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China-Africa Relations: Political and Economic Engagement and Media Strategies

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Introduction

China-Africa Relations: Political and Economic Engagement and Media Strategies

AGNES NGOMA LESLIE

Introduction

The relationship between China and Africa has grown exponentially in the last decade resulting in China being the continent's largest trading partner, displacing Europe and the United States. The status and evolving relationship is one of the most critical developments in international affairs. The growth of China as a world power and its engagement on the continent, which is manifested in various ways, including state level and private investments involving variegated actors, has not been without controversy. An estimated one million Chinese migrants resided in Africa by 2014.¹ Chinese President Xi Jinping declared at the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg, South Africa, that the China-Africa relations had reached a stage of growth "unmatched in history."² The announcement came with a major aid package, a manifestation of China's skillful use of hard, soft, and smart power that included \$60 billion in various loans, grants, and special funds, various assistance in industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, financial services, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction, and peace and security. It also included the training of 200,000 African technicians, 1,000 media professionals, 40,000 opportunities for Africans in China, 2,000 degree or diploma opportunities, and 30,000 government scholarships. China also promised to establish regional vocational education centers and several capacity-building colleges in Africa.

On security cooperation, President Xi announced that China would provide \$60 million in free assistance to the African Union (AU) to support the building and operation of the African Standby Force and an African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis, adding: "China will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and support African countries' capacity building in areas such as defense, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, customs and immigration control."³ China, however, has been willing to work with any type of government whether it is democratically elected or authoritarian as in the case of Zimbabwe. It has also provided arms to dictatorships and refused to be engaged in the internal conflicts of the countries. Clearly the increase in security is mainly to safeguard China's economic interests and its citizens, particularly in countries where China has both peacekeepers and major commercial interests such as Sudan and South Sudan (oil) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (minerals).

The State of Current China-African Relations

China's largesse serves as an interesting introduction to this special issue of the *African Studies Quarterly*, as it provides a manifestation of the positive side of the China-Africa engagement. China is often portrayed in two extremes—either very positively, bringing development and a supposedly win-win transformative experience; or negatively as imperialistic, exploitative, and

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a1.pdf>

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ruining the environment. These simplistic views, however, obscure a more analytical understanding of China's role and its implication for the continent. While there are some truths to both sides of the argument, as the articles in this special issue convey, the growing China-Africa engagement raises the critical questions about how African countries are managing this relationship and whether it is translating into a positive and lasting benefit for Africa. China is coherent and strategic about its objectives, which have been spelled out in its policies including the Africa White paper of 2006 and enunciated in the subsequent tri-annual FOCAC meetings and at its sixth ministerial FOCAC conference in Johannesburg in 2015. It also published a Second Africa Policy Paper in 2015. China's engagements, which crystallize in its usage of hard power, soft power, and smart power, have provoked diverse views of its intentions. Indeed some African countries including Uganda and Zambia have at times exerted their power to negotiate and forced China to re-examine its status and acquiesce to their demands.

The articles in this special issue focus on the state of current China-African relations.⁴ The contributors examine the major issues at the continental and state levels as well as at the level of private businesses, including medium size and small businesses as well as petty traders. The themes explored include the role of African agency in China-Africa discourses; micro-practices embedded in China's foreign policy towards Africa; the capacity of the African state and its challenges; and how African states have shaped their roles in this engagement. What distinguishes this volume from others on the topic is that it examines China and Africa's evolving relationship from varying perspectives including political, economic and strategic engagement. It also provides a window into the diverse views of the Chinese citizens in their country towards Africa and how this impacts Africa's portrayal in the Chinese media and strategies adopted. It examines the big questions including: (1) Is China's "win-win" proposition viable between a strong economic giant state and fragile states? (2) How have the African states and societies shaped their roles in this engagement? (3) What is the impact of this engagement on African societies? (4) Are African communities voiceless and powerless in this engagement? Is there evidence of them exerting independence and autonomy? (5) What is China's media strategy in this engagement? This collection portrays the diversity of Sino-African engagement across the continent, identifying similarities, differences, and peculiarities. It is unique in that it includes articles from a broad range of scholars residing in Africa, China, Europe, and the United States.

Perceptions of Chinese engagement with Africa may be summarized into three categories, according to one contributor, Seifudein Adem: Sino-optimism—the view that China's engagement with Africa will lead to positive transformative possibilities; Sino-pessimism—the view that China's engagement largely benefits China and does very little for Africa; and Sino-pragmatism—a moderate sentiment between the first two opposing perspectives. Adem suggests that Sino-optimism emerged in the shadow of the discourse that China was posing a threat in Africa to the West. What is significant to note in the China-Africa relationship is the multiplicity of actors ranging from the state, semi-private enterprises, and private companies to private individuals. While the Chinese government may be clear in its objectives, the level of engagement at semi-private enterprises and private and individual companies are variegated, with the last two being the more contentious. China's approach to Africa is coherent and more strategic. The other side of this is the multiplicity of African governments engaging with one country.

The authors examine the various levels of China-Africa engagement including security, politics, trade and investments, and media strategies. They explore China's relations with different and varied countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Zambia. At the core of many of the articles is a central question: How do the resource-rich countries such as the DRC, South Sudan, and Ghana benefit equally with China from their engagement? The authors also analyze the evolution of China's Africa strategy, whose objective is to improve its relations with the varied African states. Is China's well-meaning, popular "win-win" goal attainable for most African countries? While Claude Kabemba interrogates the question

in reference to the DRC, the same question is applicable to most of the other African countries engaged in similar relationships with China.

The ten articles are organized within four overall topics: security, political and economic engagement, business investments, and media strategies. The first two papers focus on China's engagement broadly and theoretically, considering policies and strategies in Africa. Seifudein Adem's "Sino-Optimism in Africa" analyses the varieties of China-Africa optimism noting their dialectal linkage to the growing western Sino-pessimism discourse. Adem identifies three strands of Sino-optimism: (1) vertical Sino-optimism, which refers to China's attractiveness to the leaders and that China serves as a model for Africa's success; (2) horizontal Sino-optimism, which emphasizes the good will of ordinary Africans to China's tangible projects such as roads, and hospitals which they see and appreciate as opposite to issues like human rights and democracy; and (3) economic Sino-optimism, which emphasizes the Chinese need for raw materials that in turn prompt African exports and provide foreign exchange for African countries. Adem also provides historic and contemporary examples for the growing Sino-optimism while interrogating the existing Sino-pessimism. The paper concludes that China will have a more positive impact in Africa if its activities are driven by an expectation of transformative possibilities called Sino-optimism. The real transformation, however, will come from African leaders choosing their own policies and implementing them, with China only playing a supportive role.

Lina Benabdallah's "China's Peace and Security Strategies in Africa: Building Capacity is Building Peace?" analyses China's diplomatic and military engagement. It focuses on China's security premise and offers a historic analysis of China's Africa strategy. Its approach to security engagement goes beyond the traditional supplying of military arms and hardware to include non-traditional aspects of cooperation such as capacity building programs and investments in human resource development. The analysis is in line with China's 2015 FOCAC policies for assistance to African countries, which includes education, and empowering them to take control of their economic and security needs. Benabdallah proposes a security-development nexus as a framework to understand China's security policies in Africa. This approach attaches security to reducing poverty and improving living conditions. The view that security hinges on successful development guides both China's domestic as well as its foreign policy, which differentiates the way European powers and the U.S. have engaged peace and security issues in Africa. The author notes, however, that there have been contradictions in China's security engagement with Zimbabwe, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries. Some analysts have found as in the DRC that Chinese interests have at times coincided with Western interests in support of stabilization and market-driven economic activities.⁵

The second set of papers focuses on the impact of Chinese political, security, and economic engagement in South Sudan, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia. Daniel Large's contribution deepens the security and military discussion of China's engagement with an in-depth analysis of South Sudan. In "China and South Sudan's Civil War, 2013" Large examines China's involvement starting with Sudan from the mid 1990s beginning with the Sino-Sudanese petro-partnership. Large analyzes the changing nature of the relationship and concludes that South Sudan has been the site of an evolving, experimental, and more proactive Chinese political and security engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper finds that China's engagement was dominated by a combination of political and security concerns related to its economic interests and the desire to protect its investments and Chinese citizens. This is in line with President Xi's declaration in 2014: "We should protect China's overseas interests and continue to improve our capacity to provide such protection."⁶

Richard Aidoo's contribution focuses on Chinese engagement in Ghana and the growing anti-Chinese sentiment especially for the Chinese migrants involved in unregulated artisanal gold mining in Ghana called *galamsey*. His "The Political Economy of Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Ghana" captures one aspect of China's expansion into Africa as it searches for

natural resources and its impact on the local and communities, as well as the national level. Aidoo discusses the complexity of these relations that at times have been portrayed in a simplistic way. Rather than showing the situation as Chinese foreigners exploiting African locals, Aidoo exposes the collusion of local traditional rulers and political representatives. In a broader sense the paper mirrors what is happening in many African communities where political actors and local actors play roles that make the majority appear voiceless and powerless.

Claude Kabemba's "China-Democratic Republic of Congo Relations: From a Beneficial to a Developmental Cooperation," explores the relationship between China and the Democratic Republic of Congo and questions the viability of China's "win-win" proposition between unequal partners. Kabemba details the relationship between the two nations starting before the DRC's independence. He analyses the country's history and the economic exploitation that it has suffered by external forces. The author notes the rise in trade relations between the two countries from 1991 to 2014. While there has been a rapid increase in China's imports from the DRC this has not translated into the expected employment for DRC citizens, the author finds. Kabemba also illustrates the disparity in the relationship with examples including the controversial Sicomines deal, a resources-for-infrastructure deal worth \$6 billion. Kabemba argues that, given the DRC's wealth and the state's dysfunctional status and China's strength and aggressiveness in acquiring raw materials, the DRC is incapable of engaging in an equal relationship with China, which is a strong state, militarily, ideologically, and economically: therefore, a "win-win" cooperation between the two countries is not possible. Kabemba suggests that it would be more beneficial for the DRC if China assisted in re-building the state and strengthening its institutions. Kabemba's analysis is useful in looking at state strength and capability. China's economic progress is built on stability and if the same is to be achieved in African countries China would have to play a bigger role in stabilizing, peacekeeping, and democratizing initiatives.

The idea that Africans are neither passive nor powerless in their relationship with China is amplified in Agnes Ngoma Leslie's "Zambia and China: Workers' Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement." This paper analyzes the plight of workers in Chinese operated investments and the role the opposition political party played in elevating the China-Africa relationship to national and international prominence. Through providing a historical framework for understanding protest in Zambia and showing that this is not simply an anti-Chinese response, the article demonstrates that Zambian workers have historically protested whenever their rights were threatened. Leslie also provides a history of the relationship between China and Zambia and identifies the roles that leaders from both countries have played in dealing with the workers' plight and protecting the larger relationship between the two countries. Like Aidoo's contribution, the article emphasizes the active roles that Africans play in the China-Africa relationship. It suggests that African countries could play greater roles in defining their engagement with China since they bring to the bargaining table important goods that China seeks.

The third section examines Chinese investments and their impact on African societies, commerce, and labor. Perhaps one of the areas that have received the most media attention is the perception that Chinese investments do not provide much employment for Africans. The complaints include low wages, poor working conditions, environmental degradation, lack of technological transfer, and low level skill development. Chinese employers are also accused of bringing a large workforce from China and thus denying African workers much needed employment. Tang Xiaoyang investigates those issues in research conducted on several Chinese companies in seven African countries. He poses the critical question "Does Chinese Employment Benefit Africans? Investigating Chinese Enterprises and their Operations in Africa." Tang's research also contributes to our understanding of the common issues that confront Chinese and African workers, including their motivations, practical occupations, and hopes and ambitions. He takes us into Chinese textile, plastics, and leather manufacturing companies in seven African countries where we are introduced to real people and learn about their daily concerns. The

research findings are important for policy makers who can guide the Chinese entrepreneurs in investing in areas where they can make an impact and at the same time benefit the local populace, thus reducing friction.

Another contribution, which complements Tang's paper, focuses on the role of petty traders in Kampala, Uganda and their contribution to the community. "Chinese Traders In Kampala: Status, Challenges, and Impact on Ugandan Society" by Ward Warmerdam and Meine Pieter van Dijk finds that African leaders are negotiating trade and investment policies to their advantage and not simply allowing Chinese traders to operate without conditions, as widely perceived. The authors found that some countries including Uganda, Botswana, Malawi, and Kenya have imposed firm restrictions that allowed Chinese investors to operate in specific sectors in order to avoid friction with local traders. This trend, which is spreading to other African countries, seems to enhance the local economies rather than competing with them.

The last set of papers examines how the Chinese government is using the media to enhance its image and the perception of Chinese citizens about Africa and how these relate to their country's engagement with the continent. Li Xianjing's "The Image of Africa in China: The Emerging Role of Chinese Social Media" explores how the Chinese population in general perceive Africa and what media sources they use to obtain information about Africa. Li also provides an overview of reporting on Africa in the Chinese traditional media, which explains the dearth of news and frequent stereotypes about Africa in the Chinese media. Realizing the resource base and market that Africa provides for China, he argues that it has become necessary for the Chinese people to be more knowledgeable about the continent. He thus provides an in-depth analysis of Chinese perceptions of Africa and how they use the social media, including WeeChat, to advance their understanding of Africa.

The final paper looks at how China attempts to use media to frame its Africa engagement in a positive light. As has been seen in the foregoing articles Chinese investments impact African societies in various ways, sometimes negatively, thus provoking criticism from Western as well as some local African media accusing China of neocolonialism, racism, and exploitation. Michael Leslie's "The Dragon Shapes its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa," analyzes China's attempts to influence the media which go back to before the Cold War. To achieve its objective China uses soft power including training journalists and providing equipment and infrastructure for media operations. Chinese companies have also established media operations in Africa such as StarTimes. In addition China has also expanded its own media into Africa including its state-run Chinese Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), the Xinhua News Agency, *China Daily*, and the monthly *ChinAfrica*. For example, the Chinese funded China Africa Reporting Project at the University of Witwatersrand aims to improve the quality of reporting around issues related to China and the continent. This article thus complements the others in this issue in exploring the totality of China's engagement in Africa.

Conclusion

These articles portray the evolving nature of China and Africa relations from wide-ranging perspectives, thus adding to the growing body of scholarship on this topic and the interdisciplinary way of conducting research. They identify important issues unfolding in Africa and to some extent China itself. The range and diversity of the articles help us elucidate the benefits and challenges attached to the China-Africa relations. This also indicates the robust nature of the research across the continent and involving scholars in Africa, China, Europe and the United States. As has been pointed out, China is coherent and strategic in its relationship with Africa including utilizing hard, soft, and smart power. Clearly African countries do not have a unified strategy for engaging with China. Perhaps it would be in the best interest of African countries if they could enhance their agency by developing a more unified and strategic policy on major issues and thus have a more comprehensive strategy on how they engage with China.

Notes

1 French 2014.

2 FOCAC 2015.

3 Ibid.

4 The articles all originate from papers presented at the University of Florida Center for African Studies conference “China-Africa Relations: Engagement, Investments, and Media Strategies” held in Gainesville, Florida April 9-10, 2015.

5 Curtis 2013.

6 Xi 2014.

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Sino-optimism in Africa

SEIFUDEIN ADEM

Abstract: Sino-optimism refers to the conviction or expectation that China is a force for good in Africa. There is little doubt that China would like to see Africa succeed. The sense of solidarity with Africa in China's diplomatic thought is quite deep—intrinsic interest underlies China's approach to Africa today, unlike the West's interest, which had been on the decline since the 1990s, and is therefore now partly derivative in nature, a reaction to China's interest in Africa. China's leaders also realize that Africa's economic modernization is in their long-term interest, as it could bolster the nation's soft (and hard) power in Africa and beyond, particularly if they trigger it, or play an important part in the process. This is the first pillar of Sino-optimism, the subjective factor. The second pillar that is supposed to anchor Sino-optimism, the objective factor, does not depend on the preference of decision-makers in Beijing and/or Africa. At the center of this is the logic of capital, which is the same irrespective of who the capitalist is, whether it is the Europeans, the Americans, or the Chinese. The structural distortion in Africa's political economy cannot therefore be simply wished away; in fact, China's increased involvement may deepen the distortion, at least in the short run. In this context, I seek to explore the logic of Sino-optimism in Africa today, its manifestation and its foundation.

Introduction

China-Africa relations is a misleading concept, it is sometimes said, since China is a state, or, at least, a civilization pretending to be a state, while Africa is a miracle of diversity, a conglomerate of formally differentiated, multiple units, with immense variations. This is a valid claim not least because China's economic interactions with different countries can and will have variable impacts. Hazards are always there in perspectives that fuse different levels of analysis, but, I think, in this case they are less consequential than it is often assumed.

Let me use an example from human biology to illustrate the point. If Africa can be likened to a human body and the interactions with China to a form of diet with different types and levels of nutritional values, an extrapolation can certainly be made from the effect of interactions with China (diet) on different organs (states) to its overall effect on the entire body (Africa). Just as what is good or not good for one's kidney or brain will have a corresponding effect on the general condition of the overall body, so will China's interaction with a particular country or region have a parallel effect on the African condition. Thus by this logic, what is good for Kenya is also good for Africa.

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a2.pdf>

What is Sino-optimism?

Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa, said in 2012: “We [Africans] are particularly pleased that in our relationship with China we are equals and that agreements entered into are for mutual gain.”¹ More recently, Xi Jinping, China’s President told African leaders: “China and Africa share mutual needs and complementarities and face a rare opportunity in pursuing development through cooperation.”² The Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations also observed: “The Chinese are putting their money into [African] infrastructure, they are putting their money into manufacturing and they are putting their money into construction...but they are doing this in a manner in which we in Africa have never witnessed before. The terms of engagement have been amazingly generous.”³ Sino-optimism is the anticipation of such transformative possibilities as a consequence of China’s increasing presence in Africa. It is the prevailing mood in Africa today—according a recent Pew Global Survey, “Majorities or pluralities in all of African and Latin American countries surveyed have a positive view of China. Highest praise [for China] can be found in Africa [compared to Latin America].”⁴

The Birth of Sino-optimism

It is perhaps impossible to say when Sino-optimism was born except to surmise that its birth has a dialectical connection with a discourse in the West about rising China.⁵ Sino-optimism emerged in the shadow of the discourse that China was posing a threat in Africa to the West. “How China is Taking Over Africa...and Why We in the West Should be Very Worried,” was, for instance, how a British newspaper sounded the alarm in its headline.⁶ The frame of reference of this discourse was not whether or not China was a force for good in Africa, for Africans, but whether or not China in Africa was a bad thing for the West. Some were convinced that China would be posing a threat in Africa to Western interests. There was indeed a growing popularity of the so-called the China model in Africa among some of Africa’s ruling elites as a realistic alternative to the Western approach.

In any case, increasingly, the promise of the “China model” was beginning to be contrasted with what was regarded as the failed model of neo-liberal capitalism. Congressman Chris Smith, the former chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, articulated such a line of argument when he said: “People like Bashir [of Sudan], Mugabe [of Zimbabwe] and so many others love the Chinese model of control and secret police...I am very worried about the influence of their bad human rights and bad governance model is having....”⁷ Sino-optimism in Africa was therefore partly a reaction to a strand of Sino-pessimism that emerged in the West, in which the steadily increasing influence of China in Africa was seen as part and parcel of China’s effort to systematically delegitimize the prevailing neo-liberal order and the authority on which it was based.

Varieties of Sino-optimism

In the discourse about China in Africa, different levels and types of Sino-optimism can be identified.

Vertical Sino-optimism

This is the attractiveness of China to Africa's leaders. It is based on the conviction that China is a partner of and a model for Africa. Some African elites are almost certain that as a partner, China can, and even will, ignite Africa's economic modernization, if it is not doing so already. China is after all buying more from Africa, selling more to Africa, investing more in Africa, and lending more to Africa.⁸

Africa's leaders also see China as a model. The reasoning involved here is, first, that the socio-cultural ideologies and socio-economic condition in China are/were broadly similar to those in many African countries. It follows that what worked in China should or would also work in Africa. In other words, the "China's model" is more relevant to the African condition than the neo-liberal model. As Meles Zenawi, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia put it: "Chinese transformation disproved the pessimistic attitude that 'if you are poor once, you are likely to be poor forever.'"⁹ The second, and related, reason why China is regarded as a model has more to do with China's continued success in modernizing its economy and lifting hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty in a relatively short period of time. Third, China is viewed as a model because the developmental policies chosen by many governments in Africa are believed to be consistent with those pursued by China. China does not have to try to influence the policies of African governments through its loans, investment, and aid; at least it does not do so actively and openly.

The notion that China is a partner and a model could be separated analytically and in practice. One could admire and emulate China as a model without buying into the idea that China would (have to) be a partner, capable of and committed to igniting economic modernization in Africa. To the extent that China's interests are dynamic and expansive, which they are, it does not indeed automatically follow that the two would even remain compatible indefinitely. China would continue to be a partner of Africa to the extent that it is also in China's own interest to do so, but China could continue to stimulate Africa's effort to modernize its economy even long after it ceases to be Africa's partner. To say this is not any more incorrect than to say Meiji Japan could be a model for Africa's development.¹⁰

Horizontal Sino-optimism

This is the goodwill of ordinary Africans toward China. At least three elements in China's economic diplomacy in Africa are the driving forces behind horizontal Sino-optimism. The first is the emphasis in China's own economic diplomacy on the building of visible and symbolic projects such as dams, conference halls, and roads that are designed not only to deliver services but also produce the "meaning" of solidarity and friendship. China's approach in this regard is sometimes direct and obvious and more subtle at other times. In the summer of 2016, when I was visiting Ethiopian villages with my wife, who happened to be a Japanese, Ethiopian children constantly followed us, affectionately calling her "China, China..."

Second, China's approach emphasizes projects that have tangible and instantaneous effects. These are projects that give ordinary people concrete power of choice: positive freedom. A project that is aimed at building roads and dams is more tangible to ordinary people than one whose goal is promotion of democracy and human rights. The simple observation made by the

President of China Export-Import Bank of China articulates this view: “roads and radios are more urgent needs for Africans than human rights and freedom.”¹¹ Human rights are a neutral freedom—they do not give ordinary Africans the instantaneous and concrete power of choice. This is in any case how the distinction between Western and Chinese aid is viewed by some Sino-optimists in Africa.

The third relevant element in China’s attractiveness arises from sheer human proclivity to empathize with the “Other” under similar circumstances. Chinese expatriate workers are often seen toiling in the least hospitable weather and environmental conditions in Africa. Mindful of this fact, many Africans are seemingly grateful to Chinese worker for rendering their services at great personal risk to themselves. So, this too seems to fuel horizontal Sino-optimism in Africa.

Economic Sino-optimism

This highlights the positive impact of China’s increased demand for raw materials on the global price of primary commodities, which is the main source of foreign exchange for many countries in Africa. Africa could both sell more of these commodities and earn a good price for them. China’s increasing investment in the infrastructure sector similarly sustains economic Sino-optimism.

The opposite number of economic Sino-optimism is, of course, *economic Sino-pessimism*. From this frame of reasoning, China’s growing manufacturing power harms local industries in Africa. Because of the comparative advantage China enjoys, its products will displace locally made goods both at home and abroad. Consequently, this process will steadily force national economies in Africa to specialize in the production of primary commodities permanently—the so-called the problem of primarization.

A related issue to economic Sino-pessimism has to do with China’s aid to Africa. Some observers view China’s aid to Africa as aid with no strings attached to it. Two questions arise. Is it indeed so? And, even if it was so, is it a good thing from the point of view of Africa’s development? The answers given by economic Sino-pessimists to both questions are unequivocal “no.” The explanation includes the following. It is the case, explicitly stated or unstated, that there is something that the donor gets or expects to get when it gives aid to the receiver. What is expected could be either tangible or intangible returns, but there is always something which is expected in return. Particularly in relations among states there is always some understanding that there is no such a thing as a “free lunch” in international relations. Another issue relates to whether an aid with no strings attached is or is not a good thing. Economic Sino-pessimists say it is not a good thing because by definition such aid denotes that the law of inequality governs the giver and the receiver of the aid. Absolute charity is almost meaningless between equals. The fact that one is receiving and the other is giving aid is in itself an admission of at least temporary inequality. So, in the eyes of economic Sino-pessimists, President Zuma of South Africa could not have been more wrong when he asserted that “in our relationship with China we are equals....”

Political Sino-optimism

This is connected to the fact that the rise of China and its growing participation in the global economy have been politically liberating for many countries in Africa. It is said that China provided an alternative to Western economic aid. It provided economic aid to African countries

with no strings attached to it. This element in China's economic diplomacy is also sometimes linked to the principle of non-interference that China espouses. In the same vein, China has also focused on expanding its trade with Africa as an alternative to aid.

The counterpart of political Sino-optimism is *political Sino-pessimism*. From the point of view of political Sino-pessimism, China is undermining a global trend toward democratic governance, supporting regimes in Africa that are regarded to be repressive and violators of human rights. It may be pointed out in passing that critics of China would like to see China in this regard demand from Africa a higher democratic standard than what is practiced by China itself. They nevertheless make generally no issue about the economic engagement of the West with [undemocratic] China. Relatedly, one cannot help but ask why "undemocratic" China is severely criticized when it does business with Bashir's Sudan but "democratic" India is not subjected to similar criticism when it does the same.

The Premise of Sino-optimism

"It is our African brothers that carried us into the United Nations." These words, attributed to Mao Zedong, were uttered after China was admitted to the UN in 1971.¹² Should Africans now say: "it was our Chinese brothers (and sisters) that carried us into the 21st century?" Since the 1990s, China has certainly made possible the end of the steady marginalization of Africa in global political economy by making possible the revival of or even rise in the world demand for (and price of) primary commodities such as agricultural products and minerals. And Africa is undoubtedly better off today because of China's engagement with it. But it would not be incorrect to say that Africa's cheap and abundant natural resources were also behind China's sustained and fast-paced economic growth. Or, put simply, there is a convergence of interest between China and Africa for the time being. Subjectively, Sino-optimism is based on three claims, although objections can be raised for each from a Sino-pessimistic perspective.

Claim 1—China never colonized Africa.

Because China never colonized Africa, it cannot be a new colonial power in the continent. Logically, however, from a Sino-pessimistic perspective one could argue that because China never colonized Africa, it could be tempted to become a colonial power. While colonialism was a bitter experience for the colonized, it was generally beneficial to the colonizer. Otherwise there would never have been colonialism. If so, what would prevent China from at least aspiring to systematically work out a new form of colonial relationship with African countries? There are those who read China's rhetoric of a win-win relationship with Africa in this sense as a form of colonial discourse that is calibrated for the 21st century. For instance, how different is such rhetoric in effect from what the British colonial administrator of Nigeria, Lord Lugard, once stated regarding the nature of economic relationship between Europe and Africa? He said that the relationship was one in which tropical Africa sent its primary commodities to Europe and some of those commodities returned back to Africa "converted into articles for the use and comfort of its people."¹³ If China in the 21st century is cast in the role of Britain in the last century, the articles which are sent back to Africa from China "for the use and comfort of [Africans]" would have to include radios and cellphones.¹⁴

Empirically, too, China's current behaviors in Africa are in some ways similar to those of European powers in Africa in the 19th century and beyond. Look closely, Sino-pessimists would insist, at what China does rather than merely at what its leaders say. Is it not perpetuating a structural distortion that had been introduced to Africa by colonialism and global capitalism?

Claim 2—China supported Africa's national liberation movements (NLM)

It is true China had supported NLM in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. China also spearheaded one of the major postcolonial economic projects in Africa: the TAZARA railways.¹⁵ China's support for Africa when Africa was in need of support has been both solid and time-tested. The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was therefore right when he said: "Africa will never forget the historical role played by China in the struggle against colonialism."¹⁶

And yet, Sino-pessimists would argue that China of the 1960s and 1970s is not the same as China of today. The latter resembles or behaves like what Kwame Nkrumah had described as "the neo-colonial powers that turned Africans into the hewers of wood and drawers of water."¹⁷ The structure of China's trade with Africa shows China is increasingly looking like the developed capitalist countries of Europe and North America. In fact, China's share of global GDP has grown dramatically from 4.5 percent in 2000 to 13.4 percent in 2014; the share of China's defense expenditure compared to the other great powers in 2014 was almost equivalent to those of Japan, Germany, Russia and France combined.¹⁸

The bulk of Africa's exports to China are composed of primary commodities and the bulk of China's exports to Africa are manufactured goods. The structure of African economies is not China's creation, of course, but we should not also continue to do the same thing and expect a different result. Sino-pessimists could therefore hear the echo of what Lord Lugard had said in response to accusations by Africans, as suggested above, that Europe was creating an imperial division of labor with a hierarchy of advantages in which Africa produced primary commodities and Europe manufactured value-added products.

Claim 3—China's intentions are different

Chinese leaders often speak about China and Africa as all-weather friends and say their relationship creates a win-win situation for both. In May 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang thus asserted: "China will forever be a reliable friend and true partner of the African people."¹⁹ He added, "China will not pursue a colonialist path or allow colonialism to reappear in Africa."²⁰ In December 2015, China's President Xi Jinping also said: "China and Africa will forever remain good friends, good partners and good brothers."²¹

Although Africa is not the only region where China's leaders affirm that their economic diplomacy is based on a "win-win" formula for all sides, it is mainly Africans who have seemingly embraced China's rhetoric with a deep sense of inner response. This was, for instance, what South Africa's President Zuma said: "We certainly are convinced that China's intention is different [from] that of Europe, which to date continues to intend to influence African countries for [its] own sole benefit."²² The mutual feeling both on the side of China and Africa could be genuine, but they also overestimate the degree of freedom each has over outcome with regard to Africa's economic modernization.

The level of economic exchange between China and Africa has for sure grown by leaps and bounds in recent years, but, to take a Sino-pessimistic tack, the lack of symmetry in the

relationship has also continued. From \$2 billion in 1995 Sino-African trade jumped to \$220 billion in 2014.²³ But, it seems, Africa still needs China more than China needs Africa. After all, in 2014, only about 5 percent of China's global trade was with Africa whereas nearly 17 percent Africa's global trade is with China. Indeed, the bilateral trade between China and South Korea exceeds the trade between China and Africa.²⁴

The Future of Sino-optimism

Sino-optimism is not just a figment of our imagination. True, a mountain of "empirical" facts is sometimes marshaled just to show that there is less in Sino-African relations than meets the eye. In our defense, here perhaps I must paraphrase E. H. Carr. He said that facts speak only when the "observer" calls on them: it is s/he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context. Facts do not speak for themselves.²⁵

If the discourse (in Africa) about the Sino-African relationship lags behind the (actual) Sino-African relationship for the time being, we can expect that they will catch up with one another sooner rather than later. The scope of China's interest, and the intentions of its leaders, in Africa will also change along with its national capabilities—to the extent we could tell.²⁶ China's relatively modest aspirations in Africa today will be supplanted by more expansive ambitions, and as the relationship between China and Africa deepens, their interests, too, can diverge more noticeably. But the adverse effects of such eventuality can be minimized if corrective measures are taken proactively. Such measures, in my view, would have to include a sustained focus on modernizing Africa's agriculture. If Africa embarks on agriculture-led industrialization, with a sustained support from China, Sino-optimism is likely to endure. But even if Africa was to prioritize agricultural transformation in its development strategy, it has to depend on others to implement it. But he who pays the piper, as they say, always calls the tune.

Conclusion

"If [negative] perceptions are left unchallenged, they become a reality," so said Bishop Corletta Vaughn of Detroit, Michigan. Bishop Vaughn uttered these deceptively simple but wise words in December 2015 in the context of American politics.²⁷ Using the same line of reasoning, I think we can say, China will have a more positive impact in Africa if its activities are driven by an expectation of transformative possibilities, what we have called Sino-optimism. Actions acquire meaning through human intentions. Beliefs and discourse constructs reality to some extent. By using a particular form of narrative to describe and explain the relationship between China and Africa, we do not just come to understand it in a certain way but we also create it according to that understanding. However, we should not also completely ignore the logic of capital. The positive intention of China's leaders alone, however genuine and deep they may be, cannot bring about economic transformation in Africa. In the final analysis, for the African condition to improve, it is up to Africa's leaders to make the appropriate policy choice and implement it so far as possible. China (and others) can play a supportive role in the process.

Notes

- 1 Quoted in Hanauer and Morris 2014, p. 10.
- 2 Jinping 2015.
- 3 *Cornell Chronicle*, March 3, 2015. [Online.]
<http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2015/03/kenyan-ambassador-china-offers-opportunity-africa> [Accessed September 9, 2016].
- 4 <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/2-views-of-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/> [Accessed September 17, 2016.]
- 5 In general, we can say, the debate pitted the “Engagers,” those who advocated engagement with China, and the “Adversarians,” those who saw China as an adversary in the making that must be contained by all means. For theoretical analyses of the debates see Friedberg 2005 and Art 2010. For a less theoretical but more accessible discussion of the two schools of thought see Etzioni 2011. There is no consensus about whether or not the strategy of containment or engagement of China is informing US foreign policy today. See Xinbo and Green 2015.
- 6 Malone 2008.
- 7 USHFAC 2011. In fact, it is both misleading and inaccurate to describe the “China model” merely as “bad human rights and bad governance model.” For a more systematic and balanced definition of the “China model” see Bell 2015, especially pp. 179-98.
- 8 “China’s trade with African states has grown about ten times in the last decade, with the total value likely to hit \$300 billion this year...China is seeking to raise the amount to \$400 billion by 2020.” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/10/content_22417707.htm [Accessed September 15, 2016.]
- 9 *The Ethiopian Herald*, 23 December 2008. It may be pointed out in passing that the so-called “the Beijing Consensus” neither originated in Beijing nor was there a consensus behind it. China was not the original developmental state and, more fundamentally, it can even be said that China is indeed pursuing the neo-liberal model, with a Chinese characteristics of course. See Steinfeld 2012.
- 10 Nafziger 2006.
- 11 Jakobson 2009, p. 425.
- 12 Hanauer and Morris 2014, p. 7.
- 13 Quoted in Mazrui 1972, p. 298.
- 14 Incidentally, it can also be mentioned that the number of mobile phone users in Africa did increase from 54 million people in 2004 to 600 million in 2015. See Bright and Hruby 2015, p. 69.
- 15 Is the AU Convention Center, which was built in Addis Ababa by a grant from China recently, the 21st Century equivalent of TAZARA? President Xi Jinping (2015) seems to think so: “The TAZARA railway and the Convention Center of the African Union built with Chinese assistance are landmarks of China-Africa friendship.”
- 16 Zenawi 2005, p. 198.
- 17 Nkrumah 1963, p. 4.
- 18 Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, various pages.

- 19 "China Will Not Pursue Colonialist Path in Africa — Chinese Premier," *The Sun*, May 1, 2014. <http://www.remikuti.com/media/16562/china-will-not-pursue-colonial-path-in-africa-chinese-pr.htm> [Accessed September 15, 2016.]
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Jinping 2015.
- 22 Hanauer and Morris 2014, p. 7.
- 23 <http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t1319459.htm> [Accessed December 3, 2015.]
- 24 South Korea-China trade figure for 2013 was \$228 billion. See, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/>. The comparative figure for Africa was \$210 billion. See <http://allafrica.com/stories/201404240212.html>. [Accessed April 11, 2015]. In comparison with China's \$220 billion trade with Africa in 2014, its trade with the European Union was 467 billion euros and with the U.S. \$591 billion. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/10/content_22417707.htm. [Accessed September 15, 2015.]
- 25 Carr 1987, p. 11.
- 26 Rosato 2015.
- 27 *CNN Tonight* with Don Lemon, December 1, 2015. [Live Broadcast.]

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China's Peace and Security Strategies in Africa: Building Capacity is Building Peace?

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Abstract: There is a growing body of scholarship that examines China's security engagement in Africa. However, such scholarship largely views security cooperation in terms of military aid and military equipment and considers security from a traditional perspective. This article proposes to expand the scope of security to include non-traditional aspects of cooperation such as capacity building programs and investments in human resource development. Going beyond the view that security should be understood in terms of military hardware and naval bases, I propose a security-development nexus as a framework to understand China's security practices in Africa. This nexus highlights the integration of security and development and views peace and conflict resolution to be the result of successful economic development. The core argument is that central to Beijing's security strategy in Africa are not only arms sales, deployment of combat troops, or establishment of military bases, but that equally vital are investments in human resource development through capacity building programs. The article closes with a critical analysis of the development-security nexus by highlighting its major shortcomings and unintended consequences. As China's experience in the South-Sudan indicates, over-relying on economic development as a broker for peace has its own challenges and limitations.

Introduction

"China stands ready to take an active part in Africa's efforts in capacity-building for maintaining and strengthening peace and security and support Africa in its endeavors to speed up development, eradicate poverty and realize durable peace." President Xi Jinping's speech during the Africa-China summit (December, 2015)

The Chinese government in 2006 released its first Africa white paper, an official document that outlined China's foreign policy strategy towards Africa, in tandem with the first China-Africa Summit.¹ A second edition of the white paper was released in December of 2015 in conjunction with the second China-Africa summit held in South Africa.² A quick content analysis of both papers reveals that the word "security" (in the sense of stability) was mentioned five times and the word "terrorism" was mentioned only one time in the 2006 paper. Approximately a decade later, "security" was mentioned fifteen times (in the context of peace and stability) and "terrorism" five times in the second white paper. The focus on peace and security cooperation

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a3.pdf>

in China-Africa relations is indeed a much more recent development but one that is quickly gaining a lot of attention.³

This rapidly increasing interest in security is also reflected in there being a growing body of Africa-China scholarship addressing security cooperation from different angles. The extant literature has examined the contribution of China to peacebuilding efforts and how that reflects on norm-making and norm following (Alden 2014, Alden and Large 2013), China's role in conflict resolution in South Sudan (Anthony and Hengkun 2014, Large 2008, 2009, 2015), debates regarding China's adherence to noninterference principle in Africa (Aidoo and Hess 2015, Wang 2013, Xu 2012), debates over Beijing's response to the crisis in Libya and the principle of Responsibility to Protect (Garwood-Gowers 2012), the controversial Chinese arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, Hauauer and Morris 2014, Shinn 2015), and Beijing's cooperation with the African Union (AU) on security issues (Van Hoeymissen 2010, Benabdallah 2015). For the most part, however, extant literature treats security and military engagements from a material/hard power perspective.

The above-mentioned scholarship is concerned with such things as arms deals, boots on the ground, military presence in the form of naval drills, bases, etc. Without downplaying the importance of this aspect of security, this article identifies an under-researched set of security practices in China's Africa strategy that do not lend themselves to a hard power/material perspective on security. This aspect has to do with accounting for Chinese-sponsored capacity building and vocational training programs as an essential part of China's Africa security strategy. While there is a growing interest in researching the material aspect of China's security interests in Africa, we do not know much about the intangible investments in vocational training and their role in advancing China's security strategy in Africa. This article aims at complementing extant scholarship by adding an analysis of Beijing's investments in Human Resource Development (HRD) programs for security and military personnel. These HRD or capacity building programs target African high-ranking army officials, peacekeepers, as well as private security personnel who participate in Beijing-sponsored annual trainings and military-to-military exchanges.

Key to understanding the role of capacity building programs in China's foreign policy towards African states is examining three essential questions: (1) how does Chinese official discourse conceive of security and peace building; (2) how does this perspective shape Beijing' security policy and practices in Africa; and (2) how does this perspective translate into actual policies on the ground which aim at promoting security? To answer these three questions, this article proceeds as follows. First, it starts by giving an overview of Chinese perspectives on promoting security and maintaining peace and stability. By looking at China's domestic practices as well as official discourse on China's role in promoting Africa's security, I find that Chinese perspectives on security are intimately connected to development. In short, promoting security is seen to go hand in hand with reducing poverty and improving living conditions. Viewing security as hinging upon successful development applies both to China's domestic as well as its foreign policy making, which marks a significant difference from the way European powers and the U.S. have engaged peace promotion in Africa. To be sure, even though many Western powers seem to approach the issue of security from a military coalition commands and counter-violence measures, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed Beijing's position during the latest

Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg that creating development opportunities is the best contribution to security.⁴ It should also be noted that many African leaders (including AU Chairperson Dlamini Zuma) agree that the root cause of instability is found in socio-economic conditions and that more development will lead to more security.⁵

Second, the article applies the theoretical framework of the Development-Security nexus to Chinese-sponsored security-related HRD for Africans. It does so by drawing on the broad security studies literature but also puts it in the context of China's domestic and foreign policy conduct. This section argues that China's adherence to the development-security nexus within its own borders informs how it conducts its foreign policy in Africa with regard to peace and security issues. Locally, Beijing strongly adheres to the understanding that creating jobs and connecting youth from rural areas to jobs and opportunities is the backbone of maintaining security. This section shows how the security-development nexus and Beijing's experience with domestic development is reflected in its security strategy in Africa.

The third section of the article argues that capacity building and vocational training programs are an important aspect of Beijing's security policy in Africa, and are as important if not more so than its contribution to material military equipment, boots on the ground, and other military presence in the continent. China's contribution to development projects in Africa go beyond security-related capacity building programs and include HRD programs for civil servants, agribusiness specialists, medical doctors, journalists, among other professions. However, in this study I look at human resource development programs which are specifically related to military and security cooperation. Yet, to be clear my argument about the centrality of HRD investments to China's Africa strategy should not overlook China's interest in expanding its military presence in ways that are manifested in such policies as the new logistical navy base in Djibouti. Nor does it downplay Beijing's financial support of the African Union (AU) task force with military equipment. Instead, this study seeks to complement our understanding of the whole picture of China's involvement in security (broadly understood). It sheds light on the capacity building programs that are sponsored by the Chinese government and target skills transfers from Chinese experts to their African counterparts. Chinese officials present these programs as Beijing's contribution to stability and peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

The Development- Security Nexus and China's Africa Strategy

Chinese official discourse is explicit in tying security promotion and conflict resolution to economic development. For example, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated: "We [Chinese policy makers] believe that development is the foundation for peace in Africa. Conflict and poverty often come hand in hand and form a vicious cycle. If Africa is to achieve durable peace and stability, it needs to speed up economic and social development and let all the people share the benefits of development."⁶ This section of the article traces Chinese foreign policy's emphasis on the development-security nexus to Chinese domestic policy and domestic experience with development as the basis for security. However, before doing so, it presents a brief overview of the development-security nexus.

At base, a development-security nexus points at the centrality of the interdependent connection between improving socio-economic living conditions and the prevention of conflict.⁷ This view of security rests on two principle assumptions. The first principle is a negative

understanding of security that takes absence of conflict to mean security. The second principle takes conflict to be rooted in economic development grievances.⁸ This means that this particular understanding of security highlights that improving living conditions by creating more jobs, reducing poverty, implementing more development projects is the way to conflict resolution and prevalence of security. The international practice of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, through institutions like the UN, has also shifted its focus from traditional military and political missions to missions that enhance economic and social development. Post-Cold War peacekeeping missions are a great example of the development-security nexus given that the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Report in 2000 (known as the Brahimi Report) proposed that achieving a sustainable peace required more than establishing ceasefire and more peace-building efforts.⁹ The Report instigated the UN to restructure its peacekeeping operations to move beyond the conventional military tasks to include economic and social development programs as the key to peacebuilding. This view of achieving sustainable peace through emphasizing development is coincidentally congruent with contemporary Chinese perspectives on peace and security.

While development-security is a Western coinage as such, the concept is not without equivalent in the Chinese context. In fact, China has had over thirty-five years of domestic experience with strengthening security and stability through focusing on economic development.¹⁰ China's own history with political interference in economic development since the inception of the CCP under Mao's rule has resulted in a strong belief in the necessity of economic growth to maintaining internal order. Under Mao political campaigns such as the decade-long Cultural Revolution undermined China's economic growth and caused turmoil for years to come. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping's regime was characterized by placing economic progress through campaigns such as "open door policy" at the center of the party's goals. His emphasis on industrialization and shifting the party's politicized focus toward economic reform became the new standard practice for the post-Cultural Revolution CCP. Indeed, following the footsteps of Deng Xiaoping, in Jiang Zemin's regime "development was regarded as the key to solving all problems in china," and it was set out as the main objective of the CCP.¹¹ Likewise, Hu Jintao came up with the concept of scientific development, and Xi Jinping invented the China Dream, both of which place economic development as the central task of the party.

Indeed, China's commitment to the development-security nexus approach can be traced back to Deng Xiaoping's vision and plan for China's industrial revolution. During that period, the Chinese Communist Party started implementing development plans that enhanced economic growth and focused on improving living conditions for its citizens by creating job opportunities for the youth and reducing poverty levels. These measures were successful on basically three fronts: they created the economic growth the CCP had targeted, they resulted in more stability and satisfaction among the people, and they brought legitimacy for the CCP as it was perceived by the people to be efficient in its leadership. This experience with achieving security based on launching development plans came to shape Chinese officials' conceptualization of the "new security" in the post-Cold War era that was based on a shift from understanding security as self-help to a more mutual/common security.¹² This mutual/common view of international security was mainly based on Chinese policy makers being convinced that their methods of enhancing legitimacy of CCP and security at home should also be applicable

abroad. Mutual security was viewed as the result of win-win cooperation on economic growth and development projects. For Chinese policy makers, regional and global security could not be achieved "by an increase in arms, or by military alliances. Security should be based on mutual trust and common interest...We should solve disputes through peaceful means and strive for common development."¹³ Furthermore, more recent versions of the "New Security" concept hone in the non-traditional approach to security which views threats as not just military or political but also environmental, epidemiological, diaspora-related, etc. A 2015 update of China's military strategy paper reiterates Beijing's adherence to an approach to security in which mutual peaceful development, trust, and win-win relations are central.¹⁴ Furthermore, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized a continuation of this development-security nexus when he stressed that to build security:

We need to focus on development, actively improve people's lives and narrow down the wealth gap so as to cement the foundation of security. We need to advance the process of common development and regional integration, foster sound interactions and synchronized progress of regional economic cooperation and security cooperation, and promote sustainable security through sustainable development.¹⁵

Xi Jinping even took a step further in this case by tying sustainable security to sustainable development practices and projects.¹⁶ For him the two are connected and his view of the synchronized and integrated connection between economic development and security is found not only in China's security policies within its region but also expands to its security practices in Africa. On this matter, at the 2013 World Peace Forum the Chinese foreign minister expressed that "when conducting diplomacy, we must be fully committed to development, which holds the key to numerous problems in the world."¹⁷ Chinese foreign policy officials take economic development as an essential means for promoting peace and security, and this is a view shared by many state leaders in global south countries.

Therefore, China's domestic experiences with economic development being the "cement" of security suggest that its views on how to contribute to international peace and security are very much influenced by a development-security nexus. The integration of security and development is readily apparent in Chinese official discourse toward African states so much so that scholars such as Alden and Large view this as an expression of China's partaking in the "formative process of 'norm making.'"¹⁸ They argue that these norms (including economic development priority over democracy, insisting on African countries self-reliance in choosing what counts as a priority for their own situation, and state centrality in the international system) are guidelines shaping China's alternative approach to peacebuilding.¹⁹ Contrary to what could be described as a traditional Western liberal model for peace-building, which rests on a firm belief that good governance via liberal democracy is the foundation for human rights and security, China has rather emphasized the priority of development over good governance, and this has distinct political implications for its interaction with certain African states.²⁰

Many scholars in China agree that China's emphasis on development projects, even the ones as basic as providing clean water supplies, vaccinations, and food security should be viewed as part of Beijing's contributions to promoting stability and reducing sources of grievances and conflict. For example, Liu Hui, much like Li Anshan and Xuejun Wang, argued

that “development, stability and harmony is more attractive” than “democracy, freedom plus market economics for Africa.”²¹ Along similar lines, Yizhou Wang accounts for China’s peacebuilding contributions by proposing that military involvement is not all that counts and that “development can be tied to post-conflict reconstruction measures.” He further asserts that by his account, China can be said to have “participated in the post-war reconstruction of many African countries, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Angola, Congo (DRC), etc. The process involved the Chinese government, China Development Bank, large-scaled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at state and provincial levels as well as private businesses.”²² Hence, development goes hand in hand with peacebuilding efforts, and security and development are seen as two sides of the same coin in China’s Africa strategy.

Such emphasis on the priority of development and stability over democracy and good governance is implemented through several policy programs that are outlined in each of the six editions of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation meetings. However, this article is particularly focused on exploring Chinese government-sponsored HRD programs and how they contribute to development and security. The next section gives an overview of China’s HRD programs for African states.

Capacity Building Programs: Beijing’s Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa

African leaders unanimously praised China during the Johannesburg Summit for contributing to capacity building and technical training programs for African personnel. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma in his opening address requested that Beijing provide even more of these training programs.²³ His call was echoed by AU Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who noted that by 2050 Africa will have the world’s largest working-age population, and capacity building is needed to capitalize on that.²⁴ From the supply side, Chinese leadership reiterated China’s firm belief that “development is key to all problems” and stressed the similarity between African and Chinese perceptions of security as closely related to economic and social development. To illustrate, the most recent FOCAC action plan promised vocational training workshops for two hundred thousand personnel, thirty thousand government scholarships, train no less than one thousand media specialists, provide forty thousand professional training opportunities in China, send thirty teams of senior agriculture experts to train African farmers, and establish more agriculture demonstration centers.²⁵ Premier Li Keqiang vowed to “expand cooperation in personnel training, intelligence sharing and joint exercises and training, and assist Africa to enhance its capacity building in peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.”²⁶ Beijing’s interest in “training” is apparent as the Premier used the word twice in one sentence as well as offering to enhance Africans’ counter-terrorism and peacekeeping capacity not by giving military aid or equipment but by offering to train officials and promote capacity building.

Chinese-sponsored capacity building programs target African personnel and professions of diverse backgrounds. Programs for vocational trainings include seminars and scholarships for journalists, peacekeepers, civil servants, agribusiness specialists, doctors, engineers, and students from different fields. There are also some vocational training programs that are organized and held at China’s many Confucius Institutes across Africa. A branch in China’s Ministry of Commerce called Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO) gives public

access to aggregated data on all the training programs Beijing sponsors for African officials.²⁷ By early 2014, AIBO had sponsored 603 training seminars of a varying duration, among which 43 seminars were at the ministerial level. According to AIBO data, these seminars invited 14,545 officials from all over the world (about 152 countries) among who 483 were high-ranking government officials (mostly at the level of ministries). Over a third of the total workshops targeted African officials.

To take a closer look at these programs, I have combed through all the seminars and short training programs sponsored for participants from Africa in the year 2014.²⁸ First, my goal was to get a sense of what were the main subjects of the courses, where they were going to (which regions/countries in Africa were participating most in these trainings), and how recurrent they were. A second interest in this survey work was to see if there is any correlation between the countries that receive most of the training program opportunities and those possessing natural resources or having other geopolitical assets of importance to China. I was able to identify no less than twenty-six different categories ranging from diplomacy to health, sports, agriculture, infrastructure, public administration, education, and art among other topics. The training appears to come in three different categories depending on who are the targeted participants. Some training courses are for ministerial cabinet level officials, others are for senior civil servants, and the last category is for unofficial individuals.

The initial survey shows that the training programs were targeting very diverse countries but Anglophone countries seem to benefit more from these programs than Francophone ones. To give an illustration, from a sample of 446 participants (in the second quarter of 2014) from across the continent in twenty-six different areas of training (e.g., solar energy, trade in services, machinery use, prevention of diseases, and infrastructure maintenance), Tanzania sent forty-eight participants, Zimbabwe thirty-seven, Ghana thirty-two, Ethiopia and Kenya thirty-one each. In contrast, Francophone countries sent fewer participants. Cameroon had the largest quota with twenty-five, while Mali had sixteen, Senegal twelve, Cote d'Ivoire seven, and Algeria six. As far as Lusophone countries go, in this sample Mozambique participated with only six trainees while there was no available data for Angola. In addition, it was quite visible that Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe ranked at the top list of countries targeted by these training programs. The results from the other quarters of the year 2014 were congruent with the patterns found in the case of the second quarter of 2014. Contrary to received wisdom about Beijing strategically investing its resources and FDI exclusively in African countries that could assure continuous supplies of natural and mineral resources, from the examined sample it is not possible to conclude that natural resources are the main driving force. The countries that received the most training include Ghana, which has a lot of mineral resources, but also Ethiopia and Kenya, which are not resource rich countries. Likewise, it was difficult to single out one defining characteristic or pattern in the audiences these training programs were targeting other than the aforementioned Anglophone vs. Francophone dynamics. Rather, the survey findings suggest an interest on the part of Chinese foreign policy to expand its circle of relations and interact with as many country representatives as possible. As explained in the manual put together by China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), these training efforts "complement China's comprehensive foreign policy needs, help train the human capital of developing countries, and drive forward friendly relations and

trade cooperation with developing countries.” The manual briefly explains that the trainings contain “an advanced quality: Course content should reflect China's broad development achievements and strengths in relevant fields or disciplines, and point out that China's economic development achieved substantial success principally after the reform and opening period.”²⁹

Equipping African professionals and officials with skills based on Chinese expertise and experience for the aim of enhancing their capacity to be more productive in society is compatible with China's handling of potential conflicts internally. Sponsoring as many human resource development programs is also a way for Chinese foreign policy to set norms and diffuse its own expertise for other Global States to follow. There is a potential commercial benefit for Chinese equipment to be advertised during training workshops and for Chinese expertise in general. Additionally, enhancing African capacity building also serves a political objective for China's foreign policy as it projects an image of China as a responsible power that's investing in enhancing sustainable and peaceful development for African countries in a way that minimizes interventionism. The following section focuses on capacity building programs that are specifically related to security cooperation between China and African counterparts. The case of Chinese training for African peacekeeping troops serves as an illustration of the security cooperation programs.

Beijing's Investments in Security-Related HRD Programs

Historically, the first instances of training African military personnel by Chinese authorities date back to Beijing's commitment to supporting African revolutionary wars of independence, but it was limited to a few countries and had short-term goals. After that, the interest in vocational trainings waned down given China's turn inward in the 70s and 80s. Interestingly, up until the early 2000s, the interest in security and vocational trainings was marginal. FOCAC's action plans from the first and second meetings (2000 and 2003) show very little attention given to security cooperation beside general statements about counter-terrorism cooperation and statements about China's nine peacekeeping participations.³⁰ However, China's 2006 Africa policy states “China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and co-operation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.”³¹

Chinese peacekeeping missions engage in providing trainings for local security forces. Former Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara expressed that “Chinese peacekeepers are not only a force of peace; they are also a force of development. They understand that maintaining peace not only means weaponry and sending troops, but also means improving the livelihoods of locals. Chinese peacekeepers have won the hearts of the Malian people.”³² Moussa Mara's statement indicates that Chinese peacekeepers play an important role in shaping China's image abroad and work diligently to convey the role of China in Africa as peaceful and non-aggressive. The training for peacekeeping forces also come in two distinct types, short and long courses. The long training courses usually involve Chinese PKO troops and experts conducting trainings while on mission abroad. For the short course training, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense invited a group of peacekeeping trainees to China for a week for the first time

in June 2016.³³ The training lasted a week and covered twenty-three subjects including peacekeeping legal framework, civilian protection, and logistical support.

Indeed, China is now the largest provider of peacekeeping troops among all the United Nations Security Council permanent members. Despite China being a longtime skeptic about peacekeeping missions and has been known for vetoing and resisting multilateral collective action mechanisms, it has come around to become a vital support for peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere.³⁴ Since 1990, which is China's first contribution to peacekeeping, its position has changed from blocking the missions at the UNSC on grounds of non-interference principle to actively contributing personnel and funding to make them more successful. About 10 percent of UNPKO budget is supported by Beijing. As expressed by Premier Li Keqiang while addressing the African Union: "China has contributed more personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa than other permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Chinese peacekeepers are serving their duties in multiple hotspot areas across the continent." The Prime Minister further explained that "the solidarity and mutual trust between China and Africa serve not only our respective development but also peace and progress of the world."³⁵ Chinese peacekeepers have indeed participated in nine out of the fifteen UN peacekeeping operations around the world and seven out eight of the UN missions in Africa.³⁶ While the number of Chinese peacekeepers worldwide is much smaller than that of Bangladesh (10,757), India (8,919) and Pakistan (10,656), China is effectively expected to be involved even more as the Defense Ministry announced that China will provide 10 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget.³⁷ With regard to missions specific to Africa, according to numbers provided by Shinn, over the past decade, "China has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. As of 30 September 2015, it had 2,420 troops, 171 police, and 26 experts assigned to seven of the UN's nine peacekeeping operations in Africa."³⁸

The vast majority of the units are non-combat units consisting of engineers, doctors, and other professionals, many of who are tasked with training the local populations in basic development enhancing techniques. Even when the peacekeepers have military background, they are asked by the peacekeeping academy officials in Beijing to engage in training local security forces in confidence building measures, problem-solving techniques, among other peaceful conflict resolution strategies. As expressed in a report by the Chinese Ministry of Defense, "Chinese peacekeepers have renovated and built roads spanning 110,000 kilometers and more than 300 bridges. They have also diffused 9,400 landmines and explosives, shipped 1.1 million tons of materials, completed 450 patrols and 230 convoys, and treated about 149,000 patients."³⁹

One issue, however, which puts a limitation on peacekeeper training is that more and more UN peacekeepers are asked to keep a safe distance from interacting with locals. Despite these warnings, Chinese peacekeepers are still engaged in such interaction far more than other peacekeepers. For example, in May of 2016 Chinese peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo opened a Chinese language class for orphans.⁴⁰ The report indicated that this initiative goes to show how well-received and well-meaning Chinese peacekeeping troops are in Africa. In fact, they receive praise for teaching and training ways that promote better living conditions. Chinese peacekeepers often were lauded for playing a "significant" role in promoting peace and development in Ebola-hit West African countries such as Liberia.⁴¹ In

addition, Sudan's government recognized the extra humanitarian efforts of Chinese peacekeepers and commanded their interest in sharing their skills and expertise with Sudanese people.

Limitations of the Development-Security Nexus

After having unpacked the development-security nexus that characterizes China's engagement with security issues in Africa, it helps to analyze some of the potential challenges and weaknesses to this understanding of security. This section asks what are the negative consequences of assuming that more development means more security? First of all, it is important to note that a rigid belief that underdevelopment is the root cause of conflict may result in unintended consequences that are negative for indigenous populations, the environment, and social justice. Authoritarian governments have frequently justified taking away land rights on the grounds that their actions are meant to enhance development and therefore by extension security. In addition, China's foreign policy in South Sudan—where China is a key player in peace talks and development—seems to be facing challenges that put to question the efficacy of the development-security nexus. To be sure, the Chinese government has worked hard in providing investment, development, and capacity building programs for South Sudan, and to a certain extent there has been a significant increase in South Sudan's GDP due to China's involvement. Yet, despite all efforts, economic growth in South Sudan did not translate into enhanced peace and security. Even more crucially, China's bilateral relations with South Sudan are at a very low point, which I expand on after providing a brief timeline of China's involvement in the Sudan–South Sudan disputes.

During many years of the Darfur conflict, Beijing remained unmoved by African, US, or European calls on China to use its economic and political leverage to stop the conflict. African governments condemned China's silence and non-engagement in the Darfur crisis while China continued to pursue its natural resource supplies as usual from Sudanese president al-Bashir and reiterated its non-interference principle.⁴² However, the conflict began to spill over into Chad, and Chad's Ministry of Foreign Affairs appealed directly to Beijing to urge the Sudanese government to stop the violence. Beijing's non-action had in fact stirred several international human rights and advocacy groups to call on boycotting the 2008 Olympic Games unless it took a stand on Darfur.⁴³ Such a diplomatic dilemma was a delicate task to sort out for the Chinese government. It henceforth became a milestone in China's changing discourse of non-interference in African security issues.⁴⁴

Consequently, Chinese government's continuous blocking of UN Security Council votes on implementing an oil embargo on Al Bashir's government were tweaked and pressure put on Sudan's aggressive policies towards South Sudan. China, after much reticence to interfere, was among the first countries to recognize the establishment of the new state of South Sudan, and business as usual was carried on in securing oil exports to China.⁴⁵ However, in the later part of 2013, a series of violent fights broke out between rival factions within South Sudan. This time about four hundred Chinese oil workers had to be evacuated, which led to decreased oil exports to China. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) did not evoke its non-interference principle when it rushed to issue statements calling for an immediate ceasefire and soliciting South Sudan's government to protect Chinese nationals in the country.⁴⁶ The MOFA played a

proactive role in mediating negotiations between the warring factions in Addis Ababa in 2014, and by May 2014 China had contributed 314 troops to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).⁴⁷ This first deployment consisted of non-combat peacekeeping troops who were mandated to work on development projects such as drilling water, building housing units, and providing basic medical assistance. In September 2014, China announced the deployment of a second unit with UNMISS, this time of seven hundred troops (four hundred of whom were evacuated by April 2015 when a rebel group took over the main oil fields).⁴⁸ This was the first time in China's history of peacekeeping contributions to send combat troops. Their mandate includes protecting civilians, peacekeepers, and infrastructure in South Sudan. Yet despite all efforts, relations between China and South Sudan deteriorated following remarks by Minister of Finance and Planning David Deng Athorbei essentially accusing "the Chinese government of stealing South Sudanese oil and resources without doing anything for the suffering South Sudanese people."⁴⁹ The bilateral relations between South Sudan and China are a challenge to Chinese foreign policy's insistence on development being the root cause of conflict and on its policy sponsoring capacity building programs that are expected to lead to development and peace.

Attacks against Chinese citizens and business interests around the continent are yet another challenge for the development-security nexus, as it seems that Chinese policymakers may soon have to think about more military options for ensuring the safety of Chinese nationals rather than relying on promoting development as a means to security. Indeed, a long list of attacks on Chinese companies and individuals in Africa includes incidents such as in November 2015 when "three top executives of state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation were fatally shot in the Radisson Bleu Hotel Attacks in Bamako."⁵⁰ In May 2014 Boko Haram targeted a Chinese road construction firm in Cameroon, injuring one Chinese worker and killing the guard.⁵¹ Similarly, in 2012, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) publically declared that the estimated 70,000 Chinese oil industry workers in Angola were not guests but supporters of the regime.⁵² The FLEC claimed three ambush attacks in the city of Cabinda on Chinese nationals affiliated with the China National Petroleum Corp. In the summer of the same year, Chinese workers and other foreign nationals were subject to violent racial attacks in South Africa. Even more dramatic was the evacuation of over 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011 after the fall of the regime. Most of the Chinese in Libya were working on contract for Chinese companies on infrastructure projects valued at almost \$19 billion. In 2010, one Chinese mineworker was shot dead and a dozen others seriously injured in a riot targeting foreign mining practices in Zambia.⁵³ In January 2007, gunmen kidnaped five Chinese telecommunications workers in Port Harcourt, Nigeria.⁵⁴ During that same year, sixty-five Ethiopians and nine Chinese oil workers affiliated with Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau died after an attack in April 2007 in Ethiopia's Somali region of Jijiga.⁵⁵ Such incidents are likely to keep increasing given that Chinese companies operate in some of the continent's riskiest areas. This means that more pressure will be put on the Chinese government to be more directly involved in ensuring their safety. Yet, the extent to which China is involved in conflict resolution and peace building in Africa may seem marginal compared to the West if one takes the definition of security assistance to hinge upon military assistance including boots on the ground, naval bases, or counter-terrorism collaboration. It is the ongoing Chinese foreign policy

belief that poor development is the root cause of instability and prolongation of conflict.⁵⁶ Therefore, Beijing understands its engagement in African peace and security issues to extend beyond military and traditional definition of security into including the role of promoting development.

Conclusion

This article focused on an under-examined aspect of China's security practices in Africa and consequently provides an overview of China's capacity building programs Africa. While much of the extant literature satisfactorily examines security aspects such as arms deals, military aid, and other material factors, scholars have not paid much attention to the development-security nexus that underwrites Chinese government views on security as being rooted in development. By taking this into consideration, Chinese investments in capacity building programs become part and parcel of China's contribution to sustaining peace and security in Africa. Since China's government experienced impressive levels of stability internally due to its economic reforms and development records, it also believes that investing in human resource development, technology transfer, and forming skilled labor constitute key solutions to conflicts in Africa. So far, China's understanding of its own role in peacebuilding has been mainly centered on promoting development, including capacity building programs for military personnel, civil servants, students, journalists, and other professions. To be sure, this view of security is congruent with that of many African leaders, as they frequently express satisfaction with the role China plays in training African professionals and ask for more of such programs. This focus on such an indirect (non-military) approach to security and peacebuilding is not exclusive to China's foreign policy in Africa. Indeed, issues such as climate change and a sustainable marine economy are examples of a broader understanding of security that have motivated some development projects for several decades. What is new about China's approach is the scale at which it is investing in capacity building programs and the positive impressions it receives from local political actors and international organizations. Nonetheless, as this article has shown, the development-security nexus can have serious flaws, especially when high rates of economic growth do not correlate with a reduction of conflict and insecurity. Additionally, increasing terrorist attacks putting at risk both Chinese overseas nationals and interests are also a challenge to the development-security nexus and may put pressure on Beijing to adopt a more direct approach to security and peacebuilding. All in all, this article's goal was to complement and build on existing literature that has already examined China's material and military capabilities and add to this the hitherto under-examined investments in human resource development and capacity building programs.

Notes

- 1 China 2006 for full text.
- 2 China 2015.
- 3 One of the reasons why cooperation on peace and security is off to a later start compared to other fields of cooperation such as agribusiness and trade is due to Beijing's adherence to the principle of non-interference. Evidently, security cooperation (especially if understood as military presence on African soil) seems to be a direct violation of that principle. However, as

discussed in subsequent parts of the article, pressures from international institutions, local African governments, as well Chinese nationals and business owners have all weighed in on the shift from a strict interpretation of non-interference to more lenient "selective engagement."

- 4 Xi Jinping 2015b. The Forum of China-Africa Cooperation is a summit held every three years by Chinese and African leaders. Ministerial Conference Archives as well as official white papers and speech transcripts can be accessed on <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/>. For more on FOCAC see Taylor 2011 and Anshan 2012.
- 5 Zuma, N. 2015. See also http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/2015-12/05/content_22637260.htm.
- 6 See <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dsjbzjhy/hxxd/t756377.htm>
- 7 For more on the security-development nexus literature see Duffield 2010; for a historical perspective on the origins and principles of the nexus see Hettne 2010; for an application of the nexus in the context of South Africa see Jensen 2010.
- 8 Reid-Henry 2011, p. 97.
- 9 The Brahimi report marked a turning point for the UN peacekeeping operation as it recommended these be reformed and that peacekeeping had to be anchored in a firm commitment to sustainable and lasting peace. For more information on the Report, see http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml
- 10 Wang 2010, p. 4.
- 11 Ibid., p. 5.
- 12 White Paper on China's National Defense 1998 (<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm>).
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 China's New Security Concept 2014
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml.
- 15 Xi Jinping 2014.
- 16 For further elaboration on his views linking peace, security, and development, see his first address to the UN. Xi Jinping 2015a.
- 17 Wang Yi 2013.
- 18 Alden and Large 2013, p. 23.
- 19 Ibid., p. 24.
- 20 In a speech at the Second World Peace Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Chinese diplomacy's position regarding the centrality of the development agenda: "when conducting diplomacy, we must be fully committed to development, which holds the key to numerous problems in the world."
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjzb_663304/wjzbz_663308/2461_663310/t1053908.shtml
- 21 Hui 2005. Also see Anshan 2005 and Wang 2010.
- 22 Wang 2013, p. 84, adds that "the development of Sino-African relationship provided an important opportunity for China to promote and strengthen such an image. Through peacekeeping missions, counter-piracy operations and weapon proliferation prevention efforts in Africa, China not only contributed to Africa's peace and security processes, but also achieved "quite a success in public relations."

- 23 Zuma, J. 2015.
- 24 Zuma, N. 2015.
- 25 FOCAC 2015, Section 4.3.6. Section 4.3.2 announces that the “Chinese side will offer 2,000 degree education opportunities in China and 30,000 government scholarships to African countries.” Section 3.1.11 explains in more detail the trainings in agribusiness and agriculture. Section 5.2.1 expands on the seminars sponsored for African journalists (radio and TV) to be exposed to Chinese theories and practices in journalism.
- 26 Li 2014.
- 27 <http://china-aiibo.cn/> the webpage is in Mandarin Chinese.
- 28 I would like to acknowledge the assistance of two junior fellows from the University of Florida Department of Political Science, Monica Eichner and Juliette Holthaus.
- 29 MOFCOM 2012, Clause 3 (author’s translation).
- 30 See <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/DOC22009/t606801.htm> for a full text of the 2003 action plan. For summaries of the main points see Taylor 2011.
- 31 China 2006 for full text.
- 32 In an exclusive interview with Xinhua on the evening of June 4, 2016
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2016-06/06/content_4670851.htm.
- 33 Chinese Ministry of National Defense news from June 6, 2016.
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-06/06/content_4670932.htm.
- 34 Alden 2014, p. 4.
- 35 Li 2014.
- 36 The seven missions are in Darfur, DRC, Liberia, Mali, and South Sudan, as well as small contingents in Cote D’Ivoire and Western Sahara. Thrall 2015, p. 54.
- 37 Chinese Ministry of Defense. News release May 2016.
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- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Ibid. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-05/08/content_4583900.htm
- 41 Ibid. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-10/30/content_4626701.htm
- 42 Ahmed 2010, p. 16.
- 43 More substantially, in 2007 a Chinese-ran oil field (in Defra) came under attack by the rebel movement (JEM). The rebel group spokesperson made statements that it targeted Chinese interests in the region on purpose because of Chinese support for the Sudanese government. The rebel forces declared that all foreign companies that stayed in South Sudan beyond the evacuation deadline given to them would be considered guilty of assisting the Sudanese government in purchasing weapons used to violate the rights of South Sudanese families. Shinn 2009, p. 90; *Xinhua* News 14 March 2008.
- 44 Shinn 2009, p. 92; Jian 2012, p. 7.
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China and South Sudan's Civil War, 2013-2015

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Abstract: This article examines China's engagement with South Sudan between December 2013, when conflict broke out again in the world's newest independent state, and August 2015, when a deal supposed to end the fighting was formally signed. It argues that China's engagement came to be dominated by a closely related combination of political and security concerns founded in, but going beyond, its economic interests and associated investment protection imperatives. In this way, South Sudan has been the site of an evolving, experimental and more proactive Chinese political and security engagement. For China, this represents a notable departure in its peace and security engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, China's role, like other external actors in South Sudan, has been partly constitutive of but very much subordinated to the politics of armed conflict. China sought to practically negotiate a challenging dilemma concerning the relationship between peace, economic development and conflict.

Introduction

The fighting that erupted in Juba, the capital, in mid-December 2013 devastated the high expectations accompanying South Sudan's independence in July 2011. A rapid escalation of conflict followed. Precipitated by a leadership crisis, this conflict had its roots in deeper tensions within the ruling Southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the oil-based political economy of the new state, which had been officially established as a regional government by Sudan's 2005 North-South peace agreement and then formally constituted as independently sovereign in July 2011.¹ Failure to resolve political differences between the SPLM's top leaders—in particular but not only South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and former vice-president, Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon—rapidly translated into a violent conflict with ethnicized characteristics. International efforts to respond to the growing civil war, led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), eventually produced a deal to end the fighting. It was formally, if reluctantly, signed in August 2015. By October 2015, the conflict had displaced more than 2.2 million people, including over 630,000 refugees in neighboring countries, and severely challenged the ability of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and a wide range of other international agencies to respond effectively.²

South Sudan has featured prominently in recent attention to China's changing role in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the process it has become a notable case study in the evolution of global Chinese foreign policy. Such views were advanced even before the conflict from December 2013. One leading Chinese analyst, for example, cited South Sudan as a "testing ground for China's proactive diplomacy."³ It has even been argued that the Chinese role there in some senses opens a revealing window onto China's future in Africa, seen in the

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a4.pdf>

suggestion that “China’s more assertive approach to protecting its interests in South Sudan will spread across the continent.”⁴

This article examines thematic aspects of China’s engagement with South Sudan between the outbreak of renewed conflict in mid-December 2013 and the formal, precarious August 2015 deal. It argues that China’s engagement underwent a transition characterized by attempts to engage a closely related combination of political and security concerns founded in its economic interests, but in certain respects going beyond these to reflect wider considerations. Just as Sudan was a testing ground for overseas Chinese corporate oil development after 1995, South Sudan thus became a testing ground for China’s political and security engagement. While for China this may represent a departure of sorts in its peace and security engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, such engagement conforms with core aspects of international responses to the conflict and established mechanisms by which South Sudan has managed external partners. China’s role, like that of other external actors in South Sudan, has been partly constitutive of but very much subordinated to the politics of conflict, requiring greater attention to the actual nature of China’s engagement within South Sudan and, in particular, the politics of this engagement.

This article is structured into four sections. First, China’s engagement is contextualized within the political economy of newly independent South Sudan. Dominated by oil, and turbulent relations with Sudan, this did most to condition China’s role. Second, starting with the impact of conflict on its oil interests, the various strands of China’s evolving security engagement, and some of the innovations in this, are examined. Third, China’s political attempts to engage primarily state but also rebel groups in an effort to support a negotiated political settlement to the fighting were notable. Putting any serious further economic engagement on hold, Beijing directly experienced the limits of externally driven attempts to resolve South Sudan’s conflicts. The upshot, as the final section considers, was that Beijing was attempting to negotiate a challenging practical dilemma concerning the relationship between peace, economic development and conflict in South Sudan. While recognizing the need for economic development to advance the prospects for a peace meaning more than the absence of conflict, Beijing insisted that peace was needed for the provision of any substantial Chinese economic assistance.

Contextualizing Relations Before December 2013

Much analysis of China’s relations with South Sudan is preoccupied by geopolitical dynamics emanating from, but largely external to, the Chinese engagement within the country itself.⁵ As a result, political and economic circumstances within South Sudan are frequently not explored or emphasized sufficiently, when these are fundamental to any attempt to understand how China fits in and how its multifaceted engagement plays out according to different South Sudanese perspectives. The background context of China’s relations with South Sudan is thus important but, more generally, and prior to any consideration of how an external partner has been involved, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of politics in South Sudan.

From the Chinese government’s perspective, Beijing’s relations with South Sudan were formatively influenced by its engagement in Sudan, especially from the mid-1990s onwards when the Sino-Sudanese petro-partnership was initiated. Chinese oil operations led by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) started and expanded operations amidst the multiple, inter-locking civil wars raging in Sudan at the time; that is, not just the North-

South conflict but also conflict within southern Sudan.⁶ Chinese companies were instrumental in turning Sudan into an oil exporter in 1999.⁷ China's support for the government of Sudan meant that China was regarded by the SPLM/A as supporting its enemies, both the Khartoum government and those Southern forces, led by Riek Machar, who split from the mainstream SPLA/M led by John Garang in 1991 and aligned themselves with Khartoum, resulting in an intra-Southern conflict characterized by ethnicized Nuer-Dinka violence.⁸ For CNPC and the Chinese government, however, a Sudan isolated and under sanctions due to the radicalism of its Islamist government represented a beachhead for its oil operations in Africa, and became a notable stepping-stone in its "going global" strategy.⁹ Sudan was thus initially a corporate testing ground for China's state oil companies, and China's engagement driven and dominated by economic considerations, assisted by diplomatic support.¹⁰ However, the politics of its engagement within and without Sudan became more challenging when the escalation of violent conflict in Darfur from 2003 that featured a brutal government counter-insurgency campaign. Beijing's close relations with Khartoum became far more prominent and controversial, especially before the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.¹¹ The crisis galvanized political engagement by the Chinese government in an effort to respond to the conflict, featuring Chinese pressure on Khartoum to accept a UN peacekeeping force.¹²

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005, signed between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, paved the way for South Sudan's independence in July 2011 and was also instrumental in reorienting China's engagement within Sudan in significant ways. The CPA created a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan based in Juba. Its wealth sharing protocol divided revenue from oil located in the south of Sudan on a 50/50 basis between the government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan, which became almost entirely dependent on oil money transfers from Khartoum.¹³ In July 2007, President Kiir visited Beijing and conveyed to President Hu Jintao the SPLM's intention to opt for secession from Sudan via the terms of the CPA. With around 75 percent of Sudan's oil production located in southern Sudan, and China's relations dominated by links with Khartoum, this initiative catalyzed a reorientation of Beijing's Sudan engagement.¹⁴ The SPLM's gambit to engage Beijing worked. A Chinese Consulate opened in Juba in September 2008. Relations thickened as the January 2011 referendum on Southern secession approached. After this resulted in an overwhelming vote to leave Sudan, China established formal diplomatic relations with South Sudan on 9 July 2011, when it became a new, independent sovereign state.

Concurrent with popular hope that independence would, as the SPLM had promised, mean development in a country beset by protracted, chronic underdevelopment and armed conflict, there was resigned pessimism about the state of, and prospects for, the new state. The challenges of an armed guerilla movement transforming itself into a functioning state were immense. China was engaging a kleptocratic petro-state underpinned by military rule and a national security system, governed by the imperatives of political necessity, not competence.¹⁵ Power lay in the hands of men with guns. The patronage system underpinning the new state was financed by oil (and the prospect of oil revenues). This culture shaped a widespread militarization predicated on expectations that violence would be rewarded with government positions yielding rent. Oil revenue, amounting to at least 98 percent of government revenue, allowed government salaries to be paid, with a disproportionately large proportion going to security and the SPLA.¹⁶ Oil money also underwrote the costs of President Salva Kiir's efforts to reconcile and incorporate former

foes, potential rivals and armed militias into a government “big tent.” As Kiir himself acknowledged, his government “largely squandered the opportunity of oil.”¹⁷ As South Sudan’s Development Plan noted, the new country was extremely poor despite having a rich resource base and oil revenue did “not flow to the average resident.”¹⁸ Instead, it was captured by elites.¹⁹

China’s relations with newly independent South Sudan developed in this context and were formatively shaped by the Chinese role in the all-important oil sector. This meant that on top of the challenges of seeking to enhance political relations and develop its economic engagement within South Sudan, China was caught in the middle of turbulent relations between South Sudan and Sudan. Because the oil sector was central in this, due to the lack of agreement about sharing oil revenue after July 2011, Beijing was exposed and vulnerable due to its oil interests. In response, it attempted to bridge the differences between Juba and Khartoum, even as Juba sought to find ways to get Chinese and other support for building a new southern pipeline to free South Sudan of dependence on oil exports through northern Sudan. In a dramatic gambit, senior SPLM leaders responded to Sudan’s seizure of South Sudanese oil, which Khartoum claimed to be taking “in kind” after the failure to agree on transit fees in the post-secession negotiations, by ordering the shut down of South Sudan’s oil sector in January 2012. Having previously faced attacks in Sudan, including in 2008 after which it had developed security response protocols, CNPC was forced to shut down its operations. It took a Cooperation Agreement signed between Juba and Khartoum in September 2012, and progress on its implementation, for oil production to be restarted in April 2013.

In this broad context, between July 2011 and December 2013 China’s practical engagement had to continually adjust to the fluid and challenging political realities it faced. Despite China formally styling its relations with South Sudan on the basis of sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect, there was a vast difference between its intentions, capabilities, and the reality of the actual South Sudan politics that such relations in which they were grounded.²⁰ Before independence, China’s consulate in Juba was privately optimistic about the prospects for contributing to economic development in South Sudan, starting with infrastructure construction.²¹ In theory, it was thought that South Sudan’s rich resource endowments meant that, suitably managed and overseen by a developmentally minded state, the country could realistically strive to achieve economic development. In the process, various opportunities for a variety of Chinese companies could be advanced, meaning that relations could proceed on the basis of mutually beneficial (“win-win”) ties. Learning the hard way through experience, however, the actual process of converting such plans in the context of South Sudanese politics proved far less straightforward.

At the time, China was widely looked to as almost uniquely capable of delivering a development dividend for independent South Sudan, but such faith was tested by its actual relations with the government. Despite official claims suggesting otherwise, these came to be marked by delays, frustration and mutual discontent. A notable point of friction concerned efforts to negotiate a substantial Chinese financial support package. First mooted before July 2011, and regarded as vital to strengthening relations and enabling a major expansion of China’s economic engagement, this was continually delayed. China’s concern was to ensure that there was sufficient collateral behind any major loan package. In April 2012, while visiting Beijing, President Kiir again tried to secure financial support from President Hu Jintao for a new southern oil pipeline.²² China, however, was unwilling to

support a multi-billion dollar pipeline whose economic viability was in doubt and which would undermine Sudan's position as the transit route for southern crude exports. When South Sudan's Minister of Information unilaterally announced an \$8 billion Chinese loan in April 2012, nothing had actually been agreed.²³ The premature announcement nevertheless caused a popular backlash against China, further damaging China's reputation due to the perception this generated that it was unwilling to add real substance to its rhetoric of friendship with South Sudan. Beijing hardly helped by taking nearly a year before publicly clarifying the lack of a loan in mid-March 2013.²⁴ Indicative of the difficult nature of everyday relations, this saga of the non-existent loan pointed to the underlying structural problem of South Sudan's lack of willing capacity to undertake such negotiations.

Official optimism about Sudan South's prospects in general, and China-South-Sudan relations more particularly, before and after independence became tempered by the everyday experience of implementing cooperation. Beyond concerns about the political will of South Sudan's government to be genuinely developmental, a particular concern was the lack of South Sudanese human capacity to negotiate deals with China. The pronounced asymmetry in capacity characterizing relations posed challenges to their practical advancement. Addressing this structural impediment to deeper bilateral cooperation in order to strengthen relations with South Sudan became a central preoccupation for China's embassy in Juba. Both sides sought to address this and created a "China Desk" involving South Sudan's Ministry of Finance and Chinese representatives to fulfill this role. This mechanism was intended to play a key role in negotiating the financial foundations of wider and deeper China-South Sudan economic relations.

Political circumstances in South Sudan, however, were not conducive to strengthening relations in this manner. In early December 2013, China Exim bank and South Sudan's Ministry of Finance co-sponsored a South Sudan-China Development Cooperation Forum in Juba, attended by around 200 industrial and commercial representatives. Everything changed when fighting irrupted in Juba not long after. Before December 2013, South Sudan had been experiencing a number of conflicts, including in Jonglei.²⁵ The SPLM/A's "process of transforming the institutions of the liberation struggle" essentially failed.²⁶ The political crisis of the SPLM's high leadership was one of the important factors that led to conflict, which was triggered by fighting in Juba in mid-December 2013. Salva Kiir alleged that a coup attempt led by Riek Machar was made against him. This narrative was contested. The AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, established by the AU Peace and Security Council in 2014, later found that a gunfight within the Presidential Guard had triggered the violence.²⁷ The Juba fighting rapidly spread to Unity and Upper Nile, key oil producing regions, and other parts of South Sudan. China's relations with South Sudan were confronted by a rapid and violent return to armed conflict. Unsurprisingly, this derailed plans to enhance China's role in economic development schemes and meant that these were put on hold. China's principle economic role was restricted to the oil sector and, with its interests threatened by the escalating conflict, a more involved security and political engagement was required.

China's Security Engagement

China's security engagement was multifaceted, featuring responses mounted by Chinese agencies in conjunction with the government to threats posed by the fighting to Chinese interests, together with an effort to contribute to UN peacekeeping as part of China's multi-

level role extending to the UN Security Council. Such responses extended beyond central Chinese government relations with the government of South Sudan, to feature other actors, most notably corporations, and important indirect connections.

The first, notable area concerned corporate security. China's state oil corporations shared the Chinese government's concern at protecting the immediate welfare of Chinese workers operating in the conflict-affected areas, and in protecting their oil investments. While China has a significant, leading stake in South Sudan's oil sector, it was by no means the only player in the industry and so was not alone in this regard. While reliable, accurate oil production statistics are elusive, before December 2013, South Sudan's production level was often reported as running at around 245,000 barrels per day (bpd), although in October 2013 the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining put this at 190,000 bpd.²⁸ The industry had been set for expansion after independence.²⁹ A Petroleum Act was passed in 2012 providing a new legal framework for the sector. In late December 2013, however, and at various points thereafter reflecting the pattern of the conflict, the strategic oil fields were at the center of fierce fighting. This caused a complete shutdown of the Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC) consortium operations, in which CNPC had a 40 percent stake (Petronas, ONGC and Nilepet, South Sudan's national oil company, being the other shareholders). In Upper Nile, despite intensified conflict over the oil fields, production was reduced but not stopped in fields where the Dar Petroleum Operation Company consortium operated, CNPC having a 41 percent share and Sinopec 6 percent (also involving Petronas, Nilepet and Tri-Ocean). In March 2014, South Sudan's oil production was reportedly running at 166,458 bpd, and approximately 140,000 bpd in 2015.³⁰

CNPC mounted a rapid emergency response to the December 2013 fighting. The swift evacuation of Chinese oil workers after 15 December 2013 ensured the Chinese government—and CNPC—were seen to act to successfully protect its nationals.³¹ Chinese nationals working for other Chinese companies in South Sudan, such as Sinohydro, were also evacuated via Chinese or other channels such as the UN. This set the pattern for CNPC's responses to the subsequent ebb and flow of fighting in oil-producing parts of South Sudan. In May 2015, for example, China also evacuated some four hundred workers from Paloich, Upper Nile because of fighting. Production later resumed after government forces regained control. CNPC had previously operated amidst conflict in Sudan before, but exposure to South Sudan's conflict after December 2013 enabled it to utilize procedures developed to respond to such situations and deepened its experience of operating amidst conflict. Notwithstanding damage to and disruption of its operations, and reduced profits, its response demonstrated the advances it had made in managing corporate risk through practical investment protection, apparently including local security partnerships.³²

Military cooperation was a second area of evolving security cooperation between China and South Sudan.³³ After July 2011, Beijing and Juba did not initially have a proper bilateral military relationship. Some military links between China and South Sudan grew, however, as a result of the new circumstances of need arising from South Sudan's civil war. Citing China's military support for the government of Sudan against the SPLA's armed struggle, SPLA commanders were previously dismissive of China as a military partner. A more pragmatic approach evolved as the conflict forced the SPLA's to maximize options for military procurement.

The GRSS received Chinese arms supplies, detailed in a UN sanctions panel report documenting a shipment of arms, ammunition and related materiel that the SPLA received

from Norinco (China North Industries Group Corporation) in July 2014.³⁴ This weapons consignment, worth some \$46.8 million according to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, appeared to have been ordered before the outbreak of the war.³⁵ However, given that this underlined China's support for President Kiir and the SPLA, seen as Dinka dominated, the SPLM-IO predictably sought to draw attention to this and China's partisan support for the government.³⁶ Contextualized in terms of its other external military partnerships, South Sudan by no means relied on Chinese arms purchases, having a number of more significant military suppliers. Despite China's comparatively less important direct military relations with the GRSS, its role nonetheless mattered. The mere appearance of the Chinese government seeking to promote peace and participate in UN peacekeeping in a conflict characterized by immense civilian suffering while a Chinese company was simultaneously supplying weapons of war to Juba dramatically illustrated the mixed, contradictory role of a Chinese engagement made up of multiple actors.

This was rendered even more entangled by the indirect connections involved in China's military relations with Sudan, and Sudan's military relations with rebel groups in South Sudan. Taking into account China's arms transfers to Sudan, and the indirect impact of Khartoum's secondary retransfer of arms to allied armed groups in South Sudan, Beijing's military role was thus more significant than mere attention to its direct relations with Juba might suggest.³⁷ After the revelations about the Norinco arms deal, and facing not just a damaging political backlash but also possible military blowback against its interests, China declared a moratorium on arms sales to South Sudan.³⁸ The extent to which this has been enforced remains to be seen.

China's Role in UN Peacekeeping

China's role in UN peacekeeping in South Sudan was a third, more prominent area of China's evolving security engagement. This combined multilateral engagement with other, more bilateral dynamics, such that China's role in UNMISS served to fulfill and promote a number of concurrent bilateral interests. The prominence of China's role in and support for UN peacekeeping in South Sudan is notable, and followed on from its first deployment of UN peacekeeping troops after 2005. Dispatched from the Jinan Military Command, these Chinese peacekeepers were based in Wau and undertook primarily logistical, engineering or health support roles.

After December 2013, the nature of China's UN peacekeeping in South Sudan significantly evolved when the country became the first instance of the Chinese government deploying an infantry battalion under a Chapter VII UN mandate.³⁹ In April 2015, the final detachment of Chinese troops deployed to UNMISS on this basis, thus departing from the previous Chinese peacekeeping role that had involved logistical or medical support functions. Most notably, this upgraded Chinese peacekeeping troop contribution included a civilian protection role as a core aspect of the UNMISS mandate. Debate around how this peacekeeping deployment was or was not related to China's efforts to pursue the protection of corporate oil investment interests through multilateral, UN means was in certain respects a distraction. While indirectly connected, these forces were deployed in Juba, far from the oil fields, but the real issue from the perspective of China's engagement was the changed nature of Chinese peacekeeping. This illustrated how South Sudan became the site of a notable innovation in China's UN peacekeeping, expanding the People's Liberation Army's operational experience in a potentially transferable manner while at the same time exposing

the Chinese troops to the risks inherent in being tasked with implementing an ambitious peacekeeping mandate amidst conflict.

A final related area involving China's security engagement was Beijing's role in the UN Security Council, which provides further insights into China's shifting engagement. Beyond contributing troops to UNMISS, the Chinese government supported the mission and participated in policy debates about international responses to South Sudan at the UN Security Council level. It is partly because of apparent Chinese pressure that UNMISS's Chapter VII mandate came to feature the aim to "deter violence against civilians, including foreign nationals...in areas at high risk of conflict including, as appropriate, schools, places of worship, hospitals and the oil installations."⁴⁰

China had previously opposed sanctions, and these remained a point of contention, but its attitude appeared to become more flexible. On March 3, 2015, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on the conflict protagonists. Endorsing the Cessation of Hostilities agreements signed by both the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) in January and May 2014, resolution 2206 imposed a package of sanctions against those deemed to be blocking peace and established a panel of experts to oversee these. The resolution text underscored the Security Council's "willingness to impose targeted sanctions in order to support the search for peace." In discussions over the resolution, China was keen to highlight the UN Security Council's role in supporting the IGAD mediation process, and expressed the hope that the resolution would signal its desire for a breakthrough in the negotiations. The resolution also explicitly urged "both parties to immediately implement" the "China-mediated 'Five-Point Plan'" agreed by the government and SPLM-IO during a meeting China convened in Khartoum in January 2012 to support the IGAD process (see below). The Chinese government's support for this went against previous opposition and was clearly one part of its evolving, more multifaceted engagement. While China's UN Security Council role concerned international security responses to conflict, its engagement clearly involved other, concurrent and connected forms of political engagement with and within South Sudan and the region.

China's Political Engagement

Having already evolved considerably before July 2011 and in the aftermath of independence, China's political engagement with South Sudan continued to evolve after December 2013. It came to involve interlinked direct and indirect connections, featuring bilateral inter-state relations, political party ties, and China's support for international mediation, which took its role toward a more multilateral footing. With economic interests remaining an important driver in China's engagement, the challenges of investment protection and conflict response required the adaptation of its political engagement.

Bilateral ties between China and the Republic of South Sudan continued on a regular basis at the highest level. Beijing prioritized relations with South Sudan's central government, ruling party and military.⁴¹ As seen already, the sudden violence from December 15, 2013 derailed a process of loan negotiations and as fighting spread. After December 2013, the China Desk in Juba sought to function but the Chinese government became even more cautious about extending a loan package in the context of armed conflict that, while not covering the whole country, was spreading. As the prospects for significant Chinese economic investment receded in the face of expanding conflict, China's engagement evolved. One part of this was the elevation of humanitarian aid as part of a revised

assistance program to South Sudan. China's program of development assistance predated December 2013; independent South Sudan became a FOCAC partner in 2012 and was thus eligible for assistance. The conflict severely interrupted China's development assistance, for example its plan to build hospitals in South Sudan's ten state capitals, including those of Unity and Upper Nile. China's assistance shifted in order to respond to the new circumstances, with health and medical aid remaining a key part.⁴² Outside humanitarian aid, China's development assistance encompassed other areas, notably agriculture, but invariably this was also set back by the conflict.⁴³

Efforts to strengthen political party relations between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the SPLM was another trend that pre-dated December 2013 but continued and evolved amidst the conflict thereafter. While notionally distinct from inter-state relations, in reality such ties featured overlapping and reinforcing connections between two very different incumbent ruling political parties, both originally constituted as armed guerilla movements. The CPC was active in courting South Sudan and the SPLM before independence in July 2011.⁴⁴ The SPLM and CPC signed an MOU in 2011 about "building a pragmatic relationship" between both parties focused on training and exchanges.⁴⁵ SPLM officials undertook CPC training, including at the China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong in Shanghai, as part of a developing connection featuring SPLM participation in the CPC's political party training program.⁴⁶ In November 2014, for example, SPLM announced that it was sending twenty cadres to China "for training to boost party leadership administrative capacity."⁴⁷ By then, some 150 members had received training in China.

While China prioritized dealings with the government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A, a further form of political engagement concerned its more diversified contact with the SPLM-IO. This was driven by the need to try to protect its oil investments, and contribute to China's efforts to advance the peace negotiations. It is important to underline how and why China diversified political contacts beyond its previous preference for maintaining political relations only with the governing party-state. While continuing, albeit in a disrupted manner indicative of its fragmentation, its relations with the SPLM, China maintained non-official, ad hoc connections with the SPLM-IO. This meant that its political relations came to feature multi-stranded connections, not confined to relations with South Sudan's central state under President Kiir or the SPLM. That the Chinese government needed to indirectly connect with the SPLM-IO is unsurprising. In addition, SPLM-IO members also sought to engage China as an attempted means to promote their cause and exert more pressure on the government in Juba. In September 2014, an SPLM-IO delegation led by the Chairman of its External Relations Committee visited Beijing and met China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming. Chinese media reports were at pains to point out that "China stressed its fair and objective stance."⁴⁸ The Foreign Minister affirmed: "China always adheres to a just and objective position."⁴⁹ Such efforts to stress China's objectivity may have been genuine but were formally and publicly overlaid above deeper political connections and efforts to protect economic interests.

Beijing's Diplomatic Engagement

A final area of Beijing's political engagement with the conflict involved diplomatic efforts to support and promote a negotiated end to the fighting. This took various forms, and involved connections and coordination with other international initiatives. One notable indirect political connection, for example, came via the regular and institutionalized contacts

between China and Sudan, which inevitably featured the conflict in South Sudan. Beyond Sudan, China also engaged with Uganda and other states neighboring South Sudan, giving a regional diplomatic aspect to China's diplomacy over the conflict.

One interpretation of China's engagement after the outbreak of fighting in 2013 was that it "potentially accelerated China's evolution from a reactive and passive actor in conflict resolution to one that is more active and positive in both conflict management and conflict prevention."⁵⁰ In reality, while discernably becoming more actively engaged, China's approach continued to be ad hoc, following on from the period before December 2013 when, led by its Special Envoy for Africa, China had carried out a quasi-mediation role in the disputes between Khartoum and Juba. While focused primarily on its own interests, these dovetailed with more widely held interests, since oil and oil money was central to the Sudan-South Sudan dispute and fundamental to paying for the state. Beijing's subsequent engagement featured aspects of continuity and change.

At regular points in time, corresponding to the evolution of the fighting in South Sudan, Beijing called for a ceasefire and underscored the fundamental importance of political negotiation. A consistent refrain from Beijing was that the conflict could not be resolved through military means. At times, these calls were fairly clearly connected to core Chinese economic concerns. In May 2015, for example, and in an interesting choice of wording, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson asserted: "Both sides have the responsibility to protect oil infrastructure in South Sudan, as oil is a critical resource in its reconstruction and economic development during the country's peaceful transition period."⁵¹ This pattern of publicly supporting each short-lived peace agreement was accompanied by more engaged diplomacy aimed at achieving a lasting negotiated settlement.⁵²

China's efforts to undertake a mediation role after December 2013 attracted widespread attention. While the nature and extent of China's private efforts to try to persuade the government and the SPLM-IO to end the conflict are not properly known, the notion of China as a mediator in South Sudan's conflict was mostly not commensurate with its actual role and impact.⁵³ China was readily styled as a mediator, following Wang Yi's January 2014 suggestion that China was playing the role of a conflict mediator.⁵⁴ In reality, China's engagement may have had mediation-like aspects, but, more than conform to a rigorous definition of mediation, in essence it represented a diplomatic-political intervention to try to assist negotiated settlement and assist the formal mediation process. Importantly, China sought to liaise with other initiatives, including with the US-Norway-UK Troika and, in particular, ensure its role supported the IGAD-led process. In this light, while China maintained formal fidelity to its non-interference principle, in practice it appeared to have recognized that circumstances necessitated a more proactive engagement and its diplomacy proceeded accordingly.

China's immediate response to the December 2013 fighting featured public expressions of deep concern and calls for restraint and a rapid negotiated settlement. It also called for measures to "protect personal and property safety" of Chinese enterprises and employees.⁵⁵ In January 2014 Wang Yi held talks in Addis Ababa with representatives of the conflict protagonists. Subsequent Chinese diplomacy on the IGAD process was multi-sited, connected by key individuals and involving communication and coordination between Embassy, Ministerial and leadership levels in Beijing. Four aspects about this are worth noting.

First, there was regular monitoring of the Addis Ababa negotiations by Chinese diplomats based there, which involved continuous communication with members of the IGAD team, and links with the negotiating parties. Second, China's outreach and dialogue on South Sudan went beyond its Foreign Minister to include State Counselor Yang Jiechi (who visited Juba as Foreign Minister in August 2011). Notably, China's Special Envoy Zhong Jianhua regularly travelled between Juba, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Beijing. He was also active in regional diplomacy, trying to engage Kampala and other states neighboring South Sudan, as well as maintain connections with his US and European counterparts. China's role in the mediation process assumed a new level of importance by its participation. This contributed to a more complex international mediation structure also involving diplomats from Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, US, UK and Norway.⁵⁶ Third, Beijing did propose its own recommendations about resolving the conflict, though this was not sustained and was later upstaged by China's support for IGAD. In August 2014, the Chinese government advocated a four-point solution to South Sudan's civil war. Formally arising out of talks between Wang Yi and his South Sudanese counterpart in Beijing, this appeared to resurrect and revise an earlier proposal advanced by former President Hu Jintao in relation to the Darfur conflict. The proposal reiterated China's position in stressing that a cease-fire, political dialogue, and support for IGAD were the best means for "Africa solving the issue on its own" and alleviating the humanitarian situation.⁵⁷ Fourth, and importantly, China supported IGAD and the AU's response, tending to take its lead from this and seeking to style its engagement as supporting "African solutions." Finally, China's Foreign Minister, as well as figures from the CPC's top leadership, also had a role in terms of meeting key political leaders from South Sudan and messaging Beijing's support for peace.

China's diplomatic engagement was mostly confined to a supporting role positioned carefully behind IGAD and the AU. Beijing departed from this general tendency in January 2015, when it convened a meeting in Khartoum with the conflict parties, but even this was styled as a "Special Consultation in Support of the IGAD-led South Sudan Peace Process."⁵⁸ This brought together Tedros Adhanom, the rotating chair of the IGAD Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Seyoum Mesfin, Chairperson of the IGAD mediation team on South Sudan, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, South Sudan's Foreign Minister, and Taban Deng Gai, the SPLM-IO's Chief Negotiator. It also featured President Bashir. The result was a Five-Point plan expressing support for implementation of signed agreements, negotiations to form a transitional government, measures to enhance humanitarian response, and support for the IGAD peace process, this also featured the provision: "ensure the safety of all personnel and assets of all countries and international entities operation in South Sudan," again offering a demonstration of China's effort to protect its economic interests as one part of its broader and multi-stranded political and security engagement.⁵⁹

This represented China's most ambitious attempt to initiate and convene such a meeting under its own flag. The public message from Wang Yi to South Sudan, the region, and the world was clear: "China is an active promoter of peace in South Sudan."⁶⁰ In a further attempt to address accusations of economic self-interest, its diplomacy was cited as motivated by and giving expression to "its international responsibility and not to achieve any other purposes."⁶¹ However, the nature and extent of the challenges that undertaking such an event gave rise to, rooted in the sheer difficulty of finding scope for agreement between the parties, appear to have reduced Beijing's appetite to sponsor and undertake further such ventures.

No Peace, No Development

In August 2015, South Sudan seemed to have achieved a formal peace but the nature of the agreement signed then and other developments in the country meant that there were wide doubts about the prospects for the deal being converted into an actual and lasting resolution of conflict. Riek Machar signed the IGAD-mediated Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan on behalf of the SPLM-IO on August 17. Facing heavy US-led international pressure, President Kiir eventually signed on August 26. Amongst other things, the agreement committed both parties to a permanent ceasefire and power sharing. Even as President Kiir signed, however, his government circulated detailed objections; it was clear that there was wide opposition, including by powerful leaders on both sides.

The Chinese government welcomed the August 2015 accord. In the face of the political uncertainty surrounding it, Beijing continued to respond with humanitarian assistance, while trying to manage and maintain relations with the government in the context of the first phases of the August agreement.⁶² Any hope the deal engendered was tempered by political and military developments. The political “pre-transition” period that the accord provided for was not proceeding smoothly. Despite the limited withdrawal of SPLA forces from Juba in November 2015 to comply with the demilitarization provisions of the agreement, there were regular violations of the August accord.⁶³ The US Special Envoy for South Sudan affirmed in early December 2015 that “the signed agreement, for all the challenges of implementation, currently offers the best chance for peace in South Sudan.”⁶⁴ There were real doubts, however, about the durability of the deal. As well as political and military opposition, and on top of massive humanitarian need, South Sudan faced a severe economic crisis. Plummeting oil prices and revenue compounded the problem of already much reduced oil sector operating capacity. The issue of how to pay for the South Sudanese state loomed large, as Juba sought to find ways to secure money from neighboring countries, international donors, the Arab League and China.

Expectations that Beijing would provide a big financial package, and that this would make a significant difference, were unrealistically high. For China, the issue of extending major financial support to South Sudan after August 2015 reprised a core pre-December 2013 issue but in a political, economic and military context rendered even more challenging by political tensions, security concerns and dramatic decrease in oil prices. From Beijing’s perspective, in view of the prevailing economic climate, conflict and insecurity in parts of South Sudan, and political uncertainty about the prospects for the creation and effective functioning of the Transitional Government of National Unity under the terms of the August 2015 deal, there was little prospect of a guaranteed return on any substantial new investment. Importantly, there were also myriad doubts that the peace agreement would actually last and provide the political basis for durable stability. While the strategically and economically vital oil sector would continue, the realistic likelihood of an environment conducive to a financial package between Beijing and Juba being agreed to, and forming the enabling basis for China’s plans for economic development projects to be implemented, were remote.

In contrast to the Chinese government’s abstract refrain about the necessity of peace for economic development, Beijing had to confront very real, practical dilemmas concerning peace, conflict and development. In Juba, it recognized that peace was “the foundation for development,” and that without meaningful peace Chinese – indeed most external

investors—would not be keen to meaningfully make new investments in South Sudan beyond its existing ones.⁶⁵ Such a perspective, however, raised a familiar, circular conundrum: China appeared unwilling to agree any substantial loan for the government of South Sudan until there was a credible peace deal, and a credible sense that such a financial deal would be used as intended. Until there was such a loan, however, any significant Chinese economic engagement that might hypothetically support such a deal, including through much needed infrastructural development, was highly unlikely. The logic of this dilemma was not unique to but was magnified in the Chinese case. In this respect, China's predicament was consistent with and one part of a more structural dilemma, and suggested that China would need to further coordinate with South Sudan's other international partners, such as the IMF, in order for any support it might advance to fall within and support broader economic objectives.

Conclusion

This article has examined the broad contours of China's engagement with South Sudan between mid-December 2013, when fighting broke out again, and the official agreement supposed to end the civil war that this caused in August 2015. In doing so, it explored some of the reasons why South Sudan can be regarded as a "testing ground" for attempts made by China to undertake more proactive diplomacy. South Sudan has been, and continues to be, a laboratory of Chinese foreign policy experimentation. This had been the case when Chinese oil operations started in Sudan from 1995, and in relation to Chinese diplomacy over the Darfur conflict. In South Sudan, however, this broadened to involve a more advanced security engagement and has extended into more political terrain. For Juba, the basis of China's relations with South Sudan formed an attractive contrast to that of the US by its formal commitment to sovereignty, non-interference, equality and mutual respect. For Beijing, however, much in its South Sudan engagement on the ground has raised questions about the changing actual meanings of its formal foreign policy doctrine when confronted with such challenges involving imperiled economic interests, political exposure and wider ramifications for Chinese conduct.

While South Sudan's place in China's foreign policy in Africa and the world more generally needs to be considered, more attention needs to be paid to the actual nature and constraining politics of this in different parts of the country. Unlike external views about China's supposed ability to effect internal change in South Sudan, this provides a much more sober understanding of the limits of and important constraints on China's engagement. China's South Sudan diplomatic engagement has been interpreted as evidence of a shift toward a more activist role within the country and that, for example, China was "acting not only like a 'responsible world power' but like a practical great power."⁶⁶ Notwithstanding Beijing's desire to gain external credit for its diplomacy, this is less clear-cut when China's actual engagement is considered. If anything, this confirms China's proclivity toward experimental attempted solutions, that have been revised or discarded in the face of direct experience, as well as support for African-led initiatives and, despite strong calls for peace to be agreed through negotiations, apparent recognition that this can ultimately only be achieved from within South Sudan. As its engagement has gone well beyond its previous emphasis on oil, China has come to have a more involved political and security engagement founded in the investment protection imperative but going beyond such interests. Besides representing a departure for China's engagement within South

Sudan, China has also been converging with the policy engagements of other external actors in so far as its practical ways of engaging South Sudan are concerned. Part of this was characterized by a shift to a more involved multilateral engagement, even as it sought to maintain its bilateral relations.

In late 2015, with efforts sought to implement the August 2015 deal ongoing amidst further political tensions, South Sudan remained a militarized rentier state beset by ongoing conflict and facing humanitarian need on an unprecedented scale. In seeking to examine China's role in South Sudan after December 2013, and thereby analytically elevate the role of an external actor (albeit one made up of various entities), this article clearly has pronounced limits in its ability to do more than chart the changing general trajectory of one of South Sudan's more important external relations. As such, this article has merely attempted a preliminary, thematic account of China's role during this time frame. Such an approach is, however, clearly limited when it comes to properly embedding China's role in the politics of the conflict and offering a properly developed account of multiple forms of South Sudanese agency in shaping relations not just with China but myriad other international actors of various kinds as well. Everything, going forward, depended on whether the August 2015 deal worked, and in that South Sudanese politics remained in command.

Notes

- 1 Nyaba 2013, p. 167.
- 2 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Humanitarian Bulletin: South Sudan: Bi-Weekly Update", 9 October 2015.
- 3 Shen 2012.
- 4 Fielding 2015.
- 5 South Sudan is frequently cited, for example, as an African proxy caught up in a US-China geo-political conflict. See Paterno 2012 and 2015.
- 6 See Johnson 2003.
- 7 See Patey 2014a.
- 8 See Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Johnson 2003.
- 9 See Patey 2014a.
- 10 See Large and Patey 2011.
- 11 See Budabin 2011.
- 12 See Large 2009.
- 13 Strictly speaking, this division was made after 2 percent was allocated to oil-producing states.
- 14 In 2010, 75 percent of total peak production of 490,000 bpd was produced in South Sudan, a situation carried over when South Sudan became independent.
- 15 de Waal 2014.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 "When we got to power we forgot what we fought for and began to enrich ourselves at the expense of our people." Letter from President Salva Kiir Mayardit to 75 former and current South Sudanese officials, 3 May 2013. Also, see Patey 2009, p. 628.
- 18 South Sudan Development Plan 2011, p. 13.
- 19 Moro 2013.
- 20 Large and Patey 2011.

- 21 Interview with Chinese official, Juba, September 2010.
- 22 For background, see ICG 2012.
- 23 Large and Patey 2014a.
- 24 *Reuters* 2013.
- 25 Thomas 2015.
- 26 Deng 2013.
- 27 It concluded that "widespread and systematic" killings occurred in Juba in December 2013, later spreading to other parts of South Sudan, and that these were coordinated and "could have been planned." Final Report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014.
- 28 Including, but not only, by Stephen Dhieu Dau in late May 2014. *Sudan Tribune* 2014.
- 29 A new licensing round centered on Block B, and further infrastructure projects were planned besides oil refineries built in Melut and Bentiu. A feasibility study was underway on a smaller pipeline for block 5. Ministry of Petroleum and Mining 2013.
- 30 *African Energy* 2014.
- 31 The exact numbers are unknown but thought to be around 400 oilfield workers were evacuated, as well as other Chinese working outside the oil industry in other parts of South Sudan. This was followed by subsequent evacuations, notably in early 2015, as fighting ebbed and flowed in the oil areas. *Sudan Tribune* 2015b.
- 32 The Small Arms Survey reported that the Unity blocks of the GPOC consortium, including those in Pariang country, were being defended by SPLA troops, and a militia force of some 700 recruited from the Rueng Dinka youth of Pariang. The GPOC consortium was cited as providing funds for the militia, and run by the national security service. See Small Arms Survey, "The Conflict in Unity State," 29 January 2015. In addition, new partnerships were created to undertake security activities, notably though the Hong Kong registered company Frontier Services Group, whose shareholders include CITIC (formerly China International Trust and Investment Corporation). *Africa Confidential* 2015.
- 33 China had longstanding military relations with the government of Sudan. The continuing relevance of old connections, notably the role of Riek Machar when allied to Khartoum following his 1991 split from the SPLA/M, were not to be discounted.
- 34 Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), 21 August 2015.
- 35 Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), 21 August 2015, p. 17 at 61.
- 36 In March 2015, for example, it claimed a Chinese flagged vessel had brought large quantity of armaments and ammunition to South Sudan via Djibouti. *Sudan Tribune* 2015a.
- 37 China accounted for some 58 percent of all of Khartoum's self-reported arms imports over the period 2001–12. The Sudan government angered Beijing by retransferring some imported Chinese weapons and ammunition to allied groups in Darfur, a violation of the UN arms embargo on Darfur, and also to rebel groups in South Sudan. The existence of Chinese-manufactured small-caliber ammunition in South Sudan between 2011-2013, for example, was extensively documented, mostly appearing to originally derive from Sudan Armed Forces stocks. Leff and LeBrun 2014, pp. 24, 105.
- 38 *Bloomberg* 2014.

- 39 In 2012, and before contributing troops in Mali, China had quietly deployed an infantry platoon to protect its engineering and other staff in South Sudan.
- 40 Patey 2014b; UNMISS. n.d. "UNMISS Mandate."
- 41 In June 2014, for example, Vice-President James Wani Igga visited Beijing where he met Premier Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Li Ruogu, Chairman and President of Exim Bank of Chin, and Zhou Jiping, Chairman of CNPC.
- 42 Zhou, 26 October 2014. In March 2015, China's embassy in Juba and the RSS Ministry of Health signed an agreement for further Chinese medical assistance, notably to the Juba Teaching Hospital.
- 43 *Upper Niles Times* 2014. In September 2014, China advanced a US\$25 million grant for "agro-infrastructural development" reportedly "mostly in the areas hugely affected" by the conflict.
- 44 Indeed, one senior leader involved in that process, Li Yuanchao, was subsequently elevated to the Politburo and became a Vice-President.
- 45 This was signed by former SPLM General Secretary Pagan Amum. For background, see Mayom 2014.
- 46 See, for example, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in South Sudan 2012.
- 47 Mayom 2014.
- 48 *Xinhua* 2014b.
- 49 Wang Yi 22 September 2014.
- 50 Zhang and Kemple-Hardy 2015, p.1.
- 51 *Xinhua*, 22 May 2015.
- 52 "China urges parties to ease tensions in South Sudan" *Xinhua* 16 May 2014.
- 53 Tiezzi, 6 June 2014; Zhang and Kemple-Hardy 2015.
- 54 Tiezzi, 6 June 2014.
- 55 Wang Yi 2015b.
- 56 In late March 2015, the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the creation of a panel of 5 African country leaders (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa) to support the IGAD team.
- 57 MFA 2014.
- 58 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on January 12, 2015.
- 59 The full wording was: "(i) earnestly commit to the full implementation of all signed agreements; (ii) speed up the pace of negotiations towards the formation of a transitional government at an early date; (iii) take concrete steps to relieve the humanitarian situation in conflict-affected areas, and facilitate access of international humanitarian assistance; (iv) ensure the safety of all personnel and assets of all countries and international entities operating in South Sudan; and (v) provide strong support for and take active part in the IGAD-led mediation efforts, and, in this regard, *strongly urging* both parties to immediately implement the Five-Point Plan." Taken from UN Security Council Resolution 2206 (3 March 2015).
- 60 Wang Yi 2015a.
- 61 *Xinhua* 2015a.
- 62 In November 2015, for example, Beijing announced a US\$5 million donation to the World Food Program to assist its response to food insecurity in South Sudan.
- 63 IGAD reports and UNMISS reporting. See, for example, IGAD, 9 September 2015.

64 Testimony of Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Donald Booth before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations "Independent South Sudan: A Failure of Leadership," 10 December 2015.

65 Interview with Chinese official, Juba, July 2015.

66 Tiezzi, 2015.

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The Political Economy of Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Ghana

RICHARD AIDOO

Abstract: Recently, as Chinese engagements in Africa involve a diverse array of actors, including states, corporations, private and public ventures, individuals, and groups, Beijing's economic and diplomatic relationships on the continent have become rather variegated and complex. The colliding of these actors and varied interests/motives is also shaping the discourse of anti-Chinese sentiment, and consequently, socio-economic decision-making and policies in individual African countries. Lately, different Chinese migrants and operatives have been involved in unregistered and unregulated artisanal gold mining in Ghana (locally known as *galamsey*). The illegal mining activities have resulted in increasing conflicts and controversy within Ghana, including a series of mass deportations of Chinese migrants from the country. As the governments of Ghana and China carefully determine diplomatic responses to this situation in 2013, many Ghanaians, particularly in areas mainly impacted by these Chinese illegal mining activities stirred up anti-Chinese sentiments to pressure the government to act decisively. In this qualitative study, the research draws on unstructured interviews and information gathered in 2013 and 2014, from Ghana, particularly Awaso, in the Western Region—an area known for Ghana's major bauxite mine, currently operated by the Chinese, as well as increasing *galamsey* activities in surrounding areas. The article argues that in the bid to manage or quell the increasing anti-Chinese fervor and maintain Sino-Ghanaian economic and diplomatic interests, different political actors in Ghana have contributed to the diverse reactions towards the illegal Chinese miners, as well as the outcomes for some Sino-Ghanaian economic engagements.

Situating China in Ghana's Political Economy

"I don't blame the Chinese, I blame our politicians and local chiefs"
Resident of Awaso in the Western Region¹

Between 2013 and 2014, Ghana's relations with China gained much global attention through activities of Chinese illegal miners in parts of the country, and the uproar over the disbursement of the \$3 billion Chinese loan facility secured by the Ghanaian government in 2011. Though these situations have dogged recent Ghana-China engagements, China has always had constructive diplomatic and economic engagements with Ghana. The post-independent relationship between the two countries has evolved from a political ideological one to currently an economic pragmatic partnership. A framework for this relationship will be incomplete without looking back to the anti-imperialist struggle and the initiation of South-South

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a5.pdf>

cooperation at Bandung, in 1955. Ghana (then Gold Coast) was one of the African countries that encountered China at the Bandung Conference.² Five years after Bandung, and three years after its political independence, Ghana officially recognized China, despite the very valued comradeship that Kwame Nkrumah had with the Soviet Union. To avoid any attempt at stirring up a Sino-Soviet contest, Nkrumah defined the ambits of this diplomatic relationship as mainly development and security oriented.³

As Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) rode the populist wave into office as the first leader of the country, he began to scour for resources to build infrastructure and jumpstart a development agenda for a new Ghana—both of which fostered his own political plan. Aside the Soviet Union, China became a keen supporter of Nkrumah's statist development agenda. In 1961, Nkrumah agreed to a \$20 million, interest free loan repayable in Ghanaian exports—a better deal than was being offered by the Soviet Union at that time. In character with China's current relations with its African partners, Beijing also offered technical experts to Ghana. This was followed by another \$22 million pledge during the Zhou Enlai African tour in 1963-64.⁴ Secondly, as these resources enabled the government to invest in infrastructure and pursue other development goals, Nkrumah cautiously welcomed Chinese military advisors to also help strengthen the military infrastructure of Ghana and other neighboring countries. The growing Ghana-China fraternity came to a halt in 1966 when the Nkrumah administration was overthrown in a military takeover. The relationship soured as accusations of Chinese interference by Ghana severed diplomatic ties until 1972. Scholars like Ogunsanwo contend that China took advantage of Ghana's hospitality to advance its ideological interest and agenda throughout the Africa continent.⁵

Since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, China's relationship has gradually evolved away from Nkrumah's socialist-statist ideological engagement to a more market oriented economic relationship. This economic relationship has evolved with political and diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, especially, as Ghana upheld the One-China policy. Apart from Zhou Enlai's visit, Ghana has later played host to high profile Chinese politicians such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in 2003 and 2007 respectively. Ghanaian leaders have also returned these series of visits, from leaders like Jerry Rawlings, and John Kufour to the current leader John Mahama. These high level visits came along with economic benefits ranging from series of infrastructure loans, to business exploratory missions in both China and Ghana. Generally, most of the development support that Beijing has offered to Ghana in the post-colonial era has been in reciprocity for crucial diplomatic support that the latter had extended to the former, and also to maintain the fraternal links meant to exemplify and sustain the South-South cooperation initiated at the Bandung Conference in 1955. These include Nkrumah's campaign for the reinstatement of China at the United Nations, as well as Ghana's support during the border dispute with India in 1962.⁶ Later in 1989, the Rawlings administration also displayed some sense of solidarity during the infamous Tiananmen Square protests. As many African countries alternated political systems, China's diplomatic overtures were extended to different political regimes – from one party states, through military regimes to multiparty democratic states. Beijing had to adapt as the political landscape in Africa quickly moved toward democratization. In the 1970s and 1980s, about 85 percent of the governments across Africa had suppressed various forms of open political competition and in the 1990s the

institutions and their political stories started to change as 50 percent allowed elections, in which opposition parties were allowed to openly compete.⁷

So, political change or reforms have often been tied in simultaneously with economic reforms, a feat that Bienen and Herbst argue is difficult to achieve in Africa compared to other regions of the world.⁸ In Ghana, Beijing's support and funding of the socialist-statist agenda under Nkrumah's administration gave way to different development plans—most importantly the liberalization policies that took flight with the structural adjustment policies adopted by Ghana, especially in the 1990s. Ndulu et al. observed that government economic policy changed in the 1990s as the control regimes that characterized the immediate post independent era gave way to the “syndrome free” policies that were set to achieve economic growth and accommodate the forces of the market.⁹ Often described as the “model for adjustment,” Ghana's set of IMF/World Bank stimulated growth policies and arrangements in the 1980s followed Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the 1970s that led to the “Going Out” policy. This set the stage for a liberalized, natural resource exploitation, export driven, Ghanaian economy, and a transitional China ready for a global economic outreach. Hence, Beijing's support of the Ghanaian economy largely consisted of various forms of loan packages as development assistance, trade, and technical cooperation, especially since Ghana was then a non-oil economy unlike Nigeria, Angola and Sudan.

According to existing research, China's economic activities in Ghana have become varied and helped by the liberalization arrangements, these range from major mining operations to small-scale businesses—some of which are joint ventures with Ghanaian partners with many more unregulated. Some of the recent big projects include the Bui hydroelectric dam construction, which was to add up to a \$622 million, and an \$850 million agreement for a gas project between the Ghana National Gas Company and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation in Beijing.¹⁰ In spite of the selected attempts by few big Chinese companies to direct equity into Ghanaian firms, and sign partnership agreements such as Alcatel Shanghai's investment in Ghana Telecom and the international trade and investment partnership between Ecobank Ghana and Bank of China; most Chinese investments are small to medium-sized. Both the large Chinese businesses and small-scale private actors interacting with Ghanaian business counterparts and population, at various levels diversely serve as agents or actors of Beijing's foreign policy agenda. This is an effort that may threaten the coherence of China's foreign policy agenda in Africa, as different studies that refer to the varying impacts of paradiplomatic efforts among subnational actors have documented.¹¹

With the Ghana-China relationship characterized by the building up and rehabilitation of infrastructure to address Ghana's inherited and now collapsing colonial infrastructure, trade initiatives, aid and technical assistance, and the gradual growth in investments, the number of Chinese actors in Ghana has shown a steady increase. Apart from the Chinese diplomats serving in Ghana, large groups of Chinese continued to arrive in Ghana to implement infrastructure projects. For instance Baah and Jauch note that the construction of the Esipong stadium at Sekondi-Takoradi employed 150 Chinese out of a total of 230 workers employed at the project. The Bui hydroelectric project was pegged to attract over 3000 workers (of which the Chinese were the majority).¹²

Presently, with the increasing economic engagements between Ghana and China, the benefits from complementary contributions by the Chinese are often eclipsed by the competition with local businesses for the domestic market. Apart from the struggle over market, the presence of the Chinese in the Ghanaian economy has also introduced what Lee describes as globalization from below—the human trafficking and its concomitant prostitution, and increasing illegal mining activities in parts of the country.¹³ Axelsson and Sylvanus recount the complexities and hardships that the Chinese competition brought to the Ghanaian textile industry, causing some textile manufacturers to fold and thus leaving thousands of workers redundant.¹⁴ Lee provides harrowing accounts of trafficked Chinese sex workers in Ghana who were lured into this business with the promise of working in honest, well-paid jobs in Africa.¹⁵ The focus of this article is the menace and complexities that have swelled around Chinese involvement in “galamsey”—a local referent for illegal and unregulated artisanal gold mining in Ghana. Apart from the diplomatic difficulties created by the involvement of Chinese natives and operatives in a this underbelly of the Ghanaian mining industry, which for long has been a preserve of the poor and underprivileged local people, the environmentally destructive effects of the galamsey by both local and foreign agents have been well noted in various research.¹⁶

Even though the Chinese and other foreigners have been involved in this unregulated mining activity in Ghana for a while, from 2013 its nuisance became a full-fledged crisis. The onslaught of Chinese migrants, largely from China’s Shanglin County in China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region invaded most gold rich regions in Ghana, to either engage in illegal extraction of gold by themselves or partner with locals.¹⁷ By law, Ghanaians can apply for licenses to operate small-scale gold mining. The Chinese as foreigners can provide resources for machinery and also the technical knowledge. This has led to series of joint ventures between the Ghanaians and the Chinese in which the latter have no legal ownership since their documentation for living and working in Ghana are mostly invalid.¹⁸ The fallouts from the Chinese galamsey crisis, which peaked in 2013, were widespread and transcended the locations that these activities took place, becoming a diplomatic disaster that impacted the politics and economics of Ghana-China relations.

Methodological Considerations

This article largely draws on interviews and information gathered in 2013 and 2014, particularly from Awaso in the Western Region—an area known for Ghana’s major bauxite mine, currently operated by the Chinese, as well as increasing galamsey activities in surrounding areas. As this qualitative study broadly emphasizes the interactions among different political actors and the resultant change in socioeconomic arrangements, it is framed around the evidence of the influences of the Chinese as external actors in shaping an unregulated economic activity and culture—galamsey—that is largely dominated by local actors.

To achieve the research objective, this work combines both primary and secondary sources. Published accounts and books on subject matter provided helpful secondary evidence. Primarily, information was gathered through unstructured interviews from respondents/participants that were selected through purposive and snowball sampling. It also includes general observation of the dynamics surrounding the activities of the galamsey operators, and the local populations that are impacted in both positive and negative ways.

There were two main groups of participants. The first group consists of key respondents made up of community leaders, traditional leaders or their representatives, and leaders of businesses. These interviewees were essentially selected through purposive sampling as their positions and roles in the community were key to their selection, and contribution of responses. The second group of respondents included the local inhabitants who partake in galamsey or are generally impacted by this unregulated mining activity. This group includes Chinese migrants who have come to engage in galamsey. These respondents were reached through snowball sampling, as one interviewee would usually contact other respondents or would bring in other respondents into an ongoing unstructured interview. In some cases, the local inhabitants or Ghanaians that were jointly working with the Chinese served as useful contacts to reaching their Chinese partners. This was extremely helpful given the tense nature and politicization of the galamsey crisis, especially in 2013 (which was the period most of the interviews were conducted).

In a two-month period in 2013, and series of follow-ups in 2014, the unstructured interviews were conducted with twelve key respondents and thirty-three interviewees within the communities (including Chinese migrants). Most of the respondents sought anonymity, and was also provided for those that did not. This is to protect the respondents from any impact(s) that their statements might cause, especially given that most of these individuals held positions and businesses that could easily be jeopardized by statements made during the interviewing process. Anonymity was particularly crucial due to the upwelling popular fury that was generated during the crisis that gained national and global attention. The predominantly male respondents requested anonymity to protect their livelihoods, since they were heads of household and breadwinners who saw the interviews as opportunities to vent their grievances over an ongoing menace—Chinese galamsey—but to stay out of the political frustration and popular anger that characterized this issue in 2013. Respondents that owned or managed businesses that benefit from Chinese involvement in this unregulated activity – hotels, restaurants, and equipment rental—were circumspect in their responses, to avoid public retribution or loss of business. The palpable anxiety and uncertainty of the situation was also reflected in some respondents' reluctance to agree to audio recording of the interviews. In general, the information gathered through the unstructured interviews and the observations provided a good basis for the evaluations and arguments of the political undertones and impacts that the actors had on the socio-economic environment in the communities as well as the country as a whole.

The Politics of Chinese Galamsey in Ghana

I have known these Chinese people (referring to a Chinese couple) for the past two years, since I started working for my uncle in this hotel. When they come to Ghana, they stay for about a year and then return to their home country with some gold. When they come, they rent and pay for the rooms for about six months at a stretch, but they hardly sleep in the rooms. They spend all of their time in galamsey. The stay, eat and sleep in the forest for almost a month. The only time you see them back here at the hotel is when the security forces come after them... We have a weak government that cannot control the Chinese, and with local people like us, that help them, Chinese galamsey will never stop.

Hotel Receptionist at Awaso, Western Region¹⁹

The above is an account rendered by a hotel worker and a resident of Awaso, a region that represents the fulcrum of two major mining economies—the recently discovered and celebrated oil fields in Ghana dominated by Western companies and the main bauxite mines currently run by the Chinese. At this location and surrounding towns and villages, like other gold rich areas in the country, there have been a surge of different actors, both domestic and foreign, involved in the unregulated and illegal galamsey activities, which has drawn mass public anger, and recently impacted Ghana-China engagements. At Awaso and surrounding villages, the Chinese have come to engage in the extraction of gold through artisanal mining, on a very small and unregulated scale. However, unlike the locals who use rudimentary tools like pick axes, shovels and head pans in their galamsey exploits, the Chinese have turned to the use of heavy machines such as excavators and the use of toxic chemicals in the refining process.

This practice is against Ghana's Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (Act 703) which seeks to prevent foreign nationals from purchasing or mining on plots of land smaller than twenty-five acres, and a legal instrument that is meant to ensure that small-scale mining remains the preserve of the local population.²⁰ Additionally, the practice of galamsey has been connected to the extensive destruction of the environment through the pollution of sources of drinking water, which has been linked to myriad health concerns such as arthritis, respiratory failure, miscarriages, neurological problems and death.²¹ These excesses have been compounded by some of the violent acts that have characterized the clash and competition over land plots for galamsey purposes. Consequently, the deadly clashes have persistently stoked and increased public anger. However, culpability for the Chinese involvement and excesses of galamsey has been directed at both the Chinese actors as well as their Ghanaian counterparts. He Wenping, the Director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues that low-level Ghanaian officials and businessmen have contributed to the nebulous nature of the legal perceptions of galamsey. He asserts that "Many times [Chinese miners] are not clear about Ghana laws since there are middlemen who bring them over and help them sign a contract."²²

Most research and reports on Chinese involvement in the galamsey crisis in Ghana vaguely bifurcate the blame on both Ghanaian political actors and Chinese diplomats and nationals. Nevertheless, the nuance overlooked by these reports and studies is the preponderant role played by the local and traditional political forces and actors such as the constitutionally non-partisan local chiefs, district assembly members, and community leaders that serve as conduits between the "corridors of power" and local people. Consequently, the activities of the Chinese illegal miners [and their middlemen] through the help of the local and traditional leaders are sustained by the existing frailties in the relationship between government monitoring institutions and the local/traditional structures in Ghana. These existing weaknesses that played out at both the national and subnational levels, aided by other given factors, resulted in complicated outcomes for governments in Beijing and Accra, especially, during the 2013 Chinese galamsey crisis in Ghana.

First, the increasing Chinese involvement in galamsey, and the attendant excesses of violent clashes, raids and death could not have happened at a worse time for the Chinese and Ghanaian governments, especially the latter. Amidst much promise and prospect, Ghana's then vice president John Mahama (now president) signed the first tranche of a \$3 billion loan with the

China Development Bank (CDB) in April 2012, and also had another \$6 billion loan in the works with the China Exim Bank. During the signing ceremony at the Kempinski Hotel in Beijing, then vice president John Mahama purported that, “With the current financial crisis, it’s very difficult to go anywhere in this world and get \$3 billion ... this is the single largest loan Ghana has taken; actually it’s the single largest credit facility to an African country.”²³ With such appreciation for this Chinese financial lifeline, which was meant for infrastructure development, Ghana proceeded to accessing the loan. However, after the disbursement of approximately \$600 million by 2013, the agreement hit a snag as demands for renegotiation of the terms based on the Ghana’s newly discovered oil resources remained contentious.²⁴ To further complicate a relationship that was under strain through the tug-of-war that had ensued over the \$3 billion, the galamsey crisis came to a head in 2013. This put the Ghanaian government in a rather complex and delicate situation as it was under pressure from the general populace to react to the increasing Chinese involvement in galamsey. The link between the two separate incidents in shaping Ghana-China relations was undeniable, as put by one Ghanaian government worker, “we are in a very tough spot...it is either galamsey crackdown or a big loan from China.”²⁵ After series of government efforts to deal with the Chinese galamsey operatives, including the deportation of 713 Chinese nationals—representing 67 percent of deportations and repatriations in 2013 (see table 1)—it simultaneously became clear that the three billion dollar loan disbursements had stalled, pushing now President John Mahama to admit that “China is changing its policy” and “looking more at projects that have the potential to repay over time.”²⁶ By the last quarter of 2014, Ghana found its way back to IMF for almost \$1 billion dollar loan while it explored other sources of funding to help finance the list of infrastructure projects, which were initially meant to be funded under the truncated \$3 billion Chinese loan agreement.²⁷ Clearly, the anti-galamsey efforts by the Ghanaian government, which complicated Ghana-China relations in general, also somewhat constrained a monumental step in Ghana-China economic engagement.²⁸

The second factor was the obvious mistrust that had developed between the masses and the newly elected National Democratic Party (NDC) government in Ghana. The local people and their traditional leaders in some of the areas hard hit by Chinese galamsey activities exhibited little faith in the government’s ability and willingness to stop the Chinese. For diplomatic reasons that included the promise of accessing Chinese financial resources for development projects in Ghana, the then newly elected John Mahama and the NDC administration faced a tough balancing act between domestic concerns and relations with China. The gradual and piecemeal approach of the government seemed to have developed distrust in the NDC government’s resolve to deal with the Chinese galamsey, which was perceived as a menace.²⁹ As sporadic clashes between locals and the Chinese galamsey operatives gained global media attention, Ghana’s government was pressured to act through several crackdowns by the security forces and subsequent deportations of the Chinese. These efforts on the part of the Ghanaian government were perceived as short-lived, and unresponsive to dealing with some of the Ghanaian officers and institutions that were complicit in Chinese galamsey operations. During interviews in Awaso, a local lamented at how the government was not doing much to stop the Chinese from exploiting their lands, by working through the local and traditional political structures. A middle-aged woman from Awaso frustratingly commented that “It is like

everybody is doing their own thing, the government doesn't mind our chiefs, and the chiefs and local leaders (including the member of parliament) are not working together...I know some of the leaders are getting money benefits, but guess who loses in the end?"³⁰

The seemingly uncoordinated efforts among the local government structures allowed some of the local and traditional leaders to extract financial incentives from the Chinese in return for security and cover during their galamsey operations within their community. An apparent loophole was the absence of any system to check or monitor the immigration permits and documents of the Chinese who arrive at these local areas to acquire concessions from landowners for galamsey or work with their Ghanaian partners. To some of the inhabitants at Awaso and surrounding communities, the government was not doing a good job; leaving them to find the antidote to stem the onslaught of Chinese wealth seekers who endangered their communities.

Country/Region of Origin	2010	2011	2012	2013
China	43	5	130	713
Rest of Asia	19	32	56	53
Africa	30	25	46	289
Europe	6	4	11	8
Middle East	-	-	-	1
North America	3	2	-	1
Total	101	68	243	1065

Table 1: Showing deportations/repatriations by the Ghana Immigration Services, 2011-2013
Source: Ghana Immigration Service, Annual Report 2014

The issue of Chinese galamsey, which unfolded in tandem with the \$3 billion loan saga also brought Beijing's well-known and often-touted foreign policy agenda in Africa under scrutiny.³¹ In the past decade, as China's engagements in Africa have expanded, it has been watched and scrutinized especially by Western critics who have been suspicious of Beijing's engagements in Africa.³² China has consistently and persistently evoked its cornerstone policy of non-interference in diplomatic relations with the developing world. Though the ethos of this principle has been repeatedly used to justify Beijing's inaction or otherwise in the international community, in practice, Beijing has had to defend its actions and that of its principal actors in Africa, which have been perceived as incongruous to the tenets of non-interference. This has particularly been so, as political regimes and economies change in Africa, along with China's expanding partnerships on the continent.³³ The illegal and unregulated involvement of Chinese nationals in galamsey in Ghana render a different image far from the noninterventionist, non-meddling partner that Beijing has continued to project in its diplomatic and economic engagements in Africa. Hence, any attempts that China made to contain the galamsey crisis were also to ensure the upholding of its core policy of non-interference, which came under intense scrutiny with such unwelcome accounts of reports of Chinese galamsey from Awaso, and other communities in Ghana.³⁴

Furthermore, the politics that ensued between China and Ghana during the peak of the galamsey crisis occurred in the shadow of the negotiations for the disbursement of the three billion dollar loan from the CDB. This loan was somewhat an indication of the maturity of Ghana-China engagement as well as a gesture to cement a relationship that has had its highs and lows through the decades from the 1960s. Conversely, the difficulties encountered by both states in reaching a deal with regards to the disbursement of the loan, which additionally stalled efforts to access the financial resources for a list of infrastructure projects earmarked by the Ghanaian government, also challenged a general rhetoric of China's provision of non-conditional loans to African economies.³⁵ The issue of Chinese non-conditional loans has been touted in juxtaposition with loans from Western financial institutions that mostly come with stringent conditions of economic and political reforms. A major disagreement on the terms of the China Development Bank loan, which was guaranteed with Ghana's oil, was China's insistence on \$85 per barrel as pay back price instead of the over \$100 per barrel proposed by the Ghanaian government. This is in addition to the commitment fees and a stipulation that offers 60 percent of contracts under the loan agreement to Chinese companies.³⁶ In Ghana, this loan and its legality was a subject of parliamentary debates and protests with the opposition party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), accusing the ruling NDC administration of not using the appropriate political processes to seek parliamentary approval for the Chinese loan. Particularly, the opposition claimed the NDC government was breaching the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), which stipulates that Ghana's oil cannot be collateralized for more than ten years.³⁷ As the debate over the conditions of the loan agreement and its disbursement became intense and partisan, it became distinctly clear that negotiations over the loan terms would stall its use, and hence the Mahama administration would have to look elsewhere for the resources. As aptly put by an investment banker in one of Ghana's premier investment houses, "China's loan sounds to good to be true, and now we know the hidden costs."³⁸

Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Populism

"My husband and me have all our paperwork, why these people hate us?
...We love this country..."
Chinese woman, Awaso³⁹

The above sentiment infuriatingly expressed by a Chinese woman who accompanied her husband to Awaso to work in galamsey, captures the tensions that were at play among the various actors, especially during the 2013 galamsey crisis. Fearing any form of local retribution or anger, she initially claimed her husband was working with the Awaso bauxite mine that is run by a privately owned Chinese company. The palpable anger expressed in some of the communities hard hit by the galamsey of foreign nationals like the Chinese was in stark contrast to the generally positive nature toward the Chinese in Ghana that has emerged out of various perception surveys. In a BBC World Service 2009 survey, for instance, Ghana was one of the three most favorable countries among twenty countries surveyed in terms of positive perceptions that ranged from 62-75 percent.⁴⁰ This is further corroborated by another 44 percent of Ghanaian respondents considering China's path to development as a very positive model – one of the top three countries with the most positive perception out of nine countries.⁴¹ A more

recent survey of global attitudes and perceptions by Pew indicates that 63 percent of the Ghanaian respondents see China as a good influence on the country's economy (3 percent more than the perception towards the U.S.).⁴²

Despite the embrace of Beijing as an exemplary influence through complementary gains like the infrastructure, and loan concessions, the competitiveness that is currently associated with the presence of the Chinese in some sectors of the Ghanaian economy (e.g., the textile industry) has contributed to a gradual upwelling of anti-Chinese sentiments in Ghana. Lately, increase in anti-Chinese sentiment can be correlated with Chinese involvement in activities like *galamsey*, especially as the Ghana government is often impelled by popular dissent to crackdown on the Chinese, which has mostly lead to series of arrests and deportations. Though *galamsey* is an age-old unregulated economy activity that has largely been the preserve of the locals, it is currently a representation of complex economic and political interrelationships between local Ghanaian inhabitants and foreign nationals like the Chinese – a nuanced nexus of global and domestic actors. The role of multiple actors and politics of *galamsey* are intrinsically, and broadly linked to the emerging resentment against the Chinese in Ghana.

To sum up then, *galamsey* depicts competition between the numerous Chinese migrants and local populations in economically challenged areas, similar to Awaso and surrounding communities in the Western region of Ghana. In some of the poverty-ridden, yet, resource-rich rural environments in Ghana, inhabitants are driven into *galamsey* as a means of survival, and this then convert these small mining concessions into complex and dangerous environments as the Chinese fight to protect what they deem as their legitimately acquired piece of mining concession. This nature of competition often ends up in a deadly contest.⁴³ Additionally, this fuels local popular anger, as the Chinese are perceived as usurping critical resources that are meant for locals in these low-income village communities.

A second source of popular frustration that fuels anti-Chinese sentiment is the ineffectiveness, and in some cases connivance of government institutions in *galamsey* issues. Ghana's Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (Act 703) was enacted to replace the Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 (PNDCL 153), as a statute that prevents intrusions by foreign nationals in small-scale economic activities, which include unregulated ones like *galamsey*. In different situations, Ghanaian immigration officials and security forces take advantage of the existing laws to either cover up or exploit situations that involve vulnerable and frustrated Chinese nationals.⁴⁴ Hence, despite the illegal implications, this is one of the elements that have sustained the practice of *galamsey*, and essentially emboldened foreign actors like the Chinese. Undoubtedly, incensed by the blatant Chinese involvement in *galamsey* around the communities in Awaso, a hotel receptionist at one of the hotels which lodges some of the Chinese nationals engaged in *galamsey* lamented about the kick-backs and bribes that some of the local leaders are receiving from the Chinese *galamsey* operators. "It was rumored that some the Chinese recently paid a certain amount of money to some of our own local leaders...I know it is true" she opined.⁴⁵ More flagrantly, some of the local leaders have established small income generating ventures that rely on the activities of the foreign *galamsey* operators. Some of the leaders and elites rent out excavators, tractors, and standby generators, which are certainly beyond the very limited budgets of local *galamsey* operators. Thus, increased popular anger toward the Chinese nationals engaged in *galamsey* is concurrent with the frustrations regarding

an ineffectual government institutional set up, from top to bottom, which struggles to deal with a situation that has far-reaching implications on Ghana-China diplomacy.

Though the Chinese galamsey crisis was an immediate cause that easily stoked the challenges of a weakening Ghanaian economy, and visibly widening income gap between the rich and the poor, other proximate causes that contribute to anti-Chinese sentiment in Ghana include the incursion of Chinese traders and products into the textile industry leading to a near collapse of this once resourceful industry. The other two are the increased presence of the Chinese in unlawful business ventures like trafficking and prostitution, which directly flouts domestic regulations; and thirdly, the political and partisan uproar over the three billion dollar Chinese loan.

The challenges of Ghana's textile industry predates the recent Chinese galamsey problems as Ghana's embrace of the structural adjustment policies in the 1980s affected the textile manufacturing sector—an instance of the general ill effects of the manufacturing sector under the series of policy directives.⁴⁶ This situation was further exacerbated by liberalization arrangements adopted by the Rawlings administration through the 1990s. This increased competition as the deregulation measures implemented by the state opened up the market for foreign products. Ghana's textile industry was greatly impacted by Chinese competition. Quartey alludes to the thousands of workers that were displaced and factories that were closed down as a result of the liberalization policies.⁴⁷ Over the decade, the textile-manufacturing sector has experienced intense competition from cheap, low quality knock-offs textile prints from China, which ironically serve the low-income consumer base in Ghana.⁴⁸ The Chinese competition in the textile industry and the accompanying de-industrialization effects has generated anger across different parts of the political and economic spectrum—from politicians to local textile traders who can collectively convert the anti-China fervor into political gain. But this has yet to happen given the clear roles played by other Ghanaian actors in this rather intricate tale shaping the fate of Ghana's textile industry.

An issue that is connected to galamsey, and also undergirds the growing anti-China fury in Ghana, is the increasing and visible presence of the Chinese in shady business ventures—ones synonymous with Lee's "globalization from below," which accounts for the involvement of the thousands of Chinese migrants at the non-hegemonic level in African countries such as Ghana.⁴⁹ As Chinese economic activities increase in Ghana, with sectors like construction, energy, and communication experiencing a surge in Chinese labor, so do other associated economic activities such as the trafficking of Chinese women to serve in the sex industry. This is to meet the demand by the growing community of Chinese expatriate workers who are mostly away from their spouses and families for long periods at a time. An undercover report by known Ghanaian investigative journalist Anas carefully documents the modern day slave economic exchange that takes place between the Chinese perpetrators and their victims in Ghana. According to Anas, the Chinese women: "are lured here with promises of honest, well-paid jobs, only to have their passports and tickets confiscated... They are beaten and threatened with a high debt to be repaid only through the sale of their bodies."⁵⁰

Though such activity may be common among other nationals in Ghana, the current preponderance of several other acts of unlawful behavior by the Chinese, including galamsey, overwhelmingly draws local anger directed at the wanton disregard for the domestic laws and

regulations by Chinese nationals. In this regard, the response by the manager of a haulage company captures these sentiments: “I have been to Beijing, and I can say with complete certainty that there is no way I can get away with some of the things the Chinese do here in Ghana...They are taking us for granted by disregarding our laws and security services.”⁵¹ Such opinions reflect the palpable disfavor and compounding effect of recent unlawful Chinese behavior in Ghana.

Finally, the signing and disbursement of the three billion dollar Chinese loan was characterized by an impassioned discourse of fairness, timeliness and accountability of the loan agreement for Ghana’s struggling economy. Concurrently, as already stated, the heated and largely partisan debate in Ghana coincided with the growing dissent toward the Chinese galamsey activities across the country. With a goal of infrastructure development and investment in energy, the loan would have been a major complementary offer and attempt toward the deepening of Ghana-China ties. However, as the democratic processes of parliamentary debate, and questions from the media wrung out the details of the Chinese loan agreement, some argued that the loan was a bad deal from Beijing as the terms favored Beijing and exploited Ghana and its resources.⁵² Despite the contentious and partisan nature of the debate, with the opposition party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), taking a vehement stand by abstention from the vote in parliament, one factor that united a large section of the Ghanaian public in opposition to the loan agreement was mistrust toward a Chinese structured financial deal. The rhetoric from the opposition political parties and groups gained much attention and traction in the light of the Chinese galamsey crisis. Though the opposition could not immediately thwart the processing of the loan agreement, the loan payment stalled as renegotiation terms failed. As various political actors continued to debate about the stalled \$3 billion Chinese loan, President Mahama made an about face toward a rather familiar course of action—turning to the IMF for almost one billion dollar loan that will certainly come with some restrictions and conditions.⁵³

Concluding Remarks

As Beijing continues to expand its resources and role in Africa, countries like Ghana will gain from complementary economic engagement, which includes the development of roads and other forms of infrastructure. Additionally, China’s emerging economy also serves as ready market for Africa’s natural resources. However, these complementary gains are often eclipsed by the local dissent and anger toward the competition between Chinese nationals and the locals in many African economies. Often, the nature of subnational China-African competition centers on the exploitation of critical resources like gold or oil in addition to the side-by-side competition for local market through general trade. The story of the inhabitants at Awaso and surrounding communities in the Western region of Ghana represents another emerging political economic discourse, which attempts to capture the nexus between local dissent and the foreign encroachment on crucial resources and market. However, the uniqueness in this case is underscored by the evolving complexity associated with China-Ghanaian relations, which has often been generalized and simplified by limited surveys and anecdotes in the Sino-Africa discourse. This article adds to a needed nuance in China-Africa research as it carefully and methodically offers some emerging insights through a country case study.

First, as China's effort to expand and sustain its activities in Africa grows and diversifies, so will Beijing's inability to control the myriad economic and political actors working in various African economies. In effect, this would endanger the brand that China has been assiduously trying to maintain in its economic and diplomatic engagements with African economies.⁵⁴ Furthermore, as these subnational actors related to China incur local anger and mistrust, as is the case of Chinese galamsey in Ghana, the resulting anti-Chinese sentiment often present huge diplomatic costs, as the masses in emerging African democratic polities pressure their governments to act. Secondly, most accounts of the anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa reported in the media often enable and urge Sino-Africa pessimism with lack of a clear emphasis on the connivance of local actors, making the reportage or research a tale of foreign exploitation of powerless or voiceless local dwellers.⁵⁵ In this particular Ghanaian case study, the role of local political and economic actors, specifically the alleged involvement of local traditional rulers and political representatives, underscore a less explored dimension in the development of accounts on anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa. To most of the locals interviewed at Awaso, the alleged collusion between Ghanaian political actors and their Chinese counterparts has further emboldened the galamsey operations, which led to the uncontrollable crisis in 2013 that necessitated the deportation of Chinese nationals from Ghana.

Finally, the Chinese galamsey crisis in Ghana and its attendant anti-Chinese fervor represent the impact of activities in the shadow of a competitively diverse international political economy – what Lee terms as “globalization from below” in developing economies.⁵⁶ In this particular case of China-Ghana relations, the involvement of Chinese nationals in galamsey is part of a broad account of the effect that sub-national elements have on foreign political economic relations among countries—emphasizing the effects of paradiplomacy in the developing world. At Awaso and surrounding communities in Ghana, different nationalities from various regions of the world—Europe, Latin America, and North America—are involved in galamsey activities. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of Chinese nationals in this unregulated activity has become one of the dominant issues that define recent China-Ghana relations. For the locals who are either negatively or positively impacted by Chinese galamsey this underbelly of globalization has certainly contributes to an already dichotomously aligned debate between skeptics and optimists of China's growing role in Africa. As appositely put by a manager of a haulage company at Awaso, “the Chinese galamsey issue in Ghana represents the pluses and minuses of China's role in our economy...here at Awaso, people like us have jobs because of Chinese investment in the main bauxite mine, but the involvement of Chinese nationals in galamsey takes away from this point.”⁵⁷

Notes

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1 Interview with a driver at Awaso, Western Region, Ghana, May 2013.

2 Vang 2008.

3 Shinn and Eisenman 2012.

- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ogunsanwo1974.
- 6 Shinn and Eisenman 2012.
- 7 Bates 2012, pp. 224-31.
- 8 Bienen and Herbst 1996.
- 9 Ndulu B. J. et al. 2008.
- 10 Bloomberg News 2012.
- 11 Michelmann 2009; Hess and Aidoo 2016.
- 12 Baah and Jauch 2009.
- 13 Lee 2014.
- 14 Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010. Also, see Quartey 2006.
- 15 Lee 2014.
- 16 Armah et al. 2013.
- 17 Hancock 2013; Chengcheng 2013.
- 18 Chengcheng 2013.
- 19 Interview with a hotel receptionist at one of the few hotels at Awaso May 2013.
- 20 Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2006.
- 21 Armah et al 2013, p.95.
- 22 Bloomberg News 2014.
- 23 Sanderson and Forsyth 2013.
- 24 Ghanaweb. 2014a.
- 25 During an interview at Accra, May 2013
- 26 Wayne and Hinshaw 2014.
- 27 Bax and Dontoh 2014.
- 28 Ghanaweb 2014c.
- 29 Modernghana. 2012; Ghanaweb. 2014c.
- 30 In interview with middle-aged woman at Awaso, May 2013.
- 31 Bloomberg News 2104.
- 32 Reuters 2011.
- 33 Aidoo and Hess 2015.
- 34 Xinhua 2013.
- 35 Chen 2016
- 36 Ghanaweb 2014b.
- 37 Hardus 2014.
- 38 An interview with investment banker, Accra, May 2013.
- 39 An interview with Chinese woman at Awaso, May 2013.
- 40 Rebol 2010.
- 41 Sautman and Hairong 2009.
- 42 Pew Research Center 2013.
- 43 Ghanaweb 2013.
- 44 Hille 2013.
- 45 Interview with a hotel receptionist at Awaso, May 2013.

- 46 Hutchful 2002.
- 47 Quartey 2006
- 48 Axelsson and Sylvanus, 2010
- 49 Lee 2014
- 50 Anas 2009.
- 51 An interview with the manager of a haulage company, Awaso, May 2013.
- 52 Modern Ghana 2014.
- 53 Bloomberg News 2015.
- 54 Hess and Aidoo 2010.
- 55 Hess and Aidoo 2014.
- 56 Lee 2014.
- 57 An interview with the manager of a haulage company, Awaso, May 2013.

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China-Democratic Republic of Congo Relations: From a Beneficial to a Developmental Cooperation

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Abstract: The relationship between China and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) relations provides a unique case to test China's win-win policy with African countries. A recurring question is how can a win-win partnership be realized between very unequal partners? China is a global power ideologically, economically, militarily, and financially. The DRC is known for its weak state characterized by years of instability and mismanagement. China claims to pursue a win-win relation with the DRC. The DRC's political economy has been dominated since 1885 by an economy of extraction built on the legacy of the Free State. According to this legacy, the DRC serves as an open source of capital accumulation for foreign powers. This pattern of colonial extraction, where the DRC is a source of cheap strategic mineral resources that serve the narrow interest of Western capital remains largely unchanged today. China entered the DRC with a promise to break with this exploitative economic relation. China has acquired financial and economic strengths, which it is using to position itself as an alternative to the West. The paper discusses whether or not a win-win cooperative relationship is possible between China and the DRC.

Introduction

China has become an important player in Africa's economic activities since the turn of the century. It is aggressively competing with the West for the control the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) huge strategic mineral reserves. The DRC is high on China's list of African strategic partners. The DRC is also aiming to attract China to help rebuild the country's infrastructure destroyed by years of colonialism, dictatorship, corruption, and war. China argues that its win-win economic approach and its non-interference in internal affairs of the DRC are the basis of relations between the two countries.

China-DRC relations represent a major shift from that of the West-DRC relations. China privileges economics over politics, and its promise of massive economic investment in infrastructure and mineral extraction is based purely on economic principles without political conditionality. China is a critic of the West's approach of linking economic support to the promotion of democratic principles and values, for it is a proponent of a home-grown political system. China believes the imposition of Western democratic values on Africa in general, and the DRC in particular, is one of the causes of political instability and economic stagnation. In an effort to set itself apart from what it considers as the West unequal political and economic relations with Africa built over centuries, China has set its Africa relations on the basis of what Chris Alden and Daniel Large call "Chinese exceptionalism." This

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a6.pdf>

exceptionalism is geared toward ensuring mutual benefit and win-win outcomes at the continental and bilateral levels.¹

The DRC is a dysfunctional state par excellence, lacking capacity to organize and conceptualize its future both politically and economically in a manner that differs from its past. China-DRC trade relations are taking place within the confines of a fragile Congolese state lacking in capacity to optimally benefit from opportunities that China brings. The DRC, after years of dictatorship and war, has been working with great difficulties to install democracy as a stabilization tool and a source of economic progress. The main challenge for the DRC is how to build a functional and responsible state without which every development effort whether internal or external is bound to fail. The question is: does the win-win as applied currently by China contribute to state building in the DRC?

The Strengthening of China-DRC Relations

China and the DRC are capable of maintaining a beneficial and interdependent economic relationship because they both have goods that they need to trade with each other. The main interests for the two countries in their relationship are clear. For China, the DRC is a secure source of strategic natural resources, market for its manufactured goods, and space for investment in infrastructure development. For the DRC, China is a source of finance and know-how for its infrastructural, and a source of manufactured goods. This is what China has called a win-win arrangement: “you give me the minerals I desperately need, and I build for you the infrastructure you need.” The DRC fits well into China’s trade policy of securing supply of minerals and energy products and encouraging export of finished products.

China offers considerable opportunities to the DRC, and the DRC is attracted to China for its civil engineering to help with the reconstruction of the shattered infrastructure. The DRC government sees China as an opportunity to help lift the country’s productive capacity, a source of funding for infrastructure development (road, railway, and mining infrastructure), and to strengthen public private sector partnership information and technology investment.²

The fascination with China has been about how it has succeeded in a relatively short period of time in moving so many of its people out of poverty and modernizing its cities so rapidly. For most Africans, the thinking is that because “China has managed to overcome so many similar problems, it knows what it is doing.”³ The economic transformation it has achieved is attractive, and the DRC wants to learn and benefit from China’s successes. The DRC’s fascination and increased cooperation with China are rational especially after years of failed Western imposed interventions. President Joseph Kabila’s model of development “la Modernité” is copied from China’s economic miracle, which is a result of China’s much vaunted priority of modernization. The admiration with China’s successes is fuelled by scepticism of Western development approaches, which many Africans have described as neo-colonialism and exploitative. Intensifying China-DRC relations coincide with China’s economic upswing on the one hand and an economic decline in the OECD countries on the other hand. The DRC has for a long time looked for opportunities to escape Western control.

Since the 2006 elections, President Kabila has worked “to demonstrate progress on the reconstruction of his country’s shattered by two decades of war.”⁴ The DRC’s expectation for China to help with reconstruction has been on the high side but trade between the two countries has been defined by mineral exports from the DRC to China. Minerals are the DRC’s main export to China. The DRC mineral potential, especially copper and cobalt, are

attractive and China wants a secured provision. In 2016, 67.5 percent of China's cobalt production relies on concentrates imported from the DRC.⁵ The table below shows the changing nature of China-DRC trade relations in terms of export between the two countries.

Table 1: CHINA-DRC Dollar Export Figures

	1991(million)	2003 (million)	2014 (billion)
China	63,24	25,420	1,362
DRC	5,08	26,300	2,823
Total	68,34	51,710	4,185

Source: Ntambwe 2016

In 2014, there were fourteen mining projects that contributed to the increase in exports from the DRC to China.⁶ The total investment for the mining projects was projected at \$3.72 billion, including \$320 million for a hydroelectric power station.⁷ These figures are expected to increase even more considering that Sicominis is planning to increase its copper production from the current 100,000 tonnes to 250,000 tonnes when the Busanga Dam starts to produce energy.⁸ Also, in 2014 China's total import of timber from Congo basin reached 2.9 million cubic meters representing 47.5 percent of the region's entire timber export, far exceeding the 2 million cubic meters entering the EU (equivalent of 33 percent).⁹ The recent DRC economic growth has been attributed to China's importation of minerals, mainly copper and cobalt. The DRC posted an annual average economic growth rate of 7.4 percent during the 2010-13 period and 8.7 percent in 2014, both of which are well above the average in sub Saharan Africa.¹⁰ These figures may suggest that China's impact is unquestionably positive. However, a closer look shows that the growth has not provided a significant level of employment jobless growth and it has not changed the poverty level in the country. The DRC ranked second in the Human Development Index (186 out of 187 countries) in 2014, and its per capita income, which stood at \$380 in 2014, is among the lowest in the world.¹¹

China's Ambition in Africa and the DRC

The rapid economic development China has experienced in the last four decades has shaped its appetite for foreign investment and political power in the world in general and specifically in Africa.¹² If China's aspiration is to become the world hegemonic power, the control of strategic spaces in different continents, as the United States has done, is imperative. The interest of China in the DRC is multifaceted and not, as it has been described, driven by a single motive — access to mineral resources.¹³ The DRC occupies a strategic position in China's geo-strategic consideration because of its geographic position, abundant arable land and mineral resources, huge forest reserve, and the size of the population.

The DRC is the fourth most populous African country with an estimated eighty-five million people. It constitutes a big market for Chinese finished products, with exports to the DRC including machinery, textiles, clothing, and consumer electronics. The DRC is also the second largest African country in land mass after Algeria. It is in need of reconstruction after decades of neglect and war. The DRC provides China an opportunity to benefit from massive infrastructure investment in roads, railways, energy, dams, river navigation, and airlines. The DRC is also home to abundant natural resources of various strategic

development considerations. These resources have undergone a long history of plunder and mismanagement, coupled with widespread strife caused by years of conflict. Despite this loss, the DRC still has vast untapped reserves of minerals that need to be optimized. It is estimated that the country's 2.3 million square kilometers of the national territory contains more than 1,100 different mineral substances.¹⁴ The World Bank estimates these mineral resources to be worth \$24 trillion, which is the combined GDP of Europe and the US.¹⁵

Apart from minerals, China is also interested in timber. The DRC has the second largest forest in the world, which has become a primary source of China's wood logs. The DRC is also possesses extensive arable land with rich rain seasons. It could play an important role in resolving China's increasing food insecurity, an issue with which China is increasingly concerned.¹⁶ China has already acquired 2,800 million hectares of land in the DRC to cultivate palm oil.¹⁷ China wants to export to the DRC its agriculture model by positioning itself upstream in the seed production and rice hybrid, research and development, and rural infrastructure.¹⁸ By investing in land and agriculture, China seeks food security for its domestic market. Clearly Beijing's larger interests in safeguarding economic development and increasing political influence drive China's emerging security interests in Africa.¹⁹

History of China's Relationship with the DRC

China has always maintained close and cordial diplomatic relations with the DRC well before the country's independence. During Africa's struggle for independence, China presented itself as a partisan of the world's oppressed and exploited. It is therefore not correct to see China as a newcomer and opportunist. Already in 1965, the Chinese Communist Party told the Congolese people: "They were not alone in their just struggle against capitalism. All the Chinese people are with you. All the people opposed to imperialism are with you.... American imperialism will be concurred."²⁰

China was a staunch supporter of Africa's liberation movements. China used radio programs, propaganda, books, and supplying arms to promote and support African revolts against colonial rule.²¹ China provided an intensive training sabotage, guerrilla warfar and political subversion to young Africans fighting colonial rule.²² In the DRC, China supported "the Simba rebellion" of July 1963 led by "Pierre Mulele."²³ China also supported Laurent Kabila when he created a secessionist Marxist movement, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in 1967. While supporting the rebellions, China also provided social support to the government of President Mobutu. Between 1970-1990 China supported Congo's government with small investments linked to education, science, culture, health, and social services.²⁴ In the education sector, China provided schoolbooks. During this period China also provided financial aid to the tune of \$3 million.²⁵ China also invested in agriculture focusing on rice in the Bumba region of Equateur Province.²⁶ In terms of infrastructure, China built symbolic buildings such as the parliament and the national football stadium. The relationship slowed down in the early 1990s due to increased political instability and the decline of the Congolese state.

Relations between China and the DRC regained new momentum when Laurent Desire Kabila took power in 1997. Considering the continued instability during this period, however, China followed an approach of slow penetration preferring to rely on individual Chinese traders to purchase copper and cobalt directly from artisanal miners in the DRC mineral rich Katanga Province. There was an influx of Chinese in the Katanga province in early 2000, which coincided with the commodity boom. By 2011, it was estimated that over

sixty of the province's seventy-five copper processing plants, around 90 percent, were owned by Chinese nationals.²⁷ In 2013, the two countries signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement amounting to of \$9 million which was given as a donation to the Congolese government.²⁸

China-DRC relations are epitomized by the Sicomines deal. Following the DRC's successful general elections in 2006, the Chinese government took a more proactive step to engage its government. This culminated in 2008 in a massive resources-for-infrastructure deal worth \$6 billion.²⁹ According to the deal, China will invest \$3 billion in mining and \$3 billion in infrastructure development—construction of roads, railways, hospitals, schools, and dams, as well as mine development. This agreement remains an emblematic step in the China-DRC relations. The deal gives China access to huge high-grade copper and cobalt reserves. China is expected to get in return 10 million tonnes of copper and 600,000 tonnes of cobalt. The \$3 billion to be invested in infrastructure will be repaid by the benefits from minerals. From 2008 when Sicominies was signed to 2014, the total expenditure on infrastructure development stood at around \$459.764 million.³⁰ In 2015, \$250 million was earmarked for infrastructure projects.³¹ At present the total spending on infrastructure is around \$750 million from a total of \$3 billion earmarked.

The DRC as a Failed State and its Implications

A failed state is a danger to itself and its partners. The DRC suffers from profound internal human, institutional, and structural weaknesses that prevent it from benefiting from the opportunities offered by China. These internal weaknesses are a manifestation of a weak, corrupt, and patrimonial state plus years of neglect and war. The DRC is incapable of planning, financing and building its own development infrastructure despite the abundant natural resources. Claude Ake in *Democracy and Development in Africa* writes:

the assumption so readily made that there has been a failure of development is misleading. The problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place. By all indications, political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to development.³²

Maybe neither the West nor China is entirely to blame if the DRC is failing to stabilize and develop. The DRC is simply too weak to maintain cohesive and sustained important trade or political relations. The lack of ideological orientation and the corrupt nature of its society allow for the state to be captured by both internal and external forces working in connivance. This nature of the state poses a great danger to Chinese interests in the country. It also opens an opportunity for China to exploit these weaknesses for its benefit. China cannot claim to be pursuing a win-win relation with the DRC by working with a corrupt elite that has no interest in uplifting its own people. China cannot pretend to have high moral standing when it deals with an elite that abuses and steals from its fellow citizens. China's approach to cooperation and doing business with the Congolese elite no matter what it may privately think about their virtues and conduct is an obstacle to a win-win partnership. There is no doubt that the choice as to whether the benefits of cooperation are widely spread among the populace or concentrated in the hands of a "happy few" will also determine the durability of the dynamics, at least in its current form. This is why China's principle of non-interference makes little sense.

While China enjoys accolades from the Congolese political elite, the overall population is turning its anger on Chinese citizens living in the DRC each time an opportunity presents

itself. Congolese have attacked Chinese businesses on at least two occasions. In December 2010, after the local team TP Mazembe lost to the Italian Club Inter Milan, mobs in Lubumbashi angered by the calls made by a Japanese referee who they had mistaken for a Chinese referee attacked Chinese businesses in the city.³³ Between January 19-20, 2015, following the attempt by the National Assembly to change an electoral provision which would have extended President Kabila stay in power beyond 2016, protests erupted that targeted and destroyed Chinese businesses in Kinshasa neighborhoods.³⁴ The Congolese people's dislike of the apparent support China gives to the regime of President Kabila was the motivation for their violence against individual Chinese. The unconditional character of Beijing's support for Kabila's regime is creating tensions in Congolese civil society that is anxious about the government's persistence in restricting the political space in the country as President Kabila attempts to retain power.³⁵ The motivation for violence is also about resentment by local businesses towards Chinese, who violate Congolese law by engaging in small businesses, reserved for locals. Congolese accuse the Chinese of "undercutting the prices of local producers and businesses," which put them out of business.³⁶

The violent attacks against Chinese who have chosen to settle in the DRC are an indication that China's claim of having established relations as equals with Congolese is more political than social and economic. It is clear China does not understand when Africans reject something because the Chinese Communist Party is used to suppressing its people's demands and freedom of expression. This point supports the view that "China's presence in Africa may be increasingly rejected unless the Chinese recognize the importance of taking into account what the majority of Africans want for their continent."³⁷ While in the short-term economic cooperation is helping China to secure mineral resources and market for its manufactured good in the DRC, it is not sustainable in the long run if the DRC remains dysfunctional. China should encourage and support the reconstruction of the Congolese state to create conditions that support its own investment.

Why China's Non-Interference does not Benefit the DRC

China's policy towards the DRC will make a difference only if it represents an alternative to the current corrupt management of the state and state-society relations in the DRC. It is a contradiction for China to suggest that it is helping the DRC through commercial ties and not paying attention to the importance of building vital democratic, functional, transparent, and accountable institutions that are supposed to manage the benefits of the same commercial ties. China cannot simply pretend that these problems do not exist or if they exist they do not undermine the win-win relationship. The weakness of the Congolese state requires that international partners pay attention to these soft issues. This is the biggest failing of China's "minerals for infrastructure policy" in the DRC. The only time a relationship of unequal partners' turns into a win-win relationship is when the dominant partner deliberately takes steps to empower the weaker partner to participate meaningfully in building ties that are mutually beneficial.

The opportunities offered by China are significant, but insufficient to help the DRC on a path to sustainable development. The main reason, as established above, is that the DRC is a failed state and lacks capacity to deal with China as an equal partner. The DRC will not benefit from the opportunities offered by China if the state is not reorganized in one way or another to function as a normal state with capable institutions where corruption is seen as a problem and not as a norm. Put differently, the internal weaknesses of the Congolese state

are an obstacle to China's win-win model. Despite claims by China that its relations with the DRC are built on a win-win model, in reality the DRC loses significantly because of internal weaknesses. These weaknesses include weak state capacity, corruption, instability, and lack of planning and poor management.

Corruption has been one of the fundamental causes of Congo's disastrous economic situation over recent decades.³⁸ China-DRC relations are not rooted in democratic, transparent and accountable governance. One cultural dimension that has undermined the state in the DRC is corruption and lack of transparency. As Bruno Hellendorff argues: "The mutually beneficial label of Sino-Congolese cooperation has nowadays become rather lackluster. Opportunities and challenges in the political, economic and reputational realms have not been similarly managed by China and the DRC, resulting in differentiated impacts which often proved detrimental to the African country."³⁹ China's soft power strategy must also entail the promotion of transparency and good governance, especially in fragile states.

Unless the Congolese state is fundamentally transformed and acquires sufficient capacity to design a China engagement policy that protects Congolese interests, the relationship will remain a one-way street. The Congolese government does not have a national strategy plan to facilitate and coordinate the relationship. In its current situation, the DRC is a recipient of China's policy. The argument here is that the massive Chinese investment in the DRC, especially in the mining sector, can only acquire a transformative agenda for the Congolese society if the Congolese state is empowered to play a central role in defining the nature and the direction of the partnership.

By supporting the reconstruction of the state we are not proposing that China transfers its model to the DRC or imposes itself on the DRC. China could support elements that could shape the transformation of the Congolese state by investing in building strong, functional, and transparent institutions; supporting social forces in an effort to increase constructive bargaining between state and citizens; and work to break the elite capture of both the economy and politics. The DRC has embraced liberal democracy, which it is struggling to consolidate. It will be suicidal if it attempts to abandon it now. China could support the consolidation of this system. Contrary to the system of balance of power with strong states that emerged from the Cold War, which dominated international security issues for some time, today the problematic has been replaced by fragile states and the threat they pose to global security. China cannot abdicate the responsibility that comes with being a superpower. The rebuilding of the Congolese state into a functional, transparent, and accountable institution with the capacity to negotiate and protect its interests is an imperative and a mandatory step toward the effectiveness of the win-win partnership between the two countries.

The China-DRC relationship rests on the flawed assumption that massive investment in infrastructure is sufficient to rebuild the DRC. Rebuilding is only possible if the state is capacitated in a way that it is able to play its role efficiently. Beijing's spirited defense of elite sovereignty certainly runs counter to the growing international consensus that political leaders cannot escape justice for violations against an emerging, if fragile, global norm.⁴⁰ This paper's contribution to China-Africa relations is the point it makes that for the DRC-China relationship to be a win-win one, China must adjust its foreign policy in a way that contributes to solving the fundamental problems that have kept the DRC dysfunctional and unstable, producing poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The point made here contradicts Jeffrey Sachs view that "Beijing's reluctance to interfere was an asset not a liability."⁴¹

Not a Win-Win Situation

The Sicomines deal epitomizes China-DRC commercial relations, for it presents a number of problems. First, it lacks transparency and equity. The Sicomines deal was signed in an environment of great opacity. It quickly created significant outcries from the Congolese and the international community. The secrecy surrounding the deal prompted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and local and international civil society to request that it be made public. The analysis of the deal shows that “it will increase the DRC’s potential foreign debt to an unacceptable level and the IMF demanded that it be reduced in size.”⁴² After a period of resistance, the two partners agreed. China revised its investment amount downward from \$9 billion to \$6 billion. This act vindicated the critics that the deal was largely unfavorable to the DRC. This reduction did not resolve the imbalance, however, but rather made it worse because the other dimensions of the deal were not revised in line with China’s reduced capital investment. Logically, the reduction of the capital investment should automatically lead to the reduction tonnage of minerals for China. As one Congolese expert explained:

The IMF intervention which changed the terms of Sicomines did more harm to the DRC than to China. The reduction from \$9 billion to \$6 billion investment “reduced the Chinese obligations by 33 percent and the infrastructure benefit to the DRC by 50 percent while China still get access to minerals worth over \$50 billion. . . .The reserves ceded to China under the first deal remained unchanged. China will still receive 10 million tonnes of copper and 600,000 tonnes of cobalt.”⁴³

In this case, the problem lies not with the IMF but the DRC. The IMF created an opportunity for the DRC to renegotiate the development agreement, but the DRC failed. This situation could only mean two things either it is symptomatic of a Congolese state that does not have capacity to scrutinize complex development agreements or a reflection of a state that has compromised its responsibility to interrogate the deal because of corruption. I think it is the combination of these two things. But it is China’s behavior that is shocking, because it also failed to help its weak partner to understand the imbalance inherent in the deal.

Second, Sicomines is not a departure from the type of mining contracts that the DRC has signed with western companies. Chinese companies through the contract have received required holiday, fiscal, and customs exemptions. We know that excessive exemptions deprive African resource rich countries from benefiting from their minerals. Fiscal revenues expected from deepened commercial ties with Beijing are diminished by tax exemptions granted to Chinese state-owned enterprises operating in the framework of the Sicomines deal and by Chinese private entrepreneurs operating mainly in the informal sector.⁴⁴

Third, “neither the Congolese nor the Chinese parties have properly explained how the minerals are to be priced, nor infrastructure is to be built and at what cost.”⁴⁵ The lack of clarity on the benefits that will accrue to the DRC and China is a serious concern. The available analysis of the agreement suggests that the Congolese government will lose out. The problem is that there has never been an internal discussion in the DRC on the political economy of costs and risks of this ambitious investment. The main benefit for the DRC government is that the deal has increased its bargaining power for its minerals by identifying other investment sources beyond the usual western investment.

Fourth, the deal includes a clause exempting the venture from any new laws that might be introduced by the Congolese government. It means that if the DRC changes or reforms its legislation, whether tax, custom, or environmental legislation or its mining code as it is currently doing, Chinese companies will be exempt. Linked to this, the deal also excludes the DRC from benefiting from any possible windfall taxes. Sicominex exposes the DRC's vulnerability to international finance.⁴⁶ It also exposes the Congolese government's weaknesses in negotiating development agreements and mining contracts and equally exposes China's claim to win-win partnership.

Fifth, China administers the entire Sicominex project. The DRC state company Gecominex, which is a partner in the project with Chinese companies, is a passive partner and plays no role in the administration of the partnership. Chinese companies make the decisions regarding operations, including production and exports, the importation of equipment, and deciding on the use of Chinese personnel.

The above discussion shows that the Sicominex barter deal, while a departure from the western model, has not fundamentally altered the colonial extractivism approach of the West. It is clear, despite China's rhetoric about a win-win relation, that this partnership reflects pure international relations where only the pursuit of interests matters, and in which the powerful partner asserts itself and dictates the terms of cooperation. China's intervention in the DRC is perpetuating the old extractivism approach that considers the DRC as reservoir of mineral resources to be accessed cheaply. The biggest problem is not for China but for the DRC, which has no capacity to define, engage and defend its interests.

There is no doubt that the roads, railways, hospitals, and schools that China is building are changing the DRC landscape. Unlike Belgium, which "built roads solely for the extraction and evacuation of resources in the DRC, China is constructing or rehabilitating roads that are suitable not only for the transport of resources but which citizens can also use to travel and trade."⁴⁷ As such the massive investment in infrastructure is "helping to alleviate supply bottlenecks and increase competitiveness."⁴⁸ The infrastructure development is supporting internal production activities and intra-regional trade. But, the approach where China is building this infrastructure using Chinese manpower is problematic. It is perpetuating the dependency syndrome and does not empower Congolese to own their development. China believes that Africans cannot build their own infrastructure and prefers to send its engineers and a strong army of unskilled Chinese labor to build roads and bridges, develop mines, and extract minerals. China's massive investment in the DRC has not been matched with capacity building of the Congolese. Chinese citizens run all major Chinese investments in the DRC. Generally, their investment is accompanied by a massive influx of Chinese citizens. In the process of building infrastructure, no efforts have been deployed to capacitate the DRC's public agencies such as the Roads Office, the Office of Urban Roads and Canalization, and the Office for Country Roads.⁴⁹ The use of imported Chinese labor, unstructured skills transfer, and lack of investment in the DRC institutions are among some of the factors that create scepticism about China's development approach.⁵⁰ The benefits of these mega infrastructure projects are diminished by the fact that most of the people who do the actual work are Chinese who in most cases repatriate their earnings back to China and eventually return home with their skills and expertise. As such, Chinese construction undermines sustainability and transformation of the Congolese society and undermines the win-win partnership. How China is treating the DRC differs from how it operates in other countries, suggesting that China does not have a standard approach. In Ethiopia the Huajian Group has opened a shoe

manufacturing plant in which Ethiopians are employed. In Tanzania Chinese private companies have created more than eighty thousand jobs according to the Chinese Business Chamber of Tanzania.⁵¹ These and other examples suggest that the nature of the state China is engaged with determines its behavior.

The Sicomines agreement is a thorn in a win-win partnership. It undermines it in all its dimensions. For example, one of the six principles that guide the Sicomines cooperation is the transfer of technology. This is not happening despite the claim that China is bringing technology and science to Africa. Contrary to what China is doing in other African countries, for example in Ethiopia where a shoe plant has been put in place and is exporting all over the world, in the DRC, it seems, China controls the technology it exports. IDS sums up this when it argues that “while the DRC economy benefits from improved infrastructure, the deal has resulted in closure of local civil engineering companies.”⁵² Chinese investment in the mining sector fails to satisfy key requirements if mining is to benefit the Congolese. These requirements are clearly articulated in the African Mining Vision (AMV).⁵³ They include: increased ownership, diversification, value addition (both downstream and upstream) to the minerals, community benefits, and environmental protection. The AMV envisages an African “knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyzes and contributes to the broad-based growth & development.”⁵⁴ It represents a paradigm shift away from the liberal foreign direct investment dependent and resource rent centered strategy that has governed African mining for decades. Whilst recognizing the need to improve the fiscal regime of mining, the AMV sets out a multifaceted framework for mineral-based industrialization and structural transformation of Africa’s mineral dependent economies. It also seeks improvements in mineral sector governance, including respect for and protection of human rights and the environment, and greater democratic engagement with and accountability of governments and mining companies to citizens. Unfortunately, the Sicomines deal has not integrated all these requirements, especially the need to use mining as a basis for industrialization. With the political support it receives, it has failed to consult adjacent communities as required in the country mining code; it has also been accused of polluting water. Yet, the DRC government has failed to question and sanction the company.

It is clear from the preceding that China-DRC relations, while beneficial to both countries, cannot be just and equal. As Alden and Large argue, “China’s exceptionalism is a modality of engagement that structures relations such that they may remain asymmetrical in economic content but equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing.”⁵⁵ A win-win relationship in which one partner decides the orientation of the cooperation is problematic.

Because of the interdependence that exists between China and the DRC one would have thought that it would be possible to have a far more complex relationship between the two countries than a straight A-B trade asymmetry. We are in the presence of an asymmetrical relation of power. According to Johnson and Ford, “asymmetrical relationship may exist when there is an imbalance in the relationship characteristics and one of the partners is able to dominate the relationship and influence what happens in it for its own benefits for a very long time.”⁵⁶ A complex relationship is only possible if the weaker partner, the DRC, with all its resources, has the capacities to define and defend its interests. The DRC due to its intrinsic weaknesses is unable to protect its interests, even to consolidate the gains from the collaboration. The DRC is massively losing in its trade relations with China. It is clear it is

not a win-win partnership. The insistence by China that it is, even in the presence of evidence to the contrary, is worrisome.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that China and the DRC are benefiting from established commercial relations. But the DRC's main challenge is not infrastructure development but rather state building. Without a functional state, the infrastructure being built will again collapse in a matter of time. The mega infrastructure that China is building requires a state to maintain it. For the win-win partnership to have any positive meaning for the majority of Congolese, it must also be judged on the progress that the DRC makes away from protracted conflict and bad governance that have characterized it since at least the late nineteenth century.

China has shown no willingness to help reconfigure the DRC state to become able to participate meaningfully in this relationship. China maintains close relations with the political elite and makes no effort to link its investment and the wellbeing of the Congolese people, which can only become a reality through transforming the nature of the state. In the current circumstances the only way for the DRC will benefit from its trade relation with China is if the state is reconstructed to some acceptable levels. What China could do, if it is genuine about the win-win partnership, is to deliberately desist from taking advantage of the DRC's weaknesses and instead invest in efforts to build its state capacity to engage and protect its interests in global trade.

China-DRC relations might be beneficial to both countries but do not represent a win-win relation. What the DRC needs now is a genuine partner that understands its weaknesses and is prepared to support its democratic transformation efforts by capacitating the state with human, institutional, and organizational capacity in order to ensure that it optimally benefits from opportunities being offered by external partners. China's relationship with the DRC would have to achieve simultaneously two things: support the building of a capable state and build an economy that is inclusive and sustainable. The crux of the argument is the following: as long as China does not help the DRC to achieve stability, the infrastructure development approach is not sustainable. China has built its development on the basis of consistent stability. China must help to guarantee stability through the strengthening of democracy by combatting corruption and promoting peaceful transfer of power.

Notes

1 Alden and Large 2011.

2 In 2010 China, through its Telecommunication Company ZTE, financed to the tune of \$35 million the DRC interconnection to optic fibre from the Atlantic Ocean to Luanda and Kinshasa.

3 Soros 2016.

4 Lee 2010.

5 Hellendorff 2011, p. 39.

6 Ntambwe 2016.

7 Ibid.

8 Sicomines is a development agreement signed by a consortium of Chinese state companies and the DRC state companies on behalf of the two governments. In this agreement China promises to build infrastructure for the DRC in exchange for minerals. The deal was

- signed in 2008. It took China until late 2015 to produce the first copper.
- 9 Green Peace 2015.
 - 10 World Bank 2016.
 - 11 Ibid.
 - 12 *The Economist* 2013.
 - 13 Salameh 1995.
 - 14 Kushner 2013.
 - 15 Ibid.
 - 16 Kane and Serewicz, L, 2001.
 - 17 Associated Press 2008.
 - 18 Luntumbwe 2011, p. 174.
 - 19 Thrall 2015, p. xiv.
 - 20 Anshan 2007, p. 71.
 - 21 "La Politique Etrangère" 1962.
 - 22 Ibid., p. 50.
 - 23 Pierre Mulele had undergone training in the Eastern bloc as well as the People's Republic of China.
 - 24 Richer 2008, p. 58.
 - 25 Banque du Zaïre 1971, p. 176.
 - 26 Ibid.
 - 27 Clark, Smith, and Wild 2008.
 - 28 *Le Congolais* 2013.
 - 29 It was signed between two Chinese construction companies and the DRC's state copper company.
 - 30 Ntambwe 2015.
 - 31 Ibid.
 - 32 Ake 1996, p. 1.
 - 33 BBC News 2010.
 - 34 Bangre 2015.
 - 35 AFP 2015.
 - 36 AFP & M&G Africa Reporter 2015.
 - 37 Shelton and Kabemba 2012, p. 24.
 - 38 Global Witness 2011.
 - 39 Hellendoff 2011, p. 8.
 - 40 Taylor nd.
 - 41 Reuters 2006.
 - 42 Lee 2010.
 - 43 Ibid.
 - 44 Ibid.
 - 45 Global Witness 2011.
 - 46 Hellendorff 2011.
 - 47 Marks 2007.
 - 48 Schiere 2011, p. 17.
 - 49 Ibid.
 - 50 Gu and McCluskey 2015.
 - 51 Ibid., p. 18.

52 Ibid.

53 The AMV is aimed at developing minerals for the transformation of Africa's economy. It is an initiative by Africa to ensure that not only does Africa make the most of its mineral resources but also that it moves the sector from its enclave nature to a comprehensive mineral-led development agenda that helps in Africa's economic transformation. See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

<http://www.uneca.org/publications/africa-mining-vision> (accessed November 3, 2016).

54 Ibid.

55 Alden and Large 2010, p. 28.

56 Johnson 2002.

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Zambia and China: Workers' Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement

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Abstract: This paper examines the role of civic protest and opposition politics in changing the dynamics of the relationship between Zambia and China at the top leadership and working class levels. It looks specifically at how the workers' plight became elevated to the top agenda and became a major issue for the two countries' diplomatic and strategic engagement. It takes the view that China does not always play the dominant role, but is at times compelled to engage in strategic negotiations to maintain a satisfactory relationship with African governments, suggesting that African countries have resources they can use to strengthen their bargaining positions at the negotiating table. The paper concludes that contrary to much scholarship, China does not always play the dominant role with African countries. It suggests that African governments, leaders and communities can and do actively engage in political and community actions that influence their relationships with China. The paper looks specifically at the role that workers' protest, opposition politics and civil society have played in changing the dynamics of the relationship between Zambia and China, at both the leadership and working class levels. On the basis of the Zambian case, it suggests that African countries have significant resources that they can leverage to bargain and advance their national priorities when negotiating with China and to exercise leadership in that relationship.

Introduction

Most analyses of China's foreign relations dwell on its strength and dominance in that domain, especially with regard to African politics. However, China is flexible and dynamic in its relationships with African states. Pádraig Carmody and Ian Taylor use the term "flexigemony" to capture the more dynamic interactions between China and a differentiated landscape of African politics.¹ Flexigemony denotes how "Chinese actors adapt their strategies to suit the particular histories and geographies of the African states with which they engage."² Corkin, using Angola as a case study, has shown how some African countries have been able to use China's involvement to grow their economies and bolster their political capital. Mohan and Lampert have revealed African agency beyond state actors.³ Large's work on China-Sudan engagement and Haglund's treatise both explicate in detail the dynamics of that relationship.⁴

Zambia has also been able to utilize China's engagement to strengthen its political status and elevate the plight of its workers. This paper looks at the role of Zambian workers and opposition politics in safeguarding workers' rights. The paper is divided into three parts: first, a

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brief history of China's relationship with Zambia and why Zambia makes an important case study in China-Africa relations; second, the role of opposition politics and the framework for analyzing Zambian workers' protest; and third, how the opposition party in Zambia succeeded in framing the workers' conditions as unjust, making them a central focus in the China-Zambia relations. This paper provides a historical framework for understanding the workers' protest and the role of opposition politics in elevating and improving workers' conditions. Rather than portraying the workers' response as weak and exclusively anti-China or anti-foreign domination, it provides a historical and theoretic understanding of both protest and framing concepts. The paper illustrates how the opposition party utilized the problem of workers' rights to its advantage by portraying the issue in a manner that threatened the relationship between China and Zambia. It framed workers' grievances and Chinese investments in a way that elevated them to the national stage, compelling the Chinese and Zambian leadership to recognize them as a threat to their long-standing relationship. The opposition used the workers' protests plight both to gain political power and elevate its own negotiating status.

An appreciation of the relationship between China and Zambia is essential to understand the threat posed by the opposition politics and the issue of workers' conditions.

A Brief History of Zambia-China Relationship

An appreciation of the relationship between China and Zambia is essential to understand the threat posed by the opposition politics and the issue of workers' conditions. Zambia has had a long relationship with China that dates back to its independence in 1964. Zambia established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 29, 1964, five days after gaining independence from Britain but the partnership became manifest after 1967. In 1971, China faced a major foreign policy challenge as it sought to be admitted to the United Nations. African countries played a critical role in the debate and in China being admitted. Zambia was one of the countries that supported the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Zambia supported Beijing's "One China" policy and co-sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution to restore Mainland China's seat on the Security Council. From this early stage the two countries demonstrated a strategic relationship.

The relationship between the countries has fluctuated from warm to lukewarm. Whatever the current conditions, China has maintained contact and the relationship has been one of the strongest in Africa. Zambia has been the beneficiary of one of the biggest Chinese projects on the continent, the Tanzania-Zambia railway line, which was built between 1970 and 1976 with an interest free loan from China of \$406 million.⁵ Even at the time of considering building the railway line, Zambia wanted to select who would build it. Zambia approached western lenders for financial support before approaching China. From the outset, China was eager to provide funding for the project, which, according to the major western lenders, was "uneconomical and unnecessary."⁶ However, Kaunda was deeply suspicious when the Chinese showed interest in assisting to build the railway.⁷ His suspicion stemmed from the Western assertions that communists only helped other countries in order to subvert existing regimes, and this was substantiated by Chinese Premier Chou en Lai's statement that "Africa was ripe for revolution."⁸ Kaunda knew that China had its own strategic objectives for assisting Zambia. China saw the building of the railway as an opportunity to assert its presence on the continent

and its status as a development partner. The railway line was a strategic and political project for both countries. Zambia needed the railway line to lessen its dependence on apartheid South Africa and China wanted to assert its presence in Africa.

During President Kaunda's tenure the Chinese government maintained high visibility in Zambia. China and Zambia enjoyed a warm relationship even during the Cultural Revolution when China's relations with other countries waned. Kaunda is quoted many times as referring to China as "all weather friend." China was attracted to Zambia because of the country's position and the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda.⁹ Zambia played a central role in the African countries' liberation movement and was in turn greatly impacted by other liberation movements. Having Kaunda, a well-respected world statesman, at the center was attractive to the Chinese government because of his stand on non-alignment and his personal philosophy of humanism. In 1967, Kaunda visited China, a trip that heralded the beginning of several personal trips and many by Zambian leaders. By 1990, President Kaunda had visited China four times and several leading government and party members from both countries had paid each other formal visits. These included high-ranking officials in government, military, and trade, plus students who studied in China. In the 1980s, Africa's importance to China declined due to the change in the Cold War politics and China's modernization period and so did its relationship with Zambia. China's policy towards Africa was reinvigorated after the June 4th 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, which provoked criticism against China's human rights record. China again sought Africa's friendship and the depiction after 1989 as being "the 'all weather' friends."¹⁰

Frederick Chiluba became the second Zambian president after defeating Kaunda in the 1991 election. Initially Chiluba campaigned to develop a relationship with Taiwan but he reversed his stance after the election when he realized how costly the move could be considering the large amount of money Zambia owed China. Chiluba's era emphasized privatization and economic liberalization, which corresponded to China's policy which had evolved from simply providing assistance to private economic engagement. From 1991, individual Chinese arrived in Zambia to set up private firms. In 1991, an estimated three hundred Chinese lived in Zambia.¹¹ Chiluba maintained strong ties with the Chinese government. He first visited China in 1993 as part of his Asian tour. In June 1996, the Chinese Deputy Minister for Commerce, Trade and Economic Cooperation, Liu Shanzai announced that China had given Zambia unconditional aid amounting to US\$21.6 million, including US\$18 million as a soft loan for rehabilitation and recapitalization of the Mulungushi Textiles joint venture in Kabwe. China also gave US\$3.6 million in non-project aid to Zambia.

In 1997, the Bank of China (Zambia) Ltd, a subsidiary of the Bank of China, became the first Chinese financial institution to be established in Africa. In another demonstration of the growing trade with Zambia, the Lusaka branch of the Bank of China in 2011 became the first in Africa to offer renminbi banking services, which means customers can conduct their transactions including deposits or withdrawals in the Chinese "people's currency" yuan (a unit of the renminbi). Chinese businesses operating in Zambia can use the currency amongst themselves to reduce the amount of commission paid when changing from the Zambian kwacha via the US dollar. The service was aimed at Chinese investors working in Zambia, but also Zambians importing goods from China. Following the strengthening of economic ties, the

Chambeshi Zambia–China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) was established in 2007 and became the first Chinese economic and trade co-operation zone in Africa. This was followed by the East Lusaka Multi-Facility Economic Zone that was inaugurated in 2009.

The Zambia-China negotiated relationship has yielded positive fruits and increased economic activity between the two countries. In 2016, China named Zambia as one of its major partners in Africa. Chinese ambassador to Zambia, Yang Yauming, attributed this status to the result of a cordial economic relationship developed through several years.¹² Meanwhile, China's status also rose to become Zambia's top investor in 2015. China became the main provider of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country with more than \$5.3 billion worth of projects and counting more than 280 companies.¹³ In the same year Zambia-China bilateral trade reached \$3.8 billion.¹⁴ Trade between the two has risen steadily from \$100 million in 2000 to \$1.45 billion in 2009 and doubled to \$2.8 billion in 2010. In 2010 Zambia's exports to China were \$1.46 billion and its imports were \$289.66 million.¹⁵ In 2011, Chinese investments in Zambia were expected to exceed \$2.4 billion. In 2012, China exported between \$600 million and \$700 million worth of goods to Zambia. Zambia exported about \$3.2 billion in goods to China, with copper as the major export product. The wide range of Chinese investments in Zambia include mining, infrastructure construction, agriculture and energy. For instance, a Chinese company launched the construction of the Kafue Gorge Lower Hydro-power project in December 2015. The 750 megawatts hydro-power station to be situated in Zambia's Chikankata district, about ninety kilometers from the capital Lusaka, is the largest investment in the country's energy infrastructure in forty years and will be the third largest power plant in the country.

Anti-Chinese Investments Protests in Zambia

While Zambia and China's economic and political relationship has grown stronger at the same time Zambia has been the scene of several workers' riots arising from poor working conditions and accidents, some fatal, in Chinese-owned companies. Among the most serious incidents was the explosion in April 2005 in which fifty-two Zambian workers were killed at Beijing General Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (BGRIMM), an explosive manufacturing factory near Chambeshi Mine. The explosion was a result of poor safety conditions. All the people killed were Zambians. None of the Chinese managers were hurt.

In a study published by Frazer and Lungu in 2007, out of 2,100 workers only fifty-two Zambian workers were permanent employees and unionized at Chambeshi Copper Mine which reflects only 2.4 percent of the Zambian workforce at the mine. The rest of the workers had neither medical nor pension benefits. However, all the 180 Chinese employees were on permanent contract. Also, only one Zambian was a part of the eleven-person senior management team.¹⁶ In March 2008, five hundred workers at Chambeshi Copper Smelter rioted over poor wages. Reports stated that the workers were earning as little as K291.00 (US\$78) per month and that Chinese management was allegedly not following Zambian labor laws. After two days of strikes resulting in two Zambians and one Chinese worker being injured, the Chinese management fired hundreds of workers.¹⁷

In October 2010, Chinese managers at the Collum Coal Mine in the Southern Province shot and wounded eleven Zambian workers over protest of low wages and poor working conditions. The wounded workers were hospitalized. The incident, which attracted global

attention, led to further concerns about the Chinese working in Zambia. President Rupiah Banda was drawn into the controversy and was caught in the middle. While he condemned the shooting and urged investors to follow the country's labor laws, he also warned against politicizing the labor issues. In direct reference to the Chinese, he said: "Let's be careful that we do not single out people. Everyday people are shot by Zambians, whites, Americans... we should not create a phobia against people."¹⁸ The Chinese embassy in Lusaka directed the Collum Coal Mine management to pay the medical bills for the wounded workers. The embassy also issued a statement saying that it expected Chinese nationals to strictly comply with the laws and regulation of the host country and to promote the social and economic development of the local community. The Chinese embassy also supported the Zambian side in investigating and dealing with the Collum Coal Mine managers, including helping to negotiate fair and decent salaries for the workers.¹⁹ The two governments attempted to hold the Collum management accountable for its acts and ensure workers' rights. However, problems continued at the coal mine. In 2012 workers at the mine protested when they were paid lower wages than the new minimum wage of \$220.²⁰ The incident resulted in the death of one Chinese manager. In 2013 the Zambian government revoked the three licenses of the Collum Coal Mine due to poor safety and environmental conditions, as well as a failure to pay mineral royalties and the mine was shut down. The mine only resumed operations in 2015 after promising to improve the safety measures.

Other protests took place in Chinese managed mines resulting in dismissals. In October 2011, Non-Ferrous Corporation Africa Mining (NFCAM) and JCHX Mine Construction Zambia, Ltd, summarily dismissed 2,000 mine workers for going on strike and refusing to resume work. The workers had been protesting for two weeks asking for across the board pay rise and improvements in their conditions of service. They were asking for a pay raise between US\$200 to US\$400 monthly. The management said they would give the workers an increase of US\$40. The government stepped in the day after the dismissal and ordered the company to immediately reinstate the fired workers. The minister for mines, Wylbur Simuusa, also met the Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCAM) management and employees to iron out the differences.²¹

Although the Zambian government through the Ministry of Labor and Social Services has attempted to inspect foreign factories regularly, it is hampered by a shortage of transport and personnel. Nonetheless, it tried to investigate the conditions that have provoked worker protests and strikes. In 2006, Southern Province Minister Alice Simango visited a Chinese coal mine where workers had protested against poor conditions. She was shocked at the deplorable and unsafe conditions of the mine and recommended that the mine be closed to protect human life.²² When conditions did not improve, the Zambian government suspended the licenses and the government took operation of the mine.

There have been other cases in which the Ministry of Labor decided to close businesses due to lack of safety and improper treatment of workers. An official of the Ministry of Labor reported that in July 2009 his department was forced to close a Chinese operation because of its "dangerous conditions." The ministry officials visited a lime-making factory, 27 km north of Lusaka, off Kabwe Road. "The structure was like a 'cave' of 35 meters long and 10 meters high. The people working inside the lime-making factory were exposed to high heat temperatures of 55-60°C (131-140°F) and noxious gases. There were about 405 people working in this extremely

hot environment, exposed to the gases. The workers looked 'white' (from the lime)."²³ There was no floor in the factory. Our department had no choice but to close down the operation," said the director of the Occupational Safety and Health Services (OSHS) department in the Ministry of Labor and Social Services, Kakoma Chivunda in an interview. He added, "The firm was deemed to be harmful for the people to work there."²⁴ Thus, we can see that workers' protests compelled the government to act and advocate for better and safer working conditions and better compensation for workers. The Ministry of Labor and Social Services at times closed factories due to non-compliance of the safety and environmental laws and poor labor conditions.

In November 2011, the first comprehensive study since Chinese operations began in Zambia in 2003 revealed that the worst human rights violations were committed by some Chinese-owned mining companies. The 2011 Human Rights Watch report entitled "You'll Be Fired if You Refuse: Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines" chronicles abuses in Chinese-run mines, including poor health and safety conditions, regular twelve-hour and even eighteen-hour shifts involving arduous labor, and anti-union activities, which violate Zambia's national laws or international labor standards.²⁵

Workers Demonstrate Against Chinese President

Although the catalogue of workers' rights violation is long, the Zambian workers, leadership and citizens have diligently sought to remedy the situation. There have been numerous protests against some Chinese investments and exploitation of workers, backed by the Zambian leadership's defense of workers' rights, challenging the prevailing assumption that workers are powerless, replacing it with the recognition that African workers can prod African government leaders to defend their rights.

The Zambian population demonstrated its most pronounced anti-Chinese sentiment when President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to Zambia in 2007. Although there had been protests against specific Chinese investments, the demonstration against President Hu was the most significant because it was against a foreign head of state and it was a national protest. Zambians in different parts of the country accused Chinese firms of exploiting local workers, exploiting the country's mineral wealth, and exercising poor environmental standards. Zambian workers planned protests throughout the country to express their displeasure at the way some Chinese entrepreneurs were ill-treating Zambians and having a negative impact on the society. Demonstrations included mounting road blocks to bar Hu's visit and showing placards to denounce the Chinese government. The Zambian government was compelled to cancel the Chinese premier's trip to the two provinces where heavy demonstrations were planned. Hu also faced protests on the Copperbelt where the fifty-two Zambian miners were killed in the Chambeshi explosion in 2005.²⁶

The Chinese president had previously dismissed the accusations that China was exploiting Zambian labor and resources saying: "China is happy to have Zambia as a good friend, good partner, and a good brother."²⁷ However the demonstrations Hu faced belied that notion. As Fraser and Lungu reported in a study of mining companies on the Copperbelt in Zambia, all the people interviewed, including residents, workers, commuters, government officials, trade unionists, and even the other mining companies complained that the Chinese investors were

paying very low wages.²⁸ The impact of the protests was to elevate the persistent workers' issues to the national and international levels. It forced the Chinese and Zambian government into a dialogue on the need for the two governments to be involved in ensuring workers' safety and appropriate compensation.

The Role of Opposition Politics

The classic view of the opposition's role in a democracy is that it should be a watchdog—and inevitably a critic—of government, checking the activities of public officials and holding them politically accountable.²⁹ Political parties sometimes achieve their objectives by being engaged in a fighting spirit and a readiness for political action and confrontation. It is the only avenue to institutionally organize around different views of society. In modern society, political parties in opposition have a crucial function in the state and future of governance in any particular nation.³⁰ In this case Zambia's opposition parties have at times played roles that favored improved workers' and citizens' rights. This section will provide a brief history of the workers' protest and opposition parties' roles in elevating workers' rights.

Historic Dimension of Workers' Protest in Zambia

This section provides a historic dimension to workers' demands for their rights starting from the early stages of industrialization in Zambia at the onset of colonialism. It demonstrates that workers' protest is not unique to the contemporary situation with Chinese investments. It also lays the ground for the utilization of protest theory and social movement as a framework to analyze the contemporary relationship between Zambian workers and Chinese investors. It includes the analysis of the role of leadership in protest. In this case it looks at the role that candidate Michael Sata, who later became president, played in the workers' protest.

Protest has long been utilized as a way of expanding democratic spaces and claiming rights in Zambia and other African countries. The Zambian population has been known to publicly protest when they felt that their rights were threatened. Workers as well as students at higher learning institutions have frequently taken to the streets to fight for their rights or to make known their stand on a particular issue. Public protests go back to the colonial era. The growth of nationalism in then Northern Rhodesia can be traced to the villagers' anti-colonial protests due to unfair working conditions and low wages. The Southern Province was the first area of friction between European and African farmers in the late 1920s.³¹ African farmers expressed their displeasure against Europeans who took their land for cash cropping and denied the local people's use of their traditional land, a situation that led to hunger. A few years later, the Copperbelt was the source of anti-colonial protest and labor grievances that fostered the country's nationalism.³² The grievances leading to the strikes included low wages, inferior housing, poor conditions and ill treatment of Africans by European workers. This led to the protest movements of the 1960's popularly known as the "Cha Cha Cha" movement, which engulfed most of the country until its independence in 1964. But even after the country's independence protests continued as a way of people affirming their rights and expanding their democratic space. More recently in 1990, the general population protested against the rise in mealie-meal prices after President Kaunda was compelled to remove state subsidies by the International Monetary Fund.³³ The protests led to calls for the president to step down and a

return to a multi-party system.³⁴ When Zambia's second president, Frederick Chiluba, attempted to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term of office, people protested daily in the streets until he abandoned that attempt. At one time more than 15,000 people from different political parties, churches, law association and civil society marched in protest in the capital city.³⁵

Framing Analysis and Workers' Protest

Social movement and protest theory is useful in analyzing the relationship between Chinese investors and the general working population in Zambia. Within social movement theory, framing has been recognized as a way that people identify and understand a given situation. It allows people to define a situation or a problem and it also gives people a sense that something can be done. Framing also plays a critical role in elevating the issue. Framing attempts to understand the way in which social movement actors create and use meaning or how events and ideas are framed. Frames are "action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement."³⁶ The importance of framing is its ability to shape the discourse around an issue. Successful social movements use three kinds of frames to further their goals.³⁷ The first type, diagnostic framing, states the problem in a clear and easy to understand manner; the second, prognostic framing, offers a solution and how it would be implemented; the third type is motivational framing or a call to action.³⁸

In the Zambian case, opposition presidential candidate Michael Sata's diagnostic framing defined the legitimacy of the Zambian workers cause versus Chinese investors and elevated the issue to the national level. He emphasized in his campaign the poor treatment of workers and the need to regulate foreign investments. In his diagnosis candidate Sata claimed that the Chinese investors were exploiting Zambians and the prognosis would be to elect him to control them. By emphasizing the nature of the exploitation and labeling investors in harsh terms, such as "infestors," he raised the issue beyond national boundaries. In terms of motivation framing, his call for action was for the Zambian citizens to vote for him as president. His slogans included "putting more money in your pockets" and a promise to control Chinese investors. Sata ran a long campaign for president starting in 2006, 2008 and 2011 when he was finally elected as Zambia's president. As Chinese investments and workers' rights became controversial issues he made them his central rallying issues. As president of the main opposition party, the Patriotic Front party (PF), Sata became the most vocal critic of Chinese investments. Throughout his campaign, he emphasized his opposition to China's investments because of their negative labor rights record, poor conditions of service, lack of adherence to environmental standards, and the fact that Chinese investors engaged in petty trade which eliminated the market for Zambian small businessmen. Although at times his criticism was undiplomatic and controversial he succeeded in getting the issue of workers' rights on the agenda of the Chinese government and Chinese employers.

As a result of his framing of the issues, China's relationship with Zambia was tested during his campaign and after his election in 2011. He managed to mobilize workers and engage a discourse related to anti-Chinese investments. Sata exploited the country's prevailing anti-Chinese climate that was arising from the frequent reports of accidents and poor Chinese labor relations. The areas that were more heavily penetrated with Chinese investments tended to

respond more favorably to Sata's anti-China campaign. "They're areas that are heavily penetrated by Chinese investment, which in turn generated nationalism and xenophobia that Sata has managed to exploit politically," said Laurence Caromba, of the Centre for International Political Studies in South Africa.³⁹ Although Sata lost the 2006 election against Levy Mwanawasa and the 2008 election against president Rupiah Banda, he got the highest number of votes in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, the urban areas which had been most affected by Chinese investments. In the 2006 election, Sata campaigned to force foreign companies to set aside 25 percent ownership for local investors. In his campaign Sata threatened to deport a large number of Chinese traders and casual workers for taking jobs which should be held by Zambians. He also called for the deportation of Chinese investors who were exploiting Zambian workers by paying them poor wages.⁴⁰ The result of the 2006 general election suggests that discontent among Zambians regarding the Chinese investments in Zambia led the majority of the voters in the major cities to reject President Mwanawasa in favor of Michael Sata who was opposed to China and Chinese investments. The election outcome showed that despite the cordial relations that exist between China and Zambia, resentment towards Chinese business people was widespread among Zambians.

Two years later in 2008, Sata campaigned again in a special presidential election after President Mwanawasa's death. Sata vowed to deport Chinese investors and to recognize rival Taiwan instead of the government in Beijing. Sata also referred to Taiwan as a sovereign state. Ironically, although China emphasizes a non-interference policy in the affairs of other nations, it interfered in the Zambian politics when Sata said that he would establish relations with Taiwan if elected as president. The Chinese ambassador to Zambia, Li Baodong, responded to Sata's pronouncements by threatening to cut diplomatic relations with Zambia if Sata was elected president. "We shall have nothing to do with Zambia if Sata wins the elections and goes ahead to recognize Taiwan," ambassador Li said.⁴¹ He also alleged that Sata had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Taiwan authorities to recognize them as a sovereign state if he won the election.⁴² The Chinese embassy also alleged that Taiwan had given Sata funding for his campaign. Sata denied the allegation and denounced China for meddling in Zambia's election. "China should not dictate to us who we should deal with."⁴³ Sata lost to Rupiah Banda.

Sata, however, campaigned again in Zambia's 2011 general election. For the first time in the two countries' relationship, China was unsure of its status when Michael Sata, its most vocal critic won the election. China had backed the incumbent president, Banda, who had promoted the Zambia-China relationship that had resulted in increased trade and direct investments between the two counties. However, in the 2011 Zambian presidential election, three major issues dominated the agenda: (1) ensuring the growth of the economy, (2) creating more jobs, and (3) dealing effectively with the Chinese investments to ensure local workers' rights and job security. Sata campaigned on curtailing Chinese investments and safeguarding jobs for Zambians. He also promised to "put more money in people's pockets." ⁴⁴ Sata was elected into office largely due to his stand on anti-Chinese investment. He projected himself as the defender of workers' rights and that the MMD government was not standing up for the Zambian people and workers' rights. Sata handily won the election.

Zambian-China Strategic Partnership

China was so concerned about the relationship that the Chinese ambassador to Zambia, Zhou Yuxiao became the first person to formally visit President Sata at the State House immediately after assuming the office. The Chinese ambassador who feared for the fate of his country's relationship with Zambia, read a congratulatory message from the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, who also stated that Zambia and China needed to continue with the good bilateral relations they had had for many years. President Hu emphasized that Zambia and China were involved in a "win-win co-operation" and he invited President Sata for a state visit China.

At the first meeting President Sata maintained his campaign stand but reassured the ambassador that Chinese investors were welcome in Zambia as long as they upheld the Zambian labor laws. He also called on Chinese investors to limit the number of expatriate workers they brought into the country along with their investments, as many Zambians feared that the Chinese citizens were taking over their jobs and their land. The Chinese ambassador promised that the Chinese investors would abide by all local labor laws; "It is my job to make sure that Chinese companies follow the law."⁴⁵ He also agreed with the president that hiring local workers was in the best interest for the country as well as being cost effective for Chinese investors.⁴⁶

The initial icy relationship between Sata and China began to thaw as the latter persisted and continued to negotiate China's position by promising the country goodwill and a "win-win" relationship between the two countries. President Hu continued to assure President Sata of his country's support and a more equitable economic solution for the two countries. According to Ambassador Yuxiao, President Hu wrote to Sata twice in thirty days to congratulate him and assure him that Hu's government was ready to work closely with the new Zambian government to promote friendly relations and cooperation between the two nations.⁴⁷ On behalf of the investors who had been at the center of the controversy, the Chinese ambassador pledged that they would be held accountable and that they would abide by the country's laws. The ambassador met the new president on September 25, 2011. One month later, on October 29, President Sata held a luncheon for Chinese investors at State House. This was a historic event, never been done before at such a grand level for Chinese investors by any previous Zambian president. It was even more surprising and shocking coming from a previously strong open critic of Chinese investors. The event was also held amid Zambian workers' protest of Chinese companies' working conditions. One week prior to the event, Chinese-owned NFCA Mining fired at least 1,000 miners at Chambeshi Copper Mines for participating in a strike protesting wages after about 2,000 Zambian miners had gone on strike a week earlier when the company reneged on a promise to raise their pay.⁴⁸ Some criticized Sata for "developing a soft spot for Chinese investors in the country whom he criticized vehemently during his time as an opposition leader."⁴⁹

The Chinese ambassador, Zhou Yuxiao, regarded the special luncheon as an indication of the high importance President Sata and the new Zambian government attached to China-Zambia relations. He used the opportunity to call on the Chinese business community to observe the country's laws and treat and pay the local employees fairly and decently. He stressed the need for them to actively undertake corporate and social responsibilities.⁵⁰ He also took advantage of the opportunity to highlight China's generosity to Zambia and promise more

needed assistance: “We shall use our development assistance, loans and investments to repair railway lines, build roads, bridges, schools, hydropower stations, power transmission lines, solar-powered and biogas facilities. We shall also provide more medicines and medical facilities, vehicles and scholarships.”⁵¹ In 2013, when President Sata made his first official visit to China, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for more favorable conditions for businesses and referenced the social responsibility role of Chinese investors, thus showing the need to talk about the critical issues between the two countries.⁵²

Perhaps the most significant individual action of President Sata’s government, however, was the increased minimum wage for workers who were not represented by unions such as domestic workers, shop employees and general workers. The government also increased salaries for civil servants with some getting as much as a 200 percent increase in their pay. The minimum wage for domestic workers was increased from K250,000 to K522,400 (\$50–\$100) including transport allowance. The minister of labor and social security, Fackson Shamenda, emphasized that the increases were only for non-unionized workers and were a fulfillment of the Patriotic Front’s government manifesto of “putting more money in people’s pockets.”⁵³

Conclusion

Protest theorists avoid a “success,” “failure,” or “outcome” orientation when it comes to the impact of the event but instead they focus on the aspect of consequences.⁵⁴ In this case, the Zambian workers’ protest actions led to national and international recognition of the need to ensure their rights. The immediate consequence of the protest activities was the change in the relationship between the Chinese investors and the Zambian workers. Candidate Michael Sata played a leading role in framing the issue and elevating it and keeping it constant. Although critics assert that President Sata became less vocal in his stand and took on a conciliatory tone towards Chinese investments when he became president, his earlier pronouncements changed the relationship between Chinese investors and Zambian workers. Protest theorists may view his later stand as establishment with the mainstream or co-optation.

However, even before he increased the minimum wage for workers, some companies had raised their workers’ salaries.⁵⁵ As an unintended consequence parliament took up the issue of foreign investments and the role of government in monitoring and regulating those investments.⁵⁶ Little discussion about Chinese and foreign investments was held in parliament before the protests by the workers and anti-Chinese statements of presidential candidate Sata. Framing the China-workers’ issue and taking it as his campaign platform made the opposition leader connect with the workers and defined his stand and his election.

Contrary to the belief that Zambia’s relationship with China would be weakened with Sata’s election, the two were drawn closer. The relationship between the Chinese and Zambian leaders was strengthened as they each recognized their strategic and economic dependence. This analysis illustrates China’s “flexigemony” and its strategy in dealing with a country according to its status. Although China has been branded as standing for non-interference in the affairs of other countries, it has in the case of Sudan, for instance, sent Chinese peace-keeping forces to the country. So in general, other African countries can take advantage of the Chinese flexigemony to negotiate for more attractive conditions for their people, knowing that China’s relationship with

Africa is also need driven. They can leverage their political and organizational resources to elevate their status at the international negotiation table. President Sata died in 2014, leaving China-Zambia relations in another tenuous situation. But when Edgar Lungu was elected president the Chinese leadership moved quickly to engage him. Less than two months after his election, the Chinese government invited him for a formal visit to China to address Asian leaders at the Boao forum. This is the same high recognition accorded to President Sata demonstrating the value the Chinese place on their relationship with Zambia. It is up to the Zambian government and other African countries to have clear objectives and strategies as they engage with China, to ensure that the engagement is indeed a 'win-win' relationship.

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Does Chinese Employment Benefit Africans? Investigating Chinese Enterprises and their Operations in Africa

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Abstract: The growing presence of Chinese enterprises in Africa has attracted public attention to their employment practices. Critics blame Chinese for not hiring local workers, paying low wages, having precarious working conditions, and providing little training. Addressing these issues, this article first examines the reality of Chinese companies' employment practices in Africa. Doing so reveals the diversity of Chinese enterprises' employment patterns and the reasons behind these patterns. The paper argues that the criteria for evaluating the benefits of employment are diverse and related to comprehensive social background. Efforts for improvement need to take various socio-cultural contexts into account. It is through mutual learning and the convergence of various cultural traditions that hiring practices can benefit both Chinese and Africans.

Introduction

Chinese enterprises have been rapidly expanding their business footprints in Africa. The bilateral trade volume between China and Africa has risen from US \$29.5 billion in 2004 to US \$221.67 billion in 2014, representing an average growth rate of 30 percent per year. China has become Africa's largest trade partner. The foreign direct investment (FDI) stock from mainland China to Africa reached US\$32.35 billion in 2014, over thirty-five times more than the figure merely ten years ago.¹ According to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)'s registration database, there were more than 3000 Chinese enterprises operating in Africa as of January 2015.²

With this backdrop of intensifying economic interaction, public opinions and media have paid special attention to the employment practices of Chinese companies in Africa. Much of this publicity is negative. Some observers express concerns—that Chinese companies prefer to bring a large number of Chinese workers to Africa and are unwilling to hire local workers.³ Ben Schiller reported that tens of thousands of Chinese laborers and engineers were imported to build infrastructure projects in Ethiopia, Sudan and other African countries. This makes the acute unemployment problem in Africa even worse.⁴ Others complain about low wages. The International Trade Union Confederation's Hong Kong Liaison Office (IHLO) suggested that Chinese companies' wage is among the lowest in many African countries and they usually pay less than other foreign investors.⁵ Another criticism is that working conditions in Chinese enterprises are problematic, often involving health and safety hazards and long working hours.⁶ For example, an explosion accident at the Beijing General Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (BGRIMM) 2005 killed 52 Zambian employees and provoked fierce resentment from

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a8.pdf>

the local community against the Chinese investors.⁷ Finally, doubts are raised about Chinese companies' contribution to the development of the continent's human capital. A World Bank research paper states: "Chinese firms tend to rely on their own low-cost labor and do not invest heavily in the training and education of African workers."⁸ Southern Africa Resource Watch also stated that "technology transfer to local people is not a feature of most Chinese investment."⁹

However, most of these comments are based on individual experiences or scattered case studies. Systematic research in this area has been scarce. To what extent are these perceptions about Chinese companies' employment practice true? Can we map out a precise picture of Chinese employment patterns? Further, do Chinese employment patterns contribute to Africa's own development and benefit African workers? Or do Chinese enterprises rather exploit Africa's cheap labor and bring damage to local communities? Below, this paper begins with investigating the nature of Chinese companies' employment practices in Africa and explores the reasons behind these practices. Based on the findings, it tries to analyze the benefits and harms of the Chinese employment pattern. The paper proposes that the evaluation of an employment pattern should consider not only employers' or employees' direct interests, but also a country's comprehensive social, economic and cultural development. Yet, Chinese enterprises, African workers, local governments and other related parties have different views on the reality of these broad issues. These diverging ideas often lead to conflicts and cause damage to both enterprises and employees. In contrast, when Chinese and Africans understand each other's visions and adjust their positions to converge, the cooperation can sustain and bring benefits to both sides. Therefore, I argue that mutual learning is the key to realizing mutual beneficial employment practice.

In order to present a comprehensive and precise picture, this article combines data collection with in-depth interviews and case studies. Data collected from various sources, including governments' statistics, enterprises' reports and research surveys, this author and other researchers. The information from all these sources, should be taken with caution. On the one hand, many African countries have not yet developed a regularized and effective system for collecting statistics. There may be over or under reporting. On the other hand, Chinese engagements in Africa are diverse and changing rapidly and simple classification often fails to reflect the complexity and dynamics of the reality. A contracted worker in a Chinese state-owned enterprise in Tanzania can have radically different meaning from a contracted worker in a Chinese private company in Ethiopia. Besides, since many Chinese companies are trying to adjust their operation to the local environment, their employment practices may constantly evolve and cannot be captured by a single survey. Whereas random reports may not be able to provide a clear overview of all enterprises, standardized data cannot describe concrete development of each company. Hence, case studies and individual narrations are often used to complement the data. They have been collected from field trips in nine African countries over the past six years. Occasionally, reports from second-hand literature will also be used. These individual experiences ought not to be generalized, but should be understood in their specific contexts. Records of the evolving paths of various enterprises are valuable in themselves, as they reveal the depth of a process which is not measurable by quantitative methods.

The following section begins by examining several overwhelming negative perceptions about Chinese companies' employment practices, followed by description of Chinese companies' efforts of improvement. The concluding section will summarize the mutual learning dynamics between Chinese enterprises and African communities.

Critiques on Chinese Employment Practice

Influx of Chinese Workers?

It is widely believed that Chinese companies tend to bring Chinese workers instead of hiring local people, but this claim is not supported by the available data. Though it is not easy to get the exact numbers of African employees in Chinese companies due to the lack of official statistics, occasional reports and various surveys can still indicate a general trend. In 2007, Angola Ministry of Finance published a report, which listed the composition of employees in thirty infrastructure projects realized by Chinese companies. Out of a total of 3136 employees, 1872 were Angolans, making up 59.7 percent of the entire work force. In this case, the proportion of Chinese workers is still relatively high, over forty percent, because of the pressing deadline of project completion and the lack of skilled labor in post-war Angola.¹⁰ In Ghana's Bui dam, the Chinese constructor Sino-hydro hired 560 Ghanaians and 110 Chinese workers as of July 2008.¹¹ The construction of Chinese-funded Imboulou dam in Congo Brazzaville involved as many as two thousand Congolese, four hundred Chinese and twenty Germans.¹² Employment statistics in five operating Chinese economic zones also confirms the trend (see Table 1).

Table 1. Number of Employees in China-Africa Economic Cooperation Zones (February 2012)

	Establishment year	Number of resident companies (signed)	Number of resident companies (operational)	Number of Chinese employees	Number of African employees
Egypt Suez	2000	49	38	Approx. 130	Approx. 1,000
Zambia Chambishi	2004	36	27	1372	7973
Nigeria Lekki	2007	26	6	n/a	n/a
Mauritius Jinfei	2009	n/a	0	n/a	n/a
Nigeria Ogun-Guangdong	2009	34	8	177	1619
Ethiopia Oriental	2010	12	6	Approx. 300	Approx. 3,000

Source: Bräutigam and Tang.

While the data discredit the belief that Chinese do not hire local workers, they do show that a large number of Chinese workers have recently been coming to Africa. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's (MOFCOM) statistics around 12,000 Chinese expatriates worked in Africa in 1990, this number grew to more than 40,000 in 1999, 114,166 in 2007, and 195,584 at the end of 2010.¹³ However, these numbers only included the companies and projects which were registered with MOFCOM. Most of them were large state-owned enterprises, whereas numerous small and medium-sized businesses were not counted. Xinhua, China's official news agency, noted in 2007 that there were 750,000 Chinese working or living in Africa "for extended periods."¹⁴ Today, some researchers estimate that the number of Chinese people working and living in Africa may reach two million. The sudden influx of so many Chinese into the continent may have led to the wrong perception that Chinese companies only bring their own workers.

The employment of local workers is both encouraged by governments and motivated by economic calculation. Combating against high domestic unemployment, many African countries have strict regulations on employing local workers and issuing work permits to foreigners. For example, Egyptian law allows one foreign employee for every nine Egyptians employed.¹⁵ Angola has a similar policy, requiring that 70 percent of a company's staff must be Angolans, though exceptions may be made for certain urgent public projects.¹⁶ In Ethiopia, only two expatriate residential permits are granted for every registered enterprise as of 2009.¹⁷ Even without governments' constraints, Chinese companies often think of hiring more local employees, because it can greatly reduce the labor costs. As the CEO of Huajian shoe factory in Ethiopia Helen Hai told me, "we have 200 Chinese expatriates now. It cuts our profit. We have to double the wage of Chinese workers to attract them to work in Africa. We hope to reduce the number of Chinese workers as soon as possible."¹⁸ This researcher's survey of 35 Chinese companies in Angola found that a MOFCOM worker on average earns approximately 60 percent more than his local counterpart. Yet, apart from salary, employing a Chinese requires more additional costs, including food, accommodation, one or two trips to China per year, work permit applications and extensions, and so on. Thus a Chinese employee actually costs three to four times more than a local employee.¹⁹

However, most Chinese companies have to bring a number of Chinese workers to Africa, at least at the beginning of their operations. First, Chinese workers are familiar with the companies' organization and process. They can put the enterprises into operation quickly, especially for urgent projects. Second, Chinese technicians are required to install and test the machineries, as most equipment is imported from China. Third, experienced Chinese workers can also tutor their local colleagues on the job. Through working together for a period of time, Chinese employees can demonstrate and transfer their work skills to Africans.

A decreasing number of Chinese staff has been evident in several cases. My survey in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) found that companies within their first five years were using Chinese for almost one-third of their positions, whereas for companies with a history of more than five years, the proportion of Chinese staff was down to 16.8 percent.²⁰ In Zambia's ECCZ, around four hundred Chinese and five hundred Zambians were employed during the early phase of construction, machinery installation and training, but the percentage of Chinese workers was down to less than 20 percent after the production process became stabilized.²¹ In

Ethiopia, China-Africa Overseas Tannery reduced the number of Chinese technicians from thirty-three to twenty-three within one year, as local engineers were promoted to the positions of supervisor.²² Huajian shoe factory moved even faster. It started operation in January 2012 with over three hundred Chinese. By July 2012, local workers had already replaced approximately one hundred Chinese expatriates.²³

It is clear that hiring of large numbers of workers and increasing the use of African labor are closely related to the business models of Chinese companies. Statistics show that by the end of 2009 Chinese investment in Africa was concentrated in mining (29.2 percent), manufacturing (22.0 percent) and construction (15.8 percent).²⁴ These sectors are usually labor-intensive. In addition, Chinese companies work in a more labor-intensive manner than their European and American competitors in these sectors. Consequently, Chinese investors need huge numbers of laborers, both Chinese and Africans. While it is financially compelling to employ more local workers in the long run, it is as well necessary to bring a considerable number of Chinese to implement the projects and train the local workers. Yet, quite a few African and Western critics are apparently unfamiliar with this Chinese business model of employing large numbers of Chinese and African workers at the same time, using Chinese to train African labors on site and then replacing the Chinese finally with Africans. They protest the sudden influx of Chinese workers without seeing the whole picture or the long-term trend.

Nevertheless, the Chinese and African perspectives are interacting and converging in the practice. For instance, by understanding that Chinese companies need a technical workforce to realize infrastructure projects for national reconstruction, Angola did not insist the 70 percent local employment quota at the outset. In certain sectors with high technical requirements, such as telecom and hydropower, Chinese staff even made up nearly 60 percent of the total workforce because very few qualified local engineers were available at that time.²⁵ Ethiopia also granted over three hundred visas for Huajian's technicians after its registration so that the company could initiate operation quickly and train local workers. Conversely, Chinese enterprises also seem to be influenced by local public opinions which demand more jobs for local people. Not only do they hire Africans according to regulations, but some of them in fact hire more Africans than stipulated by local regulations. Angolan statistics showed that Chinese companies in the agricultural, catering, and trading sectors filled nearly 80 percent of their positions with Angolans.²⁶ As noted before, the use of more local workers may also be beneficial for business development. That is to say, it's possible to realize mutual benefits for Chinese enterprises and local communities. Both sides just need to understand each other's interest and seek an economically viable approach together.

Low Wages?

In reference to the perception that wages in Chinese enterprises are low, unanimous answers are not presented in the findings of various studies. C.K. Lee reported that Chinese owned major company NFC Africa Mining Plc (NFCA) was known to pay the lowest wages among all major mining companies in Zambia. She also pointed out that low wage was the workers' major grievance in China-Tanzania joint venture Urafiki Textile in Dar es Salaam.²⁷ Andrew Brooks discovered similar situation in the former China-Zambia joint venture Mulungushi Textile, where Zambian workers' wage was hardly sufficient to cover basic needs of a family.²⁸

However, the 2011 World Bank survey in Ethiopia concluded that the average monthly salary for local employees in Chinese enterprises was 85 US dollars, about 13 percent above the estimated national average salary.²⁹ This research found from interviews in Ethiopia that there is broad diversity among Chinese investors. Some were paying as low as 35-40 US dollars/month to the workers on assembly lines, whereas others paid 100 dollars/month to technicians or 600 dollars/month to managers to attract them from other competitors. Hence, it is necessary to take a closer look at the reasons behind these differences.

Both Lee and Brooks regarded the low wages in Chinese enterprises as a result of casualization of employment, as previous socialist employment systems with high welfare conceded to exploitative capitalist business logic.³⁰ Casualization is an industry-wide phenomenon in Zambia, Tanzania and many other African countries. Yet, the Chinese enterprises are unique among the foreign investors because they themselves have recently experienced such transition. China's own market reform has been affecting its enterprises' employment practice in various manners. First, a few old Chinese enterprises, like Urafiki and Mulungushi Textile, were Chinese aid projects handed over to African governments. As both factories' operations ran into difficulty, Chinese partners were reintroduced to form joint-ventures in 1995. The change from aid to joint-venture was in line with the market-oriented reform of China's foreign policy.³¹ Consequently, the new Chinese owners immediately restructured the labor force. At Urafiki, the company only hired 1900 people out the previous 3-4000 workers. However, a large part of them were permanent workers and could not be laid off. The Chinese general manager Huang Lilan complained that these old workers "had obsolete ideas and low productivity," with the qualified production rate at merely 40 percent in comparison with 90 percent qualified production rate in China. The joint-venture had been running at a loss for almost every year since its opening. However, the workers' union still demanded a salary increase and more welfare. Huang felt that the workers' union did not care about the economic efficiency of the company, for they assumed that the Chinese would not let this "child of Mao and Nyerere" fail.³² The Mulungushi textile launched similar labor reform to reduce wage and welfare. But they were also burdened with hundreds of permanent workers and were unable to cut production costs low enough to become profitable. Meanwhile workers' unions continuously campaigned for higher salary. In this instance, the Chinese partner finally decided to close the factory in 2007 to stop loss.³³

Hence, low wages in the cases of Urafiki and Mulungushi reflected the problems during the transition period. The Chinese partners came with the mind of market reform, but they were met by African workers who still stuck to the moral economic standards and labor rights of the socialist period.³⁴ Since these were historical aid projects, the Chinese companies had to take the political aspect into account. These viewpoints are not able to reconcile with each other yet. Thus, the situation was unsatisfying for both sides. The managers cannot fully streamline the work force as they wished, while the oversized local staff are unable to earn the income they have come to expect. As the tension between employers and employees attracted harsh criticisms at both factories, they also failed to fulfill their diplomatic mission of enhancing Sino-African friendship. The persisting divergence brings benefit to nobody.

The Chinese newcomers do not need to reconcile with the past, but they do have their own challenges in Africa. Li Pengtao compared NFCA with other mines in Zambia to assess its labor

standards. When NFCA bought Chambishi mine in 1998, it had been closed for thirteen years. The reconstruction of the mine cost the company \$160 million, and all the employees were newly recruited. In contrast, the Swiss-owned Mopani and Indian-owned KCM bought mines that were already in operation with established salaries in place. To recoup the huge investment in infrastructure and training, NFCA initially paid considerably lower salaries than other mines. Yet, an annual increase was granted.³⁵

The same business logic can also be found among Chinese companies in Ethiopia. Huajian Shoe Company invested several million dollars to set up a highly mechanized factory. They recruited approximately eight hundred new workers and sent eighty-six of them to China for training. However, they paid their workers merely 600 Birr (\$35) per month, below the national average. There are also heterogeneous strategies among different Chinese companies. Friendship tannery and China-Africa Overseas tannery were both established recently near Addis Ababa and had almost the same processing capacity in 2012. The total investment of China-Africa Overseas tannery was 300 million rmb (\$48 million), of which 200 million rmb (\$36 million) was spent in fixed assets. The company boasted that it got the best effluent treatment system in Ethiopia and could produce more varieties of leather than any other enterprises.³⁶ Yet, the company paid a mere 500-600 Birr (\$29-35) monthly to the newly recruited laborers and additional 50 Birr (\$3) after three-month probation period.³⁷ In comparison, Friendship did not make a big initial investment. It had several rows of simple warehouses and brought machines which were just enough for current processing demand. The owner did not plan to build a factory with ISO standards or introduce advanced technology, as his factory merely does basic leather treatment to meet Ethiopian government's minimum export requirement.³⁸ He was more interested in getting quick return through leather trade.³⁹ While parts of the houses were still under construction, the factory already started to operate and export. Interestingly, they paid the workers relatively well in order to keep them working hard: nearly 1000 Birr (\$59) per month for inexperienced new laborers and 10000 Birr (\$590) for local managers.⁴⁰ The wage level was so high in Ethiopia that it attracted quite a few employees from other tanneries to come.

Managers of companies with low salaries like to use China's own experience to prove that temporary hardship is necessary for future development. Huajian's CEO Helen Hai told her Ethiopian employees to be patient and to have foresight when they demanded a raise. She reminded them that Chinese were also poor thirty years ago and it took time and hard work to finally become successful.⁴¹ A senior manager at Urafiki textile said "China's reform experience has taught us that you need sacrifice. Our own industrial enterprises have turned the corner from losing money to making profits by intensifying the labour process and reducing manpower."⁴² However, Africans have not accepted this kind of argument well. Six months after its operation, more than seventy of Huajian's eight-six trainees left the company. I was able to locate eleven former workers. They all listed the low wage as the key reason for their departure.⁴³ The laborers in China-Africa Overseas Tannery often left the company immediately after they received their wage, whereas those at the Friendship Tannery usually did not leave unless they were fired.⁴⁴

To summarize, Chinese enterprises in Africa have various salary levels, which are mainly decided by the companies' business models. Africans have differing attitudes toward these

models. It is not surprising that local people are eager to work for those companies that pay well and complain about other companies that pay less. Yet, even the companies with low salary levels may be beneficial to local communities in the long run, as they invest heavily in machinery and infrastructure. However, some of the Chinese enterprises require African workers to make the same sacrifices as Chinese workers did during the early stage of China's own development. Such attempts rarely succeed in Africa's social context, and the diverging expectations of various parties can result in a loss for all parties.

Poor Working Conditions?

Problems of working conditions are partly related to the issue of labor costs. To save costs, some Chinese companies reduce their expenditure on employees' welfare such as food, transportation, and healthcare. However, this cannot be simply criticized as exploitation or cruel treatment of African workers, since most of Chinese expatriates, including senior executives, live and work under similar conditions. Unlike Western expatriates who usually stay in exclusive villas and apartments, Chinese often sleep in barrack style dormitories. They work with local workers side by side.

Almost every Chinese views the harsh conditions as necessary costs for development. In the Huajian factory, over one hundred male Chinese workers and supervisors slept together in one room behind the workshop. When I met these young men, they had already stayed there for six months and would stay for another one or two years. They admitted that there was a lot of inconvenience in living, but it is not a bad thing for young people to "eat bitterness."⁴⁵ Rudewa Sisal farm was the second largest sisal farm in Tanzania and employed nearly one thousand workers. Its six Chinese managers all lived in one cottage outside the farm. They raised chickens, grew vegetables, cooked and cleaned by themselves after daily work. General manager Guan Shanyuan said that the farm, which had opened in 2000, was just barely able to break even and the managers wanted to save money to invest in plantation expansion.⁴⁶ The first general manager of Urafiki joint-venture recalled, "The living conditions, sanitation and housing for Chinese personnel were really terrible. Only in 2002 did we renovate the compound. We had the money, but at that time we wanted to uphold the principle of productive investment first, living conditions second. Bitterness, enjoyment later, this is our old Chinese wisdom."⁴⁷

Africans do not necessarily reject the thoughts of eating bitterness. While a number of local employees decide to leave Chinese companies because of meager wage and welfare, some workers move in for a brighter future. At Huajian, two young Ethiopians by the assembly line told me that they quit a company in Addis Ababa to work in this factory, even when they got higher salary in the previous company. They pointed to the roaring machines around and to their new uniform with Huajian's logo, "We can learn many things here: making shoes, using machines and also speaking Chinese. We feel safety for the future."⁴⁸ Likewise, an Ethiopian technician at China-Africa overseas tannery complained about its food and remote location, as he had to live in the dormitory. But he was still willing to work in the company because it had advanced machines that he had never seen in other tanneries.⁴⁹

Yet, when Chinese and local people have very different views on working conditions, tensions between employers and employees may rise. Especially in the mining sector, which

requires much attention to labor protection, the Chinese model often meets local criticism. Safety records in China's domestic mines are poor. Thousands of Chinese workers die in mining accidents every year as a result of lax regulation and ineffective implementation. When Chinese mining enterprises come to Africa, they find a different legal and social context. Consequently their conventional practices in China need modification. For example, after China Non-Ferrous Metals Company (CNMC) took over Zambia's Luanshya mine in 2008, there were on average three accidents per week. Chinese managers felt comfortable with this frequency, for it is much lower than that in China. It could even be seen as a model in China. But local employees were not satisfied, as the mine under the previous owner (a Swiss company) had only one accident per month.⁵⁰ When CNMC management discovered that Zambia's safety regulations were stricter and that workers had a stronger awareness of production safety, they began improving the protection measures correspondingly. Safety talks were introduced in early 2011. Personal protective equipment was first provided to contracted workers in 2008 and 2009, and later also provided to casual workers. Although there is still discord on several issues, Zambian miners widely acknowledge the Chinese management's efforts to improve safety conditions.⁵¹

The cases above demonstrate that the idea of making sacrifice for future development is not limited to the Chinese, but can also be found among Africans, albeit at a lower rate. The common view is achieved through a consideration of long-term economic benefits and an understanding of the importance of investment in productive machinery. The proper balance between profit for enterprises and benefits for employees is a question for all companies. However, the sacrifice of employees' benefits in Chinese companies may seem larger than in other Western companies. This is because most Chinese investors have limited financial resources in comparison to the Western multinationals, and their labor-intensive production model requires stricter control on costs per worker. Chinese companies tend to decide the financial allocation according to China's own experiences of development. This may conflict with local custom at times. In such situations, Chinese managers have to rethink the balance based on local socio-legal contexts. The balance between profit and welfare is thus related to a merger of Chinese and African perspectives.

Lack of Training?

As noted earlier, Chinese enterprises have urgent need for skilled local workers to replace Chinese expatriates so that they can save costs and prepare for long-term expansion. Companies have therefore launched various programs to train African employees. The most common form is on-site training. Experienced Chinese workers teach new African hires to start work through hands-on tutoring and gradually improve the new workers' skills in daily operation. Almost every enterprise employs this cost-efficient and practical method. Some hi-tech enterprises provide more systematic and standardized courses. Two major Chinese telecom equipment providers, Huawei and ZTE, have established a total of ten training centers across the continent. According to a Chinese government's official announcement more than 20,000 African technicians are trained by Chinese IT and telecom firms every year.⁵² Some companies also explore of cooperation/partnering with local schools and training institutes. For instance, CITIC group experimented partnered with an Angolan school to train carpenters, electricians and other technicians for its large-scale project of constructing a new neighborhood on the outskirts

of Luanda. The company provides funding and teachers to the school. In return, the students will work for the company after their graduation.⁵³ Some enterprises even send their employees overseas, mainly to China, for intensive training. Most notably, a Sino-Angolan automobile joint venture CSG sent fifty Angolan engineers to Henan province for three months in 2007 to become familiarized with the entire car assembly process.⁵⁴ As noted above, the Huajian shoe factory sent eighty-six Ethiopian workers in 2012 to its production base in Jiangxi province for two months to acquire the necessary skills to initiate operation.⁵⁵

However, the effect of the training is not always satisfying. First, some Chinese companies found that many African workers like to change their jobs after having acquired skills. Changjin, a Chinese tableware manufacturer in Egypt recruited about ninety local workers for training in 2006. Three years later, only twenty of them stayed in the company. The manager Liu Jianguo explained that the local workers are able to get higher pay in other foreign companies once they become skilled.⁵⁶ As previously mentioned, over 80 percent of Huajian shoe factory's trainees left the company soon after they returned from China. Though mobility of skilled labor is a common problem, the Chinese companies that pay low wages are particularly concerned, as they lack competitive financial methods to retain their workforce. As a result, some Chinese managers are reluctant to give advanced training to more local workers.

Second, in the training process, communication is a major barrier. Most of Chinese technicians do not speak English well, let alone French, Portuguese, Arabic, Swahili, or other languages spoken in Africa. They rely on interpreters to convey their ideas to local workers, or just use simple words and gestures to demonstrate skills. It is not surprising that the tutors and the apprentices often misunderstand each other. Local workers mechanically follow the gestures without understanding the point. They may easily make mistakes when situations change.

Third, the long-term effect of training is questionable. Historically, Chinese aid projects provided training to Africans. After the departure of the Chinese tutors, the trained local workers gradually deviated from or abandoned what had been taught as standard practice. Deborah Brautigam reported that in Sierra Leone the Chinese agriculture experts taught local farmers to level their rice paddies to create a uniform depth of water for the rice seedlings. When they were present, the Chinese experts objected to any land surface being above water. But people complained that this was "too difficult." Therefore, when the Chinese left, this agricultural practice was no longer strictly observed.⁵⁷ Similar situation can still be found in Chinese factories today. In China-Africa overseas tannery, Chinese supervisors have to sit in the workshop to monitor the workers to count pieces of leather in every process, for precise counting is crucial to the usage of chemicals and the quality of leather. "If I am not here to double check, they (local employees) will not be as careful in counting," said a supervisor.⁵⁸ In Huajian, the quality controllers in all production units are Chinese. Their task is to ensure the quality of each step of manufacturing process. They told me that the defects are often caused by failure to follow standard practice. For instance, some Ethiopian workers forgot to adjust their skiving machines appropriately at the beginning of every day and thus produced unqualified components.⁵⁹

The difficulty of maintaining the effect of training may partly be related to the communication barrier. As a Chinese tutor admitted, it is not easy to explain the structure of

machines, and some Chinese technicians even skipped a detailed explanation about machinery functioning due to the language barrier.⁶⁰ This means that African workers may not have sufficient knowledge about machinery maintenance and repair. As machines wear and tear, this shortcoming will increasingly affect the production. Additionally, an ineffective management and a lack of incentives may also contribute to the decay of the production system.

However, none of the above-mentioned phenomena is unique to Chinese investors. Enterprises from other foreign countries are also troubled with problems such as the loss of skilled employees, the difficulty of communication, and a lack of sustainability. These problems may be more obvious in Chinese companies because their investments are relatively new and some companies currently have strict control of wage level. While Chinese enterprises are actively promoting training and technology transfer to African employees, they still need comprehensive adjustment and integration to improve the effectiveness of training.

Improvement Measures of Chinese Enterprises

Training Local Managers

In order to truly develop a reliable local work force and promote the enterprises' integration with the local community, the Chinese companies have to modify their management of human resources comprehensively. Corresponding to the problem of high turnover rate, the priority is to retain the skilled local workers. Jack Hong, a manager of Hazan Shoes, which invested six million dollars to set up a factory in Nigeria, told me that the company had realized the problem of unstable local staff. Not being able to elevate the overall salary level, Hazan chose to identify a small group of core staff members and pay particular attention to their career development. According to Hong, these core workers were selected by their motivation for work, capability of learning and reliability. For the selected employees, the company provided higher wages as well as special opportunities for career development, such as promotion to management positions, company-sponsored education and other incentives. As the result, Hazan was able to keep a number of experienced local employees for more than five years.⁶¹ Likewise, Yang Xiao, the deputy manager of Chongqing International Construction Corp. in Uganda, told me that an Ethiopian employee in her company was working so well that the company promised to sponsor him to study at a university in China. The only condition was that he should return to work for Chongqing International after graduation.⁶² The Chinese managers hope that such prospects of long term development within the company can outweigh the attraction of short-term wage increase from outside and build local employees' loyalty.

With this small but capable core of selected employees, the Chinese enterprises can push forward the process of localizing the management. More and more Chinese companies realize that local workers can be better trained, supervised and managed by local managers, because the African employees are able to communicate with each other more effectively and convey information more precisely. Experienced Africans have already partially taken over the role of the Chinese managers, above all in sectors like construction, agriculture and manufacturing, for local management is especially helpful to organize and coordinate the large amount of laborers in these sectors. Meanwhile, in this process of management localization, the companies can as well monitor the management capability of the new African supervisors to ensure that they do

not loosen the control of the standards or compromise with other local workers. On the assembly lines of Hazan Shoes, I saw a handful of Nigerian supervisors organize the operations of about sixty local workers, whereas only one Chinese tutor was walking around to provide technical instructions. In Changjin Tableware in Egypt, I did not see any Chinese in the pressing and shining sections and only one Chinese instructor in the model forging section. Egyptians had already become master workers or team leaders in these sections. Yet, all the ten workers in the quality control section were Chinese. Liu Jianguo said that the company can have an overall control of the whole manufacturing process simply through inspection of the final products.⁶³ These two examples show that the training program extends from the pure learning of skills to the fostering of management capacity. In the transitional period of co-management between Chinese managers and African core staff, possible problems are tackled, local managers' capability is gradually enhanced, and the Chinese may phase out without causing big turbulence in operation.⁶⁴

In order to make full use of the respective advantages of African and Chinese management, some enterprises also experiment new organizational structures. A sisal farm in Tanzania which is wholly owned by the China State Farm Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC) has a two-tier management system. One tier, composed of seven Chinese executives, is in charge of planning strategy, as they are familiar with the principles and plans of the CSFAC headquarters in Beijing. The other tier, led by a Tanzanian general manager and various levels of local administrators, is responsible for implementing the strategies. Knowing the local society and environment well, they can ensure a smooth everyday operation of this farm with over six hundred workers. Both teams have their irreplaceable strengths and complement each other through close collaboration.⁶⁵

These efforts to improve the management effectiveness of the Chinese enterprises are still in the phase of experimentation. They need time to prove their success. However, the experiments themselves demonstrate that the Chinese enterprises through practices become more and more conscious of the complexity of the training and employment issues in Africa. Accordingly, the management style and the entrepreneurial culture of these companies are turning diverse and multi-dimensional.

Disciplined Organization

As Chinese enterprises are currently concentrated in labor-intensive sectors such as construction, textile, footwear etc., the Chinese style of industrial production is closely related to large-scale labor organization. Consequently, Chinese are also known for their work disciplines. The Chinese managers emphasize responsibility and discipline as the primary criteria for evaluating employees. The workers in the companies are expected to perform intense mechanical work on the assembly lines or construction sites. Everyday, a worker has to repeat a simple action hundreds or thousands of times. While this type of modern production organization has long been common in industrialized countries, many Africans have not yet directly experienced it on a large scale. The recent arrival of a large number of Chinese workers and enterprises presents lively pictures of modern industrial organization to the local people. The image of disciplined Chinese workers speaks about the feature of industrial labor organization rather than about a certain culture.

Nevertheless, the operations of Chinese enterprises bear more or less some unique cultural marks from China. Even those Chinese managers who do not perceive any difference between Chinese and Africans regarding hard work, they do criticize some local customs and want to replace them with Chinese conventions. Li Shusong of the CSFAC farm observed that many of the Tanzanian employees do not save money, but spend most of their salaries on drinking, which harms their health and causes instability in their life. For these employees that he viewed as imprudent, he stated, the farm has to provide additional healthcare and housing. In his view, what he described as problematic personal habits not only may bring more risks and troubles at work, but also increases the cost burden of the enterprises' welfare system. Therefore, together with his Chinese colleagues he actively persuaded the local workers to quit drinking and save money to establish a stable family.⁶⁶ The chairman of the Chinese Business Chamber in Tanzania, Zhu Jinfeng, also had his story of taking care of his employees' personal life. He advised his interpreter on how to make savings and plan future life so that this Tanzanian employee finally managed to buy land and build a house. In addition, he frequently asked about the education of the employees' children and gives extra supports for the kids to go to school.⁶⁷ In Uganda, Chongqing International has also set up scholarship for its local workers' children. When the children achieve good grades in the school, the parents can bring the transcript to the company for various amounts of cash prizes.⁶⁸

In these cases, the Chinese managers view the employees' private life as part of the business concern. Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese enterprises do not distinguish the professional life clearly from the private life. They regard the employees as members of a big family and pay attention to their lives outside the work places too. In China, it is quite common for a manager to arrange dating for unmarried young employees, to ask about fellow workers' family situation or to give suggestions on children's education. First, it was a conventional practice of the Chinese work unit (Danwei) system in the Mao era to merge work and private life; second, a pragmatic consideration of the Chinese managers is that a man cannot become a good worker if his whole life is disordered, because problems in the family life may greatly distract the worker's attention and energy. Furthermore, Confucianism also teaches that a person's private life can reflect her world view and general ethical attitudes. For example, a person who does not care about saving money for his/her family is usually not reliable for the company either. When the Chinese businesses come to Africa, they bring this type of family-style management together with the modern industrial organization and put emphasis on building personal relationship with the local employees.

Cultural Understanding

However, not every Chinese enterprise in Africa has established strong personal ties with the local employees. In some newly arriving companies, all the Chinese staff members live together in isolated dormitories. They only go out to meet their African colleagues during work. Even in lunch breaks, the Chinese have their own dining room and special meals. They have no interaction with the local employees other than work. The lack of communication leads to distance and misunderstanding between Chinese and Africans. In Angola, where many Chinese enterprises began operation just recently, there is another stereotype image describing Chinese expatriates as reclusive workers out of touch with the local community. A local manager in a

newly founded Sino-Angolan joint-venture felt that her Chinese colleagues were unwilling to talk to her, although they were sitting in the same office everyday,⁶⁹ Adeyemo Thompson, the deputy managing director of the Sino-Nigerian Joint-venture Lekki Free Trade Zone also recalled that the interaction between the Chinese and Nigerian staff members was terrible at the beginning of the project. The Chinese employees only reported to the Chinese managers and the Nigerians to the Nigerian managers. The company looked rather like two companies.⁷⁰

To be sure, the Chinese companies do realize the problem of distance and miscommunication. The lack of communication not only causes discord at work, but also affects the stability of local employees and hinders the enterprises' integration into the local society. A five-year-old Chinese company in the DRC, Congo-China Telecom, actually set up a special budget to organize parties for Chinese and Congolese workers to meet. Yet, a manager told me that the effect of such parties was very limited. Local workers preferred to get that amount of budget in cash.⁷¹ The difficulties suggest that the Chinese style family-like management cannot be simply applied to the African environment. Being unfamiliar with local language, culture and society, the Chinese newcomers do not have in-depth understanding of the local people's life and are thus unable to build appropriate personal connections with them. By comparison, in all the three aforementioned examples of family-style management, namely CSFAC farm, Zhu Jinfeng, and Chongqing International, the Chinese executives had worked at least for ten years in Africa. It was through a long period of observation and interaction that these Chinese were able to frankly discuss with the Africans about their personal lives and provide personal suggestions. If the local employees accept their advice to some extent, that's because they understand the workers' concrete needs and problems after long-term engagements.

Therefore, in order to introduce the Chinese style management into Africa, the Chinese managers must first learn about African cultures. The transplantation of the management model is not a one-way cultural import, but an interactive experimentation and adaptation of the modern entrepreneurial structure in the African context. Just as the training of African workers does not solely deal with technical knowledge, the learning of the Chinese enterprises is not limited to the activities within the workplaces. The training and learning are similarly long-term extensive experiments in socio-cultural practices. This means that no dramatic result will be achieved overnight. Continuous efforts in everyday business operations contribute to incremental and pragmatic mutual understanding.

The trajectory of various Sino-African joint-ventures reveals clearly the challenge and promise of the socio-cultural converging process. During the 1990s, some pioneer Chinese companies formed joint-ventures with African partners. But the outcome was in general lackluster. The huge gaps between both sides regarding management style, business idea and commercial interests frequently caused mistrust and conflicts. Due to the unsuccessful history, the Chinese chambers of commerce in some African countries explicitly cautioned the Chinese enterprises not to enter partnership with local companies unless they knew each other really well.⁷² However, the head of the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) in Nigeria, Chen Xiaoxing, had a different opinion. He thought that joint-venture can get more support from the local government and benefit the company's growth in the long run. Therefore, although he was aware of the risk, he decided to partner with the Lagos State

government to develop a gigantic project, Lekki Free Trade Zone. As noted before, the Chinese and Nigerian teams indeed did not know how to work together at the beginning. Nevertheless, realizing this problem, managers on both sides tried various approaches to increase mutual understanding. The experiments ranged from organizational restructuring to daily contacts like smoking together during the break. After four or five years of continuous efforts, the situation has improved significantly and the joint-venture has gradually become a functioning cooperation.⁷³ In spite of the slow and turbulent start, the Chinese and Nigerians have concretely learned how to communicate with each other through this process. This experience may prove to be an invaluable asset in the future.

Conclusion: A Mutual Learning Dynamics

Admittedly, the popular perceptions about Chinese enterprises' employment practices are not always unfounded. Chinese companies do bring many workers from China, a number of enterprises do pay low wages and control spending on working conditions, and the effects of their training programs are uncertain. It is also true that Chinese work for longer hours and attach importance to work disciplines. However, these observations are partial or imprecise. In spite of the influx of expatriates, Chinese companies create more jobs for local workers. Wages vary among different enterprises. Even those companies which pay low salaries may provide much higher salary in the long run. Some companies cut costs in welfare and living conditions in order to invest more in production machinery. Others failed to meet Africans' expectation of labor protection, as they were unfamiliar with local standards. Chinese companies are quickly learning to adapt themselves to the new socio-legal context. Enterprises also continuously emphasize the training of African employees and are trying to improve the outcome of their training programs. Simplistic perceptions cannot grasp the multi-dimensional and comprehensive nature of the employment practices.

How are the Chinese employment practices impacting Africa's development? The difficulty of evaluation lies primarily in choosing the appropriate criteria. Some may judge an employment pattern according to the success of entrepreneurial operation; some may consider more benefits for employees; others may argue that a good employment pattern ought to contribute to a society's overall development. Yet, it is not clear what makes good enterprises, good employees or good development for a society. Is it monetary gain or material abundance? Is it people's subjective satisfaction? Is it education, safety, health, family or other factors? Further, in which period shall we evaluate these factors? Short-term gains may not be sustainable, whereas long-term benefits often require temporary sacrifice.

Actually, the diverging evaluation standards are often the source of conflicts between Chinese and Africans. Chinese enterprises usually have established business models when they come to Africa. They also tend to borrow their management experiences from China for their new ventures in Africa. Although China is a remarkable success story in the world history of development, the transplantation of Chinese model in another continent proves to be highly problematic. Workers in certain African countries enjoyed relatively high welfare and rigid labor protection until recently. They are not yet ready for an abrupt decline of the old standards. Africans also have their traditional life attitudes, value system and social habits, therefore many of them have trouble shifting to the Chinese enterprises' criteria of economic efficiency and

disciplined work. The conflicting standards not only make it difficult to judge the impacts of employment practices, but also directly cause malfunction or even failure of Chinese business activities in Africa.

Hence, the evaluation of employment practice is necessarily related to the convergence of various perspectives and standards. Without consensus between Chinese and Africans on what should be good hiring practices, employers and employees cannot work together efficiently towards the same goal. As a result, the cooperation will bring no benefit to either partner. By contrast, when both sides are trying to accommodate each other to make cooperation possible, there is at least the possibility of providing mutual benefits to the related parties. Through cooperation, coordination of different criteria and goals is more fundamental and beneficial than implementation of any unilateral standards.

It is therefore essential for all cooperation partners to learn each other's standpoints, understand the socio-cultural backdrop behind them and modify each other's positions to form a consensus. The investigations above indicate that in spite of the obvious gaps among various partners' perspectives, the mutual learning process has been advancing as Chinese enterprises increase their engagements in Africa. Such processes often take place on enterprise by enterprise basis, but the patterns can be illustrated as follows. Chinese are learning to respect local regulations and conventional labor practices in their concrete engagement with African officials and workers. Equally, Africans are becoming familiar with the economic reasoning of Chinese companies by observing the evolution and effect of their operations. Africans are also gradually adapting their life style and habits to the needs of modern industrial production by working in Chinese factories. The learning from extensive interaction in continuing entrepreneurial operations proves to be practical and effective.

To be sure, the mutual learning process is far from being satisfactory. Much more communication and adjustment are required in various enterprises and on various issues. The learning is never simple or quick, as employment practice deals with fundamental economic and social structures in modern societies. As Marx noted, labor is the sole source of value creation; employment is therefore the backbone of every entrepreneurial activity. Employment practices naturally have to follow economic rules and serve the purpose of profit making. Additionally, hiring a person involves much more than merely calculating value, for it is an inter-human activity and also the primary manner of supporting individual and family life today. We also must consider that market globalization and transnational investments add more complexity to the employment practice with regard to diverse economic, political, social and cultural conditions.

The multi-faceted nature implies that there is no universal or absolute criterion to assess the benefits of Chinese employment practice in Africa. It is likely that such a standard would not emerge in the near future. The learning and convergence of various perspectives must continue its course. This paper has sought to demonstrate that different criteria of benefits can indeed be altered through mutual understanding. Consequently, two scenarios can characterize Chinese employment practices in Africa. One is that each side sticks to its pre-determined criteria of benefits and is not willing to change its position. This will inevitably lead to the failure of cooperation. The other is that both sides are willing to listen to each other and adjust their perspectives so that cooperation can go on. The cooperation does not only create economic

benefits as it strengthens both sides' competitiveness in the world market. It also offers an invaluable opportunity to communicate and interact further. This then promotes more cooperation and makes a sustainable virtuous circle of learning and working. By working together, the partners can understand different perspectives in depth and experience the benefits over the longer term. They can comprehend the benefits which were not clear to them. For instance, those who stressed employees' welfare can learn the long-term advantages of mechanized production and skill acquirement. Likewise, those who focused on economic efficiency may start to appreciate harmonious co-development with local community. In this sense, the key to achieving satisfactory employment practice is not to demand or wait for pre-determined benefits, but to actively discover benefits through mutual learning.

Notes

- 1 MOFCOM various years.
- 2 MOFCOM 2012.
- 3 Slabbert 2012; Gong 2007; Shelton and Kabemba 2012, p. 128.
- 4 Schiller 2005.
- 5 IHLO 2006.
- 6 IHLO 2006; Human Rights Watch 2011, pp. 33-38.
- 7 IRIN 2006.
- 8 Zafar 2007, p. 124.
- 9 Shelton and Kabemba 2012, p. 149.
- 10 MOF 2007.
- 11 Baah 2009, p. 99.
- 12 Reuters 2010.
- 13 Yin 2002 p. 6; MOFCOM various years.
- 14 Zhang 2007. "Shige Zhongguoren de Feizhou guishi."
- 15 An official in General Authority for Investment. 2009. Personal interview, Cairo, Egypt. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 16 Angola's Basic Private Investment Law, Art. 54/1; an official in National Agency for Private Investment. 2007. Personal interview, Luanda, Angola. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 17 An official in Ethiopia Investment Agency. 2009. Personal interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 18 Hai, Helen, CEO of Huajian Ethiopia. 2012. Personal interview, Dukem, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 19 Tang 2010, p. 354.
- 20 Ibid., p. 362.
- 21 Haglund 2009.
- 22 Ethiopian Human Resource Manager. 2012. Personal interview, China-Africa Overseas tannery, Sululta, Ethiopia. 16 July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 23 Chinese supervisor. 2012. Personal interview, Huajian shoe factory, Dukem, Ethiopia. 10 July (transcripts in author's possession).

- 24 China State Council 2010.
- 25 Tang 2010, p. 354.
- 26 Ibid., p. 362.
- 27 Lee 2009, pp. 111ff.
- 28 Brooks 2010, p. 121.
- 29 World Bank. 2012. Survey on Chinese Direct Investment in Ethiopia. Presentation on preliminary analysis. June.
- 30 Lee 2009, pp. 100-103; Brooks 2010, p. 123.
- 31 Bräutigam 2009, p. 198.
- 32 Huang, Lilan, General Manager of Urafiki Textile. 2009. Personal interview, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 33 Eliassen 2012, pp. 83-90.
- 34 Lee, 2009, p. 104.
- 35 Li, Pengtao 2010, p. 9. But Li mistook Chambishi for Luanshya, see Caixin Online 2011.
- 36 He Mingliang, Owner of China-Africa Overseas tannery. 2012. Personal interview, Sululta, Ethiopia. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 37 Tashuma, Ethiopian Human Resource Manager. 2012. Personal interview, China-Africa Overseas tannery, Sululta, Ethiopia. 16 July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 38 Ethiopia government has imposed punitive tax on export of semi-processed leather in December 2011 to encourage leather processing within the country.
- 39 Cui Yongqiang, Owner of Friendship tannery. 2012. Modjo, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 40 Getachew Tuta, Ethiopian manager. 2012. Personal interview, Friendship tannery, Modjo, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 41 Mulu Gebre and Feleke Tilahun. Former Huajian workers at Huajian shoe factory. 2012. Personal interview, Debre Zeit, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 42 Lee 2009, p. 106.
- 43 Former Huajian workers, 2012. Personal interview, Debre Zeit and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 44 Owner of China-Africa Overseas tannery. 2012. Personal interview, Sululta, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession); Ethiopian manager. 2012. Personal interview, Friendship tannery, Modjo, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 45 Chinese employees. 2012. Personal interview, Huajian shoe factory, Dukem, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 46 Guan, Shanyuan, General Manager of Rudewa Sisal Farm. 2011. Personal interview, Rudewa, Tanzania. September (transcripts in author's possession).
- 47 Lee, 2009, p. 105.
- 48 Ethiopian employees. 2012. Personal interview, Huajian shoe factory, Dukem, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 49 Mako, Ethiopian employee. 2012. Personal interview, China-Africa Overseas tannery, Sululta, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 50 Human Rights Watch, 2011, p. 52f.

- 51 Li 2010, p. 9; Human Rights Watch 2011, pp. 37-39.
- 52 Xinhua. 2010. "中国特使：中国重视与非洲在信息和通信领域合作." 29 January.
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-01/29/content_1522213.htm. [2012/10/17]. It should be noted that the telecom equipment providers do not solely train their own staff, but also the engineers of their subcontractors and their clients, namely the telecom operators.
- 53 CITIC 2009.
- 54 *Jornal de Angola* 2007.
- 55 Hai, Helen. 2012. Personal interview, Huajian shoe factory, Dukem, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession). Unlike training program supported by Chinese government, this kind of vocational training is funded and organized by enterprises. The program is also designed particularly for entrepreneurial operation.
- 56 Liu, Jianguo. 2009. Personal interview, Changjin Tableware Corp., Suez City, Egypt. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 57 Bräutigam 2009, p. 238. In fact, Sierra Leoneans have been growing rice successfully for centuries and have quite a sophisticated understanding of rice cultivation as Paul Richards (1985) has shown. The reason for the ineffectiveness of training may also be that the local farmers do not see special value of the foreign methods in comparison to their own traditional method.
- 58 Chinese supervisor of China-Africa Overseas tannery. 2012. Personal interview, Sululta, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 59 Chinese employees. 2012. Personal Interview and my observation, Huajian shoe factory, Dukem, Ethiopia. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 60 A Chinese tutor in a glove making factory. 2012. Personal interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 61 Jack Hong, Manager of Hazan Shoes, 2010. Personal interview, Lagos, Nigeria. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 62 Yang Xiao, Manager of Chongqing International Co., 2009. Personal interview, Kampala, Uganda. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 63 Liu Jianguo, Manager of Changjin Tableware Co., 2009. Personal interview, Suez City, Egypt. June (transcripts in author's possession)
- 64 Nevertheless, the final outcome of this strategy still needs time to prove. The Chinese aid project TAZARA in the 1970s also used this gradual phasing-out model, but the result in the end was not very satisfactory.
- 65 Li, Shusong, manager of the CSFAC sisal farm. 2009. Personal interview, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. July (transcripts in author's possession).
- 66 Li, Shusong, manager of the CSFAC sisal farm. 2009. Personal interview, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. July (transcripts in author's possession).
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- 69 Henda, Telma, Financial Manager. 2007. Personal interview, Sonangol Sinopec International, November (transcripts in author's possession).
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- 71 Kang Linghua, the director of public relations, Congo-China Telecom. 2007. Personal interview, Kinshasa, DRC. December (transcripts in author's possession).
- 72 For example, in Ethiopia. Ma, Xiaoqin. 2009. Personal interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. June (transcripts in author's possession).
- 73 Chen, Xiaoxing and Thompson, Adeyemo. 2010. Personal interview, Lagos, Nigeria. June (transcripts in author's possession).

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Chinese Traders In Kampala: Status, Challenges, and Impact on Ugandan Society

WARD WARMERDAM and MEINE PIETER VAN DIJK

Abstract: Chinese petty traders are the most popular and yet most controversial foreign population that most Africans meet and engage with on a regular basis. Although the quality of their goods is suspect, their contribution of affordable goods to some African societies is recognized. There has been much discontent directed towards them, especially by small traders, because they are seen as undercutting local traders, not contributing to the local economy, and only interested in short-term gain. This paper examines the role of Chinese traders in Kampala, Uganda and their contributions to that country's economy according to a number of economic indicators as informed by the survey that the authors conducted in Kampala in 2012. It also analyses the Ugandan government's attitude toward these traders, the policies it implements, and the prospects for further investment in Uganda.

Introduction

In 2011, shopkeepers in Kampala went on strike to protest among other things the increased competition from Chinese traders who were flooding the market with cheap goods and thus posing a threat to local businesses.¹ Local government officials added fuel to the fire by claiming that many Chinese traders were illegally engaged in business ventures, contravening the restrictions of their visas.² While many Ugandans welcomed Chinese investment, they insisted that this investment actually contribute to the socio-economic development of the country rather than purely benefiting Chinese interests.³

There has been a rapid increase in China's engagement in Africa in the last decade. In 1992, African imports from China accounted for 1.8 percent of all imports to Africa.⁴ By 2014, imports from China accounted for 17 percent of all imports.⁵ African exports to China increased from 1.7 percent of exports in 1992 to 21 percent of all exports in 2014.⁶ China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the continent has also increased rapidly. In 1996, China's FDI stock on the continent stood at \$56 million, by 2007 it stood at \$4.46 billion.⁷ FDI flows have also been increasing rapidly. From 2007-2008 the FDI flows increased by 81 percent.⁸ In addition there is also increased development assistance through concessional loans, grants, debt relief, infrastructure construction as well as scholarships, malaria research centers, medical teams, etc. This rapid increase in engagement from China has led to calls by many that Africa should develop a China policy. Coordination among the fifty-four African states

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a9.pdf>

is difficult, however, and effective bilateral relations with China seem to require coordination at the level of the African Union.⁹

The field of China-Africa research has in the last few years moved from broad macro international relations and geo-political studies towards country case studies, sector studies, and analyses of different Chinese actors engaged in Africa. There have been numerous studies on Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Sudan, and many other African countries, along with studies on China's impact in infrastructure, agriculture, trade, and other sectors. Finally, there have been analyses of Chinese state-owned enterprises, privately owned enterprises, and traders. This paper will focus on the last group, which has variously been called traders, petty traders, wholesalers, retailers, or migrant traders.

Chinese Traders in Africa

Traders are often the most common face of China's engagement with Africa for most ordinary African citizens. While Chinese employees of large state owned or privately owned enterprises work and reside in gated areas generally isolated from the African communities in which they live, Africans have daily interactions with Chinese traders and shopkeepers that have taken a prominent position in many African cities, town, and villages.¹⁰ These traders, while most visible, receive no support from the Chinese government and therefore do not represent China's "official" image. While the experience and perceptions of Chinese traders in Africa differ from one country to the next, there are some common trends. Chinese traders are perceived to provide low quality goods, compete with local traders, and only seek short-term gains to send back to China.¹¹ These issues have led to increased discontent among African citizens and businessmen. African authorities have, therefore, responded to popular demands for increased regulation. Foreign traders in Malawi, for example, are restricted to establishing business in the four main cities.¹² Botswana has drawn up a list of professions exclusive to its own nationals.¹³

Geda, in his study of China-Ethiopia relations, argues that the losers in the relationship are the small-scale clothing and footwear producers, while the winners are consumers and Ethiopian traders who import from China.¹⁴ Kernén provides a more positive reflection on Chinese traders in Mali and Senegal.¹⁵ He states that the organization of business communities and the ability of local business communities to put pressure on local authorities to promote the benefits of their business and curtail the negative impacts of Chinese business, has led to a generally positive business environment. Jauch and Sakaria claim that Chinese small traders provide little benefit to Namibia's overall development.¹⁶ This has led to widespread criticism of Chinese traders in the Namibian media. Based on this literature we seek to assess the role of Chinese traders in Kampala, the capital of Uganda.

The following presents summaries of studies undertaken of Chinese traders in different African countries including Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, and Senegal, noting the similarities and differences and concludes that it is important for the countries to draw policies stating where and how the Chinese traders should operate. In his study of Chinese merchants in Oshikango, Namibia Dobler argues that in fact Chinese traders are not so different from the itinerant traders of eighteenth-century Europe.¹⁷ He states that local producers find it difficult to compete with the cheap price of Chinese goods. He also notes that Chinese traders often do not reinvest their profits in the local economies. Dobler argues that the combination of these two factors has a damaging effect on local economies. Jauch

and Sakaria similarly claim that small-scale Chinese traders provide little benefit to Namibia's overall development.¹⁸ This has led to widespread criticism of Chinese traders in the Namibian media.¹⁹ Dobler states that Chinese traders respond to claims by stating that they provide employment opportunities for local residents and that they, unlike their Namibian peers, pay local taxes. With regard to re-investment in the economy Dobler finds that it is often cheaper for Chinese companies to import from China than establish local manufacturing, and Chinese businessmen are concerned over protection of their interests.²⁰

McNamee et al. conducted a survey of Chinese traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, and Angola.²¹ Their study shows the varying experiences and perceptions of Chinese traders in Africa. They found that 60 percent of Chinese traders in South Africa had been resident for more than five years and that more than half of those had been in South Africa for more than ten years. They state that South Africa is the only country in their study where there were Chinese traders who had been resident for more than twenty continuous years. It is also the country with the highest number of Chinese traders responding that they planned to remain for the long term. Nevertheless, Chinese traders in South Africa employed the lowest number of local workers, with an average of three. These traders in South Africa reported high levels of crime, corruption, and intra-Chinese competition as the main problems they faced.

Chinese traders in Botswana reported an increased sense of hostility towards them.²² They stated that recent legislation was passed that effectively barred Chinese small businesses in the clothing sector from renewing their licenses. McNamee et al. added that many Chinese traders had therefore stated their desire to return to China when they had sold off their stocks of goods. In Lesotho, none of the Chinese traders responded that they planned to stay for the long term due to high crime rates, poor education, and a low quality of life. They too experienced increased resentment directed towards them by the local population. For instance, McNamee et al. mentioned one Mosotho respondent who had worked for a Chinese company and who said that the Chinese presence was positive and that the Basotho mindset had to change as it was impeding entrepreneurship.²³ He added that the Basotho could learn a lot from the Chinese in terms of hard work and business and technical skills. The research underlines the importance of looking at the characteristics of Chinese traders and to what extent they are competing with local producers and traders.

Respondents in Angola had been in the country for only two years, which was the shortest amount of time of all respondents in the McNamee et al. survey.²⁴ These traders, although reportedly earning three times as much as they could in China, encountered the highest perceived levels of corruption and crime of all the respondents in the survey. They added that the Chinese embassy did not assist them. Chinese traders in Angola also noted an increased sense of anti-Chinese sentiment. Respondents in Zambia similarly felt more hostilities directed towards them, as riots in 2006 indicated. As in Botswana, they noted that there was legislation that would make owning their own businesses in Zambia prohibitively difficult. As in all countries in the survey, Chinese traders in Zambia stated that corruption and crime were the major problems they faced.

Cissé describes the situation of Chinese traders in Senegal.²⁵ He notes that these traders do not integrate into Senegalese society and instead form enclave societies as they do elsewhere around the world. They do not speak the local languages and only employ locals to negotiate on their behalf. Chinese traders often come from poorer socio-economic backgrounds and emigrate to try their luck. These traders often sell clothing, footwear,

kitchenware, accessories, toys, hardware, and similar products. Most traders complain of a lack of support from the Chinese embassy.²⁶

In a survey of Chinese investment in Ghana, Baah et al. described the loss of jobs and livelihoods in Ghana due to cheap Chinese imports that often outcompete locally made substitutes.²⁷ They found that local retailers complain that some Chinese companies were active in the retail sector, which in fact is reserved for Ghanaian entrepreneurs and that some Chinese retailers register as manufacturers but engage in retail.²⁸ Gadzala states that aside from the positive impact of (limited) job creation, infrastructure development, and access to affordable consumer goods, Chinese traders' comparative advantage through the business networks and enclave business nature are displacing Zambian traders.²⁹ Gadzala further argues that Zambia's weakness in implementing regulatory guidelines facilitates China's exploitation of the Zambian economy. He adds that although Zambia's immigration law requires immigrants to secure work permits prior to their arrival in the country, it is not observed until they are in Zambia. We conclude, then, that it is not only the presence of Chinese vendors that is significant but also the type of products they bring and to what extent these products are competing with local alternatives and hence local producers.

African Consumers and Criticism of Low Quality Chinese Goods

Criticism of the poor quality and low price of Chinese goods neglects the role of African consumers. The local demand for affordable products has led to the supply of low quality goods. In South Africa many local citizens are pleased with the increased availability of affordable consumer goods, though there were some complaints of the poor quality.³⁰ Chinese traders employ African agents to help identify consumer demands.³¹ Additionally, a rapidly increasing number of African traders are going directly to China to purchase their products for resale in their own markets.³² African banks working with their Chinese counterparts to lower the trade costs and ease access to the RMB further facilitates trade.³³ In Cameroon Nkotto found that Chinese businesses did not perform worse than entrepreneurs from other countries with regard to complying with local laws when appropriate monitoring systems were in place.³⁴

The African Research Institute (ARI) observes that many African leaders have failed to capitalize on the growth fuelled by China's and other Asian countries' demand for oil and hard commodities.³⁵ The ARI policy brief adds that African governments should do more to diversify their economies, channel investments to priority sectors, and demand greater skills and technology transfer in order to guarantee the long-term effectiveness and socio-economic development impact that increased engagement with China can provide. Sun et al. place the responsibility of guaranteeing the effectiveness of China's engagement with Africa on the shoulders of African leaders.³⁶ They argue that at the Fifth FOCAC Summit the Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015) was declared, but African leaders should take action on issues such as increasing African youth employment, improving attention to labor standards, and improving the transparency of environmental contracts.³⁷ ACET called on Rwanda to develop a more "proactive" policy to encourage investment in sectors such as ICT and agribusiness, in order channel this investment to achieve the government's Vision 2020 policy.³⁸ The literature shows that there is still much that African leaders can do to maximize the benefits to their citizens and economies of increased engagement with China. As shown by recent legislation in Botswana, Malawi, Kenya, and Zambia, however, African leaders are taking preliminary steps to protect their citizens from the adverse affects of

Chinese traders and potentially to maximize the benefits that Chinese traders can provide. We therefore conclude that it is important for African countries to develop policies to deal with Chinese retail traders and to specify in which parts of the country they are allowed to trade and what goods they can sell.

Chinese Engagement with Uganda

The Uganda Investment Authority states that trade volume between China and Uganda increased from \$156 million in 2006 to 222 million in 2014, with an annual growth rate of 42 percent.³⁹ Trade has increased, but there is a notable trade imbalance between the two countries. Shinyekwa and Othieno report that the trade volume between China and Uganda rose from \$16.5 million in 2001 to over \$251.2 million in 2009, while Ugandan exports to China rose from \$0.234 million to \$20 million over the same period.⁴⁰ This contrasts with Chinese exports to Uganda, which rose from \$16 million in 2001 to over \$231 million in 2009. The trade imbalance has risen from \$16 million in 2001 to over \$228.7 million in 2009.⁴¹ In their study of China-Uganda relations Obwona and Kilimani state that a reduction in the trade gap is unattainable in the near future.⁴² Shinyekwa and Othieno argue that Uganda has a very limited range of products that have revealed comparative advantage, and they indicate that the technology gap is one reason Ugandan products cannot compete with Chinese heavy industrial products, high-tech electronics, and processed products. China has recently extended further special preferential treatment to African goods exported to China.⁴³ However, Shinyekwa and Othieno find that Uganda only has a revealed comparative advantage in 234 of 4401 product lines with special preferential treatment. They argue that the government should develop more deliberate policy actions geared towards increasing the productivity of its exports to China in order to maximize the benefits of the special preferential treatment. They see the greatest potential lies in agricultural commodities, for China has well-known expertise and this is an area where Chinese investment is still low in Uganda. One Chinese respondent in our survey stated that a Chinese company had invested in agriculture but had not been successful. He wanted to invest in agriculture because he saw the potential but lacked the expertise and the network to do so.⁴⁴ The agricultural demonstration center that was being implemented by a private Chinese company informed us of their plans to consider entering the Ugandan market as a private firm after the project was completed.⁴⁵

In a similar vein, Allen and Baguma question the benefits to Uganda's economy of China's engagement given the increasingly large presence of Chinese traders and Beijing's support of investment in natural resources.⁴⁶ The former is the issue that will be taken in the analyses that follows. Of the forty-two companies interviewed in their survey of Chinese companies in Uganda, Warmerdam and van Dijk found that only three were engaged in oil, gas, and energy.⁴⁷ Of those three only one was engaged in oil and gas exploration. This state-owned company with a privately owned minority share had bought exploration rights from an Irish company. The Ugandan subsidiary of another of the three, although its parent holding company was engaged in the oil sector, was mainly focused on construction. The last of the three was engaged in hydropower as a subcontractor to a larger project financed by the World Bank and the African Development Bank. China's positive contributions include dispatching medical teams since 1983, building the Naguru Friendship Hospital and the Mandela Stadium, rice schemes, an ice plant, an anti-malarial drug donation, scholarships for Ugandan students, and provision of computers among other things.⁴⁸

Allen and Baguma describe the challenges that Chinese traders present to local businesses. Ugandan customers prefer cheaper more easily available products than those of local businesses, making it difficult for local businesses to stay afloat.⁴⁹ They add that Chinese manufacturers have also been pushing local producers out of the market through increased competition for the local market, local contracts, and high consumption of scarce resources such as water and power. Local unemployment is also said to have increased.⁵⁰ They question whether Beijing can find a way to balance the interests of the government elite and ordinary citizens.⁵¹ The pertinent question that gives the appropriate amount of agency to the African government is: “Can the Ugandan government find a way to balance its interests in its engagement with China in such a way as to maximize the benefits to Ugandan citizens, Uganda’s socio-economic development and the interests of the Ugandan elite?”

On July 7, 2011 animosity towards the influx of foreign traders reached a boiling point in Kampala. Shopkeepers went on strike for two days to protest rising fuel and commodity prices, the unstable exchange rate, and increased competition from Chinese and Indian businessmen who were flooding the market with cheap goods undercutting local business prices.⁵² Chinese traders have now replaced Indian traders as the primary target of African resentment and hostility.⁵³ In fact, traders interviewed by *Starbroek* said they had no major problems with Indians.⁵⁴ The Chinese traders were accused of hoarding dollars that they then sent back to China, having a negative impact on the exchange rate.⁵⁵ Ugandan Trade Minister Amelia Kyambadde pointed to Chinese traders in particular, stating that many came in on tourist visas but started trading and engaging in unfair competition with Ugandan traders.⁵⁶ Some Ugandan shopkeepers stated Chinese traders could help develop Ugandan markets as long as they were properly regulated, but others disagreed.⁵⁷ Many Ugandan businessmen and traders welcomed Chinese investment, but they also demanded that it should be real investment in productive industries to help further Uganda’s industrialization and socio-economic development and not simply an investment in retail and wholesale trade.⁵⁸ A survey cited in Seruwagi stated that of the one hundred and fifty Chinese enterprises surveyed sixty-five were engaged in wholesale and retail trade.⁵⁹ It revealed that many Chinese businessmen who had been licensed as investors had turned to petty trade. Of the one hundred and fifty enterprises, forty-four were engaged in manufacturing, eleven in gastronomy, and ten in construction. The survey found that all the companies employed more Ugandans than Chinese.

Methodology

The authors conducted a survey of Chinese companies in Kampala in July 2012. The sample consisted of forty-two Chinese companies, including both state-owned and private enterprises. The Secretary of the Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office (ECCO) provided an updated list for 2012 with thirty-one names of Chinese companies registered with the ECCO. Eighteen companies not on the ECCO list were also interviewed. These were observed or identified through conversations with Chinese companies on the ECCO list. Data was gathered for a total of forty-two companies. An interview schedule of eleven questions was used for the semi-structured interviews focusing on economic variables, the history of involvement and the problems Chinese companies are facing in Uganda. They also interviewed some Ugandan stakeholders and policy makers.

Characteristics of Chinese Companies in Uganda

Chinese companies fall under three different forms of ownership: state owned enterprises (SOEs), privately owned enterprises (POEs), and hybrids or mixed ownership companies. In Uganda 64 percent of the companies in the survey were POEs, 21 percent were SOEs and the remained were mixed ownership companies, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Ownership of Chinese Companies in Kampala, Uganda

Chinese enterprises in Uganda were mainly active in four sectors, namely construction, import, manufacturing, and wholesale. The construction sector was dominated by SOEs, although one POE and one hybrid were also engaged in construction. Companies from all three ownership forms were engaged in import. No SOEs were engaged in manufacturing in Uganda. Although it should be noted that an SOE engaged in the manufacture of consumer electronics has established an assembly plant in Uganda through its partnership with a Chinese POE. POEs dominate wholesale. See Figure 2.




Figure 2. Sectors in which Chinese Companies were Engaged

Figure 3 below summarizes some of the main characteristics of the Chinese companies surveyed in 2012 in Kampala. The y-axis shows the level of initial investment in millions of dollars. The x-axis shows the year the company came to Uganda. The bubble size indicates

the size of the workforce. The bubble line shows the form of ownership. For ease of presentation not all bubbles have been labeled. The figure shows that mostly SOEs had larger workforces and higher levels of investment; however there were also some larger private firms although their levels of investment were lower than SOEs. The figure also shows that more than twenty-five companies arrived after 2000, the year China's "Go Out" policy was launched. These are mostly POEs with small workforces. It is these companies to which we shall turn our attention next as these are the traders or wholesalers that have been causing the biggest stir and were the cause of the strike and riots in July 2011.




Figure 3. Bubble Chart of Investments, Size of Workforce, Ownership, and Year of Entry of Chinese Firms in Kampala

Are Chinese Traders Operating in and Competing with the Urban Informal Sector?

Before we conducted our analysis of the characteristics of Chinese traders an important issue needed to be cleared up, namely whether or not Chinese traders in Uganda can be considered as operating in or competing with the Ugandan urban informal sector. Definitions of the urban informal sector can be based on size (for example less than five to ten employees), location (in slums or on sidewalks or markets), or by some legal criterion (for example incorporated or not). Van Dijk noted that the process of formalization may have five dimensions:⁶⁰

1. Obtain legal status, implying access to government markets, but also more cost, for example because of the need to respect labor legislation;
2. Pay taxes, some or all, which may be expensive;
3. Comply with current regulations regarding commercial enterprises;

4. Obtain legal title or a formal arrangement for the use of the plot or building;
5. Other types of registration, for example with the Chamber of Commerce.

In the case of Chinese enterprises in Africa two criteria could be added:

6. Have the proper immigration documents, not a tourist visa, but a working permit for doing business in the country concerned;
7. Being registered with the Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office of China (ECCO) in the country concerned.

Considering these criteria, the forty-two enterprises for which we collected information would find it very difficult not to respect the first five dimensions in Uganda. They are too visible and too easy to identify in terms of escaping regulation, registration, or taxation. This does not mean, however, that some of the smaller Chinese traders or enterprises may try to neglect existing labor legislation. We also found some cases that gradually ended up in the informal sector because they no longer complied with some of the criteria mentioned. This was often due to overstaying visas or not obtaining the appropriate work permits. Nevertheless, the traders all responded that they were trying to obtain the necessary permits, indicating their desire to remain formal or to formalize.

Our conclusion is that it is not useful to analyze the Chinese enterprises in Kampala as informal sector enterprises, with all the theories concerning the constraints the enterprises are facing and their potential to develop.⁶¹ In fact, constraints for foreign enterprises are very different.⁶² Since African governments tax Chinese enterprises (although some enjoy tax holidays in the special economic zones for a period of time) and oblige them to comply with existing regulations and legislation, the dominant mode of production is not the urban informal sector. It seems more useful to analyze the development of the enterprises in terms of the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI).⁶³ While Chinese traders cannot be considered as operating in the urban informal sector, it can be argued that they are competing with the urban informal sector.

Characteristics of Chinese Traders in Uganda

The first issue that must be dealt with is terminology. Chinese traders in the survey have been characterized as wholesalers as they are meant to supply businesses rather than individual consumers. However, the more appropriate term is trader. This is, first, because they refer to themselves as traders. Additionally, although the retail sector was reserved for indigenous businessmen, many foreign traders, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani included, traded in the murky area between wholesale and retail. As has been mentioned above, there are accusations that Chinese traders in fact engage in retail. Similar accusations have been made in other African countries. As a matter of fact most of them started as wholesalers, but they sometimes ended up as retailers because they could not sell the quantities wholesalers normally sell.

Chinese traders sold a wide variety of products, including mobile phones, shoes, blankets, textiles, ladies accessories (bracelets, necklaces, belts, purses, etc.), electronics, and spare parts, as well as hardware. One product they did not sell according to the survey was pharmaceuticals, which seemed to be dominated by Indians and Pakistanis. The bubble chart in Figure 4 below provides a summary of a number of the general characteristics of Chinese traders in Kampala. It should be noted that the traders who did not reply with information regarding their investments were removed from the chart. The y-axis indicates

levels of investments in millions, the x-axis the year the companies entered Uganda, and the bubble size the size of the workforce. From the figure it can be seen that all traders entered Uganda after 2000, the year the “Go Out” policy was launched. The majority of them were small. Nevertheless, it seems that the average size was larger than the average for traders in South Africa as described by McNamee et al.⁶⁴ In terms of investment and workforce size it can be argued that these traders do not make large contributions to the local economy, although this is not always true since one trader invested more than \$2 million.




Figure 4. Bubble Chart of Investments, Size of Workforce, and Year of Entry of Chinese Traders in Kampala

A look at the turnover of these traders shows a slightly different picture. Again companies that did not provide clear information regarding their turnover have been excluded. The bubble chart in Figure 5 below follows the same format as the ones above. Two traders claimed they were making no money. One stated that this was because the Ugandan authorities had sealed or closed down his shop and warehouse, as he had not paid his taxes and was unwilling to do so.⁶⁵ The other was an old man who said that he never had any customers and his products were continuously stolen.⁶⁶ Two of the three traders who had annual turnovers of around \$2 million were shoe wholesalers, the other was a ladies accessories wholesaler. Two mobile phone wholesalers were not making more than \$300,000 in turnover per year. If these companies were all paying taxes, then they would be generating various degrees of revenue for the government. It should also be added, that if these traders were truly only engaged in wholesale their economic contributions should also be measured in terms of how much inventory turnover and how many employment opportunities they generated for their customers. Additionally, the mobile phones these traders sell have an economic impact beyond the taxes generated by their sale. Mobile phones provide users with access to information and facilitate efficient communication. These are two aspects that have integral benefits for users such as farmers, businessmen, and local traders.




Figure 5. Bubble Chart of Turnover, Size of Workforce, and Year of Entry of Chinese Traders in Kampala

A controversial issue related to China's engagement in Africa is the composition of its workforces, as Chinese companies are often accused of importing their own labor. The survey cited in Seruwagi noted that all the companies had workforces composed of more Ugandans than Chinese.⁶⁷ The survey conducted by the current authors in July 2012 corroborates the findings cited in Seruwagi.⁶⁸ While the majority of traders had workforces composed of more than 60 percent Ugandans, three had workforces of less than half Ugandans. Even more worrying is the fact that only one trader had more than 60 percent Ugandans in management positions. This respondent stated that as his Chinese colleagues had all been deported he had no other option.⁶⁹ In this sense, as far as providing higher levels of tax revenue on management salaries and allowing Ugandans to determine the economic engagement of the companies in which they were employed directly, these traders were contributing very little to the Ugandan economy.

In the interviews with traders we determined that they often came on tourist visas or acquired a visa upon landing. This is similar to Gadzala's findings in Zambia.⁷⁰ Chinese traders in Uganda would then try to convert their tourist visa to a work permit. However, Ugandan regulations about this are very clear. Work permits must be applied for and granted in the country of origin prior to arrival in Uganda.⁷¹ One trader reported that at least a third of all Chinese traders in Kampala were there illegally, either without work permits or having overstayed their visas.⁷² However, the traders would genuinely like to get work permits. One trader stated: "We feel that the Ugandan government is not giving us work permits for reasonable reason. We go there to get our work permits, and are willing to pay...and there are a lot of unofficial fees."⁷³ The application procedures can take very long, and this means that many traders overstay their visas. The representative from the Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office similarly stated that there was a lack of clarity about immigration policy. Some traders state that Ugandan government policy should be much clearer: "If you don't want us then don't give us visas to even come to Uganda."⁷⁴




Figure 6. Comparison of Workforce and Management Compositions (%)

Most traders were affected by the number of issues on the list in Table 1 below, although one trader said he considered some things on the list, such as corrupt officials or high taxes, not as problems but just the facts of life.⁷⁵ He added: “Some Chinese companies like to avoid the rules, but if you abide by local laws and regulations you will not encounter any problems with the government.”⁷⁶ For other traders the most important problems are getting visas, mentioned by 72 percent of traders, and corrupt officials, mentioned by 55 percent of all traders. Many were also afflicted by bureaucracy, shilling-dollar exchange rate fluctuations, revaluation of the Renminbi (RMB), unreliable local workforce, and theft by workers. There was also an increasing sense that Chinese were no longer welcome, mentioned by 27 percent of the respondents. Notable also is that the traders did not mention that Chinese workers were too expensive, likely because most employed their family members, or problems with import restrictions, indicating relatively efficient import procedures.

There was a general sense among the Chinese traders that they were being singled out by the police and the immigration and tax departments. There were numerous stories of traders being rounded up, even though they had the necessary documents and licenses.⁷⁷ Some traders believed that these roundups were used in order to solicit “tips” or bribes from the traders. All small traders agreed that they felt that the Chinese embassy and ECCO did not represent their interests, only the interests of large Chinese companies.⁷⁸ The majority of traders also had no faith in Chinese business associations. They were either not members, or believed that these associations just collected their contributions and supported only larger companies or people with the right *guanxi* (networks). Many traders, and respondents from other Chinese companies, however, felt that traders provided significant contributions to the Ugandan economy and society. As one respondent said, “Now local people can wear leather shoes, can afford to buy those shoes. This is because China provides affordable products.”⁷⁹

Table 1. Problems Faced by Chinese Traders

Problems	Percentage
Corrupt officials	55
Bureaucracy, inefficient officials	27
Re-valuation of RMB	27
Shilling-Dollar Exchange Fluctuations	27
Bank interest rates high	0
Bank interest rates irregular	0
Local workforce unreliable	27
Prices of local goods too high	0
Low skilled workforce	0
Workforce dissent	0
Local workforce lazy	0
Import restrictions	0
Fierce competition	18
Taxes too high	18
Workers steal things	27
Getting visas for Chinese workers	72
Chinese workers too expensive	0
Increasing sense that Chinese are not so welcome	27
Unstable investment climate	18
Limited market capability	0
Don't understand local procedures	0
Trade Unions	0
Negative image of China	0
No problems	9

Note: Respondents were allowed to give more than one answer. Figures are the percent of all traders who mentioned these problems.

Responses to Tighter Immigration Policies

Chinese businessmen are often displeased with the tighter immigration policies. Yang Zhengjun, chairman of the Uganda Overseas Chinese Association, argues that deportations harm Uganda's image in China. He urged the Ugandan government to reduce the investor threshold for visas and allow people who could not meet the threshold to remain in the country. There are Chinese businessmen and government officials however, who if not openly pleased with the stricter immigration policies, understand and support the Ugandan government's intentions. A Chinese embassy official commented that they did not really approve of the actions of some Chinese traders.⁸⁰ He stated that some of these traders were "stealing another man's rice bowl," a Chinese expression that means that these Chinese traders are taking away local traders' livelihoods. He added that they gave China a bad image, and he understood the Ugandan government's crackdown. Another official for the Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office of the Chinese Embassy similarly expressed his understanding of the Ugandan government actions. He stated, however, that he hoped these traders would act legally, invest more, grow and reduce competition with local firms,

and create employment opportunities.⁸¹ He added that since these were enterprises operating in Uganda the Chinese government had no control over them. A respondent from a Chinese enterprise also felt that these Chinese traders were “stealing another man’s rice bowl.”⁸² One manager of a Chinese company even went so far as to call these traders “the poison of China.”⁸³ This manager said that there is a difference in the contribution to the local economy between importing socks and manufacturing socks. He stated that he fully supported the Ugandan government’s actions. There were also more sympathetic voices, however, most notably from a man who started out as a trader himself and was now the CEO of one of the largest Chinese companies in terms of workforce size. He stated that 80 percent of the Chinese in Uganda were traders, competition between companies is always going to exist whether the Chinese are here or not, and Ugandans have this misconception that Chinese traders have access to cheaper products in China than Ugandan traders who go to China.⁸⁴ The owner of a Chinese factory, formerly a trader in Senegal, Cameroon, the DRC, and Uganda, was also sympathetic to the plight of Chinese traders and wholesalers in Uganda.⁸⁵

A number of successful Chinese entrepreneurs in Uganda started out as traders. The owner of one of the largest holding companies began as a trader just over a decade ago. He imported anything that he believed would sell well in Uganda, including bikes. A few years later he started a Korean restaurant. His business has now grown to include a security company, a bakery, a shoe factory, and a TV assembly plant. Another successful Chinese businessman who initially began trading in Cameroon and Senegal later moved to the DRC before coming to Uganda. When he first started trading in Uganda, he realized that the products he had imported originally for francophone Africa did not sell well in Uganda. He sought some private investors and invested a majority share himself in establishing an industrial zone on the outskirts of Kampala where he now has a shoe factory. He is establishing a steel pipe factory because shoe sales have declined. The two female owners of the largest furniture store in Kampala initially ran a restaurant with furniture as a side business in one of the unused rooms. Aside from their furniture store they were also engaged in real estate. Finally, the owner of a Chinese restaurant and hotel also owns a steel rod factory, a mattress factory, and a real estate firm and is engaged in mining, although he also initially was a trader.

Hope for the Future: Responsible Business Practices

A tripartite cooperation between the China Enterprise Confederation, the Federation of Uganda Employers, and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises established in 2007 aims to promote responsible business practices among Chinese, Ugandan, and Norwegian enterprises doing business in Africa. Specifically the program seeks to improve the understanding between Chinese, Norwegian, and African societies and enterprises by sensitizing employers on the importance of improving labor conditions and labor relations in Chinese, Norwegian, and African companies.⁸⁶ At their meetings experts are invited to give speeches clarifying issues such as immigration procedures and tax policies.⁸⁷ The Chinese Embassy in Uganda supports this initiative, as does the division of the embassy responsible for economic affairs, the Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office.⁸⁸

Conclusion

This paper has shown that there are many similarities between Chinese traders in Kampala and other African countries. Many arrive on tourist visas, without required work permits, applying for work permits or investor/business visas after arrival. Most traders employ only small workforces and have low levels of investment. In most African countries Chinese traders are accused of competing with local businesses. The Chinese traders, on the other hand, argue that they are also contributing to the local economy. They provide affordable products allowing greater numbers of Africans to gain access to goods such as consumer electronics and mobile phones. Although locals might complain of a poor quality of some Chinese products, access to them has benefits beyond immediate sales revenue. Consumer electronics and mobile phones provide access to information and facilitate communication, essential elements for improving business performance for farmers, traders, and businessmen alike. Corruption in the immigration service is hindering the effectiveness of immigration policies designed to protect indigenous traders. If this form of rent seeking continues then not only will indigenous businessmen continue to suffer, but Chinese traders will not plan long-term investments due to the perceived instability and corrupt investment climate, choosing rather to maximize short-term gains before moving on to more attractive countries. Our survey found that a number of former Chinese traders have become some of the biggest Chinese companies in Uganda, and they are investing large amounts of money, generating large turnovers, and providing a great number of employment opportunities. The Ugandan government should be careful in its policy design and implementation to balance the interests of its local businesses and the socio-economic development contributions that Chinese investors can bring.

No longer are African leaders simply opening their arms to Chinese trade and investment but rather are negotiating trade and investment increasingly on their terms. This paper has shown that there are policies in Uganda towards specific sectors and sets of Chinese actors—for example, changes in Uganda's immigration policy and a tougher enforcement of this policy. This indicates a trend similar to that found in new legislation in Botswana, Malawi, Kenya, and Zambia to curtail the negative impact of Chinese traders in Africa. This is a trend that is likely spread throughout Africa as governments seek to balance the benefits of foreign trade and investment to their local economies with support for domestic businesses and industries.

Notes

1 Ghosh 2011; *Starbroek* 2011.

2 *Starbroek* 2011.

3 *Ibid.*

4 OECD 2011.

5 TradeMap 2016.

6 *Ibid.*

7 Renard 2011.

8 *Ibid.*

9 Van Dijk 2009, p. 218.

10 ARI 2012.

- 11 See ACET 2009, ARI 2012, and Baah et al. 2009 regarding low quality goods and competition with local traders; Park 2009 for competition with local traders; and Dobler 2005 and 2009 and *Starbroek* 2011 for the issue of short-term gains.
- 12 ARI 2012.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Geda 2008.
- 15 Kernen 2010.
- 16 Jauch and Sakaria 2009.
- 17 Dobler 2005, 2009.
- 18 Jauch and Sakaria 2009.
- 19 Dobler 2005, 2009.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 McNamee et al. 2012.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Cissé 2013.
- 26 Ibid., p. 23
- 27 Baah et al. 2009.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Gadzala 2010.
- 30 Park 2009.
- 31 ARI 2012.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Sanya 2013.
- 34 Nkotto 2009.
- 35 ARI 2012.
- 36 Sun et al. 2012.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 ACET 2009.
- 39 Sanya 2013.
- 40 Shinyekwa and Othieno 2011.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Obwona and Kilimani 2007.
- 43 Shinyekwa and Othieno 2011.
- 44 POEL-ZG 2012.
- 45 The demonstration center was a Chinese development assistance project. AID-AGRI 2012.
- 46 Allen and Baguma 2012.
- 47 Warmerdam and van Dijk 2012.
- 48 Allen & Baguma 2012.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Ghosh 2011.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 *Starbroek* 2011.

- 55 Ibid.; POEN-LMF 2012.
- 56 *Starbroek* 2011.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Seruwagi 2012.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Van Dijk 2010.
- 61 De Soto 1989.
- 62 Warmerdam and Van Dijk 2012.
- 63 Dicken 2007.
- 64 McNamee et al. 2012.
- 65 POEN-DLTB 2012.
- 66 POEN-WS03 2012.
- 67 Seruwagi 2012.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 POEN-WKXDMP 2012.
- 70 Gadzala 2010.
- 71 See online accessed 20 January 2012 <http://www.immigration.go.ug/page/working-uganda>.
- 72 POEN-WS04 2012.
- 73 POEN-WKXDMP 2012.
- 74 POEN-WS04 2012.
- 75 POEN-WLA 2012.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 E.g. POEN-WWJ 2012.
- 78 POEN-WKXDMP 2012.
- 79 POEN-DLTB 2012.
- 80 GOVEMB 2012.
- 81 GOVECCO 2012.
- 82 HY-SAMH 2012.
- 83 POEN-LMF 2012.
- 84 POEL-ZG 2012.
- 85 POEL-Landy 2012.
- 86 CFE et al. 2012a.
- 87 CFE et al. 2012b.
- 88 As the speech by Jing Yanhui of the Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office at the meeting in March 2012 indicates (CFE et al. 2012a).

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The Image of Africa in China: The Emerging Role of Chinese Social Media

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Abstract: While the debate on Africa's image is sliding into two extremes in the Western world, either too desperate or too optimistic, China's narrative on this continent remains politically oriented and does not fit the fast growing economic and trade relationships between two sides. As the online social platform is gaining mass popularity in China, however, many new forms of information dissemination channels have been established focusing on various developments in Africa. The monopoly of information in the mainstream media represents new opportunities for the Chinese, especially those potential investors, to understand a more diversified Africa and a real China-African relationship, with the hope of avoiding investment failure and misbehavior. This paper first takes one of the traditional mainstream Chinese media as an example, to examine how limited it was when it comes to reports and news on contemporary Africa, giving a rather incomplete and sometimes misleading impression for Chinese migrants before their departure to Africa during the past few decades. It also analyses new social media in China and how it differs from traditional media in terms of ownership, usage, and impact. This paper finds that the new media is providing a change in the perception of Africa and the China-Africa relationship.

Introduction

China and Africa are both developing at a fast pace and consolidating their relationship with each other, constituting another pole of the world, as described by the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to the African Union in May 2014. China is taking a more active lead in terms of this relationship. Its investments in African infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing industry, mining, and trade have brought noteworthy positive impacts on the continent's social and economic development, but some of them have resulted in controversy and serious local debates due to the Chinese lack of knowledge regarding local customs, legal systems, and lifestyles. Thus how the Chinese perceive Africa and how they receive information about Africa has become a serious factor in this bilateral relationship's sustainable and mutually beneficial future.

The truth is that the vast majority of Chinese know little about Africa. A Chinese person may know Africa from his or her primary school textbook, especially the China-Africa friendship illustrated by the TAZARA railway and Ethiopia's patriotic defense that prevented foreigners from making it a colony. Even now when people are more interconnected by the

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a10.pdf>

Internet and various means of modern transport, the impression and image of Africa among the Chinese to a large extent remains unchanged as the continent is too far away, and the connections between it and China are still weak. While the relationship between the two sides has made a positive switch from political-oriented to business-led, under a wave of industrial product transfers from China to overseas markets, the management of Africa-China relations has remained largely the province of the Chinese government. Understanding the real nature of Africa as well as acknowledging China's previous involvement in Africa has become an urgent and desperately needed requirement for potential Chinese investors who are interested in this continent.

Until recently, there was a de facto monopoly of Africa reporting in China in that the major information sources on Africa-related stories were in the hands of several giant state-owned news agencies and media organizations. These agencies and organizations have been developing their Africa coverage in a more comprehensive and well-rounded way, but many challenges remain. It is still difficult to obtain accurate descriptions of the African realities as these sometimes collide with the official stance on China-Africa relations, which is a red line for the media. With the revolutionary development of social media, however, many new information exchange platforms on mobile devices have been established in China and among the Chinese overseas, which provides a golden opportunity to break this monopoly and to offer China another picture of Africa and China-Africa relations. This paper first analyzes the causes of the formation of the de facto monopoly of Africa reporting in China. It then moves on to discuss how new media, especially the We Media platform, is changing and having an impact on the media industry landscape in China. Last, the paper provides statistics and a case study to show how public accounts on WeChat are providing subscribers with more background and real stories about Africa and the Chinese in Africa.

Formation of the de facto Monopoly of Reporting on Africa in China

Reporting on Africa in China must be seen as a subject that is more related to China-Africa relations, rather than African stories only. This is not to suggest that the Chinese media does not report pure Africa stories, but rather that bilateral relationship stories are more influential and attractive to the domestic Chinese readership and audience as Africa is really far from China. In the initial stage of this bilateral relationship in the early 1950s, media coverage was more linked to historical decolonization and African independence struggles as well as to China's efforts to export and strengthen the socialist revolution on the continent. Mutual political support and trust was the spirit and backbone in this bilateral relationship. In later stages, however, especially after the 1980s and early 1990s, China's motivation behind its engagement with Africa was largely associated with the continent's natural resources. Consequently, it is now switching to the continent's unlocked market potential and industrialization opportunities.

Apart from breaking news generated from international agencies or China's Xinhua News Agency, African news in the Chinese media correlates with China's engagement and exchanges with Africa at various levels. Thus Africa's image in Chinese eyes is often intertwined with and reflected by its relationship with China in the present day. Also, the channel for learning about Africa was quite unified, and there was a de facto monopoly on reporting about Africa in China, which was more likely to create a singular understanding of Africa in China.

In Li and Ronning's analysis of Chinese news about Africa, 168 Africa-related stories published on various Chinese media platforms between 1 January 2002 and 30 December 2011 were selected and classified into seven categories. These were bonding with Africa, success and opportunity in Africa, development opportunities for Africa, international criticism, strategic analysis, disclosure, and debate. Their analysis showed a correlation with official Chinese engagements on the continent.

The Chinese media system is now experiencing an oscillation between the state and the market, but it is still state-owned and is part of the government. While some of the areas in this field, such content production and advertising, are now open to private capital, the media is both a "pre-eminently political propaganda machine" and a "competitor in the media marketplace" which provides "a public service," and it is also a mouthpiece of the government. Even with the commercialization of the Chinese media market, media are still under the control of the government. Their coverage on the Sino-African relationship is thus focused on "disseminating China's official policy of soft power, propagating cooperation and mutual development between China and African nations."

A new Chinese network, CCTV Africa, has tried to deliver a fuller African story to an international audience, different from the orthodox Anglo-American perspective. Since its production team is mainly composed of Africans, its content is designed to have less of a focus on Chinese subject matters and Chinese interests. This is because many Africans have been "utterly and justifiably fed up with the agenda of death, disease and destruction that we have been offering them for ages." Gagliardone describes this new approach as positive reporting. It places more attention on "collective achievements while overlooking divisive issues...[but] this principle has often resulted in an institutional and uncritical style which marginalizes alternative narratives." However, it does tap into the "rising Africa" narrative. Although CCTV Africa, by mobilizing vast resources and providing a non-traditional perspective, has won a certain percentage of the audience in Africa, this channel is in English and its target outlet is more the international audience than the domestic Chinese one. Thus its content can hardly be received on other Chinese speaking CCTV channels, and even its "Africa perspective" and "African stories" will require time to evaluate its authenticity and viability.

While orchestration with national policy is a hindrance to the Chinese mainstream media's reporting on Africa, lack of knowledge of Africa by Chinese correspondents is another. Many young Chinese journalists were sent to Africa at a career transition stage. The vast majority of them went to Africa without a solid understanding or knowledge of the continent and with a hope of being transferred to some more advanced world region afterwards. For example, one of the Chinese agencies has a classification of its overseas offices by which developed countries like the US and UK are ranked as A category and most African countries are ranked as C. If you want to be assigned to A category countries, one has to take a rotation to a C category country first. This lack of real interest in reporting about C countries severely hinders correspondents' learning curve on Africa and constrains their in-depth reporting on many issues.

In addition, while African studies in China is a booming well-established subject, which is supposed to take responsibility for providing decision makers, and the media and business community with solid knowledge on Africa, it faces some limitations. Learning about Africa has a long history in China but its major development was closely associated with China's

engagement with Africa in the past two decades. Thus this subject area in China is trying to find its own paradigm. There is a greater demand to know more about Africa, and this demand will stimulate African studies in China. But at this stage it still needs more “effort, hard work and collaboration.”

Another barrier for information flow between the two sides is a lack of funding to establish bureaus in Africa for the more diversified Chinese media organizations, especially the commercialized ones. Setting up an overseas office or bureaus in Africa is extremely costly given the high living and operation costs for expatriates in Africa. To further consolidate its international propaganda strategy, the Chinese government granted a large amount of money in 2009 to support several state-owned media organizations’ overseas operation and expansion. Apart from the yearly grant, only those with a strong funding support from the government are capable of running an African operation.

The national news agency Xinhua established its first Africa office in Egypt in 1956 and relocated its Africa regional headquarters from Paris to Nairobi in 2006 to further integrate African reports and gain influence in the continent. Some of their offices were even established earlier than the Chinese embassy in some countries. The People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda mouthpiece, was also one of the earliest to distribute in Africa. In recent years, other major government-owned media have also made their maiden visit to Africa with CCTV setting up its first overseas station in Nairobi in 2011 and China Daily opening its first Africa bureau in Nairobi in 2012, and circulating its newspaper in Africa in the same year. Others including Chinese News Service, Economic Daily, and Science and Technology Daily have also opened offices in various African cities. These government-owned media largely rely on government funding to sustain their daily operations as the Chinese government has been increasing investment in these organizations with a hope to shape its overseas image and have a say in the international media sphere.

For other media platforms in China, especially those commercialized and market-driven ones that have a freer space to exercise criticism, Africa is not attractive enough to make the huge investment necessary for establishing a permanent office. Only in recent years, did one of the leading commercial stations, Phoenix TV, send its first correspondent to Nairobi and open its Africa office. Under such circumstances, the Chinese audience and readership has had narrow information channels through which to know Africa, as state-owned media normally conform to the Chinese government’s official views regarding Africa.

A Changing Face for Africa in the Chinese Mind?

As previously mentioned, many Chinese have little interest in understanding Africa or knowing it in a more comprehensive and in-depth way as this continent is not directly related to their daily life. Also the main information channels for them to know Africa are highly orchestrated under the de facto monopoly of major state-owned media. Thus their knowledge on Africa is anecdotal and shallow.

In 2006, 5,119 respondents took part in a survey organized by China Youth’s Daily, the official organ of the Communist Youth League, and the biggest Chinese Internet news portal Sina.com, to see “how much do you know about Africa.” The result turned out that the majority of respondents (71.7 percent) knew very little about Africa and 10 percent of them knew

nothing at all. For the information channel through which they knew Africa, 21.3 percent said they learned about Africa through the print media and the Internet, and 21.2 percent attributed their knowledge to film and TV. The largest portion of interviewees (15.9 percent) saw Africa as impoverished and underdeveloped, and 14.5 percent linked Africa with AIDS. The following impressions of Africa were ranked in order of salience: wildlife (14.2 percent), Africans being gifted in sports (13.8 percent), people's talents in music and dance (10.6 percent), the origin of humankind (8.9 percent), rich resources (7.7 percent), passionate people (7.6 percent), tourist resort (6.7 percent), and other (0.2 percent).

The survey was done around the 2006 FOCAC conference, which saw the burgeoning boom of China-Africa exchanges. Three years later in 2009, another similar survey was launched on the website of the Global Times, a tabloid affiliated to the People's Daily, with a total of 5,745 participants. This survey revealed a striking change in the media through which Chinese people get to know about Africa, compared to the 2006 survey. "70 percent of respondents acquired knowledge about Africa through news reports (three times more than in 2006), suggesting a greater density of media coverage of Africa from 2006 to 2009, which contributed to the public's improved knowledge of the continent." But when it comes to the first impression of Africa, despite more dense news coverage, more than half of the respondents (53 percent) still saw Africa as having a "laggard economy, skinny, starving children," while "lions, zebras and exotic primitive landscape" ranked second (19 percent), and "frequent warfare and Somali pirates" third (12 percent) in salience.

Baidu.com is now the largest Internet search engine in China as Google.com is blocked, and it also claims to be the biggest Chinese language search engine worldwide. Based on keywords and search clicks, Baidu offers a statistical service to provide detailed information on a designated key word, including the number of searches and topic salience within a certain period of time. After entering the search term "Africa" and choosing the period of the last four years, this researcher found the average number of weekly searches on Africa increased from less than 1,200 in 2011 to around 2,000 in early 2015, with a high point of 3,200 reached in 2013. Thus, the average demand for Africa information among Baidu users increased by 167 percent during the period. But when it comes to the salience of the search topic, the most searched topics related to Africa were Africa maps, followed by African girl's circumcision, African rose wood, Chinese in Africa, African tribes, teaching in Africa, and the state of African states.

With the rapid change of China-Africa relations, however, the diplomatic and government-driven bilateral relationship has switched to being business and commercial driven. In this major transition, private companies are playing an increasingly significant role. Information and knowledge from and on Africa thus requires more professionalism, depth, and correlation with the ground reality, which cannot be satisfied by traditional media channels. Reality on the ground and real time information on African markets have become major concerns for Chinese investors at home. While the Chinese government is calling for a more rapid industry transfer from China to Africa, suspicions are in the air as little reliable information is available for decision-making.

Analysis of the We Media

The popularity of social media has proved to be a key element in China's social and political transformation in recent years. Information dissemination has found a new way to influence targeted people. During the last seven years, the number of Chinese netizens has increased from 253 million to 649 million, of which 86 percent are via mobile access. This has led to a new route of information flow, defined by Bowman and Willis as We Media. "Armed with easy-to-use Web publishing tools, always-on connections and increasingly powerful mobile devices, the online audience has the means to become an active participant in the creation and dissemination of news and information." BBS, blogs, Micro-blog, and many other immediate information transition platforms all could be regarded as We Media. Among all these developments in China, Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, and WeChat, a similar application to WhatsApp, have gained the most popularity and have had a significant social impact.

WeChat was launched in January 2011. Its core service is message transmission surrounded by many affiliated services including social life sharing, public account subscription, real life applications, and games. The number of users has exceeded 468 million. Official account is a service created by WeChat in June 2012, which is to deliver information and various media content on a large scale to subscribers, while interacting with them by automatic reply or in person by the message creators. Individuals anywhere in the world can be establish an account, and the current main users are companies, media, public organizations, celebrities, and individuals.

WeChat is a stickier and a more private information exchange platform compared to microblogs. Since information is distributed only once in any 24-hour period, only those posters with rich, practical, attractive, and interesting content will win followers and survive. Consequently, for the founder of the official account and the owner of the media platform, their passion for WeChat is from heart. On this platform, they can break the constraints of traditional media and enjoy a freer space for personal perspectives and content selection. It is a way that transcends the media bureaucracy and creates a free and direct information flow among people. Besides, this form of communication stimulates subscribers to be part of the story generation process as recipients are encouraged to be the creators and transmitters of information on this platform. This kind of communication and exchange between creators and subscribers is more likely to stimulate the desire for expression among subscribers, which will help them establish their "existence" with others who share the same interests with them. Eventually by analyzing the detailed statistics provided by WeChat analytics, official account creators will sift and identify the most desired information and stories by its number of views and reposts. Thus, they can maximize the impact of the news between each news cycle.

Reporting Africa in China's Social Media

When it comes to Africa-related information flows, there are clear signs that the information monopoly is being broken with the advent of social media. With increasingly more immigrants from China to Africa, various online social platforms are available for them to tell their stories of living in Africa. Thus naturally they can offer more perspectives and stories on Africa and

China-Africa relations apart from the official messages. For those who have been living in Africa and those who want to learn about real life experience in Africa, WeChat official accounts created by various sources give them a revolutionary channel to learn about Africa.

The significance of this service has been spotted by both traditional and new media organizations, and even governmental organizations have joined to make an impact on this platform. When the search keyword “Africa” was entered on the official account official website by this researcher, 357 accounts could be found with a classification of six categories, including business and life information, logistics, academics, official media and governmental organizations, as well as African drum lessons and African products information. Individuals, media groups, and government missions such as the Chinese embassies in Egypt and Ethiopia created these accounts.

More than one hundred accounts were related to African drumming lessons, as this is a popular art among young college students across major cities in China. The second largest category, which takes about fifty accounts, is tourism information, and the third is African business and life information, with an approximate number of forty-five. Tourism is the most direct and vivid way to understand and know Africa; however, this is so far limited to a small number of Chinese who are financially privileged or professional tourists. Information on African business and life is the category that may play a bigger role as China continues to expand its commercial interests in Africa.

Among all these public accounts, HSHAFRICA (“Buy For and From Africa”) is gaining popularity among subscribers. It was established in June 2014 by Shi Yingying, a former employee of the Xinhua news agency in Nairobi. The account can be found by searching HSHAFRICA on the WeChat official accounts page, and it now delivers four to eight articles with pictures or videos to its subscribers daily. It was initially built up to circulate Kenyan news related to the Chinese community such as currency exchanges, Kenyan business policies, local development strategies, and even information about second-hand goods. But with more subscribers and volunteers participating in her project, this account has become a pan-African information and news channel for readers and other WeChat users.

Shi said people in China do not know Africa well due to underdeveloped and old information exchange patterns, so she created the account to transmit Africa’s daily news, cultural issues, economy, tourism, agriculture, investment opportunities, life experiences, local services and also Africa security reminders. The account is also aimed at building up an information platform for Africans who want to understand Chinese culture, business, and other related information in a non-official way. Apart from the services and information it provides, Shi said based on the account’s information and news sources across the continent, it also plans to provide some industry statistics to research institutes and think tanks, becoming a real first-hand reference. The account largely relies on local newspapers, media, or personal writing, and has a team composed of many volunteers living in different African countries, or who used to live in Africa. There are even local Africans now joining her project. She did not disclose the number of subscribers to the account as she is seeking partnerships with other investors to strengthen the account. According to the open statistics under each of the stories they publish on the account, the most-read article exceeded 69,000 viewings. Shi said that the average daily visits to all articles of this account amount to between 15,000 and 30,000.

Reader-friendly and convenient is an advantage of information circulation on WeChat, but the content is the vital tool to attract and retain readers. Thus HSHAFRICA's strategy is to offer vivid, lively, and real business and life stories and pictures to its subscribers in a readable non-news style. This approach differentiates it from stories generated by the serious and politically-oriented government-owned news organizations based in Africa. So far, the most read article is "Ten Things You Won't Know Until You Come to Africa" with more than 64,340 viewings, in which some Chinese in Africa assert that some matters need attention in Africa. Such content can rarely be found in traditional media. This includes tips such as one should be careful about corruption or even robbery from the police.

An article titled "Why Africans Hate Chinese" was published by HSHAFRICA in December 2014, a story reposted from another private owned social media account called World Old News Daily. The story tells how many Chinese in Africa were treated in a rough in some of the African countries and hated by local people due to their misbehavior and dishonorable businesses, which is different from the rhetoric of friendship created by the official media. The article received more than 17,000 views on WeChat. One of the subscribers based in Nigeria, Xue Xiaoming, who has been living and doing business in the country for more than eighteen years, said it is a reality and Chinese people should know it is actually not easy to live in certain parts of Africa. This is something that will never appear in the official Chinese media. Xue said a platform like this dares to voice some ugly truths and tough pictures of Chinese engagement in Africa, which is a good thing as it shows the positive and the negative side of China-Africa relations to those who want to come and invest in Africa, leaving the decision to them, rather than providing good stories only.

Diversification and enrichment of communication channels and content are regarded as the most valued effects in terms of this public account reporting of Africa, according to Zhang Yanqiu, director of the African Communication Research Center at the Communication University of China. She says on this platform, an account creator can communicate and exchange ideas with subscribers, which is a two-way communication process that traditional media cannot manage.

To create a more balanced and rational news environment in China, these private media platforms should be embraced to complement the official messages. But their effects are yet to be evaluated. Also as an official account involves tailored information, it gives an excellent opportunity for marketing. So some of the accounts are also making efforts to make their accounts alluring to consultancy services in Africa despite the fact that the majority of Chinese companies did not have this kind of consumption habit. Zhang predicts that the market orientation of the public accounts will not change their appeal to subscribers and that their ability to balance news content among various news sources, including official ones and other private ones should not be underestimated.

Conclusion

Chinese state-owned media in Africa usually present an official tone in terms of Africa's domestic situation and China's engagement in Africa. This has led to a de facto distortion of Africa reporting in China due to a lack of funding and interest by other private commercial media, the lack of professional knowledge of most correspondents in Africa, as well as

underdeveloped Africa studies in Chinese academia. So, the Chinese people's impression and perception of Africa during the past ten years remains at an anecdotal level. With the rapid change from diplomacy to business, however, there is a growing demand for accurate information for Chinese who want to know and invest in Africa, especially under a possible unprecedented industry transfer from China to Africa in the near future. Thus the emergence of new information exchange platforms on mobile devices comes at the perfect time to fill the gap. WeChat public accounts are regarded as the most popular option. HSHAFRICA's experience with circulating more comprehensive news and an all-round perspective to subscribers, including those who now reside in Africa or who want to come to Africa, has proved that this new way of transmitting news is attractive, convenient and popular, and it is gradually breaking the monopoly of Africa reporting in China. This will give a fuller picture of Africa and China's engagement among the Chinese.

Yet, concerns also exist for this newly established platform. Privacy is an advantage but also a constraint of the public accounts as it is still quite difficult to identify, reach and convince the right subscribers, especially in the relatively small Africa-interest community. Also, the information security of subscribers poses a challenge to the platform and its future operation. How the public accounts operational team will be organized to maintain such accounts and make them sustainable and active long-term is not yet clear.

It is challenging so far to provide media content analysis data to support the finding of the de facto monopoly of Africa report in China. Also it is still too early to collect solid data to evaluate the impact of official accounts on social recognition on Africa in China. Time and more data collection are needed to dig into this topic.

Notes

- 1 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-05/06/c_1110547295.htm (accessed on March 7, 2015).
- 2 Zhang and Yang 2014.
- 3 Li and Ronning 2013b, p. 43.
- 4 Chau 2007, p. 141
- 5 Gagliardone 2013, p. 25.
- 6 Li and Ronning 2013a. p. 102.
- 7 Ngomba 2011, p. 52.
- 8 Zhengrong 2007, p. 335.
- 9 Mork 2012, p. 48.
- 10 Marsh 2014.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Gagliardone 2013, p. 25.
- 13 Marsh 2014.
- 14 Li 2005, p. 59.
- 15 Gagliardone 2013, p. 25.
- 16 See <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/10-25/3414071.shtml> (accessed on March 8, 2015).
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.

- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Li and Ronning 2013b, p. 43.
- 22 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/info/2015-01/23/c_133940681.htm. (accessed on March 8, 2015).
- 23 Bowman and Willis 2003.
- 24 Ibid., p. 7.
- 25 Wen 2013, p. 55.
- 26 See <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0fd1abc2-a610-11e4-abe9-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3WnibbO9C>. (accessed on March 9, 2015).
- 27 Zhao and Li 2013, p. 8.
- 28 Li 2014, p. 57.
- 29 Wen 2013, p. 55.
- 30 Chen 2015, p. 79.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Shi 2015.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Xue 2015.
- 36 Zhang 2015.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Chen 2015, p. 79.
- 39 Zhang 2015.
- 40 Zhao and Li 2013, p. 8.

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The Dragon Shapes Its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa

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Abstract: As China continues its human, cultural and commercial expansion into Africa it has a clear strategic interest in managing its image on the continent. The leadership in both its government and private sectors know China must find ways to counteract negative reports that accuse China and some African leaders and their regimes of being complicit in China's accelerating exploitation of African labor and resources, undermining and weakening regulatory controls, and illegal profiteering in their countries. In addition, there are continuing attempts by Western media to portray China as the new colonizer in Africa, creating a perception that China is the new bully on the block, and positioning it as a country that should be watched and monitored with suspicion regarding its Africa intentions. It would appear that the continued expansion of Chinese trade and investment in Africa will depend on China's success in developing and deploying a vigorous "soft" and "smart power" strategy that counters such allegations and media representations. This paper examines the extant research on Chinese government media-related strategies in Africa, suggesting directions future research on this topic might take.

Introduction

According to Joseph Nye, governments exercise various forms of power. The most common are hard power, soft power, and smart power.¹ Nye defines hard power as the use of economic, political and military resources to coercively achieve one's objectives. He defines soft power as the use of language, culture, social policies, and media to achieve one's objectives in a non-coercive way. Smart power, on the other hand, is described by Nye as an intelligent combination of hard and soft power. In media studies, seminal thinkers Kenneth Boulding and Walter Lipmann both argued persuasively that mass media, exercising soft power, play a key role in constructing national images and advancing foreign policy objectives.² This paper reviews and discusses the scholarly literature that has explored China's use of a combination of soft power initiatives in its attempts create and sustain a positive image of itself in the African press and African public opinion as it expands its economic presentation into the African continent.

Discussions on China's growing presence in Africa sometimes ignore the fact that trade with Africa plays a significant role in fueling China's economic growth, because it supports the growth of China's manufacturing industries. China's economic growth—on average

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a11.pdf>

approximately 9 percent annually for the last three decades—has been fueled to a great extent by export growth averaging 17 percent per annum.³ Natural resources from Africa provide the raw materials for Chinese industries.⁴ Clearly, China's rapidly developing economy is intricately connected to the expansion of Sino-African trade.

While the motives behind Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa can be seen as predominantly resource seeking, the facts point to a more nuanced reality: the increased economic exchanges between China and African nations can be attributed to the market potential that Africa offers for China's industries.⁵ Africa is also experiencing rapid development, with the onset of peace and stability in many African nations after periods of wars of various sorts. The Chinese likely see this period of relative calm to be the perfect opportunity to invest in Africa, when African governments are focusing on developing infrastructure for their countries' future.

As these investment and trade initiatives grow, however, some resistance and criticism have emerged from some quarters of the press, which accuse China of neocolonialism, racism and exploitation in Africa.⁶ And, as China's economic footprint has expanded, it has also been accompanied by some misfortunes that have prompted negative coverage in the African media and western press. For example, the shootings of Zambian miners in the Chambeshi mines, frequent mining accidents, and criticism of Chinese-Zambian labor relations by Human Rights Watch and others, have framed China's relations with Zambia in a negative light, resulting in headlines such as "China needs to respect Zambian laws," "Chinese traders allege unfair competitive practices by Chinese companies," and "Zambian workers exposed to harsh conditions of employment in Chinese-run mines."⁷ The same type of headlines have also appeared frequently in the western press and focused international attention on Chinese economic and military activities and their consequences throughout the continent. Headlines such as "Chinese neocolonialism in Africa," "China exploits African workers," and "China supports anti-democratic regimes," have become normative as Western perceptions of China as a threat to Western interests in Africa proliferate.⁸

In responding to these negative portrayals of its relationship with Africa, China had generally felt it was best to "wait for time to explain everything."⁹ The underlying idea was that, if its actions were good, they would prove themselves and the need to respond to negative criticisms would simply vanish. Nonetheless, with ongoing and mounting threats to its image in the world press and in the Africa media, China has devised a multifaceted strategy to influence African public opinion and the African media.

Chinese attempts to influence media content in Africa and about China's relationship with Africa are not new. Even before the Cold War, China was involved in some level of media engagement in Africa and by early 1958 China had opened a New China News Agency office in Cairo.¹⁰ Chinese ideological support was given to liberation movements on Chinese radio stations broadcasting to Africa. By 1967, Radio Peking was transmitting twenty-one hours weekly in English to East Africa, with transmissions occurring daily at local prime time – between six and nine o'clock in the evening.¹¹ Chinese publications such as the Mao's selected works, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Swahili translations of Chinese poems for children, *China Pictorial*, *Peking Review*, etc., were readily available in East Africa, as part of China's effort to counter Western imperialist designs.¹²

What is new is the intentionality with which China is attempting to influence African media in the context of the post-Cold war geopolitical environment. In 2006, China and forty-eight African countries announced the Beijing Action Plan (2006-2009) under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). While the plan outlined a comprehensive action plan for cooperation between the two parties, it also specified key milestones for China's intervention in the African media-scape, focusing on three aspects of the Africa media: African media institutions, the practice of journalism, and African journalists.¹³

The 2006 FOCAC action plan listed five points of intervention. First, increased contact between news media, encouraging journalists to play a role in enhancing mutual understanding and friendship. Second, it called for multi-level exchanges and co-operation, with international visits and exchanges between media groups. Third, the plan focused on reporting and coverage by both sides' news media, sending resident and non-resident correspondents to file news reports. Fourth, there would be workshops for African correspondents in China, and expanded co-operation in radio and television broadcasting.¹⁴ Finally, China committed itself to the improvement of telecommunications infrastructure in African countries. Significantly, China also appealed for a more sovereign African continent in its final declaration at the Beijing FOCAC 2006 summit: "We call on the international community to encourage and support Africa's efforts to pursue peace and development. In particular, we urge developed countries to increase official development assistance and honor their commitment to opening markets and debt relief to enhance Africa's capacity in poverty and disaster reduction and prevention and control of desertification, and help Africa realize the UN Millennium Development Goals."¹⁵

Prior to the 2006 FOCAC summit, there was an active media campaign to showcase Africa's beauty and importance. Giant photographs of Africa's scenery, people and wildlife were put on billboards. The Chinese news channels were primarily focused on the high-level interviews and information about countries in Africa.¹⁶ The massive media campaign and advertisement that China engaged in was meant to show the importance of Africa, with photos and banners, and media talking about "Amazing Africa." The summit was given center-stage in the Chinese media, and the citizens were also actively involved, with approximately one million citizens volunteering to help and provide security. The summit focused on the theme of "Friendship, Peace, Development and Cooperation." Since then and in successive meetings of FOCAC, China has actively courted African countries and passed along its message of the importance of China to Africa and vice-versa. In addition, China has restructured its foreign policies to focus on the discourse of common economic benefit, universal political exchange, and regular cultural cooperation.¹⁷

The language of co-operation in all areas was repeated in every tri-annual FOCAC summit, with a focus on trade and investments. The dominant discourse was about cooperation across the political and social spectra, always anchored in the benefits that will accrue to both parties in the economic sector.¹⁸ The phrase "win-win" was used to signify the benefits of stronger China-Africa relations and for portraying the possible economic benefits from the interactions. Good governance on the African continent, it was said, would ensure the protection of foreign investment in the private sector.¹⁹ Before the commencement of each summit, there was always an increased intensity of bilateral talks between the Chinese premier and African leaders and numerous bi-lateral deals were signed and reported in the press.²⁰

According to Banda, there were also significant investments in media and communications infrastructure, including loans and grants directed towards state-owned broadcasting houses such as the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH), and the National Radio of Equatorial Guinea.²¹ Nigeria purchased Chinese satellite technology, which included a Chinese training package and a ground station to be built in the Nigerian capital Abuja. In Malawi, a fiber-optic communication project to the tune of US \$22.94 million was commissioned. In 2002, Zambia received FM transmitters for seven provinces. In 2006, it received more transmitters for further extension of radio services. In some instances, infrastructural support was implicitly linked to political ends. For example, the provision of FM transmitters to the state-owned media in Zambia almost always occurred in election years, timed to support the then pro-Beijing ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in its electoral campaign effort, especially in rural Zambia.²² As China supplied information technology, Chinese media training was coupled with those information technology transfers.²³

Some scholars have skillfully noted that media training is not value-neutral; it also carries with it the cultural and political values associated with the acquisition of those skills. African journalists invited to China were exposed to the internal operations of Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), and the Beijing Organizing Committee for Olympic Games.²⁴ This introduction to China's view of journalism and journalistic practice allowed African journalists and scholars to compare it objectively to the dominant models of Western journalistic and communications practice, perhaps developing more a more balanced understanding and appreciation of the pros and cons of each.²⁵

The Chinese embassies in Africa arranged visits for leading reporters from Africa's large newspapers to visit Chinese enterprises that were engaged in cooperative projects, increasing their knowledge of the challenges inherent in south to south cooperation. China invited delegations of African reporters to visit China and participate in short-term training on news exchanges. These exchanges focused on sharing China's development experience—particularly in areas of poverty reduction and development of manufacturing industries—while discussing alternative models of governance and reform.²⁶

At the time, critics accused China of providing despotic African regimes with the media communication infrastructure to perpetuate their hold on political power because it protected Chinese interests in their countries. For example, Brookes and Shin claimed that "China provided a military-strength radio jamming device, which the Harare government used to block broadcasts of anti-government reports from independent media outlets during the 2005 parliamentary election campaign."²⁷ It would appear that the Chinese leadership was prescient in its decision to develop a media and development strategies that would work to counteract such claims.

Campaign to Expand Soft Power

The Chinese government continued to make major investments in the African media. In 2012, former President Hu Jintao wrote in a party journal: "Hostile international powers are strengthening their efforts to Westernize and divide us. We must be aware of the seriousness and complexity of the struggles and take powerful measures to prevent and deal with them."²⁸

His statement preceded a seven billion dollar campaign, part of a Chinese Communist Party bid to expand the China's soft power in Africa, based in part on the notion that biased Western news media had painted a distorted portrait of China.

According to Jacobs, Chinese state media investors began expanding their footprint across Africa in 2006.²⁹ A Chinese company, StarTimes, purchased a controlling stake in South African satellite television provider Top TV, adding to its presence in thirteen other African countries and the state-run radio broadcaster, China Radio International, had FM stations in three East African cities, while its AM channel covered all of Kenya. Jacobs says that by 2006, the state-run China Radio International (CRI) had begun broadcasting from Nairobi, Kenya, while Xinhua, the official press agency of the People's Republic of China had over twenty bureaus across the African continent. By the start of 2011, Xinhua's television station, CNC World, had begun broadcasting to African satellite and cable viewers and that same year, partnered with a Kenyan mobile operator to provide news feeds for mobile phones.

In January 2012, the state-run Chinese Central Television (CCTV), established CCTV Africa, choosing Nairobi to be its first ever broadcast hub outside its own headquarters in Beijing, its flagship show, Africa Live. With its staff of about one hundred people (forty of whom were Chinese), and correspondents in fourteen bureaus, the show intended to compete with the BBC and CNN. Meanwhile, China's state news agency, Xinhua, had nearly thirty bureaus in Africa, along with its own television channel, providing news bulletins for seventeen million Kenyan cellphones, while CCTV provided a mobile TV service called "I Love Africa."

Kenya's most popular English-language newspapers featured articles by the Chinese state news agency, Xinhua, and television viewers could get their international news from either CCTV or CNC World, Xinhua's English-language start-up. As Jacobs notes, on the radio, just a few notches over from Voice of America and the BBC, China Radio International featured Mandarin instruction along with positive accounts of Chinese-African cooperation.³⁰

By the end of 2012, China's leading English-language state newspaper, *China Daily*, had created an Africa edition, published in Nairobi and distributed on Kenya Airways flights. China also launched *ChinAfrica*, a monthly magazine, based in Johannesburg. And in South Africa, Chinese investors partnered with allies of the ruling African National Congress to purchase Independent News and Media, one of the most powerful media groups in the country, with daily newspapers in all of the major cities South African cities.³¹ Jacobs' description of these multiyear, multi-pronged and multi-level Chinese media initiatives leaves little doubt about China's intention to exert a long-term and wide influence on the African media.

Communication University of China

The Communication University of China (CUC) has trained or educated more than one hundred journalists or government officials from Africa through its Radio and Television Newsgathering and Editing for African Countries Program. One of CUC's most illustrious graduates is Bob Wakesa (cited elsewhere in this article), at the time of writing a fellow at the University of Witwatersrand. Through its Master's Degree Program in International Communication for Developing Countries and other short term training programs, CUC is creating a new generation of young African media professionals with a sophisticated understanding and appreciation of China.

An Africa Communication Research Center has been established in Beijing, the goal of which is to raise China's ability to disseminate information in Africa, increase the potency of China's soft power and contribute to China's efforts to create a positive image of itself. According to Jiang et al. the Center hopes to promote mutual understanding and friendly cooperation between China and African media through providing Chinese and African media organizations and firms with communication strategy advice and personnel training.³² African journalists and press officers are often invited on all-expenses-paid training sessions in Beijing as part of Chinese aid programs that give short-term training to 30,000 Africans and full university scholarships to another 18,000.³³

CCTV in Africa: A Special Focus

According to Szczudlik-Tatar, the decision to establish CCTV Africa was formalized during the 2006 FOCAC, a meeting that was an integral part of China's public diplomacy strategy.³⁴ In the context of Africa, this involved disseminating a positive narrative on China's increasing activity on the African continent. This also included the promotion of Chinese culture and values, disseminated in a way intended to appeal to an African audience. According to York, CCTV News, which claims two hundred million viewers outside China, is available in six languages; one of its latest ventures is an Arabic news channel.³⁵ To increase their reach — and compete with Western news organizations — both CCTV and Xinhua often give away dispatches programming to financially struggling news media outlets in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.³⁶

The CCTV Africa site reveals a robust and wide range of activities, designed not only to inform the world about Africa, but to extend China's ability to stay abreast of events in Africa through its network of Africa correspondents and Africa bureaus.³⁷ As a recent review of CCTV's activities in Africa by Jiang et al. notes, CCTV's African headquarters in Nairobi provides impressive coverage of African news and contemporary issues in daily broadcasts and its international arm, and CCTV NEWS sees itself as China's contribution to greater diversity and wider perspectives in the global information flow. With a special focus on China, the channel also emphasizes events taking place in Asia, Africa, and all developing countries.³⁸

China's Current Media Strategy

China continues to be committed to its established media strategy there. The 2015 Fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, produced a three-year (2016-2018) action plan with a sub-section of the plan devoted to "Press and Media." This sub-section, implies a continuation of Beijing's previous action plan from 2012, including notably: implementation of the previously proposed China-Africa Press Exchange Center in order to facilitate media training and exchange programs, including provision for training for one thousand African media practitioners per year; regular exchange of films and TV programs; training and technical support by the Chinese company StarTimes for migration from analog to digital television in many African countries; cooperation in film and television production; publication of books related to health, agriculture, culture, and education; and further expansion of the CCTV initiative in Nairobi, Kenya.³⁹ While Jiang et al. point out that China has struggled to meet those goals, they concede that it has made significant

progress in meeting its goals, including extensive cooperation in the areas of journalism exchange, with CCTV playing an increasingly important role in the African mediascape.⁴⁰

Although the 2013-2015 FOCAC Action Plan established a wide-range of exchange programs for both African and Chinese journalists, these exchanges have favored African journalists visiting China rather than Chinese journalists visiting Africa, and the majority of the African journalists work either for African state broadcasters or other government media. Predictably, these journalists have come back with a far more positive image of China than they originally had.

By far, the largest share of Chinese resources to media and telecommunication have been channeled towards supporting Africa's information infrastructure. Similar to its role with roads and railways in many African countries, China has emerged as one of the most important actors in developing terrestrial and mobile information infrastructure, including efforts to play a significant role in Africa's digital transition from analogue broadcasting to digital television through set top boxes. Importantly, Jiang et al. point out that China is also succeeding in expanding its market share in Africa as a supplier of mobile devices, including phones, tablets and PCs, another demonstration of the importance of African markets for the continued growth of the Chinese export economy.

Chinese state-owned and private companies have participated in project financing, with significant assistance provided by China's chief financial instruments for its Africa expansion – the Export-Import Bank, providing guarantees and loans for the purchase of Chinese goods and services; and the China Development Bank, through which the China Africa Development Fund and other instruments seek to stimulate Chinese investment. Some of these loans receive concessional terms with subsidies through the Chinese development aid budget.⁴¹

Is China's Media Strategy for Africa working?

One of the most ambitious projects to track Chinese influence on the African media is the China Africa Reporting Project at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. According to the project website, the Wits China-Africa Reporting Project aims to improve the quality of reporting around China-Africa issues:

Despite the expanding links between the two regions media reporting has often been inadequate or polarized, either portraying China as an exploiting predator or a benign development partner. The project aims to encourage balanced and considered reporting as the topic of China-Africa relations is further entrenched in the editorial narrative of both regions.⁴²

The project offers reporting grants to African and Chinese journalists and encourages collaborations to investigate the complex dynamics and uncover untold stories and enables research for journalism students looking at media responses to China's engagement with Africa. Funded by the Open Societies Foundation, the program aims to increase the amount of quality reporting and information about what China is doing in Africa and how Africans are responding to the expanding Chinese presence, while training a new generation of reporters for

South Africa and beyond. Notably, the project also monitors the coverage of Africa in the Chinese media. The media monitoring activities associated with this program will generate more empirical knowledge about the impact of China's engagement with the media in Africa, both on Africa and on China.

Several of the 2016 articles published in the *Chinese Journal of Communication* present a mixed assessment of the impact of the various Chinese media strategies in Africa. For example, Herman Wasserman claims because of the Chinese efforts, journalists in South Africa now hold a "cautiously optimistic" attitude towards China, but are still concerned about China's potential influence on South African policy making.⁴³ An empirical study of the output of Ugandan journalists demonstrated that their published articles contained mostly neutral to favorable attitudes towards China, although there was a concentration of negative images in relation to the opaqueness of Chinese companies regarding labor relations. Ugandan journalists who had travelled to China on Chinese government sponsored visits were more likely to demonstrate favorable attitudes towards China.⁴⁴ Tokunbo Ojo observed that South African media attitudes towards China are largely dependent on the ideological orientation of the publication, with business magazines like *African Business* more likely to display more balanced coverage than an Africanist journal like the *New African*.⁴⁵ Using Kenya as their laboratory, Zhang Yanqiu and Jane Muthoni Mwangi examined public perceptions of China's media engagement in Africa, concluding that CCTV Africa and China Daily's *Africa Weekly* "contribute to a better understanding of China among Kenyans."⁴⁶ Finally, Vivian Marsh examined agenda-setting and program-framing in CCTV Africa's television journalism to find out whether CCTV Africa offers an alternative to Western news agendas and practices. According to Jiang et al:

In comparison with earlier studies of CCTV Africa, Marsh found fewer negative portrayals of the West and a reduced aversion to cultural or offbeat stories. [However] the data indicate a content strategy designed to prioritize the Chinese agenda in Africa, rather than to promote an "Africa rising" narrative....⁴⁷

A survey conducted by the PEW Research Center, on Global Attitudes and Trends in 2015 in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria showed that the majority of opinions about China were positive (70 percent, 80 percent, and 70 percent respectively).⁴⁸ Similarly, an African public opinion poll of thirteen thousand people across the continent by Afrobarometer also confirmed that, with the exception of human rights and political system, the perception of China in Africa is largely positive.⁴⁹ Perhaps China's media strategy is working.

Discussion

This paper has taken a political-economic approach to understanding China's engagement with the African media, discussing various methods by which China is deploying a "soft power" approach to influencing the construction of public opinion in African media institutions. Clearly the considerable increase in China's overall direct investments in Africa will continue to elicit concern on the part of ordinary African citizens and African elites. Some will fear that the continuing expansion of Chinese exports to Africa will contribute to a rise in African unemployment.⁵⁰ Others will fear that the imbalance in trade between Africa and might result in further devaluation of African currencies, making it impossible for African governments to repay their debts.⁵¹ Additionally, the promises of high-quality employment opportunities

coming to Africa with Chinese investments may never materialize since Chinese firms bring their workers with them to Africa.⁵² Finally, some will fear that Chinese commercial engagement with Africans states with weak governance structures will slow political reforms in those countries.⁵³ These fears about the overall impact of both Chinese investment and the growing Chinese presence in Africa will continue to find their place in media discourse about China-Africa relations, alongside more positive and optimistic perspectives. These contradictory views will continue to be a source of ambivalence in African attitudes towards the Chinese, and given this contested terrain, there will continue to be an ample need for China to vigorously pursue its media initiatives and other soft diplomacy strategies as it expands in Africa.

Accurate evaluation of the valence of China's influence in Africa, however, requires a long term perspective that understands both the Chinese and Africans as agents, actively involved in molding a new media environment that also acknowledges the positive aspects of China's Africa engagement, including China's role in building up African infrastructure (roads, airports, and seaports) as well as its direct aid contributions to African education and health care.⁵⁴

While China's attempts to influence the African media are part of its soft power approach to creating a favorable public opinion environment for attaining its foreign policy objectives in Africa, the expanding scope of China's activities on the African continent are increasingly becoming an inextricable part of development processes on the African continent. This reflects the significant change in the involvement of China with the world in general. China has short term, medium and long-term objectives in its involvement with other nations, and this is coming at a time of growing awareness of the interdependence of nations and unbridled competition for Africa's material resources and burgeoning market. The direct connection between China's growing strategic investment in Africa and its calculated strategy to position itself as a strong ally of Africa, in both African and world public is inescapable. This survey concludes that an ongoing empirical program of public opinion research is probably the best way to ascertain the effectiveness of China's soft power media diplomacy in impacting the African media, shaping both public discourse and the practice of journalism and communications in Africa. Now may be the time to shift our media research agenda away from what China is doing in the African media, and focus instead on the new media scape that the Africans and the Chinese together are now creating. The South African Media and the New Geopolitics of Communication Research Project funded by the South Africa National Research Foundation represents an important step in that direction.⁵⁵

Notes

1 Nye 2004.

2 Boulding 1991, p. 221, and Lipmann 1993, p. 4.

3 Agbelenko 2012, pp. 47-52 and Power, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2012, p. 14.

4 Power, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2012, p. 14

5 Gill, Huang & Morrison 2007, p. 8.

- 6 Sautman and Hairong 2014.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ismael 1971, p. 507.
- 10 Banda 2009, p. 52.
- 11 Wenping, He. 2010.
- 12 Wakesa 2013.
- 13 Szczudlik-Tatar, 2010.
- 14 FOCAC 2006, p. 12-13.
- 15 King 2007, p. 14.
- 16 Jiang 2013, p. 180.
- 17 King 2007, p. 1.
- 18 Buckley 2013, p. 44.
- 19 King 2004, p. 4.
- 20 Davies, Draper, and Edinger 2014, p. 192.
- 21 Banda 2009, p. 52.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Davies, Edinger, Tay and Naidu 2008, pp. 49-55.
- 24 Banda 2009, p. 52.
- 25 Wakesa 2013.
- 26 Harber 2013.
- 27 Brookes and Shin 2006, p. 4.
- 28 Jacobs 2012.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Jiang et al. 2016.
- 33 Jacobs 2012.
- 34 Szczudlik-Tatar 2010.
- 35 York 2013.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 CCTV Africa website.
- 38 Jiang et al. 2016, p. 2.
- 39 FOCAC 2015.
- 40 Jiang et al. 2016, p. 2.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Wits China-Africa Reporting Project website.
- 43 Wasserman 2012.
- 44 Nassanga and Sabiti Makara 2016.
- 45 Ojo 2016.
- 46 Zhang and Mwangi 2016.

- 47 Nassanga and Sabiti Makara 2016.
- 48 PEW Research Center 2015.
- 49 AfroBarometer 2014-15.
- 50 Cheung, Jakob, Xingwang, and Shu 2012, p. 202.
- 51 Agbelenko, Kibet, Kiprop, and Conteh 2012.
- 52 Jackson 2014, p. 902.
- 53 Adisu, Sharkey, and Okoroafo, 2010 p. 4.
- 54 Provost and Harris 2013.
- 55 South African Media and the New Geopolitics of Communication website.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Jacob Abadi. 2013. *Tunisia Since the Arab Conquest: The Saga of a Westernized Muslim State*. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press and Southern Court. 586 pp.

This book is a general review of the history of Tunisia, which is a tumultuous, rich, and varied history. Tunisia is a country that has managed to forge an identity that distinguishes it from other Arab countries and North Africa. In his introduction, Jacob Abadi discusses Tunisia's bibliographic sources, which contain all the great names in the history of Islam in North Africa and Ifriqiya. These sources are rich and varied. This means that Abadi's study is scientifically based, and can be seen as an accurate window on the history of Tunisia and its Mediterranean environment, an environment that encompasses the northern Mediterranean (Sicily, Sardinia, Spain) and southern Mediterranean, both to the east (Libya, Egypt) and the west (Algeria, Morocco).

Abadi begins his history with the Arab conquest of Ifriqiya but fails to discuss that the past of this region, as an autonomous entity, dates back to the Carthaginians, Romans, and Byzantines. Located in the center of the Mediterranean, Ifriqiya played a major role in trade. It was a target for all Mediterranean civilizations. It was the center of all the Punic Wars that induced the destruction of Carthage. It was a refuge for Christian sects considered heretical by Catholic Rome. When it was under Byzantine rule, its inhabitants were the subject of taxation and abuse. This explains the ease with which they welcomed the Arab conquerors when they arrived in the country. The latter brought with them their new religion, Islam. But they also brought their language, Arabic.

The Arab conquerors arrived from Egypt and founded the city of Qayraouan, which became for many centuries one of the most important intellectual centers of the Islamic world and the seat of power for Muslim emirates even though Byzantines and Europeans continued to be present in the country. But the Arab and Muslim character of Ifriqiya also began to be imprinted upon the country at that time. Tunisia never ceased to be the object of envy by Muslims and Europeans (Umayyad, Abbasid, Ottoman, Almohad, French) who at one point or another sought to rule the country due to its strategic locale in the ongoing struggle for dominance in the Mediterranean.

The book is organized into fifteen chapters, each one corresponding to the reign of a dynasty (Aghlabids, Fatimids, Zirids, Hafsids, Muradites, Husseinis) or the colonial and post-colonial eras. This approach helps to capture the differences between them and to understand the ruptures and continuities that eventually make Tunisia what it became. This continuity shows that the country was endowed with a personality that allowed it to become autonomous in its relation to the successive empires that ruled it. It was able to challenge Umayyad and Abbasid rule and suffered the power of the Aghlabids, the Fatimids (who left Tunisia for Egypt), the Zirids (their servants), the Almohads, the Hafsids, and the Ottomans. It was finally able to keep a certain autonomy vis-à-vis this latter empire, while it was legally a regency. Unlike Algeria, which could not be consolidated into a centralized state, Tunisia, with its particular history, has been able to build a dynasty (the Husseinis), which gave it its character of a consolidated state. When The French occupied the country, they were forced to choose the formula of ruling it as a Protectorate. They were unable to occupy it outright and had to accept the principle of the internal sovereignty of the Beys.

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v16i3-4a12.pdf>

Abadi describes how the French Protectorate founded modern Tunisia but also provided the impetus for Tunisian nationalism that began with the Constitutional Liberal Party (Old Destour) and became the Neo-Destour Party whose leader was Habib Bourguiba. When Tunisia became independent in 1956, Bourguiba became president and ruled the country with authoritarianism and exercised a personal power until 1987 when he was declared unfit to govern because of illness and his advanced age. This removal from office was achieved by Ben Ali, who was prime minister and became the new president. As president Ben Ali exercised no less personal power than Bourguiba until he fled from the country in January 2011 in the aftermath of popular protests.

The Arab conquest changed Tunisia's intellectual and religious life since it introduced Islam and Arabism, although it was opposed by the Berbers in the beginning. The second great change was the French protectorate imposed on the country in 1881. Through its actions and reforms the protectorate altered the Tunisian lifestyle. The country became francophone, and the elite trained in French schools embraced a western way of thinking and acting.

Abdelmalek el Ouazzani, *University Cadi Ayyad, Morocco*

Awol Allo (ed.). 2015. *The Courtroom as a Space of Resistance: Reflections on the Legacy of the Rivonia Trial*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. 348 pp.

Written to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Rivonia trial, in which Nelson Mandela and nine other leaders of the African National Congress were prosecuted for their attempts to overthrow South Africa's Apartheid system, Awol Allo's edited volume *The Courtroom as a Space of Resistance* explores the development of "geographies of resistance" in highly protected legal spaces such as the courtroom. According to Allo, "geographies of resistance" develop when defendants in political trials re-appropriate legal spaces in order to challenge the status quo. Allo invokes Mandela's statements during the Rivonia trial as examples of a defendant employing the "radical openness" of legal discourse in order to challenge the contradictions and injustices problematically dominant in the prevailing symbolic order.

The Courtroom as a Space of Resistance approaches resistance as a spatial formation. To lay the conceptual groundwork for this approach, Allo draws on Henri Lefebvre's concept of social space as a social product, and on Edward Soja's argument for conceptualizing space not only as a social product but also as a force that moulds social life. Allo's emphasis on the spatial qualities of resistance is most skilfully demonstrated in his introduction's description of how, during the Rivonia trial, Mandela's questioning of the very legal system through which he is being tried succeeds in expanding "the horizon of the legally permissible and imaginable" (p. 2).

Allo's volume is invested in considering a variety of possible manifestations of resistance in the courtroom and as such is highly interdisciplinary in character. Of particular note are the chapters that highlight the performative aspects of judicial proceedings. In her chapter, Chloé S. Georas takes the Lorena Bobbitt trial as a case study through which to explore how gendered and racialized narratives are constructed and performed in the context of a domestic violence case. Kanika Sharma's exploration of the Gandhi murder trial, in which Sharma skilfully depicts how "the state carefully selected each visual marker of the trial—from the building where the trial was located, to the organisation of the courtroom itself" (p. 342), emphasizes the concern of the political trial with playing to the wider

audience that exists beyond the courtroom. In its concern with the performative, this volume demonstrates how spaces of domination and resistance are created, shaped, and intertwined.

As several authors in the volume emphasize, resistance is not only a spatial formation; it also possesses temporal qualities. Isolde de Villiers's chapter on "lawscapes" explores both the impact of historical political trials also held in Pretoria on the Rivonia trial, and the ways in which the legacies of the Rivonia trial continue to shape Pretoria's legal landscape. Similarly, Catherine M. Cole's chapter considers the influence of South African political trials between 1956 and 1964, on shaping the narratives associated with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Taken together, these chapters reflect not only the imprint of trials past on the Rivonia trial courtroom, but also the Rivonia trial's capacity to generate ripples affecting subsequent major judicial events in South Africa.

A striking reading of this relationship between resistance and temporality comes from Derek Hook's chapter reflecting on the impact of the death of Mandela in 2013. Arguing that the death of Mandela is equitable to the death of ideas of South African exceptionalism, Hook envisages contemporary South Africa on the precipice of a void, facing a crisis of self-definition, having lost what he describes as its "quasi-mythic" father figure. Whereas other authors in the volume, particularly Alison Phipps in her chapter on the theme of unanswered letters written during Mandela's trial, view Mandela's speeches during the Rivonia trial as a continuing source of inspiration in the ongoing struggle against oppression in South Africa, Hook evokes the need for a post-Mandela self-fashioning for South Africa that is at once disconcerting and brimming with potential.

Overall, Allo's edited volume is a dynamic synthesis of the spatial, temporal, and performative dimensions of the political trial. In particular, the volume provides a multifaceted set of interpretations of both the workings and the legacies of the Rivonia trial, which would provide a range of interesting insights for scholars of Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa across disciplines from history to performance studies, as well as an engaging and accessible introduction for graduate and advanced undergraduate students.

Hannah Marshall, *Brown University*

Carol Anderson. 2015. *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941-1960*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 372 pp.

Anderson's book makes an essential contribution to Black Studies and its relation with the African diaspora and Third World countries. She analyzes the most crucial African-American rights organization, the NAACP, perhaps in its most difficult time, that of the Cold War and civil rights era through revealing its anti-colonial politics, internal struggles, its place and role in the African-American movements, its approach regarding the USSR and communism, and its stance on international affairs. In her analysis of the NAACP's anti-colonial struggle, Anderson implies that the organization was controversial but also had an important and powerful role in the African-American community's internal struggle for civil rights, equality and in its desire of challenging colonialism.

As the title "Bourgeois Radicals" indicates, Anderson aims to show that the NAACP in its anti-colonial approach was unique regarding not only similar American organizations but also several international organizations, and institutions. As a "bourgeois" organization its agenda on US politics was constituted through preservation of the civil rights politics'

framework, and it put distance between itself and communism and communist groups. Meanwhile as a “radical” group, it challenged Washington’s Cold War politics, “Jim Crow structure,” and colonial administrations through the UN, the media, various alliances, and supporters within the US administration.

She chooses to use the term “NAACP’s anti-colonialism.” However, Anderson cannot be certain in elaborating the organization’s success in its struggle against colonialism and its articulation of anti-colonialism. She acclaims that international relations and colonialism were “unfamiliar” (p. 57) for the organization and that it did not want to take the lead in the struggle for colonial liberation. Rather, the NAACP aimed to be cooperative (p. 60) but to Anderson its mission was “helping destroy colonialism” (p. 268). Moreover she argues that its anti-colonial campaign was coherent. She also wants to indicate that it had some difficult accomplishments (p. 202) like challenging colonial administrations, having allies “closely working with the NAACP on UN issue” (p. 191). However Anderson accepts that the NAACP lost its role, effects, and had a “stalemate” (p. 56) on colonial liberation struggles. Its confusion was mainly based on hesitancy of a potential link with the USSR and radicals, Cold War politics, and turbulent domestic politics like the Eisenhower era (p. 290).

The book also indicates that Anderson’s analysis of the NAACP’s anti-colonial struggle includes comparison among African-American movements, left wing, and progressive groups. She makes a distinction between the NAACP and these groups especially in terms of their approach to communism and relations with the Soviets. Anderson highlights that in analyzing the NAACP is crucial to recognize the fact that African-Americans had different anti-colonial approaches. For instance to Anderson, the NAACP lacked ideological grounds, it was an ally of “indigenous freedom fighters” (p. 268), and partner with progressive alliances (p. 133). She bases the NAACP’s anti-colonialism on human rights to further highlight differences in the anti-colonial struggle between the NAACP, the USSR, and other African-American organizations. According to her the NAACP was more successful (p. 135) than Black left groups or as she says radical organizations (p. 335).

The comprehensiveness of Anderson’s work can be seen in the quantity and quality of resources and its content. Its structure and content have both positive and negative elements. For instance, she elaborates the NAACP’s policies regarding South Africa, Italian colonialism, and Indonesia, which give a comprehensive background to its liberation politics. On the other hand, a lack of headings and subheadings in all chapters makes it difficult for readers to follow the argument of the sentence, paragraph, page, or book. Anderson, in presenting the NAACP comprehensively refers not only to primary resources like reports and speeches of key figures but also to rhetorical elements and uses her own judgments. In some chapters, she takes part in the internal rivalry within the NAACP. She compares Du Bois with White or Wilson; criticizes Du Bois’ actions as failures (p. 54). She uses newspaper articles, comments, and citations from persons or institutions sometimes without a connection to the NAACP. She makes generalizations that lead readers to think that the whole African-American community supports the NAACP and its policies (p. 216). Hence, readers may question Anderson’s objectivity, her selections, and their contribution in supporting the book’s arguments.

The book shows that the NAACP was not a reactionary organization, and did not include black radicals. It functioned within the dynamics of the relationship between the White House and the civil rights movement—thus the distinction among the NAACP, left wing groups, and the black community is emphasized throughout the book. Furthermore it is argued that an anti-colonial stance cannot be attributed solely to radicals. In terms of the

book's structure, using headings and subheadings would facilitate readers' analysis of the arguments and examples. Instead of details or detailed examples, a direct correlation can be established between examples, quotes, and the organization and its politics to better understand the argument. Rather than details of Cold War history, a summary of the era, the colonial administrations' or other African-American movements' approach to the NAACP would be more useful to elaborate its anti-colonial politics. As Anderson claims, the organization was successful in some domains. She provides an essential resource for readers who are familiar with African politics, Cold War history, and are interested in African-American civil rights movements' international relations.

Ceren Gürseler Özbilgiç, *Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Turkey*

Sean Anderson. 2015. *Modern Architecture and its Representation in Colonial Eritrea: An In-visible Colony, 1890-1941*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 288 pp.

Modern Architecture and its Representation in Colonial Eritrea is a four-chapter book on the history of modern architecture in colonial Eritrea, the distinctive hallmarks of the country today, serving as reminders of its Italian colonial past. The densely presented book—with extensive citations, images and designs—helps fill the gaps of a less-studied Italian legacy in Eritrea.

The first chapter covers the early Italian colonial explorers' conquest of the "Eritrean empty spaces." Eritrea posed a great challenge for the Italians, as their nation's first colony with great strategic importance but without many desirable raw materials or a hospitable climate. The second chapter covers the planning and building from scratch of Asmara and other towns. Asmara rose relatively quickly as a vibrant replica of Italian cities. This was appropriate for its designated role as a springboard for colonial conquest. At the same time, with majestic architectural designs portraying power, the Italians designed the capital as an intimidating fortress. The chapter discusses the construction of grand institutional and residential buildings designed to blend into the magnificent landscapes. These eventually became imposing symbols, embodying and reinforcing the colonial presence.

The third chapter further explores the "interior spaces" of the Italian colonizers, the places where they finally began to enjoy their hard-won colonial presence. In the new overlapping spaces negotiated between the colonizer and the colonized, the local population finally began taking part in the modernization scheme. Thus they began to delimitate the space between the local and the colonizer, and even man and woman. The fourth chapter reframes and summarizes Italian colonial conquest through sources' memories, museum items and collections, along with surviving representations in Europe. After Italy lost its colonies during World War II, its ultimately failed efforts to reclaim them and resurrect the colonial era but depended upon memories and exhibitions that attempted to make up the loss of power.

Anderson has written about the least-studied colonial era, often neglected in the bigger African colonial map. Reading the book through the eyes of a former colonial subject, applying a localized, post-colonial critique, however, the book's positions are not so solid or trustworthy. Although Anderson expresses his heartfelt gratitude to Steven Nelson, through whom he "discovered the continent and lifelong source of inventiveness" (p. xix), he seems detached from the population of the African continent. The author reveals a conspicuous neglect of the local Africans; of the 108 people mentioned in the acknowledgements of

individuals who made the book possible, none is an Eritrean. This lack of representation and the trend of ignoring Eritreans, and African people in general, becomes even more apparent in the sources Anderson referenced. Out of the 110 primary sources he cited, none was Eritrean-produced. Similarly, of the more than 360 secondary sources cited across the book, only seven are Eritrean-authored and are used to confirm basic, uncontested facts.

Flaws and oversights resulting from such disregard of readily available scholarly material written by Eritreans are evident throughout the text. Although the book seeks to explore modern architecture in colonial Eritrea, the author, if one did not know any better, seems to be writing about a literally empty space. It's difficult to see how one can write about distinct buildings and their history, without mentioning the human element. The book ignores the interactions, relationships, and acts of conscription, dislocation, and nationalization of land that played such crucial roles during the Italian colonial period. By ignoring these ignominious hallmarks of Italian colonial rule, and instead gazing at the Eritrean historic spaces through the eyes of the colonizer, the book reads more like an homage to the latter.

The book uses leading scholars in the field of architecture to substantiate its theories and conclusions. It provides a thorough look at the Italian colonists' justifications and perspectives during the early colonial period in Eritrea, through travelogues of the early settlers and diaries from colonial missions. Employing theoretical abstractions and overusing minute details at the expense of rendering a bigger picture, the book avoids any meaningful treatment of the excessive use of lethal force and brutality exercised by the Italian colonizers. Furthermore, the author, by omitting discussion of these sensitive but relevant areas and quoting texts that appear to justify the colonial occupation, exacerbates, ignores, and/or misrepresents the rarely discussed Italian colonial "color bar" (racial hierarchy). For example, the book cites a text that glosses over the Italian color bar (later infamously adopted in Apartheid South Africa), casually observing: "Sons of Europeans mingle and play freely with native boys" (p. 173).

While *Modern Architecture and its Representation in Colonial Eritrea* features dazzling photographs of the buildings and colonial spaces discussed between its covers, it perpetuates the tired patronization and condescension committed by the early colonizers—treating the indigenous population as exotic subjects rather than human beings. Photographs repeatedly depict the superior, civilized Italians exercising their "white-man's burden"—their mission to "civilize" the muscular black body of the indigenous population, showing either topless women or the stereotypical image of "African hunters with their prey." Such images are included repeatedly, without any critique or retrospective judgment.

Abraham T. Zere, *Ohio University/PEN Eritrea*

Ruy Llera Blanes. 2014. *A Prophetic Trajectory: Ideologies of Place, Time and Belonging in an Angolan Religious Movement*, Cambridge: Berghahn. xiv, 234 pp.

The book consists of two parts: itineraries and heritages, with a separate introduction. The author's great interest in Christian pluralism in Lisbon encouraged him to study the Tokoist Church as an African Pentecostal Church. Points of interest include Portuguese governance, the Tokoist Prophet Simão Toko in exile, and the system of evangelism. The author garnered information from the participants in Tokoist Church itineraries. He also utilized historical archives regarding Portuguese political and social life. The author emphasized the need to

educate readers on effective religious change. His investigation revealed to him that the Tokoist Prophet had predicted that this work would be written after his death.

Chapter one and two present the biography of Simão Toko, while chapter three examined his life style in the struggle for Gospel. Angola gained independence on 25th April 1974. The next year witnessed various developments like patriotism, libertarianism, communism, and pan-Africanism. But of all of them, the Tokoist Church emerged as second to the existing Catholic Church of Angola (p. 8). The author stated that Christian movements in Angola led to the establishment of the Tokoist Church. The Prophet reconstructed some forgotten histories in Angola, and the Tokoist Church thus became popular in Angola and was named after its founder and prophet Simão Toko. The Church embarked upon the following gospel work: the way of prophetic trajectory, Angola's heritage was turned to specific acts and practice: liturgy, singing, praying and prophesying. Blanes also reported that dialectic concern regarding history, time, and social sciences through academic discipline was another issue that concerned the Prophet.

Simão Toko carried out an exchange of correspondence, which produced the church's doctrine with a view to striking a balance between dynamic and confusion; it was a unique development. The colonial establishment attempted using Simão Toko to destabilize and divide Angolan, accusing him of offences and seeking to influence various groups against him. During this victimization, Simão Toko was imprisoned and suffered from cardiovascular disease, but he survived and the attempt proved a futile effort on the part of colonial officials. His illness created ambiguity in the memories of Tokoists in postcolonial and post-war Angola, which reduced the membership of the Tokoist Church (p. 83).

Cultural markers were set for Tokoist Church members. They dress in white garments with eight pointed stars and cut their hair short. Tokoist Church members promoted gospel work through correspondence, they set aside time for hymns and prayers, and they taught the concept of Omnipresence. Before the Prophet's death, several obvious issues emerged. They included succession, financial mismanagement, and civil war. The transition challenge was noted when many groups in Angola and the diaspora came together as Tokoist Church members. Simão Toko planned to build central temple that was not realized. In the 20th century, members intended to erect it, but no sooner than later the idea culminated in economic determinism and sectorial national analyses (p. 173). The succession took another phase when Ilda, the eldest daughter of Simão Toko, did not subscribe to the Church of her father. She advanced reasons for her action such as sufferings, Kongo prophetism, subversive anticolonial messianism, and angel political leadership against her father.

Who was this Tokoist Prophet the author studied? He was born Mayamona Simão to the Anictombe and Ndundu family at Sadi-Zulumongo near Taia, Uíge Province, Angola in 1918. He studied at the Kibokolo Baptist missionaries 1926-1937, which included three years of study in Luanda. He also worked as an apprentice in painting, a watch repairer, a public registrar, and a secretary for associations. He joined Catholic Church and then later proclaimed that God had called him to herd the sheep, after which he formed a choir group. Having fulfilled his proclaimed mission, he died, though there was a great deal controversy about the exact date of his death. Some sources claimed it was January 1st 1984 while others presented 31st December 1983. The author described the Tokoist Prophet as a man of peace, ideas, an open heart, and an example of solidarity. He rejected violence, advocated unity, and agreed to be Portuguese until his last day.

The author did a wonderful job of research. The book is self-explanatory and informing not about Angola alone but the existence of other churches and their practices amidst political manipulations and turmoil.

Huud Shittu, *University of Jos*

Lydia Boyd. 2015. *Preaching Prevention: Born-Again Christianity and the Moral Politics of AIDS in Uganda*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 237 pp.

Lydia Boyd's robust contribution to AIDS discourse in Africa, particularly in Uganda where she undertook her study through an anthropological approach, provides a set of critical tensions to the overall understanding of the intricate interface between the pandemic, cultures, religions, politics, traditions, and foreign policies. Although the book harps on abstinence and faithfulness as veritable measures of preventing the spread of AIDS in a country that was highly infested, the cultural cum traditional perception of them and the foreign dimension that obviously promoted them, created a tension of how best to understand these measures. Within the frames of this tension is how the African personhood is defined and distinguished both from within and outside, a tension that tends to superiorize the one and inferiorize the other; and also breaks down, if it ever exists, the equality of humans. The tensions could be felt between Christianity and African religious traditions and beliefs occasioned by change and dynamism in society; western culture and African culture; African Christianity and African traditional religious traditions; African Christianity and African culture in Africa; men's and women's authority in changing family settings; concept and appreciation of love in Uganda in precolonial and postcolonial eras; and, finally, African Christians and Western Christians, which was demonstrated when there was a change in foreign policy.

Boyd argues that President George W. Bush's President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) project caused a dramatic change in the perception of HIV and AIDS. Its thrust, however, was behavior change, which makes it rupture the common prevention strategy like the use of condoms. The absence of condoms and the emphasis on abstinence and faithfulness (i.e. A+B-C) within marriage in PEPFAR seemed to have perfectly aligned with the Ugandan traditional panacea to the pandemic. Thus the enthusiasm with which PEPFAR was received and the results achieved, despite the tensions, can be easily measured. For the Ugandans and their government, there existed before PEPFAR a lifestyle that emplaced and insisted on abstinence, which is elaborately celebrated when a woman was not deflowered before marriage; and faithfulness, which oils that love in marriage.

The book espouses the cultural contests within which the Ugandans live and how these have affected their understanding of AIDS and response to behavior change. Boyd underscores the fact that most "traditional" Ugandans romanticized their past as quintessentially fit to live in even in the "modern" society. The intrusion of colonialists has been fingered as the cause of disruption of tranquillity in the community, and created tension in the family: "the household became a key locus of political and social change" (p. 61). But there are also some tensions within the precolonial Ugandan cultural values that postcolonial Ugandans do not pay attention to. Love in marriage/relationship as Boyd paints it seems to be stimulated and sustained by gifts. The ability to pay bridewealth in precolonial Uganda and the place of money among modern Ugandan youth altogether make love "insincere" (p. 136). Even parental love toward children raises a tension: the Christians

see their parents as persons that are unable to love; genuine love could only be found in the church.

Boyd locates this situation of things within the structural change introduced by colonialism and missionary religions. Within the prism of AIDS prevention strategy, abstinence and faithfulness in the precolonial era can therefore be construed in a communal framework rather than individual responsibility that characterized their understanding and application in PEPFAR. It would seem that deep down, the communal spirit of abstinence and faithfulness in the traditional love protocol still helped the campaign against AIDS even among the Ugandan Christians. The demonization of precolonial African life by Christian missionaries and African Pentecostal Christians obviously resulted in the militarization of prayer that goes in the name of deliverance. This is not without the fact that those who Boyd worked with are almost postcolonial, urban Ugandans. The Pentecostals, in dealing with human problems through deliverance prayers, come to the same point with the traditional healing mechanism which embodies both the physical and spiritual.

Finally, the Ugandan response to the American government and western Christians' support for decriminalization of homosexuality gives a sense of "freedom." Both traditional and Christian Ugandans mostly accepted that homosexuality is not admissible in the Ugandan public. The resistance from Uganda demonstrates that PEPFAR was successful, and can only be, to the point that it aligns with most Ugandans' cultural belief rather than the aid that comes with it. Despite the tensions, Boyd calls the Africans to wake up to that which defines them, which can only be found within them.

Benson Ohihon Igboin, *Ajasin University, Ondo State, Nigeria*

Gwyn Campbell and Elizabeth Elbourne (eds.). 2014. *Sex, Power and Slavery*. Athens OH: Ohio University Press. 646 pp.

In twenty-six essays, this book looks at the intersections between the history of sexuality and the history of slavery in broad comparative perspective. The book is divided into seven thematic sections. Section one begins with three overview essays about sexuality and enslavement in particular regions, by David Brion Davis on the Americas, Martin Klein on the vast northern regions of West Africa known as the western Sudan, and the late Richard Hellie on Russia and the Russian Empire. These essays lay out some paradigmatic arguments.

Section two examines concubinage, law, and the family in polygamous societies. Griet Vankeerberghen's essay in this section addresses concubinage, marriage, and slavery in China during the Han period. Abdul Sheriff and George Michael La Rue dissect relationships within the elite harems, in Zanzibar in the case of Sheriff and in nineteenth-century Egypt in the case of La Rue. Ann McDougall examines the dynamics of carnal relations within slaveholding families in Mauritania, with the attention to the status ambiguity between "wife" and "concubine" and to the ways in which enslaved concubines and the children they produced fit into wider economic and familial structures. Matthew Hopper looks at the family relationships of enslaved pearl divers, most of African origin, in the Arabian Gulf between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally, Marie Rodet echoes Hopper's emphasis on the strategies of the enslaved, focusing on the "sexual and migratory strategies" of slave women in French Sudan in the region of Kayes at the time of emancipation.

Section three looks at sexuality, slavery, and the family in the Atlantic trading system. Ulrike Schmieder provides an ambitious overview of sexual relations not only between slaves and nonslaves but also among the enslaved themselves in nineteenth-century Cuba. Tara Innis seeks to overcome the silences in both the historical record and subsequent scholarship around the sexual exploitation of enslaved children to examine the abuse of children in Barbados in the final half century of slavery in the British Empire. Mariana Candido examines sexual liaisons between foreign men and enslaved women in the slave-trading center Benguela, in what was then the Portuguese colony of Angola.

In section four, the volume homes in on some key themes. One cluster of essays addresses sex trafficking and prostitution. James Warren describes the trafficking of Japanese girls and women to colonial Singapore and the daily life of Singaporean brothels between 1870 and 1940. Johanna Ransmeir looks at the mechanisms that saw Chinese women trafficked in the first place, in the analysis of the sale of women at the end of the Qing dynasty from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Rosaline Uyanga and Marie-Louise Ermisch explore the current trafficking of Nigerian women and compare this to enslavement. Francesca Mitchell makes similar observations about the rise of sex trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia from the 1960s forward. Shigeru Sato provides a sobering comparison with the trafficking and exploitation of comfort women by the Japanese army in World War II.

Section five turns to art and the light that it can shed on the relationship between sexuality and slavery. Gabeba Baderoon analyzes contemporary South African art and fiction that seeks to recapture the traumatic but often hidden history of slavery in the Cape Colony. Charmaine Nelson examines how black girls were portrayed in Canadian art from the time of slavery. Finally, Ana Lucia Arujo analyzes the representations of slaves and slavery in colonial Brazil by European artists and the ways in which they perpetuated particular stereotypes about the enslaved, including their sexuality.

Section six turns to three chapters that “Queer” the study of slavery. Brian Lewis re-examines the sexual life of Casement in the context of his antislavery activities. Ronaldo Vainfas combs through sources to uncover information about sex between men in Minas Gerais in eighteenth-century. Salah Trabelsi writes about eunuchs in the early Islamic world, mining Arabic-language chronicles and travelers’ account from the period to gain glimpses of the lives of enslaved and the nature of relationships in elite households.

The final section of the book brings together three essays that discuss aspects of the ideological structures that accompanied slavery but in environments without formal juridical enslavement. Joost Coté studies abolitionist rhetoric in the Dutch East Indies, as well ways in which coerced labor continued after the formal abolition of slavery. In contemporary Madagascar, Sandra Evers argues, peasants in the community she studied continued to believe that some people were the slaves of other and owed them labor because they did not have ancestral tombs or land rights. The final essay in the collection, by Subho Basu, looks at the labor as coerced, but women were often forced into it by debt bondage and other more women mill workers in twentieth-century Bengal.

This collection challenges many established conceptual boundaries, and refines and reinterprets others. All its essays are framed in the larger debates on sexuality and slavery, so that each case study functions as a window on a particular theme.

Syprien Christian Zogo, *Laval University*

Campbell, John. 2013. *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*. Updated edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 240 pp.

John Campbell is a political scholar and an eclectic sociopolitical author on Nigerian historiographic content and administrative current events. As a US diplomat, he served two-terms in Nigeria, first as a political counsul, 1988 to 1990, and then as a US Ambassador, 2004 to 2007. Currently, he is a Ralph Bunche Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at The Council on Foreign Relations and produces lucid scholarship on Nigeria's lackluster governmental competence to attract and maintain sustainable national development, and policy-making capabilities that culturally appeases the split between the Muslim North and the Christian South.

Campbell's hard-hitting contemporary political literary work demonstrates Nigeria's seemingly unwillingness to internally cooperate rationally with nationalis ethics. He notes Nigeria's multi-ethnicities, the conglomeration of religiosity, and the sociocultural differences recognized between the North and the South as divided by the Middle Belt. Given the fact that Nigeria exists within oil-rich tropical lands in the Southern core Niger Delta region, especially within Bayelsa State, Campbell vividly challenges the notion as to why Nigeria is natural resource wealthy while the average citizen suffers from unprecedented economic deprivation. The Nigerian government and its federal constituents in supposedly striving for an operative democratic statehood, Campbell depicts who through economics owns and controls Nigeria as a corporate power structure. Methodically, he exposes the intricate political extremes of Nigeria by comparing and contrasting the ideological stance between the Islamic North as a province separate from the Christian South in terms of sociopolitical ideology and religious philosophy. His monograph unveils the egregious political clout of unfair and culturally under-represented presidential elections, thus advancing the general Nigerian citizenry's lack of trust and political investment into insupportable levels of governmental corruption and narrated violence.

The book's chronological time-span stretches from Nigeria's third president, Shehu Shagari (1979-1983), to the sixth president, Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), and he distinctly contextualizes the political tyranny that often occurs therein via coup d'états. He moves forward by deconstructing elements of clandestine techniques used in the process of obtaining the presidency in Nigerian "election-like" events. Interestingly, although Northern Nigeria is predominately Islamic, it is experiencing political disturbances Boko Haram, which was Mohammed Yusef, an Islamic cleric formally instituted circa 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the northeastern state of Borno. Nigerian Muslims since Boko Haram's commencement have been pushing for the institution of Sharia Law. As a non-apologist of Westernized education, Campbell thoroughly scrutinizes Boko Haram as simply facilitators of political agitation, and not adept enough to infiltrate the Nigerian federal government through standard political negotiations, other than mustering change through tactical messages of self-imposed schematics of the onslaught of terrorism.

Ambassador Campbell strongly encourages the US Department of State to succor Nigeria with formulating a functional blueprint for democracy in a potentially failing statehood. From Washington, D.C. to Abuja, Campbell persuasively argues that practical methods of influential international diplomacy could serve in the greater interest of Nigeria, leading towards self-sufficiency and national independency. He ponders the contemporary Nigerian sociopolitical environment by questioning if the Federal Republic of Nigeria is

truly “Dancing on the Brink” of collapse; certainly he tends to think not. However, at a conference held at the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs in April 2008, those involved in the Fourth Republic deliberations declared that “revolution” is the only way out of Nigeria’s current predicament. Some argued for violence, others for civil disobedience, and others for revolution of ideas and moral conduct (p. 167).

In closing, Campbell’s monographic illuminates Nigeria and its probability for super-power statehood as searching outwardly for internal healing. Nigeria, ceremoniously known as the “Giant of Africa” and by far the most populous country on the continent ostensibly is like a black-necked spitting cobra that hasn’t fully developed its venom yet. Campbell’s book is a literary testament to the modernity of Nigeria’s sociopolitical atmosphere with an undertone poignancy for practical transformation. Without reluctance, I strongly recommend this literary masterpiece, because through combining primary evidence and personal experience, Campbell administers a strongly supported critical analysis of Nigeria’s political upper class (formally known as the “Ogas”). Academically, he exhibits the potential of Nigeria and the litany of governmental dysfunctions in a systematic chronological fashion that is readily comprehended without being a histo-academician. The evidence of Nigeria’s sociopolitical historiography is arduously contemptible, however; Ambassador Campbell attentively resurrects the idea that Nigeria can mobilize for political purposes in steps towards a righteous direction of statehood stability and dependable political behavior servicing its citizens in kind for a tangible bright future.

Chinedu Uzoma Amaefula, *Indiana University-Bloomington*

Judith Lütge Coullie and Andries Visagie, (eds.). 2014. *Antjie Krog: An Ethics of Body and Otherness*. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 341 pp.

This book is a collection of thirteen scholarly essays that trace over four decades of Krog’s literary and cultural output as a writer, journalist, and translator. The book is logically organised, and offers a stimulating discussion on Krog’s transposition of South African identities. The first three essays explore the place of ethics in *Country of My Skull*, Krog’s semi-fictionalised memoir based on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings. Judith Lütge Coullie in “Remembering to Forget: Testimony, Collective Memory and the Genesis of the ‘New’ South African Nation in *Country of My Skull*,” draws from studies about trauma and memory to explain how Krog has used her authorial voice as a “second-person witness” to structure national memory. Building on the limitations of memory in constructing national consciousness in traumatic situations, Coullie is interested in Krog’s privileging of certain narratives while suppressing others.

Kim Rostan’s “The Ethics of Infidelity in *Country of My Skull*” explores two features in the memoir that offer ethical dilemmas: Krog’s integration of ambiguous testimonies of the TRC hearings, and the inclusion of an imagined extramarital affair. Rostan identifies the ethical dilemma of infusing personal narratives in a fluid genre as Krog’s. Drawing parallels from the German Holocaust and other traumatic histories, Rostan highlights the complexities inherent in reconciling private and collective memories to build a conscientious society. Concluding that it is difficult to write about others’ experiences in traumatic situations, Rostan questions certain fidelities in Krog’s writing that aspire to forge ethical responsibility.

Susan Spearey in *"Country of my Skull, the Transmission of Testimony, and the Democratisation of Pedagogy"* addresses the pedagogical complexities and moral anxieties inherent in the teaching of *Country of My Skull*. Arguing for innovative pedagogical approaches that reflect context, Spearey is interested in the "ethics of *reception*" necessary for a wholesome reading and understanding of the memoir. Providing case studies of classroom engagement in Brock University in Canada, Spearey argues for a reading that offers new sense of experience to both the learners and their lecturers.

Louise Viljoen, in her two articles in this collection, builds on Krog's use of the (auto)biographical voice in her writing to inscribe notions of the female body. In "'I Have a Body, Therefore I Am': Grotesque, Monstrous and Abject Bodies in Antjie Krog's Poetry," Viljoen uses Krog's ambiguous representation of the female body in her poetry as "grotesque, monstrous or abject" to underscore the ethical dilemma of (re)presenting the female body as a transgressive self. Pointing out specific aspects of female corporeality from Krog's early poetry (1970-1975) and later volumes (1981-2006) in which Krog deploys the autobiographical female self, Viljoen brings to light Krog's politicised female subjectivity. In "The Mother as Pre-Text: (Auto)biographical Writing in Antjie Krog's *A Change of Tongue*," Viljoen explores Krog's changing conception of the self, especially in how she constructs her (writing and feminine) identity, in relation to her mother, Dot Serfontein. Viljoen underscores Krog's ethical dilemma of writing out of her mother's embodied self, contesting notions of motherhood, culture, and history.

Turning to Simone de Beauvoir on the manifestation of the female erotic, Christy Weyer, in "The Ambiguity of the Erotic: Antjie Krog's *Down to My Last Skin*," builds on Krog's ambiguous representation of the female body. Identifying the ambivalent sexual positions in the poems, Weyer underscores how Krog writes against radical feminism, especially in her representation of "objectified eroticism" that identifies the female self as passively dependent on male eroticism.

Anthea Garman's two contributions use media theories to discuss Krog's standing as a journalist. In "Antjie Krog and the Accumulation of 'Media Meta-Capital'," Garman appraises Krog's early political and cultural consciousness, and connects it to Krog's active participation in the media. Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu, Garman consecrates Krog as a "public figure" with considerable "symbolic capital" in the media, hence her "'media meta capital'". In her second contribution in this volume, "Running with the Jackals: Antjie Krog the Journalist", Garman discusses how Krog imprints her poetic sensibilities in the field of journalism in her use of the autobiographical voice in what Garman exemplifies as "advocacy journalism".

The other essays in this collection explore Krog's contribution in the field of translation. Dan Wylie's "'Now Strangers Walk in That Place': Antjie Krog, Modernity, and the Making of //Kabbo's Story" examines Krog's version of /Xam translations by Bleek/Lloyd about the Cape Bushman. Building on studies about the Bushman and San-related peoples, Wylie is interested in Krog's translation, titled *The Stars Say 'Tsau'*, in its engagement with transculturation. Wylie turns to a few //Kabbo's stories to underlie Krog's fidelity in maintaining //Kabbo's voice, while locating the translation within modernity in the South African context.

Andreas Visagie in "Writing the Medea Myth in a New Context: Tom Lanoye, Antjie Krog and *Mamma Medea*" meditates on Krog's challenge of translation across cultural contexts. Focusing on Krog's Afrikaans translation of Tom Lanoye's *Mamma Medea*, Visagie

is interested in her appropriation of strategies of “cultural substitution and ‘foreignisation’.” Visagie questions Krog’s choice of language of translation, as well as her fidelity to sources and indebtedness to authorship.

In “The Splendour and Misery of Translation: Interview with Antjie Krog” Ileana Dimitriu interviews Krog on her translation strategies. In this interview, Krog identifies language and audience as primary in textual translation, underlining that fidelity to the narrative voice and cultural sensitivity guides her writing. Krog explains her choice of “same-language translation”, and argues for her use of “foreignising” strategies, particularly in the Bleek/Lloyd collection and in her adaptation of Lanoye’s *Mamma medea*. Krog also addresses criticism on her translations.

In “‘Inhabiting’ the Translator’s *Habitus*: Antjie Krog as Translator,” Frances Vosloo ascribes Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* to Krog in her use of an intrusive voice in the Afrikaans translations. This *habitus* is marked through her “transposable dispositions” which explains the seamlessly shifting identities and subject matter in her oeuvre, and which finds ultimate expression in her identity as a translator.

The concluding chapter, “A Question of Ethics in *There Was This Goat: Investigating the Truth Commission testimony of Notrose Nobomvu Konile*,” by Judith Lütge Coullie, addresses Krog’s journey at self, her translation and the ambiguity of otherness. Coullie revisits Krog’s physical (and symbolic) journey to Mrs Konile in the Eastern Cape. Coullie is emphatic on Krog’s ethical and intellectual obligation that sets her as an ethical scholar who registers alterity in her work with utmost sensitivity.

This book is recommended for scholars on Antjie Krog, and those interested in South Africa’s transitional moment.

Robert Rotich, Egerton University

Robert S. DuPlessis. 2016. *The Material Atlantic: Clothing, Commerce, and Colonization in the Atlantic World, 1650-1800*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 351 pp.

Between the mid-seventeenth and the late eighteenth centuries European expansion and commerce were at their zenith. They gave shape to the early Atlantic world, a world of complex internal and external networks, which made it dynamic, diverse, enduring and ultimately global. These networks were involved in extensive cultural and population transfers and ruptures and set up new economies and societies. Following the construction of the Atlantic world, commercial trends, fabric consumption, and sartorial cultures appeared. Clothing was at the core of these diverse economic and socio-cultural phenomena. *The Material Atlantic* is primarily about these commercial patterns, their acquisition and uses. It looks into how men and women belonging to various ethnic, social, occupational, and class categories designed the apparel from all sorts of materials in a variety of geo-climatic, political, and socio-cultural environments, which offered opportunities for innovation and imposed stringent constraints at the same time.

This engaging and profoundly documented account alters and extends the existing scholarship on globalization in the early modern period, the Atlantic world, and consumption. It depicts the fabrics and attire accessible to consumers, traces the methods and occasions of their acquisition, analyzes the meanings of their usages, and explicates the implications of these crucial developments on global textile industries before the advent of the factory system. These developments included large-scale enslavement, the proliferation

of new and sourced goods, the alteration of consumer behavior and attitudes, and the assertion of social identities. Fabrics and garments became indeed the dominant interculturally exchanged consumer goods. Their economic significance was obvious, while their meaning was less so. Dress includes personal expression and social status and prestige. For that, it provokes a whole range of pictorial representations.

The material Atlantic covered a vast geographical area stretching from the independent indigenous states of Cape Coast Castle on the West African Coast, Angola and neighboring kingdoms in West Central Africa, to Spanish Buenos Aires, Dutch Cape Town, the Southern district of French Caribbean Saint Domingue, British colonial Port Royal, and the continental North American French colonies of New Orleans, rural Louisiana, and Montreal. In this Atlantic, European trafficking, Catholic conversion, and colonization intermingled and thrived. These economically and geographically vibrant areas illustrate the diversity of dress cultures affected by the materials, manners, and modes brought about by the early modern Atlantic commerce and colonization. Exports and re-exports of cottons, woolens, linen, calicoes, and silk increased tremendously. These areas also witnessed a solid web of relationships linking people on each side of the Atlantic. That is how the Atlantic came to be shared, not fully, it has to be admitted. Sources, including probate and post-mortem inventories, commercial records, contemporary narrative works, newspaper advertisements, but also paintings and engravings, scarcely give a voice to Africans and Amerindians. Yet, the latter's contribution to the so-called "global turn" was notable. True, Europeans and free settlers established networks which intensified worldwide movements of people, goods, images, and styles in the early modern period. It is they who also operated these networks and exercised power between and within them. That "turn," however, would not have seen the day without the indigenous peoples. Much of the production, sale, and purchase, not only of dress and clothing, but of everything else were in the hands of Africans, Amerindians, and others, and much of the commercial activities connected to global trade were not in European hands. Early modern globalization was neither unilateral nor unidirectional. It was the outcome of the intersection, hybridity, and heterogeneity of peoples around the Atlantic. Goods, fashions, and usages flowed in diverse directions. No one could claim to have imposed a mode, a cultural practice, or a sartorial culture. The material Atlantic was a world of connections. The *Material Atlantic* reveals that the early modern global world promoted the wide availability of some similar items and some textiles became global goods, their consumption, nevertheless, was confined to local, regional, or imperial contexts. Convergence and divergence were equally central to early modern globalization. A significant part of the commodities which circulated in the Atlantic came from outside the basin. Most of the European colonies had to depend on the massive imports of Indian cottons traded in West and West central Africa for the enslaved labor working on the plantations in the Americas. The outlines of the Atlantic were as a consequence ineluctably affected by wider global patterns.

This wide-ranging history is invaluable to world and socio-cultural historians and their students respectively.

Adel Manai, *Qatar University*

Banning Eyre. 2015. *Lion Songs: Thomas Mapfumo and the Music that Made Zimbabwe*. Durham: Duke University Press. 416 pp.

Banning Eyre is a versatile creative artist, plus his roles as an author and guitarist qualifies him to write about the singer/bandleader/advocate Thomas Mapfumo. Eyre compellingly chronicles the contribution of Mapfumo, arguing that an assessment of his life and career simplifies and makes it easier for one to comprehend Zimbabwe. The book sets the biography in a historical context and presents it in sixteen chapters. It covers colonial Rhodesia when Mapfumo was born in 1945, through the liberation struggle and post-independence euphoria periods. It further stretches to the era when the musician protested against social injustice committed by the Mugabe regime and this led to his ultimate exile to the state of Oregon in the United States in 2000. His immense legacy is apparent in his unwavering struggle for social justice and African culture. Before Zimbabwe's independence, he was constantly courageously outspoken and he was a thorn to the Smith regime. He became a critic of the corrupt presidency of Mugabe that persists until today, although he assisted him to rise to power and even sang praise songs for him during the excitement for independence epoch. Notwithstanding the fact that his exile isolated him from his domestic fans, the significance of his music was maintained through live concerts he held at the end of each year in the country until 2004, including live shows that took place in Johannesburg and London since 2005. Eyre asserts that Mapfumo's return to Zimbabwe following the end of Mugabe's regime is likely to see him play to an amphitheatre audience and his songs maybe played on the radio.

The book's strengths include its candid narration of the various stages of Mapfumo's life from birth and the evolution of his musical career. Despite the dominance of Mapfumo's side of the story, Eyre equally captured the voices of both critics and admirers of the musician, including the author, at every stage in Mapfumo's life; hence his legacy prevailed over his weaknesses in the biography. The bandleader's creative career and popularity from early performances of rock 'n' roll tunes to the establishment of a genre based on Zimbabwean music encompassing the fusion of the sacred *mbira*, African, and Western popular music are a result of his childhood which was influenced by his rural experience, caring parents, and religion including the active township culture. In the 1970s, Mapfumo composed the *chimurenga* (struggle) music genre challenging the Smith regime. His music was proscribed and he was incarcerated. This elevated him to an iconic figure in Zimbabwe's struggle for independence. Accordingly, Mapfumo was embraced as a culture champion, but tainted himself by performing for Bishop Muzorewa. He invigorated his willingness to embrace and play for Mugabe and his government after independence. He attacked the post-independence government via "*Corruption*," a song released in 1988, and this set him on a confrontation path with Mugabe.

The biography reveals that the activist's call for democracy, social and economic justice through music in post-independence Zimbabwe and need not be underestimated in light of the several songs and albums he produced at home and in exile. He had good moments when he toured the United States and Western Europe in the 1980s and signing record deals with international recording companies. To his credit, Eyre candidly explains the challenges faced by the artist's *Blacks Unlimited Band* involving contractors and tour expenses including high costs of marijuana. Besides, he lost many band members through HIV/AIDS, rebellion and exhaustion. Eyre reveals the musician's weaknesses as embodying sexism, poor management, and using vagueness both creatively and proficiently to circumvent conflict.

However, grammatical and typo errors such as on page 22 where “year after year” is wrongly put ‘year after year after year’ and page 40 where there is an omission of the word “years” watered down a fascinating narrative. The book raises a number of controversial issues regarding Zimbabwean history which require rethinking on the part of historians and academics. These include the Gukurahundi massacres and the Chinhoyi battle of 1966 which Eyre singles out as the work of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army and the African National Congress not the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army as portrayed by the victorious side’s patriotic history. Overall, the book though somewhat complicated by its bias towards explaining musical terms and processes capturing detail (which it could not escape since it is about explaining the life and work of a musician done by one who is also part of the music industry), it remains a must read for all those interested in Mapfumo’s musical and political significance in Zimbabwe, particularly the country’s struggle for freedom, justice, and culture. It is vital for historians, ethnomusicologists, political scientists and activists among others.

Mediel Hove, *University of Zimbabwe*

Toyin Falola and Nana Akua Amponsah (eds.). 2013. *Women, Gender, and Sexualities in Africa*. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. 356 pp.

For centuries Africa has been “the exotic,” “the sexual other,” “a conundrum to be understood” (by whom and in relation to whom?), it was more than high time to have a comprehensive compilation of texts written on several aspects of sexuality from a decisively African point of view and centered on African ways of analyzing their own reality. This book is that compilation and a great introductory text on the subject, showing us varied perspectives, different from those of anthropological and ethnological studies, while also applying the exhaustiveness to the geographical aspect and thus dealing with most part of the continent.

The book is structured in four parts, in addition to a comprehensive introduction where the theoretical framework and a bit of the history of the issues and the genesis of the book are clearly explained. The first part, entitled “Contesting Sexualities and the African Woman’s Body,” focuses on the various aspects of African women’s sexuality, which can be used to the women’s own advantage (as shown in the first text, on *Les Saignantes*), but is very often considered as “overwhelming” and “unleashed” by European men and women (there is a chapter on women’s travel narratives and also on African women’s sexuality viewed through the lens of Western religions). It is also a topic of different types of traditional art (and there is a text on Yoruba carvings) and, finally, something women have to fight to recover control of (as analyzed in the last chapter of this section, on the Kikuyu women’s movement to fight for their sexual rights).

Although for some people homosexuality is as un-African as feminism, the topic is covered in the second section of the book, which tackles homosexuality and the politics of identity. There are only four chapters in this section, dealing with the reality of the situation in Ghana and Nigeria, the Ugandan fight for rights for homosexuals as a human right issue, and an analysis of South African’s media published with a homosexual audience in mind.

Section III deals with the use of gender by nationalist leaders, as a way to reinforce the concept of “nation” and clearly differentiate from the West, so it talks about gendered nationalism and resistance to colonialism, specifically, the use African post-independence

leaders made of women's bodies as embodiments of tradition and, therefore, their attempts to control those bodies and the way they looked. It centers on the figures of Mobutu (Zaire), Nyerere (Tanzania), and Idi Amin (Uganda), and, completing the section, women's actions to control the way they themselves dress in Sudan and the incorporation of men to a traditionally women's field of work, hair braiding, that is taking place in Nigeria.

The fourth section focuses on womanhood, motherhood, femininity and AIDS, on mothers and grandmothers, the expectations society has for each of them in Cameroon or Cape Verde, how HIV and AIDS change the meaning of those traditional concepts and the way the roles are modified by them. It also analyzes how these diseases are also being used in wars to weaponize rape; closing the section and the book, a study of medicine by Asante women, where the healing tradition has continued in the hands of women.

Overall, the book brings together a very good selection of academic articles that, starting from the introduction, carefully and in detail analyze the topic of sexuality in its various aspects, without avoiding uncomfortable subjects at all, and with sound referencing and support materials, each of them with clarifying notes and the appropriate, up-to-date bibliography on the issue, so that readers who want to increase their knowledge of specific points can do so.

Mar Rodríguez Vázquez, *Cuttington University*

Feinberg, Harvey M. 2015. *Our Land, Our Future, Our Life: Black South African Challenges to Territorial Segregation, 1913 – 1948*. Pretoria: Unisa Press. 258 pp.

African economies are agriculturally based and thus the importance of land to Africans' existence cannot be over-emphasized. This is the case not just for less industrialized African countries but even more industrialized countries like South Africa. Thus the struggle for black South African emancipation from the shackles of colonialism and bondage is intractably interwoven with their struggle for the right to remain on their birth right—the land. This is the subject of Feinberg's book. The book deals with the intentions of the whites behind the promulgation of the Natives Land Act (1913) (henceforth called the Land Act), the various differences in the application of the land legislation in the different parts of South Africa and also highlights African resistance to spatial segregation during the period 1913 to 1948.

The book with its twelve chapters has a robust presentation and analysis. The chapters first cover the intentions of the land legislation, then the implementation of the Land Act in various parts of the Union of South, and close by highlighting the African struggle with alienation from their birthright. Thus the segmental and logical presentation of facts and history in the book enable readers to easily follow the author's analysis. The chapters chronologically follow each other and are bound together by a desire to illustrate that Africans displacement from their places of origin by the Land Act regime was not without its own contradictions and resistance.

The book's strengths lie in that the author managed to thoroughly discuss intentions for the various pieces of legislation governing access to and control of land. In debating the intention of the Land Act his revisionist approach benefits from earlier writers such as Kegan, Bundy, and Davenport (p. 20) who indicated that the Land Act might have been promulgated to put a stop to sharecropping on white controlled pieces of land. Yet others (p. 20) had indicated that the Land Act had been put in place in order to meet the labor supply

demands of mining capital. Thus, because the Land Act is at the center of the dispossession of Africans from their heritage, debating the intentions of the Act and its modus operation were quite in order.

Our Land, Our Structure, Our Life successfully brings new light to the fore regarding implications of the Act for Africans. Not many writers before this publication had explicitly highlighted how land ownership in the Cape helped Africans to meet economic voting requirements. This book manages to do this in chapter 2. In so doing, however, and because of striking resemblances with the Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act, 1930, examining parallels with this legislation would have enhanced the content of the book. Similarly in discussing how the Land Act undermined African economic independence in order to meet the labor means of capital. Feinberg could have benefited greatly if he had read Giovanni Arrighi, "Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia" (1970).

While *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future* has many positives, it is not without its limitations. Paradoxically it is in the book's strengths that some of its limitations are located. There is too much detail drawn from primary sources like commissions preceding the promulgation of the Act, editors of newspapers or magazines of the time, and Native Affairs Department (NAD) officials of the time. The various primary sources deter many from reading the book especially those who are not primarily historians, since this is a revisionist study of the many abundant secondary sources available on the subject.

While it is acknowledged that the book deals with the challenges undertaken by black South Africans to territorial segregation, the concentration/pre-occupation with their struggle is understandable and justified. However, their struggle was not isolated, for there were similar struggles in British settler colonies like Rhodesia and Kenya. This could have given the reader a chance to cast an eye across borders and appreciate the similarities in African people's struggles for their birthright.

Nevertheless, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future* successfully sums up the intentions of the white colonial government in South Africa in robbing Africans of their land, indicates the regional variations in the implementation of the Act, and highlights the variegated Africans resistance to territorial segregation. Thus Feinberg, like others before him, succinctly indicates that Africans were not passive victims in the alienation/expropriation of their birthright. There was buying of land by the Africans as a means of resisting alienating them from their land. This is not surprising that given the strength and force of the colonial machinery violent response was not an easy option to use when resisting white domination. In fact, for most of the time black South Africans used non-violent means to resist domination.

Pete Makaye, *Midlands State University, Zimbabwe*

Steven Friedman. 2015. *Race, Class, and Power: Harold Wolpe and the Radical Critique of Apartheid*. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 368 pp.

Steven Friedman's *Race, Class, and Power: Harold Wolpe and the Radical Critique of Apartheid* is an exquisitely well-written account of the intellectual debates that engulfed South Africa from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Friedman is a South African public intellectual, former journalist, trade unionist, and Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Rhodes University and the University of Johannesburg. His book consists of twelve chapters, which

can be divided into three broad thematic sections. The first is a biographical account of Harold Wolpe (1926-1996). Wolpe, a Jewish South African Marxist-inspired intellectual, was a member of the South African Communist Party (SACP). He famously escaped from a Johannesburg prison in 1963, sought refuge in Swaziland, and then fled to Britain, where he eventually taught at Essex University from 1975 until he returned to South Africa in 1990. The second part is a theoretical discussion of Wolpe's works and the debates it stimulated. The final portion situates Wolpe's writings within its political zeitgeist, and his attempts to construct a post-apartheid society.

Friedman argues that Wolpe's texts, centered on reconciling class and labor, are important avenues to understand South African history. However, he cautions the reader against dismissing Wolpe's works as products and relics of infantile Marxism. Consequently, Friedman insists we rigorously apply the dialectical method between Marxist and non-Marxist thought to fathom and "transcend" the South African intellectual, political, and social realities (p. 277).

In doing this, Friedman uses three methodological approaches. The first is grounded in interviews with Wolpe's colleagues—friends and foes—and students. The second is a deep engagement with Wolpe's texts and other scholars' works about Wolpe. Finally, Friedman uses Wolpe's numerous published materials to trace the evolution of Wolpe's intellectual positions, and its juxtaposition to his political activities and academic growth.

In 1969, at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies (ICS) in London, Shula Marks, a well-respected South African Marxist historian, and Wolpe, established a seminar called "Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries." This seminar, according to Friedman, became a well-known "battleground" between Liberals and Marxists for interrogating each other's ideas and methods (p. 48). During these seminars, some papers were "'picked to shreds for [their] incoherence,'" causing poisoned relationships (p. 49). For example, Leonard Thompson's work was so "'savaged by Shula's students that he (Thompson) tried to have her (Shula) fired'" (p. 49).

Wolpe's essay, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid," written in 1972, Friedman maintains, represents the first time a Marxist framework articulated how apartheid reproduced labor power within itself (p. 117). According to Friedman, Wolpe pushed away from dependency theory and argued that capitalism needed, rather than destroyed, African modes of production in order to reduce black laborers' wages (p. 120). Friedman concedes that Wolpe recognized that "[s]eparate development" was not "only a means of securing cheap labour, but an ideological device which gave racial domination a spurious respectability" (p. 124). In addition, Friedman argues that Wolpe, in re-calibrating a Marxist analysis within the South African context while moving away from Vladimir Lenin, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and SACP's internal colony thesis, side-stepped a "pure class analysis," and looked at the "subtle interplay between race and class" (p. 124). Friedman maintains, however, that Black Marxist scholars attacked Wolpe's failure to account for the *petite black bourgeoisie* and the conflicting interests between the English capitalist mine-owners and the Afrikaner farmers. As Friedman suggests, Wolpe "continued to see the African *petite bourgeoisie* as a potential obstacle to change" (p. 181) unlike Black South African Marxists who viewed racism as a "core reality" and not a diversion from "class struggle" (p. 183). As a result, according to Friedman, Wolpe found himself at odds with Black South African Marxists.

Using Wolpe as a theoretical springboard, Friedman argues that Marxist understandings of identity, race, and gender fail to sufficiently explain South African

realities (pp. 286, 287). For Friedman, Wolpe's attempts to reconcile the party line and his critique of internal colonialism, and his inability to theorize about different classes within a race and gender framework tied him in political and intellectual knots. Ultimately, for Friedman, Marxism must be transcended to remain useful to contemporary debates. For those interested in learning about the personal, political, and intellectual contours of the South African Marxist debates from the 1970 to 1990s, *Race, Class, and Power* is a must read and buy.

Nana Osei-Opere, *University of California at Los Angeles*

Katarzyna Grabska. 2014. *Gender, Home and Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan*. New York: James Currey. 224 pp.

Southern Sudan, Africa's newest state, has had a prolonged and exceedingly painful gestation period before it emerged independent in 2011. The beginning is traced to the mid-20th century when the struggle began to break the grip of the government of then newly independent Sudan over the south, a region had been administered separately by the British and kept cut off from the North. With occasional interludes, the struggle lasted until 2005, earning the dubious distinction of "Africa's longest war." It was far from a straightforward North-South clash. Manifold conflict was waged concurrently within the South between ethnic groups, with some of them allied to the regime in Khartoum. Famine, disease, and flooding completed the apocalyptic experience of the southern Sudanese people: over two million of them perished.

Hundreds of thousands sought safety in neighboring states – Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and even northern Sudan – where they spent endless years in refugee camps looked after by international aid agencies. It was in that stressful, alien environment that the transformation of peoples' identities affecting gender relations occurred. The war between North and South ended in 2005, opening the way for refugees to return home, where many found a scorched earth on which to rebuild their lives. What they found there and how they reacted is the subject matter of *Gender, Home and Identity*.

While the focus is on post-conflict gender relationships, the author traces the process of their modification to the refugee camp setting, where women and children had to survive as best they could, while men were fighting a war many of them did not survive. The analysis is based on narratives presented by refugees of both sexes about their experiences in the camps and after their return. The author was well placed to record and evaluate them, because she did most of the research in the refugee camps while the conflict was still on, and was able to follow some of the people she met there after their return home. It was a privileged, intimate, synchronic relationship that underlay a fascinating study in cultural anthropology, with a declared personal interest.

The author states her strong commitment to "feminist transformative politics," and her intention to challenge the conventional perspective of forcefully displaced women as victims, rather than as "active agents." Female agency is manifested in "emerging women's autonomous households, their access to income, through education and paid work, changes in marriage and work practices, changes in livelihoods that allow control over resources and distribution rights." These are negotiated with diversified masculinities as a result of militarization.

Prolonged stay in refugee camps administered by international agencies had a modernizing influence that most people found attractive. This was most marked among the young of both sexes, as well as most obvious because it was reflected in dress codes, speech, and behavior. This adds a generational perspective to the study.

It was this generation of returnees that faced problems in settling home, due to the devastation of the surroundings, the unraveling of communities and social ties, the total lack of facilities and prospects for the future, and also due to hostility of the elder generation to outward signs of modernity. The arrest of young women for wearing short skirts is a poignant incident noted in the book.

War has been a feature of life as long as most people in Southern Sudan can remember. "Which war do you want me to talk about?" people asked the author of the book. Tragically, independence in 2011 has not brought peace to the torn region. It intensified the longstanding ethnic rivalry over power and resources, and in 2014 ignited the latest civil that has yet to be resolved. This incident filled new refugee camps that have been set up within the region administered by international agencies. One fears that another generation of Southern Sudanese is undergoing the experience and consequences concisely depicted and intelligently analyzed in this most interesting work.

John Markakis, *Independent Scholar*

E. Maud Graham. 2015. *A Canadian Girl in South Africa: A Teacher's Experiences in the South African War, 1899-1902*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. 220 pp.

The main text written by E. Maud Graham was first published in 1905 in Toronto by William Briggs and fills 220 pages, but this expanded edition adds a 72-page introduction, explanatory notes, and an index by Michael Dawson, Catherine Gidney, and Susanne M. Klausen. Each part will be reviewed before commenting on the book as a whole.

At twenty-six years old, Graham was one of forty female Canadian teachers chosen to teach the Dutch children of South Africa to respect and support the British government after the South African war. These teachers had a sense of adventure and purpose, much like the American Peace Corps volunteers of our day. The first nine chapters and the last give an account of Graham's travels and activities. Chapters ten through fourteen contain her reflections about issues that South Africa was dealing with at that time.

In speaking of her experience, Graham writes: "Nations, like persons, must have freedom in order to grow and develop their individuality" (p. 182). Through the narrative, her own growth as a person making cultural adaptations is evident. At the beginning, she enters believing that she has the answers. Early on though, she learns that her suppositions may be wrong, stating: "This was our first lesson to judge nothing by Canadian standards" (p. 56). Later, when reflecting on a tea she had given she noted: "We blundered innocently enough, but we should have found out the customs of the place" (p. 107). Finally, near the end of her term, she admits: "It was from Joanna, the cook, that we learned..." (p. 124). Her widening horizons allow her to see that there may be alternative ways to accomplish a task and those ways may be better suited to the local situation.

Yet, she was a woman of her times with all the prejudices and ethnocentricity common to it. She largely ignores the black and Indian people even while noting that the blacks outnumber "the whites five to one" (p. 136). Instead she concentrates on the Dutch people who are not quite equal with those of British heritage. She notes their future glory "depends

on the rapidity with which they get in line with the march of modern progress" (p. 161). This bias jumps out at a modern reader even as many in our world continue to write in a similar vein.

The author's pictures aid the reader to see some parts of Graham's life that she does not actually go into detail about. The reader is left to imagine the routine bits that one never seems to document in photographs like drinking tea, of which Graham notes: "Apparently every occasion in South Africa is an excuse for drinking coffee or tea" (p. 61).

The introduction helps the reader who is unfamiliar with Africa and this particular time period in South Africa. It provides historical context for both the setting and the author. It is essential and should not be passed over. A weakness, however, is that the introduction commonly refers to the Dutch South Africans as Boers even though Graham noted that "the educated classes resented the term "Boer" (p. 59) which means "farmer". The introduction's 141 endnotes point to ample avenues for further research. The footnotes throughout the original manuscript are helpful. One can only imagine the thought put into the decisions as to what should be explained. All in all, they are sufficient although explanations for "latchstrings always hung out" (p. 3) and "a day to be marked with a white stone" (p. 86) and a few other references would have aided this reader.

The expanded materials demonstrate concern for the reader. The bibliography and index enhance the usefulness of the manuscript. Even the attention to formatting details shows thought for the reader by vertical chapter titles on the odd-numbered pages allowing an easy return to a desired section and the use of endnotes for the introduction and footnotes for the manuscript.

This book is recommended for those who wish to learn more about South African history and early race relations or tensions. Graham's opinionated writing will amuse and interest those researching women's studies. The book is not for those seeking to understand teaching or education – two topics that are merely incidental to Graham's tale of adventure and purpose.

Amy L. Crofford, *Africa Nazarene University*

Matthew Graham. 2015. *The Crisis of South African Foreign Policy and the ANC: Diplomacy, Leadership and the Role of the African National Congress*. London: I.B. Tauris. 320 pp.

The book traverses through the different phases of the National and International experience of South Africa placing the ANC as the pole star in the entire analysis. The work enciphers the diplomatic and leadership attributes attached with the ANC and provides a detailed, descriptive and necessitous erudition. The book is an attempt to encompass the continuities and the discontinuities amidst the wavering global milieu and most interestingly the highlight has been the new found ideals of the effective and meaningful foreign policy of South Africa. Graham's methodological and interrogative approach to dive deep into analysis of contextual relevance of the ANC into shaping the nation's prospects is not only substantial but praise worthy. In any foreign policy analysis there is a chance of missing the continuity, but Graham has passed the litmus test. His work underscores the thread and does not miss the correlations. There is also a vivid balance in the analysis as he has carefully mentioned each and every aspect such as the role of institutions, the ANC, individual decision makers, contextual relevance of the domestic and foreign attributes, and

the leadership. Graham develops a narrative where he successfully connects the reader and the entire theme. The strength of Graham's work lies in the informative analysis of history, he brings out exactly how inconsistencies and the inveterate contradictions beleaguered the country's global approach amidst domestic metamorphosis.

The book has done one phenomenal three phase analysis of the three distinct periods of the ANC, the ANC in exile (1960-90), South Africa's transition from Apartheid to democracy (1990-94), and the ANC in government (1994-present). The book moves from capturing just only a narrow analysis of the democratic era, for it expands to entail the analysis and assessment of the ANC out into the nation's transition period and the key events and experiences in the movement's exiled liberation struggle. Predominantly this historical work includes all dimensions of the post-apartheid South African crises with a combination of past and future until Thabo Mbeki resigned. The work does not include the presidencies of either Kgalema Motlanthe or Jacob Zuma.

The introduction itself is so mesmerizing that it conjoins the reader and the text invariably and helps develop an insight about the nation's different attributes. The dialect which Graham reproduces with his textual representation is fantastic throughout the book. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are the quintessential part of this work as they not only deal with the three distinct phases of the ANC but generate the landscape to understand the continuities and discontinuities, the fundamentals, and the essence of South Africa's national and global orientations. The ANC's foreign policy outside southern Africa, primarily directed at western states, had proved interestingly successful in the late 1980's (p. 65). The work revolves around how has the foreign policy orientations changed over the years and what has shaped them so far. The fifth chapter is the surge to look into the post-apartheid South African foreign policy where Graham is successful in deciphering the essential elements of the policies. The outcome of the SCFA process was also important, as it saw the option of number of senior ANC leaders to a specific way of thinking and simultaneously negated and undermined the movement's embryonic vision for post-apartheid foreign policy (p. 97). The sixth chapter is significant as it unravels the most challenging question of the nature of the post-apartheid foreign policy adopted by South Africa. There is a substantial literature on the economic policies of post-apartheid South Africa and Graham is not repetitive whereas he contrasts the different of phases of domestic interactions with the global world to highlight the "idealist or realist" alignment. The seventh chapter presents the changing nature of the foreign policy and includes information about the South African participation in two international peace missions in 1996. The eighth chapter's focal point is Thabo Mbeki's renaissance and Graham underscores how Mbeki initiated a new ideologically coherent foreign policy but the crises of the nation's international relations persisted.

Graham's work is informative and descriptive which successfully helps the reader to develop the insight into South Africa's foreign policy and analyses its distinctive characteristics. The book successfully accomplishes its task to present the readers an excellent overview of how the South African foreign policy has traversed to reach where it stands today.

Utsav Kumar Singh, *University of Delhi*

Martine Guichard, Tilo Grätz, and Yousouf Diallo (eds). 2014. *Friendship, Descent and Alliance in Africa: Anthropological Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn Books. 211 pp.

The authors in this book offer new insights into the ways in which friendship is conceptualized and realized in various sub-Saharan African settings. They do this by departing from the classical tendency to study friendship in isolation from kinship. Guichard in the introduction, explains that by including analyses focusing on how friendship patterns are influenced by formal features of kinship organization, the book attempts to fill a gap in the literature. The author feels strongly, and rightly so, that friendship is a phenomenon that merits being explored and theorized with the same seriousness as kinship. Time and again, throughout the book, the importance of recalling that instrumentality and affectivity are not mutually exclusive categories is underlined. Not only can these concepts be seen as poles of a continuum, they also constitute the basic aspects of friendship.

In the literature on the topic, friendship is often differentiated from kinship along the lines of achievement versus ascription and terminability versus permanence. In practice, however, as is beautifully documented in the contributions to this edited volume, the understanding that friendship and kinship can be contrasted with each other in certain respects goes hand in hand with the understanding that they nevertheless should not be simply treated as polar opposites. Indeed people do not always know that they are related by kinship. In many cases it is because they are bound by friendship that they come to realize that they are also genealogically linked. In addition, it should not be taken for granted that all relationships phrased in the language of kinship are primarily that and not relationships of friendship, as undoubtedly many social researchers doing fieldwork in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced themselves.

Well known from studies on friendship and kinship in Africa is the widespread phenomenon of institutionalized joking that is common not only between certain social categories of kin within ethnic groups, but also exists between groups and thus constitutes an important bridge to friendship between members of different ethnic groups. Interethnic friendships are very meaningful networks of solidarity and may be crucial to the survival of individuals and the perpetuation of groups because of the building on the economic complementarity of these groups (chapter 3 by Tadesse and Guichard). However, they should also not be conceived of as reducible to bare relationships of economic interdependence. Socially and culturally rich interethnic friendship bonds facilitate intergroup interaction and integration (chapter 4 by Breusers). Or, to cite Grätz (chapter 5) "it is a small, but quite decisive difference whether somebody supports another person *because he recognizes him as a friend*, or the other way around, whether somebody recognizes another person as a friend *because of the support* he may expect from him" (p. 113).

Another essential feature of friendship relations in a sub Saharan setting is the overlap with patron-client ties (chapter 6 by Warmes). Often, the superposition of friendship bonds on patron clients ties is an important condition for the latter to function properly. Closely tied to this is the fact that, particularly in smaller countries in the early years after independence, high schools and universities represent an important 'breeding ground' for friendship circles that straddle ethnic lines (chapter 7 by Werbner). Both chapters illustrate very well the basic awareness people have that (interethnic) friendships are an important source of power. On the other hand, when issues such as nationhood come into play and

the “going gets rough” ethnic kinship still may triumph over lifelong friendships (chapter 8 by Klute).

This edited volume is a timely and richly documented contribution to the under-researched topic of (interethnic) friendships and their significance as a form of sociability in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly from an anthropological perspective. Its contributions draw attention to the complex interaction between friendship and kinship in a number of African settings, and lead the editors to suggest—and rightly so—that the analysis of friendship in Western contexts would benefit from research that explores more systematically friendship in conjunction with kinship. In addition, they also underline the importance of taking into account the influence of external (global) forces when studying observable shifts in friendship practices since variations in the way in which friendships tend to be patterned often reflect variations in aspects of the broader and structural context within which these relationships occur. As such, the book is invaluable to scholars and students interested in social changes in a global world from an anthropological perspective.

Roos Willems, *University of Leuven (KUL) Belgium*

Jean Ngoya Kidula. 2013. *Music in Kenyan Christianity: Logooli Religious Song*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 290 pp.

Jean Ngoya Kidula is an Associate Professor of Music and Ethnomusicology at the Hugh Hodgson School of Music, University of Georgia. She has co-authored one previous book, *Music in the Life of the African Church*. Her *Music in Kenyan Christianity: Logooli Religious Song* is a work that is dedicated to the Logooli people of Western Africa. Kidula is a member of the Logooli tribe who has done her people a great service by explaining the development of Christian music in her country. Kidula is a recognized expert in the field of African Music and she shows this by the breadth of knowledge and research she brings to this work. She has a companion website that provides musical examples and recordings of the music in the book. This is a very helpful addition to this work.

The first chapter deals with prelude. Kidula briefly describes her background and how living as a Lagooli gives her insight into the history of their rich musical culture. She discusses her thirty years of involvement and research into the religious music of her people. She briefly explains how she gathered the important recorded pieces, as well as some of the sheet music from her people. Her first-hand experience as well as her vast experience show throughout the book.

The second chapter discusses assembly. Music has always been an integral part of Logooli life. Special music was performed at births, circumcisions, weddings, and funerals. The Logooli culture was permeated with religion, and Christian music played a key role in the growth of society. Kidula noted that while some were concerned with the “Christian” music replacing indigenous songs, many of the clan leaders welcomed the move, preferring to see the cultural involvement in their music as preferred to the older songs being forgotten (p. 36).

The third chapter’s focus is encounter. It shows the influences of religious groups such as the Quakers, the Pentecostals, and how their music aided in the development of the culture. The Sunday service, religious meetings other than Sunday, Christmas, Easter, and New Year’s celebrations, as well as momentous events in a person’s life such as the birth of a

child, rites of passage, Christianity and its music have now become “vibrant aspects of Logooli life” (p. 70).

The fourth chapter, titled consolidation, discusses how the music was introduced to the Logooli. The four main types of church music styles are book music, or hymnals; body music or music that required motion; indigenous choruses; and choir music of the academy and church (p. 76). Kidula’s explanation of each of these styles is extremely beneficial.

The fifth chapter explains accommodation; the practice of the Logooli of using biblical passages or Christian stories to communicate Christian truth. Missionaries would use established musical styles such as a call and response and mix them with Logooli themed music. The hymnist would teach the Logooli the pitches of the song as well as rhythm and meter (pp. 110-12). This chapter is the longest and most complex in the book, but it also explains in great detail how the Logooli utilized the “book” music in their lives and culture. Someone who is well versed in music will profit from this chapter.

The sixth chapter on syncretism details the forms and structure of the music of the Logooli. Kidula briefly discussed the Quaker and Pentecostal influence on the music of the Logooli. The Avalogooli embraced these songs and mixed the Christian doctrine with their own musical and poetic structures (p. 154).

The seventh chapter discusses the current use of Logooli Christian songs in both education and the media. Kidula discusses key Logooli music leaders as well as their contributions to life and their unique musical stylings. This chapter shows off her expertise in music. Some who are unfamiliar with general music terms and forms might find this chapter challenging. A trained musician however, will find great benefit in her detailed explanations of the three types of Logooli songs.

The last chapter is a brief epilogue. Kidula reminisces about the interaction of the Logooli and the various Christian missionary movements over the past one hundred years. She recounts briefly the experience she had while recording some of the older tribal women singing their music.

The strength of the book comes from the author’s breadth of knowledge and research on the subject. Being a Logooli herself, Kidula is intimately familiar with all of the music of her people as well as the spiritual implications each song brings. The incorporation of the media files greatly adds to the understanding of the music of the Logooli. This is one of the book’s greatest assets. One of the minor weaknesses of the book might be the over use of musical jargon. Someone who is unfamiliar with musical terms such as dominant, tonic, and other terms might not understand the significance of some of the religious implications of the musical instances. This book is well written and well researched. Jean Kidula does her people and culture a tremendous service by enriching the West with the rich music culture of the Logooli. Those interested in both African Ethnomusicology and African religion of the Logooli will benefit from Kidula’s work.

John Williams, *Trinity Baptist College*

John J. Kirton, Andrew F. Cooper, Franklyn Lisk, and Hany Besada (eds.). 2014. *Moving Health Sovereignty in Africa: Disease, Governance, and Climate Change*. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 304 pp.

The compiled readings address public health challenges in African countries in an ever-changing complex and globalized world; where increased mobility has rendered national boundaries for disease invisible. The notion of sovereignty, in Kirton's introduction, from the centuries-old model of the Westphalian treaty is too slow and static. Kirton states that there is "[A]n urgent need for innovation in global governance to close this great and growing gap between the new physical challenge of a world on the move, and the old public policy response from states and their governments fixed in traditional time and territorial space" (p. 3). Thus, the authors use the challenge-response-innovation framework to critique global health governance.

First, to identify and assess some health challenges, in chapter three, Šehović identifies the challenges of South Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic as first an illness that is "a long wave with effects stretching over generations" (p. 29) and that survival of persons living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) is dependent on the State and NGOs for resources and medication. In turn, the State is dependent on donor resources to provide these services. However, Fourie believes the challenges with the multilateral effort of the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa is the labeling of the disease as a national (and international) security issue. As opposed to putting resources in developing strong healthcare systems, resources (man-power, drugs, and money) have been mobilized to "secure the State" (p. 41). If we move on to Lisk's chapter on climate-health integration, he examines how the world's poorest region will become more vulnerable and less healthier if climate change is not addressed or included in global health policies.

Neither of these challenges to public health are wrong, but the response and innovation will be different. If we compare the HIV/AIDS studies, Šehović's response says that in case a State is unable to provide security to its people, then other actors should step in and provide the services, under clear international provisions on how to do this (p. 249). Fourie, on the other hand, calls for innovation in data collection, surveillance, and research, especially between high HIV prevalence area and security matters. He currently contends that there is no correlation between the pandemic and weakening of the State. In fact, his suggestions of innovating AIDS governance would strengthen the civil sector (p. 51).

The first problem with the framework is how actors or stakeholders see the challenges in global health governance; as this sets up the response. All authors contend that the public health problems are correlated with socio-economics and underdevelopment of sub-Saharan African societies. Zondi's chapter on African health and global bio-politics touches on the first measure in postcolonial Africa, - Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs), to address critical underdevelopment. However, the challenges were seen as strong, corrupt, and inefficient States as the culprit to the development crisis in Africa, and thus the response of weakening the public sector and privatizing health services, education, and social protection were believed to bring growth (p. 74). However, thirty-five years after that World Bank report most public health and Africana scholars would say that SAPs failed to bring equal development.

In Kirton, Guebert, and Kulik's look at the role of the G8's governance of African health and development, they found a positive and strengthening performance of this organization's role in Africa, especially in addressing health and development. The

organization looked away from the Westphalia's sovereignty and led in "global sovereignty." However, the authors do not fail to notice that the response from the G8, largely depended on which leader was campaigning or "comfortably in power" (p. 147) by their constituents who may or may not see themselves as global citizens. Thus, even this model of "global sovereignty" is not immune from the domestic pressures to lead and negotiate *individually* on the international platform.

The recommendations from the authors call for a common global health agenda, with all INGOs (G8, G20, WTO, UN, AU, WHO, etc.) at the table to bring long-term planning and policy changes. This call-to-action is similar to a reflexive governance approach in which stakeholders view public health as a global public good (integrated with climate change as per Lisk's chapter [p. 200]). However, even in this lens, it is difficult to overcome the agenda of each party; actors may come to the table to negotiate for their best interests rather than to share knowledge and ideas. Thus, the book also seems to lack an assessment on power relations and Africa's role in the globalized world. Machemedze's chapter briefly touched on this, examining international trade regulations and poor countries' abilities to negotiate for cheaper generic prescriptions. However, the global sovereignty approach that calls for accountability from African leaders as well as their presence at the table assumes that they will have the equal platform to negotiate for better health governance.

Sabine Iva Franklin, *University of Westminster, UK*

Kwasi Konadu and Clifford C. Campbell (eds.). 2016. *The Ghana Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 476 pp.

The Ghana Reader harvests a wealth of material from sources as diverse as scholarly articles, books of fiction and non-fiction, poems, memoirs, and official historical correspondence and documents. The authors of the texts are just as varied and include slave traders, contemporary academics, colonial administrators, African lawyers, novelists, nationalists, statesmen, musicians, and voices of the diaspora. Altogether, the horde of excerpts comprises some eighty selections that are mostly between three and eight pages in length. The texts are organised under six subthemes of diverse historical, political, and cultural perspectives that cover over five hundred years of encounters between Africans, Europeans, and the rest of the world and which altogether have shaped the country. From the introduction, the aim of the collection is to acquaint readers with "the many worlds of Ghana and how political and cultural views have moved the nation through its histories" (p. 13). The purpose of the collection is to introduce Ghana "in a way that will make [the reader] sympathetic towards Ghana's birth its subsequent challenges. . . . as well as more appreciative of its cultural richness and transformative potential" (p. 14). These are wide-ranging objectives that obviously demanded careful and difficult choices by the editors regarding what to include and what to leave out, and how to satisfy the needs and demands of both specialist and generalist readers. Overall the selection and presentation of texts works very well in the rich collection. Its readability is strengthened by the editors' introduction, helpful outlines prior to each of the sub themes, suggestions for further reading, sources, and an index. The collection will appeal to casual readers of cultural or touristic persuasions, who will undoubtedly find something of interest to pursue further, as well as students and scholars of Ghana or sub-Saharan Africa. Although the latter may be familiar with the general contours of several of the perspectives, such as the Atlantic slave

trade, the history of Asante, the colonial experience, the Nkrumah era, and the later struggles for political stability, there are enough historical, cultural, and political nuggets here to satisfy even the most seasoned Ghana or Africa aficionado. Most readers will find something here they knew little or nothing about and thereby, the book is a recommended source of wonder and inspiration with many rich pickings from a myriad of disciplines for a broad readership.

Amongst the many gems can be mentioned: Gérard L. Chouin and Christopher R. DeCorse's account of the possibility of Black Death explaining the widespread and sudden abandonment of settlements at Akrokrowa in the mid-fourteenth century; Dennis Warren and Owusu Brempong's description of an oral tradition and the story of a Techiman chief who was tricked by a rival into fasting for a month as a test of strength and who subsequently died of exhaustion; Kwame Y. Daaku's account of the powerful state of Denkyira, which up to 1700 established political stability by taking hostage and educating the royals of neighbouring, troublesome states; John Middleton's excellent contemporary unravelling of the logics of complex religious systems where people follow more than one faith in different situations; an excerpt from the satirical play "The Blinkards" by the intellectual nationalist Kobina Sekyi (from 1915 but highly relevant today), of Africans "born into a world of imitators, worse luck...and blind imitators, at that" (p. 222), and who swallow unblinkingly Western culture; and the relationship between the use and misuse of history, and national development as described by D.E. Kofi Baku. This retells the story of how, in 1888, some boys were observed around Cape Coast Castle burning abandoned archives found on a rubbish heap to cook their midday meal, and which the intellectual nationalist John Mensah Sarbah described at the time as "ignorance, wanting its days dinner. . . . and flavouring its one roast with the burnt souls of many generations" (p. 268).

It is an admirable undertaking to attempt to convey over five hundred years of *History, Culture, Politics* of an African nation in as many pages and from so many perspectives, and it's inevitable that not all topics of significance and relevance are included. On this note, the selection could have benefited with the inclusion of a few expositions on the contentiousness of political culture, the contemporaneousness of history, culture, and politics, or the politicization of culture and history that are all key components that define the country today. However, the aims of the *Reader* are accomplished well and it thoroughly succeeds in providing varied and contrasting illuminations of the country we know today as Ghana.

Paul Stacey, *University of Copenhagen*

Mara A. Leichtman. 2015. *Shi'i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 294 pp.

Beyond the prevailing discourse on Islam, most especially since 9/11, which mainly focus on Islamist radicalism, terrorism, insurgency, and theocracy/authoritarianism, Leichtman surveyed the Sunni-Shi'i dichotomy and cosmopolitanism among African and Arab populations in Senegal. In two parts and seven chapters, excluding the introduction, Leichtman examined the nature of cosmopolitanism that features in the dichotomy between autochthony and transnationalism in the Lebanese community in Senegal and among the Senegalese converts to Shi'i Islam. The introduction entails a review of literature on transnationalism, cosmopolitanism (African and Muslim perspectives), globalization, and autochthony, and their connections. The first part of the text deals with the Lebanese

community in Senegal. Between 25,000 and 30,000 Lebanese are estimated to be living in Senegal. The Lebanese of Senegal have displayed cosmopolitanism in managing their differences and integrating with the host community without loss of identity.

The Lebanese in Senegal are heterogeneous in term of generation (of migrations) and religions. The first wave of Lebanese migration in Senegal was around 1880s to 1920s. The second wave was 1945 to 1960s, while the third wave followed in the 1970s. Although reasons for migration range from political to economy, ranging wars are significant factors. Lebanese of Senegal also include Christians (Catholic and Orthodox) and Muslims (Shi'i and Sunni). This community has transcended the sectarian conflict in Lebanon and presented itself as an ethnic bloc for the sake of integration and autochthony in Senegal. Colonial legacy has complicated this task. The French confined the Lebanese, restricted their activities and sponsored propaganda against them as a divide and rule strategy in colonial Senegal. However, Lebanese financial support for the Senegalese elites, and trading and community services for the masses are paying off in the post-colonial era. Although the Lebanese of Senegal have recorded progress in political, economic, and socio-cultural integrations their claim to autochthony has not been fully realized.

The citizenship question, political and economic influence, low inter-marriage, and active cultural identity are concerns between migrations and autochthony of the Lebanese in Senegal. Most importantly, 90 percent of Lebanese of Senegal are Shi'i Muslims, although Senegal is dominantly Sunni. Shaykh 'Abdul Mun'am al-Zayn and his Islamic Institute have become central to Shi'i lives in Senegal. In this way, efforts have been made to bring Lebanese Muslims back to Shi'i Islam with a record of progress. However, Lebanese migrants have displayed cosmopolitanism by underplaying the idea of revolution in Shi'i and appealing to public sympathy on sensitive religious issues, balancing loyalty to global religious movement in a Sunni dominated society.

The second part of the text deals with the Senegalese converts to Shi'i Islam. Many Senegalese have converted to Shi'i Islam in the belief that it is intellectually appealing, based on Sheykh al-Zayn's charming messages and the quality of education offered by the Islamic Institute, through marriage, divine direction, travelling and exposure, and to secure opportunity (grants and scholarships) to study abroad, most especially in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Becoming Shi'a is one way certain Senegalese, especially those who are highly educated and relatively affluent, attempt to escape the colonial legacy, the failure of the Senegalese state, and the growing structural inequalities in their country through adopting while adapting a religious model that for them has been successful elsewhere in combating the West (p. xi). The cosmopolitanism of the Senegalese converts is however evident in the way they are negotiating their (Sunni) past and (Shi'i) present. Despite the support for global Shi'i movement, they prefer to refine their religion practises to suite their locale and look forward to leading the movement in the country.

The book is implicit on diaspora community and transnational relations in the context of south-south migration and the glocalization of Shi'i Islam. In this way, Leichtman transcend the prevailing understanding of autochthony in Africa, which dominantly involve local migration. Moreover, the perspective on peaceful coexistence in Senegal is a constructive alternative to the prevailing belief that plural societies in Africa are intolerance and forever destine for ethno-religious conflicts. The text is well detailed on the Sunni-Shi'i dichotomy and cosmopolitanism in Senegal, although its framework is limited in understanding other African nations like Nigeria where the Shi'i population is more

significant and relations with the Sunni and the state has not been conflict-free. Nevertheless, the book is highly recommended for anyone with interest in African and Middle Eastern Affairs, Islam and Religious Studies, and Peace Studies.

Samuel Oyewole, *University of Ilorin*

Rirhandu Mageza-Barthel. 2015. *Mobilizing Transnational Gender Politics in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company. 187 pp.

Rwanda has been the focus of attention nowadays in the field of international gender studies. The East African country is in the first place in the world in female political representation. Rwanda is also the first country with a majority of female politicians (64 percent) in its national parliament. Researchers ask the question: how was this small country capable of achieving all these? Mageza-Barthel's book is about giving some important answers by describing the different aspects of the country's transition from a strictly patriarchal to an outstanding female-empowered society. She focusses on how the introduction of international gender norms was shaped in the Rwandan context after the genocide in 1994.

The author emphasizes how the most important gender norms and strategies that were introduced (mostly) by the United Nations were implemented by the Rwandan government to ensure the same rights for women and men both in decision-making and peace-building positions. The most influential of these were the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1978, the Beijing Declaration and Platform in 1995, and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. Beside the strict institutional and political aspects, the social manner such as the role of NGOs empowering women also makes a significant perspective of Mageza-Barthel's work in describing the transformation of Rwanda after the civil war. In the Introduction the reader gets concrete information why Rwanda's situation is exceptional in the case of gender issues in both sub-Saharan African and global contexts. The first two chapters, "Women, Gender and International Politics" and "Women's Representation in Transitions," are about both "women's marginalization in politics" and "their involvement in international politics" (p. 17). Chapter 3, "Gendering Rwanda's Nascent and Emerging Publics," shows a historical perspective of changing roles of female NGOs and women's political representation. The author also underlines that "the genocide redefined gender politics in Rwanda as we know it today" (p. 45). The fourth chapter, "Negotiating Beijing, Genocide Crimes and the Right to Inherit: Women's Agenda Setting during the Transition," is about introducing the adaptation and implementation of international gender norms in Rwanda. In addition, the chapter highlights the two key issues that were the most important in terms of transformation: "changing women's rights within the justice system and to regulating their access to economic resources." Some of these were the 1996 Organic Law, and the 1999 Matrimonial Regimes Law (p. 77).

Mageza-Barthel's empirical work, which was conducted in Rwanda and was based on many interviews that are quoted numerous times, is especially evident in Chapter 5, "If it is not the Constitution Anyone Can Change it! Engendering the 2003 Constitution." In this part the most influential decision, the implementation of the 30 percent gender quota is also introduced. According to the Rwandan constitution 30 percent of MPs in the national parliament must be women. But why is it good for Rwanda to have more female politicians? Among many reasons women "had shown themselves more committed and less corrupt

than men" (p. 121). The next chapter, "Going Against the Grain? First Legislative Results," analyzes the outcome of the previously introduced positive changes on women's empowerment. The chapter also puts a focus on gender-based violence issues.

In the Conclusion the author outlines her finding that "the UN's gender norms have, in fact, served as tools for women's agenda setting and even more so since the end of the genocide, when gender relations were under renewed negotiation" (p.145). Mageza-Barthel also underlines that Rwandan women's movements have done "sizable achievements: they have engendered laws that determines women's political and economic rights, and Rwandan women parliamentarians have incrementally climbed to the highest representation levels worldwide"(p. 162). The List of Abbreviations collects all the institutes and organizations she mentions, and the Index is an extra aid for someone who looks for special concept.

This book is an excellent piece for those researchers who tend to deal with gender issues like female political empowerment and tend to have an extensive knowledge about it in the context of Rwanda.

Judit Bagi, *University of Pécs, Hungary*

Kurt Mills. 2015. *International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa: Responsibility to Protect, Prosecute, and Palliate*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 302 pp.

The question that the book strives to answer is a complex one: "How have, can, and should mass atrocities be addressed?" (p. 1). Hence, the book is simultaneously historical-empirical, analysing four interrelated cases of mass atrocities in Africa, exploratory, or analytical, seeking to determine the horizon of possible and feasible international responses, and normative, seeking to establish not only that the international community should do something but also what responses are desirable and when. As such, it is an important contribution to both the study of conflict in Africa and of global response strategies, such as responsibility to protect (R2P).

The cases analysed in the volume are Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Darfur. There are apt reasons for selecting these particular cases. First of all, there are underlying causes for the conflicts in the areas under analysis: not only are they geographically linked but the factors creating instability in one place have directly or indirectly influenced atrocities elsewhere. Secondly, they are similar in terms of international responses or, to be more precise, the lack of an effective international solution. This international reaction manifested itself, and was deficient in different ways in all particular cases: the lack of willingness to acknowledge the gravity of the situation and thus act decisively in Rwanda, inability to adapt to the complexity of the situation in DRC, potential complications of pressing for international criminal justice in an ongoing conflict (Uganda), and the general unwillingness of the international community to confront national authorities (Darfur). They also show that some response strategies, like peace and justice, are not always commensurable (although the author also sets out in a quest for conditions when the two are not mutually exclusive, thus moving beyond the already well-trodden peace vs justice debate). And also the analysis reveals how the current multifaceted nature of response to mass atrocities can be counter-productive: a complex network of actors, which is part both of the solution and of the problem. Revealing this complicated network of interests, values, and actors is a significant achievement of the book.

The author also aims to expand the concept of R2P by elaborating on the “P” part of it: in this book, it stands for not only “protect” but also “prosecute” and “palliate” (hence the book’s subtitle), rewriting the standard formula from R2P to R2P³. Of course, neither of the additional Ps is completely new: all of them were at least implicit already in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document that established R2P in the first place. However, Mills is successful in outlining the additions, demonstrating their differences and similarities, practical manifestations (or failures to manifest themselves) as well as shortcomings and arguing for their indivisibility. But at the same time, the book also carries a stark warning about acts of political naming as well as inclusiveness and exclusiveness of speech: as Rwanda and Darfur demonstrate, the amount of verbal acrobatics involved in framing a situation, particularly in order to avoid international involvement, is not insignificant. However, this book also offers a solution, at least implicitly, in its P³ strategy: linking corresponding terms in such a way that one is inseparable from the other. Far from being a dilution and offering an option to escape without uttering high-valence keywords, such expansion of core concepts also offers greater clarity and transparency as to what particular responsibilities actually involves. Being mindful of particular aspects and not just of the bulk term also allows for more nuanced approach and that also forms an important part of the book’s argument.

Of course, for R2P³ to work there needs to be a substantial revaluation of how sovereignty and authority play out in today’s world. But most importantly, there has to be sufficient will, and the author has to be credited for making that one of the core imperatives. Partly due to the four case studies, his assessment of the status quo and future perspectives of R2P³ is realistic and does not transgress into either unsubstantiated utopianism or unproductive moralisation. That, as well, can be considered a major positive aspect of the book.

In short, *International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa* is a book that delivers one of the most sustained, realistic, and convincing accounts of the theory and practice of international responsibilities in face of violent crises. Moreover, being accessibly written, it is likely to be of use to both professionals and those who are only developing an interest in the issue.

Ignas Kalpokas, *Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania*

Samuel O. Oloruntoba. 2016. *Regionalism and Integration in Africa: EU- ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Euro- Nigeria Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. xi, 236 pp.

The EU has been striving to enter into partnership agreements with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries for quite some time. There has been series of opposition to the proposed agreements in the different countries in the ACP bloc. Aside from the diversity of the ACP countries based on their historical and political antecedence which to a large extent has accounted for diverse reactions to different elements in the text of the agreements, the EU, being an assemblage of former colonial powers, has over time sought ways of utilizing the diversity of the ACP bloc to its own advantage. The ping pong game between the EU and the ACP has continued for more than a decade without much success because of the tremendous influence of some regional hegemons like Nigeria, which have continued to

insist on certain fundamental conditions as requirements for the signing of the partnership agreements with the EU.

The book under review is an explicit account of the political economy of the proposed partnership agreements between the EU and the ACP. The book provides an indepth explanation of the stages and processes of the series of negotiations that have been held to further drive the initiative, which the EU is presenting as a vital instrument for accelerating mutually beneficial economic relationship between ACP countries and the EU countries, but which Dr. Oloruntoba sees as another ploy to undermine the integrative quest of Africa. The book portrays the proposed EU's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the ACP as an agenda which is being promoted by the developed economic blocs (EU and the United States), which believe that trade agreements that were inaccessible at the multilateral levels could be actualized through regional trade agreements.

The book has ten chapters covering carefully selected topics that exemplify the focus of Oloruntoba's arguments. Chapter one provides an overview of the theoretical and analytical framework of the book while chapter two elaborately analyzes the relationship between globalization and the growing interest in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and the quest for regional integration across the world. Chapter three provides theoretical explanation of free trade, regional integration, and regional trade agreements. Chapter four examines the history of Euro-African relations from the Yaoundé Convention through to the Lome Convention, Cotonou Partnership Agreements, EU-ACP Strategic Partnership Agreements to the nascent EPAs. Chapter five critically x-rays the Eurozone crisis and its implications for the funding of EPAs, pointing out that in the light of the crisis, EU could renege on its promise of about six billion euros to be made available to the ACP countries for the cost of adjustments that the implementation of the EPAs would require. Chapter six analyzes the possible implications of EPAs on the Nigerian economy to include loss of tariff revenues, increased unemployment, and the gradual decline in earnings from oil exports which could be aggravated by the country's current challenges, among others. Chapter seven examines how the non-oil sector of the Nigerian economy would be affected by the EPAs, focusing specifically on fisheries, and agro-allied businesses like cocoa exports. The capacity of the Nigerian state to formulate and implement trade policy as well as the capacity of the Nigerian bureaucracy to effectively engage trade negotiators from other countries are issues that chapter eight focuses on. Chapter nine critically examines the linkage between regional integration and development in Africa, and notes the need to discard the European model of integration on grounds that the history of state formation in Europe is different from Africa's and that what Africa needs is "a development-based integration" driven by the people, not the state. Chapter ten contains highlights of recommendations that could reposition Africa, and in particular Nigeria, for improved engagement within regional or multilateral economic relations.

A careful look at the book would reveal some deep-seated pessimism about the Economic Partnership Agreements which the EU has been trying to foist on the ACP countries. The author feels strongly that Nigeria's cautious steps in the negotiations are well-intentioned in view of the fact that the country's current economic structure of overdependence on oil, lack of infrastructure, high level of unemployment, low level of industrialization, etc. are extant factors that would mitigate against any potential benefits from signing EPAs with the EU. Consequently, he avers that Nigeria needs to radically restructure its economy from its current mono-cultural and overdependence on oil to a

diversified one, noting that such diversification would require massive investments in infrastructure including electricity, rail and road networks, a functional and safe aviation sector, and ports (p. 192). Furthermore, the author affirms the need for a trade policy that is conversant with the development needs and priorities of Nigeria, adding that Nigeria should do everything possible to promote industrialization, especially in the petrochemical, agro-allied and textile sectors with a view to meeting the job requirements of the country (p. 193). Finally, the author notes with a tinge of satisfaction that, even though Nigeria recently joined other West African countries to initialize the EPAs, the agreements have not become operational.

This book raises some important issues in the discourse on Economic Partnership Agreements which were not scientifically proven. First, the author's claim that the signing of EPAs with the EU would jeopardize integration in the ECOWAS sub-region and Africa as a whole, was not elaborated upon in the book. There is the need to expand the frontiers of such theorizing in order to make the point more convincing. Second, his thesis expounded in the ninth and tenth chapters of the book on the need for "a development-based integration that is driven by the people, not by the state" sounds more like propaganda. Nigeria has had seventeen unbroken years of democratic governance, which to a large extent is more representative of the people's interest than the erstwhile military dictatorship of the past. And, this situation is similar to what obtains in other countries in West Africa. In what other arrangement or form of government then would the people's interest drive the integration agenda in ECOWAS better than the current democratic state?

Overall, the book is a well-written piece on the politics and economics of the ongoing negotiations for the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP countries. Analyzing the role of the Nigerian state and the attendant domestic conditions of Nigeria for economic development under a regional agreement, the author displayed good knowledge of all the issues involved in the EPAs, particularly with regard to the negotiations of the EU-ACP EPAs that he believes should not be hurriedly signed in the light of the constraints that could have become obvious to the ACP countries from Nigeria's standpoint as luridly depicted in the book. This book should be read by ACP trade negotiators, policy makers in developing countries, and scholars with an interest in the political economies of developing countries with reference to their relationships with the developed countries in the context of the global capitalist system.

John Olushola Magbadelo, *Centre for African & Asian Studies, Abuja, Nigeria*

Michael A. Oyelere. 2014. *The Impact of Political Action on Labour Movement Strength: Trade Union Revitalization in Africa*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. vii, 222 pp.

The book begins with an exposition on trade unionism through which industry workers advance their goals. Specifically, it explores the economic and political activities of the trade unions in Nigeria between 1983-2012. Collective bargaining is an intervention mechanism in the context of Nigeria's industrial matters involving the state and labour unions which are regulated by government's decrees traceable to the Trade Union Act of 1973. The Act outlined the guidelines for the formation and membership of the unions in Nigeria. However, it is argued that there has been considerable decline of collective bargaining. And the disregard for collective bargaining machinery by successive military regimes also contributed to the foregoing.

On the unions' socio-political actions, casualisation of the workforce is traceable to the military era and also seen as a policy for profit maximisation with exploitation attribute. The author argues that the Nigeria Civil Service Union (NCSU) has not succeeded in eradicating the aforementioned problem to the extent that unions view strikes as the last resort in managing disputes arising from government policy. A negative development in the history of the union was the loss of members due to retrenchment of the workforce and economic instability occasioned by the government's austerity measures, on the one hand and the proscription of NLC by the Babangida government. Although the author harped on the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and subsequent devaluation of Naira, he did not adequately discuss the evolution of SAP till 1996-8 and how the union bounced back in the Fourth Republic.

Furthermore, the book also identifies Trade Union Law as being under the oversight of successive governments which greatly regulated the activities of trade unions. It should be added that governments always strive to regulate the policies of unions because their actions directly or indirectly affect the society. The author reveals that trade unions in Nigeria have emerged as social movement unionism which repositioned them to grapple with society's interests. It is noteworthy that such interests include: increment of workers' wages, reduction of the prices of petroleum products, mounting pressure on government to rethink downsizing of the workforce, and agitation for the politics of inclusion among others. These have taken the unions away from their primary objective since inception with the probability of the labour movement leadership taking advantage of such a platform to pursue their personal interests.

The author describes the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) as a central labour organisation that continuously adopted collective bargaining as industrial dispute management approach since 1978 and the advantage of all trade unions. Since then, the review of the minimum wage has always been a crucial priority of the NLC. So far, the National Union of Textile, Garment and Tailoring Workers of Nigeria (NUTGWN) has been a less vocal union than others. The fact that the NUTGWN recorded more membership decline than other unions shows that downsizing of the workforce greatly affected members. Arguably, the closure of some textile mills in Nigeria reduced the number of members.

One lesson to learn from the book is that trade unions have enjoyed more freedom of association in the civilian administrations than the successive military regimes when the unions recorded decline. The government's economic policies and Obasanjo's administration in the Fourth Republic greatly affected the unions' activities. Most strikes embarked on by the unions also violated the socio-economic rights of the citizens like the January 2012 fuel subsidy imbroglio which affected many sectors of the economy. Out of all the strike actions by the unions, that of the Nigerian Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) greatly affects people from all walks of life due to the shortage of petroleum supply across the country. And such development is usually aggravated by the cordial relationship between the NLC and NUPENG when the need arises. The NCSU has a human rights value given that it was formed to protect members' rights and the protection of trade unions' legal rights especially promotion of conditions of service on the one hand, and socio-economic rights of the community on the other hand. Apart from its conflict transformation value, the book is highly relevant for scholars of sociology, peace studies,

and social history. Conclusively, the nature of political environment can greatly determine the future of every trade union.

James Okolie-Osemene, *Wellspring University, Benin City, Nigeria*

LaRose T. Parris. 2015. *Being Apart: Theoretical and Existential Resistance in Africana Literature*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press. 196 pp.

Being Apart is an ambitious project that aims to expose, and thereby amend, the racial and classist narratives pervasive in modern Western discourses. LaRose Parris undertakes this task by establishing a lineage of Africana thinkers and demonstrating how their works challenge key tenets undergirding those by canonical Western thinkers. Identifying herself with the Black vindicationists (p. 7), Parris seeks to combat the tendency of Western discourses to intentionally exclude Africana thinkers—a phenomenon she labels as “being apart”—by highlighting their engagements with these discourses (pp. 7-8) in the four chapters of her book.

First, Parris examines how David Walker and Frederick Douglass asserted the historical agency of Africans against the scientific racism of Western Enlightenment thought during the 19th century. She begins her first chapter by outlining the status quo in Western thought against which these thinkers wrote. According to Parris, scientific racism as epitomized in David Hume’s “Of National Characters” (p. 30) came to hold much sway over American thinkers like Thomas Jefferson (p. 31), whose *Notes on the State of Virginia* demonstrates much of the same preoccupations as Hume’s work regarding the supposed inferiority of Africans (p. 32). Parris then demonstrates how Walker and Douglass disputed these claims by arguing that enslaved Africans in the United States shared ancestry with ancient Egyptians, whose culture gave rise to Western civilization (pp. 42-43, 47). Parris treats this argument as historiographical resistance to scientific racism. She identifies additional instances of such resistance in the works of W.E.B. Du Bois and C.L.R. James, which she examines in her second chapter. In addition to the failure of what she calls “traditional” Western discourses—those that are overtly motivated by scientific racism—to include Africa and Africans, here Parris shows how “radical” Western discourses—those designed to overcome the shortcomings of their “traditional” counterparts—also fell short in explicating Africana realities. Parris explains how Du Bois and James gave agency to enslaved Africans in the United States and the Caribbean, respectively, by identifying them to be proletariats whose labor contributed directly to the rise of industrial capitalism in the West (p. 67). Furthermore, she posits that these thinkers revealed limitations of Marxist theory by incorporating details of “[the] highly exploitative material conditions [of slavery]” in their scholarship (p. 70).

Parris continues to build her lineage of Africana thinkers through an examination of Frantz Fanon in her third chapter. Although Fanon’s work is on colonialism rather than the institution of slavery, Parris considers him to be of the same ilk as Walker, Douglass, Du Bois, and James, as his work also “centraliz[ed] the Africana subject’s pivotal role in watershed moments of Western historical and ideological developments” (p. 104). Fanon did this by characterizing the colonized as having “[an] ‘abnormal’ psyche” which often turned into “an insidious inferiority complex” that resulted from having been subjected to the social and ideological structures of colonial rule (pp. 106, 107). Parris also highlights the significance of language in Fanon’s work, noting how the imposition of “imperial language”

has affected the understanding that the colonized have of their own identity and positionality under colonial rule (pp. 114-15).

Parris builds on concerns of language as she transitions from Fanon to Kamau Brathwaite, the last of the Africana thinkers she introduces into her lineage. In her fourth chapter, Parris shows how Brathwaite conceptualized nation language to contest the privileged position of standard written English in the Anglophone New World. Parris characterizes nation language to be “indigenous” and “native” to the Caribbean, better able to convey the Africana realities there than standard written English (pp. 138, 139, 142) as it was created by enslaved Africans on the plantation (p. 138).

Parris’s work is significant because she explores connections amongst key Africana thinkers while tracing their engagement with Western discourses, and indeed, her efforts inspire further inquiry. However, her own use of Western theories to situate Africana thinkers within Western discourses lacks the critical analysis she brings to bear on those thinkers who incorporated or relied on works by their Western counterparts. Parris seems most critical of Fanon (p. 112), whose use of Hegel she considers “ironic” because of Fanon’s apparent failure to question the scientific racism underlying much of Hegel’s works (129). But she, too, appears at times to adopt Western theories without providing critical reflections of their relationships to racism or alterity (pp. 40, 144). Perhaps the ambivalent presence of critical attitudes at different levels of generalization directly reflects “the paradox of the Africana scholar” (p. 19). But perhaps this paradox may be resolved by turning the critical attitude more inward, for Parris to take apart the conditions of “being apart” (pp. 7-8) in her own treatment of Africana thinkers before “becom[ing] a part” (p. 162).

HeeJin Lee, *University of California, Los Angeles*

Michael F. Robinson. 2016. *The Lost White Tribe: Explorers, Scientists, and the Theory that Changed a Continent*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 320 pp.

Michael F. Robinson begins *The Lost White Tribe* by discussing Henry Morton Stanley’s account of meeting “white Africans” during his 1874-1877 expedition. Although this story fascinated Stanley’s contemporaries, it has received little attention in the dozens of biographies written about Stanley. Ignoring Stanley’s account of white Africans is inadvisable, because it “had profound consequences for the history of Africa and its relationship with the West” (p. 8). Stanley’s story not only provided supporting evidence for the Hamitic hypothesis—the idea that fair-skinned tribes invaded Africa in the past—but also allowed Europeans to claim that they were settling, rather than resettling, lands that had been conquered by these white invaders. Robinson offers a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary biography of the Hamitic hypothesis spanning many centuries and continents.

Europeans utilized the Bible, particularly Genesis, to understand their world. They associated Noah’s three sons—Ham, Shem, and Japheth—with Africa, Europe, and Asia. Genesis 9 describes how Ham committed a crime against Noah. Noah cursed Ham’s son Canaan by declaring Canaan would be the slave of his brothers. Europeans linked the curse of Canaan with blackness to justify African slavery. By the middle of the nineteenth century, this version of the Hamitic hypothesis was on the wane because of William Jones and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Jones, a British polymath and a Supreme Court judge in

India, saw the story of Ham as “a fact that buttressed a new theory of human migration” (p. 64). After studying Sanskrit, Jones saw in languages the common heritage of civilizations and expanded “Hamites” to include Africans, Europeans, and Indians. While Jones compared languages, Blumenbach compared skulls. Blumenbach believed humans were originally of one kind: European—specifically Caucasian—a label derived from the Caucasus. As Caucasians moved into new environments, according to Blumenbach, they degenerated into other human types.

The theories of Jones and Blumenbach supported the unity of humankind. During the mid-nineteenth century, however, scientists transformed the Hamitic hypothesis to explain the existence of white African tribes. Samuel George Morton, for example, argued that Egyptians were racially European and that Egypt had been populated by Caucasians. The idea of Hamites as Caucasian invaders quickly took hold. John Hanning Speke, “the Johnny Appleseed of the Hamitic hypothesis in East Africa,” (p. 94) convinced many African royals that they were descended from white invaders. The discovery of Great Zimbabwe seemed to affirm the Hamitic hypothesis because, reasoned explorer Carl Mauch, it had been built by white conquerors. Archaeologists who followed Mauch accepted the theory of foreign origin. However, in an attempt to prove this, they dug “pell-mell through archaeological deposits” and tossed “out objects of ‘Kaffir desecration’” (p. 140).

Although the new Hamitic hypothesis was grounded in flimsy soil, people readily accepted it. British archaeologist Flinders Petrie posited that a “dynastic race” not from Africa entered the Nile Valley and developed Egyptian culture. Unlike the sloppy methodology of the archaeologists excavating Great Zimbabwe, Petrie’s methods seemed beyond reproach. Scientists developed the theory of an “Aryan invasion” out of Asia. The rise of the Aryan “type” grew from the work of Friedrich Max Müller, specifically his study of Sanskrit. At the same time, explorers sent home report after report of white tribes – blond Eskimos on Victoria Island, for example. Were these white tribes a mystery of racial biology or of the Western mind? Robinson argues that the discovery of the white tribes reflected shifts in thinking and utilizes the novels of H. Rider Haggard, which often featured discoveries of lost white tribes, to demonstrate these tribes were not simply objects of scientific scrutiny but rather resonated with readers.

Despite the extensive support for the Hamitic hypothesis, scholars began to attack it. Archaeologist Gertrude Caton-Thompson demonstrated Great Zimbabwe was not the product of foreign invaders but African in origin. Aryanism was tainted by association with the Nazis, and the end of World War II marked the end of serious race science. Nevertheless, the Hamitic hypothesis is not dead. The ideas continue to live on and played a tragic role in the killing fields of Rwanda. Robinson concludes that the search for white tribes points to “something lurking beneath the surface of scientific discourse: a lingering insecurity about Western culture in the industrial age” (p. 255).

The Lost White Tribe is an outstanding book. It is well-written, well-researched, and offers an excellent discussion of a fascinating subject. This book will work well in upper-division undergraduate classes as well as graduate seminars and will appeal to both an academic and a popular audience.

Evan C. Rothera, *The Pennsylvania State University*

Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch. 2014. *The Politics of Chieftaincy: Authority and Property in Colonial Ghana, 1920–1950*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press. 250 pp.

Naaborko's *The Politics of Chieftaincy* is an important addition to the historiography on the contentious processes of urbanization and politics in twentieth century tropical British Africa. Urbanization serves as a foreground to complex interactions between colonial intentions and indigenous political and land rights. Indeed, the colonial government's mission to carry out its dual mandate led to "dramatic alteration of the Ga people's sociopolitical and economic structures" (p. 2). Particularly disruptive was the British attempt to identify and work with Ga indigenous authority. This process disregarded or ignored local tensions revolving around "chieftainship and the influence and status of priests, and who could exercise power by virtue of controlling or having access to land" (p. 3).

The author engages existing literature on chieftaincy by situating her work in them. The list includes Berry, Rathbone, Addo-Fening, Odotei, Arhin, and Busia. Additionally, she goes a step further by questioning and probing the loopholes, continuities, and changes in them. Furthermore, this book sets a good example in documenting historical narratives by making use of a wide array of sources. These include court records, reports of commissions of inquiries, written petitions and oral testimonies.

The book is divided into five chapters, with an introduction and a conclusion. Each chapter builds on the other in telling the story of tensions and fissures in Ga politics in a British colonial milieu. The chapters touch on Accra's history, its cosmopolitan character, changes in land ownership rights, especially after it was commodified, British indirect rule and chiefly succession disputes, and land disputes among the Ga ruling elites—chiefs, priests, and land owning families.

I am intrigued by the author's bold claim that the process of change in indigenous institutions in Ghana is affected by factors such as geographic location, as well as history and tradition. The point of comparison between Akan centralized political structure and the relatively decentralized Ga political structure is well made. However, Naaborko's use of the umbrella term "Akan" is problematic, since some Akan states were more centralized than others. Instead, she could have been more historically specific and, for instance, used Asante as a point of comparison.

The Politics of Chieftaincy will be ideal for a graduate level colloquium or seminar on urbanization in colonial Africa, or African history in general. It may also be of interest to researchers interested in understanding the processes and contestations surrounding property rights and indigenous authority in the British Empire. Lastly, this book may be a good source for Ghanaians seeking to understand the present day contestation between chiefly authority and extended family claims on Ga lands.

On the personal level, as a denizen of Accra and person of Ga descent, this book highlights and offers interesting moments of introspection to the current problems associated with Ga lands across the length and breadth of the capital. The commodification of land raised the stakes for groups to "actively contest what land and landownership meant in Accra" (p. 4). Indeed, Chieftaincy in Ga is "nothing to be proud of" (p. 22). Some of us have been parties and witnesses to this contentious drama, which is still unfolding.

Nana Yaw Boampong Sapon, *University of Ghana*

Polly Savage. 2014. *Making Art in Africa: 1960–2010*. London: Lund Humphries Publishers. 304 pp.

Polly Savage is a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. She specializes in contemporary art and curatorial strategies in twentieth and twenty-first century Africa, Brazil, and the Caribbean. She has analyzed the post-independence visual arts in Angola, Madagascar, and Haiti. Savage also researches post-colonial critique and trans-national exhibition practice. Perhaps it is her critical engagement with the contemporary visual arts of Africa, which gave impetus for this current book.

Not many art history textbooks offer the opportunity for the artist to reflect on their creativity, especially the influences that spurred them to create. Available books speak from a lexicon of tested theories and ideologies about creation. However, in this book, the artists have been accorded some agency. They have been allowed to each speak to their creativity, especially the influences that motivated them to create, in their own words. And according to Savage, *Making Art in Africa* is a book of conversations, and begins with a conversation. The wide array of creative peoples as were collected in this book, all offered their voices, by way of experiences and inspiration. In doing so, they help to render the book as a forum to meet and hear from the artists. This idea of granting agency to the artists is a welcome idea in art historical writing given the ever-expanding scholarship on art.

Even though the book speaks to the individual artist's creative influences and abilities, their creative connection is made possible through the various workshops that facilitated their meeting with both peers and clientele. It is a truism that creativity is never an individual act, carried out in a vacuum. Neither does creativity stem from a specific cultural source or taproot. Rather, it begins with those fertile moments of cross-pollination when people travel, meet, talk, exchange, borrow, and connect, like synapses in the brain or the lateral rhizome root system suggested by Deleuze and Guattari. By meeting and exchanging ideas, creativity is not only enhanced, but it is made multiplex. Such characteristics resonate among the artists in this book. Through participation in the various art workshops, these artists were not only able to develop their latent creative abilities, but were also able to forge connections and links with other artists who were within their localities and from national and international locations. Such connections and linkages no doubt have helped contemporary African artists forge vibrant creative engagements.

The sixty-eight chapters of the book focus on over seventy artists drawn from West, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa. Artists from Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Johannesburg SA, Cape Town, Mozambique, Botswana, and Namibia were represented. Through the works of these artists, it is possible to glean the political, social and religious influences that in large measure contributed to their consistency in art making within their various locations. Although there are artists who were influenced by religious ideas and beliefs, the sociopolitical situation of many African countries seem to occupy the imagination of many artists. Artists such as Willie Bester of Cape Town South Africa, who became a full-time artist since 1991, explored many political problems in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. In the work titled "Transition," a mixed media painting produced in 1994, Bester ridicules the post-apartheid state of South Africa. He states that even though the government claim that the atrocities that came with apartheid has been stopped, there were still killings of opposition members. The painting, a mixed media measuring 92 × 152cm, depicts a mother and child, and paper cuts of different scenes and texts. Two hands appear to hold cases of empty bullets, suggestive of the bullets

used in the killings. The paper cuts depict the image of people believed to be dead, and likely some of the victims of the spate of political killings within the country at that time. By carefully placing all these visual clues in his painting, Bester clearly speaks to the heated sociopolitical climate of South Africa in the early years of post-apartheid. Other artists such as Ugandan Godfrey Banadda was spurred by the political situation in Uganda at the time. In his painting titled "the last hope," he alluded to the chaos and anarchy that befell the nation during the rule of Milton Obote and eventually Idi Amin.

In writing this book, Savage have been able to move the conversation of art history into another level, one that focuses on the individual voice of the artist, rather than the collective voices. The significance of this style of art historical writing is that it gives the artist a voice (even power), rather than the idea of locating artists and their works within the precise documentation. Even though the way the artists talk, makes the history the most basic, it affords for a unique history, one not tainted by the biases of the critic, and art historian. Perhaps such qualities will encourage scholars of African art history to begin to consider other creative new ways of addressing contemporary African art and artists.

Ndubuisi C. Ezeluomba, *University of Florida*

Keith Snedegar. 2015. *Mission, Science and Race in South Africa: A.W. Roberts of Lovedale, 1883-1938*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 188 pp.

In this biographical study, historian of science Keith Snedegar reassesses a neglected historical figure, the astronomer, missionary educator, and politician Alexander W. Roberts. Roberts was a self-taught astronomer who devoted himself to the observation of binary stars (systems in which two stars orbit around a single center of mass). Upon learning as a young man that there was little chance of working as a professional astronomer in his native Scotland, he became a lay missionary teacher at Lovedale, the influential Scots Presbyterian mission school in South Africa's Eastern Cape, focusing his attention on teacher training. He resided in South Africa from 1883 until his death in 1938, and later in life his educational experience and scientific connections opened the way for his recognition as an expert on what were then referred to as "native affairs." This positioned him to serve in the South African Senate as one of its appointed white representatives of African interests and as a member of the country's Native Affairs Commission. As Snedegar notes, "Roberts' place at the crossroads of scientific culture, missionary education and racial politics in South Africa makes him a unique historical figure" (p. 2).

All but the first of the book's eight chapters discuss Roberts' South African career, using a chronological approach with minimal thematic overlay. This narrative structure allows Snedegar to present the complexity of Roberts' intellectual life as it unfolded; he explains his choice by arguing that "it is a matter of conjecture how he [Roberts] navigated the psychological contradictions of being a passionate Scotsman in South Africa, a missionary who put science over doctrine, and a liberal idealist who accepted racial oppression" (p. 3). The book follows its subject as he moves between South Africa and Great Britain, Lovedale and Cape Town, the local, the regional and the global, adeptly capturing the complexity of Roberts' life and times. However, Roberts himself tended to compartmentalize his activities; he did almost nothing to introduce his Lovedale students to astronomy, for example, and his one attempt to apply a scientifically-informed methodology to his political work, detailed in chapter 7, devolved into pseudoscientific racism. As described by Snedegar, much of his life

and thought was composed of parallels rather than intersections. Readers who come to this book seeking information on any single strand of his activities will thus find it scattered throughout the narrative rather than within a sustained analytical thread.

Snedegar's discussion of Roberts' astronomical activities is extensive, including an appendix detailing the many stars he observed and a bibliography of his scientific publications. In addition to assessing his research from a technical perspective, Snedegar situates it within the context of global scientific culture by tracing Roberts' involvement in the South African Association for the Advancement of Science and his connections with British, European, and American colleagues. This was the most globally-oriented of Roberts' vocations, and it becomes a case study of how South African astronomy, marginalized by foreign professionals and given little support by its own government, was subjected to "a unique form of intellectual colonialism" that persisted, Snedegar suggests, "until the end of the apartheid period" (p. 143).

Roberts' regional involvement as part of the South African governmental establishment and his localized work at Lovedale are also well-documented; the text draws on a wide range of published and archival sources housed in the United Kingdom, United States, South Africa, Australia, and the Netherlands. One disappointment is the book's lack of information about Roberts' engagement with Lovedale students and graduates. However, Snedegar does document a collegial relationship between Roberts and the Eastern Cape-based politician and educator D.D.T. Jabavu, suggesting that the two men probably "had a greater meeting of the minds than has previously been realized" (p. 85).

As a subject of biography, Roberts is unusual in that he ultimately failed to exert a significant influence on any of the currents in which he participated. His scientific work, which has recently been revisited by a new generation of astronomers, was marginalized by the end of his life; his educational and political activities produced no heirs. In this sense, *Mission, Science and Race in South Africa* is a history of paths not taken in the history of South Africa and the Anglophone Atlantic. It is a unique intellectual history of the emergence of modern South Africa, from the perspective of a man who was ill-suited to participate in its cultural and ideological shifts.

Sara C. Jorgensen, *Independent Scholar, Chattanooga, TN*

Marc Sommers. 2015. *The Outcast Majority: War, Development, and Youth in Africa*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. 249 pp.

Marc Sommers's illuminating *The Outcast Majority* exposes the vast divergence between the priorities of youth in war-affected African countries and those of governments and the international development community. An anthropologist by training, he draws on both the academic literature and numerous interviews with each set of stakeholders conducted during field research across sub-Saharan Africa.

In Chapter 1, Sommers discusses varying definitions of "youth," the importance of youth in Africa's future given demographic trends, and the source of youths' feelings of marginalization and alienation. He presents the effects of war on youth's "lives, trajectories, and bodies" in Chapter 2, including their attempts to re-integrate in communities in the post-war period. He deftly weaves in four youths' experiences from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and a refugee camp in Kenya to effectively demonstrate how periods of war can be both periods of victimization and opportunity for youth. Sommers also approaches war's effects

from the standpoint of biology and psychology, discussing malnutrition, brain development, and trauma.

Chapter 3 explores four issues: expectations surrounding adulthood, sexual violence, the migration of youth to urban centers, and alienation and exclusion. Once again, Sommers draws examples from numerous countries and groups, including the Somali diaspora, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Burundi. Stretching from pages 64-123, this chapter and the next form the bulk of the book. Sommers summarizes and critiques international development approaches in the first half of Chapter 4. For example, he notes a conflict of interest in programs and organizations evaluating themselves, argues that the “development agency literatures reveals tendencies to homogenize youth while significantly underemphasizing the expanse of youth marginalization,” and critiques the literature’s focus on quantitative evidence to the detriment of qualitative research (p. 128). Recurring throughout the chapter is frustration that African youth perspectives are frequently not taken into account, especially because of the quantitative focus of development economics. (In contrast, Sommers incorporates information from interviews with youth throughout the book.) In the sobering second section of the chapter, Sommers highlights three flaws with international development practice: the neglect of youth because they do not have their own development sector (unlike public health, for example), a donor-driven focus on numbers and immediate results that undermine programs’ impact and sustainability, and the homogenization of youth leading to the disproportionate inclusion of elite youth.

Sommers briefly summarizes his arguments in Chapter 5 before moving in Chapter 6 to a framework “to drive development work toward more effective and inclusive action for marginalized youth as well as for international development work in general” (p. 188). He outlines sixteen proposed changes or approaches for institutions and six changes to in-country activities. Unfortunately, this chapter is unsatisfyingly vague. In fairness, Sommers introduces the chapter with “The aim is not to highlight specific interventions...The reason is that the particulars of policy, advocacy, and program efforts should surface directly from the results of high-quality, context-specific, trust-based, integrated qualitative and quantitative assessment work conducted before any action is undertaken” (p. 187). Thus, his vagueness is both known and intentional. Yet, it is the earlier chapters’ specificity that bolstered their rigor and value. Stripped of this specificity, Sommers’ recommendations are harder to conceptualize and accept. For example, Sommers calls for identifying and engaging with leaders of excluded youth, even if this falls outside the common practice of elders, community leaders, or authorities identifying youth leaders. While admirable in theory, this recommendation leaves one with many unanswered questions, such whether this could inadvertently undermine or delegitimize local institutions and authorities. Because of the chapter’s brevity, the potential downsides of his recommendations are not addressed satisfactorily.

By the end of *The Outcast Majority*, one has a better sense of the ways in which youth in postwar African countries, despite their numbers, suffer systemic and cultural exclusion. One has a better understanding of why international development programs have had problems recognizing and addressing such issues. What one does not have a clear understanding of is what programs or policies that successfully include youth look like in practice—a flaw which could have been avoided by the addition of at least one chapter with one or more case studies of such successful programs. Nevertheless, *The Outcast Majority* is

worthwhile for its excellent early chapters on a vitally important topic, as well as its persuasive arguments about and demonstration of the contributions of qualitative research to the field of international development.

Brad Crofford, *Independent Scholar*

Ngugi wa Thiong'o. 2016. *Secure the Base: Making Africa Visible in the Globe*. New York: Seagull Books. 130 pp.

In seven chapters, Ngugi wa Thiong'o touches on a wide-range of issues, from the impact of slavery to colonialism and neocolonialism, from nuclear disarmament to the lopsided distribution of power within the global system, and from indigenous African languages to the future of the continent. This book could be described as a critical appraisal of the state of our globe and Africa's place in it.

The overarching theme of this book is the urgent call for the unification of the African continent. While there were many, including Ghana's legendary Kwame Nkrumah, whose attempt to promote the concept was stymied by the conspiratorial historical and ideological forces, in this audacious work wa Thiong'o reechoes the call with strident urgency. Anchored on critical appraisal of Africa's contact with Europe and the world, the author believes that it is only unification that can bring about Africa's visibility in a world that has evolved into powerful political and economic blocs.

Opening with the representation of the continent and its people in global media flows, this book indicts the West for its unremitting negative portrayals of the African experience through such pejorative terms as tribe, tribalism, tribalistic (and their companions: the "Dark Continent" and "primitive"). In line with its critical objective, the book argues that the employment of these terminologies "fail to illuminate modern developments of the continent" (p. 7). wa Thiong'o, like Wole Soyinka, traces this development back to the anthropological "fodder on which, in the main, the European mind of the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries were fed, a conditioning that has extended to its progeny till today" (Soyinka, p. 26). The author mocks the purveyors of this media frames as people who leave all reason at the door when dealing with African issues, so their narratives can fit the historical template.

While Ngugi might tend to be addressing those in the image factory, it should be of note that the academy is not excluded from the practice. As recently as 2013, Anne Neville Miller and her coauthors of an article "*Still the Dark Continent*" reenacted the template. The crux of their argument is that out of 5,228 articles they sampled from eighteen top communication journals between 2004 and 2010, only twenty-five of them were authored by researchers from African institutions. Therefore, to Miller and her colleagues, Joseph Conrad's Nineteenth Century representation was not only accurate, but it is still the contemporary reality of the continent. This willful self-indulgence that fails to account for the contextual struggles of the continent, concealing its truthful apprehension is what worries wa Thiong'o. For Soyinka, this darkness that is so readily attributed to the continent only proves to be nothing but the willful cataract in the eyes of its external beholders (Soyinka, 2012).

Still on Africa, the author unpacks the effects of the divisive colonial demarcations—the North and South Saharan, the Europhone zones (Franco, Anglo), and the LusoHispa zone—on the organic structure of the continent and calls for new measures towards the unification

of the continent. In his view, it is only the long sought unification that will deliver an intra-African common market with intra-African communications, connecting village to village, town to town, and region to region. He audaciously calls for the transformation of all the national boundaries into highways that will bring the continent together.

Closely tied to the call for the unification of the continent is the invitation to African intellectuals to return to their indigenous languages as vital conduits for reaching their base, the masses (in order to place their intellectual production at their disposal), whence visibility and respect derives. Using the notion of trickledown effects, as understood in economics, the author evokes images whereby knowledge simply trickles down to Africans because much of even what African intellectuals produce are in the language of the colonists. For wa Thiong'o, if memory is rooted in language, through which reality is constructed, then African intellectuals are doggedly locked in the reality and memory of Europeans and their knowledge of Africa is filtered through European languages. wa Thiong'o warns that Africa cannot attain its visibility through the language of others; it can only become more invisible. For those who view the multiplicity of African languages as a drawback and question their capability to support complex social thought, wa Thiong'o provides a historical map to the development of European languages to underscore the fact that those languages also faced similar questions on their journey to global prominence.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, wa Thiong'o reminds the world that only Africa has the moral right to press for this agenda. The voluntary nuclear disarmament of Libya and South Africa provides a high moral ground for the author to advance this position. Accusing the West of deception, the author specifically uses Libya as a case where its leader demonstrated goodwill by giving up nuclear weapons only to be invaded by a nuclear-armed NATO as its reward for compliance.

Continuing in line with its critical orientation, this book draws attention to the widening global inequality that is enslaving the global south and enriching the global north, especially Western Europe and the US, who control over 90 percent of the world's resources. Wa Thiong'o finds these disparities even within countries in the global north and establishes a strong link between slavery and current levels of poverty among descendants of slaves in the global north. The book places these inequalities in a historical perspective, providing inextricable links that reveal dominant-subjugated relationships between the West and Africa at each phase of their encounter—the mercantile, slavery; the industrial, colonialism; and finance; neocolonialism. It, then, condemns the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO as ideological institutions structured to promote, if not impose, neoliberal policies on the developing world irrespective of each country's economic experiences. The book calls this capitalist fundamentalism for its shared similarities with religious fundamentalism which professes only one way to reaching the ultimate reality.

This book does not only add to the fodder of literature in the area of global relations, it is a timely intervention that challenges the status quo and calls attention to alternatives in resetting global relations. But as is mostly the case, those who act on behalf of our nations are not necessarily the ones who read these materials. If only they would, they might be inspired to act—a stitch in time can save nine.

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Prosper Yao Tsikata, *Valdosta State University*

E. Ike Udogu (ed.). 2015. *Imagining the United States of Africa: Discourses on the Way Forward*. Lanham and Boulder: Lexington Books. 184 pp.

The concept of the United States of Africa is not new. It has a very long history in the sense that it originated from Marcus Garvey, an African-American in 1924, and was developed and promoted by such renowned Pan-Africanists as Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie, Muammar Gaddafi, Robert Mugabe, etc. Therefore, the United States of Africa has not just been imagined. But today, Africa leadership betrays the efforts and hopes of the fathers of Pan Africanism. Udogu's book helps to understand better the major Africa's carcinogenic phenomena that prevent the formation of a United States of Africa with a view to providing relative solutions.

Well discussed, researched and written by five scholars of international repute, *Imagining the United States of Africa: Discourses on the way Forward*, made up of six chapters, is a critical examination of such contemporary and polemic issues in Africa as "economic integration" (p. 10), social and political integration" (p. 7), "national integration" (p. 11), technology integration" (p. 122), "corruption" (p. 25), "liberal globalization" (p. 61), "leadership" (p. 26), and it may rank among the best books about Africa. This book could be described as the light, the life, the way and the future for all Pan-Africanists. It is not a book of dream and hope, but action as there is "ongoing dialogue concerning the matter of Africa's political and economic union in this millennium" (p. 1). The terms used by Udogu, *discourses on the way forward* show that Africans from inside and outside the continent have attained a point of no return. Through their contributions, the five authors give optimistic perspectives on the "continental unification" (p. 10) variously called "Union of African states" (p. 115), "united Africa" (p. 119), "United States of Africa" (p. 119).

The book is well structured, readable, newsworthy, and interesting in the sense that it provides history, economics, law, political science, and international relations students as well as researchers and all Pan-Africanists with not only the necessary reading material for the effective understanding of the nature of Africa's major concerns in the 21st century.

From a historical viewpoint, the book has also balanced the shared responsibilities of Europeans and Africans for both underdevelopment and development of Africa. In other words, if reference was made to Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (p. 85), frankly, chapter two of this book, "The Challenge of Corruption Control in Africa" (p. 25), could also be described as *How Africa Underdeveloped*. However, the causes of corruption in Africa are traceable to the West: "corruption arises ... from the clash between traditional African cultural values and the norms that were imposed on the colonies by Europeans during colonization or were imported from the developed countries through modern transnational

trade" (p. 40). It is now clear that by nature, Africans are not corrupt people. Corruption is therefore a foreign cancer.

Despite the vast contributions of the authors of this stimulating book, it would be appropriate to make known that there is an implicit definition of Africans in their writings. In other words, after the reading of this book, one may conclude that Africans are defined in relation to the Europeans or Americans who possess cleverness and imagination, and by nature, they are not capable of thinking towards progress, innovation, and development. Therefore, only European and American concepts, progress, innovation, and development can produce a better life for Africans who should "avoid the old methods of trying to 'catch up' with Western countries" (p. 122). This simply means that the development of Africa should not be considered in terms of technological, scientific and economic advancement, but in terms of what Africa imports from the West to satisfy the needs of its people. In fact, the incapacity and passivity of Africans are evidenced in these terms: "the West creates the technology innovation and Africans plug in to use it without doing any research about the product's viability in the African context" (p. 113); "Africa's new political and economic leaders will have to learn how to adjust to the forces of globalization in order to compete effectively with other regions of the world"; and "social democracy would be the best system of governance for a projected United States of Africa" (p. 153). One may also wonder if "in Africa's multiethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-racial societies" (p. 100), the best language for the coming United States of Africa could be a European language (or an African language). In fact, this book did not capture the linguistic issue.

More importantly, everybody knows that ideologies like "liberal democratization" (p. 135), "social democracy" with a capitalist orientation of course, as well as "globalization" (p. 77) came to Africa from the West. From this perspective, great events might be carefully designed to change the course of the history of the world, and Africa has to be drawn into these events. To fit this argument, Lumumba-Kassongo explains how the world functions as a complex and complicated system by adopting a "historical-structuralist approach" (p. 66). Nevertheless, the experience and expertise of the West should not be undermined.

Finally, as long as African leaders enjoy staying in power forever, integration from its various forms is useless. All that comes from the West is not good and all is not bad. It is in the interest of Africa leaders to learn from the West the democratic experience and values, which are rather good. But if democracy in Africa is implicitly defined as the power of other people by other people for African people, Africans will not be able to guide their own ways, and therefore, the project of forming the United States of Africa will be a mere dream in spite of good discourses, and the multifaceted dependency theories will never leave Africa. So, the imperative solution for all Africa's problems in general and the construction of the United States of Africa in particular would be a good education for the majority of Africans, but the reality on the ground is that academics and political leaders are not compatible in Africa. In this context, "no matter how rational and adequate a template constructed by academics for governing a polity might be if the political class conceives of such frameworks as working against their interest they are likely to ignore their implementation" (p. 100).

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Sarah Van Beurden. 2015. *Authentically African: Arts and the Transnational Politics of Congolese Culture*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 372 pp.

Authentically African is Van Beurden's impressive exploration of how colonial and postcolonial powers in former Zaire utilized "cultural guardianship" to justify their political legitimacy and to establish cultural and political economies nationally and internationally. Diverting from the imperial caricature that presses the West at the center and relegates the rest of world to the peripheral of transnational cultural processes, Van Beurden focuses on Africa and highlights how the circulation, appropriation, and reinvention of objects is utilized to demonstrate and to augment political power both in the Belgian colony and Mobutu's state. Western imperialism was not only about territorial subjugation and economic exploitation, but also "a scramble for African art" (p. 11). Western economic and cultural pillaging occurred in the exploration and conquest phases, was institutionalized in Leopold's Congo Free State and magnified during the Belgian rule. Van Beurden underscores that art/artifacts represent a "cultural value" that express the authenticity and the epistemology of the society of origin, serve an aesthetic role for museum visitors with a financial value since they can be traded. The preservation of cultural authenticity had political ramifications especially the justification of Western colonialism "as a form of cultural guardianship" (p. 13) necessary to protect and preserve the authenticity of the endangered native Congolese culture(s). The guardianship narrative legitimized the colonial state, its structures, and institution that reinforced imperialistic policies that were later epitomized by Mobutu dictatorial regime. Ethnographic artifacts exploited from Africa and imported into Europe's museums also contribute to the development of anthropology.

Authentically African is systematically woven into six chapters that illustrate how the craving for power drove the colonial conquest and the implementation of colonial rule. Narratives of political, economic, and cultural decline attributed to events such as the slave trade and the inability of the Africans to deal with Western modernity, were used to justify colonialism and the visualization of the Congo colony as a "maturing child" (p. 18) needing guardianship. Africa's precolonial progress and global connections were neglected, and instead, the past was manipulated to lock the need for Belgium guiding Congo's art. Ironically, imperialist nostalgia for the precolonial era's authentic traditions, communities, and art of the so called "noble/primitive savage" (p. 67) motivated the establishment of the Museum of the Belgian Congo as a reinvention and visualization of the Congo for the Belgian audience that were later, in the 1950s transformed into art for economic purposes.

The first chapter examines the establishment of the Belgian Congo museum that portray Congolese philosophy—cultures, epistemologies, ideologies and axiologies. The second investigates how ethnographic objects became sources of income for the colonizers. Subsequently, the Belgians issued controlling policies to protect authentic communities, their artistic and artisanal cultures that reveals the connection between politics, economics, and cultural goals for the ruler's benefits. In tandem, Mobutu's dictatorial regime fostered social conformity through the politicization of Congolese cultures. Accordingly, as the African scholar Ali Mazrui argues, the seeds of postcolonial dictatorship and control "lie in the sociological mess which colonialism created in Africa."¹

Chapter three narrates the demand for Congolese art objects from the Royal Museum of Belgian Congo in accordance with international and national decolonization struggle over cultural heritage as Congo was about to gain political independence. However the

independence was short lived, its aftermath characterized by “violence and international intervention” (p. 100) that continue to date. Chapters four and five explore the political and cultural role of the Institute of National Museum in Zaire/Congo as a means to create knowledge and to represent traditional cultural heritages out of the returned art and ethnographic collections. While the collections justified colonial guardianship, in the post colonial era, they represented Congo’s sovereignty and the continued propagation of “colonial ideas about the need for cultural guardianship” and the reproduction of “the authoritarian nature of colonial justifications for Western power in Africa, an element that contributed to the authoritarian nature of the Mobutu regime” (p. 127). In chapter six, Van Beurden notes that the process of remaking Congo’s postcolonial cultural representations was not limited to Congolese actors and audiences, but was (and remains) transnational.

In summary Authentically African uses art to tell the story of colonial control and pillaging. The same cultural objects can be utilized towards decolonization that represent Congo’s cultural heritages and identities.

Note:

1. Ali A. Mazrui. 2006. “Nationalism, Ethnicity and Violence.” In Kwasi Wiredu, *A Companion to African Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell): 480.

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Harry Verhoeven. 2015. *Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan: The Political Economy of Military-Islamist State Building*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xvi, 314 pp.

Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan is based on a doctoral dissertation completed at Oxford University. This book aims to focus on the building of the Merowe Dam, under the leadership of the al-Ingaz political movement. Harry Verhoeven strays at points to highlight other dams built as well as ongoing and future infrastructure projects in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Verhoeven argues that dams are important for Sudan’s agricultural revolution, which has been unsuccessful. This book complements other research projects that focus on dam building in Africa.¹

Oddly, the book begins with a description that includes the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir (p. 1). This book engages an interesting debate on the role of “hydrocracies” (p. 34). According to Verhoeven, political regimes will tame nature by controlling a precious resource such as water to further their economic development. Sudan becomes the case study with its dam development projects. Verhoeven argues that this is not a recent phenomenon, but is unique to this region in North Africa. In ancient times, it was the Egyptians and Nubians, and in recent times Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have the task in sharing waterways. In the nineteenth-century, the completion of the massive Suez Canal complicated water sharing in North Africa. By the 1900s, British hydrologists proposed a series of dams in Egypt and Sudan. Focusing on Sudan, British interests engineered the Jonglei Canal and Gezira scheme. Both Jonglei and Gezira were important in irrigating fields that produced cotton, primarily exported to Britain and France. The historical legacy of modern canals and ditches as well as the ability to generate a revenue stream for Sudanese farmers through cotton

sales; helps to demonstrate why expensive dam projects are envisioned as a form of economic progress by the Sudanese government.

Verhoeven examines the role of several political parties, loosely organized political organizations, and Muslim brotherhoods having influence over the construction of the Merowe Dam. The primary focus is on the al-Ingaz regime, which led a salvation revolution and their members are agents of change with the completion of the Merowe Dam in 2009. This “hydro-agricultural mission” cost the Sudanese government between an estimated \$1.8 and \$5 billion United States dollars (p. 131). Verhoeven does not highlight the concerns of dissenters towards the Merowe Dam project. It is also unclear whether the ancestors of members of the Muslim brotherhoods experienced economic progress from the earlier irrigation schemes led by the British in the twentieth century. The Sudanese Muslim brotherhoods are important, because their networks existed prior to the independence of Egypt in 1922, of Ethiopia in 1941, and of Sudan in 1956. It is unfortunate, but the only mention of the laborers who built the Dam is on foreign Chinese workers. However, it can be assumed that Sudanese people also assisted in the construction and carry out ongoing repairs on the Merowe Dam. A sequel to the book could focus on the lives of Sudanese laborers involved in dam projects.

An extensive discussion on sources and methodology should have been included to clarify the limitations of media reports as well as the unavailability of financial records and architectural drawings for further investigation. Verhoeven manages to interview several important individuals who were involved in the dam projects. It is not stated, but Verhoeven does not utilize primary sources that are archived by a state department or in the future will be stored in the National Records Office of Sudan. The sources are problematic, because the only physical evidence of a hydrocracy state is the various dams. Media reports are challenging, because informants were not available to Verhoeven to be questioned further. At times, Verhoeven’s style of writing is reflective of a journalist. For example, the discussion on “fall of the Sheikh,” several of these individuals are no longer seen as influential politicians such as Hosni Mubarak and Hassan al-Turabi (d. 2016). Moreover, there is a photo on the cover of this book that shows the Roseires Dam, but why are there no photos or architectural designs of the Merowe Dam. In addition, several websites operated by the Sudanese government are no longer active. There is a useful map and an excellent bibliography. *Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan* offers complex arguments on political and environmental movements in Africa, which is still unknown to many scholars studying the continent. If it is adopted for an African studies course, it should be read by graduate students.

Note:

- 1 Allen F. and Barbara Isaacman. 2013. *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965-2007*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press; Robert Collins. 1990. *The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal, 1900-1988*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

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Peter Westoby. 2014. *Theorising the Practice of Community Development: A South African Perspective*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 202 pp.

Community development simply is about working with people, by the people, and for the people. This work can simply be referred to as Peter Westoby's labour of love for he writes what he teaches; he researches what he likes and unfolds the vistas of the theme he is the subject expert of. Though it is not an insider's perspective (emic account), for the author teaches in Australia and is not a South African native, however his command on the discipline of community development and close and prolonged observation in the African field makes it a more credible and an objective piece of work.

The foreword is by an equally relevant scholar Frik de Beer, who is the professor of development studies in South Africa and understands the social phenomena under discussion at its core. He calls Westoby's work an outsider-insider account given his in-depth field work and thick description. This work designed somewhat like a dissertation format is a sum total of authors analysis, understanding, and interpretation where he employs historical method, field based observations, comparative approach, and sociological framework to delve deep into the pros and cons of community development in South Africa.

Apart from the crisp and highly informative introduction and lucid conclusion at the end, this work is composed of four main parts covering twelve major and equally revealing research based essays, ranging from explaining community development in theory and practice to research methodology adopted to history and framework drawn to the contribution of various Trusts in community development and finally to the state-sponsored Community development, thereby giving a complete insight into the problem.

Westoby as a researcher is highly optimistic about people's initiatives in development for he believes that community development as a practice can change the fate of millions who are marginalized and socially disadvantaged. Apart from deliberating upon the modalities of theorizing the practices of community development, he keenly observes and frames the central argument of his research about how masses organize themselves for change and how state and civil society take such vulnerable sections along to realise the process of community development.

Westoby's chapterization style rediscovers in him a doctoral scholar for he goes very systematically like a Ph.D dissertation right from introduction until conclusion. Right from Parts one to three of the total four parts, the author explores and theorizes community development along with a detailed note on methodological prism and then explains in detail about community development in South Africa linking it with historical traditions associated with community development. He traces the contribution through education of the Hantam Community Education Trust, highlights the role played in community cohesion by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, the role of Abalimi Home, and the Community Garden Movement in economic development, discusses the role played by the Southern Cape Land Committee, and finally writes about YMCA community-based education and training. He also discusses the process of community development in a dialogical form in conversation with a local community development expert Mphahlele Es'Kia and subscribes to his view that the very process of community development should be initiated by the community itself and not by any outside power agencies. The last part of the book deals with state initiated community development and the last two chapters discuss community and cooperative development within the South African context and training of community development workers. The conclusion sums up the findings briefly.

This work adds to the already rich body of literature in the field of community development, organized charity, endowment studies, trusts, state, and community development. This work is not for an intended audience but will be highly beneficial to the students and researchers in the field of community development and social work and sociology disciplines besides policy makers in Africa. Though tracing the African context, this work opens a plethora of new research ideas among the students of development studies round the world. Apart from highlighting the role played by some selected trusts, I wish the author had highlighted some of the Muslim Endowments (*Auqaf*) in Africa that have been contributing to community development.

Westoby's writing style is formal and academic; throughout his schema of chapters he maintains a coherence in arguments, clarity of thought, originality, and jargon-free style. The book is related to my own area of study, "community development through Muslim endowments." The personal experiences that I can cite on this theme is the significant role played by the organized charity institutions set up by people like trusts and endowments and finally government schemes and public welfare policies as in India the success story of Rural Employment Guarantee policy known as MNREGA.

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Justin Williams. 2016. *Pan-Africanism in Ghana: African Socialism, Neoliberalism, and Globalization*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 175 pp.

This book deals with Pan-Africanism focusing on Ghana's historical experiences since independence and explores the various ways by which Pan-African ideas have been used to shape various political ideologies. In the first part of the book, the author gives a brief summary of the origin of Pan-African movement in conjunction with the historical and global movements in the Caribbean and Americas. Asserting that the Pan-African movement occurred in five phases, the author provided an exposition into how the movement transformed from a response to the dispossession and dehumanization of African identity to that of serving as an ideological platform for cooperation between people of African descent and as a struggle for the political union of an independent Africa.

By focusing on Ghana's history, the book offers a unique perspective to looking back at the history of Pan-Africanism in conjunction with how the legacies of Nkrumah lived on and keep on shaping Ghanaian politics from his time to the present. Here, the book discusses how Nkrumah used Pan-African ideas along with African nationalism and socialism to gain political currency and how this helped him to become a prominent voice and promoter of Pan-Africanism. Thus, by seeking the liberation of the entire continent from colonial rule and offering assistance to other African nationalists, Nkrumah helped bring about the Organization of African Unity. This led to a greater articulation and later on, to the institutionalization of the Pan-African movement, which increasingly came to be characterized by the political collaboration of black leaders across the continent.

Moving beyond history and using an interdisciplinary approach, the author covers a wide range of topics that touches up on political science, anthropology, economics, and heritage tourism. In doing so, the book managed to provide a holistic understanding of the subject. This also provides insights into the flexible character of Pan-Africanism and the various ways by which it helped to shape political and economic projects in an African nation that was the first to emerge from a colonial cocoon in late 1950s. Thus, the main

contribution of the book is presenting Pan-Africanism as a progressive agenda that constitutes multifaceted issues and highlighting continuity and change as both an African and a global project. In this regard, the author successfully demonstrated how Pan-Africanism has been used by successive regimes in Ghana to deal with international political and economic ideologies and forces ranging from socialism, neoliberalism, and globalization while keeping the spirit of Pan-Africanism intact. A recent pronouncement on the provision of visas on arrival for citizens of the other fifty-three Member States of the African Union (AU) starting from July this year, made by the current Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama during the fifty-ninth independence anniversary of the nation, is a manifestation of the enduring commitment of Ghana to the Pan-African cause.

This book is very informative as it offers the much needed help for comprehending the Pan African movement. Thus, it can serve as an excellent reference for general readers and students of Pan-Africanism alike, who want to learn how the concept can be used to shed light on and respond to the forces of globalization and address the current predicaments of the people of Africa. Speaking in common voice on key issues of global consequences such as climate change, is an instance by which Pan-Africanism can give leverage to African nations. Moreover, the book having an interdisciplinary character, can be appealing to political scientists, economists, and historians and can serve as a guide to understanding Pan-Africanism in both historical and contemporary contexts.

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Zachary Valentine Wright. 2015. *Living Knowledge in West African Islam: The Sufi Community of Ibrahim Niasse*. Leiden: Brill. 333 pp.

The increase in popular Islamic education by the Salafi reformists and the spread of Aqeeda books from Saudi Arabia created a scene in West African understanding of Islamic knowledge, which seems to have become popular over the traditional method. Zachary Valentine Wright unearths the situation in West Africa where a persistent form of knowledge seeking and understanding silently gets momentum and influences the lives of many followers of the Senegalese Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (d. 1975). Wright provides an analysis of the Sufi community of Ibrahim Niasse as one of the most successful twentieth century Sufi movements in West African Islam, which present a special form of approach to knowledge with the aim of transforming the individual into a better Muslim (p. 4). Thus, “the one who has learned the Qur’an becomes the Qur’an” in terms of practice (p. 16). This form of knowledge provides the self with a special connection to God. The significance is being endowed with textual meanings and *adab* (disposition), different from the reformists’ approach which is text-based and ideological (p. 27).

The Sufi community of Ibrahim Niasse emphasizes the Maliki School, one of the four schools of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence, through personalized knowledge transmission from master to disciple leading to the concept of serving teachers (shaykhs) i.e. *khidma* (p. 34). Wright emphasized that Shaykhs are the custodians of the curriculum of learning and are responsible for decoding religious texts for disciples and if adored and respected, the disciple acquires systematic knowledge, faith and compliance with the sunna. Al-Khidri for instance stressed that the student should “ask the people of knowledge and imitate those who follow the sunna of Muhammad.” The most important aspects of this process according to Wright are: understanding the sacred law (*shari’a*), knowledge of the correct

interpretation of the Qur'an and knowing the secrets of esoteric sciences (*ilm al-asrar*), which is only embedded in master-disciple relations (p. 41). The spiritual authority of the Sufi shaykh provides the disciple with guidance towards solidifying the Sufi training that is entrenched in the West African Sufi tradition of learning through the bodily presence of the master (60). Wright raises an important point concerning the Sufi Shaykhs' engagement with litanies as part of their investment with spiritual power. Some of the Sufi Shaykhs make their expressions in metaphorical terms not quite understood today, a form of knowledge that is often accompanied by unveiling (*kashf*) of spiritual experience (*jadhb*) only relevant to a number of Sufi masters. Shaykh Al-Kunti believed that "cognizance, the knowledge of God's reality (*ilm al-haqiqah*), could be obtained only through the help and guidance of a shaykh" (p. 62). Therefore, Wright stressed that direct knowledge of God is emphasized by the community of Ibrahim Niasse as an existing habitus of personalized instruction, which established a specific West African Sufi identity, thus Sufi scholars become an icon of knowledge and disciples gather around them from far and near.

Disciples were made to understand that the best form of knowledge is *ma'arifa*, i.e. experiential knowledge of God that was introduced by Ibrahim Niasse. According to Niasse, this knowledge is necessary and Islamic scholars should be able to provide spiritual guidance in addition to textual understanding. This was exemplified by the relationship of Ibrahim Niasse and his closest disciple and successor Ali Cisse that goes beyond blood relations, as in his saying "the true disciple becomes the shaykh" (p. 105). Ali Cisse was always around Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse; praying behind him, performing *dhikr* with him, studying and reading the Qur'an as well as teaching on his behalf. Ibrahim Niasse used to praise Ali Cisse that he was to him, the way Ali was to the Prophet, an indication of spiritual choice by God (p. 121). Wright concludes that this attitude to knowledge "provides unique insight into the logic and potential of shaykh-disciple relationships at a crucial juncture in the development of new scholarly communities" (p. 122).

Ma'arifat Allah or experiential knowledge of God is considered the depth of mystical aspiration, which according to Niasse's followers; Niasse has excelled above other West African Islamic scholars in this regard. The Sufis believed that knowledge of God leads its possessor to the recognition of divine truth as a result of primordial covenant of the souls of entire human creation before fixing them in corporal bodies. Therefore, the presence of the soul in the body indicates that all humans have the intrinsic ability to know God. Thus, the purpose of human creation goes beyond worship to include awareness of God, a complimentary quality to worship (p. 133). Otherwise, how can a person worship God without knowing Him? "The purpose of human creation was to know God, and everything distracting humans from that necessity was a fleeting illusion." *Ma'arifa* is thus the true understanding of the divine Oneness of God (*tawhid*) (p. 135).

This form of knowledge ought to be transmitted through master-disciple relationship under special spiritual training called *tarbiya*. The Shaykh help the disciple to move from one rank to another like grades in a modern western school. According to Wright, the Prophet is seen as the "paradigmatic actualization of divine knowledge," which was transmitted to selected companions and which continued by means of person-to-person transmission (p. 148). The shaykh must also have the spiritual ability to bring the disciple into the presence of God therefore, entitled to the disciple's service and obedience (*khidma*) (p. 178). Although some Sufi shaykhs like Ahmad Tijani claimed direct initiation from the Prophet through dream or waking encounter (p. 156). On the other hand, the disciple must rely and accompany the shaykh because knowledge is in the bodily presence of the shaykh and there

is need to internalize it as well as become the spiritual child of the master. The disciple should hope to in the future become a spiritual master himself, and his physical companionship with the shaykh indicates his sincerity in seeking God.

However, despite the persistency of the Sufi form of knowledge for many centuries in West Africa, there are other forms of Islamic knowledge in the West African scene, which I called popular Islamic knowledge at the beginning of this review and Zachary Valentine provided an analysis of it in the last part of the book for better understanding of the situation in West Africa. Another important point, is that the Sufi understanding of knowledge is only restricted within the fold of particular believers in the community of Ibrahim Niasse and other Sufi Orders, which restrict its popularity.

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