

On the Waters: Economic and Political Drivers of Maritime Conflicts between Uganda and its Neighbors

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Abstract: The Great Lakes region has, in the recent past, been awash with numerous border conflicts/or threats to conflict among the member states. Whereas various studies have endeavored to explain the emergence of such conflicts, many of them lay the blame on colonial cartographical errors and territorial hegemony that developed after independence. This article furthers the debate by examining why, in the recent past, there have been conflict/disputes on shared waters between Uganda and its neighbors. Escalating maritime border conflicts in the Great Lakes Region have been mainly due to the increasing need for both control and exploitation of key economic resources, leading to the struggle for control of these areas. The strategic importance of lakes such as Victoria, Albert and Edward will continue to make them sources of conflict among countries in the Great Lakes Region, as long as a proper resource-management mechanism under international protocol is not put in place.

Key Words: Border, Water, Conflict, Uganda, Congo, Great Lakes

Introduction

The Great Lakes Region, comprising Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, has had to contend with either numerous border conflicts, or threats of conflict among the member states. Whereas various studies have endeavored to explain the emergence of such conflicts, many of them lay the blame wholly on both colonial cartographical errors and territorial hegemony that developed after most countries attained their independence.¹ This article broadens the debate by specifically examining why, in the recent past, there have been a series of conflicts/disputes on shared waters between Uganda and its neighbors. These increasing maritime disputes remain understudied. Escalating maritime border conflicts in the Great Lakes Region have been mainly due to the increasing need for both control and exploitation of key economic resources, either around or within these lakes, leading to the struggle for strategic control of these areas.

Literature Review

In many studies that deal with border conflicts, “border” and “boundary,” have often been used interchangeably.² However, their use in this article is cognizant to the fact that while they are related, each of them has a different meaning. For instance, according to Zartman, “a boundary is a line indicating where I stop and you start, separating an area from another.”³ Consequently, boundaries have to do with physical and political demarcations, but also with social and

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psychological separations, that is, concerned with identity or indicating who we are and who we are not. A boundary is, therefore, significant in this context because it determines the confines of a country's sovereignty by delineating the territorial and jurisdictional spheres, as well as the national identity of a particular people leading to border points.⁴ Hence, it is boundaries that eventually produce borders. On the other hand, a border refers to the territory adjoining the boundary and various political, economic, and social practices that occur between people in these areas. Thus, both border and boundary are relevant to this study in that understanding "boundary" becomes useful in analyzing "border" conflicts on water bodies between Uganda and her neighbors.

Studies of precolonial Africa indicate that the concepts of boundaries, and later borders, were not as elaborate as they are today. Societies and states were characterized by large degree of pluralism and flexibility that even among the centralized states, a territory was defined from the center, rather than from its borders. According to Dobler, different societies were often separated by large stretches of uninhabited wilderness, or valleys, hills and rivers.⁵ It is on such a basis that Khadiagala concludes that most pre-colonial borders were fuzzy—boundaries were structured along loose and flexible communal lines to accommodate shifts in political identities and allegiance.⁶ As such, external boundaries were marked where states such as Buganda could be defined by sharp edges—Lake Victoria, the Nile, swamps, and other water bodies made territorial borders for states such as Buganda with her neighbors of Busoga and Bunyoro.⁷ Therefore, the idea of a boundary or border as defined by Zartman did not exist in Africa before colonialism—there were only frontiers of contact and separation.⁸ All these were complicated by colonialism that eventually created new states in Africa with apparently definite borders.

For Wekesa, boundary making was a very deliberate and elaborate process—a cartographic feat of the colonial powers at the Berlin Conference.⁹ Thus, the current boundaries on the waters of the Great Lakes Region were inventions of colonial powers whose main objective was to enhance their imperial and economic interests.¹⁰ In this case, many rivers, lakes, swamps, and valleys came to serve as national boundaries between and among many of these East African territories. According to Kurschner-Peckman, this process created border spaces often not clearly defined, and as such, have become the source of conflicts over unclear spheres of control.¹¹ It is on this basis that various scholars blame border conflicts on the colonial partition of Africa.¹² For instance, Zotto faults colonial cartographical mistakes to have caused the conflict between Malawi and Tanzania. He argues that Tanzania and Malawi inherited maps with boundary ambiguities created by the British that later resulted in a border dispute between the two countries over Lake Nyasa.¹³ This is strongly supported by Zartman who postulates that the disputes over boundaries are due to the fact that conflicting parties either do not know where the line is, or quite simply do not like where the line is located.¹⁴

A thorough analysis of various literature also shows that the process of border demarcations between Uganda and her neighbors was influenced by economic and strategic colonial interests decided between 1885 and 1925. For instance, Okumu posits that the demarcation of borders between Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda was influenced by Britain's obsession with the control of the source of the Nile. Similar was the case of Belgium's wanton rapacity for the mineral wealth in present day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).¹⁵ Another example is found in the British struggle for the Rwenzori, Semuliki, and Muhangi areas from which it hoped to access deposits of gold and other minerals.¹⁶ These imperatives guided the Anglo-Belgian Agreement of 1894 signed to define the international

boundary in the area between Lakes Edward and Albert.¹⁷ It should however be noted that while making such pronouncements, the colonial powers were ignorant of actual local geography which led to a lot of mistakes in the creation of the boundaries in the Great Lakes Region. For instance, the Rwenzori mountains were for six years regarded as the western limit of the Uganda protectorate, while the Belgians in Congo did not know that their territory extended to Beni.¹⁸ It is on such grounds that the above scholars believe cartographical mistakes led to later border conflicts without analyzing the underlying economic factors.

Therefore, whereas border conflicts in Africa are frequently attributed to colonial cartographical failures, this cannot fully explain why conflicts are escalating between Uganda and her neighbors over water bodies. This study argues that the numerous disputes and/or conflicts between Uganda and its neighbors can be attributed to the recent discovery of oil, e.g., the conflicts between Uganda and DRC over Lakes Albert and Edwards. In contrast, the situation on Lake Victoria, particularly the conflict over the Island of Migingo, is primarily due to current strategic interests.

Methodology

To properly understand the above phenomenon, this study adopts a qualitative methodology through a historical case study approach. Three cases of Lake Albert, Lake Edward, and Migingo Island provide insights to a problem in the Great Lakes Region, particularly, and Africa, generally. These areas were chosen due to a high incidence conflicts or disputes. The study relied on both primary and secondary sources including newspapers, government reports, magazines, and speeches by politicians and other international actors on actual incidents of conflict.

Interviews included key informants such as: fishermen residing around the borders, soldiers guarding borders points, and local leaders. Informants for oral interviews were purposively selected by identifying respondents with first-hand information and experience with these conflicts. Forty informants were interviewed in the areas of Buseruka, Hoima, and Migingo. Data was collected between 2017 and 2019 in the districts of Hoima, Kibaale, and Bulisa (Western Uganda) as well as Migingo Island. The Territorial Materialism Paradigm—which holds that states and their leaders contend and fight for territories for geo-strategic material advantage—is useful in comparing strategic factors with the economic underpinnings of maritime border-related disputes in Africa.¹⁹ The study also borrows from geopolitical analysis which combines geography, strategy, and history.²⁰ The article is organized by the different areas of conflict, beginning with the Uganda-DRC conflict on Lakes Albert and Edward, then an analysis of the Migingo Island dispute between Uganda and Kenya.

Border Conflicts between DRC and Uganda on Lakes Albert and Edward

The political outlook in the Great Lakes Region has, for years, been defined by the relationship between DRC and Rwanda. However, in recent times, the interactions between DRC and Uganda are also emerging as another key factor for wider peace and security in this part of the world.²¹ Indeed, the relations between DRC and Uganda have been marked by shared acrimony since Uganda invaded and occupied parts of eastern DRC in 1998. Whereas the conflict over borders between Uganda and DRC originates from their colonial history, the conflict has, in recent times, escalated due to geo-strategic resources such as recently discovered oil reserves

and the desire to extract fish from shared waters.²² While much has been written on the broader conflict between Uganda and DRC, this section lays particular focus on the border conflicts on Lakes Albert and Edward. The borders on these waters were mainly defined by the Anglo-Belgian Agreement of 1894 which heavily relied on the lakes and the 30th East Meridian to define boundaries, a method that did not work well in determining borders in these colonies.²³

Lake Albert, about 160kms long and 32kms wide, is located on the border between DRC and Uganda, and it belongs to the Upper Nile system.²⁴ From a geo-political perspective, the areas around and across the lake continue to reflect trans-border concerns emanating from its vast natural resource endowment that sometimes pose a threat to bilateral-relations between Uganda and DRC.²⁵ In addition to being a major source of fish, the lake also serves as a vital means of transport by the people in surrounding districts of DRC (Ituri) and Uganda (Nebbi, Amuru, Bulisa, Hoima, Kibaale, and Bundibugyo).²⁶ This mode of transport mainly facilitates trade among the aforementioned border towns or districts. The lake enables both local inhabitants and those coming from far-off places to sell their merchandise such as timber, agricultural produce, and fish to the different communities around the lake.²⁷ Unclear border demarcations on Lake Albert, coupled with a struggle over the control of its Rukwanzi Island, have been sources of deadly conflicts between Uganda and DRC. Uganda claims inherited colonial boundaries places the island was within its territory even though 90 percent of the inhabitants are Congolese.²⁸

Several factors have been proposed as possible causes for border confusion, including the shifting course of the Semuliki River south of Lake Albert due to soil erosion, a factor that favored DRC.²⁹ For that matter, DRC insisted that the river was the natural boundary, no matter where it flowed.³⁰ Such circumstances resulted in killings and abductions of nationals from the two neighboring countries. One of the victims stated that her brother and uncle were abducted on Lake Albert and spent more than nine months in a prison in the DRC.³¹ This is corroborated by another resident: "a month hardly passes without Congolese attacking and impounding fishing gears from our fishermen here...which is only recovered after paying a ransom to Congolese security officers."³² The situation was made worse by increasing piracy and killings on the lake by security operatives who feigned ignorance of the border. For instance, on May 21, 2016, armed men suspected to be DRC soldiers ambushed and shot dead four Ugandan Marine Police on Lake Albert in Kibaale District near the DRC border.³³

While all these happened under the pretext of a lack of a clear physical boundary, the reality is that the struggle for resources has escalated conflicts on the lake. The "unclear boundary" is therefore only used as a scapegoat. Both DRC and Ugandan fishermen repeatedly accuse each other of disrespecting the boundary while fishing. According to one DRC fisherman, "the boundary is not visible on the lake, you can see it on the land, but you do not see it on the water."³⁴ As a result, soldiers patrolling the lake have created a business by forcing fishermen across the invisible boundary line to pay hefty fines.³⁵ This eventually ends in conflict. A case in point was in July 2018 when Ugandan soldiers fired at DRC fishermen leading to a serious military confrontation between military personnel in which thirteen Congolese were killed and ninety-two others arrested.³⁶ There has been a similar increase in tension overfishing and other activities on Lake Edward—many people have died there.³⁷

The conflicts between DRC and Uganda over Lakes Albert and Edward have been worsened by a growing struggle over oil resources. In August 2007, Uganda confirmed 6.5 billion barrels of crude oil in this region.³⁸ Tullow Oil, China Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)

Uganda, and Total E&P Uganda began developing the oil field for Uganda's commercial oil production.³⁹ As a result of this, the security situation between the two countries deteriorated significantly when a series of incidents threatened to escalate into a full-blown war. Four members of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) were arrested in late July 2007 by the Armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) for allegedly having driven their patrol boat into DRC waters on Lake Albert.⁴⁰ A week later, a Ugandan-registered barge belonging to the Canadian company, Heritage Oil, was attacked by another FARDC patrol near Rukwanzi Island, killing an official of UK Civilian Oil.⁴¹ As in the earlier incidents noted above, DRC claimed that this barge had illegally crossed into its waters. This was strenuously denied by the Ugandan authorities, who insisted that Rukwanzi Island was in Ugandan waters.⁴² The UPDF and FARDC engaged in a number of scuffles in September 2007 on/or around Lake Albert, resulting in fatalities on both sides.

Following these encounters, both sides claimed a violation of sovereign and territorial obligations. The conflict worsened when four Uganda police officers were killed by the DRC army who accused them of illegal patrols of fishing activities on the DRC side of the lake.⁴³ The DRC officers also confiscated the police boat, further escalating tension. Since the discovery of oil, both DRC and Ugandan armies have deployed heavily in the Albertine region, threatening a war between DRC and Uganda.⁴⁴ Whereas DRC accused Ugandan forces of encroaching on their territory, Ugandan authorities maintained that DRC did not do enough to fight militia activities near the border, hence necessitating their intervention.⁴⁵ Ugandan security forces entered DRC territory officials decided to move the border at Ofo four kilometers towards Uganda.⁴⁶ DRC complained of Ugandan troops firing on its people. As a result, twelve fishermen died and a dozen more were unaccounted for on Lake Edward, and this was followed by a fire exchange between DRC and Ugandan forces in which thirty people died and many went missing.⁴⁷

Realizing the need to respond to the above volatile situation, especially due to mounting pressure from the international community, presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Joseph Kabila of DRC met in Ngurdoto, Tanzania. The Ngurdoto Agreement signed by the two nations affirms that the conflict had been exacerbated by the two nations' push for oil exploration in the area. The agreement contained several provisions including the need to form a joint boundary commission that would define better the DRC-Uganda border as it passes through Lake Albert and to the north of the Lake. Both sides admitted that the clashes had been exacerbated by a lack of clarity of this border on the lake. Secondly, both sides conceded that competition for access to exploration wells on Lake Albert had been a key factor in all of the clashes, and that a commitment to joint explorations would end such skirmishes.⁴⁸ Joint operations were not anticipated as difficult to implement, given that all major concessions on both sides of the border were held by the same companies, Heritage Oil and UK Tullow Oil.

Throughout late 2007 and early 2008, the Ngurdoto Agreement was widely hailed as a key to the subsequent improvement of overall diplomatic relations but also as the reduction in the two countries' tensions over the border on Lake Albert. However, the terms of the agreement soon unraveled as DRC realized that the agreement over joint exploration would not hold once significant oil fields were found on the Ugandan side of the border. The situation worsened in May 2008 when the FARDC moved a DRC customs post north of Lake Albert from 5km to within 300 meters of the agreed Ugandan border, and erected a signpost with an inscription,

“Welcome to Congo.”⁴⁹ DRC officially withdrew from the joint boundary commission three days later and authorities then cancelled their mining contracts with Heritage Oil and Tullow Oil. These were subsequently reallocated to South African Petro SA, a move which also took DRC out of the joint exploration agreement. As such, Kinshasa laid stronger claims on these new deposits by pressing border issues more directly rather than staying within the Ngurdoto Agreement. This renewed tension between the two countries.

From the above analysis, the border conflict over Lakes Albert and Edward (which runs along the border between southwestern Uganda and northeastern DRC) was not much about the apparently unclear boundary or fishing on the lakes. The fishermen have only been caught in a battle they do not understand, e.g., “before the discovery of the precious oil resources, we would fish without minding about the borders.” Moreover, the situation has been worsened by security forces who have created business out of these unfortunate condition as mentioned above. A Ugandan court sentenced 35 DRC fishermen up to three years in jail for illegal fishing in Ugandan waters.⁵⁰ In retaliation, DRC authorities captured some Ugandan fishermen who were allegedly fishing in DRC waters and detained them.⁵¹ As one of the victims narrates: “We are living in fear. Our families back home in Uganda do not know if we are alive or dead; when we were arrested, some of our colleagues who tried to run away were killed... we have been detained for more than two months and not taken to any court.”⁵² Conflict arising from fishing on Lake Edward has also continued to flare up, with each party accusing the other of illegally fishing in the other’s waters. For instance, on 23 December 2017 a fisherman at Mbegu was surrounded by a group suspected to be DRC operatives armed with four guns and moving in three engine boats.⁵³ Since then, DRC soldiers have repeatedly confiscated boat engines, fishing boats, and nets.

Conflicts on Lakes Albert and Edward have escalated following the discovery of commercially viable oil deposits in the Albertine Basin. The discovery of some oilfields such as Kingfisher and Ngassa-2 at Kaiso has, for instance, resulted into the restriction of fishermen from carrying out fishing near the oil wells.⁵⁴ Similar to the conflict between South Sudan and Sudan over Abyei, the border conflicts between Uganda and DRC over Lakes Albert and Edward have been worsened by these areas’ rich oil endowment and the subsequent struggle for control/or ownership. In essence, therefore, it is not the waters, per se, that Uganda and the DRC are quarrelling over but rather what lies beneath or near the two waterbodies. Moreover, these escalating conflicts have not been helped by the conspicuous absence of a regional mechanism that would offer guidance in the sharing of trans-boundary natural resources, thereby creating an unfortunate situation best dubbed ‘survival of the fittest’ and hallmarked by an egoistic exercise of military prowess with subsequent state-inspired violence that has devastatingly affected the local inhabitants of these areas.

Conflict between Uganda and Kenya over Migingo Island

Uganda shares a vast border with Kenya and the Republic of Tanzania on Lake Victoria; however, most disputes have centered on Migingo Island. Migingo is a small island measuring less than an acre of land, rocky and with very little vegetation.⁵⁵ It is one of the three closely situated islands in the eastern part of Lake Victoria. The island has been indirectly under territorial control by Kenya since 1926.⁵⁶ Not long ago, Migingo was not much more than a little rock protruding out of water before the lake started receding in the early 1990s.⁵⁷ So there were no settlements on it until recent times.⁵⁸ Now there are about one thousand people inhabiting

Migingio Island, with some eighty percent being of Kenyan descent.⁵⁹ Two Kenyan fishermen, Dalmas Tambo and Edward Kibebe, claim to have been the first inhabitants of the island in modern times.⁶⁰ By the time they settled on the island in 1991, it was covered with weeds and inhabited by birds and reptiles.⁶¹ Joseph Nsubuga, a Ugandan fisherman, also claims to have occupied Migingio in 2004 and that all he found on the island was an abandoned house—a sign that there had been earlier settlements as earlier alluded to by the two aforementioned Kenyans.⁶²

Most of the island's current occupants are not able to tell whether the island belongs to Uganda or Kenya: "I do not know which country this island belongs to. I just stay here," remarked one Okello.⁶³ Of twenty residents asked this question, more than half of them gave the same answer. As such, Migingio Island has become a disputed border-space and a source of tension between Uganda and Kenya, with both countries claiming ownership. In 2004, Uganda posted an army and police marine unit that later hoisted the national flag on the island, much to Kenya's chagrin. In 2007, the Kenyan government responded by sending police to the island. Subsequently, the Kenyan parliament unanimously supported this move, apparently as a way securing the rights of Kenyan fishermen on the island and protecting Kenya's territorial-rights on the island. It is on this basis that some scholars trace the genesis of this conflict to diminishing returns in fish and related products, leading to rising competition for the increasingly scarce resources.⁶⁴ The high demand for fish, especially high commercial value Nile Perch (*tilapia*), has increased the impetus of each of these countries to contest for the full control over this island.⁶⁵

Complaints by Kenyan fishermen of harassment by Ugandan security officers for "illegal" fishing on Ugandan waters only exacerbated the conflict. Bearing in mind that fishing is a major source of livelihood for many communities it is plausible that the border tension between Kenya and Uganda revolved around the right to fish in the waters around the island.⁶⁶ Uganda blamed Kenya for "illegal" fishing in its waters, while Kenya blamed Uganda for attempting to push Kenyan fishermen out of their territory.⁶⁷ The situation worsened in early 2009 when Kenyans living on the island were told by the Ugandan government to purchase special permits for eligibility to carry out fishing. Much like the conflict between Uganda and DRC over coveted oil resources on Lakes Albert and Edward, one could assert that Migingio is an important space for both Uganda and Kenya because of its rich fish resources on Lake Victoria.

A thorough analysis of this conflict, however, shows that its escalation is more than just competition for fish resources. Rather, it has more to do with the strategic and political importance of the island to both Uganda and Kenya.⁶⁸ Indeed, the claim for territorial integrity seems to be a more plausible cause given Uganda's history of troubled border issues with her neighbors. Well before the Migingio matter, Uganda had been accused of annexing eight islands on Lake Victoria previously claimed by Kenya.⁶⁹ In the early 1970s, Idi Amin seized Sigulu Island, the largest and most important of the islands with a population of about 10,000 people—mainly of Banyala (Luhya) origin from Kenya.⁷⁰ The other islands are in the Suba region—the twin islands of Rusinga and Mfanjano, as well as Lolwe, Mayami, and Rembe—with Luo residents mainly from locations such as Sakwa, Bondo, Uyoma, and Yimbo in western Kenya.⁷¹ Some Kenyans have urged their government to reclaim these islands, a move that has been bitterly opposed by Uganda. Therefore, the acrimonious question of Migingio Island needs to be understood in terms of defending territorial sovereignty, above anything else. The issue is

complicated by the fact that while the territory is presently controlled by Ugandan authorities, the people in this island are predominantly of Kenyan origin and pay more allegiance to that government.⁷²

Much like border controversies elsewhere in Africa, the Migingo case challenges the perception that these areas are mere marginal spaces that can be ignored.⁷³ The conflict lays bare the realities of Africa's colonial borders and brings into focus how social, cultural, and economic resources cross the boundary lines.⁷⁴ Lake Victoria and its basin are made up of complex social, political, and economic dynamics presented at local, national, and global levels. Instead of a mere struggle for resources between Uganda and Kenya, the Migingo controversy raises important questions about territoriality, citizenship, and nationhood. So, this is not only about a tiny land mass, but also the many unresolved issues around the emergence, nature, and transformation of ideas relating to border spaces and control of water bodies. It resonates with Glassner's view that in Africa, struggles over borders have less to do with the physical settlement of the boundary locations but instead the meaning and value attached to such borders for strategic reasons.⁷⁵ The issues that lead to conflict are normally related to the historical processes through which such boundaries emerged, working hand-in-hand with the politics of the time.⁷⁶

The issue of territorial integrity, more than anything else, seems to have been the real cause of the Migingo conflict. This is clearly seen in comments made by Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni while addressing students of the University of Dar es Salaam in May 2009.⁷⁷ He argued that whereas the island itself was Kenyan territory, the surrounding waters were Ugandan and then proclaimed that the Migingo's Luo inhabitants would not be permitted to fish in Ugandan territory.⁷⁸ So the primary cause of conflict was not simply competition over declining fish resources around the island, as has been argued by scholars such as Birungi (2009). Instead, the conflict is a fight for territorial control and the reason why most Kenyan politicians and media did not take Museveni's comments lightly, instead urging their government to address the Migingo issue with a serious political response. Therefore, the conflict also has some symbolic meaning.⁷⁹ Subsequently, the Kenyan government sent some fifty administrative officers to the island, a move that not only caused panic among Ugandans living on the island but also threatened to spill over into a military confrontation between two nations that had previously been in a good relationship. As expected, Ugandan Police blocked the Kenyan officials from docking. Many Kenyan politicians then urged their government to use military means to remove Ugandans from the island. Uganda was similarly determined to protect their interest in and around this tiny island. The situation nearly culminated in warfare between the two neighbors, but immediate diplomatic talks saved the situation.

Migingo is of strategic interest to Uganda first as a patrol base in Lake Victoria, and only secondarily because of the rich aquatic resources around the island.⁸⁰ Uganda is vulnerable to a security threat from Lake Victoria which it views as inadequately policed by Kenya and Tanzania. The present government is especially aware of the security importance of this island as the National Resistance Army effectively used the lake to supply its guerillas with arms and food in the 1980s. However, according to Okumu, a flourishing multi-million contraband trade could be behind the present row between the two neighbors. Migingo Island is very similar to Chepkube and other islands in Lake Victoria that were hubs or transit points for coffee smuggling in the late 1970s. In the case of these islands, when Uganda deployed security forces

to curb the illegal trade it subsequently maintained a presence there.⁸¹ This confirms their interest in Migingo is primarily strategic.

Conclusion

While the dominant perspective in the literature on border conflicts in Africa suggests that they are a result of contradictions arising from colonial partitioning, this article argues that such perspectives cannot fully explain the border disputes between Uganda and her neighbors on the waters which they share. On the surface, border disputes between Uganda and DRC on Lakes Albert and Edward emanate from colonial cartographic mistakes and the need to control vital resources such as fish. In more recent times, however, these conflicts actually arise from desire for newly-discovered oil resources. Likewise, matters of territorial integrity, security, and trade drive the recent contestations between Uganda and Kenya over Migingo Island on Lake Victoria. Therefore, understanding these disputes provides a more holistic and effective approach to inter-state border conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Border issues—particularly those of the sort presented above that involve resources, trade, and citizenship—must be well-negotiated and properly administered to prevent or resolve such conflicts. These factors do not automatically lead to conflicts—conflicts emerge as a result of poor management of these matters by sitting governments.

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Notes

¹ For instance, see Okumu 2010.

² Walker 2015.

³ Zartman 2011.

⁴ Chukwuma and Ngwu 2019.

⁵ Dobler 2008.

⁶ Khadaigala 2010.

- ⁷ Green 2010.
- ⁸ Ggebenenye 2016.
- ⁹ Wekesa 2010.
- ¹⁰ Wekesa 2010.
- ¹¹ Kurschner-Pelkmann 2013.
- ¹² Munge 2017.
- ¹³ Zotto 2013.
- ¹⁴ Zartman 2011.
- ¹⁵ Okumu 2010.
- ¹⁶ Okumu 2010, p. 279.
- ¹⁷ Khadiagala 2010; Okumu 2010.
- ¹⁸ Kibulaya 1967.
- ¹⁹ Geomans and Schultz 2017.
- ²⁰ Sloan 2017, p. 13.
- ²¹ Relief Web 2008.
- ²² Westerkamp and Houdret 2010.
- ²³ UN Economic Commission for Africa 2018.
- ²⁴ Westerkamp and Houdret 2010.
- ²⁵ Reliefweb 2008.
- ²⁶ Westerkamp and Houdret 2010.
- ²⁷ Johnson et al. 2009.
- ²⁸ Manyak 2015.
- ²⁹ Uganda Nile Discourse Forum 2013.
- ³⁰ Kamugisha et al. 2008.
- ³¹ As quoted in Mugerwa 2018.
- ³² Patrick Tumusiime, quoted in Mugerwa 2018.
- ³³ Interview with Julius Hakiza, Albertine Region Police Spokesman. Hoima, August 2018.
- ³⁴ *Mail & Guardian* 2018.
- ³⁵ *Mail & Guardian* 2018.
- ³⁶ *Mail & Guardian* 2018.
- ³⁷ Interview with Jackline Asimwe. Kibaale, August 2019.
- ³⁸ Biryaberema 2014 and Manyak 2015.
- ³⁹ *New Vision* 2020.
- ⁴⁰ Reliefweb 2008.
- ⁴¹ Waswa 2007.
- ⁴² Reliefweb 2008.
- ⁴³ *The Independent* 2016.
- ⁴⁴ Interview with John Byabakama. Buseruka, August 2019.
- ⁴⁵ Ssekana quoted in Waswa 2007.
- ⁴⁶ *Missionary International News Agency* 2008
- ⁴⁷ *Deutsche Welle* 2018a.
- ⁴⁸ Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement 2007.
- ⁴⁹ Reliefweb 2008.

- ⁵⁰ *Deutsche Welle* 2018b.
- ⁵¹ *New Vision* 2018.
- ⁵² Interview with anonymous victim. Bunia (DRC), November 2018.
- ⁵³ Mugerwa 2018.
- ⁵⁴ Interview with Michael Irumba. Buseruka Sub-county, August 2018.
- ⁵⁵ Kisiangani 2010.
- ⁵⁶ Muchege 2017.
- ⁵⁷ Kisiangani, 2010.
- ⁵⁸ Interview with Michael Owino. Migingo Islands, June 2019.
- ⁵⁹ Owuor 2015.
- ⁶⁰ UN Economic Commission for Africa 2018.
- ⁶¹ UN Economic Commission for Africa 2018.
- ⁶² Interview with Joseph Nsubuga. Migingo Island, June 2019.
- ⁶³ Ogenga 2019.
- ⁶⁴ Ogenga 2019.
- ⁶⁵ Owuor 2015.
- ⁶⁶ Kinyera and Doevenspeck 2019.
- ⁶⁷ Okumu 2010.
- ⁶⁸ Muchege 2017.
- ⁶⁹ Muchege 2017.
- ⁷⁰ Muchege 2017, p. 20.
- ⁷¹ Ombuor 2008.
- ⁷² Interview with over 20 residents. Migingo Island, June 2019.
- ⁷³ Wekesa 2010.
- ⁷⁴ Okumu 2010.
- ⁷⁵ Glassner and Fahrer 1996.
- ⁷⁶ Asiwaju 1985.
- ⁷⁷ Asiwaju 1985.
- ⁷⁸ Asiwaju 1985.
- ⁷⁹ Green 2010.
- ⁸⁰ Shimoli and Mayoyo 2009.
- ⁸¹ Wekesa 2010.