crossover appeal for a general audience. While preserving academic rigor, the book has the clarity and narrative force to draw in general readers as well as lower-level students. Featuring biographies of key players, a wealth of maps and images, and a comprehensive bibliography and index, this work will serve as an authoritative source for students and scholars alike. A fine example of academic work with ambitious scope and a robust allegiance to historical justice, the only thing left to hope for is that other historians of Africa will follow in Evans's footsteps and create such engaging reference works for their own areas of study.

Robert Nathan, *Dalhousie University*

**Sandra J.T.M. Evers, Catrien Notermans, and Erik van Ommering, eds. 2011. *Not Just a Victim: The Child as Catalyst and Witness of Contemporary Africa*. Leiden: Brill. 275 pp.**

*Not Just a Victim: The Child as Catalyst and Witness of Contemporary Africa* is a collection of ten qualitative studies based on a selection of papers presented at the conference, "African Children in Focus: A Paradigm Shift in Methodology and Theory" organized by the Netherlands African

Studies Association in 2008. Acknowledging as its starting point that children's perceptions and ideas are often considered to be unreliable or insignificant, and that therefore African children have historically remained on the margins of social and anthropological studies, this edited collection sets out to challenge the established view of children as victims. However, it is notable that with the exception of Sandra Evers' chapter, "Kinning in the Imagination: Perceptions of Kinship and Family History among Chagossian Children in Mauritius," the focus of the contributions is not strictly anthropological. The volume largely focuses on the methodological implications of a child-oriented approach to social sciences research, underscoring the value of taking children's perspectives seriously and acknowledging the varied and complex roles and responsibilities that children play in contemporary Africa.

As editors Evers, Notermans, and van Ommering make clear in their introduction, "the concept of a child should be defined within specific relational, cultural and local contexts, wherein categories such as age, gender and the criteria for defining a child vary considerably" (p.3). Contributors thus examine the experiences of children in challenging circumstances that range from being orphaned, abandonment, experiencing war, and living on the streets or in exile, in African nations including South Africa, Namibia, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Cape Verde, Morocco, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya. While this might at first sight appear rather a negative approach, questions of agency are central to many of the essays in the collection.

Diana van Dijk's chapter examines children's coping mechanisms in South African child-headed households to argue that greater support is needed, but that the children's strategies, needs, and wishes should always be the starting point for those working with these children. Lorenzo Bordonaro's analysis of children's street-ward migration in Cape Verde argues that while it is important to recognize the agency of working street children or independent child migrants, it is also essential to acknowledge the social and economic constraints that limit this agency. As a further example, Tatek Abebe's chapter, "Gendered Work and Schooling in Rural Ethiopia: Exploring Working Children's Perspectives," engages in debates around child labor, but also recognizes the multiple roles of children as producers, entrepreneurs, careers, and decision makers. Abebe contends that paternalistic approaches that view working children solely as victims "are not only problematic analytically, but also from a policy point of view [as] they denigrate the capacities and meaningful contributions children make in their families" (p. 168).

The evaluation of different research methods with children is an important focus of the collection, and contributors highlight their use of a range of different approaches, from observations to interviews, focus group discussions, and questionnaires, to photo essays and the development of board games. In Chapter Two, Mienke van der Brug describes how a Kids Club was used to talk with Namibian children orphaned by AIDS about the sensitive issues surrounding their circumstances, which was evaluated positively in a follow up study six years later. June de Bree, Oka Storms, and Edien Bartels also raise the question of methodology in their "In Between the Netherlands and Morocco: 'Home' and Belonging of Dutch Moroccan Return Migrant and Abandoned Children in Northeast Morocco," finding the oral life history research method of particular relevance for their work with returning adolescents.

The range of perspectives offered in this volume is impressive and a firm editorial hand has ensured that the quality of the chapters is consistently high. It is striking that African scholars based on the continent contributed none of the essays. However, the volume will be of interest to social scientists and development agencies working with children in different African contexts, and will also be of more general appeal to anyone interested in what the editors term, "the emerging Africa of tomorrow."

Charlotte Baker, *Lancaster University*

**Zygmunt Frajzyngier and Erin Shay, eds. 2012. *The Afroasiatic Languages.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xix, 687 pp.**

Frajzyngier and Shay's edited volume, *The Afroasiatic Languages*, is an important contribution to linguistic typology and an invaluable reference book on a major language phylum. Afroasiatic is the world's fourth largest phylum, consisting of more than three hundred living languages, including an important world language, Arabic, and a West African lingua franca, Hausa. Afroasiatic languages are spoken across an extensive range of North and Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, and on into the Arabian peninsula and other regions of the Middle East, with Arabic continuing as far as Central Asia. The volume includes eight chapters, six of which are devoted to profiles of the individual families that compose Afroasiatic, as well as an introduction, and a substantial 120-page final chapter by Frajzyngier that provides an extensive typological outline of the Afroasiatic phylum.

The editors' introduction situates the Afroasiatic languages geographically and gives a brief history of scholarship on the phylum. Particularly useful is the section on the state of the art in Afroasiatic scholarship, which together with the extensive bibliography provides a useful starting point for linguists and others interested in pursuing research on these languages. As a typological study, the book aims to inventory the linguistic forms in Afroasiatic languages and the functions these forms encode, and to compare these across families. For example, gemination is a frequent type of morphological exponence in many Afroasiatic languages and can encode nominal or verbal plurality, derive causative or transitive forms from intransitive ones, and mark perfective aspect. It should be noted that this is not a historical study (although the volume will, of course, be useful to historical linguists) and that Frajzyngier and Shay do not enter into debates about the classification of Afroasiatic languages. They see no compelling reason to contest the generally accepted six-family makeup of the phylum, and they accept the inclusion of Omotic as a separate family from Cushitic, the only real area of controversy within the overall classification of Afroasiatic languages.

The chapters profiling the six Afroasiatic language families, each of which includes a useful map, are written by noted scholars and experts in their respective fields. These include both eminent scholars as well as younger researchers, many of whom contribute important insights on under-documented Afroasiatic languages. Maarten Kossmann writes on Berber, Antonio Loprieno and Matthias Müller on Ancient Egyptian and Coptic, Gene Gragg and Robert Hoberman on Semitic, the editors themselves on Chadic, Maarten Mous on Cushitic, and, finally, Azeb Amha on Omotic. The focus of the volume is on typology, and four of the six

chapters constitute a first typological study of the family under consideration, contributing substantially to the originality of the volume. Each chapter provides a survey of the phonetics, phonology, morphology, and syntax of the individual family, highlighting the characteristics that are typologically important and those that make the family particularly interesting. The chapters are replete with well-chosen linguistic examples from multiple languages, many of which come from the authors' own fieldwork.

The Afroasiatic phylum is characterized above all by its rich typological diversity. Thus it is to Frajzyngier's great credit that he attempts to survey the entire phylum to bring out commonalities between languages and language families and to show places where they differ. In addition to the generally well-known similarities between Afroasiatic languages, such as the fact that all language families have some analog of the familiar pharyngealized or emphatic consonant series in Arabic, manifested elsewhere as either ejectives, implosives, glottalized or pharyngealized consonants, Frajzyngier presents us with some lesser known commonalities.

The clustering of typological features, however, is most generally restricted to languages in fewer than the six Afroasiatic families. For example, Chadic, Cushitic, and Omotic languages are generally tonal, while the others are not, and Frajzyngier provides a plausible scenario for tonogenesis in the former; in Semitic, Egyptian, Berber, and some Chadic languages nouns have underlying vowels while verbs do not, but in Cushitic and Omotic languages both verbs and nouns have underlying vowels; Egyptian, Semitic, and some Chadic languages are verb-initial in pragmatically neutral clauses, but Cushitic and Omotic are verb-final; Cushitic and Semitic have an extensive system of case marking, and they also have the construct state, both of which are absent in other families; and finally, in Cushitic and Chadic the phonological reduction of the word—usually the reduction of the final vowel—correlates with phrase-internal position.

Within his survey, Frajzyngier also offers some tantalizing hypotheses for the correlation of features across language families, which will no doubt encourage new research on the Afroasiatic phylum. His hypothesis on the relationship between tone and the neutralization of syllable codas to sonorants in Chadic languages and syllable reduction in Omotic languages, for example, opens up new areas of investigation in the historical phonology of the Afroasiatic languages. Given the wealth of information within its pages, and the many inviting areas of research that Frajzyngier points the reader to, this volume will surely stand as the seminal work on Afroasiatic languages for quite some time to come.

Fiona Mc Laughlin, *University of Florida and Université Cheikh Anta Diop*

**Diane Frost. 2012. *From the Pit to the Market: Politics and the Diamond Economy in Sierra Leone*. Oxford: James Curry. 226 pp.**

From the *Pit to the Market: Politics and the Diamond Economy* states that it is going to examine "the social, economic and political role that diamonds have played in Sierra Leone's development since they were first discovered during British colonial rule in the 1930s." (p. 1) Diamonds are a part of the popular imagery and analysis of a ten-year civil war that devastated Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2001. Much of the academic analysis begins with "blood diamonds" and the transnational role they played contributing to conflict(s), the role of disenfranchised youths in

mining and conflict, patrimonial politics, limitations of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2003), and diversification of mining. The popular imagery in films or songs, by performers like Kanye West and Frank Ocean, leans more towards the human bodily cost of diamonds and inequalities that still structure young people's lives delimiting agency. Frost tries to weave these two strands together to give an understanding why such global resources have not benefited the local communities in which they are found.

The book is thus split into two sections. The first part deals with "Colonialism, Post-colonialism & Resource Predation" and the second part, with "The Global Context." In the first part, a historical overview is given explaining the links between colonialism and resource predation. This is where the strengths of the book lie, and the reader gets a sense of how social life, economics and politics intersected in the colonial and post-colonial creation of diamond hubs like Bo, Kenema and Kono. These intricacies still ring true today, as African resources are still highly sought international commodities, inclusive of new actors such as the Chinese. I did expect more analysis of the institutional structures behind the Structural Adjustment Policies and continuity to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and what that says about resources and development priorities. That would have explained the strong debt Frost owes to Collier in explaining the role of global capitalism, link to conflict, and dependency of the economy on resources and aid today.

In part 1, I really enjoyed chapters 3 and 4 because this is where the voices, materiality and histories of the workers and grass roots organizations are illustrated. Frost did her fieldwork in 2003 but their voices were not "hidden," which would be marginalized groups such as sex-workers or those disabled by the conflict and diamond mining. She admits she stays on the level of the "articulate" politicized elites, especially in Kono (p. 199). They stay on message looking at communal loss, suffering, environmental degradation, and human rights violations like child labor in the mines but also sex work and its consequences for girls. Like talk about rebuilding the road to Kono, people agree that these are issues that are cogent and urgently need attention but the political will is not always there. One needs to question why and who benefits. When she does that, in questioning the gender dynamics of the pits, you see that Frost has some really interesting fieldwork data. I wished she had looked around the pit and the city. The complexity of the fluid gendered and embodied politics of the pit, "juniors," ex-combatants, migrants, multinationals, increased blasting and interactions with the differing members of the Kono community, Lebanese and other diamond dealers is not explored. Likewise, if one wants to track the move from pit to market and use qualitative methods you also need to interview who controls the market and ask why.

This book would have been stronger if Frost had done some follow-up interviews with this cast and tracked the diamonds to Antwerp and the newer hubs like Dubai. Part 2 deals with this wheeling and dealing of diamonds and also the parallel economies. Much of the work about the connections of diamonds to international terrorism, arms, laundering, drugs, and trafficking was published after Farah but is an open secret in Sierra Leone. Depending on whom you talk to, you gain different versions of "the system." In effect, this book brings it together in an easily read summary that should appeal to students. However, I do think there are some generalizations such as the "Lebanese community" (p. 172), which Gberie has noted is not homogenous. Ultimately, I agree we are in the midst of a scramble for African resources, and

the diamond industry is now changing with the increased role of multinationals, deep mining, and private security companies. With the increased power of civil society organizations and the presence of activist elites in positions of political power, not tokenism but real corporate social responsibility should be high on the agenda—inclusive of past and present abuses.

Maria Berghs, *University of York*

**Kobena T. Hanson, George Kararach, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. 2012. *Rethinking Development Challenges for Public Policy*: I*nsights from Contemporary Africa*.  Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan. xviii, 293 pp.**

The global financial crisis that began in late 2007 brought serious development challenges to African economies. Hence, recovery, amongst other challenges, necessitated that the spotlight be brought to bear upon governance and leadership, which Nelson Mandela, the former South African president, once stated were problematic in Africa. Similarly on 11 July 2009, US President, Barack Obama remarked: "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions." Hence, any book that refracts developmental issues through the governance and leadership prism is a welcome addition to the development debate.

The eight-chapter book (plus a conclusion) is a collection of essays on a number of public policy issues that Africa contends with in its quest for sustainable human development and human security in the 21st century. In essence, the book catalogues development issues and offers a potpourri of solutions that African governments must adopt as they seek to claim the 21st century. Thus, the introductory chapter is a call to action; it urges African governments to develop capacity for strategic thinking and leadership *á la* European Union (EU) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as they seek to reinvent themselves.

In chapter 1, Tettey discusses the leadership deficit and proposes the path to good governance and transformative politics. While Tettey grudgingly concedes that Africa's governance record has improved during the last decade, he argues that the improvement is unsatisfactory as to necessitate transformative leadership that has a zero tolerance for mediocrity, if not total failure as instanced by failed states. In chapter 2, Makinda continues in the same vein of argument by discussing Africa's leadership and governance crises. As a solution, Makinda proposes the following: establishing a Pan-African leadership institute (to grow and nurture leaders); enhancing democracy institutions; improving access to health care facilities; and strengthening critical infrastructure.

Ayee (chapter 3) and Owusu and Ohemeng (chapter 4) discuss the role of public administration in the development process. Ayee argues that all African governments have experimented with varieties of public sector reforms, particularly, New Public Management (NPM). He argues that NPM failed because of its one-size-fits-all orientation and, thus, recommends that: public administration reforms must be context-aware; public administration reforms must be part of broader public sector reforms; and that there must be a move away from NPM to New Public Service. Similarly, Owusu and Ohemeng advocate for a developmental public administration that entails some of the following: flexible but competent

public service; strong government-business-civil-society relationships; meritocratic and career-building public service; and high ethical standards.

Using various case studies, Chikozho (chapter 5) and Oyama *et al.* (chapter 6) discuss trans-boundary water governance and water crisis management respectively. Chikozho concedes that there is no one best method of trans-boundary water governance but, nonetheless, argues that there should be developed mechanisms that would, amongst others, address conflict avoidance, conflict management and inter-state cooperation. Oyama *et al* contend that the solution to the water crisis could be found in suitable water management processes and technologies, stakeholder inclusiveness etc.

Arthur (chapter 7) argues the case for Small and Medium-scale Enterprises (SMEs) as engines of growth and catalysts of socio-economic transformation in Africa. Arthur uses case studies to showcase the resilience of SMEs. Based on challenges and problems that they face, he recommends that African governments must harness the potential of SMEs by creating an environment that will facilitate their operation. Sy (chapter 8) discusses climate financing in uncertain periods, particularly fiscal stress. He ends the chapter by proposing a raft of financing options. Lastly, chapter 9, by the editors, wraps us issues discussed in the book and proposes ways to take the development agenda forward.

The book has a number of strengths: importantly, the authors are qualified to talk to the subject because there are specialists in the subject areas. Arising from this, the book is endowed with high scholarship and, consequently, it is extensively researched. Finally, the book is a valuable addition to the literature because it discusses a topical issue; development, and it refracts it through the governance and leadership prism. Notwithstanding the above positives, the book could do with fewer in-text references because they tend to crowd-out the narrative. Ending, did the book successfully achieve its overarching aim; discuss development challenges and recommend public policy solutions? Yes, it did.

Emmanuel Botlhale, *University of Botswana*

**David Harris. 2012.** *Civil War and Democracy in West Africa. Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia*. **London, New York: IB Tauris. 300 pp.**

In light of geographical proximity and cultural similarities as well as prolonged civil conflict within overlapping time periods, Liberia and Sierra Leone are favored cases for comparative politics and there have been a number of books and articles examining the roots and trajectory of conflict, as well as prospects for sustainable peace in the aftermath of conflict. The recent book by David Harris falls in the latter category. However, contrary to much of the literature on these two countries that has focused on causes of war, this book takes as its starting point one of the hallmarks of peace processes in recent years, the conduct of post-conflict elections, and examines the effectiveness of the electoral process as a mechanism to promote reconciliation and lasting peace. In what is perhaps the book's greatest contribution, the author seeks to address a heretofore under-researched aspect of international conflict-resolution initiatives: the nexus between liberal traditions of justice that have increasingly come to dominate post-conflict

reconstruction debates, replacing realist, more inclusive approaches, and the political capacity of former rebel groups.

The author argues that legal and moral imperatives have replaced political considerations in conflict resolution interventions, with a new emphasis on seeking justice for perpetrators through means like special courts and truth commissions, rather than former practices of including belligerents in peace deals. Furthermore, the inability of rebel groups to transform into viable political groups or parties also contributes to the determination of electoral outcomes and ultimately, peace, and stability. For Harris, "the transformation of international discourses and approaches to conflict coupled with the political inefficacy of rebel movements have provided a mutually reinforcing obstacle to peace through elections" (p. 212).

To build his case, Harris examines four elections in Liberia and Sierra Leone (the 1996 and 2002 elections in Sierra Leone, and the 1997 and 2005 elections in Liberia). In the 1996 and 1997 elections, conflict soon resumed in both countries. The two later elections have ushered in a period of relative peace, although he queries the sustainability of this peace in the Sierra Leone case. The question he then seeks to answer is why the difference in outcomes between the two sets of elections.

While acknowledging that explanation rests on a variety of factors including electoral context and arrangements as well as ethnicity and security, Harris includes what he believes are crucial heretofore under-explored explanations: international discourse surrounding belligerents and political capacity of rebel actors. On first glance, Harris makes a compelling case. His detailed description of actors, events, and circumstances surrounding all four elections reveal a great depth of knowledge and intimate familiarity with the details of the cases in question. He does an excellent job demonstrating how both the international community and the political fortunes of the involved rebel groups contributed to their variable showing in all four respective elections.

Less convincing however, is the linkage between shifting international discourses and the question of sustainable peace. A central claim is that more punitively oriented discourses have made peace following elections more problematic, yet the cases do not seem to fully fit the analyses. For example, in Liberia, although Harris points to the late nineties as the harbinger of changing discourses (albeit intensified following September 11), he himself notes that Charles Taylor was unaffected by calls for a judicial process in 1997, and in fact went on to win by a landslide in the elections of that year. To the contrary, it would appear that a more inclusive perspective actually hindered lasting peace given the predatory and violent nature of the Taylor regime, and contributed to the return to civil war.

In 2005, when punitive discourses were arguably stronger, they again made little headway in Liberia. For example, Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) recommendations for the prosecution of those deemed responsible for gross human rights violations have been largely ignored. Additionally, rather than facing criminal charges, former rebel actors were able to take part in the interim government following Taylor's exit from the country in 2003, and voluntarily disbanded prior to the 2005 elections. While the author links Liberia's positive electoral outcome in 2005 to the country's non-implementation of the more punitive discourses in place, it is not implausible that other causal factors may be in play.

In the Sierra Leone case, the author appears to find problematic the Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) marginalization from the 2002 elections, a result of disapprobation from an international community that now advocated punishment rather than inclusion, as well as the poor political organization capabilities of the group itself. However, the RUF's mandated presence in government under the 1999 Lome Peace Accords, including four cabinet posts and four deputy-ministerial positions, accomplished little by way of reconciliation or peace. Concerns that RUF marginalization contributed to SLPP's landslide victory in 2002 which made Sierra Leone "close to a near one-party state" and "did not attend to the grievances and injustices that provoked the conflict in the first place" (p. 129) seem to be a little out of place as RUF inclusion might not necessarily have resulted in a more amenable result.

Moreover, Sierra Leone's two subsequent peaceful elections of August 2007 and November 2012 also seem to indicate that the absence of significant RUF participation has not been a cause for concern. In the 2007 elections, the All People's Congress (APC) unseated the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), and it was re-elected in 2012. In the latter elections, APC success has been attributed not just to incumbency advantage but also a reflection on party performance: an acknowledgement that the party has tried to address some of the grievance-related issues that gave rise to the conflict, including infrastructural development, health care and education, although the problem of youth unemployment that Harris rightly points to as a potential destabilizing issue, continues to loom large.

Finally, as the author himself points out, there are potential problems in the inclusion of rebels in post-conflict administrations and in widening participation, as it potentially "devalues the institution, legitimizes the warring parties and allows impunity" (p. 33). Knowing when the benefits outweigh the costs of inclusion is difficult, and determining the credibility of the warring faction, the legitimacy of grievances, and its motives for power is not an easy task. Thus, while the premise of inclusion is theoretically appealing, there are a number of practicalities in implementation that could have been considered in greater depth.

Aside from these issues, the book provides many useful insights, serving as a check on both the global move to indict rebels as well as the assumption that elections in and of themselves are an indicator of peace. Additionally, the book provides an excellent comparative overview of the history of both Sierra Leone and Liberia, the onset of conflict, and the various arguments and theories proposed to understand its progression and eventual conclusion. Furthermore, Harris comprehensively examines the complexities of the various relationships among political parties, rebel groups and the international community within the two countries, and his description and analysis of the intricacies of the electoral processes, the actors. and the elections themselves provide a valuable insight into the various issues associated with post-conflict elections. The book will be of interest not just to scholars of these two countries, but more generally to policy makers and scholars of conflict resolution, post-conflict reconciliation, democratization, and development.

Fredline A. O. M'Cormack-Hale, *Seton Hall University*

**William J. Hemminger.2012. *The African Son*. Lanham: University Press of America. 94 pp.**

As George Bernard Shaw wrote, "All Autobiographies are lies"; similarly most of the memoires or travelogues are mere exaggerations and hardly regulate imagination by reality. However, Hemminger's travelling to Africa is not just a travel book or simply his craze for sightseeing or doing job(s) merely at different places in different capacities in Africa. His description is also not for the amusement but to present a thick description of the social, cultural, spiritual, and economic landscape of Africa. The author very exquisitely presents the interplay of cultures, communities, life ways, and ethnicities along with people's misery and value systems, etc., that govern their lives. The book is not too extensive however; thematically thorough, giving a succinct understanding of nature and life in Africa and perhaps this feature of the book best accomplishes the author's aim behind this revealing work. It is also an eye-catcher because of its colorful look, fine printing and paper quality, besides the depth of the work reflects even the unsaid, not discussed, and unwritten aspects of African life as well.

The book is composed of fifteen small but informative chapters, starting from the author's field description (view) to his various field trips. He hits the pressing African issue in his very first chapter, "A Friend of the Family," describing the death of a boy and expressing his grief, reflecting his humane concern and the absence of the proper health care and above all poverty in Africa. In the same chapter, he turns sociologist though indirectly by mentioning the status and plight of women as he describes his friend, Abdou's wife Maimuna. He writes, "I felt that I was closest to his wife Maimouna, she had told me that she was about 28 years old and had given birth eight times," reflecting the culture of ignorance, women's plight and poverty. The succeeding chapters describe his deep knowledge about African geography, socio-biology, agriculture, food culture, hospitality, rural life style, urban delight, and even faith and spirituality. His interest in describing the social and physical landscapes of different African countries opens up lots of intellectual discourses about African life itself, be that social and economic inequalities, rich African geography and landscapes, etc. He talks of the people's faith and their religiosity and draws inspiration from their abstinence from material lust. To add spice to his work, he pastes the whole amusing curriculum vita of a Cameroonian man (chapter 11), who became his guide-driver, by referring to his bizarre skills. Heputs himself as the center of narration, however, but indirectly tells a detailed story of the holistic, diverse and pluralistic African nature and life and masses.

His clearly written but artistic description reflects more the socio-cultural landscape and his style churned with literary and academic flavors makes it inviting for the potential readership. The author, like an expert fieldworker or a trained anthropologist, studied African life in certain roles as a Peace Corps Volunteer, a Fulbright scholar, or as a visiting academician. He is a man of compassion and love and not a hallow tricky author, who just plays with words and jargon but narrates honestly without caring whether his description is reflecting positive, appalling, significant, or insignificant findings. He seems eager to report the pain and suffering of his fellow human beings. He does not sound a slave of his mere perception but reports the context exactly as he witnesses it. He does not even care about garnishing his deliberations or jargonizing his prose; he only speaks to his heart and wants to spread the message about Africa and life within.

I view *The African Son* as Hemminger's memoire of the Africa he saw on his journeys from Senegal to Malawi, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. Hemminger, like a true social worker, feels responsible to society and aspires for change. While he lives the title he chose for his memoire simultaneously he leaves a message to the world about ignored Africa. The only minor flaw of the book is the lack of images/travel photographs that could have added to the account presentation and beautify the book. *The African Son* deserves a patient reader who can immerse himself/herself deeply in the context of the book and conceptualize the pain and suffering that Hemminger has plainly narrated with empathy.

The beauty of the book is that it does not impose perceptions but leaves the reader free to conceptualize Africa in one's own social and cultural understanding. Like a social anthropologist, Hemminger acts as a field researcher in the African context and meets different people like Muslims, missionaries, clergymen, and common people to gain insights and know about the real Africa. The social but peppery content of the book will attract all except speculative fiction readers, for the book presents culture and life styles as witnessed by the author as a participant observer. The book should attract students of all disciplines especially from the social sciences and researchers on Africa and above all Africa lovers. Moreover, the book can act as a valuable travel book on Africa.

Adfer Rashid Shah**,** *Central University, New Delhi*

**Catherine Higgs. 2012.** *Chocolate Islands: Cocoa, Slavery, and Colonial Africa***. Athens: Ohio University Press. 230 pp.**

Catherine Higgs gives us a thoughtful narrative history of how chocolate production on São Tomé and Príncipe relied upon slave labor during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Her account of William Cadbury's interest in worker rights, driven by a Quaker commitment to social justice, shows how a nascent desire for ethical business practices exposed slavery, disease, and the abuses of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa. In 1905 Cadbury called upon Joseph Burtt, fellow Quaker and former utopianist, to spend eighteen months in Portugal's African colonies "to determine if rumors that slaves were harvesting cocoa on the island colony of São Tomé and Príncipe were true" (p. 1). Higgs deftly narrates Burtt's evolution from a paternalist who argued the labor system of the *roças* (plantations) "was good for Africans" (p. 40) to a man convinced, by December 1906, that "Africans were enslaved in Angola…[and] shipped to the islands" where they worked until death (p. 114).

Burtt's letters and report were not the first forays into the horrors of chocolate slavery; rather they affirmed the article written for *Harper's Magazine* by Henry Nevinson, whom Burtt met while visiting the *roça Boa Entrada* in June 1905 (p. 39). Nevinson was a staunch abolitionist who spent four months tracing the slave routes in Angola, whereas Burtt would stay for nearly one year along those same paths. Unwilling to accept Nevinson's evidence for slavery, Burtt wanted to follow through on his commitment to Cadbury's mission and to see for himself if such flagrant abuse of international and Portuguese law continued. Despite what he heard and saw, Burtt maintained an air of detachment. While sharing breakfast with two missionaries in Benguela, the American missionary William E. Fay "refused on principle to drink cocoa and

directed Burtt to 'tell Mr. Cadbury…that cocoa is blood'" (p. 95). Although Burtt did not share Fay's association between the two, bad recruitment practices and labor abuse were too evident to deny.

*Chocolate Islands* takes the reader on a fascinating tour of Portuguese Africa, from the offshore islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, to Angola, and then to Mozambique where Burtt studied labor recruitment practices for South Africa's gold and diamond mines. Here in Lourenço Marques, 1907, Burtt was so charmed by Alfredo Augusto de Andrade, the governor-general of Mozambique, that he wrote a praise-poem about the man. In the poem, Burtt extolled Andrade's "love of the dark children of this zone" (pp. 121-23). Burtt interpreted Andrade's pragmatic rule as love because it required African men to engage in wage labor or cash crop production to pay their hut taxes. The Quaker emphasis on personal liberty led Burtt to conclude that mine recruitment practices were superior to *roça* methods because workers left the mines to return to Mozambique once their contracts were completed. The great benefit here for the reader is how Higgs' narrative of one man's journey provides a window to explore multiple forms of labor and social injustice across a wide region. Burtt, like E.D. Morel, used his experiences to lobby for better working conditions and eventually, by 1909 to encourage American chocolatiers to follow the European boycott of São Toméan cocoa (p. 150).

Higgs gives us a solid history, but one that concerns itself with European attitudes about Africans rather than focused on African views on their forced servitude to colonial economies. While wholly sympathetic to Higgs' documentary limitations, this one-way view reveals how human rights histories (or even movements for that matter) fall prey to one-sided narratives. This presents a distinct challenge, but one that can be addressed within the classroom setting. Filled with high quality black and white images, Higgs' text opens up new possibilities for teaching students how to analyze historical photographs and how these photos helped stimulate social awareness. As the history of a commodity and social movement, *Chocolate Islands* is useful because it pulls together so many important narratives within African history. It is a worthwhile companion for multiple university applications, from modern Africa courses to world history, or as an excellent example of narrative historical techniques for graduate students.

Chau Johnsen Kelly, *University of North Florida*

**Charles Hornsby. 2012.** *Kenya: A History Since Independence*. **London/New York: I.B. Tauris. xviii, 958 pp.**

There have been many books, papers, monographs, and other scholarly works on Kenya's history. Most of have "focused on the colonial era or on specific post-independence topics" (p.1). None has successfully treated the post-independent era of Kenya in its wholeness. This is exactly what Charles Hornsby has accomplished.

As Kenya celebrates its fiftieth year of political independence in 2013, this book questions all the political paths that Kenya has taken since its independence in 1963. It does this by presenting a historical narrative of sequential and connected socioeconomic and political events.

Hence, it is both a reference and a compendium of Kenya's history chronologically presented in twelve parts, beginning with an introduction and ending with a well-written conclusion.

One of the major goals achieved by the author is that readers would compare this account of Kenya with those of other African states and may then understand Africa better. The book's main contribution to Kenya's history begins from the chapter three, where the author x-rayed the period 1964-1965. He refers to it as a period of Kenya's "struggle for the state." This chapter exposes pertinent issues relating to the country's quest to stand as a nation (pp. 93-155). The fourth chapter describes the 1966-1969 period. It interestingly refers to this period as a time of "multi-party non-democratic system" (pp. 156-219). During this period, Kenyans witnessed undemocratic experiences in the country, despite that the government was considered a democratic one by the international community. During these years, state abolition, detentions without trial, restrictions on public meetings, and ethnic preferential policy treatments became a culture of the then government of Kenya. The fifth chapter describes the "golden years" of Kenya (pp. 220-278). This period, 1970-1974, was "when the growth and instability of the 1960s gave way to stability" (p. 220). The book reveals that hidden in this period was the "*kikuyuisation* of Kenya." This was a period when "the state continued to talk of Kenya as one nation" but focused on "the entrenchment of *Kikuyu* power through its formal and informal networks" (p. 254). The sixth chapter exposes the "rigor mortis" period of 1975-1978 (pp. 279-330). This period saw crises along political, economic, sectoral, and regional lines. The seventh to thirteenth chapters chronicle the periods from 1978 to 2010. The author notes that a lot changed in many ways during these years. In the final chapter, the book notes that Kenya's '"economy remains structured along colonial lines" up till today (p. 787). The author passed what could be a damning judgment on Kenyans—that "Kenya's history is poorly understood by most Kenyans" (p. 787). How true is this statement? People may have divided opinions on this assertion. Only Kenyans and keen observers of Kenya would, maybe, have strong opinions on this assertion. What the book has successfully done by making this assertion is to encourage Kenyans to study their own history better.

From the diction and tone of the book, the author appears to have followed Kenya's politics intensely and has authentic views on situations in the country. Without doubt, it presents an encyclopedic knowledge of post-independence Kenya with so much clarity that any researcher, historian, political scientist, and literary enthusiast would understand it. It gives compelling evidences that a minority of people own and drive the political vehicle of Kenya. It provides a historical orientation for understanding the Kenya's 2007/2008 crisis. More so, it provides useful background for understanding the run-up to the highly contentious 2013 presidential elections. The book used authenticated documented evidences to support its message. Newspaper articles, books, journals and official government publications are some of the evidences the author used to back up his messages. The book includes detailed charts, graphs, maps, tables, photographs, and statistics about important aspects of the country's history. This book is a must-read for all those interested in the general political evolution of African countries, in particular, Kenya. It will be captivating for readers who appreciate social and political history of nations.

Uchendu Eugene Chigbu, *Technische Universität München*

**Abdourahmane Idrissa and Samuel Decalo. 2012. *Historical Dictionary of Niger*. 4th edition. Lanham, Maryland and London: The Scarecrow Press. 541 pp.**

Expanding on Samuel Decalo's previous 1997 edition of *The Historical Dictionary of Niger*, Abdourahmane Idrissa significantly contributes to this invaluable resource. The reference volume begins with a chronology of major events dating back to 2000-3000 BCE, reviewing in detail the political events of the twentieth century through 2011. Following this section, the authors provide an introduction to the volume that serves as a country profile. These sections focus especially on the political developments of the country, but given the volatile political history of Niger, this seems warranted, and the expertise of both authors assures that the pithy account is worth reading. The final two sections of the book consist of a 459-page dictionary and a 58-page bibliography.

The bibliography has undergone a transformation in this latest edition, becoming more concise and efficient. Whereas the authors and texts in previous editions often received more than one entry when relevant to multiple sections, this edition only includes single entries for authors and texts.  Consequently, the task of perusing sections for new sources is much less daunting, and the shortened size helps one to find particular citations quickly. Further, references to the burgeoning body of Nigerien produced works that emerged during the 1990s and 2000s are an admirable addition to the bibliography. Particularly, the effort to record various dissertations defended by Nigeriens at both French and American institutions is laudable, considering that this reviewer is unaware of any other comprehensive source. Perhaps the most useful part of the bibliography is the list of online resources. This section includes a variety of sources of statistics, economic data, regularly updated compilations of current Nigerien media, and the arts, all of which are accessible online at no cost.

The dictionary remains the main feature of the book, however, and Idrissa's additions to this section are noticeable. Several new entries have been added to account for Niger's history prior to the colonial era. The author's efforts to include this time period signify this edition's greater comprehensiveness. Other entries underscore the author's expertise such as the entry for Islam, which gives a concise, but nuanced discussion of Islam's history throughout the country. Moreover, some entries have been added or amended in accordance with past criticisms. For instance, the entry on Women in Niger now includes references to separate entries on the Association des Femmes Juristes du Niger and the Rassemblement Démocratique des Femmes du Niger, two organizations created in the early 1990s but missing from the previous edition. Idrissa, raised in Niger, demonstrates an in depth personal knowledge of daily life in Niger through the new entries. They thus warrant attention as this reference volume continues to be one of the few resources available in English concerned with this understudied country. For example, the intriguing discussion of the Alhazai merchants of Maradi and their development as an economic power that remains relevant today emphasizes the contributions of the new author to the project. Finally, within the dictionary are a number of entries pertaining to research centers and other pertinent resources of information for the researcher.

There are a few minor errors and omissions to the edition. Noticeably absent is an entry on the Niamey-based research organization, Laboratoire d'Études et de Recherches sur les Dynamiques Sociales et le Développement Local (LASDEL). Its only mention comes in the online resources section of the bibliography, despite facilitating the development of numerous

academic networks and research teams across Africa and Europe for over a decade. Additionally, Dioulde Laya continues to be noted as the former director of the Institut National de Recherches en Sciences Humaines instead of the Centre D'Étude Linguistique et Historique par la Tradition Orale (CELHTO), an error noted in the previous edition by Roberta Dunbar.

Regardless of such minor faults, this edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Niger* stands as a noteworthy reference work for students, scholars, and researchers seeking to establish, develop or enhance their expertise on the country. The work of any author in producing such a tome requires that delicate judgments about balance and selection be made with regard to the content. The decisions of Idrissa on such matters ensure that this reference work will remain a worthy investment for those with little knowledge of the country and those seeking to further their own expertise.

Daniel Eizenga, University of Florida

**Eldred Durosimi Jones. 2012. *The Freetown Bond: A Life Under Two Flags*. James Curry. 174 pp.**

Prof. Emeritus Eldred Durosimi Jones' memoirs starts with the family house ablaze, instantly consuming what he knew as home. It goes back exploring the inhabitants in a well-knit multi-ethnic community and his weekly forays to his matrilineal lineage in the West. But nostalgia for that physical half of his memory of childhood destroyed remains. He explores Empire Day's thrill: marching past the Governor and joyously saluting the British flag.

The ten chapters cover his early life, schooling, university studies, work and life after returning home from lecturer to Fourah Bay College Principal and community activities. Jones' foreword, an index, and an appendix, seventeen black and white pictures, and a map of Freetown are added value. This colorful account unravels Jones' humane upbringing, education, influences and works.

Mrs. Jones searches for details to arouse her visually impaired husband's memory. Structured in a fragmentary pattern, the book foregrounds the author recalling the past, reminiscing whilst foreshadowing coming events conversationally. The historical pageant on Sierra Leone's history he produced in 1957 as part of a National Festival of the Arts draws his memory to the next one in 1977 depicting Fourah Bay College history.

The varying writing styles give this book wide appeal. Students, communicators, and English scholars should find it absorbing. The first chapter tracing the challenges and excitement of educating in Africa is of general interest. The title mirrors his British colonial education and upbringing and working during post-independence disillusions under the Sierra Leone flag. The author absorbed every positive situation into molding himself into a transformative figure of the African cultural landscape.

The seventh chapter," West African Travels," devotes far more pages to Nigeria with no glimpse of Ghana beyond its "electric" atmosphere. The memory of time and place resurrects memory of such great friendships as his hosts, the Contons. In exploring Nigeria, the author details places, melding modern and traditional art, interacting with Nigerian authors and familiarizing himself with the Nigerian literary industry. He studied various art forms, visited

art centers and artists, which provided him with a rich experience that informs his critical works on African literature especially his explication of Yoruba cosmology in Soyinka's works. His narrative and descriptive prose blossoms into great vitality, capturing the eloquence of Nigerian art. The ease with which he understood it and his freely moving across the country dropping in to shrines and meeting traditional authorities who he accords the appropriate decorum is admirable. "I could not take my eyes off the view from Jos via Kaduna to Kano. The Jos plateau continued the feature of bare outcrops of rock and gradually gave way to the watershed which fed the Kaduna River" (p. 126).

Chapter Nine, "Books, Words, Causes," is of interest to Africanists. The section on African Literature Today first gives a concise background to its establishment, its purpose, its organization, the hazards of editing it from Africa, resolving such challenges, and the interests and resources generated. That on the Noma Award for Publishing in Africa, structured similarly, describes its establishment, the process for final selections, administrative support, key presentations and how greatly reading expert reports on varying subjects and books enriched Jones' knowledge of the African publishing scene.

This memoir, in spite of some repeated episodes and printing errors, is a compulsive read from an author who is a consummate connoisseur of good literature and art and a master communicator. So when he writes about his life and shares his thoughts on education, broadcasting and governance he does so with a wealth of passion and insight. It is peopled with almost everyone he has met on his way up, particularly great scholars. He has in spite of so many in his canvas gleaned and transmitted telling aspects of their personalities. The work, however, has an overwhelming number of episodes and characters that could have been developed sufficiently in four volumes capturing each stage and aspect of Jones's life and work.

The book has a relaxed conversational style—lucid, clear, and witty with a rich stock of images. Some sections soar to almost poetic lyricism, getting us enchanted with the subject and its conveyance as in the last chapter titled "Twilight and Evening Bell." The poetic title matches the lyrical rhythm of this chapter with its symbolism of their life ebbing. Jones simulates them contemplating winding down their lives in the smaller but even more charming cottage that had lured them into acquiring that property but the arty things they might have to leave behind for lack of space makes them irresolute.

Arthur Edgar E. Smith, *Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone*

**James Kilgore. 2011. *We Are All Zimbabweans Now*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 259 pp.**

To understand post-1980 Zimbabwe through a novel is of course impossible. The author of *We are all Zimbaweans Now* is specifically focusing in fact only on the "Gukurahundi" ("the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring" in the Shona language) time. It was the civil war that broke out in 1982 soon after the defeat of white rule and the election of Robert Mugabe as Prime Mnister. The Gukurahundi War ended with the merging of the two clashing parties, ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People Union), in ZANU-PF and the beginning of a "one party system" of government. Zimbabwe is landlocked and borders Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa. Some neighboring

nations played a specific role in Zimbabwe politics. Tanzania and Mozambique, for example, offered military training camps for the guerilla fighters or a logistic base as in Zambia where Herbert Chipeto, the first leader of ZANU and a black barrister in Zimbabwe, in 1975 met his death in a car explosion in Lusaka.

Zimbabwe's northern region is Mashonaland, with the capital Harare ("the city that never sleeps" in the Shona language), Chinguwitza, and Mbare as the main cities where the novel is predominantly set. Mashonaland is inhabited by people from the Shona ethnic group. Part of the novel is also set in Matebeleland, a southwestern macroregion inhabited by the Ndebele ethnic group. Ndebele, Shona, and English are then the official languages of Zimbabwe. Moreover, the Ndebele and Shona have a different pre-colonial history and mythology. During the liberation war against Ian Smith and in the early 1980s, Mashonaland was predominantly aligned with ZANU with Robert Mugabe as the leader while Matebeleland was ZAPU with Joshua Nkomo as the leader.

If the main white character of this fantapolitics novel, Ben Dabney (a U.S. Ph.D. candidate researching for his thesis in Zimbabwe), has any prejudices about the black Zimbabweans, they are on the reverse: he is blindly enthusiast about the "racial reconciliation" politics and Marxist system of government of Robert Mugabe, just elected Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980. This character is presumably autobiographical since James Kilgore himself is an American scholar of Africa and with a past as a radical leftist. Kilgore, as Dabney, also lived in Zimbabwe working as a teacher at high school during the 1980s. Ben Dabney, as James Kilgore, becomes so integrated in the Mugabe's Zimbabwean society to be sometimes called "comrade Ben." Nevertheless, he gradually discovers the degeneration of Mugabe's regime, which has engaged in a war against the Zimababwean people through the killing of civilians and mass graves: an ethnic and racist war against the Ndebele tribe in Matebeleland to destroy any political opposition. "But when someone who fights a war against the Rhodesians ends up hating his comrades because they speak another language, then makes no sense" says Ben to Florence, a former ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) guerrilla fighter, when he returned from a trip in Matebeleland. He had witnessed the violence of the Mugabe's Fifth Brigade (trained by North Koreans) in a rural school suspected of hiding Super-ZAPU members, the organization of dissidents presumably supported by South Africa. During his stay in Harare, Ben is also approached by an eccentric Professor Dlamini who suggests to him that he investigate the death of a liberation leader, Elias Tichasara, who died in a mysterious car accident some days after the end of the second Chimurenga, the war against the white Rhodesians. The story ends with the suicide of "comrade Manyeche," fictional Mugabe's Minister of Education and ex guerilla fighter who has just confessed to Florence, Tichasara's woman, of having been himself the real and hidden driver in her partner's car accident. Apparently, he committed suicide for a sexual scandal, but his death to the readers of the novel sounds as an admission of guiltiness in the Elias' murder.

Apart from Robert Mugabe, most of the characters are fictional except for Tichasara and Professor Callistus Dlamini. As the author has revealed, Elias Tichasara is Josiah Tongogara, the commander of ZANLA who in actuality died in a car accident in 1979 in Mozambique six day after the Lancaster House Agreement leading to the ceasefire that ended the war of liberation. According to a 1979 CIA briefing, Tongogara was at that time a "potential political

rival to Mugabe," and the US agency suspected a murder rather than believing to the accidental car crash of the official version. Tongogara's wife never saw his corpse, and no autopsy was ever conducted or pictures released. He has also been defined by Lord Carrington, chairman of the Lancaster House talks, as a "moderate force" compared to Mugabe. During the Lancaster meetings, the ZANLA commander favored a "power sharing" agreement with the unity of ZANU and ZAPU, a solution that Robert Mugabe opposed. The character of Prof. Dlamini is based on Stanlake Samkange, a prominent Zimbabwean historian who also wrote novels set in the liberation wars. As did Samkange, Dlamini lives in a real English castle in Harare and drives a Rolls Royce. "Since in my book Professor Dlamini engages in an intrigue in which the real Professor Samkange never took part" explains Kilgore "I elected to change the name."

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Linda Kreitzer. 2012. *Social Work in Africa: Exploring Culturally Relevant Education and Practice in Ghana.* Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press. 242 pp.

Linda Kreitzer's *Social Work in Africa: Exploring Culturally Relevant Education and Practice in Ghana* provides a strong case study exploring the challenges and failings of social work education in Ghana. This text, one of only a few that looks specifically at West Africa, provides a compelling case study specific to Ghana. While it may be argued that the dearth of scholarly work in the area pertaining to the African context makes for broader application, readers should use caution, as Kreitzer warns briefly in the introduction, against assuming African universality. Kreitzer expresses two purposes for publishing this book. One expressed purpose is "to reflect on, explore, critically evaluate, and take action on the thoughts and ideas expressed" (p. xix), is achieved brilliantly throughout the text. Most chapters are laden with more questions than answers, and thus Kreitzer's work successfully launches a thought provoking reflection on institutions of social work education in Ghana. However, the second expressed purpose, to "challenge African social workers and schools of social work to critically look at their curriculum" and evaluate its pertinence to African culture and society (p. xix), seems to be only be partially achieved. The complexity of education and policy in Africa, among other things, makes the hope of widespread exposure of Kreitzer's work to "*African* social workers" seem only a distant dream. Having said that, this text can still powerfully affect change by being aimed at a different, and arguably more mislead, audience.

As Kreitzer very honestly admits early in the book, this text is yet another foreigner's analysis of the problems of African social work education. Kreitzer uses the engaging Participatory Action Research (PAR) method in conducting research and attempting to inspire grassroots results, however, it is important to note that this text is better suited for Western academics. For Western scholars, Kreitzer's work offers a powerfully faceted understanding of the challenges and intricacies of working in the "development" and "social work" sectors in Africa. While Chapter 6 offers recommended courses for a revised social work curriculum (pp. 154-65), these courses are specific to the Ghanaian case study and should be used as just this—a single case study. The power of this work lies in challenging Western students of social work to recognize the prejudices, misconceptions, and ignorance that are often carried by foreigners into

Africa. With engagement in non-profit work in Africa ablaze, especially among Western students, this work is important to read alongside popular texts such as Dambisa Moyo's *Dead Aid.*

After a Preface, Introduction, and Prologue where Kreitzer briefly describes the research, methods, and purpose of the book, she launches into Chapter 1. Each chapter is beautifully represented by an Adinkra symbol, and the meaning of Chapter One's symbol is "go back and take," a fitting talisman for the literature review and historical context. Kreitzer speaks at length about the effects of Africa's colonial past, a theme that is carried throughout the book. The text challenges African institutions of social work to move away from the traditional European centered social work curriculum and define an African-centric one rich in indigenous case studies and culturally relevant teachings. The literature review in Chapter 1 highlights the absence of an organized and accessible database documenting African social work activities, despite the fact that social work has been practiced in Africa for over half a century.

Chapter 2, "Cultural Identity," takes an anthropological approach to situating social work within a uniquely Ghanaian identity. While short, this chapter is important in challenging scholars to recognize the effects of the "deficit orientation" often applied to Africa, branded the "hopeless continent" (p. 49). Once again, the colonial past is blamed for stripping Africans of their history and pride in their heritage. In conjunction with redefining and reconnecting African's with their rich indigenous history and identity, another important theme arises –the lack of pride and respect for social work in Africa. Kreitzer presents a battery of reasons for this distaste towards social work, most of which center around insufficient training, lack of effectiveness, and the general perception that social workers come to "change" a community that does not necessarily want to be changed. This chapter brings up important questions, especially for Western social workers, about the appropriateness of social work methodology, definitions of modernity, and the applicability of the social work institution in the African context.

Chapter 3 and 4 discuss the overwhelming presence of Western knowledge in social work curricula and the challenges that African states face in a rapidly globalizing and interconnected world. Kreitzer delves more deeply into the problems of higher education in Africa, where a degree is often sought to allow a student to work in the Western world (p. 79). Furthermore, the institutions of social work in Ghana are almost solely reliant on Western texts, failing to provide students the resources to engage appropriately with African communities. While it is not explicitly stated, this chapter reflects deeply on the failure of African education systems. Hopefully, this chapter stimulates reflection by administrators and staff, both foreign and domestic, about where education fits in the complex political and social landscape. It is worth questioning if social work education is more applicable at primary or secondary levels, and further, if the current structure of social work in Ghana is even appropriate. In this vein, Kreitzer reflects upon the global problems of Neo-liberal policy. Due to low salaries and lack of pride in the social work institution, there is little incentive for social workers to engage politicians to address international inequalities. This chapter challenges social workers to consider how to participate at national and international levels to begin crafting a solution to the ruinous global economic order. It is worth considering that the immediate role of social

workers in Ghana might only be at the national level, where a focus on crafting policy that makes social work at community and local levels feasible is paramount.

Presenting a well-recognized argument, Chapter 5 decomposes the current model of international aid, exposing the frequently crippling effects of misdirected money. In this chapter Kreitzer inspires Western students to reflect on how culture powerfully influences behavior. As non-profit work has become popular and almost "trendy" in the Western world, it is critical that Western scholars understand the failures of past aid efforts and use innovation in crafting new and more effective models to empower communities. Domestic and foreign administrators of aid must recognize effective means of working with traditional authorities to achieve community driven solutions. This chapter, rich in analysis of aid efforts in a globalizing world, offers powerful discussion points that challenge and de-romanticize NGO and IGO efforts.

Chapter 6, "Creating Culturally Relevant Education and Practice," is the meat of Kreitzer's work. Part fieldwork manual and part research analysis, this chapter, if nothing else, should be read by students of social work, development, and anthropology as they prepare to engage in field work. The PAR research method is discussed in more depth along with the practical challenges of doing fieldwork in Africa where communities usually expect research to result in action (although often hard to express, this is not necessarily the purpose of fieldwork). Kreitzer details the way she and her research group worked in the field and offers the strategy she used to deliver something "tangible" to the community. While this fieldwork analysis and research summary apply mainly to the Ghanaian case study, students can learn from the methods and begin to grapple with the realities of working in both urban and rural settings in Africa.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the book with a reiteration of major themes. The themes of creating a proud African identity, a curriculum based on African case studies, and a uniquely African style of social work training and practice provide a spark for discussions of social work in a variety of contexts. The importance of Kreitzer's work lies in creating a more textured view of the value and possibility of integrating rich African case studies into the global study of social work. While most African students will likely never read this text, its importance in Western universities must not be overlooked.

Brittany Morreale, *Lopez Lomong Foundation and 4 South Sudan.*

**Carol Magee. 2012.** *Africa in the American Imagination: Popular Culture, Racialized Identities, and African Visual Culture***. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 263 pp.**

Africanist art historian Carol Magee's first book offers important insight into how African nations and peoples are represented in American popular culture and how such imaginations reflect ideological standpoints. Magee selects four case studies to highlight the normalization of American understandings of Africa created and promoted by enterprises of Western popular culture. Magee also considers the degree to which American representations of African visual culture mediate American self-understandings with respect to black and white racialized identities. Magee eliminates a surprising gap in the literature on the topic within visual culture studies in an engaging, jargon-free, and critical manner.

Although the introduction identifies the audience as persons who engage with Africa passively, through popular cultural, the book is quite relevant for specialists. Indeed, many specialists are aware of the misguided assumptions about Africa that result from media presentations and other popular culture imaginations, but fewer may give critical thought to *how* those ideas are generated. Magee puts a spotlight on these mechanisms and thus serves both Africanists and students beginning to think critically about representations of Africa.

Magee uses four cases to advance her thesis: the 1996 *Sports Illustrated* swimsuit issue, Mattel's Ghanaian Barbie, and two elements of the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida. Not only did the 1996 *Sports Illustrated* swimsuit issue feature the first cover image of an African American model, it included a feature shoot at an Ndebele village in South Africa. Magee argues that the magazine offers insight into a nexus of ideological positions—fantasy, desire, and race—that ultimately asserts the superiority of white skin over black. Magee considers the representational conventions of the swimsuit issue in relation to those germane to the photographic essay in popular magazines and compares the power relationships and ideological positions that are subsequently conveyed. Regarding the Ndebele village in South Africa, Magee considers both what the photos communicate to an American audience—touristic travel and its attendant associations of Western superiority—and to the Ndebele viewers, who may and did perceive a positive representation, one that speaks to cultural pride, autonomy and economic empowerment. This chapter highlights the depth of Magee's research, and provides for a richer discussion than this reviewer anticipated from an analysis of the iconic swimsuit issue.

Magee Considers the Ghanaian Barbie—produced by Mattel as part of its "Dolls of the World" series—as a representative instance wherein an imagined Africa, though positively intended, ultimately reveals the cultural biases of its maker. Magee wonderfully picks up on this tension and analyzes the doll as an expression of nostalgia for an earlier era, one marked by American hegemony and stable cultural identities. Unfortunately, Mattel withheld permission to reproduce images of the doll for the book; Magee provides a detailed description of Ghanaian Barbie in her text, but the lack of visuals unnecessarily hinders the effectiveness of this chapter.

Magee's trip to Disney World first takes the reader to the "It's a Small World" ride and then to the Disney Animal Kingdom Lodge. Magee draws on a discussion of Orientalism to argue that representations of Africa within "It's a Small World" advance "a Disney ideal of a small, white, American world" rather than a world of inclusivity. The analysis of the Disney Animal Kingdom Lodge (DAKL) is perhaps the most interesting in the book, and it is here that the novelty of Magee's discussion is most apparent. In her analyses Magee balances the complex ways that cultural producers such as Disney generate imaginations of Africa that are at once productive and restrictive. The DAKL aims to re-create an African environment, wherein visitors can eat African food, view African art and artifacts, interact with African citizens that work for the lodge, and view African animals. But Magee's analysis reveals that the park ultimately presents a colonial representation of Africa to its American audience.

Each time the reader might ask for contextual information regarding the objects under discussion, Magee quickly answers, often using unlikely sources—who knew the *Sports Illustrated* models kept diaries? While in the end the reader better understands how American

perceptions of Africa are generated, the reader is less informed about how Americans *actually* perceive Africa and African visual culture following their interactions with these objects and places. While the latter issue was not the focus of Magee's study, the thorough examination of the conditioning of perceptions feels disproportionately represented to the realization of them within the American public. Overall, however, the text is an engaging and informative read, and a very welcome addition to the field.

Meghan Kirkwood, *University of Florida*

**Mahmood Mamdani. 2012.** *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity.* **Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 154 pp.**

Mamdani's book which is organized into a brief introduction and three short, but concise and insightful chapters, is based on lectures inspired from the author's reading of W.E.B. Dubois's *The World and Africa* (1947) and from his realization that he had given an inadequate answer to an important question posed at one of the lecture events about how British indirect rule was different from previous empires (including the Roman Empire). Mamdani explores the dichotomy between settler and native as separate political identities and shows how this new politics of identity laid the basis of British indirect rule and native administration in British colonies worldwide. He argues that the crisis of the British Empire in the mid-nineteenth century starting with a mutiny in India in 1857 attracted the attention of British intellectuals, especially Sir Henry Maine, who claimed that natives were bound by geography and custom rather than history and law. This view not only led to the re-examination of the colonial mission, but also to the transformation of colonial peoples' cultural identities to political identities and to the establishment of administrative reforms starting in India and spreading to other British colonies in Africa and elsewhere. The author then analyzes the intellectual and political dimensions of the decolonization and nationalist movements in Africa.

The introduction contends that indirect rule was a form of governance considered the "holy grail" of managing pluralism and difference in modern statecraft. He argues that it was different from modes of rule in previous western empires (including Roman and British "direct" rule before mid-19th century) in two important ways: first, previous empires focused on conquered elites rather than masses of the colonized; and second, they sought to eliminate difference through a policy of cultural or political assimilation of colonized elites (pp. 1-2). The author views the political identity of 'native' as an invention of intellectuals of a British empire-in-crisis. Furthermore, Mamdani analyzes the distinction between settler and native and between natives on the basis of tribe, and the creation of indirect rule. He argues that the indirect rule state governed natives under the native authority and restricted their rights to land and power on the basis of native tribe or tribal identity designated by the colonial regime. Finally, while citizenship was accorded to the colonial settler, the native was denied the same. He then suggests that "the only emancipation possible for the settler and native is for both to cease to exist as political identities" (p. 4) once such identities are abolished. This was a position achieved in Tanzania under its first president, Julius Nyerere.

In Chapter One, Mamdani explores how Sir Henry Maine, using a theory of history and of law, distinguished the settler from the native by asserting that the former was guided by universal civilization, while the latter was influenced by local customs that were fixed and unchanging. This distinction constituted Maine's theory of nativism. More importantly, Maine's intellectual ideas were incorporated into colonial policies and native administrative practices as his important books, such as *Ancient Law*, were required reading for new and prospective colonial administors in Asia and Africa.

Mamdani argues that the transition from direct to indirect rule was precipitated by the dual crises faced by the British Empire (between 1857 and 1865): crises of mission and legitimacy. According to Mamdani, Maine's larger point of distinguishing between western and non-western societies in terms of types of laws, identities, and political societies was to highlight his desire to slow down any meaningful change in colonies. He saw such changes in colonies not only as undesirable but as potentially fomenting anti-colonialism as had been the case in colonial India. Although indirect rule's language seemed benign, its doctrine of non-interference in certain domains of colonial societies (such as religion) was contradictory. For example, by defining the customary realm and determining the list of natives to be "protected," the colonial indirect rule state gave itself vast powers over natives (pp. 26-30). Mamdani observes that in the final analysis, proponents of indirect rule "had vast ambitions; to remake subjectivities so as to realign its bearers. This was no longer just divide and rule; it was define and rule" (p. 42).

While Chapter One deals with Maine's theory of nativism, Chapter Two discusses the practice of such nativism. In particular, Mamdani views indirect rule as a new and modern method of governance aimed at understanding and managing differences in British colonies. He believes that the primary focus of colonial power (especially after the 1857 mutiny in colonial India) was defining colonial subjectivity. Colonial civil law was seen as central to managing and reproducing differences in the indirect rule state. It not only recognized systems of customary law but also defined traditional societies as tribes under the jurisdictions of tribal authorities with rights of power and access to tribal lands. The law used the census as a tool of intentionally dividing the population into two politicized identities; race and tribe (rather than between colonizer and colonized). More importantly, as a political strategy, "tribalization was the kernel of native administration and indirect rule" (p. 71). The focus on race –tribe distinctions obscured the pre-colonial history of native migrations and effectively portrayed "the native as a product of geography rather than history" (p. 47). However, the reality is that natives and non-natives alike were influenced by both residence (geography) and origin (history), as Mamdani so clearly demonstrates.

Furthermore, the race-tribe dichotomy laid the basis for discrimination and inequality during the indirect rule state and in some situations continued during the post-colonial era. Indirect rule and its system of native administration institutionalized tribal discrimination under the guise of cultural diversity and the so-called doctrine of non-interference. Mamdani contends that British adoption of indirect rule was "less to civilize the elites than to shape popular subjectivities. In this sense … indirect rule was vastly more ambitious than what the Romans had imagined or practiced" (p. 84).

Mamdani observes in the final chapter that the intelligentsia and the political class, the two key groups preoccupied with decolonization, were propelled to create a nationalist movement with the goal of establishing an independent post-colonial nation-state. He argues that during the struggle for state formation, the intelligentsia sought to give the independent state a history it had been denied while the political class worked hard to create a shared citizenship within an independent and sovereign state. Among the intelligentsia, the famous Nigerian historian, Yusuf Bala Usman, argued for an alternative approach of understanding the historical movement of political communities in pre-colonial Africa by using multiple sources to deconstruct key ethnic and racial categories starting with Hausa and Fulani speaking peoples in Nigeria. The challenge he set for historians was to locate the development of political identities in an historical context of internal migrations and state formation prior to colonialism.

In post-colonial Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere and TANU peacefully dismantled the structures of indirect rule and 'successfully implemented an alternative form of statecraft" (p. 107). During the first phase of nation building, Nyerere not only rejected indirect rule and its racialist policies but relied heavily on the single-party system to create a national language (Swahili) and a national army, and sought to detribalize the Tanzanian society. And during the second phase (1967 to 1977), Nyerere used the Arusha Declaration to intervene in the economy for ideological and pragmatic reasons. Under the era of villagization, Nyerere "called upon peasants to form Ujamaa villages and to increase their productivity and welfare through collective self-help" (p. 119). Unfortunately, once this policy failed, Nyerere and TANU resorted to the use of "coercion" to settle peasants in Ujamaa villages and partitioned the country among donors by region. Regarding Nyerere's achievements, Mamdani suggests that his seminal accomplishment was "creating an inclusive citizenship and building a nation-state" (p. 108).

Mamdani's book does not attempt to explore "how the rulers of empire re-examined their own hegemony in the face of the divisions within their own camp and the challenges from the people they were trying to rule" (Cooper and Stoler, p. 609). In particular, it is claimed that tensions among colonizers meant that efforts to define natives as political identities in order to govern them using indirect rule were not always easily accepted, but were rather "problematic, contested, and changing" (ibid.). This implies there was a constant struggle to define and manage difference in colonial states. The decolonization era clearly underscores the tensions and struggles between the colonizer and the colonized.

Overall, the book represents a carefully argued and insightful analysis of the intellectual origins and contextual practices of indirect rule as a new and modern strategy of governance aimed at understanding and managing difference in British colonies worldwide. The book is a must read not only for students of colonial government policies and history but also for contemporary scholars preoccupied with understanding the challenges facing the post-colonial state in Africa and Asia.

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Johnson W. Makoba, University of Nevada, Reno

**Jack Mangala, ed. 2013.** *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership*. **New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 257 pp.**

While the European Union has been struggling with numerous internal challenges, such as institutional reforms, the Euro crisis, a new self-definition about its global (stronger) actorness, just to name a few critical issues, the increasingly interpolar environment with a "tectonic power shift" signaling "the slow dislocation of the West as the epicentre of world politics" (p. xi) demands that the EU redefines its positions in a broader sense of interregional relations. Among these, Euro–African linkages 'stand at a critical juncture' (p. xii) and the partnership needs to be restructured, as politicians on both continents voiced in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century. They felt that a "moment of great historical significance" (p. 3.) arrived in December 2007 with the Lisbon EU–Africa Summit and by adopting the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES), which is supposed to deepen the political dialogue with the aim of making the implementation of actions more efficient in a refined strategic framework. With the rise of emerging actors including Brazil, Turkey, India, and the seemingly most fearful of all (to the West), China, and calculating with the positive economic trends across the African continent in the longer run, the EU has to consider an additional dimension: to stay competitive and reaffirm its positions with Africa. On the African side, in the meantime, for political and economic reasons mainly, but also for historic and cultural accounts, a more mature and post-"donor–client approach" is demanded to help the continent's rise and leave its former image of hopelessness behind for good. The ambitious joint strategy certainly "speaks to the resilience and adaptive nature of historical, economic, cultural, and political ties that so complexly bind Europe to Africa" (pp. 41-42), but it is evidently "cumbersome and difficult to navigate' the process with all its institutional and non-institutional actors" (p. 42.). Therefore, one must stay critical (even if optimistic) about its future.

Jack Mangala manages to stay sufficiently critical, which is indeed welcomed in such a comprehensive scholarly volume. He is not only the editor of the book, but also author of five chapters out of a collection of eleven. His arguments are clear, solid and easy to follow, avoiding overstatements and sentimentality. Although the book undoubtedly acknowledges the positive developments in African–European relations in the past years, and is in favor of the Lisbon strategy, throughout its discussion it thoroughly presents all the pros and cons, thus intends to provide the necessary critical analysis so that the reader understands both the obstacles and opportunities.

The volume stems from a panel at the fourth European Conference on African Studies (ECAS) held in 2011 at Uppsala University, Sweden, and the follow-up debates. It is structured along the eight thematic partnerships of the Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, and seven chapters are devoted respectively to peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, the Millennium Development Goals, climate change and the environment, energy, migration, and mobility and employment. Although the themes science, information society and space are scarcely dealt with (no separate chapter looks at them in detail), they appear in a number of instances, in particular, connected with migration, which, "both historically and politically, represents one of the most important questions in EU–Africa relations" (p. 217). The first of the three-part structure sets the context of investigation by the editor himself: he introduces us to the historical background, the institutional architecture, the

underlying (and sometimes conflicting) theoretical considerations, as well as the significance of the reconfigured strategic partnership. In the largest second section seven scholars analyze the thematic partnerships, then, a neatly formulated closing section of the last two chapters summarizes the major conclusions and encourage the reader to think further about the perspectives and prospects of the partnership. These last pieces can be rightly considered as the most critical sets of opinions, underpinning the fact that "a five-year timeframe is too short to fully assess its substantive impact on Africa–EU relations" (p. 243), also admitted by the editor himself.

The *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership* accomplishes its stated goals with keeping to a disciplined and well-researched analysis of an evolving European–African context (in light of an even more evolving global setting). Apart from some minor inconsistencies and repetitions (especially with abbreviations and their full meanings keeping returning all over again), Mangala and his fellow authors created a basic timely reading for anyone—students, researchers and policy-makers at the same time—wishing to look into the processes that influence one of the major frameworks of interregional ties in our transnational global world. It is particularly recommended to those who developed an interest in the relatively rapidly changing context of the international relations of Africa.

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**Norman N. Miller. 2012.** *Encounters with Witchcraft: Field Notes from Africa*. **Albany NY: State University of New York Press in cooperation with African-Caribbean Institute, Hanover NH. 232 pp.**

This is not your usual academic treatise, yet it is full of valuable insights for anybody interested in doing field research in Africa. More specifically, Miller takes the reader on a ride through the complex field of witchcraft in Africa discussing his experience of living with witches, his encounters with witch-hunters and witch-cleaners, the Christian campaigns to eliminate witchcraft, the commercialization of witchcraft in urban contexts, the use of witchcraft in politics, its role in business, and its symbolic use and power as expressed through the arts.

Very few could have produced this very readable book. Miller is an old generation Africanist having begun his research—however tentative at that time—in the late 1950s eventually leading to a Ph.D. in political science from Michigan State University. In 1970, he published a seminal piece in the *American Political Science Review* on political participation in rural Tanzania. Being as much a journalist and photographer interested in reporting as a serious academic, however, Miller never landed a tenured university job but continued to operate as a freelancer taking on consultancies for African governments and U.N. organizations and, at one point, embarking on a documentary film project about "Faces of Change" in Africa, supported by the National Science Foundation.

The book is not only about Africa but also about Miller's own life and how he has interacted with Africa and its peoples for more than fifty years. He is full of respect for the many interesting persons he meets, for example Mohammadi, a woman accused of witchcraft, Chief Mwansasu who initially denied the existence of witchcraft in his area but later became a

most valuable source of information, Edom Mwasanguti, the witch-cleaner, and Chief Mturu Mdeka and his descendants of Usagara Chiefdom in central Tanzania, to mention some of those who feature in great detail in the book. Miller treats every one of them with integrity, and there is never an attempt on his part to take the moral high ground. The central theme in his field notes and in the book is to gain understanding of a complex phenomenon that people, both past and present, relate to on a daily basis but few talk about or discuss in public.

I like the way Miller approaches the subject. He never sees the people he writes about as "the Other" but tries his best to see the world from their perspective without ever assuming that he fully knows the way they live in it. Perhaps because he is at the bottom a political scientist with an interest in current affairs, Miller sees witchcraft as a human rights issue of growing significance in Africa. He realizes that witchcraft, including witch-cleaning, can easily encourage mob justice, as the case has been in Tanzania and other countries where, for example, old women become innocent victims. As Miller together with other prominent persons like Professor Amina Mama, with interest in witchcraft as a human right issue argued at a Roundtable at the 2012 ASA Annual Meeting, the assaults of witchcraft on African health, safety, and human rights have reached epidemic, crisis proportions in many areas and are the cause of thousands of deaths, mutilations, and much family strife.

Readers who approach the book from a strictly academic perspective may complain about the lack of a coherent theory or generous references to the literature whether in anthropology or other disciplines. Miller is pragmatic: he uses theory in a parsimonious and instrumental manner to make his points, not really to test data or inform it using a case study approach. The number of references is accordingly also limited.

The book is well written and the material organized in an easily accessible manner. There are unfortunately a number of misspelled names. For instance, Clyde Kluckhohn becomes Kluckholm, David Livingstone becomes Livingston, and the town of Nyeri becomes Nyere. There are also a few factual mistakes. For example, the Ankole people are not cousins of the Hima people; the Hima are the upper caste among the Ankole, Toro, Banyoro and Haya peoples. He also puts the Swahili words *malaya kidogo* in the mouth of a Swahili-speaking person when it should have been *malaya mdogo* (little prostitute). These few blemishes, however, do not take away the pleasure of reading this very informative book.

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**Laura T. Murphy. 2012. *Metaphor and the Slave Trade in West African Literature*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 243 pp.**

The transatlantic slave trade that was responsible for the great dispersal of African people to the Americas had a profound effect on both the enslaved and those who were left behind. But more often than not the literature on the transatlantic slave trade deals with the experiences of those who embarked on the ships, who experienced the Middle Passage, and who were enslaved in the Americas. *Metaphor and the Slave Trade in West African Literature* seeks to bridge the gap between those who went before and those who were left by examining how the memory of the former is kept alive in the minds of the latter.

In this groundbreaking work, Laura Murphy argues that memories of the slave trade are present in African literature but tend to be overlooked because these memories are not revealed in the forms of overt narrativization that is often found in African American literature. Largely focusing on four canonical Anglophone writers from West Africa—Amos Tutuola, Ben Okri, Ayi Kwei Armah, and Ama Ata Aidoo—Murphy explores how the distant past is represented in West African culture and literature in forms of "alternative memory" and metaphorization such as tragic repetition, fear and gossip, and tropes of suffering, bondage, and impotent sexuality.

The book is organized into six main chapters with an introduction and an epilogue. Each chapter discusses a metaphor associated with the slave trade in the novels. She also references letters, diaries, and autobiographies of the 18th and 19th century witnesses to the transatlantic slave trade. In chapter one, she argues that the literature, histories, and criticism of the transatlantic slave trade have been dominated by African Americans whose lives were defined by the diaspora experience of the trade. She contends that a reading of West African literature will engender a different system of tropes, figures, and images that represents both the horrors and the cultures produced by the slave trade.

Chapter two is centered on Amos Tutuola's *My Life in the Bush of Ghosts* (1954) and examines metaphors of captivity and enslavement in the landscape of the bush; as well as Tutuola's use of the trope of "the body in the bag" to represent the enduring legacy and memory of the slave trade in West African culture and psychology. In the third chapter Ben Okri's *The Famished Road* (1993) and his appropriation of Tutuola's body in the bag to critique global capitalism is discussed. In this chapter, the writer indicates how the narrative of the slave trade erupts onto the narrative of independence era- Nigeria to show how memory of the past can always be found in the present.

Chapter four examines Ayi Kwei Armah's *Fragments* (1969) with its focus on the African complicity in the slave trade. Murphy discusses how Armah traces the contemporary materialism in the society to the slave trade where vicious and deadly consumption of human lives were acted out. The impotent body as metaphor for the effects of the slave trade on the African continent is the subject of analysis in chapter five, which focuses on two of Ama Ata Aidoo's texts; *Anowa* (1965) and *Our Sister Killjoy* (1979). The memory of the slave trade is depicted as the debasement of the human body as a commodity and the desecration of intimacy.

The last chapter explores the long-term effects on the communities that were left behind on the African continent during slavery. Excerpts from Wole Soyinka's *Death and the King's Horseman* (1975), Chinua Achebe's *Arrow of God* (1964), and T. Obinkaram Echewa's *I Saw the Sky Catcht Fire* (1992) are used in the discussion. Finally, the epilogue turns to more contemporary writings of the historical novel on the slave trade from West Africa, and the potential for the emergence of an African historical novel tradition.

*Metaphor and the Slave Trade* is a book that is long overdue in African literary studies. Using many of the literary canon's most read texts, the author has presented a new perspective in the reading of these and other texts of African literature, opening the way forward for readers to nuance each and every African text for the subtle metaphors that point to a people's memory of the slave trade.

One drawback to this book may lie in the inadequacy of literary texts from many countries on the West African Coast beyond Ghana and Nigeria; a shortfall which the writer attributes to the lack of literary texts from these countries. Regardless of this, the book will serve as a great resource for students and scholars of African literature, African cultural studies and the transatlantic slave trade. Its simple and straightforward language would also make it useful for non-academics who are interested in the slave trade and its effects on the African Continent.

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**Beatrice Nicolini. 2012.** *The First Sultan of Zanzibar: Scrambling for Trade in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Ocean.* **Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Press. xxvii, 179 pp.**

For Africanists, the innovation in *The First Sultan of Zanzibar* is that it is an "Oman-centric" account of the political relationships established in Zanzibar at that time. This is different than more traditional accounts, which place the European colonial powers, be they Britain, Portugal, or France, at the center of the colonial story. When Nicolini puts Oman at the center of her narrative hub, the relationships between Zanzibar, Oman, and Makran in Baluchistan are highlighted, rather than the European capitals. Ironically, Nicolini does this by using the familiar sources of the British English language colonial archives. Thus, although, the story is indeed, as she intended about the Oman-centric trade-based "thallasocracy," it is still told through the eyes of the British colonial servants who directed The Great Colonial Game.

As is well known, when the Europeans arrived in East Africa in the nineteenth century, they encountered merchant-based trading networks based in Zanzibar that reached deep into the Tanzanian interior. Merchants had by that time established interior trading posts in Tabora, Ujiji, and eventually on into what is now the eastern Congo using the trade organizations of Oman-based Arabs. These Arabs operated from fortresses staffed by their Baluchi soldiers, African allies, and slaves. From these stations the merchants not only received British explorers like Burton and Livingstone, they also exported slaves and ivory to their plantations on the Indian Ocean islands. Indeed, this trade proved so lucrative that Sultan Saiyid Sai'di (1797-1856), the Sultan of Oman, in 1840 moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar from whence he continued to rule enterprises extending into central Africa, Zanzibar, the Persian Gulf, and into Baluchistan.

The strength of Nicolini's book is in the first half, where she emphasizes the Oman-Zanzibar-Mekara relationship and its role in the Indian Ocean world of the nineteenth century. Her use of the obscure term "thallasocracy" highlights that these were trade-based relationships, rather than Westfalian-style sovereignty. Particularly intriguing is Nicolini's argument that European concepts of sovereignty, with its emphasis on formal boundaries, citizenship-based loyalties, and non-interference are a poor fit for the Oman-centric world relationship she describes. Sultan Saiyid Sa'id, she points out, was the master of a web of far-flung relationships, not a sovereign maintaining a monopoly over the use of military force in a particular territory. She explores this thesis well in the first half of the book.

The book's second half focuses on the British and French struggles for influence in the Indian Ocean world with each other and in the context of later British opposition to the slave

trade. This half will be of interest to historians studying more traditional colonial relationships, and it is quite different from the first half, which is about relationships between Makran, Oman, and the east African coast.

After reading Nicolini's book, I found myself wanting to know more, which is a sign of an intriguing book. In particular, I want to know more about the role of Baluchi military who supported the Arab Sultans of Oman and Zanzibar. As Nicolini describes, they made their way into the Tanzanian interior probably in the 1830s and 1840s, extending Omani thallosocratic-style sovereignty into unexpected places. I also was curious about what Arab sources, including those in Omani archives, have to say about these events. Indeed, Nicolini cites interviews with the descendants of the Arab trader Tippu Tib, who, lived in Muscat as recently as 1993. What else might be available in Oman for linguistically sophisticated historians interested in nineteenth century east African exploration?

Finally, I wanted to know more about the relationships within the Zanzibar court; despite the title of the book, this is not a biography of Sultan Saiyid Sa'idi. But, there is enough here to indicate that a full-scale biography of a man who ruled over such an intriguing socio-political arrangement is needed.

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**Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome and Olufemi Vaughan. 2012.** *West African Migrations: Transnational and Global Pathways in New Century Child Migration in Africa.* **New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 280 pp.**

*West African Migrations*: *Transnational and Global Pathways in New Century Child Migration in Africa* examines various avenues by which West African immigrants, specifically in the United States, negotiate their multiple identities in the context of transnational ties. Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome and Olufemi Vaughan are the editors of this book of ten chapters. In chapter one, titled "West African Migrations and Globalization: Introduction" and written by Okome and Vaughan, the authors used this platform to offer insight into how the book came to life, discussed the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are used in the book, as well as gave synopses of each chapters. They note that this book is one of a two-part volume from papers presented at a symposium, which they organized, on transnational Africa and globalization in November 2008 at Bowdoin College. Based on the scholars' diverse research, "the symposium examined how African migration to various parts of the world after the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s transformed African states and their new transnational population" (p. 1). Participants examined the relationship of a variety "of social, political, economic, and religious forces" (p. 1) that impact nature and transnationalism.

Utilizing a form of personal narrative and/or autoethnography, the authors used their personal experiences to highlight their lived transnationalism. Chapter two, by Okome, is titled '"You Can't Go Home No More': Africans in America in the Age of Globalization." Okome argues that African immigrants can only pay a visit to Africa but cannot go back to live there in the era of globalization. She uses her lived experiences to support her claim, touching on a variety of topics, including how she uses her primordial experiences of Yoruba and the

language to negotiate her transnational and diasporic life experiences. Her constant usage of "Ibo" as opposed to "Igbo" was an obvious "post-colonial hangover of British and Euro-Caucasoid colonial miseducation, misrepresentations, and (mis) pronunciation preference."[1]

Chapter three, contributed by Samuel Zalanga, is titled "Transnational Identity Formation as a Kaleidoscopic Process: Social Location, Geography, and the Spirit of Critical Engagement." Zalanga critically investigates the process of his transnationalism in the context of identity formation, which commenced from his youthful days. Even though he relives his transnational identity formation in the United States, he also claims that ethnic identity is stronger than religious identity based on his experiences in Nigeria. This chapter is a reminder that there are other minority ethnic groups that exist in the northern part of Nigeria who have been living "under the hegemonic influence of Hausa-Fulani culture" (p. 47). These groups are marginalized because of their socio-religious identities.

Chapter four by Elisha P. Renne, "What to Wear? Dress and Transnational African Identity," discusses how to dress in the context of transnational African identities. She articulates that as opposed to what is the norm in the Western-dominated culture as related to dress, Africans who are not influenced by Western culture blend in with their environment ethnically, as Africans and as nationalists. She says that a choice on how to dress could depend on if the individual is residing in a rural or an urban area as well what the occasion calls for. This chapter is significant especially because the forces of globalization, including those that influence social behavior, do not provide equal platforms for the Global North and Global South.

Chapter five, Peyi Soyinka-Airewle's "Insurgent Transnational Conversations in Nigeria's 'Nollywood' Cinema," provides insight into the Nigerian film industry, known as "Nollywood." She notes that Nollywood has created competition with Hollywood for African audiences. The industry has generated fresh methods of imagining Africa, as well as becoming a fresh avenue of interpreting Pan-Africanism as it continues to create space that exhibits African identities. She notes that collaborations for film production have become a new trend of Nollywood. This chapter is relevant, articulating Nollywood discourse in the light of transnationalsim.

Bruce Whitehouse's "Centripetal Forces: Reconciling Cosmopolitan Lives and Local Loyalty in Malian Transnational Social Field" (chapter 6) engages ethnographic fieldwork to explore an African community known as Togotala of Mali, which has a population of 8,000, in the context of transnational migration. Whitehouse found that Togotalan migrants establish transnational ties through the remittance of money to their homes in support of relatives. They also finance the building of mosques and public works, observe town politics and send their children back to their ancestral homeland. The practice of sending children back home is dwindling in some African communities, while it still thrives in others. Whitehouse's research challenges us to think about transnationalism, especially as Africa's cultures evolve.

In chapter seven, "Toward an African Muslim Globality: The Parading of Transnational Identities in Black America," Zain Abdullah narrates how for the most part West African Muslims celebrate "Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Day" in New York City in the context of globalization. He notes that Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (1853-1927), who is from Senegal, founded the Murid Sufi Brotherhood during the end of the nineteenth century. Even though the

chapter is about how African Sufis negotiate their multiple identities, including Black, African, and Muslim, it also addresses the effects of gender and class. This transnational engagement allows not only Senegalese but other Blacks in New York City to come together and celebrate as brothers and sisters.

In chapter eight, "African Migrant Worker Militancy in the Global North: Labor Contracting and Independent Worker Organizing in New York City," Immanuel Ness revisits how Francophone West African deliverymen, primarily undocumented immigrants, were underpaid and their rights were undercut in New York's supermarket industry. With the formation of the African Workers Association, there were several attempts by some of the deliverymen to call attention to the October 27 -29, 1999 strike which was carried out by the *New York Times*, Manhattan weekly newspapers, and other local publications. This chapter encourages African immigrants to articulate their rights, especially when oppressed in Africa and in the Diaspora.

Chapter nine, written by Titilayo Ufomata, is titled "Transnational Memories and Identity." Highlighting transnational memories and identities, Ufomata discusses ambulatory and transnationalist identities, as well as immigrants' minority identity formation. She notes that minority status is defined based on the host country's discourse. African immigrants are faced with multiple identities in their new environment. In the United States, the identities include African, African American, and Black. This well-articulated chapter deals with identity negotiation in the context of transnationalism.

In chapter ten, "Arrested Nationalism, Imposed Transnationalism, and the African Literature Classroom: One Nigerian Writer's Learning Curve," Pius Adesanmi raises points about African writers, specifically Nigerians who are in the Diaspora and the ancestral homeland. He talks about the tensions that exist at every level of their works, including the tension between African writers in Africa and their overseas counterparts. He shows his disappointment with African writers in the Diaspora who are hesitant to claim their Africaness. This chapter challenges not just African writers in the Diaspora but also Africans in other parts of the world to embrace and take pride in their Africaness as they negotiate their transnational lives.

In summation, *West African Migrations*: *Transnational and Global Pathways in New Century Child Migration in Africa* examines challenges and progress made by African immigrants both in Africa and in the Diaspora as they negotiate their multiple identities in the context of transnational lives. Overall, the chapters are personal narrative and/or autoethnographical. The authors share their lived experiences and define who they are instead of letting others define them. This book encourages us to tell our own stories especially in relation to transnationalism. I highly recommend this essay collection because they share the stories of understudied groups, particularly as related to transnationalism. Beneficiaries of this book include students, scholars, policymakers, and those interested in African migration and transnationalism. As a scholar who is interested in the second-generation African immigrants in the Diaspora, I personally found this edited collection helpful for my current research: second-generation Igbo in the United States and their negotiation of ethnic and transnational identities.

**Notes:**

1    Chido Nwangwu. 2001. http://www.usafricaonline.com/chido.igbosoribos.html. Other
     ongoing debates can be found at http://www.nairaland.com/595859/igbo-ibo.

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**M. Anne Pitcher. 2012.** *Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies.* **New York: Cambridge University Press. 328 pp.**

How do we understand the varied reform trajectories of African states?  Why have some undertaken comprehensive privatization efforts and developed institutional arrangements to consolidate such efforts, while others have lagged in these respects?  And why do we witness varied patterns in the character of government commitments to privatization programs?  These are the questions that M. Anne Pitcher seeks to answer in *Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies*.  In addressing them Pitcher adopts a novel theoretical framework that focuses on the structuring power of institutions, the role of party politics, and the impact of regime characteristics on reform processes.  Employing cross-national quantitative analysis and three meticulous case studies, the book offers important new insights into the varied extent and character of privatization efforts by African states.

Pitcher's primary theoretical arguments are twofold.  The first concerns the important role of institutions in helping to solidify state efforts to enact and commit to reform processes. Drawing on the insights of Kenneth Shepsle, Pitcher argues that states that exhibited substantial "motivational commitments," in the form of adopting laws and creating institutions to enact reforms, were more likely at later points in time to display commitments to private sector development that were "imperatively credible."  By creating the institutional building blocks to support a market economy, states structure the preferences and interests of key actors in a manner that contributes to the later consolidation of reform programs.  The second argument seeks to account for the varied character of private sector development among democracies that expressed initially high levels of motivational commitments to privatization.  Here, Pitcher argues that the quality of democracy and stability of the party system shape the ways that governments behave in the context of privatization pressures and conflicts. This in turn has consequences for the nature of private sector development.

Pitcher's empirical analysis and casework offer support for these arguments. In her second chapter, focused on the importance of institutions, she uses a dataset of 27 countries to examine the extent to which greater motivational commitments by states facilitated more far-reaching reform processes.  Using an innovative index to measure such motivational commitments, Pitcher finds a statistically significant relationship between those commitments and sales of state–owned enterprises (SOEs).  More importantly, she finds a clear relationship between such commitments and the subsequent strength and effectiveness of institutions to support a private sector.  This indicates that even in contexts where institutions have been perceived as weak, formal institutional changes can increase the likelihood that commitments to reform will become more durable over time.

The insights on party politics and the quality of democracy are developed in the third chapter as well as the three that follow providing case studies. In the former, Pitcher examines the trajectories of countries that initially made high motivational commitments to reform, but then varied in their subsequent implementation of privatization programs. The character of state behavior, she argues, reflected different political dynamics engendered by the character of party system and level of democracy in different countries. In liberal democratic countries, greater transparency and rule of law inhibited the arbitrary use of discretionary authority to bend or break the rules of privatization. At the same time, greater democratic openness facilitated the articulation of interests by actors affected by privatization. This led to a policy trajectory characterized by compromise over and modification of privatization measures, while retaining the broader policy commitment. In more limited democracies, leaders were less constrained in their use of discretionary authority to interfere with the privatization process for political ends. But how they used it depended substantially on the character of the party system. In situations where the party system was stable, leaders interfered with the privatization process to direct benefits to supporters. The result has been the development of partisan private sectors. Where party systems were fluid and volatile, leaders faced situations where their bases of support were ambiguous, opportunities for elite fragmentation were greater, and particularistic demands more acute. Thus leaders tended to opportunistically use their discretionary authority to change or stall privatization to benefit allies and punish enemies. They also abandoned certain reform measures by embracing populist polices designed to shore up their bases of support.

To illuminate these dynamics, Pitcher offers case studies that trace the reform experiences of Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa. Zambia serves to illustrate the dynamics of reform in limited democracies with fluid party systems. Here, leaders facing shifting constituencies and volatile elite coalitions engaged in repeated arbitrary interventions in privatization processes to serve their political needs. This included circumventing the state privatization agency to ensure that allies benefitted from the sale of SOEs. This led to ad hoc private sector development. In Mozambique, a limited democracy with a stable party system, governments used their discretion to steer privatization benefits to ruling party supporters. The fact that this occurred early in the reform process was also important as it allowed the creation of a business class that was connected to the ruling party and state. This in turn led to greater policy coordination and continuity. Finally, the South Africa case illuminates the ways that a democratic context can enable the articulation of challenges and pressures by interests affected by privatization processes. State responses entailed compromises on key elements of reforms, while still retaining the institutional arrangements that were at their foundation.

Pitcher's book is quite impressive in a number of respects. The research is exceptionally meticulous and creative. For her cross-national quantitative analysis, Pitcher develops new indexes to effectively capture and measure different dimensions of the reform process. These effectively animate the theoretical constructs that inform her study and help to illuminate the very real differences among countries in terms of the extent and character of their reform efforts. Her conceptual choices and their operationalization are carefully undertaken with detailed justification grounded in the literature from political science and institutional economics. The casework is also notable in this regard. Using existing scholarly and

journalistic accounts, government and policy documents, and material from interviews conducted during fieldwork, Pitcher offers finely detailed descriptions and analyses of reform experiences in her three case countries.

Yet it is Pitcher's theoretical contribution that deserves primary praise. Her analysis effectively demonstrates, first, that institutions matter. Progress with privatization occurred in countries that developed initial institutional building blocks for reform. This insight serves to reinforce an emerging perspective on the importance of formal institutions for African governance and development trajectories. Second, Pitcher highlights the important political variables that shape government choices in privatization processes and the patterns of private sector development that ensue. And in bringing attention to regime and party system attributes she challenges scholars to move beyond earlier understandings that connected African reform processes to state weakness and neo-patrimonial politics. In so doing, she effectively shifts the conversation about African reform experiences to a terrain that allows for more effective comparison with experiences in other regions.

At the same time, Pitcher's theoretical insights might be on stronger ground if she had more forcefully considered such existing and alternative frameworks to explain privatization processes. This is especially the case with respect to the scholarship that has brought attention to the ways that state weakness and neo-patrimonial tendencies have interfered with development and reform processes in Africa. The work of Nicolas van de Walle stands out in this regard. In this view, limited state legitimacy and capacity generate peculiar political constraints, needs and strategies, all of which have implications for economic reform efforts. From this perspective, limited and ad hoc privatization reforms in places such as Malawi, Zambia, or Mali might be tied to factors *other* than the party system per se, even if that system might reflect such factors. This is all the more pertinent when one considers that the choices of leaders have been the central mechanisms undermining privatization reforms. While party systems in places like Zambia and Malawi did little to enhance the security, support base, and operational latitude of leaders, those leaders also faced threats of extra-legal displacement and very high costs of leaving power—both of which operated independently of the party system. Might these also account for some of the attributes of the reform processes observed in those countries? Some attention to questions such as this would have strengthened Pitcher's work.

This notwithstanding, Pitcher deserves high marks for producing an excellent book. She provides a model for research and theoretical innovation and offers insights that dramatically enrich understandings of reform trajectories in Africa. There is little question that her work will inform much of the future discourse on privatization and private sector development. In this regard, it represents necessary reading for those concerned with reform and development on the African continent.

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**Paul D. Williams. 2011. *War and Conflict in Africa.* Cambridge: Polity Press. xiv. 306 pp.**

The book has a useful purpose to bring to fore the dynamics of war and clonflict, mostly relying on case studies from countries in various regions of Africa. *War and Conflict in Africa* aims, first, to introduce the reader to try and understand why Africa experienced so many armed conflicts after the Cold War, and, secondly, to stress how international society tried to end those wars and reduce the risk of future conflicts on the continent. In order to do this, Williams addresses three central questions: first, what were the main trends in Africa's armed conflicts after the Cold War (1990-2009)? Second, what accounts for those armed conflicts? And third, how did international society try and bring them to an end? Thus, the book is divided into three parts. The first part has two chapters while the second part has five chapters and deals mostly with concepts and the discourse of peace and conflict in Africa. Part three has four chapters and deals with issues in peace and conflict.

The book's structure revolves around the three central questions noted above. Part I, "Contexts" provides an overview of the statistical, conceptual, and political background on which the author bases the subsequent analysis of the key ingredients in and international responses to, Africa's wars. Chapter one, "Counting Africa's Conflicts (and their Causalities)," provides an overview of the patterns of armed conflict in Africa, thereby providing a broader historical context of warfare in post-colonial Africa in which to situate the analysis that follows in parts II and III and also analyses several attempts to count the number and scale of Africa's armed conflicts, focusing particularly on the post-Cold War period. Chapter two, "The Terrain of Struggle," provides a conceptual and political sketch of the terrain of struggle upon which they were waged. Conceptuality, it concentrates on social forces and state society complexes and frames Africa's wars as levels-of–analysis problem. This chapter then summarizes and explains the central political characteristics of Africa's post-Cold War conflict zones.

Part II, "Ingredients," reflects upon the period between 1990 and 2009 in order to understand the relationship between five issues and Africa's armed conflicts. These chapters do not provide an exhaustive list of ingredients, but the author believes they address the most widely debated issues related to Africa's wars during this period, namely, governance, resources, sovereignty, ethnicity and religion. Chapter three, "Neopatrimonialism,"analyzes the extent to which governance was related to Africa's armed conflicts by focusing on dynamics within the neo-patrimonial regime found in many of the continent's weak states. Chapter four, "Resources," assesses the extent to which so-called natural resources were a key ingredient in Africa's wars. Chapter five, "Sovereignty," tackles the key issues related to statehood and armed conflict, namely sovereignty and the associated concept of self-determination. In chapter six, "Ethnicity," the author examines the construction and manipulation of ethnic identities as an ingredient in warfare, while chapter seven, "Religion," discusses the relationship between warfare and one of the most powerful belief systems known to humans and religion.

Part III, "Responses," also reflects on the two decades since the end of the Cold War but this time analyzing the major international efforts to end Africa's wars. Chapter eight, "Organization-Building," examines international efforts to build a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which despite its title was a collaborative enterprise between African and non-African states and organizations. After providing an overview of this architecture and some of its limitations, the focus of chapters nine ("Peacemaking") and ten

("Peacekeeping") is on its two main policy instruments: peacemaking initiatives and peacekeeping operations. The former discusses international attempts to build stable peace through mediation, while the latter examines the major challenges that confronted the scores of peace operations that were deployed to the same end. Chapter eleven, "Aid," analyzes the main challenges faced by the two principal forms of external aid to Africa's war zones, humanitarian relief and development assistance. The conclusion briefly summarizes the main findings from parts II and III and reflects upon what they might mean for designing more effective responses to warfare in the future.

   The book adds to the growing literature about war and conflict in Africa; it documents important contemporary African responses to conflicts from a war and conflict studies dimension; and it offers a different conceptualization of war and conflict. *War and Conflict in Africa* can indeed serve as an introduction to key themes in war and conflict in Africa, but obviously cannot stand by itself as a foundation text in this field.

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