

## BOOK REVIEWS

**Peter Alexander (editor). *Alan Paton: Selected Letters*. Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society for the Publication of Southern African Historical Documents, 2009. Second Series, No. 40. 496 pp.**

In 1963, some fifteen years after the first edition of Alan Paton's internationally acclaimed *Cry the Beloved Country*, historian Phyllis Lewsen and the Van Riebeeck Society (VRS) teamed up to publish four volumes of selected letters of South Africa's most eloquent late nineteenth-century liberal, John X. Merriman. In 1972, shortly after Paton received honorary degrees from Harvard and Edinburgh, historian Harrison Wright and the VRS brought out selected letters of James Rose Innes, who like Merriman was in Cecil Rhodes' "Ministry of All the Talents." The publication of the Merriman and Innes letters during the entrenchment of grand apartheid quietly underpinned Paton's literary and political writings in defense of the liberal tradition in South Africa. Peter Alexander and the VRS have now teamed up to give Paton an epistolic voice equal to his liberal predecessors.

Alexander, who published a biography of Paton in 1994, selected about 330 letters from some 2,500 extant for this volume. Alexander provides a helpful chronology of Paton's life and then divides Paton's correspondence into five periods: early life (1922-35), era of the Second World War (1935-45), *Cry the Beloved Country* and the rise of grand apartheid (1946-52), liberalism in South Africa (1953-68), and Paton's last years (1969-88). Alexander contributes brief, helpful introductions to the sections and provides explanatory footnotes to many letters. The book concludes with short biographies on Paton's major correspondents, a bibliography of works by and about Paton, and an index.

Alan Paton was ten when the African National Congress was created, twenty-three when Merriman died, and forty when Innes passed away in 1942. More like Innes than Merriman, Paton found politics "repugnant." Paton also followed Innes into law. From 1935 to 1948, Paton served as a progressive warden at Diepkloof Reformatory. Prior to his years at Diepkloof, Paton taught at a school in Ixopo where he flogged pupils for their misbehavior. Given liberal opposition during the Rhodes era to proposed legislation to cane transgressors in lieu of serving jail time—the so-called Strop Bill, I wanted to read more about Paton's views on corporal punishment at Diepkloof. Neither Paton's letters nor Alexander discuss the caning that did take place during Paton's wardenship.

Paton's international notoriety, gained from the popularity of *Cry the Beloved Country*, first published just months before the National Party (NP) was elected in 1948, provided him with a public voice to oppose the NP's policy of grand apartheid. Paton used his fame to help found the opposition Liberal Party during 1952-53. Given this, readers would expect Alexander to discuss liberalism in South Africa at some length, but he does not. Opponents of apartheid

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v12i1a4.pdf>

have often criticized liberalism in South Africa, and Alexander could have strengthened his work by placing Paton within this debate. Still, readers can see Paton's evolving liberalism and opposition to apartheid through a careful reading of his letters and familiarity with his life's work.

Alexander develops Paton's friendship with Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, the *verligte* Cape Afrikaner Paton met in 1927, and whose patronage Paton sought. The editor also conveys the growth of Paton's liberalism through his letters to and conversations with Nobel laureate Albert John Luthuli, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Mary Benson, Peter Brown, John Collins, Trevor Huddleston, and Uys Krige. Paton's first wife, Doris Olive Lusted, shared Paton's opposition to grand apartheid. In 1955, she helped found the courageous group of heroines, the Black Sash. In his fifties and sixties, Paton became even more committed to the rights of Africans. Paton's 20 November 1964 letter to G. Selwyn Moberley in 1964 illustrates this. He wrote:

The true liberal, by which name I would call my closest associates, desires the emancipation of all South African people from the humiliations and sufferings caused by white supremacy laws.

...All I can say is that I was born into a privileged society, and that my privilege was based on the colour of my skin, and that I no longer wish to retain it. That this may be dangerous, I understand, but I would rather face those dangers than make one of the chief purposes of my life the perpetuation of a society which I believe to be unjust in its very foundations. (p. 311)

That same year Paton appealed to the judge in the Rivonia trial to spare the lives of Nelson Mandela and his co-conspirators and predicted that the NP would eventually have to negotiate with Mandela. By publishing Paton's letters, Alexander and the VRS have restored one of South Africa's great treasures and returned a much-needed tolerant, liberal voice to our homocentric world.

Kenneth Wilburn, *Department of History East Carolina University*

**William Ascher. *Bringing in the Future: Strategies for Farsightedness and Sustainability in Developing Countries*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 328 pp.**

In fifteen chapters, organized into five parts, William Ascher explores how to improve our ability to forecast and plan for the future, particularly in developing countries, since most people and organizations tend to be, in practice, shortsighted and reluctant to make short-term sacrifices in order to get long-term benefits. The approach draws on a number of different disciplines (e.g., behavioral economy, psychology, political science, and sociology), incorporating values and institutional designs, among other dimensions, in an attempt to identify and discuss the best strategies to promote farsightedness. However, as the author emphasizes, the book is not intended to be a "how to pursue farsighted action" manual.

Part one, "The challenges and hopes of farsighted action," provides ample evidence of shortsightedness in development policy alongside an enormous potential for farsightedness,

and identifies numerous strategies and policy instruments to overcome such shortsighted thinking and practice. Ascher identifies the challenges and the obstacles to farsighted action, arguing that each barrier requires specific strategies and instruments, with some of these being able to address more than one obstacle. The author identifies challenges that these strategies have to face (e.g., family economic security, conservation and environmental protection, health and security risks, community self-help, productivity, and physical infrastructure) and explores the reasons why people are shortsighted (e.g., impatience, selfishness, analytic limits, uncertainty, and vulnerability). This part ends with an exploration of those conditions that allow some form of optimism (e.g., our capacities and motivations to think and act in the long term are, he argues, stronger now than in previous periods).

The second part, "Structuring rewards and risks," explores how to highlight the tangible consequences of pursuing shortsighted strategies (e.g., wealth, physical well-being, skill, and enlightenment) and discusses how to apply strategies to create tangible benefits. The main constraint that strategies involving welfare values have to face is the fact that benefits to be created are in general more expensive than those created by other strategies and have more political costs. In other words, the creation of a tangible benefit, as an incentive for a farsighted effort, means someone has to pay for it now and anticipating the costs has frequently negative political consequences (e.g., non electoral support by those affected negatively by the decision). This is followed by the exploration of non-material benefits and costs, suggesting that rewards can come from the quality of social relations (e.g., respect, affection, righteousness toward society, and power) and psychological satisfaction as well, and not only from welfare benefits. Several strategies for the creation of social and psychological rewards are discussed, including: the promotion of family economic security; the conservation and environmental protection; the prevention of health and security risks; the improvement of physical infrastructure; the promotion of productivity; community self-help; and charitable contributions. In short, Ascher, suggests that social and psychological rewards coming up from group participation tend to reinforce farsighted commitments, a point that planners and policy makers in all fields and in both developed and developing countries should consider seriously.

In the following chapters, the author discusses evaluation procedures, strategies for performance evaluation, indicators to assess the performance of decision makers, and other policy instruments. For Ascher, performance evaluation provides special opportunities to consider both tangible and intangible benefits and costs, a moment in which long-term consequences should be given greater importance than the short-term ones. In other words, if performance evaluation rewards farsighted performance (e.g., welfare and social and psychological rewards) it may act as a powerful incentive for choosing farsighted over shortsighted options.

"Improving Analytic Frameworks," the third part, argues that the assumption according to which the major barrier in making rational decisions is the uncertainty that brings into doubt whether specific consequences will materialize can be contested by empirical studies, theoretical insights, or intuitive judgments. He shows why and how analytic exercises about the future can be useful for policy makers and citizens in general, since these exercises can shed light on the need for short-term sacrifices, and how they can be transformed into long-term benefits. In other words, if citizens are engaged in planning exercises, their time horizons will

enlarge and they will probably be more responsive to long term consequences of present actions, a point that planners in all policy fields, in both developed and in developing countries, should take into consideration.

The last two parts explore the design dimensions for the communication of farsighted perspectives and options and examine the institutional arrangements that affect whether farsighted decision makers and farsighted proposals will be able to resist the egoism of numerous stakeholders active in each policy arena.

In sum, as William Ascher suggests, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the evidence available is that there is a large number of strategies and policy instruments available, for planners and policy makers, and for the promotion of farsightedness within development policy and spatial planning. Some of these strategies are likely to be more difficult to sustain in developing and in less developed countries, since supporters of farsighted policies in these countries have less support to maintain their proposals than their counterparts in more developed countries. Many of these strategies require changes in the subjectivity of those whose cooperation with farsighted projects are being asked for, and since this subjectivity is seen as context specific, which requires continuous adaptation of the planning or policy process to the local conditions, William Ascher's approach seems to have been influenced and inspired by post-rational planning theories. For all these reasons, *Bringing in the Future* is a timely and valuable contribution for researchers, students, and decision-makers working in the field of sustainable development policy and spatial planning in developing countries.

Carlos Nunes Silva, *University of Lisbon, Portugal*

**Deborah Brautigam. *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. xv, 320 pp.**

The eleven-chapter book discusses one of the world's topical issues, namely Sino-African relationships. As amply instanced by the abundance of literature, for example, Robert Rothberg's *China into Africa* (2008), Chris Alden's *China in Africa* (2007), and numerous conferences, China's breath-taking rise and its consequent role as a global player is a subject of intense debate, speculation, and intrigue. Hence, this book is a welcome addition to the burgeoning pool of literature on China's ascendancy and answers the question "is China a predator or malignant development partner?" Overall, Brautigam answers in the negative and argues that there is need to refract China's engagement through a prism that does not summarily condemn it as a predator.

The book is organized as follows: the prologue delineates the universe of the discourse by, chiefly, discussing the changing face of Chinese engagement in Africa by walking the reader through the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and foreign aid as seen from the eyes of China (it reportedly prefers the term, *mutual aid*). Very importantly, Brautigam provides justification for embarking on the project by asserting that "this book responds to the lack of systematic analysis of China's aid and state-sponsored economic

cooperation activities in Africa" (p.19). Following the prologue, the following issues are prominent in Chapter 1: that Chinese foreign aid strategy is grounded in Zhou Enlai's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; particularly, equality and mutual benefit, the zenith of China's aid to Africa, particularly, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, and flagship projects such as the 1967 Tazara railway project that the West demurred from financing.

The following ten chapters that discuss varied subjects such as Deng Xiaping's experiments with aid, the "going global" crusade (export of Chinese capital abroad, particularly to Africa), the Asian tsunami (the effects of Chinese imports on Africa's nascent manufacturing sector), Chinese investments in agriculture, and, importantly and perhaps controversially, China's role as a rogue donor in the sense that it is seen to be propping up "rogue" states such as Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Notably, Brautigam marshals arguments to rebut the argument that China's aid is meant for rogue states; she holds that the same is given to non-rogue states. Damningly, she argues that there are other players in the rogue states; for example, Russia once supplied Sudan with military aircraft and both Japan and India bought oil from Sudan.

The conclusion, an extension of the "Rogue Donor" chapter [eleven], begins by answering the question "is China a rogue donor?" Brautigam's answer is unambiguous: "I do not believe so" (p.307). Thus, she argues that while China's ascendancy in Africa should be a matter of grave concern, this should not be used as a *carte blanche* to paint China's engagement in Africa as inveterately bad. At the same time, while acknowledging the deleterious effects of China's engagement, for example, on the manufacturing sector, she asserts that African governments can through appropriate policy choices harness the engagement "...in ways that will benefit their people" (p. 311).

Overall, the major strengths are: jargon-free language, extensive sources and endnotes, and objectivity and candor in dissecting the body of the Sino-African relationship. To this end, the objectivity dimension deserves further mention in the sense that Brautigam labors under no illusion that it is all wines and roses when it comes to China's engagement in Africa. Thus, she concedes that there are vexing problems; for example, the displacement of people to make way for agro projects, the despoliation of the environment, cases of disregard of local labor laws, the displacement of the local manufacturing sector, and, very worryingly, the secrecy that surrounds aid and export credits. Thus, while she holds that these problems cannot be exclusively ascribed to China (the same can be placed on the doorstep of non-Chinese players), she asserts that with proper policy choices, the Chinese engagement can be beneficially harnessed. Thus, to employ a common cliché, she is saying, "do not throw away the baby with the bathwater." Very importantly, the data collection methods are in accord with the gold standard in research methodology: methodological triangulation. Thus, she employs case studies, field work, and secondary data (reports) to found her conclusions regarding debunking some myths pertaining to Chinese aid and economic cooperation. Lastly, is she qualified to speak to this subject? Yes. Given her vast work experience with the World Bank, the UN, and other development agencies and residence in China and West and Southern Africa, she is favorably circumstanced to write on the subject. This is one of the major strengths of the book. Arising from the foregoing strengths, the book should serve as a reference source for those



interested in Sino-African relations and should appeal to those within the academia and without (it is largely jargon-free).

The foregoing strengths notwithstanding, the book could do with the following improvements. The Prologue should be shortened and rather than conflate it with the Introduction, the latter should be a stand-alone item. In chapter eleven, the author liberally uses value-laden terms such as “rogue states” and “dictators.” While the use of such descriptors is unavoidable in some instances, there is a danger one that may grope for the slippery slope when one overdraws the account; hence, circumspection is key. In one instance, the author talks about “going to Africa” and besides creating ambiguity, these kinds of statements may unintentionally reinforce the impression in the minds of the not-so-geographically suave that Africa is one giant country. Hence, specificity is key.

To conclude, Brautigam convincingly sells the other side of China’s aid and economic cooperation to the reader. This side being that China is not an emerging threat that purposes to exploit Africa’s resources to the neglect of environmental and human rights concerns and governance issues. Nonetheless, she holds that China is no angel investor; it has flaws.

Emmanuel Botlhale, *University of Botswana.*

**J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. *Sudan in Turmoil: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010. 340 pp.**

The book under review examines the role played by Sudanese politician and Islamist scholar Hasan al-Turabi in Africa’s first Islamist government and its emergence from the margins of the Arab world to lead and protect the international Islamist movement in the 1990s. Burr and Collins exhaustively track Turabi’s activities from the 30 June 1989 coup d’état by a small cadre of his military and civilians followers, his falling out with the government of President Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and dramatic dismal as the speaker of the Sudanese parliament, and his subsequent periodic detention from 2003 to 2009. This book is not intended as a biography of Turabi, nor is it a comprehensive account of recent Sudanese history. Nonetheless, it is recommended for those readers interested in the central figure in the contemporary Sudan’s Islamist movement.

Turabi is deserving of more analysis than has been completed to date. Any understanding of Sudanese politics is impossible without reference to Turabi’s political activities and his influence over a generation of Sudanese political, military, and bureaucratic leaders. Similarly, Turabi wielded significant influence over Islamist revolutionaries from around the world during the 1990s and helped provide sanctuary and support for fugitives such as Osama bin-Laden.

The book under review was originally published in 2003 as *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamic State*, but has now been re-issued by a new publisher and updated to bring the narrative up to 2009. The authors are well qualified. Burr is a former US Agency for International Development officer who served in Sudan, and Professor Collins, who died in

2008, was a noted authority on African history. Together, the authors have written several books on Sudan, and their *Alms for Jihad* (2006), was controversially withdrawn from circulation by its publisher, Cambridge University Press, after a Saudi citizen they had accused of funding al-Qaeda threatened to sue for libel.

The authors' mastery of their subject is well demonstrated in this book. Sudan's political machinations in the aftermath of the 1989 coup, and Turabi's often clandestine dealings with infamous terrorists, mujahideen, financiers, and spies are notoriously convoluted and ambiguous. In such an environment, rumor often substitutes for fact, and deniable plausibility is the *modus operandi* for all actors. Yet, Burr and Collins have judiciously shifted through secondary sources, media reporting, and what appears to be a vast network of unattributed but well-placed sources to write a remarkably clear and concise narrative, although a trifle sensationalist in places.

Burr and Collins argue that Turabi is a flawed revolutionary, and that his Islamist project has failed. The authors begin their book by briefly narrating Turabi's emergence as a scholar in the 1970s, using his unrivalled learning, charisma and oratory, to enthuse a generation of educated elites to build his vision of an Islamist Sudan, governed by *Shari'a* and at the center of a revived Islamist community, the *umma*. The opportunity for Turabi's vision to become a reality came in 1989 when his followers led by then Brigadier Bashir deposed a democratically elected but floundering government. Yet, when Turabi's supporters in the new government looked to him for guidance on how to implement his vision, "he had no practical answers except his rhetoric, the example of the Sudan as the new Islamic model, and his association with a network of unsavoury terrorists." Burr and Collin's damning evaluation of Turabi's career concludes that for all of his brilliance, Turabi lacked empathy for the majority's Sufi heritage and was callously indifferent to the suffering of minorities in Sudan's periphery, thereby costing him any chance to grow his power base beyond a small group of urban followers.

Unfortunately, the limited scope of this book does not extend to analyzing how Turabi's political opponents, notably President Bashir (whom the authors have little regard for), outmaneuvered their former *murshid* (political guide) and retained control over the military and bureaucracy. If Turabi's vision for Sudan is discredited, what is Bashir's alternative? With Sudan approaching a referendum in 2011 on southern independence, it is more critical than ever that Bashir develops a new national narrative that unlike Turabi's Islamist vision encompasses all Sudanese as equals.

Sonny Lee, *Independent Scholar*

**Wayne Dooling. *Slavery, Emancipation and Colonial Rule in South Africa*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 2007 (Ohio University Research in International Studies, No. 87: first published by University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, Scottsville). xi, 249 pp.**

Wayne Dooling begins with an evocation of the wine country of the Western Cape: Boschendal, Spier, and Meerlust. We are sometimes tempted to believe that these farms and their founding families have always been there—Meerlust has been in the Myburg family since 1757—but this

“landed ruling class . . . was not timeless – it was made” (and re-made), and this book’s first subject is an account of its making and its exercise of a power which rested primarily on imported slave labor. The indigenous people, “as so many European settlers discovered in other parts of the world...were notoriously difficult to enslave” and had to be “killed conquered or domesticated,” although eventually imported slaves and indigenous survivors were proletarianised together. Slavery enabled people without noble pedigree to accumulate wealth quickly, but eventually they had to face challenges--demographic, social, technological--similar to those faced by the great landowners of Europe. The longevity of this South African class of landowners cannot be taken for granted, and its historical explanation is the second subject of this book. The third subject is the making of the settler colonial state, which both modified and nurtured the wine-growers of the Western Cape.

Chapter One takes the story up to the British annexation of the Cape during the Napoleonic wars. For founding members of the Cape gentry the first step had been to leave the service of the Dutch East India Company to be granted the status of landholder and free burger. To maintain the integrity of their estates and families, in the face of Company pressure, the laws of partible inheritance, fluctuating weather, unstable markets, and mortality itself, these slaveholders developed a moral economy in which personal honor and reputation were more powerful than bankruptcy, and marriage or re-marriage could ensure the continuity of name and property. The British brought with them the ideology of free trade and humanitarian zeal that sought “‘equal justice’ and ‘equal protection’” for all, a combination which proved “bitter-sweet” for the wine farmers. The British set about bringing order to the frontier and the trekboer economy, and opening the Cape trade to world markets, but the legal amelioration of the conditions of the Khoi, the abolition of the slave trade, emancipation and apprenticeship which followed, raised labor problems for the Cape gentry. Nonetheless the Dutch elite forged a partnership with the British colonial state, as they had with the Dutch. Eventually their post-emancipation settlement was born of negotiation, rather than emigration.

Chapter Four, “Problems of Free Labour,” gives an account of the fortunes of the gentry in the nineteenth century: the continuing high cost of labor, drought, recession, the expansion of South Africa. Although many more farmers suffered insolvency, many survived and prospered by turning to trade as “capitalists.” Dooling is particularly interesting on the mechanization of agriculture and on the question of the backwardness or otherwise of South African farming in the nineteenth century. Before the British occupation the gentry had managed to maintain credit as “a moral dimension outside the market,” but the commoditization of money set slave-owners against merchants: the primary borrowers against the primary lenders. The cumulative effect by the late nineteenth century, as recounted in Chapter Five, was “The ‘unmaking’ of the Cape gentry”: “The rules of commercial capitalism had triumphed over those of moral community.” Yet Wayne Dooling goes on to show that partly through “formal political activity” the Cape gentry were remade, in, for example, *boereverenigings*, the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners and the Afrikaner Bond, which, with Rhodes’s support, “sought to restore to the Cape countryside the kind of reactionary personal rule that the master class had known under slavery.” The mind-set survives in pockets.



The Epilogue takes us through initial industrialization and the war of 1899-1902 into the twentieth century. The war was never “a white man’s war,” neither white nor a man’s, yet from its ashes emerged the Union of South Africa “a unified white racist state,” to be “ruled exclusively in the interests of a reconstituted white ruling class.”

*Slavery, Emancipation and Colonial Rule in South Africa* maintains a clear balance between the crises and the continuities of South African history. Its use of archival resources, particularly farm records, is exemplary, and its exploitation of illustrative anecdote keeps a lively sense of individuality and personality (of both master and servant) before us, enabling us to see that emancipation is an ongoing process, rather than an achieved status.

Tony Voss, *Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University & University of KwaZulu-Natal*

**Kesha Fikes. *Managing African Portugal: The Citizen-Migrant Distinction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. xxii, 195 pp.**

*Managing African Portugal* is a well-developed ethnographic account of migrant experiences in Portugal. Kesha Fikes’ political economic perspective brings to light the performative interactions involved in the fashioning and refashioning of citizens and migrants alike. Fikes opens with her initial encounter of the study’s small population of immigrant *peixeiras* (fishmongers), Cape Verdean women who, without a license, negotiate the purchase of fish from wholesale vendors and then sell these fish on the streets of Lisbon. This scene at the Santa Apolónia train station occurs just two years after Portugal entered the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. From the outset, Fikes begins to weave a tale of changing positionality and shifting cultural identity for her select sample, four Cape Verdean immigrant fish mongers who she names Bia, Djina, Patrícia, and Manuela. The bulk of her research among these women was conducted from 1994 to 1998 and then again in 2002 and 2003.

The opening chapter focuses on “Portugal’s shift from an *emigrant* to an *immigrant* nation” (p. 8) as the state entered the burgeoning European Union (EU). By 1996, Portugal’s economy was fully integrated into the EU, and by 1998, Portugal had adopted the Euro. Accompanying these political economic shifts were changes to the more mundane social milieu. It is this transition or point of rupture that Fikes documents from the inside, noting how the racial imaginaries or colonial lusotropical ideology of racial miscegenation is replaced in Lisbon by a sentimentality that treats the migrant populations as signifiers of a modern civil society. In other words, Fikes describes the sociality of what she calls the “citizen-migrant connection.” She writes, “The inhabitation of citizenship as a *social* category occurs because of, not in spite of, Otherness such as migrant status” (p. 164).

In her discussion of methodology, Fikes acknowledges the difficulties in documenting “potentialities” and cultural change since it is something that must be viewed through the long lens of time. Her creative solution is to focus on three different locales in a single day (a wholesale market, street vending, and domestic work as a participant observer) and by temporally extending her research over almost a decade. In this way, the reader is left with both

a comprehensive or thick story of everyday nuance, something she often video-recorded, as well as an unfolding and localized history from the perspective of her key informants.

The chapters are organized according to her methodology. Chapter two is set at the fish wholesale market of Docapesca in the port area of the Tagus River. This chapter shows the ever changing relationships between the male Portuguese wholesalers and the Cape Verdean *peixeiras*. Chapter three is all about the interactions between the Cape Verdean fish sellers and both the state apparatus (through the police) and their clients. Chapter four picks up with the same four women several years later when the state in collusion with host-country nationals has renegotiated the Cape Verdean migrants' status; the women are no longer able to make a living as independent fish sellers on the streets of Lisbon. Wage domestic work becomes the only appropriate niche for African migrants as part of the new civil society dichotomy between "black migrants" and "white citizens" (p. 29). The women of this study, as meticulously demonstrated by Fikes, become dependent on their white Portuguese female employers for both job security and residency papers.

One significant contribution of *Managing African Portugal* is that it documents both the migrants and the host-country nationals lived experiences of citizenship in relation to one another, something that is often lacking in most migrant studies. In this way, Fikes provides a new approach to the study of citizenship. In her attempts to "theorize citizenship" (p. 15), she demonstrates how marginality can inform the processual realities of belonging. In addition, Fikes demonstrates how ground level economics influence the experiences of EU modernity, a model that should be transportable to other EU nations dealing with similar ideological shifts. At the same time, parallels can be drawn with the immigrant Hispanic populations in the U.S.

Fikes nuanced discussion of gender, race, transnational migration, and citizenship helps demonstrate the value of ethnography. What I appreciate most about this book is its accessibility as an English cultural description of a Portuguese-speaking part of the world. This is also my primary criticism; the most logical audience for a work such as this, Portuguese-citizens and African-migrants, are excluded from participating in this important conversation around nation- and person-hood. At the same time, as a localized account of transmigrants negotiated positionality, this case study is useful for an audience well beyond the Lusophone world. In fact, we have already recommended *Managing African Portugal* to several colleagues and students interested in immigration issues.

Brandon D. Lundy and Jessica Lopes, *Kennesaw State University*

**Lansana Gberie (ed). *Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008*. Waterloo, Ontario: LCMSDS Press of Wilfrid Laurier University. 2009. 134 pp.**

*Rescuing a Fragile State* is the product of a conference held at Wilfrid Laurier University in 2007. The conference was able to assemble Sierra Leoneans from various factions (academics, military officers, diplomats, and so forth) to review the past, present, and future. As a result, the perspective of this volume is diverse and reflects a broad spectrum of facts and experiences.

The volume commences from the present state of affairs (après the war) and thrusts us back into the events which acted as a catalyst to the war and the war itself. As a political journal of actual events, the transcript is neither ghoulish nor sentimental. It is nonetheless tragic and appalling. Many factors contributed to the depreciation of Sierra Leone. Ian Smillie's contribution entitled "Orphan of the Storm: Sierra Leone and 30 Years of Foreign Aid" provides the stark reality of the condition(s) of foreign aid. Sierra Leone is seen as just another casualty of postcolonial affairs. Sierra Leone was once a hallowed haven for former slaves. The descent of this hallowed state is chronicled well in this text. Ozonnia Ojielo attempts to explain the unexplainable in "Beyond TRC (\*Truth Reconciliation Committee): Governance in Sierra Leone." He attempts to explore the "how" and "why" Sierra Leone waged war against itself. How did civil rights fall victim to corruption in this nation? Ojielo is brave to raise the issue of how the youths of Sierra Leone became "sacrificial lambs" in the cause of greed and personal gain. The answers/rationale for these events is not so simple. In fact, Ojielo resolves that international forces can be held accountable for witnessing the horrors and acting as mere "accidental tourists" in the face of the destruction of a people. Lastly, Mark White's segment "Security and Development in Sierra Leone: DFID's Approach" speaks of the theory and reality of the UK's (and other nations) commitment to conflict resolution in Sierra Leone. The issue, he states, is one that involves the inability of the facilitators of order—to orchestrate administrative order. This post-war truth is one that existed in pre-war Sierra Leone as well.

In short, *Rescuing a Fragile State* is an earnest depiction of the state of Sierra Leonean and African affairs. One wonders if the true tragedy was never really the war alone. The real tragedy is knowing that the war did not have to occur. The international community needed only to care.

Rosetta Codling, *Independent Scholar, Atlanta Georgia*

**William D. Grant. *Zambia Then and Now: Colonial Rulers and their African Successors*. Oxford: Routledge, 2009. xv, 311 pp.**

William D. Grant was an administrative officer in Northern Rhodesia in 1958-61. He left the colonial service three years before this British colony became independent with the new name of Zambia. This book is partly a memoir of his service in the country and partly an analytical report on post-independence Zambia. The book is based mainly on the author's field experience in 1958-61 and on a one-month tour in the summer of 2006. Books and reports by international organizations and non-governmental organizations were also used as sources.

The book is divided into fifteen chapters. Chapters One through Eleven are memoirs of the author's years in the colonial service; Chapter Twelve is an outline account of Zambian politics from pre-independence years till 2006; Chapters Thirteen is the diary of his 2006 visit; Chapter Fourteen is a brief view of Zambia's economy; Chapter Fifteen contains his concluding remarks.

Grant wrote in detail about how colonial officers were recruited and trained. He stated that the officers, believing that independence would be "many years away," hoped that they would spend all their working lives in the colonies. He also described Mwinilunga and Kasempa, the two (rural) stations where he served. He stated that the former was a "by-word for

unsophisticated remoteness." He described the administrative setting in Zambia and talked briefly about the work and behavior of other Europeans there (missionaries, traders, and mineral prospectors). Among other things, he asserted that, contrary to much speculation, he did not know of homosexual relations among unmarried white men. He added that he knew only of their "frustrated heterosexuality." We might add a comment the author failed to make: that there was "frustrated heterosexuality" because Europeans, especially officials of the colonial government, had been brought up to believe that they would lose the respect of "natives" if they took African wives or mistresses.

Much of the book dealt with the work of the administrative officer and, by extension, of the colonial government in Zambia. According to Grant, the main business of colonial administration was the maintenance of law and order. He added that this was necessary because, in his view, "progress in African standards of living depended above all on stability." He also wrote about other useful activities: uniting several ethnic groups, developing infrastructure, introducing western education, improving healthcare, and developing the economy. Grant noted that the colonial rulers were very small in number vis-à-vis those they ruled. He argued that "bluff" was largely responsible for their ability to maintain their rule in spite of the lopsidedness in numbers. He asserted that the powers of the administrative officer were considerable. He defended indirect rule, insisting that it was much more than "paternalism." Grant wrote extensively about the Africans he met in his days as an administrative officer. Among other things, he expressed admiration for their system of justice, which, in his view, emphasized compensation rather than punishment and did not enable criminals to use legal technicalities to escape punishment.

Grant wrote briefly on the race question in colonial Zambia. He asserted that there was equality before the law. He added, however, that there was an "informal color bar." He further stated that the white settlers in Zambia wanted to establish white minority rule in the country, as their compatriots had done in Southern Rhodesia. However, he continued, the whites were, relatively, too few to succeed. Grant noted that colonial officers were opposed to the nationalist movement. He described the leaders of the movement as "so-called nationalists." He added that he and his colleagues believed that independence was coming too early, and feared that "unscrupulous" politicians, rather than those groomed by the British, would take over and ruin the place. But, he noted with a tinge of regret, the tide of nationalism was too strong to be stopped. Summing up on British colonial rule, Grant held that it was based on "trusteeship" rather than "ownership," and that it did much to modernize Zambia and improve the lives of its citizens. He is convinced that while foreign rule is bad in principle it helped Zambia to a much greater extent than its people could have done during the twentieth century. He hinted that, under an indigenous empire, progress would have been much slower and oppression probably much greater.

Grant made several remarks about post-independence Zambia. Among other things, he observed that, under its first president Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia paid a heavy price for supporting liberation struggles in neighboring countries. Sadly, rather than commend Kaunda for living up to his worthy convictions, Grant held that he was not "pragmatic." The former colonial officer is however more persuasive in his assessment of the domestic policies of

Kaunda. His account left no doubt that Kaunda's dictatorship (as president of a one-party state, from 1973) and left-inclined economic policies were wrong-headed. But Grant conceded that Zambia, both under Kaunda and his "pragmatic" successors, has not been among the very badly governed states of post-independence Africa.

Among Grant's several comments about the situation in Zambia today is the view that Zambia is under another kind of imperialism: that of foreign donors (who fund about 52% of its annual budget). According to him, foreign "experts" take decisions Zambians should be taking themselves. Besides, he added, the "experts" (unlike the officials of the colonial government) are not well informed about the country.

*Zambia, Then and Now* is written in felicitous prose. It is easy to read, yet it is serious. Besides interesting stories of the author's days in "the bush" as an administrative officer and of his one-month tour forty-five years later, the book engages in the important intellectual debate about colonial rule, neocolonialism, and development in Africa. The documentary sources he cited are rather scanty but adequate for his purpose. Both the academic and the general reader would find it interesting and intellectually stimulating.

Okechukwu Edward Okeke, *Abia State University*

**Messay Kebede. *Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960-1974*. Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2008. xi, 235 pp.**

*Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia* is the result of Messay Kebede's quest to understand the modernization process promoted by Haile Selassie since the sixties, and more specifically its failure which, apparently, led to its overthrow and to the 1974 Revolution.

Multiple factors help to explain the Ethiopian radicalization process in the decade and a half prior to the revolution, the shift of the regime being its culmination. Usually, the structural ones have been underscored, pointing to a question of degree rather than of form to make clear why, suddenly, Haile Selassie's reign broke up in the middle of the seventies. Following this point of view, the events appear as something natural or even logical in the Ethiopian historical process: having reached a decisive point, the economic and political problems became unbearable for the society; reform was not an option, the autocratic regime had to come to an end.

Nevertheless, in contrast with this explanation, Messay Kebede comes back or rescues the fundamental question from which the historical analyses may start afresh, namely: why? Transmitting, in a certain way but not explicitly, a kind of *braudel*ian notion of history (maybe the fruit of his personal experience in Ethiopia and of his knowledge of the French Academy), Kebede offers a critical account of the 1960-1974 period. Analyzing the modernization process promoted by Haile Selassie in the education system and its social consequences, the author looks for new answers to an old issue.

Even if the revolution in the seventies is not something new, it can be understood from a renewed point of view. From this perspective, the question is not any more how the 1974 break-up was possible, as why the radicalization which allowed it, proscribing the reformist option,



has been possible. Messay Kebede points to the cultural dislocation undergone in Ethiopia at the educational level as the fundamental explanation for this shift towards extremist options, and specially its impact on students and intellectuals. His hypothesis is that when culture stops working as a cohesive element for the society and there is a strong rejection of traditions and past values, radicalization and receptivity towards foreign cultural and ideological models are more probable; structural factors may be important to explain the Ethiopian revolution, but they make little sense without taking into account the role of culture and ideology.

Messay Kebede confronts the complexity of the cultural-ideological process that he describes, and the conjunction with the material and political and political factors that have been usually underlined, in nine chapters dealing with the appearance of student radicalism, as a consequence of the modernization of the education in Eurocentric terms that was a product of Haile Selassie's political project, engendering uprootedness and extroversion. The impact of those policies in a concrete social sector, the new educated elite, and the way this one tried to focus its new western lenses on the Ethiopian situation, caused a profound dislocation reaffirming their opinion about the necessity of a radical social change in the country.

In short, social and cultural dislocation produced by the sudden shift from the traditional education to the Western one, created a void which came to be filled by a radical ideology — Marxism-Leninism — embraced by a small sector of the society. This educative process originated a generational conflict. The new elite should have been following Haile Selassie's objective, the key to consolidate its autocratic rule. Instead, the introduction of Western analytical tools and concepts, and specially its evolutionary lecture of the history, denigrating as backward other cultures that do not seem to have reached the "same stage of development" than the one marked by Western countries, generated a rejection of the customary values, and a questioning of the government and parental authority.

The traditional came to be seen as the cause of the underdevelopment, validating in this way the Western values as the norm to follow, to imitate, instead of creating a model adapted to local realities. The moderate position, which existed in the sixties, more favorable to liberalism and advocating for a political reform, lost its appeal in favor of the marxist-leninist radicals who found in this ideology a way to fill the lacuna caused by the rejection of their cultural values and principles. As Messay wonderfully explains, the substitution was possible because Marxism-Leninism had common points with their former mental map.

The rejection of their traditions, strongly marked by the Christian beliefs, was appeased by the adoption of a credo that had similarities in its objectives and promises with the traditional messianic role of the Ethiopian state, appeasing their sense of guilt because of the betrayal committed against their elders. Moreover, even if Marxism-Leninism was a product of the West, it was also critical of liberal and capitalistic values and, apparently, it offered an explanation and a solution to the identity, cultural, and generational crisis.

The Ethiopian paradox stems from the fact that, despite resisting European colonialism, the Western dominance finally came in through the back door, opened by Haile Selassie himself. Cultural dependency arrived in Ethiopia; and this happened precisely when physical colonization was being questioned in the entire African continent. This cultural dislocation permitted an ideological process favorable to radicalization, which constitutes for Messay

Kebede the cornerstone that allowed the interpretation of the structural conditions (economic, ethnical, political, and international) in revolutionary terms; the structure did not lead to a radical ideology, a radical ideology led to questioning the entire structure, although we can wonder if it is necessary to emphasize the preponderance of one factor over the others. Anyhow, Messay shows how the attitude and decisions of a well positioned social minority can be powerful enough to have an impact on the entire society, even if it is true that the author keeps us in suspense, leaving for another occasion the analysis of how the Derg managed to control the Revolution, relegating the new educated elite.

A good point of *Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation* is the manner in which Messay Kebede illustrates punctually his reasoning with examples of the way other countries faced similar situations. Avoiding the big pretensions of huge comparisons, the Japanese, Hindu, Russian, or Chinese examples consolidate his study with an international perspective about the impact of Marxism-Leninism in this period and of the westernization and modernization processes in other countries. If Japan is a good example of how past and present could be harmonized, the Russian case, as the Ethiopian one, show the opposite.

In continuity with his earlier *Survival and Modernization—Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present* (1999) the author in *Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation* furthers the understanding of the country's present situation from an historical and cultural point of view. It is worth saying that for those who did not read the former, this book will motivate one to do so, and for those who are interested in the immediate history, this book will be a good proof of the necessity of the historical perspective in order to make sense of the current time, specially if we consider that the consequences of the process analyzed by Messay Kebede are still felt today.

Elsa González Aimé, *African Studies Group (GEA) of the Autonomous University of Madrid.*

**Chima J. Korieh. *The Land Has Changed: History, Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2010. xix, 370 pp.**

Any research on the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria should be viewed with great caution because of the difficult task involved in dealing with the Igbo subject. The origin of people is a research subject most historians have become fed up with. Chigbu (2009: p. 4) described it as a historical "headache yet to respond to any known analgesic." Echeruo (1979) noted that the Igbo are a people best described with two words, "headstrong" and "ambitious"—because this "quality in Igbo character... has been its primary source of strength and of disaster." Afigbo (1981) therefore called for a "commonsense approach" in dealing with any of the Igbo questions for lack of a more functional approach. In enlightening his readers on the *History, Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria*, Korieh has adopted this approach in *The Land Has Changed*.

The book is based on the author's study of gender relations among the Igbo. With an introduction and conclusion, it is divided into seven chapters. Each chapter chronologically deals with a specific ethno-historical issue. Chapters one and two constitute an exposé of their late pre-colonial political, cultural, and economic set-up. The third chapter deconstructs their societal transformations from its virgin agrarian nature to a "western gendered ideology of

male farmer" (p. 25). Chapter four provides insight into their colonial rural revolts. Chapters five and six discuss their reaction to major structural changes and colonial policies. Chapter seven elaborates on the post-colonial agricultural policies of the region.

In terms of methodology, the author relied on primary and secondary sources. The book provides information on socio-economic and political issues pertaining to the Igbo. Its analysis is based on data collected through face-to-face interviews. The volume is rich with a quality literature review. The use of illustrations, tables and photos in the book provide for the broadening of readers' perspectives in the subject. The book's breadth cuts through multi-disciplinary lines. It merges colonial history, ethnography, rural economy, African traditional politics, agriculture, and rural development of the people in one volume. It serves as a literary megaphone for the usually silent voices of the rural people in the Igbo part of Nigeria.

The book provides an in-depth look at the emotional makeup of colonial Igbo life. The various responses from the rural voices of the region reflect a mixture of the agony and opportunity (not love) with which the people viewed colonial intrusion in their sociopolitical and economic life. In fact, the author acknowledges quite vividly that the Igbo were part of the making of their colonial history, although not "under conditions of their own choosing" (p. 275). It serves a diverse readership. Researchers and practitioners with potential interests in Nigeria's rural and regional development will find the book very informative. Lecturers and students of African sociology, rural economics and regional politics will find it helpful. Nigerian policy makers will find it an invaluable piece of research, especially as a way of learning from the past.

Although providing very important information about the political and cultural struggles in colonial eastern Nigeria, the author could have done more by describing rural life in more expansive and narrative terms rather than viewing it mainly from the perspective of agricultural change alone. However, considering that the main objective of the book is to expose the "British attempt to transform a colonial society through the modernization of agriculture..." the author probably had no other choice but to adopt the "agricultural change" path (p.4). As Afigbo (2000) has already noted, the problems which have faced Igbo studies can be grouped under three heads –lack of interest in the subject by the Igbo themselves, lack of financial support, and lack of an institutional base. By presenting a well researched work in this volume, the author has contributed in providing a solution to the first problem.

## References

Afigbo, A. E. *Obi Ikenga: The Case for a pan-Igbo Centre for Igbo Studies*. Nigeria: Abia State University Press Limited, 2000.

Afigbo, A. E. "The Age of Innocence: the Igbo and their Neighbours in pre-Colonial Times." Paper delivered at the Third Ahiajoku Lecture of the Igbo, Owerri, Imo State, Nigeria, 1981..

Chigbu, U. E. "The Igbo Person—the Igbo People." *Igbo Catholic Church Magazine* (Munich, Germany: Igbo Catholic Community Publication, 2009).

Echeruo, M. J. C. "A Matter of Identity." Paper delivered at the first Ahiajoku Lecture of the Igbo, Owerri, Imo State, Nigeria, 1979.

Uchendu Eugene Chigbu, *Technische Universität München*

**Henning Melber and John Y. Jones (eds). "Revisiting the Heart of Darkness—Explorations into Genocide and Other Forms of Mass Violence." *Development Dialogue* 50 (December 2008). 302 pp.**

"Genocide studies" has emerged in recent years as an interdisciplinary field in its own right, drawing upon the methodologies of history, political science, psychology, and sociology in an effort to answer the question as to why groups of human beings pursue the wholesale extermination or extirpation of other groups. Not only has this blossoming field produced countless books on the subject, in addition to several journals (such as the *Journal of Genocide Research* and *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*), but now several universities across the globe have established centers, or offer programs, devoted to the subject. Unfortunately, however, twinned with this increased desire to understand the mechanics of genocide is the growing willingness to employ the label for political purposes, so that the true meaning of the word is forgotten amid accusations and counter-accusations launched across the world in our twenty-four-hour news cycle. Too, the commercializing of genocide manifest in movies like *Hotel Rwanda* popularly reduces the etiology of such crimes against humanity to mere original sin or man's inherent inhumanity to man.

All of which make this particular issue of *Development Dialogue*—devoted to genocide and mass violence, with a particular focus upon the African continent—a most welcome addition to the literature. Arising from papers presented at two different conferences in Scandinavia in 2006 and 2007, this issue tackles both the broader questions of the definition and archaeology of genocide while, at the same time, offering analysis specific to the Congo, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and more. Opening the issue is Jacques Depelchin, who links modern genocide with European colonialism in the question, "what if the evil which has so often and unquestioningly been associated with Nazi Germany, or, today, with believers of Islam, were to be seen as deeply imbedded in a way of thinking which is actually more associated with the triumph of the West, its economic, political and social models?" (p. 18). Contributor Gerald Krozewski follows up this question by asserting that violent conflict in Europe's African colonies must be contextualized within the doctrines of the nation-state then being debated in Europe at the time, while Jürgen Zimmerer provides a comparison of the Holocaust and colonial genocides, concluding that they are different only in levels of organization, centralization, and beauracratization. Dominik Schaller—contrary to writers such as Adam Hochschild of *King Leopold's Ghost* fame, who insist that European colonial violence cannot be dubbed genocide despite the fantastic death count—applies to the colonial project Raphael Lemkin's original definition of genocide, which can cover the deliberate destruction of cultural and political institutions as well the elimination of targeted populations, and concludes that "the *situation coloniale* in Africa was not only violent but inherently genocidal" (p. 86).

Coupled with these and other papers that embody much of the theorizing at the center of genocide studies are four papers which zero in on specific events of mass violence in post-colonial Africa. Mohamed Adhikari explores the Rwandan genocide through the lens of the popular movie *Hotel Rwanda*, offering not only a contrast of the real-life experience of hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina with that of the character played by actor Don Cheadle, but also presenting the deep context of Belgian and German colonialism, Hutu-Tutsi relations through history, and the post-independence regimes of Gregoire Kayibanda (during which thousands upon thousands of Tutsis were massacred) and Juvenal Habyarimana (widely seen as a traitor by Hutu extremists). While recounting this bigger picture, Adhikari takes to task the film's unnecessary simplification and decontextualization of events. Iam Phimister recalls the largely unknown massacre of some 20,000 Ndebele speakers in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, during the early 1980s—a crime directed largely at a population known to have antipathies toward Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF political party. The author argues in conclusion that such violence, "as regionally bound as it was indiscriminating," could well fall under the UN definition of genocide (212). A second case study centered upon Zimbabwe is Mary E. Ndlovu's paper on the 2005 "Murambatsvina," the central government's notorious attack upon the infrastructure of informal trade and informal housing, an event for which Ndlovu offers several possible explanations, including the government's desire to suppress or pre-empt urban opposition to ZANU-PF rule or to reassert control of a black market economy that deprived the state of revenue. Finally, Elina Oinas and Katarina Jungar examine the HIV activism of the organization Treatment Action Campaign and its indictment of both the South African government and multinational pharmaceutical corporations on the charge of homicide for their respective failures in addressing the AIDS crisis in the country. Examining the struggle from the perspective of Foucauldian body politics, the authors conclude that the government, largely on the basis of inaction, has "played itself into a corner where it can be defined as a perpetrator of mass violence and lethal biopolitics on a mass scale" (p. 256).

Closing this issue is a handful of shorter papers that link colonialism and genocide with modernity, explore the economic interests behind mass violence, ask the question as to whether or not there exists a unique global south perspective on genocide, and report from a panel debate on what constitutes genocide. The whole package, coming in at just over 300 pages, has the feel more of a scholarly book than it does a single journal issue, and it practically demands employment as such—for this volume has both the philosophical heft and general accessibility to serve as a primer to the fields of genocide studies. While its modern historical case studies are limited to a meager handful of sub-Saharan nations (with two of them focusing upon Zimbabwe), they are all excellent works that provide a useful template for further inquiry. Moreover, the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre generously makes this issue, along with others in the *Development Dialogue* series, available for free download at its website. If this volume is indicative of the broader work of the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre, then people of goodwill across the world have a valuable ally in their struggle against inhumanity and violence.

Guy Lancaster, *Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & Culture*



**David Newbury.** *The Land beyond the Mists: Essays on Identity and Authority in Precolonial Congo and Rwanda.* Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009. 444 pp.

David Newbury lui-même caractérise probablement le mieux l'apport essentiel à l'historiographie de l'Afrique de ses articles parus entre 1974 et 2001. Il décrit ainsi le courant contre lequel il avance depuis bientôt quarante ans :

« ... they identified culture with race, they assumed that broad cultural/racial groups acted as single (internally homogenous) agency, and they took it for granted that racial/cultural groups were organized in a hierarchical fashion. There is an implicit assumption in these works that the structures of African societies observed during colonial rule could simply be extrapolated into the distant past, thus effacing the effects on African societies of both colonial influences and African agency within that colonial context. [...] what is most surprising is that these assumptions seemed to intensify over time, as researchers became further removed from local testimony [...] a rigid intellectual framework (which also increasingly reinforced colonial administrative thinking) became self-perpetuating. » (pp. 9-10).

Introduire de cette façon en 2009 un article cosigné avec un historien congolais trente ans auparavant (en 1980), ne revient-il pas à combattre de vieux démons ? Malheureusement, ce n'est toujours pas le cas. Les changements apportés à la conceptualisation des sociétés africaines par les universitaires, semblent avoir eu peu d'effet sur la perception générale de l'Afrique. Elle est encore dominée par l'idée que « broad cultural/racial groups acted as single agency ». Newbury insiste sur le danger de s'éloigner trop rapidement des modes locaux de mise en représentation autant du passé que du présent. Il remarque que la conviction faisant loger à la même enseigne le pouvoir et le savoir fait conclure que le savoir produit dans les universités l'emporte nécessairement sur le savoir local. Les nationaux qui, comme David Newbury, persistent à mettre en valeur les représentations locales contre les dogmes politiquement soutenus par un pouvoir paient parfois de leur vie s'ils n'ont pas eu le temps d'opter pour l'exil. Ce fut le cas du coauteur de l'article de 1980, Bishikwabo Chubaka.

David Newbury nous a habitué à l'extrême rigueur de sa démarche, ses recherches sur place, ses enquêtes dans les archives et leurs analyses sont exemplaires. À cet égard, chaque texte repris dans ce recueil est une perle du métier, un exemple de la recherche historique à son meilleur<sup>1</sup>. En disposer en un seul volume est précieux pour l'enseignant de l'histoire de l'Afrique, un cadeau pour celles et ceux qui envisagent entreprendre une thèse en histoire de l'Afrique. La finesse des analyses de David Newbury, sa sensibilité aux contextes temporel, social, culturel et, évidemment, politique lorsqu'il récolte, puis analyse, les traditions historiques locales sont sans pareils. Historien attaché aux normes de son métier, il est néanmoins aussi très sensible à ce que nous qualifions aujourd'hui des usages du passé. Il sait que les traditions orales sont transmises non pas par souci de conservation d'un savoir antiquaire, mais parce qu'elles permettent d'interpréter le présent et d'envisager l'avenir. L'histoire écrite par des historiens et les traditions que ces derniers interprètent constituent dans la région où il travaille un enjeu politique important. Newbury nous explique pourquoi il

---

<sup>1</sup> Dans son « Foreword », Jan Vansina écrit à propos de l'histoire que pratique David Newbury : « history rests on fundamental concepts that have been carefully scrutinized and probed rather than merely assumed. », p. XII.

en est ainsi et il fait tout en son pouvoir pour éviter d'être à son tour capté par les enjeux et les jeux politiques.

Tous les textes que David Newbury a choisi de rassembler ont fort bien traversé le temps et gardent leur actualité et leur pertinence. Néanmoins, la présentation de certains aurait pu être mise à jour. Par exemple, dans le titre du deuxième chapitre, Zaïre aurait dû être remplacé par Congo. Le texte couvre les années 1960 à 1980 qui sont divisées à part égales entre l'appellation du pays du nom Congo et du nom Zaïre. Dans les notes de plusieurs chapitres, l'adjectif « récent » ne doit pas être compris comme référent à une publication parue en 2009. Certes, le lecteur finit par saisir la valeur relative du terme, néanmoins la confusion le guette. Le sens exact de « récent » est important parce que, à juste titre, David Newbury engage de nombreux et très éclairants débats avec la littérature sur chacun de ses sujets, et « récent » en 1980 ne renvoie pas à la même littérature que « récent » en 2001 ou encore en 2009.

Cette observation m'amène à exprimer un autre regret, en particulier par rapport au dernier chapitre, paru à l'origine en 2001. Ce long texte de grande importance, écrit après le génocide de 1994 au Rwanda, est paru pratiquement en même temps que le livre de Jan Vansina, *Le Rwanda ancien* (traduction américaine de 2004 *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda*, Madison, 2004). Et même si Newbury ne pouvait pas avoir lu ce livre sous sa forme finale alors qu'il rédigeait son article, il n'ignorait pas ce travail compte tenu de ses relations avec Vansina. Il s'y réfère marginalement, un débat de fonds aurait été de grand intérêt pour le lecteur. Également, même s'il mentionne dans sa bibliographie la synthèse (*Afrique des Grands Lacs*, disponible aussi en anglais) que Jean-Pierre Chrétien a fait paraître en 2000, il n'engage aucune discussion avec elle, pas plus qu'avec les synthèses d'Augustin Nsanze (*Le Burundi ancien: L'économie du pouvoir de 1875 à 1920*, 2001), ou avec le volume de Chrétien et Banegas, *The Recurring Great Lakes Crisis: Identity, Violence, and Power*, 2008. Il en est de même avec les livres de Prunier (*Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, 2008) et de Lemarchand (*The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*) parus plus tard. À mes yeux, le dernier chapitre du livre justifie l'opinion de Vansina qui écrit dans son avant-propos : « ... violence in the middle of Africa since 1994 [...] was the outcome of several centuries of historical developments, and anyone who wants to understand the présent situation of this region would do well to read this book... ». Je regrette donc que David Newbury n'y ait pas ajouté une note prolongeant ses analyses afin de débattre avec les auteurs des travaux parus au cours de la première décennie de ce siècle, même s'il s'agit plutôt des synthèses. Tous ces travaux sont inévitablement marquée par la plus récente explosion de la violence extrême, violence qui ne finit pas de ronger la région depuis au moins une génération. On m'objectera soit que ces livres sont politiquement engagés, soit que couvrir la littérature de la dernière décennie demanderait tout un livre. Cependant, pour ces mêmes raisons, une extension des analyses du dernier chapitre, à la lumière des livres cités, mais aussi des publications de Claudine Vidal et d'autres, aurait pu, avantageusement, clore cet important livre.

Bogumil Jewsiewicki, *Université Laval*

**Kwaben Dei Ofori-Atah.** *Going to School in the Middle East and North Africa.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008. 133 pp.

*Going to School in the Middle East and North Africa* is the sixth volume in a series on comparative education by Greenwood Press. In this particular volume, which is organized by themes, the location is “MENA countries,” including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Emirates, and Yemen. The author begins his study with a general background on the MENA region in the first chapter, specifically noting the early writing forms by the Sumerians, Egyptians, and Greeks and the schools known as “*edubbas*” or “tablet houses” for Sumerian students. His very brief history emphasizes the long tradition of schooling in the MENA region, the male only education system, and the rote learning form of pedagogy.

Chapter Two follows the introduction of Islamic schools called *kuttabs* (for the younger students) and *madrasahs* (for adolescents), which were established, in order to teach Islamic religion, values, and culture. According to Ofori-Atah, the modernization of education in the MENA countries was the result of European cross fertilizations, among them the French who were active in Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, and Syria, and the British who worked in Egypt, Lebanon, and The United Emirates. The chapter concludes with a section on education in Israel and the type of schools: state schools, state religious schools, Arab and Druze schools, and independent private schools. All of these institutions follow the Ministry of Education’s common core curriculum, which is mandated by the state.

Since independence for the various MENA countries, the respective curricula have undergone changes that reflect regional and country interests, values, and student goals. Among the Arab states, the core curriculum generally includes language arts (Arabic, French, or English), maths, sciences, computer education, religious education, and national/social studies. Curriculum tracks, such as scientific, commercial, literary, and technical, are common among all MENA countries. Interestingly, the technical and vocational tracks are important in Kuwait and Libya, as specifically noted by the author. Yet, the author provides evidence from the World Bank (2005) that students do not find the vocational and technical tracks attractive for a number of reasons including the poor quality vocational streams for students who continue from basic to secondary education, limited access to post-secondary education, over-representation of lower socio-economic students, and a growing mismatch between educational outcomes and skills needed. Other topics touched on in Chapter Three are the locally published and distributed, free textbooks, the increasingly influential use of technology, and the approval process involved in all private educational institutions from a curriculum planning committee.

In Chapter Four, preprimary education is examined and examples of the purpose, subjects, and curriculum are provided from Oman, Israel, and Bahrain. Primary education, which is free and compulsory in all MENA countries, is also discussed, as is secondary education. Other topics that are covered include the variable school year from country-to-country, class size, school uniforms at public, religious, and private schools, requirements for teacher education, classroom management and co-education. Overall, the chapter spans a very wide range of topics and only briefly engages the reader on any one topic, thus the information tends to be

general and of limited use to someone interested in depth for a particular issue. More detailed background on the development, progress, and status of higher education in the Middle East and North Africa is given in Chapter Five. Short synopses are provided for Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Specifics are provided on admission requirements, programs of study, enrollment, grading and libraries.

The final two chapters address Special Needs Education and Gender and Schooling. Ofori-Attah attaches great emphasis to the 1994 United Nations conference in Spain that resulted in the Salamanca Statement, which aims for schools to include all children irrespective of their physical, intellectual, social, emotional, and linguistic conditions. Although countries are discussed individually by section, the overall progress in special education is difficult to ascertain, as only broad statements of improvement are provided. Likewise the gender and schooling chapter is organized by country and the theme of female illiteracy, due to a traditional male-dominated society, is presented. Of note are the laws that have been established in many MENA countries to help minimize the gap between male and female education opportunities and subsequent jobs. Also noteworthy is that many MENA countries do not support coeducation after the third grade. Most often, foreign schools, such as the Dubai British School, offer the only coeducational possibilities. The curriculum for males and females differs in many MENA countries as well, and there are inroads being made in many places to improve opportunities for females, particularly in the last decade.

In sum, this text can serve as a basic introduction to the schools in the Middle East and North Africa for undergraduates in comparative and international education. Among the many themes, it is difficult to find strong arguments for specific issues that affect particular countries, as the supporting material is discussed so briefly. Several themes do occur throughout the text, such as the under-education of females, the ubiquitous pedagogical use of rote learning, and the authoritative role of teachers. While some chapters do include very short theoretical frames, the overall text lacks theoretical arguments as the basis for different educational perspectives. Perhaps the original direction of this series, which focuses on countries rather than themes, is more effective for a comparative analysis. A quick flip through the text would suggest that while there is information provided in short segments, charts, and lists, the sum of the text lacks a compelling narrative for the various themes, which would help in making substantive comparisons.

Sonja Darlington, *Beloit College*

**Akinwumi Ogundiran and Toyin Falola (eds). *Archaeology of Atlantic Africa and the African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. xvii, 509 pp.**

This volume brings together archaeologists working on various aspects of Africa in the trans-Atlantic world. A wide range of issues is covered: Africa's incorporation into the international trade networks of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries; the impacts of the slave trade and the influx of new goods on African societies; and the incorporation of enslaved Africans into the

Americas, both as slaves and free persons. Two of the chapters discuss the past in the present and/or the practice of archaeology, namely Brempong Osei-Tutu's chapter, which examines the complexities of cultural politics, tourism and memory at Ghana's "slave castles," and Anna Agbe-Davies, who discusses the history of African-American archaeology in the United States and the role of descendant communities and African-American archaeologists in the sub-discipline. Agbe-Davies particularly highlights the empowering potential of archaeology in questioning the naturalization of the status quo and by engagement with marginalized communities.

The book opens with an insightful introduction by the editors, which situates the chapters and the book within the trends present in the study of trans-Atlantic Africa. Although the chapters are then divided into two main sections: "Atlantic Africa" (comprising of seven chapters) and "African Diaspora" (comprising of twelve chapters), thematically they might be described as falling into three groups: Africa, the African Diaspora, and what might be described as "Africa in the Diaspora." In the "Africa" grouping, chapters by Ann Stahl, Akinwumi Ogundiran, J. Cameron Monroe and Aribidesi Usman discuss ongoing research on the impact of the Atlantic trade on everyday African life in the Banda region (Ghana), the Yoruba-Edo hinterland (Nigeria), the kingdom of Dahomey (Bénin), and Northern Yorubaland (Nigeria) respectively. A perspective on the collapse of coastal city-states in East Africa as a direct result of the imposition of Portuguese colonial interests is provided by Chapurukha Kusimba, while Alioune Dème and Ndèye Sokhna Guèye compare the impact of the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Saharan slave trades in the Middle Senegal Valley.

The "African Diaspora" chapters cover diaspora populations and sites in both North and South America and touch on a number of themes in African Diaspora archaeology including the creation of households and the use of space by enslaved Africans at the Hermitage (Whitney Battle-Baptiste) and the Isaac Royall House in Medford, Massachusetts (Alexandra Chan). Mary Beaudry also discusses the use of space, this time by free blacks at the African Meeting House on Nantucket. She argues that it is possible to identify a "culturally distinctive way of organizing and maintaining communal space" (p. 405), most particularly in the form of the well-swept yard that opened up the space for a variety of activities. Mark Hauser, in contrast, examines the role of the enslaved and free African population in commercial activities in eighteenth-century Jamaica, reporting on the trade networks that spanned urban and rural contexts, revealed to us by the chemical analysis of the clay used to produce the traded *yabba* pots. Fred McGhee's chapter discusses the potential of maritime archaeology for informing our understanding of the African Diaspora. Two chapters serve as a reminder that the populations with which diasporic Africans would have interacted were not limited to European-Americans. Terrance Weik's chapter highlights the history of African Seminole Communities in Florida, which grew out of the connections forged between African Maroons and Native Americans, and Kofi Agorsah discusses Maroon communities and their links to Native Americans in the Caribbean. Both of these chapters serve as ample warning against the practice of assigning too narrow an ethnic label to sites based solely on their material culture.

The African Diaspora in the South American continent is generally under-represented in this volume. Daniel Schávelzon's chapter provides some fascinating insights into the now almost forgotten presence of Africans in the settlement of early Buenos Aires, a presence that



has almost been written out as a result of the “whitening” of Argentina. Pedro Funari situates the archaeological study of the African Diaspora in Brazil with reference to the archaeology of Palmares, a runaway- slave settlement established in the early 1800s.

The two chapters that fall into the third grouping, that of “Africa in the Diaspora,” are studies by Christopher Fennell (on “Bakongo Identity and Symbolic Expression in the Americas”) and Candace Goucher (on “African Metallurgy in the Atlantic World”). Many of the other authors reference material symbols or the use of space that are possibly reflective of African origins, but Fennell and Goucher self-consciously interrogate symbolic, cultural, and productive practices that may have originated in Africa and that re-appear in the Diaspora in a variety of forms. In Fennell’s case he discusses the “symbolic composition” of the BaKongo belief system and how this may have been interpreted by Africans more familiar with other symbol systems in a way that made sense to them. Goucher examines issues relating to technology transfer and the retention of African ritualistic and symbolic components in Caribbean iron-working.

On the whole this book is exemplary of the role of archaeology in enhancing our understanding of the human experience and in laying bare the history of how our globalizing, unequal world came to be. Chapters such as those by Hauser, Schávelzon, and Fennell also illustrate the true potential of archaeology and material culture to inform on broader questions of economy, society, and religion that are not illuminated by documentary or oral accounts. The different geographical foci of the book also highlight the regional differences between archaeologies focusing on the same time period. There are definitely differences—the chapters set in West Africa, for example, are more likely to refer to the broad brushstrokes of decades and centuries at the regional level, in contrast to some of the chapters focused on the western side of the Atlantic where minute details are given about fairly shorter periods of time at a smaller geographic scale (often at the level of a site). These differences arise from the numbers of archaeologists doing research in the respective areas, as well as the scale and qualities of the source materials that each are dealing with. Also, to some extent, it is because the chapters in this volume are not fully representative of the full range of the African archaeology of this time period that is currently being done. The African chapters do, however, provide a solid base with which to forge new directions in the study of the Africa in the Atlantic World and to re-examine what the archaeology of Africa and the African Diaspora have to teach each other. Indeed, the true value of this book perhaps lies in its ability to acquaint very different readerships with a wealth of sources and research with which they may hitherto have been unfamiliar with.

Natalie Swanepoel, *University of South Africa*

**Charles F. Peterson.** *DuBois, Fanon, Cabral: The Margins of Elite Anti-Colonial Leadership.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007. ix, 160 pp.

The thesis of the book “is a historical-theoretical analysis of: contemporary issues within continental and diasporic African cultures and my positionality in relation to mass popular culture and politics” (p. 139). Based on this declarative epistemological guidepost, Peterson’s study takes him on a scholarly enquiry starting from the United States, through the Caribbean and continental Africa using interdisciplinary explorations of W.E.B. DuBois, Franz Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral in an attempt to enter into a thick description underpinning their theoretical and practical thoughts on the subject.

Tracing the background of DuBois from Great Barrington, Massachusetts, to Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, Peterson argues that DuBois was far removed from his people. Peterson contends that DuBois had little or no sustained connection to a larger Black community (p. 36). He was particularly alienated towards blacks from the south. He was a black bourgeoisie who had disassociated himself from his own people because of his “eliteness.” Peterson attacks DuBois’s academic discipline, sociology, which he argues exposed him to the Afri-US life. However, he did not step in to help; instead, he became more of a pet negro relying upon a belief in colonial and historical evolution as a linear progression form.

Peterson evaluates the colonial elite with mass-popular culture and deploys it as the undergirding platform to anchor his critique challenging the credibility of DuBois as a black person in America vis-à-vis his relationship and communal identity with his fellow blacks. His work is also an indictment of DuBois pointing particularly to his philosophical worldview expatiated in *The Talented Tenth* (1903) and his concept of “Double Consciousness.” Peterson notes, “DuBois’s formulation of his ideas of Black underclass pathology revealed this conflicted racial-class position. His concept of the Talented Tenth sought to formulate a social-political relationship between an elite and the Black majority” (p. 54). For Peterson, DuBois is trapped in a colonial mentality of superiority that impels him to look down upon his own people based on a socially engineered class dichotomy that conferred on him an elite status due to having been able to ascend the academic ladder. This theme is recurrent throughout the entire book even as he surveys DuBois’s attitude toward Afri-US people from the south who moved up north. Through a comparative lens in which he appraises his relationships with other diasporic Africans, DuBois is seen as being caught-up in internal colonialism where he aligns himself with the colonial master and evaluates others through that prism.

DuBois’s attitude of aligning himself with the colonial master was a reason for his conflict with the Jamaican Marcus Garvey as Garvey became a threat to DuBois’s leadership. Garvey stood for the working class and the welfare and gained popular legitimacy to the detriment of DuBois, who stood for and aligned himself with the middle class.

Mass-culture especially in jazz and the blues and folklore existed among Afri-US people and was very much enjoyed by the lower class. Duke Ellington and Zora Neale Hurston, in spite of their Talented Tenth status, both stood with and among their people and were not alienated from them. They identified with their people in tone, language and attitude (p. 70). In a sense, this was a form of their collective social resistance against the very structure that put them in the so-called Talented Tenth status.

In answering the question of what should have been done, perhaps, Peterson brings in Franz Fanon and Cabral Amilcar, whose activities became even more amplified in the post-DuBois era. Unlike DuBois, Cabral from the African continent and Fanon from the French Martinique made a clear distinction between being used as a tool for colonial manipulation and being liberated from the chains of colonialism. Fanon and Cabral were able to resist what DuBois could not, hence, with their overt resistance to imperialism and colonialism they were able to win the trust of their people. Fanon and Cabral were both what DuBois would term the Talented Tenth (in their case *petite bourgeoisie*). However, they determinedly resisted the system that they found themselves in even as they took advantage of the education that the entrenched structures offered. Indeed, it is through this education that the structural social inequities would be unveiled exposing to them the “other” status that existed. As Peterson quotes B. Marie Perinbam, “Fanon chose the peasants because, like the nineteenth-/early twentieth century European Proletariat, they were ‘outsider’...Low social status, and lack of education, technological skills, and capital had denied the dubious advantages of ‘colonial oppression’” (p. 101). These were the revolutionary force of resistance. These were the same masses that, for instance, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana also used to successfully establish his political agenda.

Just as Fanon’s travels brought him in proximity to the ordinary people and their cultural values and belief systems in North African and other places, so did Cabral’s trade as agronomist expose him to the masses and cultures that had not suffered the external intrusions of colonial ideology and domination. However, as Peterson aptly points out, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) leadership began to unravel when Cabral demanded an erasure of privileged identities or class positions (something DuBois could not do); as it was the policy of the Portuguese colonial master to do away with the indigenous culture while enculturating them with their own.

Both Fanon and Cabral understood colonialism and its twin evil of racism differently from DuBois’s era and so were successful in using it toward the advancement of their people. Essentially, the problems were different. Living in their *own* countries, both Fanon and Cabral were able to move beyond certain points, whereas most of Afri-US or African Americans, because of their luminosity, could not in their borrowed spaces.

In characterizing DuBois as an elite black outsider (as a substantial portion of the book suggests), we should not lose sight of the fact that Peterson, with his higher education, also fits the DuBois status in a way as he expressed in the introduction (pp. 1-10) and conclusion (pp. 139-45). Although DuBois, Fanon, and Cabral came from different parts of the world, they should also be studied within a sociopolitical contextual historicity of time and space.

Peterson’s work is a massive read and offers tons of information worthy of study. He does not merely cite footnotes; he also very well explains the footnotes, giving differing opinions where necessary. He has also proffered a different intellectual interpretation and analysis of DuBois’s works. His analysis of Cabral’s “re-Africanization” and “Return to Source” are excellently done. However, this book is not too palatable for the general reading consumer because many details are needed across disciplines to fully understand the problematic embedded in most of the issues discussed. I was hoping that he will define “Afri-US” in the

introduction, but the reader has to figure that out. Having said this, the book contains useful information that would expose graduate students to the interpretation of many theories and ideas from different (probably more radical) points of view.

E. Ofori Bekoe, *The College of New Rochelle; Rosa Parks Campus*

**Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (eds). *Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010. 387 pp.**

There has been an ongoing dichotomy between retributive and restorative approaches to transitional post-conflict justice in modern Africa. Scholars and practitioners from within Africa and beyond participated in the May 2007 “Peace versus Justice? Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and War Crimes Tribunals in Africa” seminar, organized by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, South Africa.

The volume *Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa* is based on a collection of essays that were originally presented at the 2007 seminar. The co-editors—Chandra Lekha Sriram, Professor of Human Rights at the School of Law, University of East London, and Suren Pillay, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa—worked in conjunction with the CCR to develop this book as a comprehensive examination of previous and existing transitional justice mechanisms in the African context. It contributes toward the restorative vs. retributive justice debate by discussing challenges and prospects of accountability through expert and insider critiques of both specific African case studies, and of the continent as a whole. In addition, many of the authors refer to previous transitional justice experiences in Latin America and Europe that have influenced similar African initiatives.

The volume offers a unique insider analysis by practitioners who have participated in developing or implementing the justice mechanisms discussed. Authors such as Kenneth Agyemang Attafua, who served as Executive Secretary of the Ghana National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), and Alex Boraine, who served as Deputy Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), explain the challenges of establishing transitional justice within the realities of modern Africa. Other chapters provide critical analyses from leading transitional justice scholars, such as Ambassador John L. Hirsch who offers a comparative analysis between the reconciliation processes that took place in Sierra Leone and Mozambique, and Charles Villa-Vicencio, who examines limitations of implementing either trials or truth commissions as solitary justice mechanisms in the African context. The majority of the book’s authors are Africans, which provides critical perspectives into the actual challenges and needs of the local people.

In the introduction Sriram establishes the existing “peace versus justice debate” but argues that it has become an over simplistic dichotomy. “In reality the choice is seldom ‘justice’ or ‘peace’ but rather a complex mixture of both” (p. 1). She explains that often African states have implemented a hybrid of both restoration and retributive justice approaches through a combination of truth commissions, domestic trials, international and/or hybrid tribunals, and

traditional justice mechanisms. The determination of what type of mechanism is used, and at what time it is implemented remains context-specific.

The book consists of seventeen chapters, including experiences and lessons learned from case studies in South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. It is structured into five sections, first looking at the broad debate of peace vs. justice in Africa, and then more narrowly focusing on specific justice mechanisms.

Section one discusses challenges to African peace and justice through a political and theoretical framework and considers the context of transitional justice in Africa through a comparative approach. Section two is about truth and reconciliation processes that have taken place in Africa. It mainly focuses on the significant impact the South Africa TRC had in establishing a model for the rest of the continent, but it also includes insider analyses of the Ghana and Nigeria truth commissions. Section three focuses on war crime tribunals in Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Section four looks at traditional justice practices, specifically Mozambique's spiritual rituals and healings, and Rwanda's Gacaca court process. Section five discusses the emergent role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa briefly touching on the four existing investigations in addition to a closer examination into the case of Darfur.

Overall the structure of the book seems to have a fluid flow from the general debate into the restorative and then retributive justice approaches. However, it would make sense to have the war crime tribunals section directly prelude the ICC section instead of skipping from tribunals to indigenous practices then back to international criminal trials.

A reoccurring theme throughout the volume is the significance of local participation in developing transitional justice mechanisms. This is particularly evident in the case analyses of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the Ghana NRC, the Rwanda Gacaca courts, and the South Africa TRC. A reoccurring question, which remains unanswered, is if international justice through hybrid courts or the ICC is perceived as an external imposition or valid justice by local Africans?

The insider analysis in many of the essays adds a unique perspective to the volume, but at times is also limiting. This was most problematic in Chapter eight, "Peace vs. Justice? A View From Nigeria," written by Matthew Kukah who was a member of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Committee (HRVIC) in Nigeria. Although he did provide some interesting insight about the challenges of the Human HRVIC, in the conclusion he becomes somewhat defensive of the investigation, and fails to have an objective view of the committee's work. Fortunately this was a rare weakness in the essays—most of the insider analyses provide unbiased critiques and feedback.

The editors' hope to contribute toward "... the understanding among both specialists and the general public of the importance and role of truth and reconciliation processes and truth commissions in Africa" (p. xii). Overall, *Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa* offers a comprehensive look at transitional justice mechanisms in the African context and provides adequate background as well as critical analyses that could be informative to both the general public and experts alike. It proves to be timely due to the rising number of transitional justice mechanisms in Africa as well as the overwhelming attention the ICC has focused on



Africa since its inception in 2002. The more recent ICC indictment for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, as well as the recent investigation into the 2008 Kenya election violence, could provide the editors with a basis for a second edition.

Tracy Fehr, *North Carolina State University*

**Peter Uvin. *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*. London: Zed Books, 2009. 210 pp.**

For many, the 2005 election of President Peter Nkurunziza finally signaled the successful transition from Burundi's decade-long civil war, a conflict characterized by unconscionable violence and ethnic politicization that resulted in the deaths of over 300,000 people, many of them civilians. By 2007, the country had disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated most rebel factions, successfully integrated the army, established requirements for gender and ethnic parity in the public sector, and by all accounts had a developing democracy, an independent media, and an active civil society. In this sense, the Burundian transition was a successful one.

*Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, Peter Uvin attributes much of the credit for this transition to the international community. State actors, multinationals, and private organizations all worked tirelessly to resolve the conflict. They brought about successful negotiations between the various rebel factions and developed imaginative transition mechanisms, all the while taking considerable risks to fund Burundi's peace-building agenda. At the time of Uvin's research, Burundi received about \$300 million per year in international aid, accounting for around 39 percent of its GDP. In turn, much of this aid was funneled into the development enterprise itself, funding top-down projects in good governance, rule of law initiatives, transitional justice programs, community-based economic empowerment efforts, and the like. While it is certainly true that international efforts were central to ending the war, what is less clear is whether these post-conflict aid initiatives have actually helped the thousands of Burundians—returned refugees, internally displaced persons, former rebels—still living in poverty, dying of treatable diseases, and struggling each day to survive.

Uvin contends that such efforts by the development community have largely failed. By juxtaposing the international post-conflict agenda in Burundi with the lives of ordinary Burundians, Uvin shows that the assumptions that underlie international development and inform the policies and practices of post-conflict and peace-building endeavors are often at odds with the hopes and dreams of the people of Burundi. For Uvin, the overarching post-conflict agenda has failed to account for a Burundian worldview in the wake of such violent conflict. How do regular Burundians view their lives? What are their goals? What are their priorities? In what ways have their lives changed since the end of the conflict? What are the gendered implications of these changes? How have the youth coped following the war? Do young men pose a threat to Burundi? These are the types of questions that Uvin argues must be factored into development, post-conflict, and peace-building initiatives in Burundi, and which he sets out to answer in this book.

Relying on 388 in-depth interviews with regular Burundians throughout the country, Uvin examines Burundian post-conflict popular opinion on topics such as peace, governance,

development, and gender expectations. Through these interviews Uvin highlights the distinctions between the assumptions of the international community and the attitudes and ideas held by ordinary Burundians on these issues. The results of this exercise are often surprising. These findings shed light on both the misunderstandings of international development and peace-building organizations, as well as the areas in which these organizations and everyday Burundians share common goals.

With respect to peace, Uvin discovers that Burundian views are very much in line with recent peace studies discourse that equates peace with human security. As well, this notion of peace calls into question literature that criticizes the post-conflict agenda (security, governance, development, and justice/reconciliation). Such critiques portray the agenda of the international community as a neo-colonial import without allowing for the possibility that local populations might have similar views. Uvin's findings seem to counter these critiques. Though the language used by Burundians may be different, nearly 80 percent of those interviewed stressed the importance of security, development, and improving economic and social relations in promoting peace.

Surprisingly absent from the Burundian conception of peace is governance. Rarely did Burundians discuss issues of governance (democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc.) with Uvin. Echoing Roland Paris's contention that states must be institutionalized before being democratized, Uvin explains that national politics and elections matter little to Burundians in improving life chances. What is important is a safe environment in which economic progress and social relations can flourish. Interestingly, this does not mean that Burundians do not care about governance. While they may not speak in terms of Western notions of human rights and good governance, values such as equity, respect, and a desire to end corruption remain vital to Burundian life. As Uvin notes of the interviews, "A deep adherence to values of truth, justice, [and] non-discrimination appeared everywhere in our conversations" (p. 78). For the author, the presence of such values in everyday speech calls into question the current peace-building processes utilized by international donors. This points to a systemic inability of the international community to understand the nuances of Burundian society.

Equally surprising are the ways in which Burundians understand economic development. While all of Uvin's respondents stressed the many negative impacts of the war on their economic well-being, many still hold firm the belief that their lives can improve. Interestingly, this hope is very often conveyed through an adherence to values that Westerners equate with capitalism. Burundians believe they can improve their lives so long as they are smart, work hard, and persevere. Further, contrary to much of the economic development literature that stresses the importance of "collective development" and "community empowerment," Burundians see economic improvement in individualistic terms. During Uvin's interviews people were far more concerned with job creation and individual access to credit. The sorts of community development mechanisms so popular in international development were rarely mentioned.

Critical of the absence of discussions of gender in most post-conflict literature, Uvin finds that gender norms in Burundi are shifting as a result of the war. Economic constraints have altered traditional marriage requirements and blurred gender roles. The hardships placed on

Burundian men—particularly young men; ex-combatants and those still internally displaced—make it difficult for them to live up to traditional Burundian notions of masculinity. Yet while Burundian men acknowledged these hardships, they also expressed the importance of values associated with traditional male responsibility: hard work, self-reliance, providing for one's family. In terms of development policy, such shifts challenge the widely accepted causal linkages between poverty, the constraints it places on masculinity, and subsequent violence. As it turns out, at least in Burundi, young men do not necessarily turn to violence when confronted by economic, political, or social hurdles; rather, many work harder, find creative solutions to solve their problems, or relocate in search of better opportunities. In short, these young men respect social norms and do what they can to survive. This, then, should be cause for development scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to reassess their conceptions of conflict and post-conflict in Burundi, which almost always paint young men as agents of violence.

Through this examination of the lives of ordinary Burundians, Uvin's *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi* questions conventional approaches to peace-building and development. In doing so, the book challenges normative post-conflict policies, which far too often rely on totalizing macro-level solutions to solve nuanced micro-level problems. As such, Uvin departs from much of the development literature that tends to focus on the development enterprise itself in order to evaluate the efficacy of its policies and practices. Instead, he presents a "view from below," that is a socioeconomic and political analysis of a post-conflict Burundi as described by its people, particularly its youth. Uvin asserts: "I wanted to know the ideas of the international development and peace-building community, the aims it seeks, the agendas it sets: do they make sense to regular people? Or are [development practitioners] basically living in a totally different world, unrelated to the real lives of the poor and the excluded in whose name [they] claim to speak?" (p. x). The interplay between these dynamics—the goals of everyday people on the one hand, and the policies and practices of international development organizations on the other—provides the foundation upon which Uvin's argument rests.

A well-crafted and well-researched effort, *Life After Violence* does what many books about development in Africa do not—it listens to the concerns of everyday people and gives them a platform from which to speak. Through these voices, Uvin presents a rather convincing argument for the need of more studies like his own. If the international community wants to improve the lives of ordinary people in post-conflict states than it should start by knowing those people, how they view their lives, and where they want their lives to go. Uvin's first book, the Herskovits Award winning *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (1998) forced the international aid community to reevaluate its role in creating many of the structural conditions that helped precipitate the violence of the Rwandan genocide. Through *Life After Violence*, Uvin again challenges us to think differently about international development. This book represents a fresh take on the role and impact of development aid. It should be required reading for any development scholar or practitioner working in the field today.

Sean Fairchild, *University of California, Los Angeles*

**Harry G. West. *Ethnographic Sorcery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 128 pp.**

This tiny, readable book consists of fifteen short chapters averaging six pages, each arranged according to a thematic that flows directly from Harry West's ethnographic encounters with people living on the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique and with his scholarly musings regarding questions of theory, epistemology, sorcery, truth-claims and discourse – in other words, about knowledge. In this book – which initially formed part of an earlier draft of his important book *Kupilikula* (2005) – West sets out to “explore the epistemological paradox arising from the ethnographic encounter of sorcery” (p. xi). He takes the reader on a number of brief but forceful encounters with debates within anthropology on the question of knowledge and sorcery: from the positivists and Evans-Pritchard's view of sorcery as subjectively true but objectively false, to Tambiah's use of a context-independent notion of reality and the symbolists focus on symbols and meaning, to the phenomenologists' emphasis on the kind of reality sorcery would produce, ending with more recent discursive theories of knowledge. Skillfully combining ethnography and theory in his writing, West demonstrates some of the key differences between these varying theoretical positions, not only through “objectively” analyzing their basic tenets and arguments but also by attributing theoretical positions to real-life characters. The Catholic nun, the revolutionary socialist, the sorcerer and the anthropologist thus become, at times too neatly, characters in this “theoretical narrative.” Adopting a decidedly perspectivist position, which allows him to present various theoretical position with fairness and from “within,” West does not pretend to present the reader with clear answers but instead raises important questions: If everyone in Mueda contributes to sorcery discourse, *is not everyone a sorcerer?* Who can *imagine* such a thing as sorcery without *doing* it? What is then the difference between what is *imagined* and what is *real*, between what is *visible* and *invisible*? Can we separate theory and ethnographic practice? Beautifully recounting a number of encounters during fieldwork – such as falling sick, being treated by a healer, and being dreamt of – West adopts a discursive position, treating sorcery as a language through which Muedans comment on the workings on power (p. 8) and as a “perspectival space” (p. 44) through which they make their life-worlds and understand the discourse and practice of liberal democracy. After reading this book, having enjoyed the witty descriptions of intimate ethnographic encounters (such as the one about the Boers in the lumber camp and the encounter with Chombo), one is left with the feeling that West's own theoretical position – that ethnographic knowledge is a form of sorcery and that everyone is really an anthropologist – has as much to do about searching for “interpretative transcendence” than about the weight of history his own position carries. While his stance ostensibly solves questions about representation, authority and positionality for the individual anthropologist, it begs other (including structural) questions which no amount of ethnographic sorcery can make disappear.

Detlev Krige, *University of Pretoria*

**James Zug.** *The Guardian: The History of South Africa's Extraordinary Anti-Apartheid Newspaper*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press/Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2007. xv, 371 pp.

The "Prologue" to James Zug's history opens, like a mystery, with a funeral by the sea. In the autumn of 1963, two men buried a newspaper in a garden above a Cape Town beach. They were hiding, and hopefully preserving, years of back issues of the *Guardian*, whose entire staff had just been condemned to house-arrest by the National Party government. After more than a quarter-century of hounding and harassment, the editors declared defeat. Reading James Zug's lively, detailed and committed book is like opening up those ammunition trunks in which the back numbers were interred, releasing the spirit of the *Guardian* like a genie from a bottle. Now, nearly half a century after its last banning, the *Guardian* (to give it its first name) seems as relevant to post-apartheid South Africa as it was to the struggle.

The *Cape Guardian* first appeared on 19 February 1937 in Cape Town, a city which, then as now, had a distinctive social and political character and history in the South African context. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the so-called Mother City had been the birthplace of important progressive organizations. Political speakers still drew crowds to the Grand Parade. Fascism was rising in Europe and tempting some South Africans. Although many of the *Guardian's* staff were members of the Communist Party of South Africa, it was not an organ of the party: it was, rather, "an independent paper" and "a Party newspaper, not in letter but in spirit." This was crucial to the *Guardian's* survival when the party was banned by the Nationalist regime in 1950.

As a weekly the *Guardian*, as it became on 18 June 1937, appeared at first every Friday, and then every Thursday for twenty-six years, interrupted for only five months during the 1960 state of emergency. Although remembered as the *Guardian*, in order to survive banning the paper appeared altogether under five other names—*Clarion*, *People's World*, *Advance*, *New Age*, and *Spark*—each name suggests a distinct function of the paper. The sequence reflects its intellectual history: *Guardian* recalls the New Left origins of the 1930s, *Iskra* (*Spark*) was the name of Lenin's newspaper in exile around 1900, and *Spark* had been the name of a duplicated news-sheet of the Trotskyist Workers' Party in the late 1930s.

The *Guardian* was always a progressive publication which valued "intellectual richness and depth": "Read the *Guardian*, feed the mind." It covered both South African and international news, and it maintained its democratic, socialist, and non-racial principles throughout. At times it was felt to be "a white man's organ," written by but not for Africans, and at times it ran up against the complexities of the struggle itself, the contradictions of South African ethnicity, and the equivocations of Soviet communism. By the time the *Guardian* was ruthlessly and grotesquely cut down by apartheid ("the warfare state," the jackboot state"), it had become itself "a battlefield," but it could claim to be "the conscience of South Africa."

In all its life the *Guardian* had only two editors. The first was Betty Radford, the English-born wife of George Sacks, a Cape Town medical doctor, who became a leading communist intellectual. In 1948, the year of the National Party's electoral victory, Radford resigned her editorship and the couple left South Africa and settled in London, gradually dissociating themselves from the South African liberation movement. At the invitation of the Communist



Party leadership Brian Bunting became the editor, a place he filled until the *Guardian's* last and fatal banning. He was the son of S.P. Bunting, who with Bill Andrews had been the founder of the International Socialist League in 1915 and its successor, the Communist Party of South Africa in 1921.

In both its coverage and its management, the *Guardian* was a community paper, locally and nationally. It relied heavily on sales by individual sellers in suburbs and townships, direct to readers and to neighborhood shops, and it organized and generated social and community-building events and institutions: concerts, Christmas and New Year parties, an annual birthday party at the home of Bram and Molly Fischer, and beauty contests. For many years it operated a Christmas hamper scheme, and throughout its life it took its educational responsibilities seriously, particularly the publication of pamphlets, beginning with "The Munich Swindle," which appeared in 1938, attacking the handing of the Sudetenland to Germany and the implicit aggression of Britain and France toward the Soviet Union.

Early in its life the *Guardian* dealt courageously with the Spanish Civil War, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, the plight of Jews and others under the Nazis, and the Second World War itself. At the same time it was covering the continuous crises of South Africa: the pass laws, factory conditions of women workers, the Ossewa Brandwag, and racial intolerance. On the day of the Normandy Landings, Betty Radford hung a red flag from the window of her editor's office in Barrack Street Cape Town. By the end of the war, Brian Bunting believed that the Communist Party and the *Guardian* itself could claim to be "a valuable part of the grand alliance whose heroic efforts had brought about the defeat" of Nazi Germany. Circulation had risen from 6,000 to 50,000, the staff from three to twenty-four, and it was talked about "on the floor of Parliament and in the muddy streets of shantytowns."

Post-war optimism was soon crushed by the political backlash in South Africa. The Miners' Strike of 1946, which split the South African left and launched the *Guardian* on the collision course with white power, which it followed until the end of its days. In the wake of the strike Smuts targeted both the Communist Party and the *Guardian* and mounted a Sedition Trial that prefigured the Treason Trial of a decade later. There followed the Langa riots and Bethal prison labour scandal of 1947. The government's harassment of the newspaper was continuous and only intensified under the National Party after 1948.

James Zug's narrative takes his reader through six stages of the *Guardian's* history: the "Cape Town childhood" of 1937-1939; the war years; a time of departures and the initiation of apartheid from 1945-1950. In these years the *Guardian* had a foot in the door of political power; both Radford and Sam Kahn were on the Cape Town City Council. (Sam Kahn was also the *Guardian's* racing tipster.) The first years of banning lasted from 1948 to 1954. James Zug calls the years 1950-1959 the Democracy Decade: this was a time when the *Guardian* was closest to the Communist Party of South Africa and its post-banning transformation into the South African Communist Party, when some South Africans (always a minority) were living democratically and non-racially. The promise of that example roused the insane fury of the apartheid state and initiated the decade which saw the final gagging of the *Guardian*: Sharpeville and beyond 1960-1963. After an uneasy start the *Guardian* was fully identified with the alliance that now rules South Africa: "The paper, especially in those last days, was the

movement." As Harry Gwala said, "After 1963 it was gone, but it was never banned in the minds of the people."

The post-*Guardian* life of the newspaper's important figures is exemplary. Betty Radford and George Sacks, and Harold Baldry (who as "Vigilator" had written on foreign affairs), ended their days in England, alienated from the paper and the struggle. Michael Harmel, the intellectual and theorist of South African communism, died in Prague. Brian Bunting returned to South Africa and became a member of parliament. James Zug gives us lively and often detailed portraits of these big names and many others. We meet such headline figures as Ruth First, Govan Mbeki, Sam Kahn, Dennis Brutus, Moses Kotane, Albie Sachs, Harry Gwala, Helen Joseph, and many others. But we also meet the sellers, the beauty contest organisers, the reporters, and the readers. Of all these people we can say with James Zug that "They had done their part. They had stood up." Douglas Manqina, who was exiled for a quarter-century to a remote farm and returned in 1994 to "all those places where I used to sell *New Age*," said that the paper "was the seed that we sowed." The young plant still needs nurturing: South Africa still needs *The Guardian*.

James Zug has written an absorbing book, which all South Africans should read: the detail is gripping and the history will be a revelation. I think the publishers could use a good proof-reader.

Tony Voss, *Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University & University of KwaZulu-Natal*