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"Every Car Or Moving Object Gone"The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia.

CHRISTOPHER TUCK

Abstract: This article examines the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in terms of its usefulness as a model for future African peacekeeping operations. Whilst the holding of elections in 1997 and the subsequent withdrawal of ECOMOG clearly indicate that the operation was not a failure in the way that, for example, Somalia was, this article argues that its success did not lie in its achieving answers to perennial peacekeeping problems. In terms of its intent, method and outcome, the intervention was deeply flawed and its eventual success lay in compromises made by Nigeria in the face of ECOMOG's inability to produce the desired end-state at an acceptable cost.

October 1999 saw the final withdrawal from Liberia of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. For much of its seven year duration, the vicious civil war in the West African state of Liberia barely touched Western consciousness. From the beginning of the war in 1989 to its formal conclusion in 1997, 200,000 died and 1.2 million were displaced out of a pre-war population of only 2.5m. The conflict itself exhibited all the manifestations of post cold-war intra-state conflict: state collapse; ethnic conflict; political fragmentation; warlordism; and a late and inadequate response from the United Nations.

Yet despite the severity of the conflict, 1997 saw an agreement to end hostilities, the disarmament of warring factions, the establishment of political parties and elections in July 1997 which returned Charles Ghankay Taylor as President of the Republic of Liberia. A key component of the process by which conflict termination was achieved was the deployment of a peacekeeping force sent by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG.[1] The achievements of this deployment have been favourably compared by some commentators with the failures of Western operations in Somalia and held up as "an example for the rest of the world to follow"[2] and a "unique feat in both military and peacekeeping terms."[3]

Understandably, therefore, there is a growing interest in the idea of a more developed African peacekeeping capability building in part upon this perceived success. In 1997 France established its RECAMP programme [4] and the US has introduced its Active Crisis Response Initiative. [5] ECOMOG troops have been actively engaged in Sierra Leone and deployed into Guinea-Bissau. There are, of course, good reasons why specifically regional responses make sense, not least the manifest unwillingness of the international community to countenance significant engagement.[6] Nevertheless, the problems concomitant with an African regional

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initiative are many. The purpose of this paper[7] is to examine the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia from 1989 onwards, focusing on its applicability as a model for African peacekeeping capabilities.

THE ECOMOG DEPLOYMENT

A comprehensive examination of the origins of the Liberian conflict lies outside the scope of this paper.[8] It is sufficient to identify that in December 1989, Liberian rebel forces of the National Patriotic front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from Cote d`Ivoire intent upon overthrowing the regime of President Samuel Doe. As the fighting escalated, and the international community displayed marginal interest, ECOWAS initiated a regional response to the crisis, establishing a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to try and encourage a diplomatic solution. On August 7th 1990, a lack of progress on the diplomatic front prompted the SMC to begin the insertion into Liberia of a military monitoring group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was deployed in order to overawe the warring factions, and to oversee the implementation of a cease-fire, the disarmament of the warring factions, the cessation of arms imports and the release of prisoners.

The ECOMOG operation began on 24 August 1990 with deployment of 3,000 West African troops into the Liberian capital Monrovia. It was tasked with "assisting the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in supervising the implementation and in ensuring the strict compliance by the parties with the provisions of the cease-fire throughout the territory of Liberia."[9] Whilst the commander initially envisaged a six month operation, the force continued to be deployed until late 1999, and, indeed, expanded its operations into neighbouring Sierra Leone.

The contributing nations and troop strengths varied, but included at one time or another Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the forces, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Burkino Faso and Sierra Leone. In February 1995, for example, the force consisted of 8, 430 troops organised into ten battalions; of these troops 4,908 were Nigerian, 1,028 were from Ghana, 609 from Guinea, 747 from Tanzania, 760 from Uganda, 359 from Sierra Leone, and ten each were provided by Gambia and Mali.[10] The force peaked at a strength of around 16, 000 in 1993 and by early 1997 consisted of around 11,000 troops.

During the period of its deployment, ECOMOG engaged in a variety of missions including protection of humanitarian aid, disarming of factions, cantonment, mediation, and peace enforcement. ECOMOG's formal peacekeeping role ended in February 1998, but a contingent of 5,000 remained deployed after this in a "capacity-building" role, helping to train the new Liberian security forces and to maintain order. Further withdrawals commenced in January 1999 after disputes between ECOMOG and Taylor over the treatment of ECOMOG soldiers by Liberian forces.[11]

DIFFICULTIES

The ECOMOG operation was never likely to be easy given the complexity of the situation in Liberia. Whilst ethnicity was much less of a factor early on in the struggle, as in Bosnia the manipulation of ethnic differences by faction leaders for political purposes led to a conflict

increasingly fought along ethnic lines. As well as embittering the fighting, this led to a rather "zero-sum" approach to negotiations[12]: cease-fires, for example, were often used in a calculated fashion to provide breathing spaces during which to consolidate and re-arm. In its early incarnation, the civil war pitted the troops of Doe's Liberian government, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), against the insurgents of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under Charles Taylor, the former drawn predominantly from the Krahn ethnic group, the latter from the Gio and Mano tribes. As the war continued, the situation became increasingly confused as, often with outside support, new groups appeared and existing groups fragmented. The NPFL, for example, spawned the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), as well as the Central Revolutionary Council. A new group, ULIMO (the United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia), emerged in 1991 only to fragment into a Krahn faction (ULIMO-J under Roosevelt Johnston) and a Mandingo faction (ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah). By 1995 there were at least eight major factions as well as many more minor ones.[13]

The progressive splintering of the militias (which was caused by, but also contributed to, the longevity of the conflict) created a range of problems.[14] As with Bosnia, there was a pronounced shift towards "localism" within militia groups in which weak central control led to the emergence of warlords whose objectives extended no further than personal gain; for example, economic motives such as the control of diamond mining and rubber plantations became an important dynamic in the continuation of the war. This made the formulation of an over-arching political solution very difficult.

Moreover, ethnic hatred and the progressive factionalisation of the militias made concrete advances on issues such as disarmament and demobilisation very difficult. Since weapons and troops were the basis of faction power in Liberia, agreements regarding the handing over of weapons and so forth could only succeed if every faction, however small, was included (a problem also experienced in Somalia). In reality, such difficulties meant that some factions excluded themselves from political agreements; for example the Lofa Defence Force (allied to Taylor) and the Bong Defence Front (allied to Kromah) were not signatories to the Cotonou Agreement of 1993. [15]Neither was the Liberian Peace Council, which operated in NPFL areas with clandestine support from the AFL.

The situation was further complicated by strife in Sierra Leone, one consequence of which was that Sierra Leonean resistance groups based themselves in Liberian territory; these competed with ULIMO for control of territory and resources.[16] The overall situation was also exacerbated by the composition of the militias. At least a quarter of the soldiers were children[17] who, as the conflict progressed, naturally found it harder and harder to integrate back into society. Warlords also vied for a predominant position within their ethnic group as was the case with the struggle between the Krahn groups of Roosevelt Johnson's ULIMO-J and George Boley`s LPC. This provided yet another autonomous dynamic behind the war. Thus, as the war became more prolonged, the nature of the war shifted, complicating ECOMOG`s attempts to formulate a coherent strategy and encouraging "mission creep".

At face value, the question of whether ECOMOG has been a success would seem to be redundant. Given the termination of conflict , despite the considerable difficulties posed by the complex nature of war outlined above, the case for "The ECOMOG Miracle"[18] might appear to be self evident: sceptics who characterise the operation as "unwarranted aggression and

illegality camouflaged as a peacekeeping operation"[19] might seem to have missed the point. In reality, however, ECOMOG provides a poor peacekeeping role model. In terms of intent, method, and outcomes, the ECOMOG operation embodied serious flaws which make it an imperfect model upon which to build future African intervention capabilities.

INTENT

Even at its inception, ECOMOG was controversial, not least because the justifications given for intervention were questionable. ECOWAS maintained that intervention was a duty as prescribed by the 1981 ECOWAS Defence Protocol. According to Article 16, the Head of State of the member under attack may request action or assistance from the Community. Article 4 of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to initiate collective intervention in any internal armed conflict, within any state, engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace of the entire community. Article 6(3) and Article 17 empower the Authority to decide on the expediency of military action, to impose a peacekeeping force between the warring factions or to engage in political mediation. Also Article 13(1,2) provides for creation of Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) from earmarked units.

The problem was that whilst Doe did request aid, it was from Nigeria not ECOWAS. It was Nigeria who then took the issue to ECOWAS for consideration. Whilst attempts were made to justify the intervention in terms of the existence of a crisis that would "endanger the security and peace of the entire community", ultimately there does not exist (and probably never will) any objective criteria to decide when a problem might or might not fit into this category. Given this, the issue was one of political interpretation; in the case of Liberia, this interpretation did not command consensus and provoked resistance from Francophone states such as Cote d`Ivoire and Guinea who were themselves sympathetic toward or actively supporting the NPFL.

As justifications for intervention, democracy and human rights prove to be equally problematic; humanitarian considerations provide no legal reason for intervention[20], nor could one ignore the irony of states such as Nigeria in 1990 tasking ECOMOG with "creat[ing] the necessary conditions for free and fair elections." Nor could the intervention draw on international legitimacy, since the UN did not authorise ECOMOG from the outset: the first UN political response was not until October 1992 when it retrospectively approved ECOMOG`s actions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

METHOD

It might be thought that a regional operation would stand a much better chance of avoiding common peacekeeping problems, if only by virtue of a greater interest in, and understanding of, local conditions. In dealing with a complex dispute, however, the ECOMOG force faced many of the same problems of UN operations. Indeed, in key areas, such as strategic direction, the formulation of mandates, the use of force, co-operation with other organisations, and the question of resources, the operation proved to be little more effective than other international deployments.

Divisions at the strategic political level had a significant impact on the operation. Whilst, in theory, a multi-national operation is a method of reducing tensions by preventing unilateral advantage, it can, in practice, simply act as a catalyst for conflict. This was indeed the case with ECOWAS, which was the mandating body for ECOMOG and which was supposed to exercise political control over it. ECOWAS was divided by conflicting ideas over how the ECOMOG force should operate, a situation attributable to the diverging geo-strategic interests of its member states and to emerging problems over contributions to the operation.

The clearest problem resulted from the clash between the interests of Nigeria and those of other West African states, notably Cote d`Ivoire.[21] Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the ECOMOG troops and financial contributions opposed Charles Taylor`s NPFL. It provided Samuel Doe with assistance; despite denials by the then President Ibrahim Babangida, the Nigerians supplied weapons and ammunition to Monrovia during the AFL campaign in Nimba county.[22] Once Doe had been killed, Nigeria continued to provide support for factions opposed to the NPFL, including the AFL, ULIMO, and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). Nigeria`s opposition to Taylor was founded on a number of pillars. Whilst Doe was a good friend of Nigeria`s President, Taylor`s actions, including the killings of up to 1,000 Nigerian nationals in Monrovia in 1990, and his close links with Nigeria`s regional rival Cote d`Ivoire, seemed to threaten Nigerian interests in the region.[23] Fear of a "ripple of instability" that might be generated by the Liberian war and concerns that once Taylor was in power, Liberia might become a refuge and source of aid for opponents of Nigeria`s military regime, were also contributory factors.

According to Babangida:

"[In] a sub-region of 16 countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens to jeopardise or compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the sub-region....We believe that if [a crisis is] of such level that has [sic] the potentials to threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria in collaboration with others in this sub-region, is duty-bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to .... ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony."[24]

Nigerian policy towards ECOMOG-its methods and objectives-were therefore coloured by its fundamental antipathy toward Taylor`s NPFL. Taylor, on the other hand, received support from Cote d`Ivoire and Burkino Faso as well as from further abroad, e.g., France and Libya.[25] The manoeuvrings of the rival Anglophone group, dominated by Nigeria, and the Francophone`s, dominated by Cote d`Ivoire, had profound implications for the ECOMOG operation. There existed considerable resentment of Nigeria`s rather heavy-handed use of its influence: for example the dispute with Ghana and Benin regarding Nigeria`s unilateral replacement of the ECOMOG Force Commander Arnold Quainoo (a Ghanaian) with the Nigerian Joshua Dogonyaro. One member of the SMC stated that "ECOMOG ... is nothing but a convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian war machine."[26] Moreover as Nigerian influence within the operation grew, it became increasingly difficult to isolate ECOMOG from Nigerian domestic politics. Thus Dogonyaro's eventual removal as commander has been attributed to Babangida's fears about the former's successes and the possible emergence of a future rival.

The economic and political costs to those involved also contributed to divisions. As the operation became progressively more dangerous, costly and protracted, the willingness of ECOWAS states to support potentially dangerous options often reduced correspondingly. The Senegalese contingent, for example, was withdrawn after initial casualties caused the Government to forbid its contingent to engage in combat operations without significant Nigerian support.[27]

Divisions at the strategic political level eroded the decision-making capability of ECOWAS and led to an inability to decide which objectives to pursue at any given time. The effect on ECOMOG was to commit it to a composite "operation of the lowest common denominator", in which political priorities often triumphed over military practicalities. Moreover, in time honoured fashion, the national governments intervened directly in ECOMOG operations by giving instructions to their own contingent, undermining the cohesion of the force and sometimes creating potentially disastrous situations.[28]

Another related difficulty was the lack of clarity in the mandates given to ECOMOG. Initially, the ECOMOG Force Commander was tasked with the "conduct of military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire" and "restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia".[29] However, as the situation evolved, the operation found itself tasked with various functions in which the mandates were often very vague, particularly over the situations in which force would be used.[30] For example, within a month of deployment the Force Commander, Arnold Quainoo, found himself subject to a major NPFL offensive. Far from "monitoring" a cease-fire "The military situation [is such that] my forces now have no choice but to mount a limited offensive in order to protect their positions .... and enforce a cease-fire".[31] Yet the Nigerian president stated soon after that "ECOMOG is a peace force .... Our mission there is clear, precise and attainable .... ECOMOG forces are soldiers without enemies or favoured faction in the conflict; they can open fire only in self defence."[32]

Agreements at Bamako (November 1990) and Lomé (February 91) tasked ECOMOG with "monitoring" cease-fires, drawing up buffer zones, the establishment of check points, and the disarmament of militias without any clear guidelines about how this would be achieved in a non-permissive environment. At Lomé for example the ECOMOG cease-fire was to be "supervised and maintained" by ECOMOG through the take-over of airports and ports, the establishment of roadblocks at strategic locations, patrols into the countryside, escorts/transports to repatriate displaced persons and so forth.[33] How they were to be maintained, given the paucity in the numbers of troops, and what would happen if ECOMOG were resisted, was not stated.

Another example of the confusion surrounding mandates was the later decision relating to implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV agreement: ECOMOG was tasked on the one hand with using "all necessary measures" to ensure compliance with sanctions[34], whilst on the other an explicit assumption of the forces status as peacekeepers continued to be made.[35] The mandates were thus often only tenuously linked to the reality of ECOMOG's material and political circumstances and provided little guidance on how the use of force could be linked to the attainment of the operations wider strategic objectives.

Closely linked to the difficulties caused by strategic level political differences and the issue of mandates were the problems associated with ECOMOG's military strategy, which oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement without decisive breakthroughs in either. Peacekeeping in Liberia was always likely to be difficult; the examples of Bosnia and Somalia illustrate the problems associated with trying to apply the Cold War concept of peacekeeping in post Cold War conflict environments. The value-based nature of disputes and the complexity of the politics lead to circumstances in which risk escalates, consent is contested, violence is vicious and endemic, and where impartiality is difficult to maintain. In Liberia, the traditional essentials for a peacekeeping operation, the consent of the protagonists and a working cease-fire, did not really exist-indeed the ECOMOG force was fired upon even as they landed.

Through ECOMOG enforcement, a measure of stability was then established which lasted until October 1992 with ECOMOG in control of Monrovia and the NPFL controlling most of the rest of Liberia. Sporadic violence continued, but at a much lower level and ECOWAS was able to establish an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in November 1990. However, attempts by ECOMOG to establish buffer zones and police the UN arms blockade were complicated by continued conflict between the militias. Indeed the early cease-fire did not represent any significant change in the NPFL`s opposition to ECOMOG and was instead a tactical decision designed to consolidate the NPFL`s position before returning to the offensive.[36]

It became clear that peacekeeping was essentially a temporary solution, capable only of freezing the situation, without reducing the capabilities of both sides to resume fighting. It could not address one of the critical reasons for the prolongation of the conflict-Taylor's belief that he could obtain more through continuing the violence than by agreeing to a political settlement. In circumstances where ECOMOG appeared divided and its commitment to "staying the course" was questionable, ECOMOG could provide neither the neutral reassurance necessary to overcome problems associated with "co-operational insecurity," nor could it coerce an unwilling NPFL into implementing political agreements.

The early failure of peacekeeping was indicated on 15 October 1992 when the NPFL launched Operation Octopus, a surprise attack against Monrovia and the predominantly ECOMOG forces defending it. This precipitated another switch from peacekeeping to peace enforcement by ECOMOG forces in the defence of Monrovia and subsequent ECOMOG counter-attacks. The move to peace enforcement had some early success. The NPFL were beaten off and in January 1993 ECOMOG went onto the offensive, drafting in 5,000 extra troops, and using air and naval assets as well as co-operating with ULIMO and the AFL. Significant gains led the ECOMOG field Commander Major General Olurin to expect victory. This victory, however, eluded ECOMOG and ultimately it accepted a negotiated settlement in July 1993 with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. This agreement, which paved the way for the deployment of a UN mission, failed to provide a lasting settlement and, after a progressive breakdown in order, serious fighting broke out in 1996.

The problem for ECOMOG was that effective peace enforcement was difficult. One effect of increasing the risk and intensity of operations was that it further eroded consensus within ECOWAS because of the progressive "Nigerianisation" of the Command Structure and the way in which ECOWAS operations were directed specifically against the NPFL. The friction

generated by this contributed to a lack of strategic direction as to where force ought to be applied and the outcomes that ECOMOG wanted to achieve.[37]

This problem was exacerbated by several other factors. One was the NPFL`s move towards a guerrilla strategy which meant that, despite holding Monrovia and extending the area controlled by the IGNU, ECOMOG found it difficult to exploit their success. Another was that, despite being a West African force, ECOMOG displayed a remarkable ignorance of the geography, people and politics of Liberia even to the extent that the initial planning for the operation was carried out on the basis of a tourist map.[38] Often lacking an understanding of the context in which it operated, it is not so surprising that ECOMOG found that its military strategy did not always produce the desired results. Moreover, ironically, the early territorial gains made through peace enforcement tended to encourage the view within ECOMOG that a military solution could be found which served to undermine attempts to find a political solution, particularly early on.[39]

Moving to peace enforcement, of course, also undermined the already partial consent for the ECOMOG deployment. The loss of consent in itself, may not have been a critical weakness if ECOMOG had retained its impartiality, but this too was further compromised through its attempts at peace enforcement. Nigeria's determination to get rid of Charles Taylor reinforced the perception that ECOMOG was not neutral.[40] Even before ECOMOG was deployed, Taylor had announced his intention to resist the operation, making Babangida`s comment that ECOMOG was "going to Liberia not to fight but to keep the peace" rather optimistic.[41] The NPFL's concerns about ECOMOG were also extended to IGNU which had little ability to secure itself and, as a result, was seen by the NPFL as a government imposed by Nigeria through ECOWAS.

Finding it difficult to score a decisive success against the NPFL, ECOMOG tried to exploit the civil war situation by allying itself with some of the warring factions; for example the AFL, ULIMO, and forces controlled by IGNU co-operated with ECOMOG in the attacks on Taylor's HQ at Gbarnga in 1993.[42] During the outbreak of violence in April 1996 ECOMOG forces were alleged to have helped clear a way for the forces of Kromah and Taylor in their assaults on Prince Johnson's positions in Monrovia.[43]

The impartiality issue was significant since, after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 1993, ECOMOG attempted to shift into a new peacemaking phase in co-operation with the UN and OAU. The problem was, however, that the disarmament, and cantonment of the factions was always going to be difficult if the NPFL and its allies had no confidence in the willingness of ECOMOG to treat all the factions equally.

Even without the preceding difficulties, ECOMOG's task would have been a challenge, simply because of a lack of resources. Financial and material constraints left ECOMOG consistently short of the means necessary either to inflict a "defeat" decisive enough to deliver lasting political gains or to implement the ambitious peace-making programmes. This in part explains the initial force of only 3000 which was inadequate for anything except a holding operation. Indeed, without heavy investment from Nigeria, the operation could never have been mounted, a fact which made it easier for it to adopt a leadership role.[44]

Estimates made at the time indicated that the complete occupation of Liberia would have required Nigeria to increase its ECOMOG forces to 15,000 at a cost of $135m. Although, as one

ECOMOG commander pointed out, the sum was "what NATO spends in a few days in Bosnia", it represented a prohibitive expense for ECOWAS.[45] The lack of troops was one explanation for the inability of the force to seal off the border and cut the NPFL's access to finance and materiel and also the failure to prevent the war from spreading into Sierra Leone in March 1991. Even when numbers were sufficient, there were critical equipment shortfalls, not least with regard to communications equipment and transport, particularly helicopters.[46]

The lack of resources also had important implications for the effectiveness and morale of the troops; according to Jean-Daniel Tauxe of the ICRC, ECOMOG forces were variously unpaid or underpaid, and in such conditions are peacekeepers in name only".[47] This created friction with the UNOMIL personnel whose operation was much better funded but who depended upon ECOMG to function.[48] It also led to numerous alleged incidents of corruption,[49] including the sale of fuel purchased by the US and intended for ECOMOG vehicles; hence the local joke that ECOMOG was an acronym for "Every Car or Moving Object Gone".[50] The issue of low and irregular pay was worsened by the lack of an organised system of roulement to relieve troops deployed in Liberia. As one UN officer commented "They're not motivated, not rotated, often not paid".[51]

The poverty of the ECOMOG contributors highlighted the significance of external sources of aid; this was, however, a double-edged sword. The degree of dependency on outside sources gave leverage to aid donors and led to considerable discontent in ECOMOG, discontent which was unlikely to foster faith in their mission. The US, as the largest contributor to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia, held what amounted to a veto over expenditure, even to the extent of cancelling some fuel purchases.[52] The US also created resentment through its tardy provision of promised logistics, transport and communications equipment for ECOMOG forces.[53]

One area in which ECOMOG might have scored highly was in its relationship with the UN. The UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1994 following an agreement reached by the protagonists at Cotonou in the previous year, and UNOMIL and ECOMOG worked in tandem to implement the peace accord. This represented the first ever such arrangement and its potential utility as a method for resolving other disputes makes it a relationship worth examining.

The relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG was often less than harmonious. The difficulties were partly practical, such as who should be in control of joint operations, and partly psychological, not least a certain degree of resentment of the UN on the part of ECOMOG and thus an unwillingness to relinquish control. There were tensions at the higher level, between the respective force commanders, the central issue being which should be the lead force ECOMOG was already deployed and was the larger formation UNOMIL, on the other hand, was entrusted under Cotonou with "supervising" implementation, which implied some kind of directing role.[54] Additional friction was caused by perceived UN high-handedness and an alleged lack of appreciation of the realities on the ground - including a failure to keep ECOMOG properly briefed and naiveté in their dealings with the NPFL. In part, these problems could be attributed to the late involvement of the UN; the lack of effective political direction exercised by ECOWAS in the period before UNOMIL involvement led ECOMOG to become in some senses self tasking, taking control of both the political and military aspects of operation. This naturally made it more difficult to accept co-operation with a UN agency.[55] Some

ECOMOG soldiers also viewed the whole idea of being "monitored" by the UN as being at best irrelevant and at worst an act which undermined them; according to the Gambian contingent commander in July 1994 "...it is like an inconvenience. Monitoring Ecomog symbolises distrust." These problems were worsened by the UN`s own attempts to improve its local profile; the "trust the UN" public information campaign in Liberia was seen by some ECOMOG members as an implied criticism of the West African force`s credibility with the population.[56] It is, therefore, no surprise to find a certain tension in the UNOMIL/ECOMOG relationship at the lower level as well.[57]

The difficulties outlined above stemmed directly from the very vague nature of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which does not lay down any detailed guidelines on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations.[58] Chapter VIII of the UN Charter permits a degree of "farming out" of responsibility; allowing regional organisations to deal with matters concerning threats to international peace and security, as long as "such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."[59] There is no detail elaborating the exact relationship between the regional organisation and the UN, beyond the restriction that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies". This causes particular problems in respect of multi-organisation operations; which organisation, for example, should lead ? Who should have overall political authority? How does one avoid dual chains of operational and political control?[60]

In Liberia, the late involvement of the UN left it "imprisoned within the framework of strategies determined by ECOWAS."[61] This problem also extended to command and control structures, with UNOMIL having to compete with arrangements that in many cases had been established for years. This problem was compounded by the Cotonou peace accord which also failed to address such issues. The executive powers given to Special Representative of the Secretary-General were widely regarded as too weak and the degree of authority over ECOMOG was unclear; the SRSG was cast in the role of "co-ordinator" with UNOMIL and ECOMOG having separate and autonomous chains of command. There was no one to decide categorically when, where, or how ECOMOG was to support the UNOMIL teams.[62]

These problems caused enormous practical difficulties. The coordination between the deployment of the UNOMIL and ECOMOG forces was often very poor. UNOMIL observers were sometimes deployed into areas without ECOMOG backup, leaving them in an exposed position. Thus UNOMIL personnel deployed into Lofa County and Northern Nimba were without ECOMOG protection and in summer 1994 observers were subsequently held hostage following a dispute over alleged arms deals with a warring faction.[63] Even where UNOMIL and ECOMOG were deployed together, UNOMIL was sometimes subject to so many ECOMOG restrictions that the credibility of the UNOMIL operation was undermined.[64]

OUTCOME

The issue of whether or not the ECOMOG deployment prolonged the war is a controversial one.[65] Eight years on, Taylor occupied the position that he might have occupied in 1989; as he himself commented, "If we had been allowed to win on the battlefield, we would have finished

the war in six months in 1990."[66] Taylor's assessment is perhaps overly optimistic, given that Liberia had antagonistic neighbours that may well have been willing to provide support to anti-Taylor factions in continuing the struggle. Nevertheless, even a prolongation of the conflict might have been acceptable if it had resulted in a better quality of outcome--a long-term solution for Liberia`s instability and the promotion of regional stability.

Clearly, in some respects, the outcome was initially positive. The election process was at least inclusive, ensuring that the major factions became involved in a political process. A military victory by Taylor in 1990 might simply have pushed opposition factions across the border, leading to continuous low-level conflict in Liberia. Another crucial difference between the situation in 1997 and that which might have occurred in 1990 is that it has been brought about with the active support of Nigeria and at least the acquiescence of other major protagonists, such as Cote d`Ivoire; thus the current Taylor government is at least not subject to outside efforts to de-stabilise the regime. Moreover Taylor's electoral victory shored up his legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, opening up the prospect of financial and other aid. Yet there remain several areas of concern. In many respects Taylor has succeeded in squandering the early advantages that accrued to him through his landslide election victory. It is clear that Taylor`s electoral victory was the result of a number of factors including having more resources, better organisation, and better media coverage, but it is also apparent that the strength of his support was related to a fear on the part of the electorate that if he were not elected, violence would return.[67] Whilst Taylor's approach in the immediate aftermath the election was generally benign,[68] he could afford to be magnanimous given the scale of the NPP victory in the elections and its grip on the levers of power. Yet in 1992 Taylor dismissed "All this foolishness about multiparty democracy."[69] More recent incidents indicate that Taylor's commitment to democracy may be questionable: the use of predominantly ex-NPFL manpower to fill out the nucleus of the new Armed Forces of Liberia,[70] the summary sacking and reinstatement of cabinet ministers,[71] and attempts by Taylor to curb the media.[72] The government remains heavily centralised with the legislature exerting little meaningful power over the Executive. The Government's human rights record is poor with frequent harassment of political opponents and democracy and human rights activists.[73] Taylor's relationship with some of his rivals remains tense; the President recently accusing Alhaji Kromah of raising forces in Guinea in preparation for an assault on Liberia.[74] Renewed tension between Taylor and Roosevelt Johnson led to armed clashes in September 1998. These issues have negatively influenced Liberia's relationship with potential aid donors, and resulted in an unwillingness of states such as the US to diplomatically engage with the Taylor regime.

Regional stability also remains problematic. With regard to Sierra Leone, for example, ECOMOG proved unable to contain the Liberian conflict thanks to its inability to seal off the borders. In March 1991 the war spilled over into Sierra Leone when NPFL elements made incursions in collaboration with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a Sierra Leone rebel group. The NPFL took around 25% of Sierra Leone[75] and disrupted the areas which provided most of Sierra Leone`s export earnings. The prolonged Liberian conflict thus made a direct contribution to the prevailing instability in that country.[76] Liberian-Nigerian relations also remain strained; notwithstanding the emergence of a new Nigerian civilian government under Olusegun Obasanjo, which itself raises issues regarding future Nigerian policy towards Liberia.

Tensions were already emerging over a range of issues. Nigeria has accused Taylor of breaking the arms embargo and distributing weapons to the Liberian security forces. The military/RUF Government of Johnny-Paul Koroma contained many Taylor allies and the Liberian president is thus at odds with Nigeria over ECOMOG`s reinstatement of the deposed president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.[77] The ECOMOG commander has made claims that Taylor is supporting the rebel forces in Sierra Leone, claims which Taylor denies.[78] Thus, long-term Nigerian support for the Taylor regime cannot be taken for granted.

Conclusions

There can be no doubt that the ECOMOG intervention in the Liberian crisis provides an interesting case study in post-Cold War peacekeeping. Intrastate conflicts are on the rise, with their associated humanitarian problems and "insecurity ripple" effect. Calls for greater intervention by the United Nations have tended to founder upon legal wrangling, worries about feasibility, a lack of consensus and a certain crisis fatigue.[79] The question of the success or otherwise of the ECOMOG deployment thus has considerable bearing not only on Africans' view on the utility of UN/regional interventions in general and on peacekeeping in particular, but also on the whole issue of Chapter VIII co-operation. It is less clear, however, whether the operation provides any new answers to perennial themes with regard to the problems of peacekeeping or if it represents a more effective model for new regional peacekeeping initiatives.

Ultimately, ECOMOG`s success was less in peacekeeping, since the fighting may well have been more prolonged and heavy than if it had not intervened. The ECOMOG operation was, in reality, an ambiguous exercise in attrition, sustained by Nigeria's willingness to accept heavy material costs,[80] which succeeded largely because of eventual compromises made bilaterally between the then Nigerian President, Sani Abacha, and Charles Taylor which gave Taylor much of what he sought. Prolongation of the war was the key reason for its eventual termination, but this prolongation was made possible by the fact that the Liberian crisis was viewed by Nigeria as an issue of national interest: it did not stem from a new approach to conflict resolution.

The ECOMOG deployment was in several respects a very poor choice of role model for future African peacekeeping operations. Whilst it was in many ways no worse than other contemporary peacekeeping operations, it struggled to be much better and it provided few answers to enduring peacekeeping problems. Indeed, to answer the question "how might it have been done better?" one would be on familiar post-Cold War territory--resources, commitment, speed, appropriate strategies, well defined end-states, and so forth. For answers to vexed questions on the best way to keep the peace in complex emergencies and on the appropriate co-operation between regional and international institutions, the search continues.

Notes

1. ECOWAS: founded in 1975 by the states of Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkino Faso). Its original purpose was the promotion of

regional economic and social integration. In 1981 a Protocol on Mutual Assistance on defence expanded the remit of the organisation into the sphere of security.

2. Alex Okunnor, "Africa's Shining Example", *West Africa*, 16-22 June 1997.
3. Ben Asante, "The ECOMOG Miracle", *West Africa*, 24-30 March 1997.
4. "Renforcement des Capacites de Maintien de la Paix en Afrique": for details see Melanie Bright, "African Peacekeeping Comes of Age", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 26 May 1999, pp.22-27.
5. See Bright, Ibid., and Ebow Godwin, "Blueprint for Enforcement", *West Africa*, 6-12 October 1997.
6. For a discussion of the potential advantages and disadvantages of regional approaches to peacekeeping see Paul Diel, "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.19, No.2 (Winter 1993).
7. The opinions expressed are the authors own and should not be taken as representative of HM Government policy.
8. For a useful examination of the origins and nature of the conflict, see Stephen Ellis, "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence", *African Affairs* (1995), 94, pp.165-197.
9. ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, Article 2 in Marc Weller (ed*.), Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 1994).
10. Figures from *The UN and the Situation in Liberia*, UN Reference Paper (UN Department of Public Information April 1995), p.18
11. Segun Adeyemi, "Nigerian Monitoring Troops Leave Liberia*", Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 January 1999, p.19.
12. For a summary of the ethnic and religious characteristics of the protagonists during the war, see "Liberia on a Knife-Edge", *New African*, March 1995.
13. These included the NPFL (led by Charles Taylor), ULIMO-K (led by Alhaji Kromah), ULIMO-J (Roosevelt Johnson), the AFL (Lt.General Joshua Bowen), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC, under George Boley), Lofa Defence Force (Francois Massaquoi), Central Revolutionary Council (CRC, Tom Woewiyu) and the Movement for Justice in Africa (Moja, Amos Sawyer). See Anthony Clayton, "*Factions, Foreigners and Fantasies: The Civil War in Liberia*" (Conflict Studies Research Centre 1995).
14. For a more detailed examination of warlordism in Liberia, see Paul B. Rich, 'Warlords, State Fragmentation and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.10, No.1 (Spring 1999), pp.78-96.
15. An important milestone in the peace process, signed 25 July 1993, which tried to arrange a ceasefire, the disarming of warring factions, de-mobilisation, the establishment of a transitional government and a timetable for elections. See "Letter from the Charge' d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations," Addressed to the Secretary-General, 6 August 1993 in Weller, Op. Cit., pp.343-352.
16. "Liberia: Problematic Peacekeeping", *Africa Confidential*, 4 March 1994, pp.2-3.
17. "Beware the Children", *Time Magazine*, 4 December 1995.

18. Asante, Op.cit.
19. Baffour Ankomah, "The UN: Taking Sides in Liberia", *New African*, November 1993.
20. See Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long, "Humanitarian Intervention: A New Role for the United Nations", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.2, No.2 (Summer 1995) pp.140-156.
21. For more details on these and other external players, see George Klay Kieh, Jr., "Combatants, Patrons, Peacemakers, and the Liberian Civil Conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.15, pp.125-143.
22. Clement E. Adibe, *"Coercive Diplomacy and the Third World: Africa After the Cold War*." Paper presented to the Workshop on Coercive Diplomacy, King's College London, 7-9 June 1995, p.14.
23. Ibid. p17.
24. Ibrahim Babangida, *"The Imperative Features of Nigerian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Liberia*", Contact 2 (3) (November 1990) from Adibe, Ibid. p.12.
25. For examples, see Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, *"The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict: The Case of Liberia and West Africa*, Copenhagen Centre for Development Research, Working Paper 97.4 (June 1997), p.12. (Http//www.cdr.dk/wp-97-4.htm).
26. W. Ofuatey Kodjoe, "Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The Ecowas Intervention in Liberia", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.1, No.3 (Autumn 1994), p.290.
27. Abiodun Alao, "ECOMOG in Liberia-the Anaemic Existence of a Mission", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (September 1994), p.430.
28. Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia", *International Security*, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter 1996/97), p.162.
29. Ecowas Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90. Article 2(2) from Weller, Op.cit., p.67.
30. Alao, Op.cit., p.430.
31. "Call for Ecowas Summit: ECOMOG given 'Fresh mandate'", BBC Monitoring Report, 21 September 1990, in Weller, Op.cit. p.100.
32. "Speech at Press Briefing of Media Executives by the President of Nigeria", 31 October 1990, in Weller, Op. Cit. p.105.
33. "Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict, Lome, Togo, 13 February 1991", Article 1(1) & Article 2(7) from Weller, Op.cit. pp.136-139.
34. ECOWAS, A/SEC.1/10/92, Article 6, in Weller, Op.cit. p.227.
35. "Final Communique of the First Joint Summit Meeting of the ECOWAS SMC and the Committee of Five, Article 10.20/10/92", in Weller, Op.cit. p.230.
36. For a more detailed examination of Taylor's strategy see Jinmi Adisa, "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the burden of Community Spirit", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.5, No.1 (Spring 1994), pp.83-110.
37. Nigeria was always keen to target Taylor's NPFL whereas others, including Cote d'Ivoire, sought to resist this. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Op.cit., p.290.
38. Howe, Op.cit.,p.164.
39. "Liberia:The Battle For Gbarnga", *Africa Confidential*, Vol.34, No.11, 28 May 1993, pp.1-2.
40. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Op.cit., p.293.

41. "ECOWAS Peace-keeping Force to be Sent to Liberia; Foreigners Released by the NPFL", BBC Monitoring report, 9 August 1990, in Weller, Op.cit., p.66.
42. "Liberia: The Battle for Gbarnga".
43. "Liberia: Out Of Control", *Africa Confidential*, 10 May, 1996, pp.1-4.
44. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Op.cit., p.291.
45. Thomas L. Friedman. "Warlords Versus the People, Who Have No Voice", *International Herald Tribune*, 22 January, 1999.
46. Howe, Op.cit. p.168.
47. Jean-Daniel Tuaxe, letter to the *International Herald Tribune*, 17 May 1996.
48. See, for example, Funmi Olonisakin "UN Cooperation with Regional Organisations in Peacekeeping: The Experiences of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1996) pp.33-51.
49. Friedman, Op.cit.
50. "Witness to insanity", *Newsweek*, 29 April 1996.
51. Ibid.
52. "Liberia: problematic Peacekeeping", Op.cit.
53. "Liberia: Keeping What peace?", *Africa Confidential*, 16th February 1996, pp.2-3.
54. "Liberia: Problematic Peacekeeping", Op.cit.
55. See the United Nation's Secretary-Generals Report on Liberia 1995.
56. "Liberia: Problematic peacekeeping", op.cit.
57. Olonisakin, op.cit., p.41.
58. For example Article 52 (1) and Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter.
59. UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 52 (1).
60. Olonisakin, Op.cit., p.44.
61. "The UN: Taking Sides in Liberia", *New African*, November 1993, pp.16-17.
62. Olonisakin, op.cit., p.42.
63. Ibid, p.41.
64. Ibid., p.40.
65. See, for example, Karl P. Magyar, "Liberia's Peacekeeping Lessons for Africa," in Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, *"Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia"* (Macmillan: London 1998).
66. "Liberia: The First 100 Days", *New African Special Report*, December 1997, p.6.
67. Terence Lyons, "Liberia's Path from Anarchy to Elections", *Current History*, May 1998, p.232.
68. For example, giving his previous enemies minor positions within his cabinet as well as making great play of the human rights issues.
69. Jinmi Adisa, Op.cit., p.104.
70. "The Key to Security," *West Africa*, 24-30 November 1997.
71. "Liberian President Re-instates Sacked Cabinet," *BBC Online Network*, 22 May 1999 (http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid%5F350000/350452.stm)
72. Lyons, op.cit., p.233.

73. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Liberia, US Department of State, February 25th, 2000 (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/liberia.html)

74. "Cross border incursion into Liberia", *BBC Online Network*, 21 April 1999 (http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid%5F325000/325452.stm)

75. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Op.cit., p.283.

76. See, for example, Earl Conteh-Morgan and Shireen Kadivar "Sierra Leone's Response to ECOMOG: The Imperative of Geographical Proximity," in Magyar and Conteh, op.cit.

77. "A Diplomatic Coup", *Africa Confidential*, 6 March, 1998, p.4.

78. "Liberia Denies Backing Rebels", *BBC Online Network*, 10 April 1999 (http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid%5F314000/314957.stm)

79. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, op.Cit, p.261.

80. According to Nigeria $8bn and 500 dead, although Nigeria may well have an interest in talking up its efforts . "Liberia Peace Cost Nigeria 8 Billion Dollars," BBC Online Network, 25th October 1999.

From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of International Order in Central Africa

CHRISTIAN R. MANAHL

The 1999 crisis in Kosovo has been interpreted as the end of an era of international relations ruled by the UN Charter and the Security Council, and the beginning of a new world order.[1] NATO's air raids against Yugoslavia in order to halt ethnic cleansing and oppression of the Kosovars was indeed the first major military intervention in violation of national sovereignty, which was justified by the need for the protection of human rights.[2] One would wish that the Kosovo intervention does not remain an isolated case where a conflict between the two major pillars of modern international law--national sovereignty and human rights--is resolved in favour of the latter. The establishment of an International Criminal Court of Justice and the indictment of President Milosevic for crimes against humanity are encouraging initiatives pointing in this direction.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the industrialised countries on both sides of the North Atlantic will defend with similar determination the victims of dictatorship and ethnic hatred in other regions of the world. The relative indifference of the international community towards notorious human rights violations in various parts of the world (Algeria, Myanmar, Tibet, both Congos, Sudan, etc.) sheds some doubt about the willingness of the major global powers to defend the basic rights of life, freedom and human dignity wherever they are threatened. Admittedly, human rights are not and cannot be the only factor to be taken under consideration in case of a foreign military intervention. Nonetheless, "feasibility" and "tradeoffs" are ambiguous arguments when it comes to basic principles. To defend human rights *manu militari* only where it can be done with little casualties, or where it is economically not too damaging, is not only morally questionable, it also has a profoundly negative impact on the nature of international relations. Intervening where it is convenient, but not wherever it is necessary and possible, opens the way for an erosion of state sovereignty which will not be balanced by a corresponding revalorisation of human rights.

This erosion did not start in the Balkans, where previous military action in Bosnia was taken in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, but in Somalia after the withdrawal of a tragically unsuccessful UN peacekeeping mission. A serious acceleration of this process has recently occurred in Central Africa, where it has been accompanied by a dramatic erosion of human rights that seriously puts at stake the credibility of the international community to impose the respect of a new international order based on universal human rights principles.

The series of conflicts from the Great Lakes region to Angola, which has uprooted several million people, is gradually destroying the achievements of more than three decades of development efforts; entire populations are sinking back into misery, inter-ethnic violence,

illiteracy, and a daily struggle for survival. But while this political and humanitarian disaster has gone largely unnoticed by the international media, it is worthwhile to consider the unravelling of the Central African crisis from the Rwandan genocide to the regional war in the Congo basin in the light of basic principles of international law. It will have a severely destabilising effect on the geopolitical structure of Africa, and probably on the structure of international relations in general.

THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS (1994-1996)

From April to June 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu opposed to the Habyarimana regime were brutally massacred by the army and extremist militia of Rwanda. This genocide, the second one recognised as such by the United Nations, has silenced the resounding "never again" declarations that followed the end of the Second World War and the capitulation of the Nazi regime. After the extermination of European Jews, the world powers of the 20th century have failed to react to another genocide, this time not behind the frontline established between the Allied Powers and a powerful dictatorship, but in a small country with a weak and ill-equipped army, where western military intervention could have stopped the slaughter within a few days or weeks. There was no risk of an international escalation--the Berlin Wall had fallen five years earlier--and there was no international rivalry over Rwanda, a rather insignificant country somewhere in the middle of Africa. Worse still, the genocide happened literally under the eyes of 2,600 UN peacekeepers.

The reasons that led to this tragic failure have been analysed by a consortium of European and North American donors as well as by the Belgian and French parliaments.[3] An investigation of the UN's role was launched in early 1999 by Secretary General Kofi Annan, who was at the time heading the UN department for peacekeeping operations. Perhaps these critical evaluations have contributed to the decision of Washington and its European NATO allies to act in Kosovo before it was too late. None of these investigations, seem to have contributed significantly to a prevention of the steadily continuing breakdown of humanitarian principles and international order that followed the Rwandan genocide and the exodus of several million people in the Great Lakes region.

More than three million Rwandan refugees fled to Zaire and Tanzania, mostly Hutu who feared the revenge of the FPR.[4] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental aid agencies were overwhelmed by the sheer size of this humanitarian disaster and had to accept, *nolens volens*, the establishment of huge refugee camps in walking distance from the Rwandan border, in a blatant violation of international humanitarian rules. Very quickly it became apparent that the camps were controlled by the same people who had perpetrated the massacres of Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The army of the *ancien régime* of Kigali and the extremist *Interahamwe* militia had emigrated under the cover of the refugee exodus and prepared for a return to Rwanda with military means. The refugee camps were turned into military bases from which regular cross-border incursions were launched in order to destabilise the new Rwandan government.

The attitude of Kinshasa towards this flagrant abuse of its territory was a mixture of complacency and political arson. Zairian troops were sent to the east to provide security in and

around the refugee camps, but many officers and soldiers collaborated or made business with the Rwandan extremists. A UN report on arms trade to the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR), published in March 1996, established that arms deliveries negotiated by one of the major instigators of the genocide, Theonest Bagosora, had benefited from connivance, if not co-operation, of Zairian authorities.[5]

The alarming appeals by Sadako Ogata, UH High Commissioner for Refugees, and Emma Bonino, the former EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Assistance, who denounced the abuse of emergency aid as an alibi for political in-action, were left unanswered. The international community assisted passively at the diversion of humanitarian aid to finance the rearming of the extremist Hutu militia. The spread of the genocidal ideology in the vicinity of the camps led to mounting tensions among ethnic communities in eastern Zaire. During 1995 and early 1996, attacks against ethnic Tutsi in Northern Kivu multiplied, and thousands were driven from their homelands and forced to emigrate. Most went to Rwanda, where a combination of the external security threat and the unhealed trauma of genocide led to generalised insecurity and a rapid deterioration of the political climate. The north-western provinces became a war-zone; 2,000 people were killed when the new army emptied a camp of internally displaced people in Kibeho in April 1995; more than 100,000 genocide suspects were arrested and kept in abominable conditions in prisons and municipal detention centres. A number of political figures from various parties, whom the FPR had invited in July 1994 in a remarkable gesture of political openness to participate in a coalition government, were forced to resign and went into exile.[6] By attacking both Rwanda and ethnic Tutsi communities in eastern Zaire, the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* contributed to the hardening of the ethnic polarisation of Rwandan society and succeeded in exporting their extremist ideology to the country of asylum.

THE ESCALATION OF THE KIVU CONFLICT (1996/7)

On the 9th of October 1996, the Vice-Governor of South Kivu, Lwabanji Ngabo, summoned all *Banyamulenge* (ethnic Tutsi of the highlands to the east of the Rusizi river and Lake Tanganyika) to leave the country. He thus sparked off an escalation of a scope nobody could yet imagine: a war of seven months, involving troops from Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola as well as logistic support from Zimbabwe, leading to the ousting of President Mobutu and his entire political *entourage*.

However, the war between Rwanda and Zaire did not come as a surprise. Vice-President Paul Kagame told diplomats in early 1996 that if the international community was unable or unwilling to stop the delivery of weapons to the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* and the military training in the refugee camps, the Rwandan government could decide to take preventive military action. Furthermore, the notorious corruption of the Mobutu regime had left Zaire a hollow state that only continued to exist thanks to the skilful manipulation of political opponents and foreign allies by the master of Gbadolite;[7] once the external support had faded because of the end of the Cold War, and as soon as the internal manipulation was hampered by organised democratic opposition, the country was precipitated into protracted political instability.[8]

In spite of this structural weakness, the war did not immediately lead to a wholesale violation of Zaire's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. First of all, the military campaign by Rwanda and Uganda in eastern Zaire did contain a genuine Congolese component, crystallised in a coalition of four movements opposed to the Mobutu regime, the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire* (AFDL), even if most military operations were conducted or commanded by Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers.[9] In addition, the rebellion supported by Kampala and Kigali spent considerable time to consolidate its power on a narrow strip of land from Lake Tanganyika to the Sudanese border, and this did not seem to pose a serious threat to the Government, which retained control of 85% of the national territory, including all major cities.[10] Furthermore, the AFDL rebellion counted only some 3,000 to 4,000 combatants, whereas the combined Zairian security forces numbered officially more than 100,000. Until the fall of Kisangani, nobody in Kinshasa took the security challenge in Kivu very seriously.

In December 1996, President Museveni proposed to Mobutu's special security advisor a 12-point peace plan, which was explicitly based on the respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire, in accordance with international law. Kinshasa rejected the plan; Prime Minister Kengo announced on 20 January 1997 "a total and crushing counter-offensive" ("*une contre-offensive totale et foudroyante*"). This counter-offensive backfired not only on the Mobutu regime, but also on the principle of inviolability of national borders, established by the UN and OAU Charters and specifically reaffirmed for Africa in the Cairo Declaration of 1964 of the OAU.[11] After taking Kisangani in mid-March 1997, Rwandan and Ugandan troops walked all the way across the country to Kinshasa.

Despite a flurry of diplomatic activities to negotiate a political settlement, involving the UN, US and EU Special Envoys, as well as President Nelson Mandela and Mwalimu Nyerere, nobody in the international community bothered any more about the foreign military intervention.[12] Even in Zaire itself, the Rwandan and Ugandan troops met little resistance from government soldiers, who preferred to flee or to join the ranks of the rebels instead of fighting for a dictator hated by the Zairian people. In the end, everybody was relieved that the war did not cause too many victims and that Mobutu, his family, and his *entourage* were leaving the country. Kabila and his foreign allies were received by cheering masses in the Zairian capital. The donors were hoping that the new government would engage in a vigorous policy of national reconciliation and reconstruction, and generally agreed "to give Kabila the benefit of the doubt".

INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE CRISIS AND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "NEW CONGO"

The EU, the leading donor of former Zaire, now re-named Democratic Republic of Congo, nonetheless subordinated the offer of development aid to two essential conditions: respect for human rights and a clear commitment to democracy.[13] There were good reasons to be suspicious about the new leadership in Kinshasa. The AFDL military advance had been accompanied from the very beginning by massacres and persecution of refugees amply documented by concurrent reports from humanitarian agencies.[14] There was considerable

argument about the number of the victims, but even the most cautious estimates amounted to tens of thousands being systematically attacked, driven into the forest, and denied vital humanitarian assistance. Mass graves were discovered and rumours abounded about rebel troops burning corpses in order to destroy compromising evidence of their sanguinary campaign.

Even before the attack of the refugee camps in mid-November 1996, the international community was fully aware of the risk of another major human rights catastrophe involving Rwandan victims, only two years after the genocide of the Tutsi. The United Nations was compelled to react. On 15 November 1996--for the first time since the Somali debacle--the Security Council decided to launch a military intervention in order to stop a humanitarian disaster (UNSC Resolution 1080/1996). Canada offered to lead this multinational force designed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees and other displaced people.

The decision was taken very quickly--little more than a month after the beginning of the conflict--but it came too late: Two days before the Security Council decision was taken, Rwandan and rebel troops attacked the refugee camps and triggered a geographical explosion of the conflict, which had until then been confined to parts of North and South Kivu. The majority of the refugees returned to Rwanda, but tens of thousands fled westwards into the rainforest, and in the course of the following months, across Zaire to half a dozen countries of the region with the AFDL forces at their heels. While the military experts of several Western countries spent weeks discussing the modalities of deploying the multinational force, the crisis spread over a vast area and reached a degree of complexity that was totally incompatible with the original mandate. The multinational force never materialised.

After Kabila's exultant arrival in Kinshasa, the international community was at pains to forget the humanitarian catastrophe and AFDL's role in it, despite the gratitude for having accomplished what the combined pressure of the Zairian civilian opposition and the donor countries had failed to achieve--to get rid of Mobutu.[15] The UN and the EU insisted in an independent investigation of the allegations of massacres by the AFDL; Kinshasa resisted. The issue of the human rights investigation quickly became the main bone of contention in the relations between the international community and the government of Kinshasa. In addition, the Democratic Republic of Congo soon became notorious for the harassment of opposition politicians, human rights activists, and journalists. Within weeks, the illusion of an early improvement of the human rights situation had faded.

Developments in the political field were equally disturbing. When Kabila was sworn in as President, he issued a decree giving him unlimited legislative and executive powers as well as the right to nominate and sack the supreme judges.[16] Rarely in contemporary history has a new head of state so bluntly ignored the principles of separation of powers and concentrated the main functions of state authority in his hands. The opposition parties and civil society, which had worked towards democratic change by peaceful means for six years, found themselves the victims of a bitter irony. By the time the former dictator, Mobutu, would have relinquished power by natural death (he passed away in Morocco on 7 September) his successor had firmly established himself as the supreme ruler of the "new Congo."

TOWARDS REGIONAL ESCALATION (1998)

Another irony was soon to follow--the unwillingness or inability of President Kabila to rally the major political forces of the country around him in order to establish a broad-based transition regime soon made him unpopular with his former allies. Not that they were excessively concerned about democracy, on the contrary; a genuine and rapid democratisation process in Congo would have put more than one regime of the region into the embarrassing position of explaining to its population and to the donors its own reluctance to engage on a similar path. But Congo's neighbours and Kabila's allies feared regional destabilisation. Kabila's *bras de fer* with the internal opposition and the international community, the tensions between various ethnic communities in the new army, and the deteriorating security situation in Eastern Congo were observed with growing anxiety in neighbouring capitals. The *Banyamulenge* mutiny and the Butembo massacre in February 1998 turned out to be the precursors of a political earthquake that was going to hit Central Africa with the outbreak of the second rebellion later in the year.[17]

By the time the Congolese government proposed to hold a regional conference on "Solidarity and Development in the Great Lakes region", in May 1998, the relations between Kinshasa on the one side, and Kampala and Kigali on the other had already soured too much to mend the fences. The proposals made for this conference by Kinshasa were very reasonable and reflected many of the ideas circulating in diplomatic chancelleries in Europe as well as at the UN, but President Museveni and Vice-President Kagame declined the invitation to the meeting.[18] The summit, which should have coincided with the first anniversary of the AFDL victory, was called off a day before the planned opening.

Interestingly, the proposals for the conference were presented to the diplomatic missions in Kinshasa by Foreign Minister Bizima Karaha, who was considered to have the confidence of Kigali. One wonders whether this was an act of hypocrisy or whether Karaha, like the other Congolese Tutsi of the new regime, decided only after the aborted summit to abandon Kabila and, about a month later, to quit the capital.

In either case, the former allies of the Congolese President had decided to turn their back on him long before the mutiny of the 10th battalion in Goma, on 2nd August. The Rwandan and Ugandan concerns about a rampant deterioration of the security situation in Congo, compromising the stability of the entire region, were shared by the Angolan Government. Luanda was afraid that the remainders of several former armies were recruited or financed by rebel leader Savimbi, who could try to form "a coalition of the outcasts". Indeed, a string of rebel groups along Congo's eastern border, pockets of ex-FAR soldiers and *Interahamwe* in the east and south and in several neighbouring countries of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a devastating war of attrition among the militia of Congo-Brazzaville, all added up to an explosive mixture, with the government in Kinshasa at the political, and the Kivu Provinces at the geographical, centre of the powder keg.[19]

Kigali, Kampala, and Luanda could have come to similar conclusions in the analysis of this situation; their respective security interests did not seem to be incompatible. Why, then, did the second Congo rebellion lead to a regional war, opposing three countries of Southern Africa to the Rwando-Ugandan coalition, and threatening the security of practically all neighbours of the

ailing giant of Central Africa? A combination of factors provides elements to answer this crucial question. Among these factors are rumours that three leading Mobutist generals with longstanding contacts with Savimbi were seen in Kigali around the time when the rebellion started. Furthermore, the decision of Rwanda and Uganda to launch a rebellion against a recent SADC member was taken without proper consultation of the other countries concerned. Angola, with its aspiration to become a regional power, might have found it difficult to accept that Museveni and Kagame play the kingmakers in Kinshasa. Zimbabwe's and Namibia's precipitation to assist Kabila motivated probably by financial interests in Congo also put Luanda into a delicate position. Taking the side of the rebels would have meant to accept a split within SADC and to offer Savimbi a welcome opportunity to find new friends in the region.

The main reason, however, appeared to be the parachuting of Rwandan, Ugandan and rebel troops at Kitona on the lower Congo river, without involving Angola. Luanda might have remained relatively indifferent towards a Rwandan and Ugandan military campaign in eastern Congo, where it has no direct interest, but the lower Congo region was a totally different story. The oil-rich Cabinda enclave is vital for the economic survival of the Angolan regime, and it is equally vital for Luanda to prevent chaos in its immediate neighbourhood, which could be exploited by the Cabinda separatist groups, or even by Savimbi's UNITA. The situation in Congo-Brazzaville was bad enough to tolerate a further deterioration of the security situation in Cabinda's vicinity. Hence, Angola entered the war on Kabila's side, and the stage was set for a regional confrontation.

THE SILENT DISMANTLING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The escalation sometimes described as "Africa's first World War" presents a number of paradoxes and it has led to worrying developments with regards to the relations among countries in the region and with the international community. The most striking paradox is evident in the mutual accusations of the belligerents of the first hour. Kabila denounced the aggression and the violation of his country's national sovereignty, with feigned obliviousness to the fact that it was exactly the same type of aggression by the same countries that had brought him to power. Rwanda and Uganda claimed the Congolese government had been unable to ensure the security of their common borders, expecting that the international community would forget that they had never totally withdrawn their troops from eastern Congo and that a Rwandan officer had commanded the new *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC) precisely during the time when the relations deteriorated.[20] Finally, the international community had a certain comprehension for Rwanda's and Uganda's security problems, but it was rather ridiculous to make the world believe that their national borders had to be defended on the banks of the lower Congo river.

Unlike the first Congo rebellion, this second one immediately targeted Kinshasa and Kabila. It was an outright aggression, although it was never recognised as such by the United Nations Security Council, which remained divided over the issue of the responsibility for the Congo crisis. Not until the 9th of April 1999, eight months after the beginning of the war, did the Security Council find an awkward compromise formula with the term of "uninvited forces" (UNSC Resolution 1234/1999). At the same time, the United Nations was also reluctant to

criticise the military intervention of Kinshasa's allies, which is controversial in the light of international law. Article 51 of the UN Charter confirms the inherent right of individual or *collective self-defence, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security*. However, Article 53 clearly states *that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council*.[21] Consequently, the intervention of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to rescue Kabila appears to be in contradiction with the UN Charter.

Ignorant of or indifferent to prevailing international law, the heads of state of SADC and the Central African countries supported this intervention.[22] SADC's endorsement would have remained controversial had the issue not been discussed only a week before South Africa's and Botswana's military adventure in Lesotho. President Mandela viewed the Congo intervention of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe with suspicion, a suspicion shared by some other SADC countries, which feared a spill-over of the conflict into Southern Africa. But South Africa would have been in an embarrassing position to vote against the resolution supporting the Congo intervention and then do the same in Lesotho a few days after.[23] The SADC decision was therefore dictated by *Realpolitik* and an accidental coincidence between the Congo and the Lesotho crises. This coincidence left no room for a careful assessment of the long-term interests of all the countries concerned, let alone for a debate about the legitimacy of a regional intervention in the light of international law.

In general, part of the problem stems from the fact that the UN Charter remains silent about what to do if there is a stalemate in the Security Council, which prevents the United Nations from taking the necessary measures referred to in Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain or restore peace and security. Such a stalemate had not been foreseen by the founding fathers of the United Nations, although it became the structural feature of the Security Council during the four decades of the Cold War.

The original vision of a UN acting efficiently as the guardian of international peace and security, as enshrined in the Charter, appeared to be materialising immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the UN launched its first real "peace enforcement" missions according to Chapter VII in Kuwait and Somalia. However, the failure of the latter mission to restore a lasting peace has shaken the renewed confidence in the UN to deal with complex military and political conflicts, although this failure can probably be attributed to the inability of a restricted humanitarian mandate to address the broader nature of this crisis.

The reluctance of the Security Council to approve "peace enforcement" missions and to provide them with the necessary resources--a reluctance tragically demonstrated in the Rwandan genocide--does not remove the challenge that massive human rights violations pose to the international community. If a global society is to be built upon basic human values, then these values have to take precedence over national sovereignty in all parts of the world. In other words, crimes against humanity have to justify the crossing of national borders. However, the new rules of the game for such "crossing of borders" have yet to be established, and this is what UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called "the dilemma of humanitarian intervention".

With the Kosovo intervention, NATO has crossed a threshold and decided that preventing crimes against humanity justifies military action against a sovereign state, even without the blue flag of the United Nations. This humanitarian legitimacy, as one could call it, will be difficult to

defend, if the powers intervening in Kosovo continue to tolerate human rights violations in other parts of the world. From a moral point of view and according to all relevant international conventions, all human beings enjoy the same basic rights and are therefore equally entitled to international protection. This right of protection must not be biased by economic or political "convenience". As Kofi Annan says, in order to remain credible, the humanitarian legitimacy has to be applied wherever there is a just cause, and where an intervention is possible.[24]

In Central Africa, the human rights situation is dramatic and well known-- ethnic massacres in eastern Congo, abduction and enslavement of people in Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, widespread laying of landmines, denial of humanitarian assistance to people in dire need in Angola and Congo-Brazzaville.

In spite of these extremely grave violations of human rights, the UN Security Council has been reluctant to decide upon an intervention with an extensive mandate, although this is explicitly called for in the Lusaka peace agreement.[25] This reluctance, and the relative indifference of the international community, may be explained by the complexity and the immense geographical scope of the Central African crises, which would require resources possibly beyond the capacity of those countries that could provide troops for a UN intervention. But "letting the crisis burn out", i.e. allowing it to linger on until the belligerents reach physical exhaustion, will eventually lead to a *de facto* establishment of different and ultimately racist human rights standards. The Kosovars and the people in East Timor are entitled to international protection against ethnic cleansing, but the peoples of Africa have to sort out their problems on their own, whatever happens to them. This is the unpleasant aspect of the "African solutions to African problems".

In this situation, where military leaders and warlords are making the law, old and new concepts emerge. Considering the perspective of protracted foreign occupation of both Congos, certain experts talk of the establishment of *protectorates*.[26] In Somalia and Southern Sudan, the belligerents have shown a surprising capacity to wage low-intensity civil wars with an economy based on a permanent precarisation of the populations and the highjacking of humanitarian aid. In Angola, a similar concept of "sustainable warfare", although based on highly valuable resources --crude oil, diamonds--allows for an alternation of low and high intensity war. Both result in the total destruction of infrastructure, the perennialisation of poverty, the blocking of all development perspectives, and ultimately the systematic denial of basic human rights to millions of people. International investors are retreating towards certain key cities or areas and concentrate on the well-targeted exploitation of certain strategic resources, preferably offshore. With this trend continuing, relations between Africa and the rest of the world will end up resembling pre-colonial times--*retour à l'Afrique des comptoirs*.

But not only investors and diplomats are pulling out of much of Africa. The international community as such is doing the same, taking in its baggage the basic human rights which are supposed to be universal. What is left behind is an area where international order has ceased to exist, because nobody is ready to uphold it when it comes under threat. If Joseph Conrad travelled today to the interior of Congo, he would probably recognise a familiar environment.[27]

The Kosovo and East Timor crises have created a strong motivation for changing international law with a view toward giving more weight to human rights and curtailing abusive interpretations of national sovereignty. At the same time, the international community

ignores the plight of millions of people in Central Africa. Today, this region is marginalised more than ever before in contemporary history. Not only has it become irrelevant in terms of international trade, much of it has also slipped into lawlessness and is scourged by the combined dismantling of international order and human rights. The OAU military observer mission in Burundi and the UN mission to Angola (MONUA) were terminated in 1996 and 1998 respectively, at the outset of renewed escalations of violence in both countries. The planned inquiry into allegations of massacres of Rwandan refugees in former Zaire in 1996 and 1997 was systematically boycotted by the regime in Kinshasa;[28] the human rights observer mission in Rwanda was unilaterally cancelled by the government in Kigali in July 1998, officially because of a lack of agreement on the future of this mission. The international community bends to the pressure of local military leaders, and behind the frontlines of various conflicts in Southern Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, both Congos and Angola, human rights violations with frightening proportions are regularly reported by humanitarian agencies.

We are about to establish human rights *intra muros*. The industrialised countries (and their immediate neighbourhood) on the one side, the least developed countries on the other, in the uncontrollable suburbs of our global village. Unconsciously, the world leaders are abandoning the fundamental principle of human rights--their universality. Human rights are universal, or there are no human rights.

Notes

1. Ignacio Ramonet, "*Nouvel ordre global*", in *le Monde diplomatique*, June 1999.
2. In the course of history, many military interventions were (partly) justified by, or more often conducted under, the pretext of protectionist purposes. Outstanding examples are the Crusades and the "Indian wars" that led to the westward expansion of the United States. However, such interventions were usually aiming at the protection of one's own kin or members of religion, not at the protection of human rights in a universal sense, and they were often accompanied by massacres and other forms of violence that would today be considered as massive violations of human rights.
3. "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience", published by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen, 1996; "*Rapport de la Commission d'enquête du Sénat belge sur les événements au Rwanda*", Bruxelles 1997; "*Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994)*", *Assemblée Nationale Française*, Paris 1998.
4. *Front Patriotique Rwandais*, the rebel movement that attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and eventually ousted the Habyarimana regime in July 1994, thus putting an end to the genocide.
5. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry [into arms trade to the ex-FAR], New York 1996 (UN doc. S/1996/195 of 16 March 1996). Bagosora was arrested on 9 March 1996 in Cameroon and is awaiting trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha.
6. The Prime Minister and the Ministers of Justice, Interior, and Information left the Government in August 1995, accusing it of ethnic exclusion.

7. Gbadolite, called the "Versaille in the jungle", was Mobutu's lavish residence in Equator province.
8. See Endnote 15 below.
9. Kampala and Kigali denied or banalised for several months their intervention, but Kagame finally admitted, in an interview published in the *Washington Post* of 9 July 1997, that Rwanda had planned, led, and directly fought the rebellion that toppled Mobutu.
10. It is interesting, in this respect, to look at the main dates of this first Congo rebellion. The AFDL fought for five months before taking Kisangani, the major city not too far from the eastern border (15 March 1997); once this city had fallen, the rebellion crossed the huge country in only two months (arrival in Kinshasa on 17 May 1997).
11. This declaration consecrates the acceptance and inviolability of African national borders that were largely established by colonial powers.
12. Four days before the rebel troops and their allies arrived in Kinshasa, Nelson Mandela made a last-minute attempt to mediate a cease-fire in order to prevent a blood-bath in the Zairian capital (such fears turned out to be unfounded). Mandela, accompanied by UN and US diplomats, waited in vain on a South African vessel anchoring in the port of Pointe Noir; Kabila did not turn up.
13. Conclusions of the Amsterdam EU summit, 16/17 June 1997.
14. The UN Rapporteur for Human Rights appointed by the Commission for Human Rights, as well as an investigative team appointed by the UN Secretary General, were prevented throughout the civil war and after the seizure of power by the AFDL to carry out an independent inquiry into the allegations of massacres. The team appointed by Kofi Annan nonetheless prepared a report drawing largely on information and testimony from humanitarian sources. It was presented to the UN Security Council in June 1998 (S/1998/581). The report concludes that "*the massacres committed by the AFDL and its allies during the period October 1996 to May 1997 and the denial of humanitarian assistance to displaced Rwandan Hutus were systematic practices involving murder and extermination, which constitute crimes against humanity.*"
15. From early 1992 onwards, a group of opposition parties led by the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* of Etienne Tshisekedi, tried to coax the Zairian Government into democratic reform. A *Conférence National Souveraine* and a transitional parliament (*Haut Conseil de la République*) were established. However, Mobutu managed to manipulate the process to avoid concessions that would have curtailed significantly his power. The "transition" dragged on with little progress for six years, before it was aborted by the AFDL rebellion.
16. *Décret-loi constitutionnel* of 28 May 1998.
17. In mid-February 1998, a group of *Banyamulenge* soldiers refused to be affected to several contingents in various regions of Congo, and left the new Congolese armed forces (FAC). On 20 February, an inexperienced FAC contingent recently deployed to North Kivu entered Butembo after an attack of the local *Mai-Mai* militia. The *Mai-Mai* had already left, but the soldiers took revenge on the population considered to be complices. NGO sources estimate that several hundred civilians were killed.

18. A Conference document entitled "*Sommet des Chefs d'État sur la solidarité et le développement dans la sous-région des Grands Lacs*" was given to diplomatic mission at the beginning of May 1998.

19. e.g. Gérard Prunier, "*Une poudrière au coeur du Congo-Kinshasa*", in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 1998.

20. James Kabare (or Kabarehe, as his name is sometimes spelled), became (interim) chief-of-staff of the new army after the arrest of Masasu Nindaga, one of the four founding fathers of AFDL, in November 1997. Kabare was only replaced by Celestin Kifwa on 13 July 1998, three weeks before the outbreak of the second rebellion.

21. The following wording in Article 53 that provides for an exception to this rule *with regards to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any of the signatory of the present Charter* (i.e. Nazi Germany and its allies) is today outdated. In any case, no interpretation of this article would make this exception applicable to any of the countries intervening in Congo.

22. Summits of Mauritius and Libreville, on 13/14 and 24 September respectively.

23. On 22 September, security forces from South Africa and Botswana entered Lesotho upon request of its President who had lost control over the country after civilian unrest and an army mutiny.

24. Kofi Annan, "*Deux concepts de la souverainété", Le Monde,* 22 September 1999.

25. The Lusaka cease-fire agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 by the belligerent states militarily involved in the Congo war, and by the two rebel movements at the end of July and August respectively. It calls upon the UN to dismantle a series of "non-statutory forces" including the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* and UNITA.

26. Mwayila Tshiyembe, in a presentation at a *colloquium* of the Mario Soares Foundation on the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa, Porto, 21-23 May 1999.

27. Joseph Conrad was the author of the famous novel *Heart of Darkness*, which describes the travel of a young man into the interior of the Colonial Congo, where he discovers the inhuman world of merciless colonial agents, hostile tribal warriors, and greedy ivory traders.

28. See endnote 14. After the outbreak of the second Congo rebellion, the government in Kinshasa invited the UN investigators back to the country; although this looks pretty much as a political manoeuver, it would be worthwhile to launch this inquiry now and to make an attempt to end impunity in the region.

African Culture and Personality: A Reply to D. A. Masolo

JAMES E. LASSITER

I read with great interest Professor D. A. Masolo's response to my article on African culture and personality (see Masolo 1999 and Lassiter 1999).[1] I fully welcome comment and criticism on the issues raised in my paper and am happy that scholars such as Masolo are responding.

I believe that the issues raised in my paper are very important for the future of African studies and culture and personality inquiry in the social sciences. Therefore, given the nature of Masolo's comments, I believe a full and detailed reply is called for. Let me begin by briefly summarizing my paper's main themes which were unfortunately either misrepresented or ignored by Masolo:

African scholars outside the social sciences continue to identify and analyze what they believe are broad psychological and cultural patterns and processes in sub-Saharan Africa. They do so despite the lack of interest in or support for such lines of scholarly inquiry within the social sciences.

Although the African scholars' use of social science terminology and concepts is sometimes questionable and their opinions and propositions are not always tied to historical and ethnographic data, most of their insights and arguments are well reasoned and compelling.

As such, the African scholars' insights and arguments cited should be studied by African and non-African social scientists. Social scientists should support and join non-social scientist African scholars in pursuit of the broader psychological and cultural patterns and processes in Africa. They should conduct investigations to see if assertions such as those I cite are supported by the historical and ethnographic record, and conduct new research on the continent to test such claims and develop new areas of inquiry.

It is hoped that social scientists and non-social scientists, Africans and non-Africans, will make significant contributions to the identification and elimination of recurring psychological and cultural patterns and processes that form barriers to community, national, and regional development in Africa.

Having studied in detail Masolo's *African Philosophy in Search of Identity* (1995), I was surprised by the sketchy and defensive note Masolo submitted as a comment on my paper. I fully expected a philosopher with his experience and academic stature to fully address the key issues raised in my paper. Regrettably, he chose to comment on the paper cursorily, declared it an attack on African scholarship, misunderstood and misrepresented my writing, and ignored

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the key issues and my suggestions for further research along the lines suggested by the African scholars I survey. Suffice it to say, the significance of my paper has little or nothing to do with me, as Masolo's title tries to indicate. My paper's value derives from the purported patterns and processes of African psychological and cultural adaptation it reveals, and its recommendation that scholars from *all* relevant disciplines address these subjects for the sake of furthering knowledge and finding solutions to Africa's problems.

My main objective in this reply is to *refocus* attention on the crucial issues the African scholars persuasively raise, and the implication these issues have for Africa and ethnology. I will do so by addressing the major misunderstandings and misrepresentations of my paper as found in Masolo's critique.

First, Masolo claims I argue that the "pollution of the social sciences in African studies is occurring mainly as a result of the freelance attitude and practice (of) African scholars". Further, he asserts that I believe African scholars' writing on social science topics are "devastating to the integrity and growth of a tradition of scientific and respectable African social studies". The "old ethnology" of culture and personality died for good reason in the 1970s not at the hands of African scholars; rather it succumbed from its abandonment by social scientists themselves. Currently, other than ongoing studies of ethnicity and identity, there really is no recognizable social science study of the *broader* aspects of culture and personality for African scholars or anyone else to pollute, devastate or otherwise influence. In my paper, rather than condemn I, overall, commend the efforts of African scholars for sustaining intellectual inquiry into such topics. Most importantly I praise the scholars for identifying and seriously exploring broad psychological and cultural patterns and processes they believe exist in Africa, without resorting to the stereotyping and useless modernity quantifiers of the past.

My call for social scientists to join African scholars outside the social sciences in this effort is a tribute to the persistence and insight of the African scholars. Social scientists are *not* being called upon to get the Africans on the right track or right a wrong done by them. I seek to have social scientists join in the pursuit of what appear to the African scholars surveyed and to me to be extremely fruitful lines of psychological and cultural inquiry in Africa.

Second, Masolo asserts that the selection I made of a "handful of works by scholars in East and South Africa" was made to support a "demonstration of the extent of this devastation (of African social studies)". Masolo also writes that my sample contains "particularly weak and clearly problematic publications by Africans" and that I discuss the issues the authors raise "widely out of context". My sample includes more than a handful of the writings of a diversity of imminent scholars from East, Southern and West Africa. It includes, for example, works by Ali Mazrui (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995), Augustine Shutte (1993) and Kwame Gyekye (1988 and 1996), respectively. The works of the scholars sampled, despite occasional social scientific methodological shortcomings, were put forward as examples of innovative analysis, compelling argument and leadership in a long-neglected area of inquiry that I believe social scientists should no longer ignore.

Masolo also claims that I am a proponent of the "noble rules and methods of ethnographic studies set in place by Western cultural and social anthropologists". Accusations of nobility in anthropology aside, if anything I make it clear that I am disappointed in the lack of interest in the social sciences in the study of the broader aspects of culture and personality. The subtitle

and content of my paper, in fact, call for social scientists, African and non-African, to reinvent ethnology by expanding its theoretical focus and methodology to encompass such studies as those I laboriously cited from the African scholars surveyed. This misrepresentation by Masolo is made worse by his misunderstanding of my comment--"such inquiry (becomes) no more than unscientific stereotyping, usually with malevolent intent and effect" (Lassiter 1999:2)--which he believes I wrote to refer to the African scholars cited. Here, and in using the term "bad social science" in my title, I refer to the works of Western social scientists of the 1950s and 1960s, *not* African scholars such as Thairu, Nyasani, and the others.

Finally, regarding the sample, Masolo writes that I "hide behind a wide but unused list of reference texts". Quoting from my paper's fifth endnote, I thoroughly reviewed a wide range of texts written by African scholars and chose to omit many from my paper "because they make little or no reference to pan-African culture and personality traits or patterns and processes of African cultural adaptation" (Lassiter 1999:13). I omitted these texts because they focus either on philosophy in the strictest sense of the term or social, economic and political development issues in Africa, yet give no attention to the broad or general patterns and processes of cultural and psychocultural adaptation on the continent.[2]

Third, Masolo claims that I conveniently leave out of my discussion a much wider tradition of literature, namely, the ethnophilosophical, Afrocentric and Pan-Africanist movements. To have ventured into the literature on these movements as Masolo believes I should would have taken me far from the main points I was trying to make. Masolo also writes that I fail to "take note of recent advances in anthropological discourse." Again, in my endnotes I "deferred for the time being trying to place my findings within the contemporary intellectual context that includes non-African scholars writing on African ethnicity and identity" (ibid).

He further asserts that I failed to "read Nyasani's (1996) text (*The African Psyche*) at least partly in relation to the rest of the history of African professional philosophy". A careful reading of Nyasani's book shows that he did not write it as philosophy, per se. In fact, except for his introductory chapters on elementary philosophy, Nyasani made virtually no effort to place his subsequent writing in the historical context of philosophy. Nyasani's main point was to illuminate broad patterns of African psychological and cultural adaptation to indigenous social influences and external cultural interference. His book in essence is a wake up call to Africans to take note of what he sees as negative psychological and cultural adaptive patterns and processes on the continent, and to apply the knowledge gained toward realizing a more positive and productive socioeconomic future for Africa.

Fourth, Masolo describes the work of Nyasani and others I reviewed as "particularly weak and clearly problematic." I believe this is a mistake. Though it was Nyasani's use of social science terminology I objected to most among all the scholars surveyed, it was, nevertheless, his analysis of the impact of indigenous African social organization and non-African cultural influence on Africa during the colonial period and after that I found most persuasive of all the writers surveyed, with the possible exception of Gyekye (1988 and 1996). Despite its flaws, Nyasani's work should be regarded as ground breaking, not weak and problematic. It is significant as a contribution to the study of African psychological and cultural adaptation, and as an innovative and plausible way of understanding many national and sociocultural problems in Africa's post-colonial history.

Fifth, Masolo surprisingly asserts that I might believe "(African) scholars lack the legitimacy to talk of who they think, imagine, or believe they are, or what their beliefs and practices are or should be". By implication, I believe Masolo is referring to the long-standing yet erroneous argument that only social scientists can speak objectively about the psychology and culture of their subjects, because their subjects are ill-equipped intellectually or are too subjectively immersed in their culture to do so. I do not question anyone's ability to legitimately and credibly speak or write about their own ethnicity, and there is nothing in my paper that suggests that I do.

Finally, Masolo writes that I take a "swipe" at Ali Mazrui (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995) concerning his use of the terms "East African mind" and "African Personality". Neither do I write from an "ignorance of the historical genealogy of that term and others", nor do I suffer from a "serious misreading of the intent and context" of the Mazruis' text. In my paper (Lassiter 1999:11) I cite Mazrui and Mazrui's purported link between the spread of Kiswahili and ethnic behavior and loyalty in East Africa as one of four primary areas I think are of extreme importance and of greatest need of further examination. Surely I am complimenting and showing appreciation for their lead, not taking a swipe at the Mazruis.

I have gone to much greater length than I wanted in this reply. However, I felt it was necessary due to the significant number of misunderstandings displayed and misrepresentations committed by Masolo. The tone and snide remarks found throughout his comment show that Masolo seeks to portray me as an unqualified, insensitive amateur meddling in areas I know little and care less about - Africans and their philosophy, psychology and culture. He tries to depict me as what he regards to be the typical Western social scientist, one with a superior attitude toward non-social science African scholarship. Note his remark: "One hopes here that Lassiter is not suggesting that these scholars lack the legitimacy to talk of who they think, imagine, or believe they are, or what their beliefs and practices are or should be." His sarcastic comment about the "noble rules and methods of ethnographic studies set in place by Western cultural and social anthropologists" is also noteworthy in this regard. Finally, his attack becomes personal and unprofessional when he accuses me of attempting to "hide behind a wide but unused list of reference texts". Regrettably, it appears that Masolo's comment is an attempt to stifle discussion on the issues addressed in my paper by focusing attention on me.

I regard my paper to be a seminal effort calling for a revitalization of social science inquiry into the broader patterns of African psychological and cultural adaptation. This call for an expanded approach to the study of culture has been of interest to me for over twenty years as shown in my professional publications and presentations. See Lassiter 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1983a, 1983b, 1990 and 2000. Despite Masolo's opinion to the contrary, I believe my Africa-focused education and experience are sufficient qualifications to explore the matters addressed in my paper, and perhaps contribute to the theoretical and methodological shift in anthropology and the social sciences I am calling for. This experience includes three and a half years service as a Peace Corps Volunteer in rural Swaziland (1980-83), and five and a half years as Peace Corps Country Director in Tanzania and Ghana (1985-91). Also, as Assistant Immigration Attaché at the U. S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya from 1996-98 and a survivor of the August 7, 1998 bombing, I traveled extensively throughout rural and urban Africa to interview thousands of

UNHCR-referred refugees regarding their detailed persecution claims and applications for resettlement in the U.S.

Upon further reflection, the strength of Masolo's reaction to my paper reminds me of what my late father-in-law, the imminent Ugandan education administrator Mzee Lawrence Mukhama Kiondo, once told me. When I asked him early in my research if he thought I was playing with dynamite in addressing the topics found in my paper he said, true to his characteristic wit and humor: "No, not really. There is no particular problem in handling dynamite, as long as you keep it pointed in the right direction!"

Regrettably, Masolo seems to think that the targets of my figurative dynamite are the African scholars I survey, including him. That I should not be or am unfairly or disrespectfully criticizing African scholars. The fact is, despite my selective criticism of their methodology, I am not only respectful of the scholars, I am overall very much impressed, motivated, and encouraged by their work, especially their overall handling of these complex topics. I also fully agree with the scholars that these are matters of profound importance to Africa's future.

It is at my own discipline anthropology (especially ethnology) and the social sciences in general, not African scholars, that I am "aiming". I do so in the hope of encouraging my colleagues to take up a reinvented, more objective and useful study of the broader patterns and processes of African psychological and cultural adaptation, as suggested by the African scholars I survey.

As I state in my article's conclusion, "anthropology should not allow itself to be influenced by or become the *exclusive* domain of popular Western culture, political correctness, or social and political activism. Anthropology, and ethnology in particular, should freely pursue a full range of understandings of culture, specific cultures and their similarities and differences, the processes of regional and global cultural adaptation, and how such knowledge can improve human living conditions" (Lassiter 1999:12). In the future, thanks in no small part to Masolo's critique and Mzee Kiondo's advice, I will be more careful in the handling and aiming of scholarly dynamite!

Again, I am happy Professor Masolo submitted his comment. I hope he and I are able to continue this dialog on African matters of utmost importance and mutual interest. I also continue to fully welcome *all* reactions to my paper via the *African Studies Quarterly* and other journals, or at my e-mail address: Majahonkhe@yahoo.com.

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Notes

1. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this reply are solely those of the author. They in no way reflect or otherwise represent the policies or official positions of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service or any other U. S. Government entity.
2. A brief note: Since returning from Africa, I have been able to acquire and study in depth additional works by Appiah (1992), Gyekye (1995 and 1997), Mudimbe (1988 and 1994) and others. Contrary to Masolo's assertion, these works were *not* readily available during my refugee processing travel and concurrent research on the paper in Africa. For the most part, I am finding that these outstanding works, which I will treat in future articles, lend further support to the main points in my paper, specifically, that the works of non-social science African scholars on African culture and personality are extremely valuable and their arguments compelling. And that the authors of such works should be joined by social scientists in conducting further studies in these areas.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE STATE IN AFRICA. Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou. Oxford, Bloomington & Indianapolis: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999. 126 pp. cloth $ 39.95. paper $ 18.95.

The study of corruption and various forms of criminal activities in Africa is not new. Since the early days of independence, the subject of criminology (including corruption, smuggling, the plundering of national resources, kleptomania, money laundering, etc.) has been the focus of fierce debates in many academic circles. As many sought to provide a comprehensive explanation for the origin and operation of various forms of infractions in Africa, explanations tended to remain as controversial as they were doctrinaire. At the end of the twentieth-century, these problems have been magnified, transcending national territorial boundaries and assuming an international dimension.

Consequently, the study of various criminal activities in Africa has shifted from analyzing the individuals' roles to group responsibility. Thus, the subject has been approached and observed from various dimensions. Jean-François Bayart, for instance, gave a fascinating account of group responsibility for this problem in his 1989 book, *L'État en Afrique: La politique du ventre* [*The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly*].

In *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou expand the study of corruption to include the most recent incidents of state-supported criminal activities in Africa. Whereas many studies on corruption in Africa often reveal individual responsibilities, these scholars include the role played by the state in aiding and abetting corrupt practices. It is this process that they call the "criminalization" of the state.

The Criminalization of the State in Africa chronicles in fascinating detail the totality of state-supported criminal activities. The book analyzes the impact of criminal activities on African nations. It examines the future of public life in Africa, and reveals how African states have become vehicles for organized crimes. It addresses the manner in which African states, through criminal means, cover up the corrupt practices of those in power. The book exposes the linkages between government and institutionalized fraud: smuggling, the plundering of natural resources, the growth of private armies, the privatization of state institutions, and the development of "economies of plunder." The result is an incisive and authoritative exposure of Africa's entanglement in a web of internal and international crimes. More innovative than anything else is the analysis of the internationalization of crime in Africa from two fronts. First, the study deals with criminal activities initiated in Africa by corporate officials, employees of parastatal organizations, and government officials at both the national and continental levels. Secondly, the book examines Africa's role in the internationalization of certain criminal activities involving non-Africans, but supported by African entrepreneurs and policy-makers.

Although originally written in French, the book's scope is not limited to francophone Africa. It dwells on the involvement of all African nation-states, south of the Sahara, in the international drug trafficking, money-laundering, currency counterfeiting, credit card fraud, conversion of cash of dubious origin into legal goods, and theft of international food aid, just to mention a few. Throughout the book, the authors contend that "politics in Africa is becoming markedly interconnected with crime" (p. 25). They examined six main indicators of the criminalization of African politics (pp. 25-26) and, interestingly, conclude that "only Equatorial Guinea, the Comoros and Seychelles could be correctly classified as criminal states at the moment." The majority of other African states, write the authors, exhibit classical symptoms of what Bayart calls "la politique du ventre," a Cameroonian popular adage that means [loosely translated], a goat eats where it is littered.

On the whole, the book is a beautifully conceived, richly textured work. Powerful, intriguing, and essentially transcending national territorial boundaries, it offers an important analysis of state-supported corrupt practices in contemporary Africa. The authors might have further explored the varied levels of democratization in specific African nations, and discussed how the leadership of those nations either promoted or discouraged state-supported criminality. Such an exercise would likely reveal the emergence of a "moi je m'enfou" (colloquially translated as "I don't give a damn") attitude among some African leaders. It is this "moi je m'enfou" attitude, resulting from the gross lack of accountability in the performance of government duties, that weakened rigid press censorship imposed by totalitarian governments and now gives a false sense of democratization. Regardless, each chapter pulls the reader deep into the innermost circles of corruption, kleptomania, criminal actions by governments in power, and the resultant destitution of independent Africa.

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Agencies in Foreign Aid: Comparing China, Sweden, and the United States in Tanzania. Goran Hyden and Rwekaza Mukandala (eds.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 256 pp. Cloth: $ 69.95.

Foreign aid researchers have endured a frustrating decade since the Cold War. It was widely expected in the early 1990s that the many problems associated with foreign aid, particularly its manipulation by donors and recipients in the East-West ideological struggle, would give way to a new era of "sustainable development." Unfortunately, the aid regime confronted a new set of obstacles during the decade: widespread cynicism and resentment stemming from the Cold War experience, cutbacks in aid budgets among most OECD donors, and regional economic crises that shifted attention from development aid to damage control, largely in the form of massive IMF bailouts. At the same time, neo-liberal calls for private investments to replace government transfers fueled the backlash against aid while only selectively bringing foreign capital into the world's poorest economies.

Among other lessons of the 1990s, the need for effective development aid was again made clear in areas that could not attract large-scale private investment. This included much of sub-Saharan Africa, which was still reeling from the "lost decade of development" in the 1980s. As many African governments struggled to implement democratic reforms, along with market-driven economic reforms recommended by the OECD and other international organizations, the reduced aid flows hampered their efforts to lay the groundwork for long-term development. Education programs went unfunded, technical assistance to farmers was cut back, environmental reforms were delayed or canceled, and steps to reduce population growth fell victim to religious debates among donors and within some recipient governments.

Into this morass comes the informative, if not uplifting, edited volume by Goran Hyden and Rwekaza Mukandala, *Agencies in Foreign Aid: Comparing China, Sweden, and the United States in Tanzania* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999). Their comparative case study brings well-deserved attention to Tanzania, the "darling" of aid donors during the Cold War whose government somehow managed to attract large-scale aid from such diverse sources as the communist government of China, the kingdom of Sweden, and the hotbed of global capitalism based in Washington.

This volume succeeds in several ways. First, its focus on Tanzania is justified for the reasons already noted. Second, the cross-national approach offers a wide variety of lessons for all members of the current aid regime, including donors and recipients. Scrutiny of the Chinese program is especially illuminating given the lack of attention previously paid to China as an aid donor. Third, the longitudinal coverage allows readers to assess the successes and more common failures of aid programs to Tanzania during an extended period (1965-1995). Finally, the volume goes beyond the "macro" level of aid as a foreign-policy instrument and explores the role of government agencies in devising and implementing aid programs. This is particularly helpful because, as we learn in reading the six chapters, these agencies often played a crucial independent role in determining the shape and outcome of aid projects.

The case study on U.S. development aid to Tanzania most aptly makes this point. Stephen L. Snook examines the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and finds that the agency's work in Tanzania often departed from the government's general foreign policy goals, which were based on the realism of the Cold War. "Much altruism came from within," notes Snook (p. 107). The AID mission throughout this period was "replete with expressions of humanitarian concerns. AID's officials and the private contractors and consultants who work for the agency do not appear to be driven by narrow self-interest."

The point here is not to exonerate the U.S. government, whose aid program frequently rewarded military dictators at the expense of development. Snook instead illustrates the book's central thesis that aid agencies serve not merely as conduits of aid, but as vital instruments of aid policy development and delivery. A similar lesson is advanced by Ole Elgstrom, who describes how the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) enjoyed "considerable freedom of manoeuvre" (p. 122) and frequently changed direction in administering aid to Tanzania. Specifically, SIDA's early emphasis on solidarity with social democracies yielded in the 1990s to concerns for efficiency and market reforms that had become central to IMF, World Bank, and OECD officials. In this respect SIDA moved from the "solidarity trap," as outlined earlier by Hyden and Mukandala, to the "coordination trap." In neither case, however, was the success of SIDA-funded projects adequately safeguarded.

The Chinese case provides a less convincing example of bureaucratic autonomy. According to Ai Ping, China's government initially viewed development aid as a vehicle for exporting its program of "proletarian internationalism" (p. 158). In the 1980s and 1990s, however, Chinese aid to Tanzania, as elsewhere, became infused with enhancing its own economic self-interests and integrating the PRC into the "donor community." The evidence put forward in this case suggests a more determinant role by Chinese government officials, and less flexibility for the agencies involved with delivering the aid to Tanzania. But again, the results for development were disappointing. "By first and foremost transplanting its own experience from home, Chinese aid did not have much incentive to develop a full understanding of Africa's social formation and economic characteristics" (p. 200).

In the concluding chapter Hyden is joined by Kenneth Mease, a colleague at the University of Florida. They review the diverse experience of the three donors and argue again for the central role of aid agencies as "front-line organizations" in the struggle for Tanzanian economic and political development. Taken together, the case studies reveal the agencies to be "part not so much of the solution as the problem" (p. 228) either by falling into the two traps noted above, or by succumbing to the "accountability" and "insularity" traps outlined in the introductory chapter. Hyden and Mease conclude that not all of the blame for Tanzania's poor economic performance should be directed toward the donors. Tanzania's government routinely failed to make use of the massive inflows of aid that came from almost every developed country during the three decades under review.

Taken together, this important volume sheds much-needed light on one of the world's most complex networks of aid delivery. Although instructive, the depiction of foreign aid to Tanzania as a "tainted enterprise" (p. 232) may only add to the cynicism that provoked rampant withdrawals of aid from sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. In the years to come, one hopes that temptations to let the Africans "fend for themselves" are overcome by leading members of the aid regime. The humanitarian disasters that have plagued Africa in recent years--from Somalia and Sudan across central Africa to Nigeria and Liberia-make it painfully clear that the world's affluent states can and must seek a more constructive role in this embattled region.

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Globalisation, Human Security and the African Experience. Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.). Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publications, 1999. 211pp. Cloth $49.95.

This book aims to explore "security from a *human* perspective" (as opposed to the more orthodox *state* perspective) and "to illustrate this perspective by drawing on case material from sub-Saharan Africa" with the objective to help generate "an alternative debate and understanding of security in a global economy" (p.1). The human security perspective (HSP) is put forward as emancipatory, focusing on the household (as opposed to the neo-liberal individual) and collectivity (rather than individual market choice). It centres on both basic

survival needs and liberation from oppressive structures as necessary for human security (p.3). Broadly speaking this approach is designed to "encompass non-conventional concerns such as ecology, human rights, and social capital" (p.127).

The book is divided into two main sections. The first part deals with the concept of security and globalisation. The second part demonstrates the human security experience of specific African societies. These case studies make a grim but informative reading if human security is to be positively effected. In the introductory chapter, Caroline Thomas highlights how globalisation affects human security by compounding inequities of power and resources. In the process "power is located in global social formations and expressed through global networks rather than through territorially based states"(p.2).

Africa's plight is complicated by a variety of factors which "have served to undermine the possibility of legitimate states developing around an inclusive politics." The conventional state-centric security approach did not help. For one, the assumption of state as a provider of security rather than a source of citizen insecurity was misplaced. Indeed states happened to be instruments that destroy the security of populations.

In conceptualising the alternative approaches, Peter Wilkins offers a critique to orthodox security by questioning the past assumptions about the relationship between security and state in international relations. He also explains why Africa is chosen as an object for such a debate. It is because Africa "stands as the most marginalised continent in geopolitical terms in orthodox international relations and represents perhaps the most dramatic area of concern for those focusing on human security" (p.23).

In Chapter Three, J. Ann Tickner discusses gender, globalisation and human security. Though the approach is broad to confirm a global, modern feminist perspective, the author correctly points out that women in Africa, as elsewhere, "face multiple oppressions" (p.49). In Chapter Four, Jan Aart Scholte deals with the crucial but insufficiently addressed aspects and effects of globalisation on communities. Aswini Rays deals with the topic of justice and security in Chapter Five. The author is optimistic that at this age of globalisation, a wider consensus might emerge in the form of democratised UN, reinforced human rights, regional development and support with "the NGOs monitoring the process" (p.97). Yet it remains to be seen if any of these elements are new and how far non-governmental organisations could avoid the problems associated with their governmental counterparts.

In the second section of case studies, Ann Guest argues that the governments of Senegal and Mauritania did not seriously consider the human security of the adjoining valley populations (p.105). The study reveals the interconnections, the pressures and influences of the local and the global, the displacement and violence, as well as the partisan attention of the states towards their *ethnie* in the apportionment of "economic goods in the state" (p.116). Guest is of the view that while the said governments had the chance to listen to their citizens they chose not to, and therefore posed a more immediate challenge to the population of these valleys than any global forces.

Michel Chossudovsky's brief analysis dwells on the case of Rwanda, arguing that economic liberalisation is contributing directly to anarchy and civil war. Chossudovsky argues that "Rwanda's plight highlights the malign impact of neoliberal policies on the current world order in stark and brutal fashion" (p.118). He relates the colonial legacy and the impact of neo-liberal donor policies on the economic structure and social fabric. The author counters the widely held

belief that blames "deep-seated tribal hatred" for genocide. In fact such a belief "exonerates the great powers and the donors" while distorting the "exceedingly complex process of economic, social, and political disintegration affecting an entire state of more than seven million people" (p.126).

Writing on the Horn of Africa, Mohamed Salih argues that the state can be the source of citizen insecurity. He notes with dismay that the end of the Cold War in the Horn of Africa did not lead to prosperity "as the result of reduced military expenditure" and the end of super power rivalry. In other words, globalisation and interdependence did not bring desired political stability of decreasing the utility of force (p.128). Indeed state actions led to more human insecurity, human rights abuse, and absence of democracy and general political discontent. Salih further opines that the end of bipolarity created new forms of polarisation along ethnic, religious, and economic ones. Thus, the deterioration of human security is one of the major drawbacks of the New World order (p.139). He rightly concludes that the end of the Cold War failed to induce significant changes in the Horn of Africa or to improve the mutual security of states and citizens (or subjects) causing "real struggles and wars fought by the dispossessed, the displaced, the hungry, and the victims of human rights abuses" (pp.142-43).

Moving to West Africa, Max Sesay details the historical, social and political factors at work in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In both countries, economic decline and state collapse were exacerbated by global capital accumulation (with enclave mono-economies exacerbated by debt accumulation and external intervention). The eventual civil war and state collapse instituted the gravest form of human insecurity in both countries.

Ali Mazrui offers a final touch to the topic of African security in the nineties as he described the African condition in the eighties. He is of the opinion that the place of states and races has shrunk. This assertion seems superficial but in a stylistic Mazurian way he keeps on asking more questions and, in the process, invites the aspirants to jump on the answers. The problem is that the questions are simpler than the answers. What to do with Bismarck's legacy? Why states collapse? Can the UN do better? How can human security advocates turn their attention to where their mouth is, as opposed to the Orthodox preoccupation with militaristic national security, balance of power, and terror?

True, Africa needs alternative solutions. But what alternatives? Regional integration, recolonisation or self-colonisation? African pax-Africana? Five African states-cum-big brothers "who would oversee the continent?" The employment of an associated "African commissioner for refugees linked to UN high Commission" etc. (pp.166-7)? The trouble with seemingly limitless choices is that most of these were tried at different times but failed. The author is definitely concerned with human security in Africa, but the mixture of his approaches weigh more heavily towards the orthodox conception of state security than the remainder of the book.

All considered, the book demonstrates that neither market nor state "has attended adequately to the human security of Africans" (p.179). Moreover the case studies bring to attention the impact of the policies and actions of the World Bank, IMF, the former colonial powers, regional governmental co-operation arrangements, etc. The gap in human security needs is projected to be filled by "micro-communities" at the village level supported by global political activism drawing from the pool of gender, environmental, and human rights concerns. The analysis in the book calls for a new agenda, with new aims, new methods and results. There is also a demand for fair trade, instead of free trade for African human security (p.181).

In sum the book is readable and a timely contribution on human security, democracy, both globally and in Africa. It comes at a time when much of the promises of the end of the Cold War and the fervour of globalisation have but reinforced generalised misery and uncertainty in Africa.

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People Are Not the Same: Leprosy and Identity in Twentieth-Century Mali. Eric Silla. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1998. 220 pp. Paper: $26.00.

People Are Not the Same is an excellent examination of the social and political experience of leprosy patients (Hansen's disease) in colonial and post-colonial Mali. Eric Silla's book is based on an extraordinary variety of oral and written evidence. The author conducted extensive interviews with "lepers," indigenous healers, African and European doctors and nurses, and missionaries. He also examined French colonial archives in Mali, Senegal, and France; Catholic missionary records in Rome; and selected Arabic manuscripts drawn primarily from the famous collection at the Centre de Documentation et de Recherche Ahmad Baba in Timbuktu. Silla synthesizes this rich variety of sources into a very readable and engaging account of the social, political, and medical history of leprosy during an extremely dynamic period of regional and global change.

Silla sets for his book the difficult task of examining both the patient's personal experience of leprosy as well as the broad political, administrative and medical histories that affected those personal experiences. He succeeds in this task and even reveals much about how individual lepers and leper organizations were able to influence government policies towards them, and to participate in broader historical events. But the double focus on the personal and institutional leaves its mark on this book. Much of it is organized by topics, such as the process of being diagnosed and socially labeled as a leper; the process of becoming a leper patient in indigenous and colonial health systems; the development of colonial medical institutions and the influence of administrators, missionaries, and the broader European medical establishment on those institutions; and finally the development of a leper community. These topics constitute mini-narratives of their own that as the reviewer of *Choice* magazine pointed out, interrupt the narrative flow of the book. For example, each of the middle chapters (3-5) begins in the early colonial period and ends in the late colonial period. Yet, despite this problem, Silla made the correct choice in organizing the book as he did. The processes that he examines in individual chapters would have been obscured if they had been buried in a single, broad narrative. The book's organization disrupts the chronological progression of the larger story, but it also enhances the coherence of its disparate elements.

Certainly the most compelling mini-narrative in *People Are Not the Same* is the first chapter, which tells the story of Saran Keita, a Malinke woman born sometime around 1915 in a rural village in Mali. Saran Keita contracted leprosy as a young woman and was progressively exiled

from her husband's household and later his village. After returning to her mother's village, Saran lived for a time with her older sister Hawa, also a leper, in their mother's house. There they led lives of internal exile, unable to marry and enjoying little contact with others in the community. They were even segregated from family members, as they were forced to sleep and eat alone. Hawa soon left the village to seek treatment in a big town. Saran finally left home in 1939, after several years of treatment by local healers in and around her mother's village. She resettled in Bamako, the colonial capital, at the invitation of European administrators. In Bamako Saran became part of a leper community that formed around the Institut Central de la Lepre, and was reunited with Hawa, who had married a fellow leper in the community. Saran likewise married a patient and had children. Saran and her husband survived by farming a small plot of land obtained from a local chief associated with the colonial government. In the late 1960s Saran lost her husband and sister to the complications of leprosy. Later she suffered additional economic and personal hardships, some of which were the effects of rapid urbanization on Saran's small community.

The most important contribution of *People Are Not the Same* is its description of the process by which leprosy victims were labeled and marginalized, as well as their personal and collective efforts to resist, and to form families and communities. This process is best revealed in the personal histories of patients such as Saran Keita. But the chapter on Saran Keita is brief and leaves the reader hungry for more details about her life and struggles. Silla also paints brief portraits of a few other patients, chief among them Aldiouma Kassibo and Fousseyni Sow, who reappear, as does Saran Keita, in several chapters, helping to weave together the various narrative threads in the book. *People Are Not the Same* is extraordinary because it humanizes leprosy patients while also placing them in a broader history of large events and processes, but it also leaves the reader wishing to learn more of their stories. Africanist teachers are in particular need of detailed biographies and autobiographies, similar to Charles Van Onselen's study of Kas Maine and Mary Smith's edited version of Baba of Karo's life story. One would certainly welcome such a biography of one of the patients introduced in *People Are Not the Same*.

Another measure of the quality of this book is that it raises as many questions as it answers, effectively pointing the way for future research in the social and political history of illness. Although Silla's narrative of Saran Keita's life demonstrates some of the ways in which the experience of leprosy was shaped by gender, much more could be done along these lines. Did leprosy and migration affect women's view of their own femininity and their role in the family and society? How were they changed by their exposure to European doctors and missionaries? Also, precisely how did one's identity as a leper mediate one's occupational and ethnic identity? What significance did ethnic identity retain in the relationships among individuals within the multi-ethnic leper community? It seems that very few 'Moors' and Tuareg became part of the community around the Institut Central de la Lepre, and relatively few Songhay. Why was that? One would hope that Silla will continue to draw on his extensive interviews to answer these and other questions in future work on leprosy in Mali.

In summary, *People Are Not the Same* is an excellent and unusual study of the personal and political experience of leprosy in twentieth-century Mali. It should be of interest to anyone teaching graduate or advanced undergraduate courses on 1) West Africa, in history or the social sciences; 2) medical history or the social history of health and illness; 3) the history of

colonialism and the role of secular and missionary medical policies in colonialism; and 4) the history of migration and urbanization in twentieth-century Africa.

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UNESCO General History of Africa Vol. IV: Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century (abridged). Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Djibril Tamsir Niane (eds.). Paris, Oxford and Berkeley: UNESCO, James Currey, & University of Claifornia Press, 1997. 316 pp. Paper: $16.95.

One sign of the maturing of African history has been the publication over the last twenty years of two massive eight volume collective histories -- the Cambridge History of Africa and the UNESCO General History of Africa. They differ in several ways. The Cambridge volumes were produced by scholars, most of whom were linked to the School of Oriental and African Studies. The volumes were divided into a small number of long chapters, usually fifty to eighty pages long. The volumes thus have a greater unity and maintain a consistent standard. They are available only in English. The UNESCO History has a very diverse set of authors. Like most UNESCO enterprises, a lot of politics were involved in the assignment of chapters. They are, however, shorter, and the volumes often seek to present different perspectives. More importantly, although the list of contributors is truly international, the UNESCO project is dominated by Africans. Both the scientific committee and the list of authors are over half Africans. Thus, when published, they represented an effort by African historians to present a predominantly African view of the African past. Given the domination of agendas in the field by non-Africans, and the difficulties scholars within Africa have in publishing, this is important.

The UNESCO volumes were also designed to reach a larger audience. Initial publication was to be in three languages (English, French and Arabic) with the hope of eventual publication in thirteen other languages, five of them African. Equally important, abridged editions of several volumes have been published. In volume IV, the bibliography was cut from forty-one to ten pages, the number of plates were reduced, footnotes eliminated, and chapters reduced in length to a little over a third of the original. There is also no author listed for any of the chapters, but rather a separate list of the authors of the originals. One can only assume that the original authors were not involved in the abridgement and not willing to put their names on the chapters that resulted. This is understandable. Most of the abridgements are atrocious. They are fact-laden and often incomprehensible to a reader not already familiar with the subject. There is little attention to causation and little effort to delineate processes of change. Although the chief editor, Niane, lays out some methodological concerns, discussions of methodology are brief and rare. There is little sense of the larger questions and the debates that mark the history of the period.

Since this is not a period on which a great deal of research or synthesis has been done, a more elaborate discussion of problems and questions would have been useful. In addition, it is

dated. One of the problems with large collaborative histories is that chapters submitted early are often out-of-date when the volume comes out, but in this case, thirteen years passed between the original and the abridged edition. A lot has been written since 1984 and even the questions being asked have changed. The selection of themes and the division of chapters also reflects a West African orientation, both in the amount of space accorded West Africa and in the central themes Niane lays out in his introduction: the triumph of Islam, the expansion of trade and trade relations, and the formation of large empires.

Some chapters survive abridgement better than others. Mahdi Adamu's chapter on the Hausa deals with causation and nicely sums up the views of the Abdullahi Smith school on processes of change. Tadesse Tamrat's discussion of the Horn is a coherent picture of process. B.A. Ogot's chapter on the Great Lakes shows that the complicated mosaic of that region can be dealt with coherently. The same is true of A.F.C. Ryder and Yves Person on different stretches of the Guinea coast and Jan Vansina on equatorial Africa. Ogot stresses different patterns of pastoral-agricultural interaction and state formation, but he also underlines that decentralized societies have a history, which is as important as the history of large empires.

The editors' introduction rightly stresses the importance of oral tradition, but the few references to it stress its limited applicability to the period covered in the book. This being true, it is disappointing that few authors use language data. This deficiency is particularly striking in V. Matveiev's treatment of the Swahili. Authors often give language classification, but few use language as a source. Most rely heavily on documentary sources, although Fagan's article on the Zambezi and Limpopo valleys is based almost exclusively on archeology.

The result is a volume that presents basic facts on a period of African history not yet well studied. Some chapters are useful, but there is little reason for anyone to buy or use this book. Students should be directed to the original volume where ideas are developed more fully and there are detailed references that would send the student on to other sources. The original is also uneven. Some chapters stress naked data with little analysis, but many are still excellent. They also present African views of the past, written by outstanding African scholars. Anyone teaching African history should try to come to grips with that. The abridged version of this volume will not help them very much.

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White Slaves, African Masters: an Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives. Paul Baepler, (ed). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. pp. 310. Cloth: $46.00. Paper: $19.00.

White Slaves, African Masters is a collection of nine narratives written by Americans who were held captive in North Africa. Those narratives included are: Cotton Mather's *The Glory of Goodness* (1703); John D. Foss's *A Journal, of the Captivity and Sufferings of John Foss* (1798); James Leander Cathcart's *The Captives, Eleven Years in Algiers* (1899); Maria Martin's *History of the Captivity and Sufferings of Mrs. Maria Martin* (1807); Jonathan Cowdery's *American Captives in*

Tripoli (1806); William Ray's *Horrors of Slavery* (1808); Robert Adams *The Narrative of Robert Adams* (1816); Eliza Bradley's *An Authentic Narrative* (1820); and Ion H. Perdicaris's *In Raissuli's Hands* (1904).

The anthology begins with an introduction by Paul Baepler, in which he outlines the historical circumstances of the capture of these Americans, most generally the political tensions between North Africa and the United States that included the Tripolitan War of 1801-5. Baepler traces the development of several themes throughout these narratives. The nine authors all have a very strong pro-Christian, anti-Muslim message, a notion of racial "othering," and a condemnation of slavery and captivity, which may or may not be applicable to the slave system in the United States.

The Barbary captivity narrative flourished alongside the American slave narrative, the Indian captivity narrative, and the Christian conversion narrative. Various rhetorical tropes and strategies can be found in all of these narrative types, including a search for God's divine will as a reason for the captivity and minute descriptions of the captors, the surroundings, and the tortures of the captivity itself. Because of these striking parallels, *White Slaves, African Masters* would work well in an early American literature or history course, a course on slavery or slave narratives, or a course on conversion or confessional narratives. Moreover, the texts in the anthology provide excellent comparative resources for those working in any of the above-mentioned fields.

For instance, the Barbary narratives might be read in conjunction with Frederick Douglass' *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (1845). One may wish to juxtapose William Lloyd Garrison's "Preface" to that narrative, in which he declares that white men who have been held in slavery in North Africa lose their language skills and their trappings of civil humanity, with Jonathan Cowdery's *American Captives in Tripoli* and William Ray's *Horrors of Slavery*, allowing for fruitful investigation into the strategies of American abolitionists. It is also interesting to note that Robert Adams is the only African American included in the anthology and that the white scribe who took down Adams' story indicated that he was speaking an odd mixture of Arabic and English when he was captured, a trauma specifically mentioned by Garrison as happening to white slaves in North Africa.

For this reason, one may want to read Adams' narrative alongside other American slave narratives. His views of the continent appear to be, by and large, similar to the dominant white American culture of the nineteenth century, possibly owing in part to his white scribe. However, Adams does note that he and a fellow slave of Portuguese descent appear to have gotten special treatment from the Africans. Adams assumes this treatment comes from being lighter skinned than the Africans themselves (Adams was of mixed race origins) but not as light as the northern Europeans who were captured with them. In fact, Adams claims that he excited "uncommon curiosity" among the Moors who captured him because they "had never seen [a white man] before" (229). At the same time, the scribe parenthetically notes that Adams was "a very dark man, with short curly black hair" (229). By including Adams in this anthology, Baepler exposes multiple levels of racial ideology and prejudice existing during the 1800s.

Interestingly, the social class of the captive was used by the North Africans to determine the treatment the captive received in slavery. Cowdery's and Ray's narratives read together produce a clear picture of this system. Cowdery was a naval doctor, became the personal physician to the Bashaw of Tripoli, and spent his days treating his patients and strolling in the

personal gardens of the Bashaw. Ray, on the other hand, was an enlisted seaman aboard the same vessel as Cowdery. His narrative is a corrective to the vision of North African slavery that Cowdery produces. Ray proclaims, in fact, that "when the Doctor says *we*, it is the very same as if he had said *we officers only*" for the enlisted men suffered from hunger, cold, and abuse that the officers knew nothing of (189). The officers and upper class passengers that were captured fared far better in North African slavery than the common people.

Of course, differentiation among slaves emerged in the American system of slavery. This classification system, however, was imposed on the captives by their oppressors and had no reference point in the captives' own social systems. In fact, the American system existed only to distinguish house slaves from field slaves or female concubine slaves from others. An interesting comparison may be drawn between African American women's slave narratives, such as Harriet Jacobs's and Mary Prince's narratives, and the narratives of Eliza Bradley and Maria Martin. Neither Bradley nor Martin claim to have been sexually assaulted, while a great deal of Jacobs' and Prince's stories detail their maneuverings around the sexual advances of their owners. Bradley's narrative is generally acknowledged to be fictive; the author liberally borrowed sections of the narrative from an account authored by James Riley. One must keep in mind, however, that Jacobs's narrative was also thought to be fiction (or written by a white woman) until the 1980s.

While this collection is by no means exhaustive, *White Slaves, African Masters* can be considered a welcome addition to early American literature and early American history. Baepler has assembled these narratives from a racially and economically diverse group of men and women cutting across many centuries. Those studying American racial or religious ideology will find his collection a convenient starting place for an archaeological comparison of dominant American thought about Africa and Africans, about Muslims, and about slavery.

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Juan Maria Schuver's Travels in North East Africa 1880-1883. Wendy James, Gerd Baumann, and Douglas H. Johnson (eds.). London: The Hakluyt Society, 1996. pp. 392. Cloth: $ 63.00.

The youthful Juan Maria Schuver's detailed descriptions of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border region in the early 1880s constitute an extremely valuable and exciting new contribution to the travel literature of late nineteenth-century Africa. Published by The Hakluyt Society, this lengthy volume is a sort of "recueil de textes" assembled, introduced, annotated, and, in some cases, translated by the editors with great care. They most appropriately dedicate the book to Richard Hill, one of the great scholars of modern Sudan.

The editors open with an essay of a hundred pages. They introduce Schuver, provide political and geographical background about the regions he visited, describe his almost embarrassingly self-conscious efforts to make his mark as a major traveler with a blockbuster of a story to tell, and situate him in his time. Shorter items follow presenting Shuver's texts and

manuscripts, a concordance to guide the reader through their various versions in various languages, an outline chronology, a glossary of Sudan Arabic, notes on ethnic and place names, and biographical sketches of major historical figures in Sudan at the time. Several of Schuver's maps are also reproduced to illustrate his text, but because they are not enlarged, they are not very useful (between pp. 52-53, 180-181, 255).

Schuver's two major texts are entitled *Between the Two Niles* and *On the Abyssinian Frontier*. Written in English and French, and meant to be two versions of a single account, they appear here for the first time in their totality, although abridged versions were published in German the year of Schuver's death (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1883). The tale of their modern discovery is the stuff of historians' fantasies. Long lost, they were found in Amsterdam in 1985, in a space above folding doors which pierced thick double walls between the dining and living rooms of a house belonging to a son of Schuver's cousin, Jan Schuver (pp. xiii-xiv, 361).

In addition to these accounts, editors James, Baumann, and Johnson have assembled a third book, *Last Journey South*, from extant letters written by Schuver in the course of his final and fatal expedition to the White Nile region. The volume also includes eight appendices made up of Schuver's shorter texts-letters, journal entries, vocabulary lists for languages that remain even today little-known, along with record books, and autobiographical materials--either written to geographical societies in Europe, or found among his papers in Cairo and elsewhere.

Schuver's *Travels* are valuable for several reasons. First, he visited the volatile border region between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopia during a very critical few years. In the early 1880s, the region lay between the sphere of English and Egyptian authority, and that of the expanding imperial Ethiopian empire. Aware of this "big picture," because the support of the Anglo-Egyptian authorities in Khartoum and regional centers was vital to the success of his expedition, and yet attentive to the realities of local power, because his survival depended upon it, Schuver offers numerous examples of how local chiefs and warlords maneuvered to maintain their independence, while at the same time avoiding retribution by Sudanese colonial authorities. Indeed, Schuver walked the same tightrope-identifying himself with the "Turkish" (or Sudanese) authorities when it was required, and condemning them when it helped him to gain access to a chief or a region otherwise off limits. Schuver also records specific examples of tactics adopted by Ethiopian rulers and their local governors to extend their authority over the Oromo (Schuver's Galla) in the Blue Nile region. Ethiopian incursions set the stage for the incorporation of the area into the Ethiopian empire in the years that followed.

In addition, Schuver traveled "between two Niles" during the years when the rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movement called the Mahdiyya in central and western Sudan increasingly threatened Anglo-Egyptian rule. The Dutchman records the comings and goings of Mahdist emissaries--usually Islamic clerics--who brought news of the Mahdiyya's successes in the west and encouraged local people and their chiefs to reject Anglo-Egyptian authority. Finally, the traveler documents the abandonment of vast areas by people fleeing the "ghazzias" of slave raiders, includes vivid mini-biographies of slaves given to him by his hosts or purchased during his travels, and estimates that slaves "constitute at least one half of the population" (p. 11).

Second, Schuver's writings are of interest because they offer several examples of how he strategized to make his mark as a professional traveler. A young man, Schuver was ambitious and eager to identify the errors of his elders: "The larger animals have disappeared from these

parts during the last 20 years. [...] I do not disbelieve travelers, if they affirm to have seen lions in parts where they may be found, as is the case on the banks of the Blue Nile, but I know Matteucci cannot have met one between Beletava and Fadasi, because there are none in the whole Berta country" (p. 14). Or: "The forest is nowhere heavy; notwithstanding the enthusiastic descriptions of some of my predecessors in these parts, there is nothing in this quarter of Africa to rivalise [sic] with our splendid Northern oakforests" (p. 23).

During his travels, Schuver also clearly sought to pave the way for the eventual publication of his account. He wrote letters to the major European geographical societies--usually in their national languages; furthermore, he exchanged "notices" and letters with their officers and prominent members. He also may have tailored the various versions of his "récits" to different European audiences. A comparison of the English and translated French texts of "Between the Niles" and "On the Abyssinian Frontier," for example, suggests that Schuver adopted a much more dramatic style in French than he did in English-perhaps because he thought it more appealing to his Romance readers. Of many, I cite but two examples; the first in English: "However, I had made it a principle never to furnish the natives with means of destroying each other. The Arabs import into Central Africa the most loathsome of diseases; shall it be said that the European makes himself the apostle of the demon gunpowder?" (p. 39). The second is in French: "[...]of the one Beelzebub, who will survive all the believers in invented demons, of the great Satan who has the name 'The Powder,' of the infernal God adored by all oppressors and the ambitious, of him who reigns over the unhappy human species he calls his cannon fodder?" (p. 59).

Finally, a letter written to the Royal Geographical Society in 1880, and included in an appendix, demonstrates Schuver's efforts to acquire the training deemed necessary for a successful explorer: "Dear Sir, I wish to receive instruction in practical astronomy, which might enable me to be of some use during my intended protracted journeys through Asia Minor & Mesopotamia. Could I be allowed to receive this instruction from the R. G. Society's instructor?" (p. 251).

The third major reason that these writings are valuable is because they offer a clear example of European ambivalence about Africans. To Schuver, local, non-Muslims were, in turn, docile infants, ignorant savages, and trusted fellow travelers. He writes in defense of the Amam (probably today's Mao-speakers or Kwama-speakers): "Let me just correct a few others of his hallucinations regarding these poor, calumniated negroes. They are not 'the Patagonians of Africa'. [...] They do not 'prefer raw meat'. [...] "They do not wear loincloths of human skin ..." (p. 48). Shortly thereafter, however, he denigrates African intelligence: "But neither the penetrating cry of the muezzin, nor the disciplined exercises and almost military appearance of the Muslims have generated in the negro's heart the need to search for more clearly and strongly formulated ideas about supernatural powers than the fainter notions he already has" (p. 62).

Moreover, Schuver's antagonism towards Muslims and Islam is palpable. This antagonism also was shared by many fellow travelers. Such scorn and xenophobia characterized the French in particular; hence, it is not surprising that Schuver's French account is particularly virulent:

Can it be said that the negro turned Muslim shows himself superior in a moral sense to the black who is pagan, or who has such vague ideas about a supreme being, that they must be classed among those ineffectual dreams which have never had significance for human action?

For myself, I say No! I have observed thousands of blacks professing Mohammedanism, and never in a single case have I been able to find the least trace of humanitarian sentiments, of justice, or morality, of family duties, of brotherhood, of respect for the truth, which develop in the rays of what I have heard called: the spiritual sun of monotheism. This monotheism, introduced under the sign of the Crescent, on the contrary has seemed to me a dark cloud, extending its somber veil over the serene sky of negro primitivism" (p. 59).

Juan Maria Schuver's Travels in Northeast Africa should find a prominent place in the library of European travel literature on the continent. However, this authoritative edition is useful not only for understanding a pivotal period in the region's past, it is also relevant to the contemporary world. The editors underscore this point in the preface: "As the editorial work progressed and the translation became more lucid our fascination grew for the way in which Schuver's writings evoke a North East African past which resonates in so many striking ways with the present" (p. xx). Researchers at Human Rights Watch/Africa and Amnesty International would undoubtedly agree.

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The Rise and Fall of Swahili States. Chapurukha M. Kusimba. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999. Pp. 237. Paper: $27.95. Cloth: $55.00.

The purpose of this book is to document the growth of Swahili civilization on the eastern coast of Africa, from 100 B.C. through the European colonialism in the sixteenth century. By using archaeological, anthropological, and historical information, Dr. Kusimba endeavors to describe the origins of this unique and powerful culture, including its Islamic components, architecture, language, and trading systems. He combines the results of his own anthropological surveys and archaeological excavations, providing a comprehensive study of the origins, rise, and collapse of societies on the Swahili Coast and their broader influence on African history.

Dr. Kusimba definitely views the origins of the Swahili States as distinctly African in nature and he offers historical, anthropological and archaeological evidence in support of this idea. The underlying basis of Swahili societies were long-established populations and cultural mores of African origin. Despite other scholars suggestions supporting extensive Arab settlement and even colonization along the Swahili Coast, Dr. Kusimba maintains that Swahili culture was not simply imported or derivative, but a rich fabric of African manufacture, one woven with threads spun from local fiber as well as imported yarn (p 26). The author repeatedly emphasizes that the ancestors of modern Swahili settled in East Africa long before the ancestors of many ethnic groups. The evidence presented in this book suggests that the Coastal peoples are not biologically different from other East African groups. The cultural diversity of Coastal peoples is similar in magnitude to the general diversity one finds among African peoples. The author proclaims such diversity should be celebrated rather than demeaned by who believe that the Swahili states originated from foreign settlement (p. 202).

The author maintains that the Swahili elite (during the Omani regime) wished to be associated with places from which power and authority emanated. Therefore, they emphasized traditions of blood ties to Oman and Persia while minimizing their African roots. They even claimed to be Sharifs, the reputed descendants of the prophet Mohamed (p. 174). Because of this myth that Swalili states originated from Arab settlements, many modern Africans consider the story of the Coast to be outside the African experience. Thus, the descendants of that colonial heritage occupy only a marginal position in the current order of things. Anti-Swahili sentiments among post-colonial East Africans have arisen from an under-appreciation of the relevance of Swahili history and culture (p. 202).

Dr. Kusimba's book is very well organized. The geography, resources, languages and peoples of the coast are described in detail. The earliest settlements and those that followed between 300-1000 are well documented and clearly described. The role of iron working, the importance of interregional trade, and the impact of Islam prior to 1500 are all discussed at length. Dr. Kusimba also examines the hierarchy of Swahili Coast society. This book not only provides for a better understanding of the complex Swahili polities between 100 B.C. and the sixteenth century, but also lends itself to an appreciation of the relevance of Swahili society and culture in East Africa today.

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Religious Ethics in Africa. Peter Kasanene. Kampala: Fountain Publishers (distributed by ABC Ltd. Oxford, UK), 1998. Pp.110. paper $11.25.

For teachers eager to whet the appetite of undergraduates for religious ethics, this is a good text. The author presents the positions of African traditional religion (ATR) and three world proselytizing religions on moral issues for a largely African readership. The book provides a basic discussion of the teachings of ATR, Christianity, Islam and Baha'i Faith. It is an adequate elementary text for explaining each religion's position on moral issues such as sacredness of life, smoking, abortion, the use of contraceptives, euthanasia, fornication and adultery. Kasanene manages to distill the various sectarian or denominational views on these moral issues and presented a representative account of an otherwise cacaphonous plurality of positions. It informs the reader about the culture of Africa and the pressures exerted by Christianity, Islam and Baha'i Faith on African ethical systems. However, it does not engage any new theoretical discussion or contribute significantly to the literature on religion in Africa.

The book has nine chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of the value of morals to the individual and society. Chapter Two guides the reader through the fine distinctions between ethics and morality, and makes explicit the various internal and external guides to moral decision-making. Chapter Three opens with a discussion on the interconnectedness of religion and morality, and closes with the differences between African traditional religious ethics and those of the three imported religions. The next five chapters are concerned with specific moral issues and the position of each of the four religions on them. The final chapter

makes a plea for the return of Africans to their original worldview if they want to maintain their identity in the face of modernization.

However, Kasanene provides no scholarly evaluation of each religion's position or even a comparative analysis of each of them. Merely listing each religion's position on issues is not what one expects from a book that purports to educate university students. Moreover, the book discusses smoking and alcoholism, but is surprisingly silent on dietary rules. Dietary theory is an important aspect of every religious system and its analysis is central to understanding, at least, the connections between ethics and classifications in any society. Mary Douglas (1966 &1992) has shown the relationship between systems of knowledge and the systems of society by examining dietary rules and projections from diet to health. Often the vast rules of food prohibitions in Africa are the projection or extension of rules from human life to animal life and are also a reflection of principles of social and political relationships. "Eating the right foods and abstaining from the wrong one publicly exemplifies the system of social categories" (Douglas 1992:265).

Kasanene's book would have yielded more benefits if the author had also discussed the conversion process, especially in light of his call for Africans to go back to their traditional worldview in the face of activities of foreign agents. An analysis of the conversion process would have provided historical context for his argument, and perhaps reveal whether the dominance of the universalistic concept of God over the indigenous African concept of localized spirits is concretely related to the whole process of economic development or is just a reversible fad. Indeed Robin Horton (1971) has explained the 'conversion' of African peoples to Christianity and Islam as a result of economic/societal development and increasing exposure to the outside world. He has suggested that "acceptance of Islam and Christianity [in Africa] is due as much to development of the traditional cosmology in response to other features of the modern situation as it is to the activities of the missionaries" (1971:103). What Horton argues is that the conversion to world religions does not represent a rejection of traditional African religious cosmology. Instead Islam and Christianity played the role of 'catalysts,' that is, stimulators and accelerators of religious changes and conversion which were 'in the air' anyway for purely indigenous reasons (p.104).

Horton's anthropological theory is affirmed years later by Nelson Goodman's philosophical analysis. Goodman (1978) has argued that the conditions for distinguishing right from wrong-- the stuff of ethics--and the remaking of world version are not based on comparison with a "world undescribed, undepicted, unperceived." Goodman's (1978:138) idea that "rightness" and "wrongness" or "true" or "right" version is a matter of fit with practice; "that without the organization, the selection of relevant kinds, effected by evolving tradition, there is no rightness or wrongness of categorization, no validity or invalidity of inference..." is key in understanding why foreign pattern of moral order prevailed over the indigenous pattern. In the light of Horton and Goodman's ideas that worldmaking (whether through conversion or scientific paradigm) is from worlds already at hand, Kasanene's failure to examine how existing African worldview interacted with the foreign ethical systems and the kind of synthesis that ensued undermines the value of his book.

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Griots and Griottes: Masters of Words and Music. Thomas A. Hale. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. pp 410. Cloth: $35.00.

This study brings together widely scattered information on the griots and griottes, traditional artists who have survived for more than a millennium in West Africa. Thomas Hale examines these artists in order to understand how verbal art is created and used in African societies to achieve personal or social goals.

Apart from the introduction and the appendices, the work is composed of ten chapters. These chapters easily sort themselves into two groups: the first group is a summary and confirmation of results by scholars spanning the fields of folklore, oral literature, anthropology, literature, etc. Indeed, Hale explains in his introduction the need to summarize what scholars have previously found in the course of studying the griot. Clearly, the art of the griot is one of the oldest to be found on the African continent. Yet despite such an ancient lineage, this art and its practitioners should not be perceived as trapped in some traditional past. Instead, the art and the artists consciously evolve in response to the demands of their age, constantly making themselves relevant to the needs of the society without compromising their original mandate (serving as the memory of the society). Hale also confirms, as many have done before, that difficulties arise when trying to study African poetics in translation (pp. 114, 145). This is especially problematic if the researcher assumes an external perspective that fails to surmount the barriers griots and griottes erect around themselves (p. 191).

A second important aspect of this work are the insightful new contributions to the study of griots and griottes. This group includes Hale's meticulous discussion of the origins of the word griot, revealing that it is not indigenous to the communities in which griots and griottes are found. In fact, he states that there are many indigenous artists and scholars who find this term offensive and would rather avoid using it all together. Hale points out convincingly, and with numerous examples, that there are many other terms in indigenous languages that are used by these artists to refer to themselves and their craft. The name griot has, however, tended to stick because scholars, largely Western and foreign, have found it more convenient than having to learn relevant indigenous names. Thus, Hale demonstrates the powerful impact of the external researcher upon the subject under scrutiny. The retention of the term "griot" continues despite the objections of both artists and their societies.

The most appealing chapter is "A Job Description of the Griots" which thoroughly demonstrates the socio-political importance of these artists and their "multi functional role" (p.17). It also exemplifies some of the broader characteristics of African art (socially-based, public, and multi-disciplinary). "Griottes: Unrecognized Female Voices" is also a contribution of some significance. It raises the issue of an urgent need to study the role of gender in performance arts in Africa. The evidence in this chapter illustrates that the male emphasis in most studies of the griot has been created by the researchers' own biases rather than a true reflection of gender relations in society. Indeed the author stresses that "women are viewed as more talented" than their male counterparts when it comes to discussing music and griots (p.165).

This work is a culmination of Hale's research which he began in 1964 and, with few interruptions, has continued for more than three decades. The study reflects the author's extended experience in West Africa. Hale has interviewed, talked to, and interacted with hundreds of artists and other scholars in this field. Yet he is quick to admit that without certain skills--a knowledge of music, a better understanding of the many cultures, and overall acceptance by the griot society--a researcher in his position finds it difficult to penetrate beyond the superficial when studying this important group of artists.

The target audience of this work is primarily a Western academic audience. Because of this, the actual contribution of the griots and those most familiar with their work, remains muted. The author points out the need to include contributions from the griots themselves for a more in-depth understanding. Hale reiterates that "we need to reframe the perspective on griots by including them in discussion" (p.317). This perspective is appropriate, since there is growing recognition of the need to approach African art forms through the artists who create them.

The other area of the text's strength lies in the extensive and valuable appendices. The richness of this topic can be seen in the various audio-visual media that Hale utilizes to create the multifaceted approach required to study African artists. The detailed sources/contacts the author provides will be of value to anyone interested in carrying out library and field research in West Africa or the United States.

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Guinea: Malinke Rhythms and Songs. Famoudou Konate. Budamusique, 1998.

Famoudou Konate's latest CD "Guinea: Malinke Rhythms and Songs," while long overdue, has been well worth the wait. This is Famoudou Konate at his very best - at home in the music with a family of master musicians, "L'ensemble Hamana Dan Ba." For *djembe* aficionados throughout the world, Konate is something of a living legend. Now, for the first time on a commercial label, this legacy comes to life.

Born and raised in the Hamanah region of Guinea, Konate was recruited by *Les Ballets Africains* at its inception in 1958. For 26 years, he was first soloist for this world-renowned national ballet before setting out on his own to make a name for himself on the European circuit. Since the mid-eighties, he has been establishing a reputation in Europe as the foremost Mande master drummer. This has contributed greatly to the legitimation of Malinke music as a formal, complex musical tradition by introducing it to the curriculum of Western institutions of higher learning. In 1996, he was awarded an honorary degree by the Hochschule der Künste in Berlin.

Konate's music is as much story as it is song. As co-producer Nassar Saidani explains in the liner notes: "His music is primarily language. Like a griot making us live out a story with accurate details in his gestures, words and even silences, Famoudou makes his drum talk." These words come to mind, particularly so on "Borokoni", where Konate himself speaks while playing the *borokoni*, or "sorcerer's harp." Inasmuch as Konate's solo techniques can be likened to language, he is not a man of many words. He speaks with clarity, precision, and the power of understatement. The solo phrasing accentuates the melody created by the rest of the ensemble; it does not overwhelm or blur it. His is a subtle song -- refined, not flaired. The result is spellbinding.

Konate's solos on this CD leave no room for doubt about this: there are at least twenty-five distinct sounds emanating from the drum in his hands. On track six, "Könönari," a series of slaps in the solo seem like sounds from somewhere else. Of course, Konate's tones do more than punctuate the pieces -- indeed, they carry them. But what seems most striking at times, for example on "Siwe," a song from the Konyan people, is the depth of the bass tones Konate draws from the *djembe*. Non-initiates might even be led to believe a fourth bass drum has been added to the weave. But this is the deep bass of the *djembe*.

The "dundunba" selections, clearly identifiable based on the pronounced emphasis of the kenkeni in the off-beat, are more refined by comparison to the "dundunbas" on the 1996 release, "Hamanah," which features both Famoudou Konate and Mamady Keita. On "Malinke Rhythms and Songs," we encounter the softer side of this form in "Donaba," an ancient Dunun piece combined with a contemporary version of the song to honor a beautiful woman whom the

community had chosen as the village princess. What really comes to the fore here is the youthful spirit of play that has marked Konate's career, from its village beginnings in Sangbarala and throughout the quarter-century he spent touring the world with *Les Ballets Africains*. The sharpness and accuracy of the beat is irresistible. More so here than anywhere else before, the complex interplay between *dunun*, dance and *djembe* drum emerges. This is the first recording in which Konate has enjoyed complete artistic freedom to "choreograph" and direct an ensemble of his own choosing, according to his own aesthetic standards.

One cannot help but note the conspicuous presence of women and children on this recording. They feature prominently and Konate has placed them in the foreground. Indeed, many of the musicians -- Nankouma Konate, Fode Konate, Bijou Konate, Cadet Konate, joined by the Kourouma's and Keita's cited in equal number -- are Famoudou's "children," literally and figuratively. One special featured artist is Konate's nephew, Nansedy Keita, who came down from the village of Sangbarala especially for the recording to solo on several cuts, "Dibon II," "Sirankuruni," "Donaba," and "Lambe".

Most striking perhaps about this 73-minute release is the strength of song throughout. A capella vocals set the tone on the opening track, "Damba", where praises are sung for a young woman about to be married. A splendid blend of versatile voices in varying constellations carry the celebratory spirit of song on this CD and underscore the element of (his)story. There isn't one purely instrumental selection in the 13 story-songs recorded in Simbaya, Guinea. At the same time, the instrumental diversity of the Malinke tradition is displayed here with the inclusion of lesser known instruments like the *borokoni*, the *kodo-kodo*, the *dönsökoni*, the *bolon*, and the *djabara*. The track "Könönari" even includes a rare recording of Konate playing the *tumbadoras*.

This release promises to become a milestone in the Malinke musical tradition. With any luck, it will finally provide recognition for a master musician who has gotten far too little exposure this side of the Atlantic. It is perhaps fitting that this long-established *djembe* master should be the one to make clear to Western listeners that the *djembe*, while it is a solo instrument, does not stand alone. Rather, the collective effect of story, song, celebration and a skilled ensemble of musicians makes up the magic of Malinke music.

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