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Special Issue

Local Communities and the State in Africa

Guest Editors: **Parakh Hoon and Lauren M. MacLean**

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Table of Contents

Review Essay

Book Reviews

Kwame Anthony Appiah. 2014. *Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 227 pp.
Review by Christopher Allen Varlack (160-161)

Andrew Bank and Leslie J. Bank, eds. 2013. *Inside African Anthropology: Monica Wilson and Her Interpreters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 354 pp.
Review by Voudina Ngarsou (161-162)

Lizelle Bisschoff and Stefanie Van de Peer. 2013. *Art and Trauma in Africa: Representations of Reconciliation in Music, Visual Arts, Literature and Film*. London: Tauris. 325 pp.
Review by Charlotte Baker (162-163)

Catherine Boone. 2014. *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 416 pp.
Review by Leila Demarest (164-165)

Clifton Crais and Thomas V. McClendon, eds. 2014. *The South Africa Reader: History, Culture, and Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press. 605 pp.
Review by Sarah Hanisch (165-167)

Sebastian Elischer. 2014. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 336 pp.
Review by Nicholas Knowlton (167-168)

Peter Geschiere. 2013. *Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust: Africa in Comparison*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 293 pp.
Review by Uchenna Onuzulike (168-170)

Susan Gilson-Miller. 2013. *A History of Modern Morocco*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 306 pp.
Review by Brahim El Guabli (170-171)

Richard Grant. 2015. *Africa: Geographies of Change*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 356 pp.
Review by Heidi Frontani (171-173)

John Hannigan. 2012. *Disasters without Borders: The International Politics of Natural Disasters*. New York: Polity Press. 195 pp.
Review by Tony Waters (173-174)

Zelda La La Grange. 2014. *Good Morning, Mr Mandela.* New York: Allen Lane. 370 pp.
Review by Suraj Yengde (174-176)

Laurenti Magesa. 2013. *What is Not Sacred?: African Spirituality*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. 256 pp.
Review by John Williams (176-178)

Chrispen Matsika. *Traditional African Education: Its Significance to Current Educational Practices*. Harare, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press. 206 pp.
Review by Eustace Palmer (178-180)

Temitope B. Oriola. 2013. *Criminal Resistance? The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers*. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 243 pp.
Review by Olawari D.J Egbe (180-182)

Adebayo Oyebade, ed. 2014. *The United States' Foreign Policy in Africa in the 21st Century*.
Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 202 pp.
Review by William A. Taylor (182-183)

Terence Ranger. 2013. *Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-67*.
Woodbridge, UK: James Currey. 206 pp.
Review by Myles Osborne (183-184)

Robin Law, Suzanne Schwarz, and Silke Strickrodt, eds. 2013. *Commercial Agriculture, the Slave Trade, and Slavery in Atlantic Africa.* Woodbridge: James Currey. 272 pp.
Review by Gordon R. Barnes Jr. (185-186)

Vivian Seton, Konrad Tuchscherer, and Arthur Abraham, eds. 2013. *The Autobiography of an African Princess: Fatima Massaquoi*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 274 pp.
Review by Tamba E. M'bayo (186-188)

Chantal Zabus. 2013. *Out in Africa: Same-Sex Desire in Sub-Saharan Literatures and Cultures*.
Suffolk, UK: James Currey. 298 pp.
Review by Matthew Durkin (188-189)

Introduction
The Politics of Local Communities and the State in Africa

PARAKH HOON and LAUREN M. MacLEAN

Introduction

After over two decades of political and economic reforms in many countries in Africa, the interactions between African states and subnational actors at the local level have been transformed in fundamental ways. Many important dimensions of politics take place outside of the formal state institutions in the capital city. Given the prevalence of weak central states, subnational politics is hence crucial to understanding a range of important outcomes, including democracy, civil society, ethnic conflict, and economic development. The relationship between African states and local communities is thus especially relevant for contemporary Africanist scholarship. Despite the significance of these on-the-ground politics, mainstream debates about African state–society relations have focused largely on the variation in more formal institutions at the national level. This special issue shows how many important dimensions of politics can be understood by examining the interactions between the state and local communities and the nuanced variations in subnational politics. Moreover, the special issue highlights how scholars are gaining analytic leverage in this emerging research area by taking a multidisciplinary approach and employing a variety of methodological tools.

On-the-ground patterns of conflict and cooperation over political power, economic development, and land or other natural resources in contemporary African societies point to the ongoing salience of public authority that resides outside formal institutions and central governments.[1] Sometimes authority is exercised through neo-traditional customary institutions and local community actors.[2] At other times, international donors and non-state transnational corporations and NGOs blur the boundaries between the public and private.[3] International and local NGOs and community-based organizations have become especially significant for service delivery, the provision of security, and political representation in decision-making.[4] However, externally driven community-based interventions may be less effective.[5]

Indeed, there is a wide variation in patterns of interactions between local communities, political regimes, state institutions, and markets in Africa. Moreover, these dynamics are not a universal or simple linear march toward liberal democracy, good governance, and the free market. Instead, in Africa, many political regimes have vacillated between democracy and authoritarianism; central state administrations have been decentralized and often recentralized; and, markets have been reorganized and then reconstructed in a response to pressures for policy reform as well as new sources of investment.[6]

The six papers presented in this special issue respond to concerns raised at the American Political Science Association's Africa Workshop 2012 on "Local Communities and the State in Africa" that took place at the University of Botswana in Gaborone, Botswana.[7] Twenty-two

scholars teaching at different African universities and four US-based doctoral students attended the workshop. The group was diverse, with participants originating from fourteen different countries, having pursued degrees in thirteen countries, and specializing in seventeen different disciplines/research areas. Workshop participants also were at a variety of stages of their careers and have attained many different ranks: from early graduate students to full professors. In addition, the workshop had five co-leaders, who facilitated the discussion on the politics of local communities and the state.[8] During an intensive two week period in July 2012, workshop participants debated several key theoretical and methodological questions and then worked to apply these new insights to our respective writing projects.

This special issue showcases a subset of papers that seek to expand our collective understanding of subnational politics. Our work is motivated by several questions. We begin by asking what are these new emerging local institutions and organizations that are vying for public authority? And, how does the role of these new local institutions shape the structure of state power and legitimacy in Africa? We then shift the lens to ask how are Africans participating as citizens and/or subjects even as the political arena is contested and reshaped at the local level? And, finally, how do interactions between local communities and the state involve local but also significantly other national, regional, and transnational actors and linkages?

Local Communities and the African State: Diverse Perspectives and Subnational Variation

As a whole, the papers in this special issue demonstrate the need to systematically examine subnational politics in the context of very different types of political regimes and levels of state capacity—political regimes and state capacity that run the gamut from South Africa to Zimbabwe. All of these papers highlight the existence of significant subnational variation from party politics to service provision, from natural resource management to discourses on culture and tradition. Our collection of papers also reveals the utility of incorporating multiple perspectives in a variety of contexts on any particular issue. The value of diverse points of view is particularly evident when one reads the two different authors focused on politics in Ghana, or the two others investigating processes of decentralization in Botswana and South Africa.

The Provision of Public Goods at the Local Level

For many local communities in Africa, the concrete experience of these complex and varied histories of state formation involves whether and how public goods are provided at the local level. During decades of authoritarian rule and economic stagnation, local communities played a significant role in the day-to-day survival of ordinary Africans.[9] Beginning in the 1980s, many African states adopted structural adjustment programs that reduced the central state's role in the provision of public goods.[10] With the spread of democratization and decentralization initiatives in the 1990s, African states faced growing popular demands for enhanced delivery of public goods and services in security, health, and education. Would fuller democratic regimes be more responsive to the claims made by African citizens for greater accessibility and higher quality service provision?

Kirk Harris's paper "Bread and Freedom: Linking Democracy and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa" responds to this question by examining some of the taken-for-granted

assumptions about the relationship between democracy and food security in Africa. Taking Sen's assertion that no democracy experiences famine as a theoretical starting point, Harris attempts to unpack the concept of democracy to explore the likely causal mechanisms of this potential relationship in thirty-eight African countries. On the one hand, he finds that competition through democratic elections is not influential in shaping food security in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other, his analysis reveals a positive relationship between civil liberties, or the freedom to make one's voice heard, and food security. Harris's analysis supports rights-based approaches that highlight the capacity of the most vulnerable groups in society to be able to make effective demands and participate in the political process as the key driver of food security outcomes. Thus, instead of elections, the everyday freedoms that allow vulnerable groups to participate in the policy process are a more robust explanation of food security outcomes in Africa's hybrid democracies.

The paper by Harris points to a major gap in the literature and debates about democracy that tend to rely on national-level aggregate measures of democracy without accounting for significant subnational variation. He sees the need for a research agenda that "shifts the level of analysis" from the level of the state to that of the community. MacLean's paper, discussed in the next subsection, further investigates this subnational variation as well as the mechanisms for democratic participation within several regions and then among two case study villages in Ghana.

In addition to the nature of the political regime, another important factor of public goods provision is the capacity of the state as well as the proliferation of new non-state providers. In weak African states governed by neopatrimonial patronage networks, there is a constant tug-of-war between local authorities and central patrons. Due to ensuing uncertainty, African citizens frequently "exit" and rely on community-level associations to access resources. As Innocent Chirisa notes in "Housing Cooperatives and the Politics of Local Organization and Representation in Peri-Urban Harare, Zimbabwe," low-income residents in peri-urban areas outside of Harare, for example, rely on local housing community-based cooperatives and consortia in order to increase their land security. Since the City of Harare (the responsible government agency) is unable or unwilling to incorporate peri-urban areas within its jurisdiction to service them with the basic amenities of water, sewage, and electricity, new cooperatives have emerged and devised various strategies for survival. In the absence of security of land tenure, and with no access to public services, in some cooperatives local politicians act as guarantors for residents' continuity of stay on their pieces of land. In other instances, local membership in cooperatives and consortia is a way for the urban poor to enhance their "sense of security in a place." These practices of collective action are a form of associational life, which not only shape political identities but also constitute alternative avenues of representation, themes that are explored in more detail below.

The Politics of State Formation: Partial Decentralization and Administrative Reform

Historically, African rulers have differentially integrated local communities into state-building processes. In contrast to Herbst (2000) who makes a more general argument about the inability of African states to project state power into the rural hinterlands, these papers build on Boone (2003) to examine variation in state building over time and at the subnational level.

Parakh Hoon, in "Elephants are Like our Diamonds: Recentralizing Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana, 1996-2012," also examines the patterns of state building in Botswana, but in a different arena of interactions between the state and local communities. Hoon's paper suggests that in Botswana between the 1990s and 2012, there are two patterns evident in the relationship between the state and local communities in the context of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). In the mid-1990s, the central state gave certain powers to local elites in order to harness their cooperation for CBNRM local institutions. This was not power-sharing, but a mechanism to exert control. Hoon finds that the endogenous state formation of the Botswana state, which had entailed continuity between the pre-colonial and post-colonial dominant elite coalition, and the cooptation of local customary elites by the central state, has meant that, since independence, the central state has governed from the center rather than build local entities or networks of state outposts in rural areas. Hoon's paper identifies various strategies that are used by the Botswana central state to co-opt subnational actors under the veneer of nation-building and national identity. In the national debate over CBNRM policy, by comparing diamonds for national development with the benefits from elephants and wildlife in general, the CBNRM policy rejected the foundational logic and rationale for a community-based approach. This was an approach which implied that for elephants and wildlife in general to survive in the long term those who face the costs of living in close proximity to wildlife should receive a major share of benefits.

Majuta Mamogale's paper "Financial Performance of Local Government in Limpopo Province" reveals "twilight practices" at the local level, where the formal processes of administrative decentralization are co-opted by informal but ritualized local practices, which compromise state efforts.[11] In South Africa, the Limpopo local government receives the highest percentage of unsatisfactory audit reports, which suggests poor financial performance as compared to municipalities in other provinces in South Africa. Mamagole's paper explains how cadre deployment in South Africa accounts for these variations in financial management and performance of municipalities. Cadre deployment is not a formal policy of the state, but an informal system of patronage where party loyalists of the ruling African National Congress are recruited into municipal governing structures, sometimes without the requisite skills or competencies. Mamogale argues that in the case of the Limpopo Province, meritocracy has been compromised. He thus calls for "party-specialist recruitment patterns" to be adopted, where party loyalty is combined with expertise as the basis for recruitment.

Politics of Belonging and the Representation of Citizens

Most African regimes are still highly centralized, largely non-competitive party systems, and the linkage between local communities and the state is dominated by clientelism and patronage.[12] Lauren M. MacLean and George Bob-Milliar focus on the politics of belonging and the representation of citizens at the local level. Together, MacLean and Bob-Milliar provide interesting insight into two different time periods in the development of Ghananian democracy. MacLean focuses on the initial period following the democratic transition in 1999, and Bob-Milliar discusses the effects of participation on dynamics of representation after a decade of democratic consolidation in 2012. Both of these papers complicate the perception of Ghana as a strong democracy that is progressing along a linear path of democratic consolidation.

Lauren M. MacLean's "Citizen or Client?: A Conceptual Analysis of Everyday Politics in Ghana" explores the meaning and everyday practice of democracy on the ground to ordinary citizens in Ghana. The relationship between the local communities and the African state is frequently characterized by scholars as clientelism and contrasted pejoratively with the Western ideal-type of citizenship. MacLean's paper juxtaposes the abstract conceptualization of these two concepts in the literature with the everyday politics of individual Ghanaians. Starting with Afrobarometer data from 1999 and 2008, the paper first establishes subnational variation in different regions in Ghana with regard to political participation and belonging that do not parallel the distinctions in the literature between citizenship and clientelism. MacLean then undertakes a further "fine-grained," local-level study in two villages in the region that score highest in the indicators for political participation and belonging to further explore this puzzle. MacLean's paper shows that local political leaders and community-based institutions were especially salient avenues for representation for Ghanaians. She finds that, contrary to the scholarly conceptualizations, ordinary Ghananians' notions are more entangled and reflect significant hybridity, including elements from both theoretical categories. For MacLean, "these village residents were neither perfect citizens nor clients but articulated their own conceptions of everyday politics." Maclean illustrates how everyday politics, the political attitudes and forms of everyday politics of ordinary Ghanaians, do not fit the common Western conceptual categories to theorize citizenship and clientelism.

These findings are salient in light of the arguments about the resurgence of low-level party activists in Ghana after the transition to multi-party politics in 1992 by Bob-Milliar in his paper "Party Youth Activists and Low-Intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana: A Qualitative Study of Party Foot Soldiers' Activism." He shows how these "foot soldiers" play an important role in mobilizing support for different political parties especially during recent elections. Bob-Milliar considers how politicians and party leaders use state resources, including government appointments, to dispense patronage to these foot soldiers. The paper reveals the persistence of neopatrimonial linkages between local communities and the state in hybrid democracies. Bob-Milliar contends that while electoral contests have been generally peaceful in Ghana, it is important to recognize the existence of such localized low-intensity violence instigated by these foot soldiers. Bob-Milliar demonstrates how clientelism drives the foot soldiers and highlights the pernicious effects for notions of citizenship and the Ghananian democracy as a whole.

Field Research and Methodologies to Study the Politics of Local Communities and the State

The papers in the special issue and those discussed at the APSA-Africa workshop have been based on field research and illustrate the significance of this fundamental practice.[13] Field research involves much more than landing in a particular site to gather data. Fieldwork means that the scholar becomes engaged or immersed in the community being studied in order to understand the phenomenon taking place within its own context. Thus, even when relevant Afrobarometer data exists, the authors' experiences in the field sites provided crucial insight for the formulation of their research questions, development of key concepts, and analysis of politics on the ground.

In many cases, field research is necessary because the questions about interactions between local communities and the state are new, or previously, key groups were not included in

existing data collection. For example, Chirisa's arguments about peri-urban Harare are based on extensive field research and contextual aspects and are supported by a sample of 402 questionnaires (with both closed and open-ended questions) from five sites: Whitecliffe, Hatcliffe, Caledonia, and Harare South's Southlea Park and Hopley. The politics of housing for peri-urban areas is a relatively new dynamic, and the precariousness of the tenancy of many of the respondents would have marginalized their participation in any previous data collection.

The authors in this special issue also highlight how an understanding of local communities and the state involves field research at multiple levels with a longer historical perspective. For example, Hoon's analysis traces changes over time and situates subnational bureaucratic and community-level of decision-making within the context of Botswana's national politics.

The special issue contributors also demonstrate the value of using multiple data collection techniques to approach questions from various angles and be able to triangulate among potentially competing perspectives. Hoon's paper analyzes the debates from the local press and interviews with district-level bureaucrats and NGO leaders to unpack strategies of recentralization in Botswana. Bob-Milliar's research on Ghanaian foot soldiers is based on a grounded and contextual understanding derived from extensive field research in local constituencies, which included interviews with foot soldiers and party leaders along with newspaper reports. MacLean combines findings of Afrobarometer with ethnographic observation and survey and focus group interviews in two villages. Harris uses aggregate data collected by the Afrobarometer project in combination with published secondary sources. Moreover, the findings in Harris' paper point to the need for further field research to tease out the mechanisms between experience of democracy and food insecurity.

The practice of conducting field research and its use by African and non-African Africanists, however, are not neutral and raises several normative issues that were discussed at the APSA-Africa workshop. In particular, these were about recognizing and being cognizant of how research positionality and situatedness within different power structures shapes access to field sites and our interpretations. Many of the scholars challenged the pretense of objectivity from an imagined ivory tower in the field and favored more participatory and interactive field approaches to negotiate a more level balance of power. In response to these discussions some of the workshop participants reflected on their positions in a newsletter for the African Politics Conference Group.[14]

Conclusion

In examining the varied relationships between local communities and the African state, the papers in this special issue highlight several important cross-cutting themes. First, several papers demonstrate that the African state is changing in important ways. Many African states have responded to external pressures to reorganize administratively, in particular, to decentralize, but these processes are often partial and incomplete. Various terms have been used to signify these local practices—local governance, community-development, local participation, local clientelism, and patronage. These concepts highlight the ongoing significance of the subnational level of African politics, as well as the debates and contention regarding the normative desirability of certain subnational actors and outcomes. The papers in this issue reveal the importance of conceptualizing and systematically studying subnational so

that we can begin to theorize the varied and dynamic interactions between local communities and the state over time in particular contexts.

Second, our papers reveal that the provision of public goods and services increasingly involves multiple new non-state actors. Indeed, many of these new subnational institutions and actors blur the traditional boundaries between the categories of state, market, and community, a theme that is emphasized throughout this special issue's papers. Our research emphasizes the necessity of going beyond a narrow geographical concentration on a particular community to analyze linkages that connect local, national, and transnational actors.

Third, African citizens are participating in politics at the local level through many more avenues than simply the sporadic elections held every several years in their countries. Representation occurs not only through the formal electoral institutions but through many informal institutions. Nevertheless, despite the significance of these on-the-ground politics, typically debates about African state–society relations have focused largely on the variation in more formal institutions at the national level.

Fourth, these papers demonstrate the importance of grounded field research for investigating the politics of local communities and the state. Scholars who work on such local governance questions—whether in rural or urban areas of Africa—lack access to systematic comparative work on many of the key questions of local politics. They often find that existing datasets or secondary sources are absent or insufficient. Almost all of the scholars therefore conducted fieldwork at the local level in order to collect original data for their studies. The fieldwork experiences of these authors demonstrated that simple notions of objectivity were futile in the study of African politics and also that there was no single model or template for conducting field research in Africa. Like the workshop, this special issue thus not only interrogates the substance of local communities and the state but also reflects critically on the research process for studying these important questions from varied and multi-disciplinary perspectives.

Finally, this special issue reveals the value gained from the collaboration between African and non-African Africanist scholars who share similar research interests. The APSA Africa 2012 Workshop facilitated the development of new networks among scholars working in different parts of the continent and in the US. Our hope is that these particular, person-to-person relationships between a relatively small number of colleagues will become broadened and institutionalized over time. With declining funds for field research available to both African and non-African Africanists, and the limited availability of new scholarship due to the lack of reliable power supply and internet speed, strengthening our collaborations promises to enrich our future understandings of local communities and the state in Africa.

Notes

1   Lund 2006; Galvan 2004; Hyden 2013.
2   Ntsebeza 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Geschiere 1993.
3   Piot 2010, 1999; Ferguson 2006, 1990; Leonard and Straus 2003.
4   See Reno 1998, 2011 and Brass 2012.

5   Mansuri and Rao 2013.
6   Arriola 2012; Bratton and Van De Walle 1997; Boone 2003; Pitcher 2012; Poteete and Ribot
     2011; Ribot et al. 2006; Van de Walle 2002.
7   For additional information from past and future APSA Africa Workshops, including
     detailed proceedings from the 2012 workshop, see:
     http://www.apsanet.org/~africaworkshops/. Many additional workshop papers are
     available as working papers at the APSA Workshop's Social Science Research Network
     website at
     http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=
     2181663.
8   The workshop co-leaders included: Professors Parakh Hoon (Virginia Tech University),
     Lauren M. MacLean (Indiana University), Joseph Mbaiwa (University of Botswana-
     Okavango Research Center), Sethunya Mosime (University of Botswana), and Lungisile
     Ntsebeza (University of Cape Town). The co-editors of this special issue thank all of the co-
     leaders for their intellectual inspiration and guidance, but any errors in this publication are
     our own.
9   Hyden 1980; Chazan 1988; Mahieu 1990; Berry 1993; Tripp 1997.
10   Mkwanadire 1995.
11   Lund 2006.
12   Englebert 2009.
13   Kapiszewski et al. 2015.
14   See link to the African Politics Conference Group's newsletter:
     http://africanpoliticsgroup.org/wp/wp-
     content/uploads/2011/08/APCG_Newsletter_Feb2013.pdf.

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Bread and Freedom: Linking Democracy and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract: This article looks at the effect of politics on food security in thirty-eight Sub-Saharan African nations since 1990. In so doing, it helps clarify the causal mechanisms through which democracy impacts hunger. In contrast to previous empirical research where democracy is often treated as one-dimensional, this study incorporates multiple measures of democracy and freedom. The cross-national statistical analysis uses data from the Global Hunger Index of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), as well as data on democracy and civil liberties from a variety of extant sources. The article finds that while variables measuring the procedural and institutional elements of democracy are not connected to levels of hunger in Africa, the protection of civil liberties is moderately associated with improved food security. This conclusion is borne out by a brief case study of Ghana, whose democratic transition in the 1990s has proceeded in tandem with significant reductions in hunger. Taken together, this suggests that the positive effects of democracy on food security in Africa are not a result of the opportunity for Africans to discipline non-responsive elites at the polls, but of the effectiveness of political liberalization in creating new spaces for vulnerable populations to mobilize and to make their voices heard.

Introduction

Over twenty years after a democratic "wave" swept the African continent, just what difference has democracy made for the material wellbeing of African communities, particularly as it relates to hunger and malnutrition? While many African economies are growing steadily, human development remains a challenge, and many states struggle with the most basic of dilemmas, that of how to feed their populations. Resolving this dilemma is a critical challenge for African governments and citizens alike. To the extent that public action makes a difference in hunger outcomes, food security is an important issue for government accountability. How African states respond to hunger, then, is a function of how effectively governance arrangements connect the behavior of political officials to the will of the populations they serve.

Using data from the Global Hunger Index of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), as well as data on democracy and civil liberties from a variety of extant sources, this article looks at the effect which political variables have had on the levels of food security in thirty-eight Sub-Saharan African nations since 1990. In so doing, it helps clarify

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the causal mechanisms through which democracy impacts hunger. Previous research has explored the link between democracy and a variety of other social outcomes, including hunger and famine. This work makes a number of powerful claims about the effects of democracy. This literature often treats democracy as one-dimensional, however, rather than looking at how different elements of democratic governance may be empirically linked with these outcomes. To address this lacuna, this study uses a multi-method approach to examine the effect of different measures of democratic governance on food security. First, a cross-national regression analysis is used to test hypotheses about the relative significance of several dimensions of democracy. This statistical analysis reveals that while variables measuring the procedural and institutional elements of democracy are not connected to levels of hunger in Africa, the protection of civil liberties is moderately associated with improved food security. This conclusion is then supported by a brief case study analysis of Ghana, where political liberalization in the early 1990s promoted citizen mobilization and created new possibilities for Ghanaians to hold their leaders accountable for development outcomes. Taken together, this suggests that the positive effects of democracy on food security in Africa are not a result of the opportunity for Africans to discipline non-responsive elites at the polls, but of the effectiveness of political liberalization in creating new spaces for vulnerable populations to mobilize and to make their voices heard. By lowering the barriers to collective action and opening up new forms of political participation, the protection of civil liberties creates opportunities for food-insecure communities to lobby their representatives for policies that can alleviate the sources of their vulnerability.

Democracy and Social Outcomes in Political Science

The question about whether or not democracy makes countries richer, healthier, more educated, or less hungry—in short, whether or not democracy leads to development—is as normatively important as it is empirically compelling. This question has been taken up by a number of researchers who affirm that there are positive links between democracy and desirable social outcomes (including primary education, reduced child hunger and mortality, and investment in public goods).[1] While these findings have been critiqued, they identify several distinct ways in which democracy may impact social welfare.[2]

Explanations for the relationship between democracy and positive social outcomes are diverse. They include the effects of formal political institutions, such as the role played by political parties competing to win votes in elections, or the inclusion of citizens into the political process.[3] Additional explanations stress the political efficacy of civil society and a free press, and the importance of equality as a democratic virtue.[4] Still others add the argument that democracy operates over time to transform citizens' expectations of what they should receive from the state, thereby encouraging increased action to promote public welfare.[5]

The multiplicity of causal pathways through which democracy may impact human development may simply signify confusion on the part of researchers. A more compelling explanation, however, is that democracy is a distinctly multidimensional concept, with different facets of the concept associated with different social or economic outcomes.[6] While this conceptual fact is recognized by political scientists, much of the empirical work attempting to link democracy to specific social outcomes is based on an examination of the

correlation between the author's preferred measure of democracy and the outcome of interest.

The failure to compare the effects of democracy (or related phenomena like civil liberties) on an outcome is a shortcoming of this previous literature. Rather than relying on one static indicator to examine the link between politics and food security in Africa, this essay looks at three measures related to democratic governance: a continuous measure of democracy provided by the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers 2010), a binary measure generated by Cheibub et al. (2010), and an indicator for civil liberties provided by Freedom House (2010). While both elections and civil liberties are linked to the overarching concept of democracy, they represent different facets of this idea. As such, they are associated with different theories about how democratic representation helps to reduce hunger in a population. The following sections explain in greater detail these theoretical arguments.

The Role of Formal Institutions

One theoretical explanation linking democracy to food security posits that democratic institutions will foster accountability for positive hunger outcomes by promoting electoral competition, thereby encouraging public action to reduce hunger and promote development. Elected officials must be responsive to the needs of a majority of constituents or face rejection at the ballot box.[7] Electoral incentives should also rein in corruption by creating a competitive political market in which popular pressures restrain the rent-seeking behavior of the state, thereby ensuring a more efficient provision of public goods and higher levels of social welfare.[8] The presence of competitive, well-regulated, electoral institutions represents a theoretical "safety valve" for citizens discontented with their elected leaders. Hungry, food-insecure citizens can toss out non-responsive elites and install leaders who will provide food relief, build agricultural infrastructure, provide access to markets, subsidize agricultural inputs, or control food prices.

While these reductionist models may be normatively and aesthetically appealing, they are not without theoretical and empirical problems. This is especially true when applied to the African context, where democracy is a relatively recent and weakly entrenched mode of governance.[9] Even free and fair elections serve as loose accountability mechanisms, with considerable "agency slack" between public will and political action.[10] The investments which democracies do make in the production of public goods can also be "captured" by the non-poor, and political entrepreneurs in the developing world use a variety of tools-- including denial, blame deflection, and patronage—to skirt accountability for food security outcomes even in an ostensibly democratic system.[11] In such environments, public officials have incentives to produce only those public goods that are "visible" and for which they will get credit from voters at election time, to the detriment of essential but less visible public goods for which voters struggle to accurately attribute responsibility.[12]

An extension of this is that politically marginal communities, whose voices politicians can "afford" to ignore, do not receive the kinds of infrastructural investments necessary to build food secure communities.[13] In Africa, political marginality is often linked to ethnicity, as incumbents disproportionately distribute resources to co-ethnic clients at the expense of citizens whose ethnic identities do not grant them access to the political resources necessary to demand goods or services from their representatives.[14] In addition to cutting out their ethnic adversaries, rent-seeking politicians in these ethnically polarized political contexts

may be able to afford to undermine public welfare by withholding resources from even loyal clients, whose support they can count on regardless of how they mismanage public resources.

The Role of Rights and Freedoms

The apparent shortcomings of the above explanation, which focuses on the role of political competition in democratic elections, suggests a second potential mechanism linking democracy to food security. Rather than elections serving as mechanisms of accountability, political freedoms serve to open up new channels for citizen communication to policymakers and create space for new voices to enter the political sphere. Authoritarian rule effectively censors the distribution of interest groups who are permitted to mobilize, thereby shortchanging potential groups who would benefit from alternative policies.[15] In contrast, democratic states which protect civil liberties create space for formerly marginalized individuals and groups to engage in the policymaking process. By forming civil society groups to lobby their representatives or by taking advantage of press freedoms to draw attention to the issues that matter to them, citizens can in turn communicate their concerns and priorities to policymakers more directly and more eloquently than by merely casting a ballot.[16]

Research on the importance of civil society and social capital suggests that this ability to mobilize and pressure political officials is important for ensuring accountable, responsive, and equitable governance, even in settings where democracy is nominal or non-existent.[17] In particular, the concerted action of well-organized civic groups can be essential in overcoming the inertia of a recalcitrant government and asserting the rights of poor people who suffer from hunger. The effects of civic activism and social mobilization on hunger in Africa are well recognized, with Bates asserting several decades ago that Africa's post-independence governments were often biased policy against rural smallholders to appease their nascent urban populations who faced fewer barriers to collective action than their compatriots in the countryside.[18] The power of citizen mobilization is perhaps best summarized by an Indian labor leader: "law is like a donkey—it goes whichever way it is pushed."[19] By creating spaces for this mobilization, the presence of civil and political rights can help "push" law and policy in a direction that is more favorable for the majority of African citizens whose voices were stifled during decades of authoritarian rule.

This argument should be familiar: it has been asserted repeatedly by Amartya Sen and others who argue that a free press' ability to cover sudden hunger spikes and generate public outrage in democracies can push these regimes to avert famines.[20] As Sen and several authors note, however, democracies are not necessarily any better at responding to chronic malnutrition or long-term hunger.[21] There are a variety of reasons why this may be the case, not least of which is that those groups most at risk of starvation often have the least access to and leverage over the political elites responsible for directing policy. This skepticism about the influence of poor citizens is balanced against the proponents of "rights-based" approaches to development studies which re-frame the development process as a political struggle for substantive and enforceable rights, or as a process of popular decision-making in which citizens can "claim genuine accountability" for policy outcomes.[22] Seen from this perspective, poverty and hunger are symptoms of inequality and power asymmetry.[23] By creating opportunities for citizens to make demands on their leaders, the protection of civil liberties can ensure that these leaders respond to the will of the majority of their

populations. The juxtaposition of these theoretical claims justifies an inquiry into the potential mechanisms connecting democracy to food security in Africa – through elections or via civil liberties.

Democracy and Freedom in Contemporary Africa

In addition to these more general arguments about the efficacy of civil liberties in inducing accountability for hunger outcomes, there are a number of distinct features of African politics which may explain why civil liberties, and not democratic elections, would be significantly associated with decreased hunger on the continent. To begin with, competition between political parties in Africa is relatively quite weak. African elections have been accused of being racial or ethnic censuses that result in uncompetitive single-party dominant systems.[24] In addition, political parties can be weak and personalistic, with new parties forming and old ones folding each election cycle as political alliances between elites shift. In spite of the perceived weakness of elections, however (a conclusion supported by this analysis), accountability between citizens and political officials is not impossible. Personal links between citizens and politicians are possible even in environments where inter-party democratic competition is non-existent, as in Kenya's *harambee* system under Kenyatta.[25] While these citizen-elite linkages are often clientelist in nature—which may ultimately be detrimental to the provision of the kinds of public goods that help improve nutrition outcomes and forestall hunger—the existence of such relationships may nonetheless promote a certain kind of accountability between people and their representatives.[26] While the protection of civil liberties does not necessarily ensure that political patrons will respond to the interests or needs of their "clients" in these relationships, it does at least create the possibility that politicians will hear from a more diverse cross-section of their constituency.

Data and Methods

The sets of theories highlighted above linking democracy to development outcomes provide a point of departure for empirical inquiry. They identify two distinct pathways through which attributes of democracy may be linked to food security, either by promoting public accountability through formal institutions, or by facilitating the integration of previously marginalized interests into the political process.

In order to evaluate the hypotheses that African states with higher levels of democracy and greater respect for civil liberties have higher levels of food security, I run a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for each of the key independent variables described above. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1 (see below). The unit of analysis for these regressions is the country-year, with the 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2011 estimates for the Global Hunger Index (discussed below) serving as the dependent variable.[27] The analyses include data for thirty-eight African countries, with 148 total observations for these models (113 observations for models using a lagged dependent variable). The regression estimates use country-specific fixed effects and incorporate temporal "dummy" variables to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries and across time. These are extremely restrictive models. They help ensure, for example, that we do not falsely assert the importance of democracy (or any other variables) to food security when in fact the "true" link between the two variables is conditional upon an unobserved third measure that is specific to a given country or a given year.[28] As a robustness check of these results, I also run a series of similar regressions incorporating a

lagged dependent variable. This technique controls for the effect that the level of hunger and food security in a previous period may have on the level observed in the following period. Finally, I disaggregate the GHI measure to examine how the protection of civil liberties affects each of its component measures.

Issues in the Measurement of Food Security: Establishing a Dependent Variable

Food security is not particularly challenging to define: an oft-cited description comes from the 1996 World Food Summit Plan of Action, which states that "[f]ood security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life."[29] Measuring food security is more difficult, however. As it is most often articulated, the concept consists of three component factors: availability (the degree to which food is present in a community), access (an individual's ability to acquire the food), and utilization (in part, the ability to absorb and process the nutrients).[30] As a result of the multiple facets and determinants of food security, no single measure of food security is suitable for an authoritative, reliable, cross-country comparison.[31] Research measuring food security has been conducted by development scholars and practitioners, who focus on hunger and nutritional stability as it is experienced at the household or individual level. Such work can rely on multiple methods—including household surveys, observed physical outcomes (such as the Body-Mass Index, a weight-to-height ratio), or consultative methods such as participatory rapid appraisal (PRA)—for establishing the overall food situation of the household, community, or region being studied.[32] For cross-national research, however, a different, more widely applicable indicator is needed, one that can be used to assess the effects that democracy and rights-protection may have on nutritional outcomes. This measure should reflect the multi-dimensional nature of food security as a concept while maintaining its applicability to a wide range of contexts.

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) employed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is a useful measure in this regard. The GHI combines data from United Nations agencies on undernourishment (the percentage of the population consuming insufficient calories), the percentage of children who are underweight (low weight-for-age, known as "wasting"), and on child mortality (percentage of children who die before their fifth birthday).[33] The index ranges from zero to one hundred, with a score of zero reflecting absolutely no hunger and one hundred reflecting total disaster (the entire population is undernourished, all children are underweight, and all children die before their fifth birthday); each component is weighted equally.[34] The index thus contains information pertaining to food availability, access, and utilization amongst the population of a country. When people cannot get enough to eat, this is a reflection of a lack of availability or access; when their children are unable to grow, this is a reflection of a lack of access or utilization; when children die from hunger this is often a byproduct of their inability to fight off disease, a key function of effectively utilized nutrition. For the purposes of this cross-national analysis, GHI scores thus serve as adequate measures of the key dimensions of food security.

The utility of this measure is further enhanced due to the index's temporal breadth. The 2011 GHI contains estimates for 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2011, facilitating the evaluation of a country's progress over time. In this respect, the measure is more useful than indicators such as the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) which measures a country's

commitment to combating malnutrition.[35] While HANCI is extraordinarily detailed, the index is a better reflection of the political will to fight hunger than it is as a measure for hunger itself. In addition, the index is available for fewer countries than is the GHI and is not available as panel data, curtailing the scope of the analysis. The multidimensionality of the GHI in the present analysis also improves on Jenkins et al.'s (2007) discussion of food security in Africa, which looks exclusively at "wasting" (low-weight for age) as a proxy for food security, and is conceptually distinct from cross-national research on democracy and famine prevention.[36]

Democracy and Freedom: Independent Variables

While measuring food security can be challenging, evaluating democracy can be even more difficult. A recent effort to compile a multi-dimensional index of democracy has catalogued no less than six different conceptualizations of this term present in political science literature.[37] For the purposes of this study, three separate indicators of democracy that measure different facets are needed: two which look at democracy as a way of ensuring political competition through open elections, and a third measure of political freedom which looks at the extent to which countries protect key civil liberties.

For the first of these indicators, I use the widely-used *polity2* score in the Polity IV dataset, which emphasizes the presence of competitive electoral institutions and reflects the degree to which leaders are chosen through an open, competitive process.[38] When measures of autocracy and democracy are combined, they constitute a twenty-one point scale ranging from -10 (a fully institutionalized authoritarian regime) to +10 (a fully open and democratic regime).[39]

A second measure for electoral democracy is the binary indicator produced by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (CGV), which updates well-known work by Alvarez et al (1996).[40] This indicator takes a value of 0 for non-democracies and 1 for democracies. In order to be considered a democracy by the authors, a country's chief executive must be chosen via elections or by an elected body (i.e., a parliamentary system), have a popularly elected legislature, feature competition between political parties, and experience an alteration in power between these parties. The combination of these of these features results in a high hurdle for regimes to clear in order to be considered democratic, but is also limited to a handful of institutions. The Polity and CGV measures provide different levels of detail and precision regarding the competitiveness of African regimes, with the Polity score offering a more nuanced measure of political competitiveness while the CGV indicator focuses even more narrowly on elections. Although distinct, both variables can make a claim to being reliable measures of the procedural minimalist definition of democracy in which leaders acquire power "by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."[41] This definition focuses on the method of selecting political leadership—elections—and little else. This 'thin' notion of democracy has been widely accepted within political science.[42]

In contrast to the procedural minimum definition, the organization Freedom House ranks countries on the presence of civil liberties, an element of democracy, which reflects its participatory character. Freedom House ranks countries from a measure of one (indicating that the country respects such liberties) to seven (indicating that a country denies citizens these liberties). These rankings are determined by a battery of experts who evaluate countries on a checklist of criteria that includes freedom of expression, associational rights, the rule of law, and individual autonomy.[43] The Freedom House rankings have been

criticized for inter-temporal inconsistency, conceptual ambiguity, and for their opaque coding rules.[44] However, in spite of the problems with the Freedom House data, it is readily available, complete, and useful. In the present analysis, I use an inverted measure of the civil liberties scale because it is more intuitive to interpret (so that 1 reflects a country that restricts civil liberties and 7 reflects an open regime) as a foil to the minimalist Polity IV and CGV definitions. The freedoms measured in the Freedom House variable are not in themselves constitutive of democracy, but they are consonant with its application. The use of these three variables represents an opportunity to examine the effects of different components of democracy on food security outcomes, suggesting different mechanisms that may be at work in linking politics and food security.

Control Variables

Several control variables are used in each model. In addition to the measures of democracy and civil liberties discussed above, these control variables are also expected to influence food security outcomes. Including them in these statistical models thus helps isolate the effects which democracy and freedom may have on food security. Economic measures of income and poverty should be particularly influential. Higher rates of extreme poverty, as measured by the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 US per day, should thus be associated with increased hunger.[45] Additionally, we should expect that poor countries will have a much more challenging time feeding their citizens than will wealthy ones. In order to account for this potential relationship, these models include a measure for GDP per capita.[46] Additionally, data on the percent of a country's GDP that comes from international trade and the percentage of gross national income used to service international debt are included in these models. Studies examining the effects of globalization on social spending and outcomes have found both of these measures to be negatively associated with public welfare.[47] Given the high amounts of public debt held by many African states, the inclusion of this variable should be particularly important.

In addition to these measures of key economic variables, these analyses control for the effects of armed conflict as a potential determinant of malnutrition, using the log of the number of deaths from violent conflict in that country in that year. This is theoretically important given that warfare can undermine communities' abilities to meet their food needs and divert important resources to destructive conflict.[48]

Finally, the models include the percentage of the total population living in urban areas. The inclusion of this measure offers the potential for a rough test of Bates' famous "urban bias" explanation of underdevelopment in Africa. According to Bates, as a way to stave off unrest, post-colonial African governments subsidized the consumption of their more-easily mobilized urban minorities at the expense of their rural majorities.[49]

Results

The results of these statistical models are largely supportive of the link between the protection of civil liberties and food security and do very little to bear out the theory suggesting that democratic elections promote accountability for hunger outcomes. In other words, it appears that it is democracy's capacity for including marginalized groups, rather than the effects of electoral competition, which are influential in determining food security. Neither The Polity IV measure of democracy nor the CGV indicator, measures that focus narrowly on the openness and fairness of the political system, appear to be a significant

predictor of food security in this sample. In none of the models in Tables 1 and 2 do either of these measures approach statistical significance.

TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ON GHI

Variable description	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Civil Liberties	-0.950**			-1.273**	-0.999**
	(0.279)			(0.363)	(0.316)
Polity IV democracy		-0.071		0.111	
		(0.065)		(0.081)	
CGV democracy			-0.984		0.277
			(0.745)		(0.816)
log of # of persons killed in armed conflict per year	0.245[+]	0.252[+]	0.237[+]	0.238[+]	0.239[+]
	(0.132)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Urban population (% of total)	-0.190[+]	-0.190[+]	-0.187[+]	-0.170[+]	-0.191[+]
	(0. 099)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.113	0.089	0.086	0.108	0.114
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Log of GDP/capita, constant 2000 USD	-4.243*	-5.388*	-5.909**	-3.960+	-4.071[+]
	(2.005)	(2.073)	(2.060)	(2.007)	(2.076)
% of population below $1.25/day	0.064*	0.063[+]	0.051	0.057[+]	0.064*
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
year (1990)	0.198	0.886	1.079	0.952	0.247
	(1.189)	(1.375)	(1.200)	(1.303)	(1.203)
year (1996)	0.712	1.290	1.443	0.936	0.720
	(0.931)	(1.375)	(0.933)	(0.941)	(0.935)
year (2001)	.331	0.516	0.629	0.617	0.368
	(0.759)	(0.826)	(0.790)	(0.784)	(0.770)
R^2 (overall)	0.606	0.565	0.566	0.633	0.605
**p<0.01, * p<.05, [+] p<0.1,			N=148, 38 countries		

When country-specific features are accounted for, these measures of democracy are irrelevant to the eradication of hunger. For every success story like Ghana (which experienced a 12.3 point decrease in its GHI score from 1990-2011 along with a 15 point increase in its Polity IV score) or Mali (an 8.2 point decrease in GHI and a 14 point increase in the Polity IV measure) there are countries like Kenya (only a 2 point decrease in GHI in spite of a 15 point increase on the Polity IV scale) and Zambia (0.7 point GHI decrease and 16 point Polity IV increase). Despite undergoing similar transitions from single-party authoritarian regimes to multi-party democratic ones, in these latter countries, the presence of open and competitive elections did little to alleviate hunger. These findings reflect Drèze and Sen's (1989) observation that endemic hunger persists in democracies, as well as the skepticism of Ross and others as to the practical implications of democracy for the poor.[50]

In fact, when respect for civil liberties is taken into account in these statistical models, the sign of the coefficient for the Polity and CGV measures is in the "wrong" direction – associating electoral democracy with increased hunger. It would be inaccurate to condemn electoral democracy on the basis of these results, however. Rather than demonstrating that the electoral effects of democracy are actively harmful to food security, the models in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that electoral competition through democratic elections has had no effect on food security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In contrast to the narrowly procedural measure of democracy, The Freedom House measure for civil liberties does appear to be positively associated with increased food security, at least in the models described in Table 1. Countries with higher civil liberties scores tend to have lower levels of hunger, as measured by the GHI. Model 1, which measures the effect of civil liberties without including the CGV or Polity IV indicators, estimates that one point of improvement in civil liberties is associated with a 0.95 point reduction in the hunger index score. In Model 4, which includes both the Freedom House score and the (non-significant) measure from the Polity IV dataset, the coefficient on the civil liberties variable is -1.273. On the surface, these may seem like small changes, but they are both statistically and substantively meaningful. A two point decrease in GHI, for example, equates to a drop of two percentage points in the proportion of the population who are undernourished, a drop of two percent in the proportion of children who are underweight, and a drop of two percent in the proportion of children who die before they turn five.

Especially important in these models is that civil liberties have a significant effect on food security outcomes even when economic features (such as income, debt, and the extent of poverty) are taken into consideration. Although governments in Africa that are democracies and respect civil liberties also tend to be wealthier, this fact alone cannot explain the positive relationship between civil liberties and food security that is present in the data. Politics makes a difference for an African nation's ability to feed its citizens.

Based on the data in this sample, it thus appears that freedom of expression and association, and respect for human rights (features of civil liberties measured by the Freedom House indicator) are meaningfully associated with improved food security and decreased hunger. These features are critical in the process of forming political demands and transmitting them to policy makers. This finding helps clarify exactly why democracy matters for food security. It reveals that the causal pathway through which democracy impacts food security likely has more to do with the freedom of groups to organize and communicate demands to their leaders than the right to select between competing sets of elite politicians.

This does not indicate that formal democracy is unimportant. The Polity IV variable is highly correlated with the Freedom House civil liberties variable, indicating that there is a tight link between these two measures. In other words, there are very few (if any) African states which extend civil liberties to their citizens but restrict political competition in a formal sense. Potential exceptions to this include Burkina Faso, which receives a "partly free" civil liberties score (4 for 2001, 3 for 2010) from Freedom House while scoring a 0 (between -10 and +10) on the *polity2* scale; and Tanzania, which received the same civil liberties scores for 2001 and 2010 in spite of being rated as undemocratic in the Polity IV dataset (-1 on the *polity2* variable in 2001 and 2010). Seen in this light, the positive relationship between civil liberties and food security suggests that the causal pathway through which democracy impacts food security has to do with the effect civil liberties have on lowering the barriers to collective action by previously marginalized groups. Democracy thus impacts food security, not through elections, but by improving the political environment and enhancing the ability of marginalized groups to enter the policy process and demand favorable outcomes.

While the results of the regressions in Table 1 are encouraging for champions of democracy and freedom, the data presented in Table 2 demonstrate the need for caution in

TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ON GHI (LAGGED DV)

Variable description	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Civil Liberties	-0.423			-0.651	-0.436
	(0.340)			(0.390)	(0.367)
Polity IV democracy		0.033		0.110	
		(0.082)		(0.094)	
CGV democracy			-0.271		0.082
			(0.765)		(0.818)
log of # of persons killed in armed conflict per year	0.033	0.048	0.041	0.047	0.033
	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Urban population (% of total)	-0.274**	-0.332**	-0.315**	-0.284**	-0.275**
	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.098)
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.164*	0.154*	0.162*	0.151*	0.163*
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.006	-0.008	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Log of GDP/capita, constant 2000 USD	-4.270*	-4.816*	-4.726*	-4.449*	-4.247*
	(2.016)	(2.030)	(2.010)	(2.016)	(2.044)
% of population below $1.25/day	0.051[+]	0.051[+]	0.052[+]	0.050[+]	0.051[+]
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
lagged GHI	0.245**	0.235*	0.237*	0.238**	0.246**
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)
R^2 (overall)	0.676	0.633	0.643	0.676	0.676
**p<0.01, * p<.05, [+] p<0.1,			N=113, 38 countries		

interpreting these results. The models here incorporate a lagged dependent variable to control for the extent to which hunger in one period predicts the degree of hunger the following period. In none of the models in Table 2 is the civil liberties measure significant, and in each of them the magnitude of the coefficients for the civil liberties variable is about half of those in Table 1. While the unbalanced nature of the panel data in this sample makes it difficult to interpret the effects of the lagged dependent variable, these results warrant further investigation. In this case, it appears that the effect of including the lagged term in the models is equivalent to estimating the models in Table 1 and simply excluding the data for 1990 (models not shown here). It is the loss of these data points, rather than the incorporation of a lagged term, that best explains the difference between Tables 1 and 2. In substantive terms, this means that there may be a strong relationship between civil liberties and food security in the year 1990, which helps explain why the civil liberties term is significant in several of these models.

All models in Table 3 incorporate an interaction term for civil liberties and the year 1990, testing whether the apparent effect of civil liberties on food security can be attributed to a particularly strong link between these two measures in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is indeed the case in the full model presented in Table 3, where the interaction term is significant, and the coefficient is much larger than in any of the previous regression models. A one point increase on the civil liberties scale in 1990 is associated with approximately a 1.7 point decrease in GHI (almost double the size of the coefficient in Model 1). This suggests that there is an especially strong link between GHI and civil liberties in the early part of the observed period. This may reflect that notion that democracy is a "stock" rather than "level" concept, with the effects of expanded freedoms taking time to reveal themselves.[51] If this is

the case, then the effects of expanded freedoms across Africa may in the past two decades not yet have begun to ameliorate the effects of hunger. Alternatively, it is possible that there was something especially pernicious about authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s that adversely affected food security

TABLE 3: YEAR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES INTERACTION

Variable description	GHI	under-nourished	under-weight	under 5 mortality
Civil Liberties	-0.348	0.302	-0.754[+]	-0.615*
	(0.310)	(0.655)	(0.416)	(0.250)
log of # of persons killed in armed conflict per year	0.206	0.251	0.189	0.132
	(0.125)	(0.264)	(0.168)	(0.101)
Urban population (% of total)	-0.252**	-0.483*	-0.229[+]	-0.048
	(-0.252)	(0.200)	(0.127)	(0.076)
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.146*	0.300*	0.145	-0.007
	(0.066)	(0.139)	(0.088)	(0.053)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Log of GDP/capita, constant 2000 USD	-4.435*	-7.736[+]	-6.894**	1.081
	(1.893)	(3.997)	(2.539)	(1.524)
% of population below $1.25/day	0.060*	0.114[+]	0.018	0.035
	(0.030)	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.024)
Civil liberties * year (1990)	-1.669**	-4.322**	-0.463	0.097
	(0.457)	(0.984)	(0.625)	(0.375)
year (1990)	4.652**	9.616**	0.630	2.751*
	(1.657)	(3.547)	(2.253)	(1.352)
year (1996)	0.060	-0.409	0.070	2.787**
	(0.879)	(1.856)	(1.179)	(0.707)
year (2001)	0.369	-1.299	0 .583	1.902**
	(0.716)	(1.514)	(0.962)	(0.577)
R² (overall)	0.570	0.309	0.455	0.169
**p<0.01, * p<.05, [+] p<0.1,	N=148	N=147	N=147	N=147

Because GHI is a composite indicator, it is also possible to examine the effect of civil liberties on each of its component parts. The additional models in Table 3 do just that. They demonstrate that the interaction effect between the 1990 year and civil liberties variables on food security is largely due to the relationship between these freedoms and levels of undernourishment. Every point increase on the civil liberties scale in 1990 was associated with a 4 percent decrease in the proportion of a country's population that lacked sufficient caloric intake. There was thus an especially meaningful link between civil liberties and undernourishment in the early 1990s as African states were just beginning to transition to democracy. This interactive effect is not present for the models in which wasting and under five mortality serve as dependent variables. The civil liberties score is at least marginally significant in both of these models, with no interaction between the year term and the Freedom House measure. This suggests that the protection of civil liberties has an independent effect on wasting and child mortality that is constant throughout the observed period, unlike the effect of these freedoms on undernourishment, which is most profound in the first year included in these models.

Viewed in their entirety, the results of this statistical analysis indicate that democratic gains have the potential to reduce hunger and food security, and specify a causal pathway

through which this link operates. These models are largely consistent with the argument that democratic freedoms—in particular civil liberties like the freedom to organize in groups, criticize the government, and be protected by law from arbitrary retaliation—give communities the tools with which to hold leaders accountable for meeting their basic needs. The fact that the procedurally minimalist measures of democracy are not significantly associated with decreases in hunger seems to indicate that the route to food security and healthy communities does not proceed through elite competition for the popular vote. Rather, food security appears to be at least partially dependent on the ability of marginalized actors to organize and make their voices heard to their leaders. The point here is not that autocrats are incapable of ensuring that their populations have sustainable access to adequate nutrition, but that they have no incentive to do so. By contrast, regimes which grant communities the right to organize, publicize government failures, and protest corruption are more capable of holding their leaders accountable and ensuring desirable policy outcomes. As such, we see higher levels of hunger in countries which curtail these liberties, thus effectively denying citizens the opportunity to make their voices heard – than in those which protect the rights of citizens to organize and make their will known to their leaders.

Freedom and Food Security in Ghana

One African state which has been singled out for achieving notable reductions in hunger during the period covered in this sample is Ghana. As Ghana has democratized and liberalized politically, improving its Polity IV and Freedom House Civil Liberties scores, it has also experienced a dramatic reduction in hunger, decreasing its GHI score by 12.3 points from 1990 to 2011 (dropping from 21 to 8.7). This is the largest decrease of any of the thirty-eight African countries included in the analysis above, and one of the largest of any country in the developing world.[52] All three of the composite components of GHI (percentage of the population that is undernourished, percentage of children under the age of five who have low weight to age ratios, and the under-five mortality rate) showed improvements in Ghana. The factor that drove most of this change, however, is the measurement most directly related to food; the percentage of Ghanaians who did not receive sufficient caloric intake decreased from 27 percent in the 1990 GHI to 5 percent in the 2011 score.

Can Ghana's dramatic success in reducing hunger be attributed to improvements in governance resulting from competitive elections or civil liberties? While it is difficult to demonstrate a clear causal pathway leading from political openness to improved food security, it does appear that political liberalization has played a role in this process. Civil liberties are important in ensuring that Ghanaians are able to hold their leaders accountable for desirable social policies and development outcomes.

The timing of Ghana's improvement in food security certainly coincides with the process of democratization and political opening in the country. Following years of authoritarian rule by the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, in the 1990s the Ghanaian regime agreed to put in place reforms that would open up political space to new actors. Multiparty elections were held in December 1992, which Rawlings won easily, with the main opposition boycotting the polls. Their participation in subsequent elections ensured the incorporation of new parties in the legislature.[53] Crucially, this period also witnessed an opening of political space into which civil society groups mobilized. During the 1990s new, independent media outlets

proliferated, as did community organizations through which Ghanaians could become politically active.[54]

While the expansion of civil liberties did not result in a wholesale transformation of Ghanaian governance, these rights are a fundamental feature of Ghana's democracy. When asked what democracy means to them, a plurality of Ghanaians describe democracy in deliberative terms: as a political system which allows them to speak publicly about government, put forward their own views, and have a say in how they are ruled.[55] In Akan, democracy is popularly described as "you say some and let me say some," emphasizing the importance of free speech and dialog in this system of government.[56]

The consequences of this liberalization have been an expansion of opportunities for citizens to influence the policymaking process, particularly with regard to the kinds of social policies that are critical to ensuring food security. Avenues for this influence have included the ability to initiate private endeavors that serve as an inspiration for public policy, taking advantage of freedom of speech to bring forward new agendas, and using the press to generate debate on these issues.[57] In addition to stimulating policy change, the presence of local voluntary organizations in Ghana can promote the amicable resolution of community problems by giving members new opportunities to "practice democracy" and to develop the capacity to engage in cooperation and local problem solving.[58] While Lindberg argues that these organizations are not necessarily effective in holding politicians accountable, he observes that even demands for patronage and clientelism from citizens and party activists can push leaders to generate more collective goods for their constituents and to lobby more strongly for the benefit of their communities, demands that local traditional chiefs forcefully articulate.[59]

The efficacy of this expansion of civil liberties may have also been enhanced by the decentralization reforms implemented in Ghana in the late 1980s. Under both domestic and international pressure, Rawlings' Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) created a local district assembly composed of both popularly elected and appointed members, and overseen by a district chief executive (DCE) appointed by the central government.[60] With these reforms the government sought to decentralize social service management, as well as to buttress or to extend existing informal systems of social welfare.[61] While these changes were not miraculous, since local government clientelist imperatives rather than public opinion or norms of bureaucratic rationality often drive allocations of public goods, they are reflected in how Ghanaians perceive and interact with state authority.[62] MacLean notes that unlike in neighboring Côte D'Ivoire, residents in Ghana are more likely to highlight local (rather than national) government leaders as influential in their village, and to describe their rights as citizens in terms of local public goods like social services or rural infrastructure, rather than as individual benefits they receive from the state.[63] Investment in these public goods can be critical for improving a community's food security.

The participatory nature of democratic governance is reflected in several of the country's development plans. During the 2000s the Ghanaian government developed the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) plans in 2002 and 2007 which focused on policy issues most relevant for the majority of Ghana's rural smallholders. These plans accompanied and supported the country's Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies (GPRS) I and II. While authoritarian governments in Ghana have long histories of laying out ambitious goals, these more recent policy planning initiatives incorporated substantial public consultation and participation.[64] Perhaps as a result of these consultations, democratic governments in Ghana have largely rolled back the distortionary policies (i.e. import

restrictions and artificially depressed prices for export crops) that disadvantaged many Ghanaian consumers and small farmers.[65] Prices for cocoa farmers (the country's largest export crop) almost tripled during the 2000s and support for non-traditional agricultural exports increased as well, alleviating the poverty of many farmers in the Ghanaian countryside.[66]

John Kuofor, president of Ghana from 2001-2008, personally ascribes a great deal of importance to civil liberties in promoting food security in Ghana by encouraging citizen participation and ensuring government accountability. Kuofor has argued that political freedoms were crucial to the food security achievements he claims for his administration. He notes that improving the prices given to Ghana's cocoa producers, supporting rural infrastructure, and creating programs to feed schoolchildren (a policy innovation which significantly boosted enrollment) would not have been possible without rights to due process and free speech.[67] "Because the government insisted on due process, people felt free to express themselves without having to look over their shoulders."[68]

This image of local civic activity and consultative governance is helpful in understanding how citizens can hold policy makers accountable in Ghana and elsewhere. These pathways to accountability are not always effective, nor do they always run through NGOs or "civil society." Nonetheless these diverse patterns of social mobilization do testify to the importance of civil liberties in allowing citizens the space to raise issues with their leaders, publicize these in independent media, and to win political support for their proposals. This freedom has been an important part of Ghana's democracy during its Fourth Republic, an era in which policy change and economic growth have substantially curbed hunger and malnutrition in the country.

Discussion and Conclusion

The findings from the statistical analysis as well as the Ghanaian case study suggest at least two directions for future research, both of which necessarily entail linking political processes to nutritional outcomes. The first of these research agendas involves attempting to isolate the exact policy determinants of food security. In other words, what governmental policies influence poor peoples' abilities to provide for themselves? What are the causal mechanisms linking effective governance with a reduction in hunger?

A second research agenda shifts the level of analysis from the national level to the community level. National-level measures of democracy, or of political rights and civil liberties, mask sub-national variation in the nature of governance in Africa and elsewhere.[69] In the future, investigating the political determinants of food security must necessarily involve disaggregating the political environment (i.e. levels of democracy or political freedoms) from the actual ability of aggrieved social groups to mobilize. From a rights-based perspective, this will entail linking the right to food to other rights to well-being (e.g. education, health, etc.), and determining how different patterns of citizen mobilization for any one of these rights impacts the achievement of each of the others.[70] Future research should therefore examine how citizens join together to access the entitlements necessary to meet their basic food needs.[71] We need to understand how citizens form and make claims on the central state. This is a process which, although certainly generalizable, will also reflect the social structure, economic history, and political environment of the arena in which these claims emerge. Such an approach would ideally be focused at the sub-national level, but it

would do well to go beyond ideographic case study work to understand the mobilization of groups from different sectors of the population.

There can be no question more relevant for a nation than how to ensure that its citizens are fed. This is doubly true for African states that are struggling to overcome decades of economic stagnation and poor records of human development. Proponents of democracy and rights-based development argue that this goal can only be realized when government is accountable to, and informed by, its most vulnerable citizens. The analysis offered in this essay supports this point of view. While tentative, these findings are important for understanding the potential of democratic arrangements for connecting local communities with the state. They suggest that improvements in the capacity of marginalized groups to mobilize politically and to push forward their demands is an important feature in holding politicians responsible for hunger outcomes. Future work on the political determinants of food security must examine the processes that lead to food secure outcomes, either by specifying the types of policies which lead to adequate nutrition, or by specifying the pathways from citizen mobilization to effective food security. While civil liberties alone do not determine hunger outcomes in Africa, the link between these hard-won freedoms and improved food security justifies further research into the processes by which groups form and make demands on the state for policy choices that reduce hunger.

Notes

1. Jenkins and Scanlan 2001; Jenkins et al. 2007; Stasavage 2005; Lake and Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003; Gerring et al. 2012.
2. A handful of findings disputing such a link includes: Ross 2006; Currie 1998; Mulligan, et al. 2004; Mani and Mukand 2007.
3. See Lake and Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003; Rudra and Haggard 2005
4. Sen 1999a, p. 178; Drèze and Sen 1989, pp. 214, 278; Gerring et al. 2012.
5. McGuire 2010; also Gerring et al. 2012;
6. See Coppedge, et al. 2011.
7. E.g., Jenkins et al. 2007; Stasavage 2005; Carbone 2011; Baum and Lake 2003 for empirical studies of this mechanism at work regarding social policy in the developing world.
8. Lake and Baum 2001.
9. van de Walle 2003.
10. Baum and Lake 2003, p. 337.
11. Ross 2006, p. 870; Currie 1998.
12. Mani and Mukand 2007.
13. Harding and Wantchekon 2012, Kramon and Posner 2013.
14. Harding and Wantchekon 2012.
15. Rudra and Haggard 2005, p. 1018.
16. Verba et al. 1995.
17. Putnam 1993, Tsai 2007, Tripp et al. 2009.
18. Bates 1981.
19. Quoted in Joshi 2010, p. 626. See also de Waal's (2000) discussion of "political contracts" against famine.
20. Sen 1999b.

21 Drèze and Sen 1989, Banik 2011

22 Antunes and Romano 2005, pp. 131-143; Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004, pp. 1424, 1432.

23 Gready and Ensor 2005, p. 25.

24 Ferree 2006, van de Walle 2003. For a counter-argument see Lindberg 2006.

25 Widner 1992

26 cf. Wantchekon 2003.

27 So, for example Kenya-1990, Kenya-1996, and Kenya-2001 would all be recorded as separate observations. While all of the GHI scores are estimates for the year in question, annual statistics are not available for every country for each year and the estimates often rely on data for the years surrounding the year used in the analysis. Estimates for 1990 rely on data collected from 1988-1992, estimates for 1996 rely on data from 1994-1998, estimates for 2001 rely on data from 1999-2003, and estimates for 2011 use data for 2005-2009 (see von Grebmer et al. 2011, pp. 48-50).

28 Say, for example, that countries with higher average annual levels of rainfall are both more likely to democratize and to have lower levels of hunger.

29 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations 1996.

30 Chung et al. 1997, p. 5; Sen 1981, pp. 45-47; Kent 2005, pp. 12-15.

31 Chung et al. 1997, p. 8.

32 Valente 2009, pp. 1540-41, 44; Mallick and Rafi 2010, p. 596; del Ninno and Dorosh 2003; Chung et al. 1997, pp. 18.

33 von Grebmer et al. 2011, pp. 7-9, 48.

34 In practice this never occurs. The country with the highest GHI score for 2011 is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), at 39.0, in which an estimated 69 percent of the population is undernourished, 28.2 percent of children are underweight, and 19.9 percent of children die before they turn five.

35 te Lintelo et al. 2013.

36 Jekins et al. 2007; Rubin 2009, 2011.

37 Coppedge et al. 2011, pp. 253-254.

38 The indicator accounts for the competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, competitiveness of political participation, and in the case of autocracy, regulation of participation (Marshall et al. 2010, pp. 14-17).

39 The polity2 variable is an adaptation of the polity variable, which features un-interpretable codes for "foreign interruption" (-66), anarchic "interregnum" (-77), and political "transition" (-88) . The -66 code is treated as missing in polity2, the -77 is treated as 0 (a 'neutral' score), and political transitions, -88, are "prorated across the span of the transition." (Marshall et al. 2010, p. 17).

40 Cheibub et al. 2010, Alvarez et al. 1996.

41 Schumpeter 1950, p. 269.

42 see Alvarez et al. 1996 as well as Schmitter and Karl 1991, and Collier and Levitsky 1997. For a counter-argument, see Morlino 2004.

43 Freedom House 2010.

44 Giannone 2010; Cheibub et al. 2010.

45 The $1.25/day poverty measure variable is calculated by the World Bank's Povcalnet software (Zhao et al. 2012; accessed June 22, 2012).

46 The models use the natural log of GDP/capita, in constant year 2000 US dollars, as a predictor of aggregate food security, since each additional dollar of income should have diminishing returns for the food security of individual households and communities. For example, consider that an extra thirty dollars of income per month will make a much larger difference in the life of someone in extreme poverty, while it will make much less of a difference in the life of a wealthy individual with a monthly income of several thousand dollars.

47 Rudra 2011; Rudra and Haggard 2005.

48 de Waal 2000, pp. 18-21; Jenkins et al. 2007.

49 Bates 1981

50 Ross 2006. See also Currie 1998, Banik 2011

51 Gerring et al. 2012.

52 von Grebmer et al. 2011, p. 13.

53 Bratton et al. 2001, p. 239; Lindberg 2010, p. 122

54 Bratton et al. 2001, p. 233.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Carbone 2011.

58 Morris MacLean 2004, p. 599.

59 Lindberg 2010: 124, pp. 127-29.

60 Horowitz and Palaniswamy 2010.

61 MacLean 2010.

62 Horowitz and Palaniswamy 2010.

63 MacLean 2010.

64 FASDEP II, pp. 1-2; Breisinger et al. 2011, p. 98.

65 Breisinger et al. 2011.

66 FASDEP II, pp. 16, 36.

67 Kuofor 2011.

68 Kuofor 2011.

69 See Boone 2003.

70 Drèze 2004.

71 Maxwell 1999.

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Housing Cooperatives and the Politics of Local Organization and Representation in Peri-Urban Harare, Zimbabwe

INNOCENT CHIRISA, MARILYN GAZA, and ELMOND BANDAUKO

Abstract: Housing cooperatives have emerged in the context of housing challenges in the urban areas as a strategy for securing low-cost housing accommodation in peri-urban Harare. They constitute vehicles that allow people to pool resources and secure tenure. The paper explains the "politics of peri-urban housing" in contemporary Zimbabwe by looking into the resurgence of these new forms of housing cooperatives. The paper compares five sites in Harare (Whitecliffe, Hatcliffe, Caledonia, and Southlea Park and Hopley in Harare South) to provide insights into the politics of peri-urban housing and security of tenure. We argue that political identity, networks, and participation have been at the core of these housing cooperatives as residents sought to secure tenure in the peri-urban areas by enhancing citizenship rights.

Introduction

More than one million people in Zimbabwe constitute the country's urban housing backlog as of 2004.[1] The government launched Operation *Murambatsvina* (Operation Restore Order) in 2005, to get rid of illegal structures that had mushroomed in urban areas.[2] The government action reduced the amount of illegal housing stock but increased the housing backlog. This exercise made the Zimbabwe African National Union government (ZANU PF) unpopular at home and abroad. To regain support, the government subsequently responded with Operation *Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle* (Operation Live Well), by constructing housing units to accommodate the victims of Operation Murambatsvina.[3] The latter initiative failed to close the gap, and with the economic crisis peaking in 2008, the housing backlog grew rapidly.

Due to the government's failure to deliver urban public housing, the demand for low-cost housing in the country's peri-urban areas increased. Housing cooperatives grew rapidly in the peri-urban areas as government acquired land near urban areas to resettle those affected by

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Operation Murambatsvina. Resettling the victims of Operation Murambatsvina on unserviced peri-urban land seemed to be the right thing to do. These housing cooperatives have their identity in the ruling party of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union. This explains the politics of patronage and clientelism.

Some housing cooperatives like Nehanda in Dzivaresekwa (Harare) have made major strides and have been celebrated as success stories. However, a number of these still face challenges in the provision of water, sanitation and road infrastructure. The City of Harare is yet to incorporate most of the farms that house these settlements and therefore they are inadequately prepared for urban development. Because the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) "nationalized" most rural land, peri-urban settlements are mostly on state-owned land.

This paper attempts to answer why these cooperative schemes have been resurgent and whether they are sustainable by examining five sites in peri-urban Harare, namely Whitecliffe to the west of the city, Hatcliffe to the north, Caledonia to the east, and Southlea Park and Hopley in Harare South. We argue that political identity, networks, and participation have been at the core of these housing cooperatives as they sought to secure tenure in the peri-urban areas by enhancing their citizenship rights.

Research Design and Methodology

We conducted this study against the background that the Zimbabwe state has struggled, over the years, to create better and habitable sites of human settlements. We conducted a household survey between February 2011 and June 2012. Our data collection took full cognizance of the fact that communities in Zimbabwe were polarized along political lines. The survey had 402 respondents and included both closed- and open-ended questions. The survey was administered in the peri-urban sites of Whitecliffe (100), Hatcliffe (100), Caledonia, (100), and Southlea Park and Hopley (102). Random sampling avoided bias and enhanced representativeness. We analyzed the quantitative data using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). In addition to the survey, we interviewed community leaders, officials from government departments like the Department of Physical Planning (DPP), war veterans, and selected members of community in the five research sites.[4] We then made use of textual and content analysis to analyze this qualitative data.

Urbanization, Cooperatives and Informal institutions: A Review of the Theoretical Literature

Urbanization, defined as "the proportion of a country's population living in urban settlements," has been an increasing trend in developing countries, especially since the 1950s.[5] Africa has witnessed "runaway urbanization," which has created immense gaps between citizen demand for services and the supply of infrastructure, including housing.[6] Deborah Potts suggests that urbanization activates certain kinds of development, including population and civic participation in matters that affect the inhabitants living in the city on a day-to-day basis. Nucleation, with or without urbanization, provides a window for development and innovative behavior. Specifically, Potts argues that "Political, social and behavioral changes are just as significant in densely settled, nucleated settlements and these are occurring whether or not the level of urbanization is rising."[7] This statement is critical in understanding how, in the face of

crises and challenges, urbanites strive to form groups and associations as avenues to participate in urban settlement development.

Housing cooperatives have emerged as one form of associations used by the urbanites to participate in human settlement development. Cooperatives in Zimbabwe increased in popularity in the 1980s when the government strictly pursued the communist-socialist agenda, which defined the country in its first decade of independence (1980-1990). With increased rural to urban migration and the failure of state housing schemes in urban centers, housing cooperatives increased their prominence in towns and cities.

With the adoption of neoliberal market reforms in the 1990s under the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), the state removed subsidies and all forms of public support to the citizens. Another dimension of state retrenchment was that the national housing fund for public-sector housing shrank. Discussing the influence of the economic performance and decisions by households to stay or move away from the city, Potts stresses how economic structural adjustment conditions in most of Africa restricted households regarding the initial decisions to stay in cities. In the context of Zimbabwe Potts states:

> What people would like to do and what they actually do are often different—their choices are constrained. The interaction of these shifting forces means that there are also shifts in the relative prevalence of different types of migrants who might be more usefully divided into four groups: characterized as willing stayers, reluctant stayers, willing leavers and reluctant leavers.[8]

This categorization of the migrants under pressing socio-economic conditions is important as it shapes the type of spatial pattern of living that emerges ultimately, which determines the manner the inhabitants behave in space.

In addition to the decline in public support for housing during this period of structural adjustment, the formal channels of housing provision had their own shortcomings. Usually the formal channels were so stringent that they would blockade efforts by the public. The formal procedures were overly cumbersome and bureaucratic.

To counter the bureaucratic bottlenecks, communities and groups have formed informal groups in the form of burial societies, women's groups, and youth groups.[9] These informal groups tend to enhance popular participation, especially of low-income households trying to cushion themselves against the vagaries of state and market failures, which include inadequate housing provision. The failure of formal service delivery systems has given rise to the resurgence of societies and cooperatives. Cooperatives had been common across Africa since the 1970s. However, by the 1990s, cooperatives had declined and seemed to be relics of prior statist policies. By the 2000s, however, local cooperative organizations re-emerged as an instrumental way of dealing with the problem of housing and land tenure, particularly among the residents of peri-urban areas. In these housing cooperatives, community members pooled their resources together as a way of dealing with their own challenges.

Housing cooperatives have adopted an incremental approach, as they are not able to pool sufficient resources at one time. The incremental approach to housing development emerged as an alternative to the traditional housing development model, which emphasizes providing full infrastructure and services before housing construction and habitation. This incremental

approach allows for "parallel development," as people settle in the presence of basic services like water and sanitation, with roads and electricity provided later. Macro-economic hardships compromised the ability of people to service land in totality. Thus under such conditions, the incremental approach was advocated.

In sum, popular participation in the informal sector urban development has seen the growth of slums or informal settlements normally characterized by tenure insecurity and inadequate infrastructure and services like water and sanitation. The next sections provide analysis of the research findings.

Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents in the Case Study Sites

The below section briefly describes the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents from the five case study sites. Whitecliffe, Hatcliffe, Caledonia and Harare South's Southlea Park and Hopley are all in the immediate vicinity of Harare. Of the 402 respondents, 158 (39.3 percent) were male, while the remainder was female. The majority of the respondents were heads of households 123 (30.7 percent) or spouses to the household heads (47.6 percent).

In terms of education, 71.1 percent had attained secondary education, with 19.9 percent having gone only up to primary school. Four percent of the respondents claimed to have attained college training, presumably holders of professional certificates or diplomas. Only two respondents (0.5 percent) had university degrees. Overall, this distribution in educational attainments is quite normal and typical of most urban settlements in Zimbabwe.

Only 10.2 percent of the respondents claimed being formally employed. The majority, 45.3 percent, claimed to be unemployed and 39.9 percent said they were self-employed. Table 1 summarizes the foregoing distributions and descriptions. These results on the ground confirmed the state of employment in the entire economy, where the bulk of the population relied on informal employment as a source of household income. This may point to the general instability in income that typifies peri-urban settlements. Urban centers in Zimbabwe are presumed to be affiliated predominantly with the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition party formed in 1999. In contrast, the peri-urban majority is purported to be supporters of ZANU PF. During the time of the survey (as of any other time), households were very sensitive to questions or statements deemed to be 'political' so no reliable statistical data was generated on party affiliation.

Peri-Urban Cooperatives: Local Organization and Representation on the Outskirts of Harare

The focus of this section is to unpack the variables of political identity, networks and participation as they have influenced the dynamics of the peri-urban sites of Harare. The presentation and interpretation of the findings connected to the above named variables now follow.

Caledonia

Caledonia, east of Harare city center, is partly a product of the fast-track land reform program in Zimbabwe and partly a result of Operation Garikayi/Hahlani Kuhle (OGHK) in 2005. OGHK sought to resettle people affected by Operation Murambatsvina in the same year. The residents

of Caledonia are also people from Porta Farm. Porta Farm was a holding camp for squatters in Harare.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SOCIO- DEMOGRAPHIC RESULTS FROM THE RESEARCH SITES (N = 402)

Aspect	Frequency	Percentage
Sex Distribution of Respondents		
Male	158	39.3
Female	244	60.7
Total	402	100
Household Headship of Households		
Male	123	30.7
Female	279	69.3
Total	402	100
Education		
Never been to school	18	4.5
Primary School	80	19.9
Secondary School	286	71.1
College	16	4.0
University	2	0.5
Total	402	100
Employment		
Formally employed	41	10.2
Informally (self) employed	160	39.9
Unemployed	182	45.3
Undefined	19	4.6
Total	402	100

In terms of political identity, the majority of the inhabitants of Caledonia have a few weak ties with ZANU PF given that the inhabitants are mostly those who were in Porta Farm. These relocated people could not have a strong working relationship with the ZANU PF government. For example, Lucia, a resident of Caledonia elaborated, "I cannot say I am here because I support ZANU PF. Remember these are the people who dumped us at Porta only to come again and say we are moving you, again. Our life has been that of pilgrims. We are not sure if they now mean it that we can permanently stay here at Caledonia." Francis, Monica and Tarupiwa echoed the same sentiments. These three stayed in the same area. For this reason, we can say that the relationship of the inhabitants of Caledonia and the ZANU PF party is faint and opportunistic. A few of the others, though, do claim allegiance to the party. For example, Guru explained: "Had it not been for ZANU PF which empowered us by giving us stands for building houses, who else could have given us this land?"

Certainly, there are networks in place in Caledonia. However, these lack distinct definition given the assortment of the inhabitants residing there. They came from different places and are of different origins, some from squatting at Porta Farm, others straight from lodging in the city,

and yet others being beneficiaries who got land for housing by default having originally been seeking land for farming and then taking advantage of the 'wind' of the fast-track land resettlement program.

The diversity of the people in Caledonia affects the parameters of community participation. The area has loosely arranged and fragmented housing cooperatives. Consequently, the habitat is still largely "ill-developed." For example, 70 percent of the structures were of a temporary nature made from sun burnt bricks, plastic, and timber boards. This is in contrast to Nehanda where finished housing structures were already in place. The absence of a development animator, a development agent to provide technical expertise as is the case with UDCORP in Harare South, organizing housing development partly explains this. In the absence of a strong development agent in an area, participation by community members is minimal. A development agent is required to provide technical advice or support for sustainable housing projects.

Whitecliffe

Whitecliffe was once a farm, owned by a white farmer (the late Sammy Levy) under the Zvimba Rural District Council. Whitecliffe exhibits apparent housing developmental chaos. Such chaos is associated with the fast-track land reform program (FTLRP), which the government embarked upon in 2001.[10] Residents in the area argued that during the period of the farm invasions, Sammy Levy tried to change the name of the farm by incorporating Edgar Pfugari into its ownership. Unfortunately, the deal was unsuccessful. The reason for selling the farm was to turn it into a residential area. Some land invaders took over certain sections of the farm under the name Tongogara Housing Cooperative.

Whitecliffe farm also houses Operation Garikayi/Hahlani Kuhle (OGHK) houses. These houses were constructed using the 2004 Housing Standards and have been developed on an incremental basis, without water, sewer and related utilities in place. One female participant in Whitecliffe observed that:

> I blame the government's policy for the mess we are in as this place was well planned. It was going to be one of the most beautiful places, I tell you. However, *jambanja* [haphazard land invasions] came, hijacked and messed the entire town planning goal for the area. The developer was not faithful as well. He was only concerned pocketing money but never considered water and sewer infrastructure. The responsible authorities must impel the private developer to re-consider health standards for a settlement lest we contract cholera, dysentery and typhoid here. The majority of blacks who are in private development are corrupt, self-enriching, unscrupulous and inconsiderate to the laid down building standards.

The foregoing quotation reveals the foiled capacity of a formal development initiative whose plans failed as chaos "dictated" by the state crept in. When state action (or inaction) comes in, not all private initiatives will stand. The people who participated in the *jambanja* and then embarked on housing development took advantage of the state's position of "riding on the chaos for political advantage."

Whitecliffe contains OGHK houses and is a case of "inadequate housing" given the absence of proper sanitation, water and roads facilities. In effect, when the government realized that it could not shoulder the burden alone, it then invited private companies to help. But, due to the restrained economy (for more than a decade) they could not then do much. The ailing economy and souring relations between the Zimbabwean government and the international community short-circuited the network between government and the private sector in providing adequate housing for Whitecliffe OGHK houses. In the miasma, the local utility companies, specifically the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and building societies, have not been able to aid the situation.

Southlea Park

Southlea Park is located in Harare South and is predominantly a consortium-based housing arrangement between working-class people and their employers. Membership of the consortium include up to fifty-four private companies that guarantee their workers for land acquisition and support for building. In Southlea Park, chiefly work-based beneficiaries have increasing disposable income and can afford to build their own houses over a short to medium-term period. The chief determinant for housing development is income.

The Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP), a state-run agency and an arm of the Ministry of Local Government, National Housing and Public Works, is spearheading the development project offering project management and technical services. For Southlea Park, the inhabitants had to move into the settlement only after certain minimum conditions (provision of basic infrastructure especially water and sanitation) had been met. In this arrangement, UDCORP prepared the project plan, which it reviews on a regular basis to check if development is on track of the stipulated provisions. A UDCORP officer describes the Southlea Park development: "The project is being implemented in phases, beginning with those ideas [we deem] easier to handle, for example, water and sewer reticulation. We started with major roads, the fifteen and twenty-meter roads.... They applied for a Parallel Development Permit. The City of Harare gave some conditions about water and accessibility. Only paid-up beneficiaries are already on site, have built temporary structures, and are in the process of putting up permanent structures. They have also established a primary and a secondary school. The secondary school is now operational."

Despite the fact that Southlea Park is a consortium-engineered development, it is following an approach where the blueprint plan for the site under development is first set and then construction follows the plan in phases. The case of Southlea Park shows how the presence of a strong quasi-government entity is a step towards ordered housing and settlement development. The mere presence of a statutory body in the name of UDCORP has gone a long way in covering the gaps of uncertainty produced by the incremental approach adopted at Southlea Park.

The formation of a consortium is clear evidence of strong networking among employers seeking to provide shelter to their employees. And, yet, the consortium remains a relatively loose network of employers. Instead, the workers are participating with verve, fighting for their own cause to battle homelessness, with their employers paying a peripheral guarantor role. Thus, the workers have pride in effectively participating to change their destiny.

Hatcliffe

Hatcliffe, located north of Harare City Centre, has many housing cooperatives. This is clear evidence of social groups consolidating their standing by producing a shared political identity. Most of the members of these cooperatives were victims of Operation Murambatsvina. When the operation was unleashed, some of them had built state of the art houses from their life's savings. Operation Murambatsvina resulted in the destruction of all of these illegal developments.

For over six years, Chimutsa had been watching the environment and had become a housing cooperative member. For him, the environment is now more conducive to start building. Chimutsa's cooperative had been hampered by uncertainty but now they felt they could go ahead and start building because they had now been fully recognized by the government. The lingering memories of Murambatsvina had hampered the cooperatives from resuscitating developments, as they did not want to fall victim again should such a similar government operation get launched. But, now the members felt more confident because the same government that had pulled their houses down before had now given them permission to build houses and then later undertake road construction. The permission to build was probably a political move by the government to gain popularity and support. However, only those with a steady flow of income from either formal employment or entrepreneurship were ready to build. Nevertheless, there are other issues now. As one resident explained, "You see we are coming from a crisis [economic crisis] and only those who are employed or engaging seriously in self-employment activities and earning significant money, are building."

The chairperson of a Housing Cooperative in Hatcliffe tries, as much as possible to indicate that his cooperative is working flat out to involve his work with local government. His use of the term "us" in his narrative is revealing: "We are working with the local government. When I say local government, I mean Harare City Council and us, actively involved with each other to have this settlement completely serviced…. We are doing everything possible to ensure formalization of the settlement. What they are saying, we have no way but to follow if we are going to have a good place to live in, free from disease outbreaks. It is difficult but good for us at the end." From this statement, it is evident that housing cooperatives in the peri-urban areas of Harare are making frantic efforts to ensure that they are politically recognized by the state. They are embedded in the politics of patron-client relations. In addition, they are striving to affiliate themselves with political parties while at the same time seeking technical legitimacy by following the standards spelt out with the city of Harare as the local authority.

Origins of Migrants to the Peri-Urban Area

This study has revealed that the large majority of respondents had moved from an urban centre, in this case, Harare to reside in the peri-urban areas (76.5 percent, 66 percent, 77 percent and 96 percent for Whitecliffe, Hatcliffe, Caledonia and Harare South, respectively) (see Table 2). Relatively, very few of the respondents mentioned that came directly from rural areas (21.5 percent). This is not surprising for a settlement emerging outside any large city. This is because the housing waiting list) provides first preference to those who have been on the waiting list the longest.

TABLE 2: PLACE OF STAY BEFORE COMING TO THE PERI-URBAN AREAS (N=399)

Research Site	Urban	Rural	Total
Whitecliffe	75	23	98
	76.53	23.47	100.00
Hatcliffe	66	33	100*
	66.00	33.00	100.00*
Caledonia	77	23	100
	77.00	23.00	100.00
Harare South	96	5	101
	95.05	4.95	100.00
Total	314	84	399*
	78.70	21.05	100.00*

*For one respondent, not determined whether from urban or rural area

Accessing Land in the Peri-Urban Area

The official expectation is that for a person to qualify to own a plot to build, he or she must have first registered with the local authority, and, hence, have been on the housing waiting list. However, our data shows that 21.5 percent of the participants came directly from the rural areas to occupy peri-urban land, which falls under a local authority. The question emerges how these rural migrants managed to move into the peri-urban without having been on an urban housing waiting list. The answer is simple. Both urban and rural classes of people have used other means to obtain access into this zone. It is not the rigid, formal route but, rather, use of the "twilight institutions" of the housing cooperatives or consortiums. For example, in Southlea Park, the settlement is predominantly a consortium-based project which is composed of work-based cooperatives that have come together to enhance their critical mass in order to access land and contribute towards its servicing. To legitimize their actions, these residents always align themselves with the politicians or "people in government." Largely, the reason that most of the cooperatives are aligned to ZANU PF is "seeking some legitimacy" to a claim of land for housing.[11] This reveals the importance of informal networks of patron-client relations between cooperative members and the ruling party.

Duration of Stay in the Peri-Urban Area

Tenure security is a function of many factors including whether the inhabitants of any area have managed to gain legitimacy for their stay in a place through formal channels or not. Sometimes, politicians lead the homeless into acquiring unapproved pieces of the land for occupation. When laws are subsequently enforced, the people are left wanting. This happened before Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. The evocation of the law resulted in housing being destroyed completely, with no compensation for the owners. Residents found that it was a myth to assume that if they stayed in an area for a long period, they would have security of tenure.

Most of the peri-urban dwellers (50.5 percent) moved to the areas of their habitation in the past three years (Table 3). Nevertheless, in Whitecliffe, Hatcliffe, and Caledonia, some

households (14.25 percent) have been in the area for a period between six and ten years. That is a significant length of time for them to have put up structures.

TABLE 3: PERIOD SPENT IN THE PERI-URBAN HABITAT

Research Site	< 1 year	1-3 years	4-6 years	6-10 years	11+ years	Total
Whitecliffe	23	52	10	12	1	98
	23.47	53.06	10.2	12.24	1.02	100.00
Hatcliffe	25	36	17	13	9	100
	25.00	36.00	17.00	13.00	9.00	100.00
Caledonia	3	46	19	32	0	100
	3.00	46.00	19.00	32.00	0.00	100.00
Harare South	30	68	4	0	0	102
	29.41	66.67	3.92	0.00	0.00	100.00
Total	81	202	50	57	10	400
	20.25	50.50	12.50	14.25	2.50	100.00

Factors Militating Against Permanent Structures in the Peri-Urban Areas

Many factors hinder residents from putting up permanent structures in the peri-urban areas. The major cause was the economic meltdown that reached its zenith in 2008. Most residents were simply not in an economic position to build anything significant. The second reason was the "haunting memories" of Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. Chomukwenjera in Whitecliffe explains, "In 2005, due to Murambatsvina, I lost my house, which by today's value in US dollars is of the value between $25,000 and $30,000. It was a big loss to my family; at least in the context of the economic constraints we have been since 2000. I will see how the wind is blowing before I can build another one." In addition, absence of tenure security also delays the construction of permanent houses. Morgan in Caledonia had this to say: "Though I have been given this stand, the paperwork remains unfinished. How then can I go and build on land I am not sure is truly mine?" This statement shows how a long duration of stay in an area does not easily translate into tangible results like houses in an area. Finally, conditional clauses in the contract between people and their agency also have a bearing on the progress that takes place on the ground. How administrative structures (in this case local authorities) relate with one another has an effect on tenure issues. The communities and households lack capacity to understand these relationships. As evidenced by the experiences from most cooperatives, the communities are "insulated" from knowing these relations. Furthermore, the details of relations are regarded as the prerogative of the cooperative committees. Since charisma is a factor in the formation of housing cooperative committees, there is little attention to technical capacity and competence. This negatively affects the progress of the cooperatives, but, meanwhile, the common members find it difficult to understand the politics in detail. This tends to work against the broader interests of all cooperative members.

The peri-urban is an area of transition and sometimes can mean a kind of "no man's land" compromising tenure security. The urban local authority may be less committed to incorporate the area to include it under its jurisdiction since that would mean committing resources for the provision of infrastructure and services. At the same time, the rural local authority, under

which the peri-urban area previously belonged, may have reluctantly released the land and may continue to hold the area inadvertently. This creates "bad" politics, which tend to confuse peri-urbanites. Illustrating these dynamics, one senior local government officer said, "The peri-urban area is a place in which there is interplay of factors on non-commitment by especially the urban local authorities who may not be ready to develop the area and reluctance to release the place, by especially the rural local authorities which may be losing their source of revenue. As these forces play out, it is the common people, communities living in this area who suffer most." In the end, the peri- urban dwellers' tenure security is compromised.

The Question of Belonging

Most peri-urban dwellers did not know (24.6 percent) or were not sure (33.6 percent) of the local authority to which they belonged after moving to the peri-urban areas. Their survey responses to the question "to which local authority do you belong" thus indicate the degree to which their situation is uncertain and precarious (see Table 4). The city of Harare has inadequate public infrastructure, limiting its capacity to incorporate the land to be under jurisdiction, leaving the residents yearning for acceptance by Harare. The other reason is that the settlements do not satisfy the expected urban planning standards such as that of good infrastructure services. It is in this sphere of confusion, again, that informal twilight institutions come in to try to reinforce or at least assure the residents that they have no need to be worried. This lack of awareness could be due to lack of education. Lack of knowledge explains the interplay of politics surrounding housing land delivery in the peri urban areas.

Comparative analysis of the data below reveals that the lack of knowledge is more prevalent in Harare South where only 16.7 percent of the participants know where they belong. This may be explained by the fact that the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP) is the main agent facilitating development in that area. The consortium, composed of work-based cooperatives, has hired UDCORP as its technical adviser on matters to do with servicing the land and managing the project. In the other cases, the housing cooperative leaders (committee members including the chairperson, secretaries and treasurers) always try to explain to their members that they are working with the City of Harare to regularize their settlements and operations with the city.

TABLE 4: THE QUESTION OF BELONGING IN THE PERI-URBAN AREAS

Research Site	Yes	No	Not sure	Total
Whitecliffe	47	21	31	100*
	47.00	21.00	31.00	100.00*
Hatcliffe	35	26	39	100
	35.00	26.00	39.00	100.00
Caledonia	68	7	25	100
	68.00	7.00	25.00	100.00
Harare South	17	45	40	102
	16.67	44.12	39.22	100.00
Total	167	99	135	402*
	41.54	24.63	33.58	100.00

*For one respondent, not determined whether from urban or rural area

The Irony of Increasing Membership against Little Development

Ironically, cooperatives continued to increase their membership even when they were already constrained to meet the needs of the original smaller number of members. The chairperson of Kuroja Kukura Housing Cooperative in Hatcliffe explained, "Of course big numbers mean bigger subscriptions per month. We have no option but to mobilize our resources. The politics behind the long queue so that it finally gets its houses, we know how to deal with that."

This increasing membership base creates a "mammoth task" in ensuring that all members benefit. The cooperative management leader (chairperson of Nehanda Housing Cooperative) in Dzivarasekwa explained the challenge he faced: "We are working flat out with the City of Harare to get more land to house our members who have not yet benefited from the houses so far. We have over 4000 members but we have only built 800 houses so far. I think you understand what a mammoth task we have in ensuring that all members benefit."

This situation had created elements of mistrust among the cooperative members. Those who were yet to benefit were beginning to question why they have to continue suffering paying rentals elsewhere while others are made "to jump the queue" and benefit well ahead of earlier members. Corruption was becoming a major problem in such cooperatives. According to Taneta in Whitecliffe:

> Some members are now torn between pulling out and continuing. However, after investing your monies over a long time, you cannot just quit. Mudhara Pita left the cooperative after his son bought him a house in Kuwadzana. He only made so because his son who is the Diaspora (United Kingdom) said he should take such investment to the cooperative as water under the bridge. However, how many are like Mudhara Pita, who has "rich" children to buy their parents houses? Most cooperative members will have to soldier on, until they get their house.

This narrative shows how the long waiting periods are beginning to affect community participation; some are contemplating leaving, whilst others have already done so. What many considered as the easiest and quickest way to own a residential property was proving to be a

costly investment if one ends up pulling out of the cooperative. All of these dynamics dampen the morale of the cooperators.

Risks of the Peri-Urban Area

The reality of the peri-urban area is a quagmire of risks. The temporary structures peri-urban settlers in Harare have built are on un-serviced land; hence, development is taking place without adequate support infrastructure (land has not been formally acquired). Even with a few remnant and resilient settlements, it seemed the only guarantee for continuity lay in nothing but "doing the right thing." Thus, a few years after Operation Murambatsvina, "new housing schemes" have resurged in Harare's peri- urban areas. Risks to do with health, the political climate in the area, cooperative management challenges, and the state of the land on which they were supposed to build are some of the many challenges in the peri-urban areas.   Only 8 percent of peri-urban dwellers in the five sites were generally confident in the leadership of their cooperatives and consortiums guiding their development. This small number of positive-minded respondents was those among the people aware of ongoing dialogue between their cooperative leadership and the state. This dialogue is the zone in which Lund's (2006) concept of twilight institutions is manifesting itself. However, they are also convinced that they have to do something on their own in terms of establishing water and sanitation infrastructure.

TABLE 5: RATING THE RISKS

Research Site	Health	Political	Tenable	Coop	Land conf.	Other	Total
Whitecliffe	33	7	1	0	2	47	90
	36.67	7.78	1.11	0.00	2.22	52.22	100.00
Hatcliffe	58	1	1	1	0	39	100
	58.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	39.00	100.00
Caledonia	54	6	9	0	5	21	95
	56.84	6.32	9.47	0.00	5.26	22.11	100.00
Harare South	39	0	1	2	1	47	90
	43.33	0.00	1.11	2.22	1.11	52.22	100.00
Total	184	14	12	3	8	154	375
	49.07	3.73	3.2	0.80	2.13	41.07	100.00

In a state of uncertainty, individuals will try to adopt a wait and see approach. Our data reveal that the main sites with such an approach are Caledonia, Hopley in Harare South, Whitecliffe, and Hatcliffe. In these areas, the cooperatives are operating in such a way that the construction of temporary structures is more dominant than that of actual permanent houses. Harare as the local authority was taking its time to incorporate the emergent settlements hence the process was less expedited than the peri-urban residents would like.

For Harare, on the other hand, it is a question of the resource availability to incorporate them. This incorporation does not come cheap. It involves serious infrastructure financing and regularization to ensure settlement sustainability. Otherwise, the peri-urban settlements will pose a health threat to the entire megalopolis. When households have learnt about the health risks posed by the lack of infrastructure, they are more cautious and want the problem resolved

in the shortest possible time. The case of Southlea Park seems more organized given the activity of UDCORP in the development process.

In Zimbabwe, conversion of state land to private land is a process that takes many stages including acquisition, compensation for improvements, planning, allocation of stands, and full payment. The Deputy Director of Physical Planning partly explains this by saying, "You must (...) bear in mind that it's only after everything has been planned and allocation of stands has been done that State land then becomes private land." In this present case, the City administration of Harare has remained somewhat unclear in its actions putting the hopes of the home-seekers in disarray and shattering them.

Quite a number of these low-income peri-urbanites indicated that they were uncertain of their future. For example, Chipo in Harare South said, "We have been here since 2005 and we do not know, whether to build or to wait. If we build and the government decides to unleash another Murambatsvina, then we are in trouble…." In the same vein, Tagara in Hatcliffe says, "the only thing we must build at the moment is temporary shelters. We cannot risk building what may be razed off like what Murambatsvina did to some of our friends." These sentiments show the level of uncertainty that most peri-urban dwellers share. The places lack adequate public health services exposing many to diseases like cholera and dysentery that since 2008 have been commonplace in Zimbabwe.

Despite the variations highlighted above, in all cases, we see the interplay of politics, both in terms of internal cooperative politics and external politics. The internal politics includes housing cooperatives ballooning their membership numbers to raise financial resources but then failing to meet the demand of the bigger numbers. Corruption is a cancerous development within the cooperatives much to the detriment of the trust and commitment among cooperative members. Regarding external politics, we see cooperatives trying hard to ally or collaborate with politicians so that they can lay a claim on the land in which they are trying to house themselves. In most cases, tenure security is vague, creating opportunities for politicians to act as guarantors for continuity of stay on the pieces of land. Besides, the fact that the land on which peri-urban housing cooperatives were trying to build is under transition, having to move from neighboring rural local authorities to Harare, there is hesitance on the part of Harare to immediately incorporate such areas by servicing them. At the same time, some rural local authorities reluctantly release such areas as they may have historically provided revenue through rental contributions by the farmers. This tug-of-war between local authorities puts the inhabitants at serious risk of tenure insecurity which may not be immediately resolved.

Conclusion

The paper has managed to unmask the key issues surrounding housing and land tenure in the peri-urban fringes of Harare. As urbanization increased, the state has continued to provide services to the urban dwellers, housing included. The formation of housing cooperatives is the manifestation of the ineffectiveness of these state-sponsored, formal service delivery mechanisms.

This study has shown a number of dimensions to the reality of political identity, networks and participation in these cooperatives in peri-urban Harare. Belonging to a membership group, particularly in the form of cooperatives and consortia, explains how low-income groups

enhance their sense of security in a place. Still, many of the peri-urban dwellers in the researched sites were not familiar with the administration that they fall under, making it impossible for them to direct with vigor their demands there. Nevertheless, most peri-urban dwellers feel they have "gained" by being in the areas of their residence. Tenure security is a major battle, and fear characterizes peri-urban Harare. In trying to resolve the challenges, individuals and cooperatives alike have to brace with the politics surrounding this matter.

Notes

1   MNHSA 2010.
2   For more on Operation Murambatsvina, see Chipungu 2011; Tibaijuka 2005; Toriro 2007. The literal translation of *murambatsvina* is "to get rid of trash."
3   See Toriro 2006.
4   All of the quoted comments in the article come from these interviews in 2011 and 2012. The identity of the interviewees has been kept confidential, and names have been changed.
5   For definition of urbanization, Potts 2012, p. v.; for developing countries, Satterthwaite 2004.
6   Guyer, 2011, p.474.
7   Potts 2012, p.xvii.
8   Potts 2011, p.605.
9   Guyer 2011.
10 This was a haphazard seizure of white-owned farms in which land was grabbed by the land hungry Zimbabweans. Before this, the government followed religiously the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement between the British Government and the new Government of Zimbabwe. The Agreement stipulated that the new government could only acquire land from the whites following a "willing-buyer-willing-seller" dictum. After 1990, this arrangement lapsed but the government had not resettled its land-hungry populace. The formation of MDC in 1990 prompted ZANU PF to look into the land issue as its escape gate towards garnering votes hence the ZANU PF Government just allowed farm seizures which it then "christened" the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FLTRP). This FLTRP in 2000 assisted in bringing to surface a critical dimension to the deep-seated urban housing question. As war veterans, the general landless, farm workers and the urban homeless joined in the race of "land grabbing," a peri-urban "chaos" arose as they began to build houses (Moyo 1995; Murowe and Chirisa 2006; Moyo 2000, 2011).
11 Murowe and Chirisa 2006.

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Elephants are Like Our Diamonds: Recentralizing Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana, 1996-2012

PARAKH HOON

Abstract: When the Botswana parliament passed a Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) policy in 2007, ten years after its implementation, the formal policy rejected some of the basic precepts of community based conservation—those who face the costs of living in close proximity to wildlife should receive a major share of benefits. In the national debate over the CBNRM policy, benefits from wildlife were seen analogous to diamonds to be shared by the nation. The paper explains how and why Botswana's CBNRM policy took this direction through an analysis of three key aspects: subnational bureaucratic and community-level decision-making, national political economy and shifting coalition dynamics in a dominant one party system, and the contestation between transnational indigenous peoples' networks and the Botswana government. By understanding the CBNRM process as it unfolded at the national, district, and local level over an extended period of time, the paper provides a longitudinal argument about CBNRM recentralization in Botswana.

Introduction

> Use rights meant different things in practice. It was not any devolution of authority or development and management capacity at the local level. Rather, it was a complicated recipe for organizing villages by establishing by-laws for some form of decision-making into community-based organizations or trusts with a boilerplate set of rules. [1]

The above statement reflects the frustration that conservationists have with community based approaches in natural resource management in Botswana and indeed elsewhere in Africa. In 2007, a decade after the implementation of a donor sponsored Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM**)** program, the Botswana parliament passed a national CBNRM policy. The policy repudiated some of the core CBNRM assumptions about local ownership, resource access, and distribution of revenues. The emphasis on the nationalization of revenues was the most significant change. The new CBNRM policy represented a major shift in the distribution of benefits, for it allocated two-thirds of the income that was accruing to community trusts in a national conservation fund. In addition, the policy gave additional oversight powers to the central government and district councils.

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Nelson and Agrawal (2010) consider Botswana's CBRNM experience as "paradoxical" and peculiar. According to them, Botswana wildlife management CBNRM reforms were undertaken in what they consider "a context of transparent and technically competent—but nevertheless patrimonial—governance, relative economic prosperity and relatively low bureaucratic dependence on wildlife on community lands for revenue."[2] This is a valid characterization, but without much elaboration on how the recentralization process unfolded over time and what factors influenced the process.

This paper explains the actors, interests and ideas that shaped the recentralization of CBNRM in Botswana. It differentiates the CBNRM policy process by highlighting three aspects: subnational bureaucratic and community-level decision-making, national political economy and shifting coalition dynamics in a dominant one party system, and the contestation between transnational indigenous peoples' networks and the Botswana government. Each section of the paper addresses one of these three aspects and highlights contrasting claims of different actors involved in CBNRM including local community members who reside in close proximity to wildlife, urban Batswana and national politicians, local and international expatriate "expert" consultants, and mid-level government bureaucrats who were tasked to implement CBNRM. By integrating different levels of analysis, strategic action, and narratives of different actors, the paper provides what Poteete and Ribot refer to as "repertoires of domination." These include an ensemble of activities undertaken by different actors that collectively create, facilitate, and support efforts at recentralization. The actors draw on multiple sources and forms of power: political, economic, discursive, and coercive, plus symbolic and real violence, and the power to access, control, and manufacture knowledge.[3] In Botswana, this was evident in the CBNRM policy of August 2007 which repudiated some of the foundational principles of community conservation. The public debate surrounding CBNRM evoked a number of questions that intersected distributional equity, that is, distribution of resource wealth between national and sub-national levels of government, urban versus rural claims, and issues of ethnicity and citizenship.

Research Design

The analysis in this paper is based on field research conducted over short periods of time (between two and three months) from 1996 to 2012, and a year of fieldwork from 2000-01. The arguments are based on in-depth interviews with government officials at the national and district level associated with CBNRM, district level politicians, NGO representatives, and members and elected representatives of community based organizations (CBOs). Many of the respondents were interviewed multiple times between 1996 and 2012. These discussions provide insights for making longitudinal claims about the changes in the CBNRM policy process and politics. In addition to in-depth interviews, the arguments are also based on participant observation at national CBNRM stakeholder meetings, the annual tourism *pitso* (gathering) organized by the Minister of Environment Wildlife, and Tourism, district level CBNRM forum meetings and minutes, and community meetings in remote rural villages located in the Okavango panhandle (Seronga, Gudigwa, Eretsha, Beetsha, and Gudigwa, Sankuyu, Kwai, and Mababe). Finally, secondary sources were consulted including CBNRM policy documents and consultancy reports, newspaper articles, and public statements by

government officials pertaining to CBNRM. In short, by understanding the CBNRM process as it unfolded at the national, district, and local level over an extended period of time, the paper is able to provide a longitudinal argument about CBNRM recentralization in Botswana.

Botswana in Comparative Perspective to Its Neighbors and CBNRM

The mid-1990s witnessed the end of apartheid in South Africa, of the minority white racial government in Namibia, and of the civil war in Mozambique. These democratic transitions were a critical political juncture that created momentum for bottom-up participatory approaches in other arenas, including natural resource governance. As the post-apartheid democratic process evolved, the "land question," which was a key issue, threatened to derail the transition. The demands of the black majority populations for land also challenged private wildlife concessions. Should the private concessions under the minority white apartheid system be considered legitimate or expropriations?

In response, a regional network of southern (mostly white) African wildlife conservationists leveraged Western donors to support a particular model of community-based natural resource management. The southern African CBNRM model was thus based on the "sustainable use" approach for wildlife utilization that had originally been tried on private land in these apartheid systems.[4] In the context of wildlife conservation, supporters of sustainable use CBNRM argued that the "apartheid parks" with their exclusion of local people made wildlife management especially difficult outside protected areas. Wildlife populations would not survive without providing benefits to local communities that lived adjacent to national parks and game reserves.

Essentially, the sustainable use CBNRM strategy was to address historical inequities over access to land and resources through the commercial utilization of wildlife mostly through trophy hunting and also photographic tourism in communal land areas. The southern Africa sustainable use CBNRM approach also "spoke to" global norms of sustainable development that major Western international donors and conservation organizations could relate to—the integration of poverty alleviation and wildlife conservation through participatory approaches. In Southern Africa this took the form of CBNRM.

The implementation of sustainable use CBNRM approach and the forms it took varied in different contexts. This is in part because of the different institutional trajectories of state building and post-apartheid democratization. During apartheid, wildlife utilization in Namibia was on private white-owned land and mostly through commercial hunting. After independence, these rights over wildlife on private land were not disrupted in Namibia, as they were in Zimbabwe. The conservancies were implemented on marginal communal land where wildlife had been depleted. Thus, the CBNRM sustainable use model of wildlife conservancies did not challenge the Namibian central state, nor was there high value that could be extracted by the central state (as has been the case in Kenya's and Tanzania's wildlife concessions). Zimbabwe and Namibia with their white settler colonial context in the short term looked similar, but the fast track land policy in Zimbabwe derailed the sustainable use model expressed through its Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).[5]

In contrast to other Southern and East African countries that underwent a political transition in the 1990s, the sustainable use CBNRM in Botswana was implemented in a different context of state building. The management of diamonds by the state for the benefit of all has been interpreted as the fundamental reason of why Botswana has been able to avoid the resource curse that afflicts many other African countries that rely on minerals or oil. Botswana is also regarded as a success story because the state's development project has been promulgated as an ethnically neutral process whereby the state is cast as a benevolent provider of resources and services, irrespective of status.[6] In short, instead of a critical political juncture that created the conditions for CBNRM elsewhere, the context for CBNRM in Botswana was of a stable economy with forty years of sustained economic growth, but it was also a highly centralized "authoritarian liberal" state that was reluctant to devolve or decentralize authority.[7]

Backlash against CBNRM in Botswana (2007-2012)

> We cannot please everybody. We need to bite the bullet. There are areas where we can see very well that wildlife is in danger and it needs protection. It's about time that the government be able not to allow those villages to be growing as they are. The way those Gunitsogas and Etshas are growing is bad. They are in the way of elephant's path when they go to drink water. –Head of a major conservation NGO in Botswana.[8]

The above comment, by the manager of a local conservation NGO, reflects the position of Botswana's central government's stance toward community conservation. At the 2005 CBNRM national forum meeting, one of the delegates declared that CBNRM was dead, since the CBNRM policy remained stalled despite several years of discussion and feedback.[9] For community trusts, after the year 2000 and especially after the CBNRM policy was passed by the Botswana parliament in 2007, the CBNRM process entered a turbulent period of severe punishment. The CBNRM policy that was passed in 2007 by the Botswana parliament was radically different from the original intent of CBNRM.[10]

From the perspective of central government policy makers, the actions by the central government leading up to the CBNRM policy and after the policy was passed in 2007 were designed to stop malfeasance in current projects and concentrate authority in the central government, especially to the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism (MEWT). The decisions from the central government were projected as a clean-up operation to scale back the operations of troubled CBNRM projects.

The new CBNRM policy represented a major shift in the distribution of benefits to the detriment of local community trusts. The 2007 policy focused on centralizing 65 percent of the revenues in a national conservation fund and allocated the remaining 35 percent to local community based organizations. In so doing, it allocated two-thirds of the income that otherwise was accruing to community trusts to go instead to a national conservation fund. In addition, the policy gave additional oversight powers to the central government and district councils. District level government officials, NGOs, and academics involved in CBNRM were of the view that the central government was not interested in devolving authority or resources to the districts or in building capacity at the community level but rather sought to withhold revenues and strengthen upward accountability to the central government.

Government officials with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks at the district level provided instances of dealing with "instructions" and pushing issues that would not lead to the expected results. A senior consultant and an advisor to former President Festus Mogae explained the rationale of this perceived breakdown in communication:

> Where "normal" government procedures entail talking those through across different levels now [under the current government] this process is not dynamic. Sometimes ideas may need feedback [for example between the minister, permanent secretary, and mid-level bureaucrats]. However because the so-called "normal" government procedures have not been followed and decisions are made at a particular level [by a small group of people] it often becomes "instruction." Therefore many decisions get misinterpreted. And so, at the lower levels the idea is to "please" the higher-ups and not upset the big boss.[11]

This "breakdown in communication," was especially evident in the CBNRM decision-making between central and district level authorities. By 2005, several aspects of decision-making for CBNRM were moved from the DWNP to the Botswana Tourism Board (BTB), a parastatal organization that was created for marketing tourism and enterprise development of ecotourism in Botswana. "[W]hat we see again is that at the urging of the Minister, who has appointed a close confidante as the CEO of the Botswana Tourism Board and a few other elements," according to a senior government official, "their interest is to create standardized rules to establish companies once we go forward with photographic safari tourism.[12] The community extension officer at the Department of Wildlife and National Parks confirmed that the centralization of decision-making was through the Botswana Tourism Board (BTB). "Now [that] the Botswana Tourism Board is marketing and promoting tourism," he pointed out, "we are not sure whether they will be part of the Technical Advisory Committee." [13] The TAC is a joint district level coordinating committee that had until then been responsible for evaluating CBNRM joint venture agreements with the private sector.

The centralization of decision was, in part, due the emphasis on establishing a tourism model of "high value, low volume," in which marketing and branding of Botswana as a prime wilderness destination took precedence. Other aspects of ecotourism, especially the efforts at building the institutions of democratic participation at the local level, were neglected.[14] "The decision to centralize the decision-making in the BTB and making it a "one-stop-shop" instead of involving the Wildlife and Land Board officials at the district level and the appointment of his former campaign manager to head the agency," according to a senior government official in the DWNP, "was the decision of the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism."[15]

The changes undertaken by the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism is illustrative of President Ian Khama's centralized and personalized decision-making. He also played a significant role in guiding private investment in emerging economic sectors such as wildlife tourism. The growth of wildlife tourism as the second largest sector that now contributes 10 percent to the GDP also reflects the personal vested interests of President Khama toward the value of wildlife conservation and its contribution to the long-term national development. Appointments to key posts, including significant ministries, often consist of former military officers and extended family and relatives from the Bangwato, which is

indicative of patrimonial tendencies. For example, the decision to appoint a trusted former military official, businessman, and friend of President Khama's brother as the Minister of Environment Wildlife and Tourism and the support to "high end, low volume" exclusive safari companies and conservation business interests has been the modus operandi to transform tourism into a growth sector.

This has resulted, however, in recentralization of decision-making to the executive branch and extensive administrative changes undertaken by loyalist ministers. In this case, he appointed a former military officer and family friend to undertake extensive administrative reorganization that emphasized supporting the private sector. In addition to new regulations and administrative reorganization, the ministry established an autonomous entity, Botswana Tourism Board (BTB), led by the Minister's former campaign manager and tasked with spearheading the branding and marketing of Botswana tourism. In short, since 2005 under the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism CBNRM policy implementation is illustrative of greater centralization and personalization of decision-making.[16]

Diamonds, Wildlife, and Identity Politics

> The animals now belong to the government, the trees, and all the land. These things burden us. Now the government sells animals…which it uses to buy cars, to pay soldiers…We are not moving. If you want to take us, you will forcibly be removing us…if we move from here, it will be the government that moves us, because it is used to doing so. That is what we told him at the *kgotla* [public meeting]. –Basarwa resident of Khwai village.[17]

The above statement is by a resident of Khwai village, who belongs to the minority Basarwa (San) group, the "first people of the Kalahari," about her community's marginal position. Her perspective contrasts with the national debate on the CBNRM policy to which we turn to in this section.

In mid-2007, prior to the introduction of the CBNRM policy to the Botswana parliament, then-President Festus Mogae gave a speech at the University of Botswana where he reiterated the notion that the collective ownership of natural resources is intimately linked to national unity. In this speech, Mogae made the case that the central government was the custodian of both diamonds and wildlife; as diamonds benefit the nation as a whole, so should be the case for wildlife and other natural resources:

> In Botswana collective ownership of our natural resources is fundamental to our development strategy…The sharing of the benefits accruing from natural resources strengthens national unity and cohesion and moves the entire Nation forward in the development continuum…In fact, all natural resources are shared… Government is the custodian of our wildlife resources. This ensures that all our citizens have a common stake and enjoy unqualified benefits from our natural resources…When we have issues with the international community about the sale of ivory, it is a matter for the entire nation and not just for those where elephants are found.[18]

The national media took up this idea, and several commentators embellished the official view by referring to it as the "doctrine of collective ownership." Making references to the ongoing parliamentary debate on a decade-long experiment with decentralized natural resource management, one of the specially elected Members of Parliament, Botsaelo Ntuane, criticized CBNRM for being divisive and a threat to national cohesiveness:

> [A]ny legislation that promotes separate ownership of natural resources only serves to sow the seeds of national discord. Any semblance of separate ownership and preferential treatment, no matter how well meant, is injurious and engenders a sense of injustice. Agitators who resent having to share resources on equal terms with everyone will be provided with enough reason to preach the gospel of resource chauvinism.[19]

The president's remarks and debate in the media, however, did not address the management issues of CBNRM. Rather, they equated the ownership and distribution of benefits from diamonds with wildlife.

Diamonds and elephants are central to Botswana's image as a successful African country. The former project economic prosperity and evidence of good governance, the latter indicate that Botswana is an exemplary tourist destination and a conservation success story in contrast to many other African countries.[20] Subsequent generations of post-independence politicians (especially of the ruling BDP party) and most urban Batswana (especially from the dominant Tswana ethnic groups) consider that the wealth from diamonds should be used to benefit the country. To them, the management of diamonds by the state for the benefit of all Batswana is a fundamental reason why Botswana has been able to avoid civil war or the resource curse that afflict many other African countries that rely on minerals or oil. Seretse Khama, Botswana's first president, was the chief of the Bangwato, one of the dominant Tswana ethnic groups. Yet he supported a nationalist vision of a unitary state conceptualizing the pre-colonial *merafe* as the nation.[21] As chief of the Bangwato, Khama was able to proclaim that the diamonds on Bangwato land belonged to the nation and not to a particular ethnic group. In so doing, he set a precedent about national ownership, and equitable distribution of the revenues from diamonds provided the initial impetus of an ethnically neutral nation state.

In the construction of the ethnically neutral citizenship discursive, all citizens in Botswana are viewed as equal and therefore should benefit equally from the distribution of natural resource wealth. But in practice and experiences, the question is whether this citizenship extends to everyone. Who is included and who is excluded? As Nymanjoh (2006), Werbner (2004), and Hitchcock (1993) have argued, the dominant Tswana nationalism projects itself as ethnically neutral, but it is a constructed citizenship in which Setswana-speaking groups are recognized, while other minority groups are marginalized.[22]

Historically, the dominance of the Tswana originates in the consolidation of pre-colonial Tswana states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which involved the incorporation of minority ethnic groups (for example, Basarwa/San, Bayeyi, and Humbukushu). The spatial hierarchy and its functional manifestation contributed to a "spatiality of citizenship," which was articulated in the kgotla-ward system, a system of citizenship which was associated with residence, and minority groups and subordinate groups live away from the center of the village

where the dominant Tswana ethnic group and a chief's family.[23] The Basarwa/San were incorporated as *malate* (or serfs), and their condition did not improve during the colonial period. Instead, it laid the foundations for the contemporary dynamics of resistance and confrontation between national and local claims. Under the British protectorate, the non-Tswana groups were not recognized as having their own chiefs and hence did not have the power to allocate land on tribal land. The paramount chiefs were from one of the eight Tswana tribes who held this power (despite the presence of any minority tribes in that area).[24]

From the perspective of many local communities who had been marginalized by the Tswana pre-colonial states, participation in CBNRM thus partly also allows them to exercise their collective rights over land and natural resources, and claims based on their local ethnic identities. This was evident when several Basarwa villages involved in CBNRM—Gudigwa, Xai Xai, Mababe, and Sankuyu—wanted to define the membership of their community trusts based on their identity as San. DWNP refused to accept an ethnic basis for the formation of community trusts and instead emphasized shared interests and geographic proximity of different communities as a basis for membership. From the perspective of the minorities, the assertion that wealth from diamonds should be viewed on a par with benefits from wildlife utilization reinforces the domination of the Tswana nation, which is projected as ethnically neutral.

The challenge to the notion of ethnic neutrality has also surfaced in the case of Basarwa (San) communities who were residing within the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). In 1997 and 2002, the Government of Botswana relocated around two thousand San who resided in the game reserve. Government officials made the case that CKGR was on state land and the people living inside the reserve had livestock and vehicles. In accordance with previous government policies such as the Remote Area Development Program (RADP) and other "development" programs relocating the San people to new settlements outside CKGR was to provide access to education, health care, and other modern services. In 2004, the people of the Central Kalahari (San and Bakgalagadi) filed a lawsuit against the Government of Botswana in the High Court. This court case that lasted over two and a half years, ended with the people of the Central Kalahari being granted the right of return to their original homes in the reserve, and the right to hunt in the Central Kalahari as long as they had licenses from the government.[25] In this instance, the government lost the case and had to acknowledge the group rights of the San to remain in the CKGR; however, the court also decided that the state was not obliged to provide social and health services if the San decided to stay. The Government of Botswana did not provide any services, especially water. In response, the residents of CKGR filed another lawsuit with the Botswana High Court in 2009. When the Botswana High Court rejected the case, the CKGR people approached the Appeals court and also took their case to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. In 2010, Botswana's Court of Appeals ruled on behalf of the CKGR residents. Since then there have been additional cases filed with regard to hunting rights and keeping livestock within CKGR.[26]

The CKGR court case has been the longest and most expensive in Botswana's history, continues to be divisive, and hurts Botswana's international reputation as an open democracy. The issue evolved into an international controversy over indigenous rights when Botswana based human rights and conservation organizations, and Survival International (SI; an

influential international NGO based in London) became involved especially from 2004 onwards. Speaking on behalf of the communities, SI argued that relocation was taking place due to the discovery of diamonds. The government denied this and maintained that there were no diamond concessions in CKGR and that there was no relationship between relocating the San and the location of diamonds. In 2007, however, the government announced licenses for mining.[27] Critics also point out that the government has allowed tourism companies leases, while heavy-handed treatment (including unjustified arrests and alleged torture) of local community members by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Special Support Group (SSG) of the Botswana police has persisted.[28] For many Batswana, despite the government's "mishandling" of the CKGR situation, the issue centered on how an international NGO manipulated illiterate San rather than the marginalization of a minority group by the dominant ethnic groups. A similar argument has been made with regard to CBNRM. "It was areas of minority tribes where much of the CBNRM projects were being implemented," according to a retired high-level government official who was involved in the decision-making. He further points out that "it was best [for the government] to make the claim that resources belong to the nation and therefore there would be no room for CBNRM to become a vessel for international entities, such as Survival International or other NGOs, to use this on the pretext of bias against minority groups in Botswana."[29]

Instead of a constructive engagement with the management issues of a decade-long experiment in community conservation to reform CBNRM, the government and public statements by national politicians have asserted that wealth from diamonds, wildlife, and other natural resources are and should be shared by all Batswana. The national media took up this idea, and several commentators embellished the official view by referring to it as the "doctrine of collective ownership." Writing in *Mmegi*, the national newspaper, MP Botsalo Ntuane makes the case that the "implications [of the new CBNRM policy] are far reaching and may create a precedent that shakes the foundation of our unity as a nation."[30] By placing wildlife alongside diamonds, he makes the case that "the decision to nationalize mineral rights established the basic premise that as a nation bound by a common destiny we all share what we have. When viewed against this principle, therefore, the CBNRM policy negates the spirit and intent of equitable sharing of resources."[31] Referring to the ongoing parliamentary debate on CBRNM, Ntuane argued further, as already quoted above, that legislation promoting "separate ownership of natural resources only serves to sow the seeds of national discord" and even if well meant," is injurious and engenders a sense of injustice." Furthermore it will lead to agitators preaching "the gospel of resource chauvinism" to those who resent any sharing of resources on an equal basis with all Batswana.[32]

In the discursive shift and reframing of CBNRM, community now implied "national community" and not "local community," and natural resource benefits included not just veld products and wildlife, but also diamonds. The point here is that by implicating CBNRM, with resource ownership and ethnically neutral citizenship, the claims of marginalized ethnic minorities to benefits from CBNRM projects are seen as allegedly precipitating a slippery slope of tribalism and ethnic separatism that would threaten national unity.

Privileging national interests in the CBNRM policy, however, neglects the specific costs and needs of local communities that live with wildlife. As Lapo Magole, a researcher on indigenous

rights issues in Botswana, in one of the editorials points out, "this position (perceived threat to national unity) exaggerates the threat of ethnic exclusion."[33] This narrative reinforces the marginality of communities living with wildlife. By viewing diamonds and elephants in the same light, community use rights become national collective ownership, and little attention is paid to the specific location and needs of local communities. Furthermore, terms "ownership" and "benefits" have become rhetorical devices to privilege national claims and reject particular claims by local communities. In so doing, the CBNRM policy repudiated local claims of use rights and access, which government in its own white papers had earlier established.[34]

According to critics of the government's version of the CBNRM policy, the manner in which the policy was eventually passed in the parliament was also indicative of "directive" driven top-down decision-making rather than a genuine debate over reforming CBNRM.[35] They argued that after two years of no legislative movement, the policy was pushed through at the last minute. Senior level government advisors close to the CBNRM debate pointed out that policy that was submitted to the Permanent Secretary was not that which was tabled in Parliament. The 65/35 formula was inserted later along with additional language that strengthened the powers of the central government. Much to their surprise, the parliamentary debate instead of focusing on community management issues that were raised during CBNRM stakeholder meetings and lessons learned from project evaluations, linked CBNRM to issues of national ownership of diamonds.

CBNRM Recentralization: Coalition Dynamics and Electoral Competitiveness

The national debate on CBNRM policy was also shaped by the coalition dynamics within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the increasing electoral competitiveness. Since independence in 1966, the BDP has maintained its majority in the Parliament and has elected each president of Botswana. CBNRM was introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s during a period of declining electoral support from 77 percent in 1974, to 68 percent in 1984, and 55 percent in 1994. The increased competition raises the salience of CBNRM as an electoral issue and according to Poteete (2009), accounts for the partial recentralization of CBNRM.[36] The constituencies that are electorally competitive have either been urban areas or where non-Tswana minority ethnic groups are in a majority. The latter areas are where most of the CBNRM interventions took place. This argument could be one factor, especially if CBNRM implicated in identity politics could be seen as a divisive issue that would benefit opposition politicians in competitive electoral areas.

The electoral competitiveness at the district level also shaped the policy debate around CBNRM. Local politicians, especially the councilors, saw the chairpersons of community based organizations (CBOs) who were receiving large sums of revenues as rivals. Their issue with the CBOs was that as councilors (or members of parliament) they had made promises for local development, which had to be followed through with the District Council or parliament or both to carry out development activities. The CBOs and especially the chairpersons had much more discretion. In a few instances CBO chairpersons (or someone they supported) were from the opposition parties that challenged BDP councilors. During the debate over the CBNRM policy, these conflicts were incorporated to make a case against devolving authority or discretion to CBOs.[37]

Implementing CBNRM Policy: Impasse (2007-2012)

Between 2008 and 2010 there was an impasse between the central government, especially the Minister of Wildlife, Environment, and Tourism, and the CBOs or community trusts represented by the National CBNRM Forum that was comprised of local NGOs, academicians, and local government officials. During this time, the Botswana Tourism Board started creating its own CBNRM strategy, while most CBOs that lacked any external efforts at capacity building collapsed. Those CBOs that had had allegations of mismanagement directed at them were restrained by withholding their revenues. This was especially the case for such CBOs as the Okavango Community Trust that had to now approach the District Commissioner and submit receipts to access funds. The community division of DWNP began to review the constitutions of CBOs to bring them in line with the CBNRM policy. Among the reforms that were implemented, the most significant were the allocation of 65 percent of the resource royalties in a national fund, the closure of elected Village Trust Committees, and limiting the elected representation to a board chairperson and secretary. In so doing, the government neutered CBOs by taking away the sources of political confrontation between the CBOs and external actors. The CBNRM forum and representatives of the CBOs raised this issue with the government because, from their perspective, only the punitive aspects of the CBNRM reform had been implemented.

The Botswana Parliament has not yet passed an act to implement the CBNRM Policy of 2007. In June 2012, the contents of such an act were discussed at the Tourism *Pitso* meeting. Once passed it would give the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism final authority in all decisions regarding CBNRM. In addition, the government would support the establishment of a permanent entity ("a vehicle") that would include trained professionals in governance, financial management, marketing, and natural resource management to support the CBOs.[38] The central government, however, has yet to introduce the relevant legislation. Why? And, what are the implications? There are many reasons why the government has not passed an act (which was a proposal from an expert committee) to implement the 2007 CBNRM Policy. From the perspective of the arguments in this paper about the recentralization of CBNRM, the creation of new organizational entities such as the Botswana Tourism Corporation are interpreted as "repertoires of domination" that Poteete and Ribot discuss.[39] In this instance, the ambiguity of having an act that can be submitted to parliament, but for which there is no urgency, is because in the case of CBNRM such an act would (when needed) provide the central government with the authority to address some of the complicated legal issues about long term leases to safari companies. For instance, in the case of the Okavango Community Trust, the length of the fifteen-year "head lease" provided by the government, and the contract between OCT and Wilderness Holdings, which extends until 2024 and is past the expiration deadline for the head lease, has been under litigation. From the perspective of implementing agencies such as the community division of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, an Act would allow whoever is mandated as the body administering the Act lawfully to take action against CBOs, the private sector, or any government department that may violate the Act. What would follow the Act would be regulations stipulating to detail what to and what not to do.[40]

Conclusions

The paper traces the policy process of a conservation and development approach in Botswana that was intended to be participatory and community-oriented, but after almost ten years of implementation drastically shifts direction when it is legislated. The paper explains this shift by illustrating sub-national (i.e. district) bureaucratic and community-level debates, discussions, and decisions, shifting political dynamics in a largely single party dominated state, and the contestation between transnational indigenous peoples networks and the Botswana government. Taken together, the result is a CBNRM policy that is punitive rather than enabling. The current version of the CBNRM policy and an act of parliament that gives the Minister of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism additional powers, has transformed what was supposed to be a bottom up and participatory approach to empower rural communities living in close proximity to wildlife, into a mechanism for the central government for managing relations between local communities and the private sector.

Notes

1   Resident of Kwai, quoted in Taylor 2000, p. 253.
2   Nelson and Agrawal 2010, p. 568.
3   Poteete and Ribot 2011, pp. 440-41.
4   Suich and Child, with Spenceley 2009.
5   Jones and Weaver 2009.
6   Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson 2002; Good 1996; Samatar 1999.
7   A process whereby the state is cast as a benevolent provider of resources and services, irrespective of status (Samatar 1999, pp. 14-15; also see Gulbrandsen 1984).
8   Interview with the head of local conservation non-governmental organization, Gaborone, August 2012.
9   Swatuk 2005.
10 Between 1995 and 2004, USAID contributed about $21,000,000 toward CBNRM through Chemonics International, a USAID contractor/international consultancy company that set up the Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) to implement CBNRM. The expectation of the donors and consultants was that NRMP would eventually be integrated within the Department of Wildlife and National Parks Community Management Division.
11 Anonymous Interview, Gaborone, August 2010.
12 Anonymous Interview, Gaborone, August 2010
13 Interview with community liaison officer, Department of Wildlife and National Parks, July 2010.
14 Magole and Magole 2012.
15 Anonymous Interview, Gaborone, July 2010.
16 Critics point out that Ian Khama's presidency has been highly personalised in its reliance on a group of trusted loyalists, often from within the family: Tshekedi Khama, (brother) has been an MP and in 2012 was appointed as the Minister of Environment Wildlife and

Tourism; Tebelo Seretse, (cousin) is the Defence Minister; Dale Ter Haar, nephew, trained at Sandhurst, engaged in mining and resource projects; Johan Ter Haar, formerly married to President Khama's sister, Jacqueline Khama, chair of the Business and Economic Advisory Council; Isaac Kgosi, DIS chief; Pelonomi Venson-Motoi, a "very close and trusted friend," Minister for Communications, in charge of the government's radio, television, and print networks with their unique nation-wide coverage; Ian Kirby, High Court judge, ex-Attorney General, confidante; Sheila Khama, cousin through marriage and head of De Beers Botswana; Tsetsele Fantan, a relative is member of the Tribunal of the DIS; the Minister of Mines and Mineral resources, Kitso Mokaila and his brother, have been childhood family friends and BDF colleagues; and Thapelo Olopeng, retired soldier, little-known figure with a long friendship with Khama. http://www.iankhama.com/the-presidency-of-general-ian-khama-militarisation-of-the-botswana-miracle/ [last accessed November 11, 2014].

17   Statement by resident of Khwai village cited in Taylor 2000.

18   Address By His Excellency, Mr. Festus G. Mogae, President of The Republic of Botswana, at The University of Botswana Graduation Arena at 16.15 Hours on 4th September 2007, Gaborone.

19   Ntuane 2007a.

20   Acemoglu et al. 2002.

21   Bennett n.d. *Merafe* is the plural form of the Setswana word *morafe*, which is often translated "tribe" or "nation." As Bennett notes: "Pre-colonial Batswana were organized in a number of relatively small independent kingdoms or chiefdoms, showing a definite fissiparous tendency, but also showing an ability to absorb and recoalesce. Refugees etc. joined as junior partners. This pattern assisted the merafe in the north and west to successfully integrate large numbers of non-Tswana during the 19th C. in conditions of varying levels of subordination. By the later 19th C. the largest merafe, such as GammaNgwato under Khama III were emerging as multi-ethnic but Tswana-dominated states. Thus as applied to the Tswana-ruled precolonial states of the Bamangwato, BaTawana etc. and their colonial-era successors 'morafe' is perhaps better rendered 'polity' since they were essentially political rather than ethnic units."

22   Hitchcock 2001, 2011; Nyamanjoh 2006

23   Taylor 2000.

24   Parson 1981; Werbner 2004.

25   Hitchock 2013.

26   Sapignoli 2009; Solway 2009; Hitchcock, Sapignoli, and Babchuk 2011; Sapignoli 2012.

27   Hitchock 2013.

28   Pienaar 2013.

29   Anonymous interview, senior government official, July 2010.

30   Ntuane 2007b.

31   Ntuane 2007b.

32   Ntuane 2007b.

33   Magole 2007.
34   Republic of Botswana 1986.
35   Anonymous interview, July 2010.
36   Poteete 2009.
37   Interviews, BDP district councillor and council chairperson, Maun, Botswana, July 2010.
38   Interviews with CBNRM forum representatives, August 2012. This negotiated agreement was also discussed at Tourism *Pitso* 2012. This annual event brings together government, private sector, and non-governmental actors who are involved in the tourism sector.
39   Poteete and Ribot 2011, pp. 440-41.
40   Personal Communication, December 23, 2014.

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Financial Performance of Local Government in Limpopo Province, 2010-2012

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Abstract: Governance problems mar local government in South Africa's Limpopo Province, especially in relation to financial management. The province received the highest rate of unsatisfactory audit outcomes between 2010 and 2012 of any province in South Africa. This paper examines the various explanations for this situation and uses the datasets from the Afrobarometer and the audit outcome reports to compare the financial performance of the Limpopo local government and its municipalities with that of other South African provinces. One key finding is that employment recruitment patterns have a major influence on financial performance of the municipalities. In particular, an "informal" cadre recruitment approach has a negative impact on local government's financial performance. The paper thus concludes that the governing African National Congress has used a strategy that disregards competitive recruitment practices and rewards party members and those affiliated with the party with access to employment, especially in local government, which has detrimental effects on financial management of municipalities.

Introduction

The establishment of democratic local government in South Africa in 2000 decentralized the decision-making powers from the center to the periphery. Municipalities are responsible for their own local planning and the preparation of their budgetary processes. The central government, however, remains responsible for providing resources in terms of funding and training and capacity building programs and continues to monitor local government programs or policy implementation. Despite huge investment in terms of resources (funding and capacity building programs), empirical studies suggest that many municipalities in South Africa, especially rural based local municipalities, are struggling to improve their performance in terms of financial management. For example, only two of the thirty municipalities in the Limpopo Province received "clean audit outcome reports" between 2010 and 2012. The performance of the municipalities also has empirical significance in relation to service delivery (e.g. provision of water, electricity, sanitation, infrastructure, etc.) to the local communities. The questions that this paper tries to answer are: why does the poor performance of the municipalities matter; and, why the variation in terms of financial

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performance between the municipalities in the Limpopo Province and those outside the province?

This paper argues that municipal variation in terms of financial performance within Limpopo and in relation to other provinces can best be explained by the differences in recruitment patterns being adopted by the individual municipalities. That is to say, the municipalities that apply meritocratic recruitment practices to run their administrations tend to be characterized by better institutional performance or quality pertaining to financial management (revenue collection and spending) than the municipalities that adopt a different recruitment approach. It then suffices to say that the two municipalities with clean audit outcomes in the Limpopo Province have adopted a meritocratic recruitment culture, which implies that key municipal officials have appropriate required competencies to discharge their official duties. For example, the Auditor-General has found that key officials in 72 percent of the municipalities in the Limpopo Province lack appropriate competencies and skills.[1] Therefore, the generally poor performance of the province's local government system implies that the national vision of achieving a clean audit by 2014 for all the government institutions including the municipalities throughout the entire South African local government system remains elusive.

Research Design

Limpopo Province is a rural province with approximately 5.6 million people, according to *Statistics South Africa*, with over 90 percent of the population residing in the rural areas.[2] Limpopo Province's local government has five district municipalities and twenty-five local municipalities. In terms of Section 83(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act and the South African Constitution, the district municipalities are responsible for building the capacity of local municipalities in their jurisdictions to sustainably delivery services and develop the local economy.[3] The district municipalities are further required to ensure that local municipalities have the necessary capacity to manage their finances in line with the relevant legislation such as the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003.

Undoubtedly, Limpopo Province shares many similarities and few differences with some other rural South African provinces. For example, provinces such as the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Kwa-Zulu Natal, the Northern Cape, and the North West are considered as rural and serving mostly rural communities. According to South African Institute of Race Relations, these rural and poor provinces experienced overall higher net out-migration between 2001 and 2011 than net in-migration for the urban provinces of Gauteng and the Western Cape.[4] Rural provinces experience huge net out-migration because their people are attracted to the urban provinces by better prospects of work and a decent standard of living. Many other provinces also have diverse ethnic groups and few provinces like the Eastern Cape (predominantly Xhosa speaking), Kwa-Zulu Natal (predominantly Zulu speaking), and North West Province (predominantly Tswana speaking) seem ethnically homogenous. The differences lie in their sizes in terms of area and number of established districts and local municipalities in each province, but size does not matter in explaining the financial performance of municipalities.

Successive reports of the Auditor-General show that Limpopo and Eastern Cape local governments are often the worst performing municipal institutions as compared to their rural counterpart municipalities.[5] Limpopo Province's local government is chosen as the

study site because the province is politically stable but was placed under "administration" or intervention by the national government in terms of Section 100 (1)(b) of the South African Constitution.[6] However, the levels of service delivery protests in Limpopo Province were relatively low in 2010/11 as compared to provinces such as Gauteng, Western Cape, and Eastern Cape. This does not, however, suggest that there are no problems in the Limpopo Province, especially in terms of service delivery and financial management. Limpopo Province's local government offers rich empirical evidence for scholarly inquiry into recruitment patterns that are implemented at the local level. Furthermore, given its rich ethnic diversity and existence of two major academic institutions, we should expect the province to be able to recruit meritocratically from a pool of skilled and competent graduates to drive public service delivery implementation. Financial performance of all municipalities in Limpopo Province was assessed using the audit outcome reports from the Auditor-General, thus complimenting the existing dataset from the Afrobarometer.

The Role of Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa

South African local government consists of two hundred and seventy eight municipalities, which are made up of metropolitans, districts, and local municipalities differing in sizes and scattered across the nine provinces. This simply means that South Africa has a two-tier system of local government, with the first tier being made up of metropolitan and larger district municipalities and the second of small local municipalities. Limpopo Province lacks a metropolitan municipality because it is mostly rural. The legal framework for local government is contained in Chapter 7 of the Constitution of South Africa, which outlines the structure, composition, and object of this sphere of government.[7] Further supporting legislation that elaborates on the structures and mechanisms of local government include the Local Government Municipal Structures Act and the Local Government Municipal Systems Act.[8] Furthermore, the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act details financial management responsibilities and accountability mechanisms for municipalities.[9] Based on this legal framework and the Constitution, local government has been charged with the responsibility of implementing the local sphere's policies and programs, which are largely drawn from national vision. Thus specifically, local government is responsible for the following, among others: a) providing democratic and accountable government to the local communities, and b) ensuring the provision of quality services to the communities in a sustainable manner.

Based on the above constitutional mandate for local government, it is clear that local government is the central government's service delivery arm. This suggests that the central government remains responsible for setting the national developmental agenda or vision for implementation by both provincial and local governments and to monitor their activities. To reiterate, the center remains solely responsible for funding local government to enable public goods provision at the local level. In order words, power is decentralized to the municipalities to implement the national development agenda. In similar vein, van der Waldt and Thornhill concur that local government is at the center of public good provision since it is often the first point of conduct between an individual or communities and the central government or even the provincial government.[10]

Theoretical Explanations for the Variations in Local Government Institutional Performance

Local government performance can be explained and evaluated from several perspectives. The first line of thinking emphasizes citizen engagement and participation.[11] Proponents of citizenry engagement and participation theory argue that without involvement and participation of local communities in governance affairs, public institutions like the municipalities, for example, are less likely to improve their performance in terms of provision of public goods and services as well as managing public funds. While community engagement and participation is emphasized in democratic contexts for promoting institutional performance, in African contexts of hybrid democracies it can contribute to ensuring accountability in the use of public resources by government institutions and the consolidation of democracy at the local level.

As Grosso and van Ryzin correctly point out, public institutions inform citizens about their financial performance through mechanisms such as annual reports, the media by reporting on incidents of financial mismanagement, press releases, word of mouth, or public hearings. However, citizens normally do not engage or scrutinize these financial statements contained in the annual reports of public institutions like the municipalities.[12] This is because of the complicated structure of the annual reports of the government institutions, especially with the financial statements, which are often difficult for an ordinary person with a limited educational background, especially in finance or financial accounting, to understand and follow. To understand the language contained in the annual reports, one needs to have been appropriately trained to grasp and understand the meaning of the financial concepts or jargon used in the financial statements. The same holds for the language or concepts always used by the auditors when giving an opinion about the financial statements of state institutions. Undoubtedly, ordinary citizens are not afforded the opportunity to be capacitated or trained by, for example, the Auditor-General in order to understand audit language. Although the theory of citizen engagement and involvement is applicable to public institutions like municipalities, it cannot be applied to a private institution to analyze its performance in relations to financial management. Another theory limitation for the public sector is that citizens are often involved in the conceptualization and the early planning phases such as budget preparations of development programs and not during policy or program implementation. The implementation phase is always left to the officials of the municipalities with the "technical know-how." Even though the theory is directly applicable to public sector institutions, it cannot be used to explain the variations in terms of financial performance within and between municipalities in Limpopo and elsewhere in South Africa.

Another perspective on local government performance theorizes that cadre deployment or what is commonly known elsewhere as the political appointment system enhances the performance of public institutions like municipalities.[13] As noted by Kopecky, cadre deployment is normally brought about by the governing political party or parties.[14] It must be understood that government is constructed and consolidated by political parties, which means that they directly influence the performance of government institutions. When the governing political party or parties enter, construct, and consolidate their own government identity, they usually do this by dispensing political patronage via state jobs for their party supporters and party loyalists to bargain over policy output. Empirical research shows that patronage politics or simply a political appointment system is a global phenomenon or an

inherent feature of all governing political parties worldwide. Various reasons are provided for this recruitment approach by the governing political parties. From the cadre deployment perspective, the system helps to mitigate the risk of intra-party rebellion in the face of electoral defeat or unpopular decisions made by the governing political party.

Moreover, cadre deployees or simply political appointees provide checks and balances on the formulation and implementation of the policies of the governing party within all government institutions including the municipalities. In other words, political appointees serve as the eyes and ears of the governing party or parties, thus always monitoring the level of support for the governing party's policy goals within state institutions. According to this theory, cadre deployment assists to minimize potential harm to government policy vision by public servants, especially from those who might be supporting the opposition political parties. However, Kanyane, Muller, Picard, and Africa and Mosiane have vigorously criticized this theory for promoting and tolerating mediocrity, power struggles, patronage politics, corruption, and nepotism in the civil service, thus resulting generally in the poor performance of the government institutions.[15] Similarly, Kopecky argues that cadre deployment provides party leaders with the means to maintain party organizations by distributing "selective incentives" to party loyalists or activists and party elites in exchange for organizational loyalty or other benefits.[16] In similar vein, Butler concurs that the growth of political appointments and deployment of under-qualified or inappropriately qualified political loyalists to public service positions in all spheres of government including local government undermine the effectiveness of the South African state.[17]

Further criticisms are leveled against the cadre deployment system in that this recruitment approach politicizes rather than professionalizes local government throughout South Africa. Lack of competencies on the part of municipal officials is well captured thusly: "The greatest injustice is committed when patently incompetent and unqualified people are deployed into administration as municipal managers, chief financial officers, and head of ...technical services."[18]

Cadre deployment as a recruitment pattern is not a legislated policy of the South African government. This means that the system is not a formal state policy but rather a policy of the governing African National Congress. It thus suffices to suggest that the cadre deployment system is an "informal" recruitment approach used mainly by ruling political parties not only in South Africa but also elsewhere in the world. Similarly, Dahlstrom et al gives an example of a Spanish mayor who between 2001 and 2003 replaced "merit-recruited" state officials with political appointees. As a consequence, the mayor coordinated with ease his corruption intensions with the people he himself had appointed based on political patronage.[19] Undoubtedly, this works against state performance in public goods provision and fiscal management, especially when one party remains in power for extended periods of time and/or dominates both the legislative and executive branches of government. This is true as well as if there is frequent turnover. In the former situation, the governing party or parties becomes accustomed to accessing privileges, while in the latter where they come and go or their political term in government is very limited, there is a greater incentive to benefit in the short term. Wasilenski, for example, illustrates two similar versions of cadre deployment as a recruitment pattern in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.[20] According to Wasilenski, the first recruitment pattern required a job candidate's commitment to the ruling party's dominant and operating ideology, which took precedence over anything else. The second recruitment pattern, which replaced the first approach, was known as "party-specialist." With the party-specialist

approach, a job candidate was first expected to be a card-carrying member of the political party and at least a diploma or degree holder but political requirements were of greater importance than educational credentials that were treated just as a pure formality.

In the South African local government system, with specific reference to Limpopo Province, the governing ANC has used cadre deployment as a recruitment approach to dispense political patronage to its party loyalists and supporters. The cadre based recruitment strategy, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), is based on a Marxist-Leninist model of government in which the party card carrying members dominate not only in local government but also in other spheres of government.[21] SAIRR argues that the two systems might have been regarded as formal depending on the historical circumstance during that era, but nowadays these two recruitment approaches may not be formalized in any democratic nation.

This paper argues that a cadre deployment system neither promotes performance of municipalities not only in Limpopo Province but across the country nor assists in building administrative capacity of the municipalities. It is worth noting that the cadre deployment system has been applied in not only Limpopo Province but throughout the entire local government system in South Africa. In spite of the municipal mayors and speakers, for example, empirical evidence suggests that the appointment of municipal managers and chief financial officers is based on party considerations rather than legally prescribed requirements like educational qualifications and competencies. This simply suggests that municipal managers and other senior municipal officials are all politically appointed within the municipal administrations. As noted by Weber, selection of the administrative chiefs (i.e. municipal managers) and his or her immediate subordinate officials by governing political parties usually endangers the expert qualification requirements of the officials as well as the effective functioning of the bureaucratic administration.[22] However, some municipalities within Limpopo Province and other provinces have been performing better in terms of financial management with this recruitment approach in place. The difference, I argue and will provide evidence in this paper, lies in the integrity and merit of individual candidates to lead those municipalities. As a result, we cannot use this theory without modifying it to explain variations in term of financial performance within and between municipalities in the Limpopo and other provinces in South Africa.

The third line of thinking theorizes that ethnic heterogeneity shapes or explains good group performance within or between institutions, while, in contrast, ethnic diversity impedes or leads to under-performance.[23] This theory suggests that ethnically homogenous communities or institutions are more likely to be characterized by better performance. Easterly and Levine argue that ethnically diverse groups are more prone to fraud and corruption and political instability as well as poor institutional performance or quality.[24] These scholars use high levels of ethnic diversity in the United States to explain the lower provision of local public services across municipalities. Furthermore, Alesina et al. argue that different ethnic groups prefer distinct types of public goods and avoid mixing service delivery priorities across ethnic lines.[25] This simply suggests that there is always ethnic competition among diverse ethnic groups that can either limit or enhance the performance of local institutions like the municipalities.

South Africa is a multi-racial and multi-ethnic country, and Limpopo Province's local government has a diversity of ethnic groupings, which include Venda, Pedi, Tsonga, and Ndebele, and racial groups include Africans, Indians, Coloureds, and Whites. This clearly

shows that the province's population is not ethnically and racially homogenous but rather a very diverse one. But, this diversity in terms of ethnicity and race does not better explain the poor financial management performance of the municipalities. Again, at the district level, the Limpopo provincial local government has diverse ethnic groups, but certain ethnic groups tend to be more dominant than others. For example, Mopani district municipality is predominantly populated by Tsonga speaking people, whereas Sekhukhune district municipality is predominantly populated by the Pedi speaking ethnic group, but there are also Venda and Ndebele speakers living and working peacefully within these districts.

It then suffices to argue that there are just no opportunities for homogeneity in terms of ethnicity in Limpopo Province's local government, but the same does not hold for homogeneity in terms race in the province. As Ferree asserts, race has historically been an extremely important indicator of interests in public affairs in South Africa, while ethnicity has not.[26] Thus local ethnic competition is actually quite rare not only in Limpopo but in other provinces, which tend to have a mixture of most of South African ethnic groups, and all these ethnic groups mostly shared or experienced similar apartheid atrocities. Therefore, this paper concludes that ethnic diversity cannot be used as a better explanation for the financial performance variations within and between the municipalities in Limpopo Province and elsewhere in South Africa or that ethnicity cannot be predictive of local government financial performance in South Africa.

Bratton and Sibanyoni correctly argue that citizens' perception on the performance of the municipalities in South Africa is influenced by factors such as race, the demographic profile of citizens, geographical locale, level of education, public participation in municipal affairs, and access to information.[27] Rural and black populations, for example, are less likely to be satisfied with the performance of the local government in relation to financial management and service delivery than are urban dwellers. This is because, according to Bratton and Sibanyoni, the black population see democratization often through the lens of the socio-economic delivery of services. Between 2004 and 2006 and using the Afrobatometer dataset, these scholars examined citizen perception about the performance of the South African local government on financial management (revenue collection and spending). They found that 85 percent of the municipalities in the Limpopo province did not handle their budgets well.

Kellough and Murphy and Cleveland warn that it is often difficult to measure performance of public institutions like the municipalities through subjective public perceptions.[28] The difficulty arises from most of the measurement tools of public sector performance, which are perceptually influenced by different personal factors. For instance, some measurement tools rely on employees' assessment of managerial performance or public opinion on the performance of government institutions. In similar vein, van der Walle agrees that the application of public sector performance indicators is purely subjective based on people's perceptions of very small sample size.[29] Bratton and Sibanyoni also highlight similar limitations of public opinion, thus arguing that subjective public perceptions, rightly or wrongly, guide mass action in democratic societies.[30]

To mitigate this methodological limitation, this paper complemented public perception about the financial performance of the Limpopo Province's local government with institutional audit outcome reports from the Auditor-General, who specifically audits the financial statements or books of all government institutions. The Auditor-General does not only assess the financial management capacity of the municipalities but also the service delivery performance of these institutions in what it is referred to as a "performance audit."

Once the Auditor-General completes the auditing process based on facts and performance evidence presented to the auditors, he/she then gives an opinion in accordance with international auditing standards. These audit outcome reports are highly trusted and used by oversight bodies such as the legislatures through their parliamentary oversight committees in provincial government and local government as practical tools to measure the financial performance of all government institutions.[31]

At the local government level, the audit outcome reports from the Auditor-Generals are usually used mainly by politicians or the municipal councils through the Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) to hold the municipalities financially accountable. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) is responsible for holding the executive financially accountable at the provincial and national levels. Nevertheless, in the Limpopo Province's local government, we cannot assume that these parliamentary structures were effective in discharging their oversight function because they were established towards the end of 2011 and the beginning of the 2012. Although 100 percent of the municipalities in the province by mid 2012 had created the MPACs, the municipalities were still in the process of developing and building the required capacity of these oversight structures to operate effectively. Moreover, many members of municipal councils were still new to the local government system after the 2011 local government elections and thus still receiving training or being inducted in order to build and strengthen their capacity with regard to oversight and lawmaking functions.

The last line of thinking emphasizes building the administrative capacity of the institutions from the foundation up to improve performance through instituting pure meritocratic recruitment practices. The theory of meritocracy stems from the notion of "bureaucracy" conceptualized by Max Weber in the nineteenth century. Admittedly for Weber, how institutions are designed and internally configured remains critical to either promote or stifle organizational performance and growth.[32] For Weber rational-legal institutions are designed to promote the rationalization of institutional tasks and goals. As such, the basis for a rational-legal institution like a municipality, for example, is "expert-officialdom" or simply meritocracy. Kranze and Slomczynski as well as Bell define the concept of meritocracy in terms of educational achievements since they talk about "educational meritocracy."[33] These scholars choose this criterion not because they believe merit equals education but simply because education plays an important role in the discussion of meritocracy. Education and training, for example, provide a foundation upon which the development of competency rests. Merit-recruited officials always enter the office with an understanding that office holding is a vocation. According to Weber, this is first shown in the requirement of a firmly prescribed course of training, which demands the entire capacity for work and in the generally prescribed and special examination, which are prerequisite for employment.[34] In other words, the possession of educational certificates is usually linked with the qualification for municipal office. Moreover, such officials understand that office holding is a source not to be exploited for rents or emoluments but is an acceptance of specific obligations of faithfulness in return for a secure existence.

This paper strongly argues that the above theory can better explain the financial performance variations within and between the municipalities in the Limpopo Province and elsewhere in South Africa. I argue that the theory of meritocracy or meritocratic recruitment provides the most compelling explanation of local government performance, especially in relation to financial management. To reiterate, expert-officialdom simply means that access

to bureaucratic office is dependent upon lengthy training in a field of specialization, usually certified by public examination and possession of a university or college degree.[35] From Weber's analytical framework, we can interpret clearly that he was promoting hiring and promotion of organizational candidates based on technical competency acquired through education and training processes, of which some scholars such as Rauch and Evans would emphasize as critical and necessary for the local state to become developmental.[36] Conspicuously, expert-officialdom requires that recruitment and selection practices within both private and public sector institutions should be based solely on merit rather than political patronage politics as is the case with a cadre deployment system.

Expert-officialdom or meritocracy is clearly similar to the recruitment approach termed "loyal-expert technique," formally adopted by Poland in the 1990s to improve and sustain the performance of government institutions.[37] This type of recruitment approach became formal in many developed and newly industrialized countries and was legislated through government policies and/or constitutions. Chang and Fakui and Fukui illustrate that the recruitment and the appointment of the public servants in Japan, for example, is made on the basis of a legally binding national examination system.[38] The same examination system holds for the public servants in Australia.[39] The theory of meritocracy is what this paper is emphasizing to first build the administrative capacity of Limpopo provincial local government in order to sustainably improve performance not only in relation to financial management but also to other service delivery areas (e.g. infrastructure, housing, electricity, roads, water, sanitation, etc.). With meritocracy as the formal recruitment approach, political engagement and involvement as well as the political preference of job candidates are not to be a subject matter of recruitment and appointment procedures, as long as the potential candidate has the required skills and knowledge and declares his or her allegiance to the country's constitution. Weber points out that in every sort of recruitment of officials by deployment, political parties naturally give decisive weight not to expert considerations but to the political activism a follower renders to the party bosses.[40]

In contrast, expert-officialdom or meritocracy as a recruitment pattern undeniably promotes the professionalization of institutions rather than politicizing them. Fortunately, this has been recently realized by the South African state in 2011 through the Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act.[41] Undoubtedly, the state is aimed at professionalizing municipalities by providing that professional qualifications and experience become the criteria for governing the recruitment and appointment processes, especially for all senior municipal officials. In other words, personnel appointments at the managerial level in municipalities are now supposed to be merit-based instead of party-based. The Act further provides that senior politicians at any level of the political party or parties structures are not to be appointed to the apex of the institutional structure of local government as officials. However, the Act made an exemption for municipal officials, especially politicians, who were already in the municipal administrations as officials in the sense that the Act's provision did not apply to them when it took effect. Interestingly, the Act harshly disciplines the municipal officials who are deemed corrupt by declaring that re-employment of any dismissed municipal official, especially in cases of financial misconduct, is unlawful for a period of ten years. The impact of this necessary reform in local government may be undermined by non-compliance, which is major problem in the South African local government system, on the part of the local politicians and officials who for many years treated municipalities as their fiefdoms.[42]

Notwithstanding the above Act, Ritzer correctly points out that professionals or specialists contribute to the rationalization of rational institutions much as rationalizing institutions conversely contribute to the development of the profession.[43] A professional is distinguished, as Max Weber argues, from a non-professional person by his or her professional equipment of specialized knowledge, fixed doctrine, and vocational qualifications.[44]

The simple question becomes: why do various scholars emphasize promotion and enforcement of meritocracy in the state institutions? This is because well-trained and competent persons can multi-task, analyze a very complex situation, and apply rational decision making to address the identified challenges at hand. Weber correctly states that if a specialist is in charge of each work function, the executive manager would be certain that an educated and expertly trained person is responsible for that work function.[45] Implicitly the importance of individual persons comes into play in the discussion of meritocracy. People, not the machines, structures, or technology, bring knowledge, expertise, and competencies to bureaucratic organizations. All these important individual attributes are, of course, acquired through formal education and training but also through informal training; hence we speak of tacit knowledge. Similarly, Macaulay cited in Muller argues that through education and training individuals acquire conceptual knowledge (knowing what), procedural knowledge (knowing how) and strategic knowledge (knowing what to do when).[46] These different attributes are used to describe human capacity or competence in office. Arguably possession of individual capacity is in turn used to describe institutional capacity, not the other way round. However, institutional capacity is not only understood in terms of individual capacity, as Levin and Chikane correctly argue, but also in terms of bureaucratic structures, protocols, systems, and technology.[47] While this is true, it is people through their expertise and competence who develop good organizational structures, strategies and put in place good systems and processes to drive organizational development and performance in order to maximally achieve its goals.

Lastly, according to this theory, meritocracy promises equal opportunity to every job candidates irrespective of ethnicity, race, gender, class, geographical region, etc., and protection from an arbitrary dismissal. In a similar tone, Weber and Andreski argue that meritocracy in organizations ensures that a middle class or peasant educated person has the same job opportunity of entry into an employment contract as does an upper class or wealthy person.[48]

Variations in Financial Performance on Municipalities Among Provinces

Municipalities are expected to develop effective financial management systems to ensure efficient and effective use of monetary resources in such a manner as to accomplish institutional objectives and financial sustainability. The purpose in the public sector is to prevent financial waste (e.g. overspending, a persistence of negative cash balances) and other avoidable expenses (fruitless and wasteful as well as irregular expenditures) when providing public goods and services to the citizens. Since there is high demand for financial accountability in the local civil service through the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, local government is expected to keep all payments and receivables transparent. Therefore, financial performance is the process of measuring the results of the institution's policies and operations in monetary terms. In local government the audit process is used as tool to measure the municipality's overall financial health over a given

period of time. The audit process is further used to compare similar municipalities across the local government system or to compare the sector in aggregation with regard to financial management and public goods provision.

There are various and interested actors involved in analyzing the financial performance of local government in South Africa, and these actors include the national and provincial legislatures, municipal councilors, the general public, creditors, auditors, tax authorities, and other spheres of government. To measure or analyze the financial performance of a municipality, we use financial statements. Although financial statements do not reveal all the information related to the financial position of a municipality, they do however provide some useful information. Such information highlights two important factors of financial soundness and sustainability. Development of sound financial management systems and effective internal controls within the system of local government not only in South Africa, but elsewhere requires the appointment of competent candidates with appropriate skills and expertise to plan and control the finances of the municipalities. The area of financial management is a much specialized area of which not every person can run with without appropriate and lengthy training and education.

Therefore, from the audit outcome reports of the Auditor-General, there are serious variations in terms of financial performance between Limpopo Province's local government and municipalities in other provinces. Empirical evidence suggests that the Limpopo's local government performs more poorly in financial management (revenue collection and spending) than other provinces. These variations amongst the provinces are illustrated by Figure 1 below:

FIGURE 1: UNSATISFACTORY MUNICIPAL AUDITS BY PROVINCE, 2010-2011

Source adapted: Deloitte & Touche. The Local Government: Achieving the Elusive Dream of Sustainable Turnaround and a Clean Audit.[49]

Figure 1 shows that the governance problems mar the Limpopo Province's local government regarding public goods provision and financial management more than many other provinces. Limpopo Province topped the list of provinces with the highest percentage of "unsatisfactory audit outcomes" at 82 percent in the 2010/11 financial year, and this increased to 93 percent of unsatisfactory audit outcomes in the 2011/12 financial year. In other words, the financial performance of the municipalities increasingly regressed rather than improving. Unsatisfactory audits mean that local government experiences high levels of irregular expenditure, unauthorized expenditure, and fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

The Auditor-General found the root causes of the problem in Limpopo Province are that key municipal positions remain vacant and also key officials within the many municipalities lack the appropriate competencies and skills. That makes it difficult for almost 73 percent of the municipalities to produce credible financial statements and performance reports.[50] In addition, a lack of consequences for poor performance and transgressions of the applicable laws contribute to poor audit outcomes for municipalities.

It then suffices to say that the financial position of municipalities in the Limpopo Province has not drastically changed compared to what Afrobarometer survey found in 2006.[51] For example, in the 2006/07 financial year 85 percent of Limpopo Province's municipalities had received unsatisfactory audit outcomes.[52] This audit evidence suggests that the municipalities in the province are struggling to manage their finances. To reiterate, this is because inappropriately qualified and inexperienced candidates have been appointed as chief financial officers through a cadre deployment system. Undoubtedly, the lack of appropriate skills in the municipalities results in a significant use of consultants to prepare the financial statements of the municipalities. On this aspect, the Auditor-General found that the municipalities neither have a policy on the use of consultants nor do they even monitor and evaluate the consultants' work to ensure the projects succeed in their objectives. The paper further strongly argued that municipalities do not always determine whether the outsourcing of services to consultants is a more cost effective option than creating their own internal financial management capacity in relation to preparations of the financial statements. However, we observed that in 2009 the municipal audit outcomes for the Limpopo Province sharply decreased to 39 percent and we do know exactly what contributed to this sharp improvement. Notwithstanding this improvement, the Limpopo local government failed to sustain this good audit record when it recorded over 82 percent of unsatisfactory audit outcomes in the 2010/11 financial year.

Comparatively speaking, Limpopo Province shares some similarities Kwa-Zulu Natal, Mpumalanga, North West, and Northern Cape. Despite their similarities, empirical evidence, however, suggests that these other rural provinces performed better in terms of financial management than Limpopo Province as illustrated by the audit outcome for the 2011/12 financial year. From Figure 1, it can be deduced that less than 25 percent of the municipalities in KZN received unsatisfactory audit outcomes, while Mpumalanga, North West and Northern Cape received 44 percent, 29 percent and 42 percent respectively during the same period. These results suggest that the other four provincial local governments improved on their financial management more than Limpopo Province's local government, which obviously regressed. It must be noted that the national government intends to achieve 100 percent of clean audits not only at the local government level but also at the other spheres of government by 2014. One does not however believe that this vision is achievable by 2014, given the highest number of unsatisfactory audits in provinces like Limpopo and the Free State, which also received more than 69 percent of unsatisfactory audit outcomes in the 2011/12 financial year. The Auditor-General agrees that the progress towards clean audits is very slow with the number of clean audits remaining at the same low level of 5 percent throughout the South African public service for the past three years. He further remarked: "Limpopo Province's latest local government audit results also showed a number of regressions and an increase in unauthorized and irregular expenditure."[53]

Moreover, it has been found that there is no correlation between municipal integrated development plans (IDPs) and the delivery budget. And now the question is why so many

municipalities in some provinces like Limpopo and Free State receive higher rates of unsatisfactory audit outcomes in terms of financial performance than provinces such as Gauteng and Western Cape? Empirical research shows that although Gauteng and Western Cape Provinces experienced high rates of municipal service delivery protests between 2010 and 2012, they however received high rates of "unqualified audit outcomes."[54] Therefore, future research may assess why robust financial management by municipalities in Gauteng and Western Cape does not automatically translate into good and quality service delivery on the ground.

Nevertheless, one answer to the above question lies in the greater capacity deficit in some provinces than others, as suggested by Picard, the African Peer Review Mechanisms Report, Nyalunga, and Levin.[55] The issue of capacity deficit brings in the issue of recruitment practices being adopted by individual provinces or individual municipalities. APRM Report argues that capacity deficit within and between provincial municipalities stem from, among other causes, an inability to recruit and retain the requisite personnel, especially in small and rural based municipalities. In addition, the rural municipalities do not always use the opportunities available for skills development of their officials despite huge funding from the national government.

With regard to recruitment patterns, the paper argues that the Limpopo Province's local government has always followed the "party-specialist recruitment approach" or a Marxist-Leninist model to build administrative capacity of the rural based local municipalities. In the party-specialist recruitment approach, political credentials such as the political party membership card more than educational credentials take precedence over anything else when appointments to municipal offices are made. Moreover, the party-specialist recruitment pattern implies that the governing political party dispenses more political patronage in the form of government jobs to its party loyalists and supporters. The Auditor-General Report concurs that most worst performing municipalities were found to have senior municipal officials such as chief financial officers, who could not keep sound financial records and achieve clean audits. These municipalities are characterized by the persistent use of costly external consultants to do the work that "well-paid" municipal officials should themselves be able to carry out. This suggests that chief financial officers of these municipalities did not have a good understanding and knowledge of the financial management principles.[56] As a consequence, municipal officials are unable to detect early critical issues of financial misconduct such as unauthorized expenditures, wasteful and fruitless expenditures, and irregular expenditures.

The Auditor-General makes a similar observation that the worst performing municipalities are unable to identify financial misconduct themselves due to a lack of administrative capacity, since the problem gets revealed only during the audit process. Ramphele argues that it is undeniable that possession of academic qualifications and or prior work experience is regarded as secondary during recruitment and selection processes in local government throughout the provinces.[57] Other political commentators and scholars have also identified as problematic a cadre deployment or political appointment system that is being massively applied in local government especially in rural provinces. Some commentators further argue that being black and or well connected politically is often regarded as sufficient qualification to secure local government jobs, even if one has neither the qualifications nor the competence to perform the job at hand.

The paper however argues that with a cadre system it remains important for politics to justify why a particular chosen candidate has the qualification credentials, competencies,

and abilities to meet the job requirements and how the appointment qualifies as an exception to the competitive recruitment practices. In contrast, Kretzschmar, for example, illustrates that in Western culture a candidate's suitability for a job is assessed mainly on the basis of qualifications, skills, and experience. In short, competence is more important than political connections.[58] In a similar tone, Weber points out that the superior qualification and integrity of federal judges appointed by the US president is well known, but these judicial officials have been selected primarily in terms of party considerations.

Variations Within the Municipalities in Limpopo Province

The financial performance of both the districts and the local municipalities within Limpopo Province's local government also varies greatly. Only two municipalities, namely Fetakgomo Local Municipality and the Waterberg District Municipality, were able to achieve clean audits between 2010 and 2012. This suggests that the two municipalities were able to handle their budgets well, and they have maintained that status for three consecutive financial years, whereas the rest of municipalities in the province failed to reach this status. In as much as clean audits are a concern, it could be argued that the two municipalities may have adopted "loyal-expert" recruitment pattern, which gives precedent to academic credentials, the competencies, skills, and allegiance to the country's constitution over political involvement or political considerations. Fetakgomo Local Municipality was found to have recruited the youngest and brightest chief financial officer with the relevant financial training and expertise who has introduced good financial management systems and internal control systems within the municipality. The same holds for the Waterberg District Municipality. Table 1 below illustrates the uneven performance of the municipalities within the system of the Limpopo Province's local government between 2010.

TABLE 1: LIMPOPO MUNICIPAL AUDIT OUTCOMES FOR 2009-10 AND 2010-11

Audit outcome	Municipalities	
	2009-10	2010-11
Clean audits	1	2
Financially unqualified with findings	8	3
Financially unqualified financial statements	30%	17%
Qualified Opinion	12	12
Adverse opinion	0	3
Disclaimer of opinion	9	7
Number of audit reports not issued by 31st January 2012 Prior year audit outcomes of 2010-11 audits outstanding	0	3
Financially qualified financial statements	70%	83%
Total number of audits	30	30

Source: Auditor-General Report.[59]

Table 1 illustrates variations in terms of the performance of financial management within the Limpopo Province municipalities. There are both improvements and regressions

in audit outcomes within the municipalities for the 2009/10 and 2010/11 financial years. In the 2009/10 financial year at least 30 percent of the municipalities were financially unqualified with findings. This result suggests that there were areas that required the municipal political leadership's attention through the municipal councils and the municipal administration's intervention in order to improve financial management internal control systems and compliance with applicable laws and regulation. There is also a need to address issues of unauthorized expenditures, irregular expenditures, and fruitless and wasteful expenditures. The slow municipal political leadership response to address the identified root causes of poor audit outcomes in has been highlighted by various reports of the Auditor-General. However, the above percentage regressed to 17 percent in the 2010/11 financial year as the results of the three municipalities receiving adverse audit reports from the Auditor-General. It is clear that the municipalities within the province itself struggle to maintain or sustain their previous year audit status, thus implying that local government's financial performance tends to fluctuate every year.

It has been observed that the financial performance of the municipalities improves where there have been an involvement of consultants to assist in producing credible financial statements but always regress after consultants had left the municipality. This is because the municipalities themselves create no internal capacity through the assistance of the consultants or even allow the consultants to transfer the skills internally. Empirical evidence suggests correctly that many of the external consultants throughout the entire South African local government system are in reality former civil servants who left the public service so as to come back and draw wealth from the government through selling and also benefiting from post-maintenance contracts of their most complicated IT systems and also preparing the state institutions' financial statements. Notwithstanding the consultants, it could be argued that given the financial performance fluctuations there is no transfer of skills during involvement of consultants within municipalities but yet municipalities spend millions of rands on outsourcing services.

Furthermore, and to reiterate, Table 1 suggests that the number of municipalities with a clean audit (financially unqualified with no findings) increased from one (Fetakgomo Local Municipality) in 2009/10 to two to include Waterberg District Municipality in 2010/11. Of course, this improvement is very minimal as it only constituted 3 percent of the total number of the municipalities in Limpopo Province. As noted earlier, the Auditor-General Report concurs that the two exceptional municipalities with clean audits were characterized by a high number of officials in key positions of power and control—meaning at the senior management level with the required minimum competencies and skills to perform their functions and a capacity for high performance—as well as a municipal political commitment or will and political ownership to implement the previous Auditor-General's recommendations.[60] That said, the "loyal-expert" recruitment approach adopted by these municipalities assisted them in building their institutional capacity, which is lacking in other municipalities within the province. Lastly, Table 1 further shows that only three municipalities were not audited for the period of 2010/11 financial year, perhaps because their financial statements were not yet ready for submission to the auditors by the cut-off date for the audit submissions, for which the Auditor-General makes no exceptions. These findings suggest an unpredictable and uneven financial management performance of Limpopo Province's local government. In similar vein, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) argues that 27 percent of the municipalities in Limpopo Province are in "financial distress."[61]

While many explanations for the performance variations within local government have been provided, such as a lack of community participation, cadre deployment, and so forth, this paper argues that the lack of meritocracy during recruitment and selection processes is the main reason why so many municipalities within Limpopo Province's local government and elsewhere are performing poorly in terms of financial management. Undoubtedly, the few good and competent municipal officials who have been hired based on merit are often overwhelmed by the high level of the mediocrity of senior municipal officials around them whose appointment might have been based on political considerations rather than merit.

The paper suggests that to improve financial management within the municipalities in Limpopo Province and elsewhere in South Africa, municipal councils should institute and enforce meritocracy through legislation and oversight as mandated by the South African Constitution. It will further take courage from the municipal political principals to completely curb political meddling in the municipal administrations, especially during recruitment and selection processes. In other words, municipalities can only institutionalize loyal-expert or meritocratic recruitment patterns through political will and vigorous oversight. The political leaders need to closely monitor and oversee the implementation of the government laws and regulations, especially the Local Government Municipal Systems Amendment Act, which seek to professionalize the system of local government. Undoubtedly, professionalization of local government and democratic accountability of local politicians to the voters would help to overcome other problems facing municipalities throughout South Africa, such as the inability to prepare credible financial statements, to spend the revenues as budgeted, and curbing corruption. As Butler rightly argues, political consideration in the appointment of senior municipal bureaucrats without required qualifications and skills tremendously weakens the performance of municipalities not only in terms of financial management but also in terms of the provision public goods and services. Contrary to this requirement, in the South African civil service, especially in local government in general, "being black and or well connected politically is often regarded as sufficient qualification to secure local government job, even if one has neither the qualifications, training, expertise nor the competence to perform the job at hand."[62]

It is also important for the municipalities in the Limpopo Province to retain the most competent municipal bureaucrats since no institution can afford to lose its critical cohort in this competitive performance environment. Glenn argues that the capacity of institutions to recruit and retain highly trained, qualified staff is central to the civil service renewal and success in the twenty-first century.[63] Therefore, the paper further suggests that a program on talent management needs to be initiated in order to build the capacity of the province's municipalities. Talent management, according to Glenn, is a comprehensive approach to human resource management, which integrates the core human resource functions of attraction, retention, development, and transition. Research shows that there are a number of strategies to recruit and retain competent people, and these strategies include the professionalization of the bureaucratic role into a tenured lifelong career and providing adequate compensation in comparison to the private sector. The Japanese state, for example, is praised for highly paying its civil servants and also ensuring that their retirement benefits are more generous at the upper ranks of the bureaucracy than in the private sector, except in the few largest "*zaibatsu*" conglomerates.[64] A study by the World Bank and Miller reached a similar conclusion that civil servants perform better in terms of service delivery and the budget implementation, become more responsive to citizen concerns and are less corrupt

when the people the state recruit are well paid and have access to internal promotions not distorted by patronage.[65]

Conclusion

The institutionalization and enforcement of meritocracy or rather expert-officialdom within the municipalities through policy and oversight function remains critical. These processes will help build and enhance the administrative capacity of the Limpopo Province municipalities to better manage their budgets and improve their financial performance. The paper illustrated those variations in terms of financial performance among the municipalities in Limpopo Province and other provinces as well as within Limpopo Province itself. Comparatively, in other words, persistent poor financial performance characterizes Limpopo Province's local government. Its local government receives the highest percentage of unsatisfactory audit reports of any of the other provinces' local government, which clearly suggests a poor financial management capacity of the Limpopo municipalities. The financial performance cannot be explained in terms of the size, race ,or ethnic homogeneity or diversity, nor the public engagement and participation, as suggested by some theories of institutional performance. Furthermore, cadre deployment, which is widely applied in all three spheres of government in South Africa, cannot explain the variations in terms of the financial performance in the province's local government, but directly accounts for the capacity deficit within the system. The paper has discussed that where a commitment to the ruling party's dominant and operating ideology and the party-specialist recruitment approach takes precedence over any qualification credentials for candidates to secure government jobs financial performance of the institution suffers. It was only in mid 2011 through the Local Government's Municipal Systems Amendment Act that the central government at least formerly attempted to depoliticize the system of local government in South Africa. The paper concludes that meritocracy is the precondition rather than an outcome for institutional growth and performance and must be institutionalized and enforced within organizations by regulatory and oversight institutions such as the municipal councils and the legislatures.

Notes

1   Auditor-General Report 2012.
2   Statistics South Africa 2012.
3   Municipal Structures Act 1998, and Constitution 1996.
4   SAIRR 2013.
5   Auditor-General Report, 2010, 2011, 2012.
6   Section 100 (1) states "when a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation, the national executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation."
7   See the Constitution 1996.
8   See the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 1998, and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000.
9   See the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 2003.
10   Van der Waldt 2006; Thornhill 2008, p. 492.

11   Mathekga and Buccus 2006; Friedman 2011.
12   Grosso and van Ryzin 2011, p. 240.
13   Plaatjies 2011; Potgieter 2011.
14   Kopecky 2011.
15   Kanyane 2006, p. 116; Muller 2011, p. 198; Picard 2005; Africa and Mosiane 2011.
16   Muller 1989; Panebianco 1988 cited in Kopecky 2011, p. 713.
17   Butler 2011, p. 26
18   Gigaba in SAIRR 2010, p. 4.
19   Dahlstrom et al 2012, p. 656.
20   Wasilewski 1990.
21   SAIRR 2010.
22   Weber 1948, p. 201.
23   Habyarimana et al. 2007; Ferree 2004.
24   Easterly and Levin in Miguel 2004, p. 328.
25   Alesina et al. 1999 in Miguel 2004.
26   Ferree 2004.
27   Bratton and Sibanyoni 2006.
28   Kellough 2002; Murphy and Cleveland 1995.
29   Van der Walle 2005.
30   Bratton and Sibanyoni 2006, p. 19.
31   Auditor-General Reports 2010, 2011, 2012.
32   Weber 1968.
33   Kranze and Slomcynski 1985; and Bell 1976.
34   Weber 1948, p. 198-99.
35   Weber 1968.
36   Rauch and Evans 2000.
37   Wasilewski 1990.
38   Chang 2008, p. 70; and Fakui and Fukui 1992.
39   Hawthorne 2002.
40   Weber 1948, p. 201.
41   Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act 2011.
42   SAIRR 2013, p. 31.
43   Ritzer 1975, p. 628.
44   Weber 1968.
45   Weber 1968.
46   Macaulay in Muller 2011, p. 48.
47   Levin 2011, p. 263; Chikane 2011, p. 48.
48   Weber 1968; and Andreski 1983, p. 120.
49   SAIRR 2012.
50   Auditor-General Report 2012.
51   Bratton and Sibanyoni 2006, p. 10.
52   Auditor-General Report 2010, 2011; SAIRR 2012.
53   Auditor-General Report 2012.
54   SAIRR 2010; Karamoko 2011, p. 19: Hirsh 2010; Auditor-General 2011, 2012.
55   Picard 2005, p. 296; African Peer Review Mechanisms Report 2009, p.20; Nyalunga 2006,

p. 19; Levin 2011, p. 263.
56   Auditor-General Report 2012.
57   Ramphele 2001, p.1.
58   Kretzschmar 2010, p. 581.
59   Auditor-General Report 2011.
60   Auditor-General Report 2012.
61   SAIRR 2012.
62   Butler 2011, p. 26.
63   Glenn 2012, p. 30.
64   Fukui and Fukui 1992, p. 27.
65   World Bank 1997; and Miller 2000.

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Citizen or Client? An Analysis of Everyday Politics in Ghana

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Abstract: This paper reconsiders the abstract concepts of citizenship and clientelism based on the political attitudes and everyday practices of people living in Ghana. Drawing on survey and ethnographic research at the village level in Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana as well as two rounds of Afrobarometer data, the paper reveals a hybrid conception of politics that departs strikingly from scholarly theories. I argue that the particular patterns of hybridity highlight the importance over time of the historical construction of the colonial and post-colonial state. Overall, the paper emphasizes that future scholars and policymakers need to understand indigenous conceptualizations of everyday politics rather than assuming that African practices exemplify or fall short of an externally imposed normative ideal.

Introduction

In the 1990s, many African states began a process of political liberalization whereby the formal rules of political contestation changed. In many countries across the continent, military rulers and leaders of one-party states begrudgingly allowed multi-party elections for the first time in decades. Ghana was emblematic of this "third wave" of democratization in Africa.[1] In the spring of 1992, a new constitution was approved by popular referendum, which led Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to remove the ban on party politics and prepare for elections by the end of the year. Opposition parties gained recognition and were permitted to open offices and hold rallies. Furthermore, official restrictions on the media were relaxed, and the state-run monopoly on information was overrun with new radio stations and newspapers.

The early optimism about "the winds of democracy" blowing across Africa has been tempered by events on the ground, however.[2] With devastating election violence in Kenya in 2008, and returns to authoritarian rule by coup and constitutional manipulation in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, and elsewhere, many scholars have understandably turned their attention away from studying the conditions for democratic transition toward analyzing the factors that support democratic consolidation.[3] At this point in time, Ghana is often held up as a model of democratic consolidation. Indeed, the Obama administration intended to

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communicate precisely this message with Ghana chosen as the President's first head-of-state visit in Africa in July 2009.[4] Observers have noted that while the initial elections were imperfect, Ghana has now completed six multi-party elections and two peaceful transfers of power to the opposition, even remaining calm in the context of a razor-thin victory for the opposition in December 2008 and protracted court battles over results in December 2012.[5]

While many political scientists have focused on explaining the dynamics of party politics and voting behavior at the national level during these highly contested electoral periods, this paper shifts the lens to explore how Ghanaians think about participating in politics on an everyday basis at the local level.[6] In particular, do they conceptualize their role as citizens or clients? Hence, this paper explores the meaning and everyday practice of democracy on the ground to ordinary people in Ghana outside of and between heated national elections. In particular, the paper examines a critical turning point in the late 1990s, immediately prior to the first alternation of power to the opposition, to see how Ghanaians thought about participation in politics before the political system had become a more consolidated democracy and widely considered a model of success on the continent. The paper intentionally does not focus on the most recent empirical data on political behavior from Ghana, as its objective is to make a broader, conceptual point: it is crucial for scholars to study how concepts of political participation--whether they be based on notions of clientelism or citizenship, or both—have been constituted by Ghanaians over time at the local level. Indeed, while the democratic governance of Ghanaian politics in 2014 may not be representative of the continent as a whole, the political period highlighted in this paper from the late 1990s is more typical of the hybrid regimes experienced by many Africans today.

The paper begins by comparing the literatures on citizenship and clientelism to see how scholars conceptualize the key differences between the two. Then, the paper analyzes the sub-national variations in public opinion within Ghana from the Afrobarometer Project survey in 1999 and 2008. In the second half of the paper, I draw on original data from two villages in Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana from 1998-99 to interrogate from below these differences in how Ghanaians conceptualized their role in politics.[7] The analysis reveals that village residents from Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana did not articulate a pure type of citizenship or clientelism, but instead they described a hybrid conception of everyday politics.[8] I argue that regional differences in the history of state formation critically shape how people imagine their role in negotiating their political communities. This paper's analysis from below suggests that indigenous notions of citizenship and practices of clientelism are more entangled and less distinct on the ground than our abstract social theories would predict.

Conceptualizations of Citizenship and Clientelism from the Literature

This paper brings into dialogue two literatures that do not usually speak to one another—one on citizenship, and the other on clientelism. These literatures seem to have evolved quite separately within the discipline of political science, developed by different sets of scholars with dissimilar subfield specializations, usually working in divergent empirical contexts. Thus, citizenship has been largely the domain of normative political theorists working frequently from abstract models of logical reasoning, or, when empirically grounded, on a small number of Western, advanced industrialized countries. By contrast, clientelism has been historically an

area of expertise for scholars of comparative politics based on their field research in the developing world. While each of these literatures is admittedly quite diverse, this paper highlights some core assumptions that dominate the conceptualization of politics in each area. Table 1 is a conceptual typology that highlights the very different ways that scholars tend to theorize citizenship versus clientelism. The side-by-side comparison of these scholarly conceptualizations illuminates how the selection of empirical cases, or even the researcher's own positionality, can inform the conceptualization of key ideas and subsequent theory development. This paper unpacks the normative assumptions that are loaded into social science theories by subsequently investigating the indigenous conceptualizations of everyday politics.

TABLE 1. SCHOLARLY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EVERYDAY POLITICS

	CITIZENSHIP LITERATURE	CLIENTELISM LITERATURE
Orientation of political claim-making and identity	National State-centered	Local Organized outside of state
Nature of interactions	Universal, impersonal, and detached.	Customized, highly personalized, and face-to-face.
Formal transparency and accountability of claim-making	Formal institutions guarantee claims with transparent mechanisms for accountability.	Informal institutions sanction behavior with little transparency or accountability.
Notions of rights and duties	Liberal notion of equal individuals who claim rights and liberties.	Illiberal notion of unequal individuals who claim reciprocal rights and duties.
Effect of political claim-making on broader system	Integrative effects associated with wealthy democratic regimes.	Disintegrative effects associated with impoverished authoritarian regimes.
Normative evaluation	Positive	Negative

To begin, the literature on citizenship is extensive and certainly heterogeneous. While drawing from diverse theories of citizenship, including liberal, republican, deliberative, multicultural, and cosmopolitan models, this paper emphasizes some core assumptions that dominate these scholarly conceptualizations of politics.[9] The most pervasive assumption is that the relevant political identity is at the level of the nation-state, and thus, political claims are oriented toward the central state. In much of this literature, the nation-state actually "bestows" citizenship status and thus formally defines and constructs its citizens in legal language.[10]

A second dimension of politics theorized in the literature on citizenship is that the interactions between citizens and the state are universal. The uniqueness of the person or their attributes has nothing to do with the citizen's interactions with the state. In fact, communications with the state's politicians or bureaucratic personnel are rare, and when they

do occur, usually it is mediated by the television, radio, or web-based e-mail or application forms. In-person interactions are very infrequent and often involve a one-way, top-down (state-to-citizen) receipt of information or instructions.

A third component of politics theorized by citizenship scholars is that state institutions formally guarantee individual rights with greater transparency and mechanisms for accountability. Often a national constitution enshrines this popular and shared agreement on rights within the nation, which citizens can invoke and appeal when their rights have been transgressed.

A fourth aspect of politics that is most often shared by citizenship theorists is the liberal notion of free and equal individuals claiming rights and liberties.[11] Even scholars such as Kymlicka (2001) and Young (1989), who highlight the existence of social difference and inequality, express hope for a more just, but liberal, future when they make arguments for expanded group or differentiated representation on the premise that these institutions eventually would become unnecessary.[12]

Finally, much of citizenship theory emphasizes the integrative effects of political claim-making by citizens on the broader political system. Marshall argued that the expansion of civil, political and then social rights would reduce the experience of social inequality and enhance integration and stability.[13] Theorists of deliberative democracy such as Jurgen Habermas (1994) and Seyla Benhabib (1996) have argued that the participation of citizens in deliberative processes would strengthen the popular legitimacy of policy and of the regime itself. Overall, citizenship theory tends to imagine citizenship as emerging from wealthy, democratic regimes and evaluates the concept of citizenship as normatively positive. Citizenship can be improved, according to multicultural theorists, or perhaps become more cosmopolitan, according to others, but none of these theorists reject the concept as something to eliminate from the everyday practice of politics.

The scholarly conceptualization of citizenship stands in stark contrast to that of clientelism. Despite a recent renewal of scholarly interest among comparative politics scholars, the study of clientelism is not nearly as widespread across the subfields of the discipline as the work on citizenship.[14] The first commonly espoused characteristic of clientelism is that these interactions start locally, and can pyramid upward or downward, but, unlike citizenship, are not officially sponsored or legislated by the nation-state.[15] Hyden, in his theory of "the economy of affection," has argued that the state is actually irrelevant for much of African politics floating like "a balloon suspended in mid-air."[16] The peasants' ability to exit into the reciprocal relationships of the economy of affection gives politics a more "community-centered orientation."[17] Of course, certain patrons may operate from within the state and distribute their greater access to public jobs, resources, and perquisites to their clients.[18] Clientelism, however, particularly according to Africanist scholars, extends well beyond public sector patronage and decision-making.[19]

The second dimension common in theories of clientelism is that politics are highly personalized, consisting indeed of face-to-face interactions and exchanges of gifts, favors, and support.[20] The unique personality and personal relationships are at the very foundation of politics in this system. These interpersonal dynamics are important even when the exchanges are generalized over a long time period, for example, over multiple generations.[21] In highlighting the personal networks and local customization of clientelism, theorists emphasize

the high level of variation in empirical forms that does not necessarily correspond to world regions or nation-states.[22]

The third aspect of clientelism is that the informal rules dominate any formal system officially on the books.[23] In their summary of the core analytical characteristics of patron-client relations, Eisenstadt and Roniger even write that clientelist relations are informal and "often opposed to the official laws of the country."[24] Van De Walle distinguishes between patronage, which is often legal, although "frowned upon," and prebendalism, the more prevalent type of clientelism in Africa, "in which important state agents unambiguously subvert the rule of law for personal gain."[25] Clientelism is not necessarily illegal (as corruption necessarily is) but the interactions are governed through informal institutions that are less transparent. As a result, accountability is more personalized, privatized, and perhaps contingent.

The fourth core assumption seemingly unanimously-shared by theorists is that clientelist interactions are essentially vertical, built on inequality and social difference.[26] Eisenstadt and Roniger, for example, insisted on the strong inequality involved, highlighting how patrons have "greater access to the means of production, major markets and centres of the society."[27] In the analysis of contemporary clientelism in Europe, Piattoni also emphasizes the "unevenness of power resources" between the individuals or corporate groups involved, but maintains that the relationship is not necessarily exploitative or involuntary on the part of clients.[28]

The fifth dimension shared by many theorists of clientelism is that these practices are disintegrative, both for political stability and for economic development.[29] Even Piattoni, who considers the possibility that clientelism is a different type of interest representation, ultimately concludes that clientelism "tends to generate economic and political externalities which may accumulate with devastating effects."[30] Van de Walle argues that since clientelistic politics in most of Africa are more narrowly concentrated within a small, political elite, citizens are less likely to receive any material distributive benefits and more likely to vote based on ethnic rather than programmatic appeals.[31]

Finally, clientelism certainly conjures a negative normative evaluation by theorists. In most cases, it is associated with the failures or 'pathology' of African states and leaders.[32] My point below is not to reify what have been used as binary opposites of citizenship versus clientelism.[33] Rather, this paper's objective is to blur the boundaries between these abstract scholarly concepts by examining from below how Africans actually think about politics on an everyday basis.[34]

Research Design and Methods

In order to investigate how Africans think about everyday politics, this paper both narrows the focus from the level of continental generalizations and shifts the perspective from the top-down to the bottom-up. To begin, the enormous political, historical, and cultural variation across the continent makes generalizations about Africans extraordinarily challenging. Instead, this paper uses a careful subnational comparative case study research design to explore the dynamics in particular regions and critical time periods of Ghana in more depth. The paper's research design essentially has two parts that complement each other.

FIGURE 1: MAP OF GHANA WITH REGIONS

Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/geography/region.php

First, the paper engages in a subnational analysis of three different regions within Ghana in 1999 and 2008 (see map). This subnational analysis investigates the role of ethnic culture, geography, and infrastructure as these factors vary considerably across the country's different regions. While all of the regions were examined, the data from three regions is highlighted in the paper: Brong-Ahafo, Greater Accra, and Northern Regions. These three regions were chosen both because they had large enough samples, and because they varied considerably in terms of level of urbanization, poverty, infrastructure, education levels, and ethnic and occupational composition (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FOR AFROBAROMETER RESPONDENTS FROM AFRICA, GHANA, AND THREE SUBNATIONAL REGIONS IN 1999 AND 2008

		AFRICA		GHANA		Brong-Ahafo		Greater Accra		Northern	
		1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008
Number of respondents		21,462	24,000	1407	1,200	148	112	223	184	98	112
Urban/ rural	Urban	54	35	36	44	28	36	86	87	28	29
	Rural	46	65	64	56	72	64	14	13	72	71
Education	No formal schooling	19	17	23	26	18	25	7	2	56	62
	Primary only	28	35	15	37	15	46	11	23	8	21
	Secondary	38	38	40	29	49	27	40	54	22	16
	Post-secondary	15	10	22	7	18	3	41	20	13	1

Listened to radio news	Never	12	15	20	10	19	5	7	4	33	38
	Less than 1X/mo	3	3	6	3	7	5	2	2	4	2
	About 1X/mo	3	*	5	*	4	*	3	*	3	*
	About 1X/week	8	7	13	4	17	6	15	4	12	7
	Several times a week	22	22	15	18	12	10	18	18	7	18
	Every day	52	53	41	65	41	75	55	72	42	35
Poverty [Gone w/o food over past year for you and family]	Never	49	43	67	70	82	73	73	76	72	55
	Occasionally	33	39	23	22	15	21	21	21	27	30
	Frequently/often	10	14	9	4	2	5	5	3	1	8
	Always	1	4	1	4	1	1	0	0	0	7
Occupation	Farmer/fisherman	23	*	33	*	42	*	4	*	49	*
	Informal marketer	10		12		12		16		3	
	Artisan/appren-tice/carpenter	5		8		8		7		2	
	Unemployed	4		10		5		12		4	
	Business	5		5		4		7		4	
	Teacher	3		6		8		5		9	
	Govt worker	3		3		4		4		0	
	Prof/ nurse/a/c	4		5		2		13		0	
	Student	10		6		4		9		9	
	Services worker	10		4		3		8		2	
	Housewife					1		3			
Primary languages spoken in the home in Ghana	Akan	--	--	60	46	88	72	41	39	2	1
	Ewe			12	15	1	5	10	15	12	0
	Ga			6	10	0	0	34	39	1	0
	Dangaare			1	3	1	0	1	0	4	0
	Dagbane			2	7	1	1	1	1	23	60
	Hausa			2	1	1	0	3	5	2	1
	Frafra			2	1	0	2	1	0	1	2
	Dangbe			1	+	0	0	8	+	-	+
	Kasem			1	1	0	0		0	-	2
	Konkomba			1	1	0	0		0	15	2
	Mamprulni				1	0	1		0	11	5
	Gonja					0	0		0	12	0
	Brong					1	0				0
	Nafaana					4	0				0

+All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number to ease interpretation.
* = Not asked.

This time period of the late 1990s in the country of Ghana was chosen explicitly as a critical case study for two reasons. First, Ghana is a fascinating country case as it has emerged from decades of political instability and authoritarian rule to become by 2014 one of the most consolidated democratic systems in sub-Saharan Africa. And, yet, Bob-Milliar's paper in this special issue reveals some of the limitations of the contemporary democratic system in Ghana,

with the increase of low-intensity violence among young party foot soldiers during the second political alternation when power was returned to the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Hence, an investigation of this earlier time period is also critical because this is the moment immediately prior to the first alternation of power to the opposition political party in Ghana in 2000.

In a similar vein, Brong-Ahafo Region, the subnational region with the highest scores for political knowledge and participation in 1999, which then saw subsequent declines in knowledge in 2008, was chosen for further investigation in the second half of the paper. Here, I compare the way individuals describe politics and their political behavior in two village communities in the Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana in 1998-1999.[35]

In addition to narrowing the focus to subnational regions within Ghana, this paper also adopts a perspective from below. The paper uses a combination of ethnographic observation, survey research and focus group interviews to reveal individual-level differences in political opinions and everyday practices. The Afrobarometer data was collected by the Afrobarometer Project using a nationally representative sample of adults in Round One from July 1999 to June 2001 in twelve countries and in Round Four from March 2008 to June 2009 in twenty countries.[36] The paper draws on the most recent round of publicly available data (2008-09) as well as the earliest round of data (1999-2001) in order to increase comparability with my fieldwork data.[37] The survey research from the two villages of Brong-Ahafo Region was original data I collected interviewing a multi-stage, stratified sample of nearly two hundred adults.[38] I also draw extensively in this paper from single-sex focus group discussions that were recorded and transcribed. The interpretation of the survey and focus group data was heavily influenced by additional in-depth interviews, ethnographic observation, oral histories, and archival research completed in the field.

Conceptualizations of Everyday Politics: A Sub-National Analysis within Ghana

Having examined earlier how various scholars view politics, what do Ghanaians think? In particular, beyond their sporadic participation in a national election, how do they conceptualize everyday politics? Below, I examine the conceptualizations of everyday politics across several subnational regions within Ghana. I take the conceptual typology of everyday politics generated from the literature on citizenship and clientelism as a starting point, and then use different parts of the Afrobarometer survey data to gain insights into these five dimensions of everyday politics.

Orientation of Political Claim-Making and Identity

The orientation of political claim-making on an everyday basis is revealed in the Afrobarometer survey through the variation in the Ghanaian respondents' awareness of their various political representatives (see Table 3 below). Survey respondents were asked to name their local government representative, their legislative representative (in the national legislative body), their finance minister, and then, finally, their vice president. When compared to all Africans participating in the Afrobarometer survey that year, more Ghanaians knew the correct answer for all four political representatives. What was particularly illuminating, however, was that Ghanaians demonstrated a particularly strong awareness of the politicians that represented

their specific constituency, rather than those that were elected or appointed to represent the nation as a whole. Hence, the Ghanaians' awareness of their legislative representative (49 percent) was over three times as strong as awareness by all Africans overall (15 percent), and Ghanaians correct knowledge of their local government officials (59 percent) was nearly twice as strong as awareness by all Africans overall (32 percent). Meanwhile, only 32 percent of Ghanaians knew their finance minister, slightly better than 21 percent of Africans overall, and 60 percent named their vice president, compared to 52 percent of Africans overall.

TABLE 3. AWARENESS OF ELECTED POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES FROM AFROBAROMETER ROUND ONE 1999 AND ROUND FOUR 2008

		AFRICA		*GHANA*		*Brong-Ahafo*		*Greater Accra*		*Northern*	
Year		1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008	1999	2008
Number of respondents		21,462	14,399	1,407	1,200	148	112	223	184	98	
Named local government representative	Incorrect	5	*	10	*	11	*	12	*	28	*
	Correct	32		59		64		38		63	
	Don't know	49		31		24		50		9	
Named Legislative representative	Incorrect	5	9	6	8	3	9	4	10	23	3
	Correct	15	51	49	48	59	43	47	42	49	63
	Don't know	70	32	45	34	38	30	50	41	28	33
	Know but can't remember[1]	*	8	*	10	*	18	*	7	*	2
Named Finance Minister	Incorrect	4	3	6	4	3	2	4	2	25	1
	Correct	21	29	32	22	36	20	47	39	14	11
	Don't know	66	60	62	64	61	63	49	46	61	86
	Know but can't remember*	*	8	*	11	*	16	*	14	*	3
Named VP	Incorrect	4	*	4	*	1	*	0.3	*	17	*
	Correct	52		60		66		82		36	
	Don't know	36		36		33		18		46	

+All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number to ease interpretation.
* = Not asked.

A comparison of the results in Round 1 in 1998 with Round Four nearly a decade later show that Ghanaians have now lost their edge over Africans as a whole in having great knowledge of their political representatives. Perhaps with greater democratic consolidation, and more certainty about the prospects of regime continuity, Ghanaians were slightly less attuned to political information and less likely to correctly identify their representatives.[39] Democratic consolidation does seem to have produced a shared normative pressure that citizens *should* be able to name these politicians, as more Ghanaians than Africans claimed that they knew this information but simply could not remember it.[40]

While fascinating to compare Ghanaian responses to Africans in Round One and 4 of the Afrobarometer project overall, these aggregate numbers for "Ghana" obscure important regional variations in the awareness of political representatives within the country. Respondents from Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana, which is examined in more detail in the second half of the paper, had an even greater awareness of their local (64 percent) and legislative representatives (59 percent) than Ghanaians overall in 1999. Perhaps not surprisingly given their physical proximity to the national corridors of power, the respondents from Greater Accra had the greatest ease in naming the vice president and finance minister compared to respondents from any other region but then struggled to name their local government or legislative representative in 1999.

Again, over the next decade, however, a greater number of respondents from both Brong-Ahafo and Greater Accra Regions were incorrect in naming their representatives, or claimed that they knew but could not recall the name. Respondents in Northern Region revealed the most dramatic improvements in political knowledge, starting with the greatest number of respondents offering an incorrect answer for all four representatives in 1999, and becoming the most accurate, with the least frequent excuses about knowing but not remembering.

The orientation of everyday politics in Ghana was further revealed with an analysis of the Afrobarometer questions on the frequency of different types of political participation.[41] For Ghanaians overall in 1999 and 2008, the type of participation that involved both the greatest number of Ghanaian respondents and the highest frequency over time was attendance at community meetings.[42] This exercise of citizenship was explicitly oriented toward the local community level whereas the other acts of participation where more likely occurring outside of the individual's immediate residence. But, once more, the variation across the regions was also significant, with respondents from Brong-Ahafo Region again reporting a higher percentage involved in community meetings at a higher frequency than the other regions in 1999 and 2008.[43] Overall, the respondents from Brong-Ahafo Region demonstrated a higher level of political knowledge and frequency of political participation than other regions, particularly for the more localized level of political officials.

Nature of Political Interactions

The nature of political interactions was more difficult to glean from the Afrobarometer survey data. One pair of potentially useful questions inquired about the patterns of contacting that people used to resolve problems.[44] Notably, in 1999 only one out of every ten Ghanaians reported ever contacting any government ministry official over the past five years. This number seems extremely small but may reflect the wording of the question, which could suggest a

narrower conceptualization of contacting only a government official located in the central ministr*y* offices in Accra, rather than someone based in the district or region, which would be much more feasible and likely for the majority of respondents. Still, when the wording was broadened in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey to include "any official of a government agency," only 13 percent of respondents replied affirmatively. Notably, too, it was respondents from the Northern Region who were most likely to contact a government official (20 percent) as compared to those from Greater Accra (10 percent) and Brong-Ahafo (8 percent).

Over 27 percent of Ghanaian respondents did report contacting "some other influential person" however. This data suggests that nearly three times as many Ghanaians sought the assistance of a power broker outside of the state government than within it to resolve their problems. Because of the ambiguity of the first question, however, the results are difficult to evaluate. In 2008, in a newly formulated multi-pronged question designed to uncover the authority base for these non-state leaders, nearly 46 percent of Ghanaians replied that they contacted religious leaders, almost 26 percent contacted traditional rulers, and nearly 19 percent maintained that they contacted some "other" influential person. Similar to contacting of government officials, respondents from Brong-Ahafo Region attested to greater numbers and intensities of contacting influential people in 1999, but they were outpaced in 2008 by respondents in Greater Accra for contacting religious leaders or some other influential person, and by those in Northern Region for contacting a traditional ruler.[45] Ironically, as Ghana's democracy became more consolidated by 2008, citizens from all three regions seemed to converge on Brong-Ahafo's earlier pattern of more intense political interactions with non-state and more local political authorities.

Mechanisms of Accountability

Despite very high voter participation rates in the last election across the regions in Ghana, a relatively small minority of Ghanaian respondents cited voting or multi-party elections as the first thing that came to mind when they thought about the meaning of democracy in 1999 (unfortunately, this question was not asked again in the 2008 survey to enable comparison over time).[46] Only 9 percent of Ghanaian respondents described voting or multi-party politics, one percentage point lower than the response from Africans overall (10 percent).

More frequently, Ghanaians responded that democracy meant "government by the people, of the people, and/or for the people" (22 percent). This conceptualization of democracy is a much broader, more inclusive and collective notion of democracy than the individual exercise of voter choice. This notion of government by the people also involves a much more sustained and active participation of the group in the system than the sporadic and more passive exercise of an individual's voter choice. Notably, nearly 41 percent of respondents from Brong-Ahafo Region described democracy in this way as government by the people. This was the single most frequently articulated meaning of democracy in the region and remarkably higher than the other regions. This data reinforces the earlier finding that Ghanaians, and in particular, those respondents from Brong-Ahafo, were more actively and directly participating in politics by attending community meetings and getting others to raise an issue. Participation in demonstrations or writing to the newspaper was more infrequent for Ghanaians than even for Africans overall in 1999 and 2008.[47]

Notions of Rights and Duties

When asked about the meaning of democracy, one of the most frequently mentioned response for Ghanaians was "civil liberties and personal freedoms." Nearly 28 percent of Ghanaians described civil rights so this answer was slightly more frequent than "government by the people" discussed above. Political rights such as voting were much less frequently mentioned (9 percent), and social and economic rights to development were only cited by less than 3 percent of Ghanaian respondents.

T.H. Marshall (1950) might have predicted these results as they reflect his theory of a linear expansion of rights from civil, to political and culminating in the state's guarantee of social rights. But, the results do not square with either the non-linear political history of rights in Ghana, or my fieldwork data from Brong-Ahafo Region, which suggests a much more dominant emphasis on collective social rights. These puzzling results could be an artifact of the question wording, which might have prompted a liberal individualist response because it asks about the meaning of "democracy." It might have been illuminating to also ask an even more open-ended question that investigated how people imagined their responsibilities and ability to make claims on whatever type of political community.

Finally, another question that sheds light on how Ghanaians thought about rights and duties is the Afrobarometer question on individual versus government responsibility for well-being (which was not replicated in the 2008 round). Compared to Africans overall (47 percent), a greater number of Ghanaians (55 percent) placed more emphasis on the individual's responsibility for their own well-being. In Ghana, government was not seen as holding the primary responsibility for the population's welfare, a finding that is reinforced by my fieldwork and discussed in more detail in the second half of the paper. Here again, though, respondents from different regions varied tremendously in their views on this issue. In 1999, an even bigger number of respondents from Brong-Ahafo (49 percent) said that they "strongly" agreed that people were responsible for their own well-being than in Greater Accra (25 percent) or Northern Region (19 percent).

Effects of Everyday Politics on the Regime and Normative Evaluations of Democracy

One of the primary objectives of the Afrobarometer project is to investigate people's normative evaluations of democracy. The primary message from the analysis of Afrobarometer data has been that most Africans viewed democracy positively and were supportive of its prospects for the future.[48] My analysis also supports this characterization of the majority opinion. But, I would contend that it is important to disaggregate the data further and investigate the minority opinions as well. For example, one very interesting dimension of the Afrobarometer data that might be missed is the number of Ghanaians (26 percent) that responded "don't know" to the question about the meaning of democracy in 1999. Ghanaians answered "don't know" almost twice as often as Africans overall (13 percent). The replies to this question varied substantially by region too. So, fewer respondents from Brong-Ahafo (14 percent) replied "don't know", more like Africans overall, whereas 63 percent of the respondents from Northern Region answered "don't know."

Their inability to provide a response to this question was not because they were simply not interested in politics or did not like to discuss politics. Nearly 72 percent of the Ghanaian

respondents reported that they were interested in politics in 1999, which was even greater than the results for Africans overall (63 percent).[49] Similarly, nearly 68 percent of Ghanaians said that they discussed politics sometimes or frequently, compared to 66 percent of Africans overall. Again, similar patterns of cross-regional variation persisted in the responses to this question with a greater number of Brong-Ahafo respondents reporting an interest in politics (87 percent) than for Ghanaians or Africans overall.

What was equally interesting was the sizable minority of respondents who approved of single-party or traditional rule in response to other questions.[50] Again, the dominant majority disapproved of these alternative options for governance. But, in Ghana, in 1999, over 19 percent of respondents approved of single-party rule, and nearly 25 percent approved of decisions made by a council of traditional elders. By 2008, over 15 percent of respondents approved of single-party rule, a still significant share of respondents given the extent of democratic consolidation by that time. And, yet again, the extent of minority support for authoritarian regimes varied substantially from region to region within Ghana during this time period. For example, in Brong-Ahafo Region in 1999, only 23 percent approved of traditional rule whereas in Northern Region, over 38 percent approved of this option. Similarly, in Brong-Ahafo Region in 2008, only 4 percent approved of military rule compared to 11 percent in Northern Region, and only 5 percent approved of one-man rule, whereas 8 percent did so in Northern Region.

Summary and Brief Explanation for Sub-National Differences

This section of the paper highlighted some advantages and disadvantages of the Afrobarometer survey data. Where the Afrobarometer survey project had an advantage was that they were able to draw a nationally representative sample from every region in the entire country of Ghana. This allowed us to estimate the "average" response from the country as a whole and to compare this mean score with the average for all of the twelve countries included in Round One and the twenty countries included in Round 4 of the project. In this way, we were able to put the "Ghanaian" response in a broader context.

Another advantage of the Afrobarometer data was that the stratified sampling techniques at multiple stages allowed us to compare the different scores for each highlighted region. This analysis revealed important variation across the three regions, which previously was obscured by the national aggregate score.[51] These regional comparisons suggest that individuals from Brong-Ahafo Region have greater political knowledge and participate in a broader range of politics more frequently than respondents from Greater Accra or Northern Regions in 1999. Surprisingly, after nearly a decade of further democratic consolidation, by 2008, some of these regional differences in political knowledge and participation have reversed, for example, with respondents in Northern Region better able to identify their national legislators and ministers.

The regional variation remained puzzling, however, because there were so many factors that varied simultaneously, including, but not limited to: pre-colonial ethnic culture and politics; ethnic heterogeneity; geography; local economies and extent of poverty; and, levels of public infrastructure including schools, health, roads, and markets (see Table 2 above). Additionally, several of these potential explanatory factors changed in unexpected ways between 1999 and 2008. For example, the Afrobarometer self-reports on the lived experience of poverty actually worsened in both Brong-Ahafo and Northern Regions, compared to the nation

as a whole.[52] Perhaps less surprising, given the donor emphasis on primary education beginning in the 1980s, is the dramatic drop between 1999 and 2008 in the percent of respondents across all regions who had a secondary or post-secondary education, and marked increase in those who had experienced only primary, informal, or no schooling at all. Hence, in these regions, during this time period, the increased experience of poverty, and declines in educational achievement might have hindered some of the positive effects of democratic consolidation on the exercise of citizenship. In an attempt to reduce some of this causal complexity, the next section of the paper zooms in to focus our analysis on just two villages in Brong-Ahafo Region.

Conceptualizations of Everyday Politics: A Case Study of Tano District in Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana in 1998-99

Below, we turn to concentrate our analysis on two villages in the Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana in 1998-1999 during the early phases of the democratization process. This in-depth analysis allows us to control more carefully for many potential explanatory factors that varied significantly among Brong-Ahafo, Greater Accra, and Northern Regions of Ghana. To begin, the villages in this region shared a similar ethnic demographic, with an approximate population of 1,000-2,000 residents, who were predominantly indigenous Akan. These Akan groups had resisted incorporation into the Asante Empire in the mid-17th century and migrated about an hour's drive further westward of Kumasi. The villages had similar Akan village chieftaincies, matrilineal family systems, and customary land tenure systems. Likewise, approximately 12-15 percent of the village populations were non-indigenous migrants.

In this district, the villages also shared similar agricultural economies, wealth, geographies, market incorporation, and infrastructure levels. Farmers had started to grow cocoa for export at around the same time in the early decades of the 20th century and were relatively prosperous compared to other regions in Ghana. By the 1980s, Brong-Ahafo Region had experienced significant deforestation and serious bushfires, which had prompted grave declines in cocoa production.[53] The villages in this district of Brong-Ahafo were also located on a dirt road with frequent "taxi" service even in the rainy season, approximately one hour to the regional capital and six hours from the national capital. The villages each had moderate levels of infrastructure for schools, health clinics, and markets, which tended to emanate from the coasts upward.

In addition to a locally-grounded research design where data collection was concentrated in just two carefully selected villages, the methodological approach for gathering this data was also bottom-up. At the broadest level, all of the interpretation was informed by my full-time immersion in the daily life and routine of each village. Additionally, many of the quotes used as evidence were derived from focus group discussions where very open-ended questions were posed, and the group's conversation flowed more naturally. Even the survey questions in this section of the paper were frequently more open-ended than the Afrobarometer questionnaires. The enumerator posed intentionally broad questions or scenarios and then waited for the respondent to supply his or her own answer, in whatever form that might be. While more difficult to code and enter, this approach helped illuminate how village residents put their political opinions and practices into their own words.

So, how did village residents conceptualize everyday politics in these villages of Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana in 1998-1999? Overall, none of the village residents articulated concepts that were consistently similar to the ways that scholars of citizenship or clientelism portrayed everyday politics (see Table 4). Perhaps, not surprisingly, indigenous conceptualizations of everyday politics were mixed in complicated ways. This paper argues that this blurring of scholarly categories was done in regionally distinct ways. New regionally-specific hybrid patterns emerged that challenge the scholarly conventional wisdom. Again, the analysis below refers to the conceptual typology presented earlier in Table 1 as an initial frame of reference to assess how indigenous conceptualizations did or did not fit into existing scholarly categories.

TABLE 4. HYBRID CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EVERYDAY POLITICS IN TANO DISTRICT VILLAGES IN BRONG-AHAFO REGION OF GHANA

DIMENSION OF CONCEPTUALIZATION	*HYBRID VILLAGE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS IN BRONG-AHAFO REGION OF GHANA*
	Concepts associated with clientelism in italics **Concepts associated with citizenship in bold**
Orientation of political claim-making and identity	*Village or district-level* **Local state** and *non-state institutions*
Nature of political interactions	*Face-to-face* **Universal treatment by institutions**
Mechanisms of accountability	**Preferred formal accountability** *Dismissed electoral accountability* Active participation in more **formal accountability** frequently through *chieftaincy institutions at village level*
Notions of rights and duties	*Community reciprocity*
Effect of political claim-making on broader system	Rarely discussed
Normative evaluation	**More positive**

Orientation of Political Claim-Making and Identity

To begin, villagers from Brong-Ahafo Region more consistently described everyday politics as being oriented toward the village or, at most, the district level. Furthermore, political claim-making and decisions involved a diversity of local state and non-state institutions. When these Ghanaians described everyday financial or political problems encountered in the village, they almost always mentioned sources of help that were within the village community—usually a family member, friend, religious congregation, or village leader such as the chief, an elder, or a unit committee member.[54] For example, in discussions of financial conflicts, village residents frequently described how the problem would be resolved by summoning the participants to an extended family meeting, or having the case heard in the village court presided over by the chief and his elders.[55] During my fieldwork stay, the village chief insisted on settling a problem that afternoon in his court in the village rather than sending the matter upward to the district authorities.

The survey data further supported these observations. The most frequently mentioned leaders for the development of the village in Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region were the elected unit committee members (82 percent), the village chief (55 percent), and the District Assembly (24 percent).[56] Similarly, in focus group discussions of a broken borehole pump and embezzled funds, most of the village residents agreed that this problem was the water and sanitation or unit committee's responsibility, both of which were located within the village itself.[57] After the village leaders, the district assembly was often cited as the next source of help in resolving a problem such as the borehole or a corrupt contract.[58]

Village residents from this district never mentioned asking the regional government to intervene and rarely mentioned a relative or connection in Accra as the principal source of help with problems. Furthermore, villagers had a difficult time recalling the names of their members of parliament (MPs).[59] Finally, when village residents did invoke their national leaders, they almost never used their proper names, but referred simply to their political offices, for example, as "the Head of State" or "the President."[60]

Thus far, villagers from Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana appeared to orient their political claims at a very local level. Some survey data tentatively suggests that the construction of their political identities was also more localized. After being prompted by the enumerator that any one individual belongs to several different social groups and possesses multiple identities, respondents were then asked to name which identity they would associate with most closely or list first. The majority of respondents listed their ethnic group first (68 percent), and only 11 percent declared a Ghanaian national identity.[61] Notably, religious identity was slightly more important (12 percent) than national identity in these Brong-Ahafo villages. In the next subsection, we explore whether political interactions were conceptualized in more universal or particularistic terms in these regions.

Nature of Political Interactions

In these Brong-Ahafo villages, political interactions were described as face-to-face but were highly universalized, with respondents referring more frequently to institutions and offices rather than individual names, and insisting on equal treatment, rather than customization. The importance of face-to-face interactions was emphasized by village residents, but the political

process was described as bottom-up and localized within the village community. Several respondents Brong-Ahafo Region described how the advice of village residents crucially informed and guided appropriate decision-making, in particular, of the elected village-level unit committee members.[62] Notably, several respondents from both villages described the unit committee as an association, not perceiving it as an "outside" governmental institution, but rather, a local, voluntary group that met monthly "to help the whole community."[63] When faced with conflicts, village residents usually proposed to call a meeting within the family or the village to meet in person and discuss the issue.[64] One woman described what should be done to resolve the water crisis in the village: "The town should call a general meeting and ask the committee to explain and make accounts to us."[65]

These villagers from Tano District expected concrete benefits to be delivered by their politicians, particularly those serving at the local level. While national-level politicians were rarely brought up by these villagers, when asked about the local MP, several men described how she had failed to bring the hospital or cassava mill that they wanted for the village. The district chief executive was also criticized for failing to fulfill his promise to rehabilitate village school buildings.[66] In contrast, the unit committee members were remembered for being instrumental in getting electricity to the village.[67] Again, each of these politicians was almost never mentioned by name but instead by their office title.

The importance of face-to-face interaction for villagers in this region was also highlighted in their critiques as they lambasted the MP for not coming to the village to thank them or see them after her election.[68] Also many respondents expressed frustration at the big gap between themselves "down here" and "those at the top."[69] Village residents agreed that they lacked power, and that their input "does not reach anywhere."[70]

In Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana, village residents expressed their frustration that political decisions about allocating resources were not universal or equal, but targeted toward certain favored groups. For example, respondents described how the village chief, elders, unit committee members, and cooperative leaders would have more access to help than "those without connections."[71] Several respondents described how ruling party members would also have more access to funds or programs than opposition political party members.[72] Political ties were not the only way to curry favor, however; several respondents explained that recognition as participating in the communal work of the village was also a determinant of political access.[73] This last criterion, of service done as part of the collective within the village community, was perceived by villagers as more just and fair than when an individual benefited due to their individual, particularistic connections.

Ironically, it seemed that the Brong-Ahafo villagers' ideal of universality and equality diverged from the political reality described above. Village residents from this district of Brong-Ahafo repeatedly insisted that health care "should be free for all of us."[74] Similarly, in a discussion about what would be a fair premium to pay for national health insurance, almost all respondents agreed that the monthly payment should be equal for all participants.[75] Even when there was some initial disagreement among focus group participants as to what a fair premium should be, the respondents discussed and settled on a consensus amount.[76] Some villagers even argued explicitly that by having universal and equal rights, rather than targeted benefits, it was possible to avoid corruption and subsequently, injustice.[77] Villagers in this Ghanaian region also

highlighted on many occasions how the Ghanaian government's contemporary policy of providing free health care to certain vulnerable populations such as the elderly was not actually implemented as a further justification for more equal and universal policies.[78]

Mechanisms of Accountability

Ironically, in a context where political accountability on an everyday basis occurred most frequently through unofficial channels, village residents in Brong-Ahafo Region expressed a preference for more formal avenues. The crucial dimension of formality to villagers was that the rules and procedures be publicly known and agreed upon. Several respondents invoked "the law" as the primary mechanism of accountability in discussions of everyday politics. While villagers often highlighted the role of the law that was written and enforced by the central state, this also included the legal process of the village chieftancy, which was highly formal, albeit through verbal rather than written transmission.[79] For example, one man described how participation in communal labor was high because whoever refused to take part was "sent to where the law is."[80] Another man explained that only a man's children had recourse to legal action as if it were the most effective and binding sort of mechanism of accountability.[81] According to villagers from this region of Brong-Ahafo, the law was simultaneously enforced by village courts and the central state.

In other discussions, Brong-Ahafo village residents expressed their preference for formal accountability when they became disgruntled with the uneven implementation of the formal rules. For example, one respondent in Brong-Ahafo Region described how political elites from a few large families dominated multiple local political institutions which informally hindered any checks and balances between these institutions and prevented formal accountability. He could not put forth his complaints in any outlet because all of the political leaders were informally connected—in this case, sharing family ties.

Despite the shared yearning for more formal paths of accountability by Ghanaians in these villages of Tano District, elections were not seen as the answer by anyone. In repeated interviews and discussions, the village residents in Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana seemed dismayed with formal electoral accountability. Recall, that at the time of this data collection, previously authoritarian incumbents had won two rounds of "democratic" elections in Ghana, so there had been no successful turnover of power to the opposition yet. Voting was seen by these village residents in the late 1990s as an exercise and a citizen duty but clearly not the way to influence politics.[82] When one woman described her discontent with the government's management of the economy, she was then asked why she continued to vote for the government. She replied, "What can my individual opinion do?"[83]

So, if elections were not viewed as an effective avenue for seeking accountability, what did these Ghanaians in the Tano District of Brong-Ahafo do on an everyday basis? Village residents described an active role in seeking a formal and public type of accountability, at least at the local level. At the national level, Ghanaians from these villages often explained that they did not have the time to complain or hold national politicians accountable because they were so busy doing farm work to make ends meet.[84] But at the local level, they organized public meetings to discuss past actions of their political leaders or address grievances amongst themselves. These meetings might be chaired by the unit committee chairman (a village-level institution of the

central state) or the village chieftaincy but were always held outdoors after villagers had returned from their farms and were open to anyone. When describing the process of seeking political mediation by the village chief, village residents clearly shared a common understanding of the formal rules involved in asking for a case to be heard. For example, villagers all understood that because you had to pass through the *okyeame* (or chief's spokesperson) first, the cost was doubled, in terms of the numbers of bottles of schnapps presented. Village residents often relayed that this entry cost was important for screening out matters that were not serious. Furthermore, this cost was certainly more affordable to the majority of residents than travel and lodging to and from the national capital. Village residents in this region of Ghana not only faced lower costs with a more local system of accountability, but they also had more leverage. Villagers explained how their local political leaders were more responsive because they actually lived in the same community and experienced the same problems as they did. One man defended the unit committee members' efforts by highlighting their physical proximity to the villagers and their role in resolving problems that they also experience such as drinking water. "They are with us here."[85] One overall indicator of the relative success of this system of local accountability mechanisms was that Ghanaians seemed more satisfied with the job done by their village and district-level politicians than the national-level ones.[86]

Notions of Rights and Duties

Villagers from Tano District also differed in their notions of rights and duties vis-à-vis their political community (see Tables 5 and 6). Villagers did not articulate an expansive list of rights that would be consumed primarily by individuals. Most frequently, respondents mentioned the state's role in providing free health care and education.[87] One woman stated simply, "We need electricity and good roads."[88] Only very rarely did a respondent mention the provision of credit, and even then, these were described as loans to establish a business or expand farming, rather than grants to ameliorate an individual's standard of living.[89]

TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RIGHTS

	GHANAIAN REGION
Three most frequently mentioned rights	Social services (33 percent) Employment (24 percent) Roads/markets/electricity (21 percent)

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DUTIES

	GHANAIAN REGION
Three most frequently mentioned duties	Develop the community/country (47 percent) Pay taxes (22 percent) Perform communal labor (21 percent)

In general, village residents from the Tano district of Brong-Ahafo Region did not view politics exclusively in terms of rights but quickly communicated the importance of communal duties. They tended to view politics as a paternalistic but clearly reciprocal relationship with their political leaders. For example, one woman gave this advice to improve governance of the village: "The elders or big people should do their part for us; the children, too, to do our part."[90] The giving and receiving was not equal but it was certainly two-way. Many respondents in these villages mentioned the "responsibility of the citizens to do communal labor."[91] Over 22 percent of respondents also cited their duty to pay taxes explicitly as the reciprocity owed for the state's provision of public goods.[92] The village residents were more ready to acknowledge the limits of the state's beneficence and appeal to citizens to help themselves. One 42 year-old man, originally from Burkina Faso who had lived in this Ghanaian village for over twenty years, declared, "The citizens are too many for the state to be able to help, so the citizen should rather do something to improve their lot instead of relying on the state."[93] When villagers cited their agricultural production as their duty to the state, they almost always described their production of food and how it increased the food security of the entire nation of Ghana, rather than in terms of the individual cash revenues earned by export crops. As one young Akan woman said, "I should work harder at my farming to produce more food to help feed Ghana."[94] In summary, villagers in this district of Brong-Ahafo Region conceived of themselves as reciprocal participants in a local community rather than autonomous individual claimants in the nation-state.

Effects of Everyday Politics on the Regime and Normative Evaluations

Unlike the scholars of the theoretical literature, village residents in this region of Ghana rarely discussed the broader effects of everyday politics on the regime as a whole. None of the villagers spent much time considering whether the different ways that problems were solved or decisions made on an everyday basis were integrative or disintegrative for the overall political regime. In many cases, villagers appeared to conceive of the everyday politics of the village as separate and disconnected from the politics of the regime. Many of the quotes above illustrated this point of view.

Ironically, the only time that there was mention of disintegration or conflict was in the discussion of democratization, which, at the time of data collection, was less than a decade old and hence relatively new. The discussions about democratization reflected heated debates particular to Ghana in that time period of the late 1990s. The substantive content and themes of the discussions were not that surprising. Instead, what was fascinating was the process by which contention about regime politics was resolved, or not, within a village discussion group. In these Ghanaian villages, discussions were lengthy and often explicitly critical of the regime. Tensions between participants with different points of view were resolved through an emphasis on community problem-solving and local-level representation.

The village respondents rarely discussed "democracy" in all of their heated debates about politics, and when it was invoked, it was not necessarily positive. More frequently, villagers expressed a negative change in the political system. One respondent described how accountability had become more bureaucratic, less immediate, and less effective under the democratic system. He contrasted the past and current response to corruption: "In the past, if

someone misbehaved, he would be slapped. Now, we say democracy. If something happens, we say investigation. This investigation ends at the person who commits the crimes. It closes there."[95] Many villagers agreed that their non-elected village chiefs held more power than the democratically-elected unit committee or district assemblymen.[96] For example, one respondent described how the potential instability of frequent elections undermined the power of elected representatives in comparison to the village chief. "A chief is not deposed anyhow. Assemblyman can be changed at any time. The chief owns the village. Nothing is done here without his agreement. He has the greatest power."[97]

The respondents also seemed suspicious of the actual everyday practice of their democratic system. They talked freely about how elections were corrupted. Repeatedly, village residents described how the NDC bought votes in the 1996 elections. One Ghanaian man explained and everyone in the focus group concurred that: "The [NDC] government was voted into power a second time because of poverty."

The civil liberties of the Ghanaian democracy in the late 1990s were also questioned by villagers in this region of Ghana. The "culture of silence" of the previous Rawlings military regime (1981-1992) seemed to persist with the villagers, and they were reluctant to speak freely at this point in 1998-1999. Many villagers described their fear of repercussions if they expressed criticisms upward. One woman said at the very end of a lively focus group discussion, "If you go and stand somewhere and say he's not governing this nation well, you'll be killed. If you say he's destroying the nation, it won't go well with you. So the only thing you can do is pray for God to change him for everything to be okay." The conclusion here is to turn toward prayer. "What can I do? I am in a village, and they are in Accra. If you say something, and you are not careful, they will arrest you."[98] Another woman expressed her dismay, "Truly, because of fear, we do not voice our worries."[99] Interestingly, the above discussion of the possibility of political arrest led to the call for the community to "help each other" and resolve issues locally. Others highlighted how problems were routinely discussed with the district assemblyman, and they reminded each other how their voices were at least heard at the village and district level.

Summary of Patterns in Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana

The village residents in this district of Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana clearly articulated an indigenous conceptualization of everyday politics. This indigenous conceptualization diverged in complicated ways from the scholarly conceptualizations of politics presented by theorists of citizenship and clientelism in the first section of the paper. These Ghanaian villagers described norms and behaviors that combined different aspects of citizenship as well as clientelism in a unique and specific hybrid form (see Table 4). Indeed, democracy, and particularly, multi-party elections, were not viewed as the most positive regime politics for either accountability or conflict resolution.

So what explains the existence of such hybridity in this particular place and historical moment? Recall that these villages in Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region shared broadly similar pre-colonial cultures, geographies and agricultural economies, levels of infrastructure, and experiences of economic and political liberalization. This in-depth analysis of residents from comparable villages in this one district and region enables us to control for many of the potential explanatory factors that vary tremendously across Brong-Ahafo, Greater Accra, and

Northern Regions to likely produce significant variation in how people conceive everyday politics.

This case study thus allows us to perceive a specific type of hybrid conception that is shared by many of the village residents in this particular district and region. I argue that these villagers' striking conceptual departures from the scholarly notions of citizenship highlights the importance over time of the historical construction of the colonial and post-colonial state. It is not simply the relatively short-term experience with new electoral institutions that shapes how Africans think about and participate in politics but instead a more long-term experience of a broader range of state institutions. In other work, I uncover in much more detail the history of the construction of the colonial and post-colonial state in the areas of political administration, social service delivery, and agricultural policy in these villages in this district and region of Ghana.[100] I show how differences in the history of state formation are actually experienced on the ground and then shape informal institutions of social reciprocity and the norms of citizenship.

Building on earlier work by Boone, which theorizes that state formation varies significantly across regions within nations, we should therefore expect to see that conceptions of everyday politics in Greater Accra and Northern Regions would also demonstrate hybridity, but in different combinations.[101] We should also expect that the conceptualizations of everyday politics will have changed in Brong-Ahafo Region over time with the changing construction and local experience of state institutions. Further comparative analyses across and within regions would permit us to disentangle further the relative weight of the role of state formation versus ethnic culture, geography, economy, and infrastructure.[102]

Conclusion

This paper investigates the conceptual categories used by scholars to theorize citizenship and clientelism and then shows how their boundaries are actually blurred by Ghanaians on the ground. I find that the indigenous conceptualizations held by Ghanaians in Tano District of Brong-Ahafo Region did not map precisely to either set of theoretical categories. These village residents were neither perfect citizens nor clients but articulated their own conceptions of everyday politics. These Ghanaians thought about politics quite differently from academics. The paper highlights striking sub-national variations in the Afrobarometer data that persist from the early years of the democratic transition in 1999 to the later period in 2008, when more competitive elections produced two alternations of power. The village residents from Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana expressed a more active and community-based everyday politics, where people contributed communal labor at the village level and solved problems through local state and non-state institutions. By investigating indigenous conceptualizations, the paper revealed new patterns and identified alternative causal mechanisms for these puzzling variations between regions.

This paper also revealed the tensions and gaps between what respondents described as their everyday practices and what they expressed as their normative ideals. Future research on African politics needs to investigate both, but be aware of how practices and norms may actually overlap and co-mingle. This sort of interpretive analysis will often necessitate in-depth field research and a co-mingling of research methods as well.[103] The paper highlighted the

potential value of survey research and less structured focus group interviewing for revealing the meaning of indigenous concepts. But, these methods were critically informed by intensive ethnographic observation, historical research, and unstructured, in-depth interviewing. In addition to this mixed method, bottom-up approach, the comparative research design used in this paper was critical for shedding light on potential explanatory factors. In sum, future scholars and policymakers need to understand indigenous conceptualizations of everyday politics rather than assuming that African practices exemplify or fall short of an externally imposed normative ideal.

Notes

1   See Huntington 1991. On Africa, see Bratton and Van de Walle 1997.
2   "A Lull in the Wind. (Democracy in Africa)." 1993. *The Economist*, September 4. Van de Walle (2002) cites Freedom House data that defines thirty out of thirty nine electoral democracies as "partially free" or "not free."
3   See Carothers 2001.
4   In his speech to the Ghanaian parliament, President Obama contrasted the conflict in Kenya with praise for the 'good governance' of Ghana: "The people of Ghana have worked to put democracy on a firmer footing, with repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections." See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/.
5   Gyimah-Boadi 1999.
6   See the growing literature on party politics in Africa (Reidl 2014; Pitcher 2012; Le Bas 2011; Carbone 2007; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005) and voting behavior (Bratton et al. 2012; Lindbergh and Morrison 2008; Wantchekon 2003).
7   See MacLean 2010.
8   I am grateful for the valuable comments of colleagues such as Hillel Soiffer, Françoise Montambeault, and Melani Cammett as well as participants at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Indiana University's Center for Constitutional Democracy, and the Colloquium on Comparative Research at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Any errors or faults are my own.
9   Here the paper draws on work on citizenship by scholars as diverse as Keller 2014; Fung 2007; Bosniak 2006; Mansbridge 2003; Archibuigi and Held 1995; Smith 1999; Mamdani 1996; Young 1989; Benhabib 1996; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Turner 1993; Rawls 1993; Ekeh 1975; and Marshall 1950.
10   See Marshall 1950. See also Smith 1999 and Yashar 2005.
11   Rawls 1993.
12   See also Williams 1994 and Mansbridge 2003.
13   Marshall 1950.
14   For more recent work from various regions of the world, see Brun and Diamond 2014,

Hilger 2012, Pitcher 2009, Moran and Johnston 2009, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kawata 2006; Hyden 2006; Piattoni 2001, 1996, and Auyero 2000. For earlier works, see Clapham 1982; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; and Schmidt et al. 1977. Also see a relevant literature on corruption, for example, Holmes 2006; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006), Kotkin and Sajo 2002; and Della Porta and Vannucci 1999.

15 Lemarchand 1977, p. 106.

16 See Hyden 1983, p. 19, where he first articulated his theory of "the economy of affection," which he also incorporates and develops in Hyden 2006.

17 Hyden 2006, p. 56.

18 Sara Berry's 1992 work on pervasive patterns of investments in social relations could be viewed as a critical reinterpretation of what other scholars included as clientelism. See also Bayart 1989 and Van de Walle 2007.

19 In her introduction to the edited volume on clientelism in the Europe, Piattoni (2001: 6-7) distinguishes clientelism as "more penetrating and all-encompassing" than patronage but still focuses much more exclusively on benefits tied to access to state power and public decision-making.

20 Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Callaghy 1984; Jackson and Rosberg 1982. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007, p. 4), however, argue that the face-to-face nature of clientelist systems evolves into a more broker-mediated system in the context of more highly institutionalized, democratic settings.

21 Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984.

22 Earlier work by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984, pp. 47, 220) emphasized variation but tended to draw cross-national distinctions. In contrast, more recent scholarship by Piattoni (1996) compared two southern Italian regions and found that clientelism was organized in different ways with divergent consequences for economic development.

23 Hyden 2006; Joseph 1987; Medard 1982.

24 Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, p. 48.

25 Van de Walle 2007, p. 52.

26 Landé (1977, p. xx) highlights how patrons and clients are unequal in 'status, power or resources' and that even the favors exchanged are different in kind. See also the discussion by Scott 1977, p. 125.

27 Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, p. 49.

28 Piattoni 2001, p. 12.

29 Regarding political stability, see Reno (1995, 1998) on warlordism in West Africa. Landé (1977, pp. xxxii-xxxiii) talks about factionalism and feuding. In his early statement on clientelism, Lemarchand (1977, p. 100) offered a more positive viewpoint that it might be something you want to build upon or extend upward. "…nation-building…becomes, rather, a matter of how best to extend to the national level the discrete vertical solidarities in existence at the local or regional levels." In terms of economic development, Englebert (2000) argues that leaders face legitimacy deficit and use patrimonial strategies to secure loyalty which derails economic development. One exception is earlier work by

Lemarchand (1977, pp. 102-03) that acknowledged clientelism's inherent "divisive tendencies" but also suggested its "integrative potentialities."

30   Piattoni 2001, p. 205.

31   Van de Walle 2007, pp. 66-67. In an experimental study of electoral appeals and voting behavior in Benin, Wantchekon (2003) also validates the importance of clientelism and how it reinforces ethnic voting.

32   Budd (2004) argues that higher levels of patrimonialism are correlated with lower GNP and Freedom House rankings in a quantitative study of 30 developing countries. Oelbaum (2002) describes African clientelism as a "disease." Pitcher et al. (2009) argue against this dominant perspective contending that patrimonialism is compatible with both legitimate government and economic development using a case study of Botswana. Anthropologists Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2014) draw on ethnographic fieldwork to show that many Africans view corruption as a legitimate part of the "everyday" routine.

33   Pitcher et al. (2009) make a related point in their discussion of patrimonialism. They argue that patrimonialism is juxtaposed with its antithesis, formal, democratic regimes.

34   See Smith (2013) for a historical and ethnographic approach to the study of how citizenship is exercised in Ethiopia.

35   I conducted fieldwork in Tano District, Brong-Ahafo region, Ghana, from October 1998-March 1999 with support from Fulbright-Hays, the Social Science Research Council, etc.

36   The countries included in Round 1 of the Afrobarometer project in 1999 were: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Round 4 in 2008, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Senegal were added to the survey. The data is weighted to approximate the inclusion of 1,200 cases from each country.
     See www.afrobarometer.org.

37   Round 5 of the Afrobarometer project was conducted in thirty five countries from 2001 to September 2013 but has not been released publicly as of this writing.

38   The multi-stage stratified sampling technique ensured proportional sampling of women and minority, non-Akan ethnic groups.

39   See Bump (2014) for analysis of the lack of awareness of elected political representatives by Americans.

40   A new response category of "know but can't remember" was added to this question in Afrobarometer Round 4. The remaining responses were: incorrect, correct, and don't know.

41   The question wording in 1999 was: "Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me how often you, personally, have done these things during the last five years: Attended a community meeting?" This question was followed by: got together with others to raise an issue; attended an election rally; worked for a political candidate or party; wrote a letter to a newspaper; and, attended a demonstration. In 2008, these questions were divided among two different political participation batteries of questions but all of the same questions were included except attendance at an election rally.

42   In 1999, over 63 percent of Ghanaians reported attending at least one community meeting,

and 24 percent of them reported doing so "often." These numbers declined slightly but remained the highest of any types of political participation in 2008 with 57.7 percent of respondents attending a community meeting and 13.4 doing so often.

43   In 1999, nearly 70 percent of respondents from Brong-Ahafo reported attending at least one community meeting, and 31 percent of them reported doing so "often." In 2008, nearly 68percent of respondents answered that they attended a community meeting compared to 65percent in Northern Region and only 41.3 percent in Greater Accra.

44   The two questions follow the list of participation acts above. The first of the pair reads: "During the last five years, how often have you contacted any of the following people for help to solve a problem: An official of a government ministry?" Then, the same preface is repeated and followed with: "some other influential person?"

45   In 2008, 49 percent of those from Greater Accra, 36 percent from Northern Region and nearly 36 percent from Brong-Ahafo Region contacted religious leaders; nearly 32 percent from Northern, 26 percent from Brong-Ahafo, and only 13 percent from Greater Accra contacted traditional rulers; and, over 24 percent from Greater Accra, over 15 percent from Brong-Ahafo and nearly 12 percent from Northern Region contacted some other influential person.

46   In 1999, nearly 89 percent of Ghanaian respondents replied that they had voted in the last election. This is significantly higher than even the 73 percent for Africans overall. This high rate of voter participation in the last election was relatively consistent across all of the regions, with 88 percent of respondents in Brong-Ahafo having voted. By 2008, these rates had declined slightly with nearly 81 percent of Ghanaians reporting that they had voted in the last election with Northern Region surpassing the national average with 85 percent and Brong-Ahafo right behind with 81 percent voting.

47   In 1999, over 95 percent of Ghanaians reported that they "never" wrote to a newspaper whereas only 74 percent of Africans overall reported "never." Similarly, over 91 percent of Ghanaians reported that they "never" attended a demonstration whereas only 74 percent of Africans overall replied "never" to the same question. In 2008, fewer Ghanaians reported writing to a newspaper or attending a demonstration than Africans overall, but the number who replied that they "never" would declined because a significant percentage were given a new option of "no, but would do if had the chance."

48   Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005.

49   The percentage of Ghanaians who report having an interest in public affairs is only slightly lower in 2008 (68.3 percent).

50   The question was: "Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options? We should have one political party?" Follow-up questions asked about military rule or decisions being made by traditional elders.

51   Where the Afrobarometer dataset facilitates this subnational analysis, most of the well-known datasets on regime type and the level of democracy from Polity to Freedom House summarize the indicators into an aggregate score for the nation.

52   The Afrobarometer data for these regions also contrasts with trends in "objective" trends in poverty rates for Ghana over this period.

53   See MacLean (2004) for a comparative analysis of the divergent farmer response to environmental and price changes.

54   Quote from survey interviews, #123, #175, #215, #164, #140, Makwan, Ghana.

55   Quotes from men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

56   These statistics are cumulative amounts that combine results for the first, second and third mentioned responses.

57   Quotes from men's and women's focus groups, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

58   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

59   Survey interviews and men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

60   Quote from men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

61   This difference was statistically significant with a t-test significance of .005.

62   Quote from survey interviews, #190, 139, Makwan, Ghana.

63   Quote from survey interviews, #38, B, Ghana.

64   Survey interviews, B, Ghana.

65   Women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

66   Men's focus group, B, Ghana, March 1999.

67   Men's focus group, B, Ghana, March 1999.

68   Men's and women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

69   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

70   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

71   Quote from survey interview, #149, Makwan, Ghana. See also for example survey interviews #162, 147, 134, 118, 144, 133, 144, Makwan, Ghana. Quotes from survey interviews, #97, B, Ghana.

72   Quote from survey interview, #135, M, Ghana. Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999. Survey interviews, #22, #2, #89, B, Ghana.

73   Quotes from survey interviews, #134, 150, Makwan, Ghana.

74   Men focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999. Men's focus group, B, Ghana, March 1999.

75   Quotes from men's and women's focus groups, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

76   Men and women's focus group, Barima, Ghana, March 1999, and Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

77   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

78   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

79   For a more in-depth discussion of the distinctions between formal and informal institutions, see MacLean 2010.

80   Quote from men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

81   Quote from men's focus group, Barima, Ghana, March 1999.

82   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

83   Women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

84   Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.

85 Men's focus group, B, Ghana, March 1999.
86 Men's and women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
87 Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
88 Women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
89 Quote from survey interview #197, Makwan, Ghana. Quotes from men's focus group, B, Ghana.
90 Women's focus group, Barima, Ghana, March 1999.
91 Quote from survey interview, #142, Makwan, Ghana.
92 Survey interviews, Makwan, Ghana.
93 Quote from survey interview, #206, Makwan, Ghana.
94 Survey interview #59, Barima, Ghana.
95 Quote from men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
96 Quotes from survey interviews and men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
97 Men's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
98 Women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999.
99 Women's focus group, Makwan, Ghana, April 1999. See also women's focus group, Barima, Ghana, March 1999.
100 MacLean (2010).
101 See Boone (2006) on the cross-national and sub-national differences in state formation in Africa.
102 Schaeffer's (1999) pioneering study explores how Wolof speakers in rural Senegal conceptualize democracy in their own way but does not seek to make causal claims. Bleck's (n.d.) research on public and Islamic education and citizenship in Mali attempts this sort of multi-level causal analysis.
103 See Schatz et al. (2009) on political ethnography.

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Party Youth Activists and Low-Intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana: A Qualitative Study of Party Foot Soldiers' Activism

GEORGE M. BOB-MILLIAR

Abstract: Within the literature, there is growing concern about how competitive politics are contributing to electoral violence in Africa. The focus of scholars has been on large-scale organized political violence, referred to here as high-intensity electoral violence. This article fills a gap in the literature and introduces a "new" concept I call low-intensity electoral violence by youth activists affiliated with political parties. The article is based on youth activists affiliated to political parties in Ghana. Ghanaian parties mobilize these rank and file party members, who are commonly known as party foot soldiers. I argue that politics in Ghana functions within a clientelism environment where the party in government uses state authority to dispense patronage. Political parties recruit and use foot soldiers to commit electoral fraud in order to win elections or to maintain their control over state resources. On the basis of an original dataset built using event catalogs and in-depth interviews, the key argument of this article is that the normative logic of the winner-take-all electoral politics is that the winner of a presidential election monopolizes all state power. It further argues that this logic contributes to what I call low-intensity electoral violence. The aggressive behavior of the party foot soldiers is also linked to structural and partisan factors such as youth unemployment, unfulfilled electoral promises, and the survival strategies of elite groups within parties. The article concludes that as party foot soldiers begin to play an important role in the capture of power by political elites, they view a change of regime as the right time to claim political opportunities. On the whole, however, acts of aggression committed by youth party foot soldiers are of the low intensity kind.

Introduction

Youth in Sub-Saharan Africa are said to constitute an important constituency for electoral mobilization. But in spite of making up 70 percent of the region's population, they are less engaged in partisan politics for a variety of reasons.[1] To be sure, elections are increasingly characterized by bitter struggles over access to state resources. And given the high stakes involved in capturing state power, politicians have come to value the organizational abilities of youth groups.[2] Democracy in Ghana is arguably a model of African democracy and serves as a yardstick for other democracies on the continent. And, yet, competitive politics in Africa's "model democracy" still generate electoral violence. This article proposes the "new" concept of low-intensity electoral violence to describe, measure, and show how interactions between Ghana's main political parties and party activists generate electoral violence. Electoral violence results from keen competition when incumbents and challengers manipulate the processes to gain advantage over their opponents. Most observer

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assessments of the conduct of elections in Africa since the "third wave" of democratization in the 1990s usually contain incidences of violence.

In the democratization and elections literature, various authors analyzing flawed elections or conflicts resulting from disputed elections in sub-Saharan Africa have used the concept "electoral violence" to describe these political infractions, disturbances, or riotous behavior of party supporters.[3] The majority of existing studies on electoral violence have tended to focus on large-scale violence. These kinds of violence, which are sometimes systematically organized by elite groups and their sympathizers, may be described as high-intensity electoral violence.[4] Indeed, Straus has noted that electoral violence is on the increase in African democracies.[5] This reflects the fact that competitive politics had never been keener. Disputed presidential polls in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, and Côte d'Ivoire, for example, were accompanied by reportedly widespread mass killings, destruction of property, and the displacement of several communities.[6]

To be sure, not all electoral violence in Africa can be categorized as high-intensity violence. The degree of intensity and the scale of atrocities vary widely between states. Researchers have barely begun to conceptualize the intensity or magnitude of election related violence. This article begins to fill this gap in our understanding of what I call low-intensity electoral violence. I define low-intensity electoral violence as election-related disturbances or infractions occurring during the pre-vote and post-vote periods in which there are no more than ten election-related deaths; violence is localized; and, there is no large-scale displacement of human beings and dispossession of assets. Nonetheless, low-intensity violence is one characterized by the manipulation of formal procedures, violent assault/harassment, breach of the peace, disorderly behavior, protests, disorderly conduct, violent intimidation, vandalization or destruction of the properties of parties and supporters, stealing or stuffing of ballot boxes and other kinds of electoral fraud. The instigators or perpetrators of low-intensity electoral violence are political parties, politicians, and party youth groups.

Two main parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), dominate competitive politics in Ghana. The competitive behavior is relatively free of the kinds of high-intensity violence that has characterized multi-party elections in some parts of Africa.[7] Nevertheless, the country has recorded localized ethno-political violence in which activists of the main parties clashed.[8] In Ghana's party system, foot soldiers—that is, rank and file party members—play a very important role in the partisan process.[9] Political office seekers have increasingly come to rely on the mobilization abilities of these young men and women. The role of party foot soldiers in the democratic process is, therefore, very controversial and has been questioned. A recent Afrobarometer survey reported that a majority (81 percent) of Ghanaians agreed that some of the activities of party foot soldiers had the potential to derail the country's democratic development.[10] The foot soldiers' brand of party activism violates the norms of liberal democracy. The operational logic of foot soldiers activism manifested itself in the open presidential elections of 2000 and 2008 and the resultant power alternation between the two dominant parties.[11] Foot soldiers of the NPP used the Akan saying "*y atu aban*" ("we have overthrown the government") to describe the NDC's defeat. In its practical manifestations, foot soldiers claiming NPP affiliation seized party patronage objects, including public toilets and lorry parks in Accra and other urban centers.[12] Violence characterized the changing of the party guards. The defeated NDC party foot soldiers, who controlled some public goods, refused to relinquish

their management to the victorious NPP party foot soldiers. The process repeated itself in early 2009 when the NDC recaptured the presidency.

On the basis of an original dataset built using event catalogs, in-depth interviews, and other sources (study design and method outlined below), the central claim of this article is that the normative logic of party politics understood as winner-take-all contributes to low-intensity electoral violence. The political system of the winner monopolizing all state power comforts and discomforts all political activists. Also foot soldiers' aggression is linked to structural and partisan factors such as youth unemployment, unfulfilled electoral promises, and survival strategies of elite groups. The article concludes that youth party foot soldiers place a high premium on capturing state power for the political elites. As a result, the foot soldiers view the change of government as the right time to claim political opportunities. Nevertheless, there is a significant decline in election related violence committed by youth party foot soldiers, a positive sign that democracy is deepening in Ghana.

In order to put the contending perspectives on political violence into their proper context, it is first necessary to outline the different conceptualization of political violence in the literature, before moving on to an analytical outline of the concept of low-intensity electoral violence. This is then followed by an explanation of the term "party foot soldiers." The section focuses on the multifaceted nature of the term in Ghanaian politics. The discussion is centered on the roles foot soldiers play in the partisan process and the potential triggers of low-intensity political violence analyzed. Finally, I will present and discuss the empirical findings and the overall implications of low-intensity electoral violence for the consolidation of democracy in Ghana.

Method and Data

This article examines contentious or aggressive politics using both direct and indirect approaches. The indirect approach used to gather data for the creation of my original dataset was the event catalog model. The event catalogs method has figured prominently in empirical studies of collective violence and political struggle.[13] As a method, event catalogs allow for the compilation of acts of political aggression over a longer time period. For instance, in studies of collective violence, event categorizations give an indication of the intensity, magnitude, duration, as well as the form of violence.

For this event catalog model, I gathered data on incidences of infractions that constituted election related violence between 1992 and 2012. It must be acknowledged that it is difficult to determine whether a particular violent incident is directly related to an election or not.[14] There are no fixed criteria in the existing literature on which incidences constitute electoral violence or worse still what constitutes low-intensity electoral violence. To overcome this lacuna, I established a number of criteria to determine what constitutes a particular level of electoral violence. First, I examined whether the perpetrators of violence shared a political motive and an illegitimate strategy to win elections. Second, I categorized the time or occurrence of the incident as pre-, day-of-vote, and post-vote phases. Third, I delineated the magnitude or degree of intensity of the disturbances or infractions based on the level of casualties recorded and their geographical spread. Finally, I determined the level of criminality by the number of injured people, number of dead, and the damage to land and properties.

In preparing the event catalogs for this study, I consulted three broad sources including local newspapers, publications from democracy promotion think tanks, and reports of

election observer missions. From these different sources, I prepared event catalogs covering the period from 1992 to 2012. The events or incidences were differentiated into five sub-categories: a) ballot box theft or electoral fraud (e.g., underage voting, impersonation, double voting, etc.); b) physical assault or violent intimidation; c) seizure of public properties; d) protests or public disorders; and e) vandalization or destruction of party property. In order to avoid repetition or duplication of events reported in the various sources, the reports were crosschecked by date, location, and content. Nevertheless, the accuracy of some events reported in some politically aligned newspapers (e.g., *Daily Guide*, *Daily Searchlight*, and *Ghana Palaver*) could not be ascertained. The total number of events or incidences contained in the catalogs was 5,707 (see Table 1 below).

The direct methodological approach employed in-depth interviews and personal ethnographic observations. I undertook semi-structured in-depth interviews and participant observation with party members to contextualize the data from event catalogs. Fifty party activists were interviewed. The respondents were purposefully selected and consisted of thirty self-identified foot soldiers, ten Members of Parliament, and ten party executives of the main parties. The sampling frames were divided into list and non-list. To qualify to be included in the list sample, one needed to be a registered member of one of the main parties. Consequently, card-bearing party members, including Members of Parliament and party executives, made up the list frames. The non-list frame consisted of the party foot soldiers without registration but who claimed affiliation to one of the main parties. Foot soldiers were sampled from party regional offices. Consequently, foot soldiers interviewed were randomly selected from constituencies across the country.

Finally, I used political ethnography to observe political activities involving party activists. Political ethnography allows for a "close-up and real-time observation of actors involved" in contentious political activities.[15] Indeed, ethnographic methods "can reveal a great deal about interactional dynamics, particularly at the meso or organizational level."[16] The direct observations of foot soldiers' activism as a participant observer at party rallies, congresses, conference, and protests since 2007 have yielded valuable insights.

Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

The first task of this article is to provide an overview of the contending perspectives on political violence that dominate mainstream political science literature. Nevertheless, the focus here is on election-related violence in matured and emerging liberal democracies.

In a theoretical overview that examined the relationship between democracy and violence, Schwarzmantel defined political violence "as the use or threatened use of physical coercion to achieve political ends."[17] He explained further that "political violence is the use of physical coercion to achieve a change in the nature of the political order, or to defend that order in its existing form." The author also distinguished "political" from "criminal" violence. While identifiable groups carry out political violence, either as part of the state apparatus or as members of a non-state organization, criminal violence is carried out for personal gain and is also done by persons or gangs whose identities are not known. Schwarzmantel's categorization allows for a similar distinction in my analysis of electoral violence. Höglund, a conflict studies scholar, makes a strong case for a conceptualization of electoral violence, which is distinguishable from other types of social and political conflicts.[18] However, within the context of political pluralism, Andreas Mehler was categorical about the utility of violence on political platforms. Mehler argues that electoral violence is "a

dominant mode of the political struggle."[19] He went further to explained thus: "We may distinguish different dimensions of violence that should not lightly be mixed up. A mass protest demanding political freedoms may escalate into street violence. This is not the same as when a political party decides to go underground and to directly participate in a civil war. All violence is not equal."[20]

This study's empirical evidence, analyzed below, is consistent with Mehler's position that "all violence is not equal" and that electoral violence is different from other forms of political violence. Indeed, two key contributions on electoral violence in Africa advanced similar arguments. Alluding to European antecedence, Laakso concludes that democratic transitions and electoral violence are always correlated.[21] However, in the case of Africa, Laakso argues that the preponderance of electoral violence on the continent is evidence of flawed post-1990 transitions. In a recent publication, several scholars examined the origins, the triggers, and the consequence of electoral violence in Africa.[22] The findings from the study of Straus and Taylor, based on a comprehensive dataset called the African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD), challenged the prevailing perspectives on the causes of electoral violence.[23] First, electoral violence in Africa occurred in only 10 percent of the elections conducted in Africa between 1990 and 2008.[24] Second, government parties perpetrated the majority of electoral violence during the pre-vote campaign period. The authors argued that electoral violence is primarily the result of incumbents manipulating the electoral procedure to maintain power.[25]

The phenomenon social movements scholars call "contentious politics" could offer some insights into the behaviors of party foot soldiers in Ghana. In this context, Tarrow argues that "we cannot understand episodes of contention without examining how contentious and institutional politics—including electoral politics—intersect."[26] In their book, *Contentious Politics*, Tilly and Tarrow provided an elaborate definition of the concept, and it is worth quoting them at length because it forms the basis of the argument in this paper: "Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties."[27]

Collective action is characterized as contentious politics when it causes activists to come together and confront ruling elites or their opponents "around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent."[28] Tarrow points out that the mechanisms that help to explain the occurrence of contentious politics within a polity are linked to "changes in political opportunities" and "perceive threats."[29] These mechanisms induce citizens to respond to a range of incentives, which could be "material, ideological, partisan and group-based, long-standing and episodic."[30] Political opportunities and constraints are the ingredients needed to induce contentious politics. In the context of developing world politics, some of the variables in the theoretical literature that are given as the cause of contentious politics appear abstract. The empirical literature addresses this problem.

The empirical literature expatiates on the agents of electoral violence. Electoral violence is triggered by the interaction of three principal agents: political parties, elites groups, and youth groups (or party youth wings).[31] It is generally assumed, with little empirical evidence, that politicians and political parties instigate most electoral violence. In ideological and conceptual terms, there are difficulties in associating political parties with electoral violence.[32] There is a thin line between what is institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics in many African democracies. Many political parties are weak and lack an

organizational structure. Some observers see African political parties as the vehicles for elite groups to capture state power.[33] Consequently, political parties have varied motives for employing violence to achieve a political objective.[34]

Nevertheless, the instrumentalization of violence is not exclusive to incumbents. Competitive elections in every democracy have two outcomes. Przeworski puts it succinctly when he notes that democracy is a system that produces winners and losers.[35] In African democratic practice the winners, most often incumbents, tend to be satisfied with poll results. The losers, mostly opposition parties, would always dispute the validity of the polls. Yet, in all democracies a popular mandate grants political opportunities to the winners. The exclusive use of state resources by a ruling coalition to entrench itself in power is the source of contention in many African democracies. According to Mehler, because so much is at stake political elites have incentives to influence the electoral process through intimidation and violence.[36]

Besides political parties and elite groups, the other important agent of electoral violence is youth groups aligned with political parties. The behavior of youth activists or supporters of political parties in Africa straddles conventional and unconventional political participation.[37] Writing about Africa's youth, Jon Abbink noted that "African youths are over-represented in armed rebel or insurgent movements of various kinds as well as in criminal activities, to which they are so easily recruited."[38] This observation also holds true for youth recruitment for partisan politics. All political parties in Africa pay attention to youth mobilization simply because they are the group needed to bring about change.[39] The political elites see the youth as an important constituency for electoral mobilization because of "their sheer numbers, their availability, and their eagerness to take up anything that may relieve them of conditions of poverty."[40]

More importantly, conflict studies experts have noted that many countries in Africa are experiencing a "youth bulge."[41] Consequently, the democratic stability of the continent is said to be threatened because stagnant economic development has a negative effect on the youth bulge. Weber argues that a country with a high proportion of young men risks democratic collapse because "male adolescents have a higher propensity to intergroup hate and political violence."[42] The supporting evidence for Weber's claim is that young men formed the principal recruiting pool for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), among other rebel movements.[43] Africa's youth are also found in various criminal networks or ethno-religious movements.[44] Youth vigilantism becomes intertwined with partisan politics when the vigilantes represent the interests of their political "godfathers."[45] The Mungiki youth movement in Kenya is one such example.[46]

From the discussions in the theoretical and empirical sections, it is evident that the conceptualization of electoral violence is problematic. The common characteristics of election-related violence in Africa are violent displacement, dispossession, or death. This type of violence is also known for its traumatic experience. Arguably, mass killings, displacement, and dispossession constitute high-intensity violence. The arguments advanced in this article are consistent with the theoretical and empirical observations of Laakso, Mehler, and Höglund, which emphasized that the degree of intensity and the scale of the election-related violence are never the same in any two countries or even within districts in the same country. Yet, there is an overgeneralization about violence in the conduct of elections in Africa since the "third wave" of democratization in the 1990s. This study's contribution to the literature on electoral violence begins with the unpacking of the

old loaded concept. In order to minimize miscategorization and mislabelling, a determination of the nature of violence based on the degree of intensity or magnitude, criminality, timing, and motive are all relevant for an informed analysis. The time of occurrence must be established. This requires a clear delineation of the pre-vote, day-of-vote, and post-vote phases. The degree of intensity of the election-related disturbances or infractions, as measured by the degree of injuries, geographical spread, and costs, is equally vital. More importantly, the level of criminality—based on the number of injured people, number of dead, and damage to landed properties—must be measured. Finally, the motive of the actors/perpetrators must be determined. A political cause must be the basis for the inclusion of a motive into the analysis of low-intensity electoral violence.

If, in an emerging liberal democratic state, the overall incidences of election-related violence do not affect the proper functioning of the state machinery and the overall incidences (as cumulated number of events) are on the decline, such a phenomenon is defined as low-intensity electoral violence. Election-related infractions or disturbances that record a death toll not exceeding ten and where no large-scale displacement and dispossession is involved would constitute an example of low-intensity electoral violence. The same holds for an election which has witnessed one or more of the following incidences: manipulation of formal procedures, physical assault, breach of the peace, disorderly behavior, disorderly conduct, violent harassment/intimidation, destruction of the properties of parties and supporters, ballot box theft, and other kinds of electoral fraud. A juxtaposition of the theoretical perspectives and the empirical literature, with the study's empirical evidence to be analyzed in the next section reveals the following. First, violence is the use of physical force to achieve a set of political goals and political violence must always be differentiated from criminal violence. Second, the flawed character of many post-1990 transitions is the root cause of many incidences of Africa's electoral violence. Third, political and not electoral violence is on the decline in Africa. Finally, and most interesting, contentious politics arise when political actors make counterclaims on political opportunities. The empirical evidence of what has been conceptualized here is presented in the next section.

Youth Foot Soldiers in Ghanaian Politics: Unconventional and Contentious Action

Political party activism in Ghana's Fourth Republic has been largely defined by the behavior of party foot soldiers. As a result, the term "party foot soldier(s)" is of recent origins. It gained political significance when a group of middle class supporters of Andrews Kwame Pianim, an NPP presidential aspirant in the party's 1996 presidential primary, described themselves as the candidate's foot soldiers.[47] Despite its inauspicious origins, the term has gained popularity on the platforms of all parties and has been used by politicians to identify with the aspirations of party members.[48]

Nevertheless, in Ghanaian politics, where social status is a significant identity marker in party membership, foot soldiers are at the bottom in party hierarchy.[49] According to the Marxian conceptualization, they are the lumpenproletariat. Party foot soldiers may be described as itinerant activists because their activism is very mobile and crosses party platforms: their engagement with the main parties is largely informal and highly personalized. In partisan operations, foot soldier activism consists of volunteering energy and mobilization abilities to support individual politicians attain party or public office. Foot soldier political activism is very contentious as it is driven by passion and aggression. Their

brand of political activism has features of lawlessness, and the line between conventional participation and contentious politics becomes blurred.

Based on my interactions and observations, the majority of party foot soldiers tend to have below-average levels of education or none at all. They were mostly without secure employment and survived by doing casual jobs, known in the local parlance as "by-day" jobs.[50] Consequently, as Honwana and Abbink have observed, without any meaningful employment, Africa's youthful population and, by extension Ghanaian youth, are always available to be recruited by the political elites as foot soldiers to work for their political interest.[51] The popular image of party foot soldiers is of heavily built men or what is locally called "macho men." They are more likely to be male than female and within the age cohort fifteen to thirty-five. As a non-elite group, many tend to live in poor neighbourhoods or in urban slums.[52] The political activities that engaged the attention of foot soldiers may include taking part in pro- and anti-government protests, attending meetings, canvassing for votes, and exercising public authority in diverse ways (e.g., providing security for their communities). The ambitious ones tend to formalize their membership with a political party. Those with exceptional mobilization abilities and leadership qualities are able to transcend the membership categories defined by social status, including education or monetary considerations, and move up the party ladder, either as youth organizer, constituency organizer, or local chairman. Chief Sofo Azorka, for example, one-time leader of the "Azorka Boys" (a ragtag youth group), used his leadership skills to secure the NDC Northern region chairmanship slot when the position became vacant in 2010.

Political Parties: Participation and Membership

Members of political parties are at the heart of the partisanship process in most liberal democracies.[53] They play an important role in the decision-making process including nominating and selecting members to fill critical national and party leadership positions.[54] However, the size of formal membership of Ghanaian parties is not known. Formal party membership varies widely between the NDC and the NPP.

To be sure, all political organizations need a few dedicated members to keep their base vibrant or engaged with the political happenings within the polity. In the formal western conceptualization, party activists are said to be the lifeblood of political parties. They are needed to keep their party functional from the national to sub-national level. This group of active members canvass for votes, explain controversial policy positions to the undecided electorate, attend party conventions and congresses, and do routine fundraising in their local communities.[55] The rules regulating recruitment to political parties are set out in the party constitutions. Nevertheless, the process for recruiting foot soldiers operates outside the formal rules. From my interviews and observations it would seem that party foot soldiers are recruited directly by an executive member of a political party or a party's candidates to assist them attain party or public office. The foot soldiers are recruited from the ranks of the youth within a particular community (known as "area boys").[56] Recruitment is largely informal and therefore brings a different meaning to bear on the concept of voluntarism, which is at the heart of party activism in the advanced democracies.

The political activism engaged in by foot soldiers is not seen as a voluntary activity in the formal or theoretical sense, but one that is mediated by an institutionalized Ghanaian traditional custom of reciprocity (or gift giving).[57] Lemarchand calls this phenomenon of gift exchange in traditional societies as "tribute."[58] And van de Walle classifies tribute as a

distinct form of political clientelism.[59] In operational terms, this custom requires that small gifts or assistance are given to the less successful person by the "Big Men" or women who were rendered a service. The post-1990 democratization process has embraced this custom on the party platforms to the chagrin of the promoters of political accountability. With regard to political party activism in Ghana, the party candidate or politician is seen as a successful person who must, by custom, reward foot soldiers for their services. According to the patronage politics perspective, foot soldiers are the clients and the politician is the patron who must provide for their needs in order to maintain their loyalty.[60] This thesis is problematic because it portrays the foot soldiers as powerless and therefore passive beneficiaries of the spoils of political power. Nevertheless, from the interviews and observations, foot soldiers expect that political power, once achieved, must be convertible into tangible goods. For example, when a group of NPP party foot soldiers felt neglected, they organized a press conference to register their displeasure with the Kufuor administration. A quote from the press conference is important because it captured the political and socio-cultural motives for party foot soldiers' activism:

> After the party has stayed in power for almost seven years, the foot soldiers have been forgotten and none of the foot soldiers have seen a change in their lifestyles and right now there are troubles in our marriage homes where some of us cannot pay our children's school fees and even most of us are thrown out of our homes because we cannot face our responsibilities. We want the NPP government to come out and address these issues; other than that, we will not involve ourselves in any critical party activities within the constituency.[61]

Evidently, party foot soldiers' activism is based on the notion of reciprocity and the provision of personalized goods. The foot soldiers perceived public office holders as wealthy and in control of patronage resources.[62] As a result, they expect the ruling elites to share state resources with them. As one foot soldier put it in an interview: "government property is for all citizens and since the men we help to attain public office are the ones in charge of the state resources we expect them to share the resources with us."[63] Thus, the motivation for activism in the foot soldier category is mainly targeted at receiving selective private goods.[64]

Incumbent party functionaries and aspiring politicians dispense patronage goods to secure the services of foot soldiers. Knowing that they are most sought after during competitive elections, foot soldiers strategize and extract the most political opportunities they can possibly get. The rewards foot soldiers expect from politicians are both tangible and intangible resources including monetary gifts (or "chop money") as well as the time and authority of the politicians. An introductory letter, for example, from the office of the "Honourable" Member of Parliament or Minister of State would enable foot soldiers to enjoy selective goods such as job opportunities in the security services (e.g., army, police, prisons, and fire service).[65] Similarly, the inclusion of the name of the foot soldier on the "Protocol List" from the office of the Chief of Staff or national party chairman would ensure that one's level of education is overlooked and "jobs for the boys" caters for such foot soldiers.[66] Additionally, some foot soldiers are rewarded with employment in the District Assemblies (as revenue/tollbooth/market toll collectors, cleaners etc.), and others are given seed money to start a retail business.[67]

The labor intensive nature of political campaigns makes the services of foot soldiers indispensable in Ghana's electoral politics. That said, it is worth asking to what extent and how foot soldiers actually participate in politics. In the conventional (non-violent) type of participation, foot soldiers play two very crucial roles. Political campaigning in Ghana is heavily dependent on the old forms of campaigning, which are all labor intensive. Externally, party foot soldiers are needed to market the party and its candidates to the voting public. Thus, the foot soldiers become the middle political fixers, receiving information from the party hierarchy and disseminating such vital messages to the electorate at the sub-national level.[68] As a developing country, some rural areas are difficult to reach because of poor communication networks. In this context, the foot soldiers are needed in the mobilization efforts of the party and its candidates: foot soldiers tend to use bicycles and motor bikes to make contact with rural communities to canvass for votes for the particular party and candidate they work for.[69] I also observed foot soldiers in urban centers engaging in house-to-house or door-to-door campaigning.[70]

More importantly, foot soldiers are involved in internal party activities. Their involvement in the mobilization of party delegates is especially crucial during the selection of candidates for executive positions, for parliament, and the presidency. At the same time, it is important to point out that foot soldiers only enjoy limited voting rights within the parties, as the constitutions of the main political parties directly disenfranchise them.[71]

In intra-party contests, the foot soldiers' role is marginal. Their function in internal party elections is largely symbolic. This is because internal party contests are limited to elite members; that is, party members in "good standing" in terms of payment of membership dues and financial support to the party. What this means in practice is that only a few members can run for executive positions at the national and constituency levels. Furthermore, the composition of the party's electoral college indirectly disenfranchises foot soldiers as many do not vote at party congresses.[72] On this score, the differences between the major parties must be highlighted. The center-right leaning NPP in 2009, expanded its electoral college from some 3,700 delegates to over 140,000 delegates. The expansion has made it possible for some foot soldiers to participate in its internal elections. The center-left NDC's electoral college is restricted to some 3, 600 party delegates.[73] The upshot is that many foot soldiers only participate indirectly in party primaries, congresses, and conventions.

Nevertheless, for different reasons, all parties encourage the presence of foot soldiers at political events. First, the large numbers of foot soldiers at a party rally or program appears to give an indication of the popularity of the particular candidate or party. Closely related is the entertainment component of political rallies. From my observations, party rallies are at least partly social events for merry-making. And in rural constituencies, rally attendees are served food and drink.[74] In internal party contests, candidates recruit foot soldiers to mobilize votes for them. But the action of the foot soldiers on the day of voting greatly determines whether a candidate succeeds or fails. The various foot soldier factions usher their candidates into the congress grounds with acrobatic displays, drumming, and dancing. Second, some candidates purposely bus foot soldiers to campaign grounds to harass, intimidate, and destroy campaign symbols and paraphernalia of rival candidates.[75]

Aside from organizing, mobilizing, canvassing for votes, and, in a few cases, voting for political elites seeking election to top leadership positions, some foot soldiers also exercise public authority in the decentralized governance system. Through party patronage, the few foot soldiers that get tapped as the President's nominees in the Metropolitan, Municipal and

District Assemblies (MMDAs), while representing their party, also provide leadership for their communities.[76] At one District Assembly, for example, some foot soldiers contributed ideas or proposed practical solutions to sanitation, security problems, and other daily problems of the inhabitants.[77] Additionally, foot soldiers serve their local communities in socio-cultural terms. They attend festivals, weddings, naming ceremonies, and the funerals of members of their local communities. Without doubt, party activism at the foot soldier category is laborious. The majority of party foot soldiers act and behave like activists elsewhere in the advanced democracies.

Contentious Political Participation: Low-Intensity Electoral Violence by Party Foot Soldiers

Since 1992, Ghana has held six multi-party elections, making the Fourth Republic the longest surviving civilian regime. Political parties have mostly been the vehicles used by the successful elites to attain public office. As Lindberg has explained, party supporters including foot soldiers perceive the ruling elites to have control over state resources. Consequently, the expectation of the foot soldiers is that the politician who is in-charge of state resources must share with "their people."[78] Hence, in situations where the political elites or government functionaries are unable or are perceived to be unwilling to share political opportunities (the spoils of office) or fulfil the promises made to the foot soldiers, conventional politics veers off into the realm of unconventionality. That is, the actions and the behavior of foot soldiers become contentious, aggressive, confrontational, and violent.

The violence employed by foot soldiers to achieve their goals is spontaneous, localized, and therefore of low-intensity. On this score, a key contribution of the article that needs re-emphasizing is that the intensity of any election related violence must be delineated. Electoral violence generated by party foot soldiers in Ghana must be contrasted with the theoretical and empirical evidence analyzed in the above sections. Indeed, the high-intensity electoral violence of the kinds witnessed in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, and, Cote d'Ivoire are not comparable to those that occurred in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa. Broadly speaking, contentious political participation is manifested in two areas. First, aggression is demonstrated in the conduct of internal party politics during the recruitment and appointment stages. A perception that ruling party elites or appointees are not spreading the spoils of power adequately results in aggression. In my interviews with party executives and MPs, it emerged that there is an unwritten rule among the main parties that mandates political appointees or government functionaries to "take care of our people first before the others."[79] A former Minister of State captures it succinctly, when he said "we must make sure that our boys have chopped first before extending the invitation to others."[80] This is the unwritten contract that sustains foot soldier activism. To address the foot soldier agitation that characterized the early years of the Mills administration in 2009, the Eastern Regional Minister, Samuel Ofosu Ampofo, reminded newly appointed Chief Executive Officers of the various Municipal and District Assemblies that "when you are eating don't forget the foot soldiers."[81] Externally, contentious politics is visited on state institutions, public servants, and political opponents.

Manifestations of Low-intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana

Table 1 is an event catalog of the various forms of contentious political participation undertaken by foot soldiers in the period between 1992 and 2012. The next section gives an overview of the five categories of event catalog of election related incidences.

Ballot Box Theft and Other Electoral Fraud

Reports of ballot box stealing and stuffing were prevalent in national elections conducted in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. While ballot box stuffing is the process of putting pre-cast ballots into the boxes prior to the scheduled voting, stealing of ballot boxes is where ballots cast in an election are taken away by supporters of one of the competitors in an election. Party foot soldiers at the grassroots were involved in the stuffing and stealing of ballot boxes. In the

TABLE 1. ELECTION RELATED INFRACTIONS IN GHANA, 1992-2012

Categories of Event Catalog of Election Related Incidences					
Ballot box theft	Molestations/Violent intimidation	Seizure/public properties occupancy	Protests/Public Disorders	Party property vandalization	Totals
89	468	5	3	8	573
-	112	8	17	3	140
-	8	-	5	-	13
-	398	-	54	5	457
16	15	13	3	3	50
-	18	-	2	-	20
-	115	-	115	-	230
-	416	-	28	7	451
26	252	3	16	19	316
-	19	432	101	5	557
-	11	156	203	3	373
-	126	9	27	-	162
10	17	-	5	5	37
-	13	8	19	13	53
-	27	5	27	-	59
-	37	-	5	-	42
1	237	-	164	12	414
-	387	765	28	3	1183
-	19	321	16	2	358
-	15	87	13	-	115
-	97	-	7	-	104
142	2807	1812	858	88	5707

Source: Compiled by author, 2012

event catalog in Table 1, a total of one hundred and forty-two (or 2.5 percent) incidents were recorded and an overwhelming majority of the cases were in the strongholds of the two leading political parties.[84] Additionally, the compilation of new voter registers was marred by allegations of fraud, violence, and irregularities. For example, foot soldiers of the two main parties prevented prospective voters they alleged were "foreigners" from registering in Kumasi and Accra during the compilation of new biometric electoral registers in 2012.[82]

Molestation, Physical Assault, or Violent Intimidation

Molestation, physical assault, and violent intimidation have characterized most national elections and some internal party contests. From Table 1, these incidences total 2,807 (49.2 percent) represented nearly half of all incidences of low-intensity electoral violence analyzed in this article and appeared widespread. Consistent with the studies by Laakso, Mehler, and Straus and Taylor, the evidence shows that during the pre-vote period, party foot soldiers engaged in molestations and violent intimidation of the electorate and rival supporters/activists. In August 2008, an NDC foot soldier allegedly fired gunshots and scuttled an NPP campaign rally at the Jubilee Park in Tamale.[83] In the December 2012 election, for example, the main domestic observer group, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) received reports from its field agents of intimidation, harassment, and violation of the voting procedures in the Ashanti, Greater Accra, and Northern regions.[84] This observation contradicts postulations by Laakso and Straus and Taylor that on the actual day of polling, parties do not engage in election related violence. Similarly, inter-party violent intimidation was common during voter registration, national elections, and bye-elections.[85] In the north of Ghana, foot soldiers of the NDC and NPP vandalized registration centers. The violence was aimed at disenfranchising the supporters of rival candidates so as to reduce the vote margins.

Seizure or Occupancy of Public Property

Seizure and unlawful occupancy of state properties were widespread among the foot soldiers of the main parties. Recorded events of such seizures or occupancy from Table 1 indicate 1,812 cases (31.8 percent). This behavior of the victorious party foot soldiers resonates with Tarrow's argument that contentious politics results from "changes in political opportunities." Patronage objects such as bus terminals are political opportunities enjoyed by the incumbent parties' activists. Consequently, public property, including office buildings, cars, toll bridges, toilets, and lorry parks (or bus terminals), were the target of party foot soldiers. In early 2009, the foot soldiers of the NDC occupied several government buildings, evicted the occupants, and took over their jobs. The revenue collection jobs at many public toilets were forcibly taken over by the foot soldiers of the NPP in 2001 and the NDC in 2009 respectively.

Protests or Taking Part in Public Disorders

In Table 1, violent demonstrations against political appointees were the third highest incidence of low-intensity violence, registering a total of 858 (or 15 percent). Social movement theorists such as Tilly and Tarrow see public protest as contentious politics. Arguably, the behavior of foot soldiers is contentious because their motive for engaging in public protests was to confront the ruling elites. To be sure, foot soldiers demonstrated against Ministers of State, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs). A case in point was in March 2010, when a group of NDC foot soldiers in the Agona West constituency demonstrated against the MCE, Jacob Felix Obeng-Forson, whom they alleged was "misguided and incompetent."[86] Also found within this category were several anti-government demonstrations, the popular ones being the "*Kume Preko*" (Akan Twi meaning "kill me instantly") and "*Wahala*" (a Hausa word meaning "sufferings") protests which were staged in the nation's capital and other major towns. On May 11, 1995, an opposition pressure group, the Alliance For Change (AFC), organized the Kume Preko demonstration protesting against the then Rawlings administration decision to introduce the

Value Added Tax (VAT) policy.[87] In 2005, the Committee for Joint Action (CJA), another pressure group aligned with the opposition NDC organized the Wahala demonstrations against fuel price increases, "bad governance," "economic hardships," and the "insensitivity of the NPP government."[88] The above illustrations are consistent with Tarrow's argument that the mechanisms that induce party activists to engage in contentious politics could be "partisan and group-based."

Vandalization or Destruction of Party Property

The contentious politics engaged in by foot soldiers also affected party structures, campaign cars, and other party branded properties or paraphernalia. From Table 1, a total of eighty-eight (or 1.5 percent) incidences were recorded covering the two decades of the Fourth five (1.5 percent) incidences were recorded covering the two decades of the Fourth Republic.

FIGURE 1. TRENDS & PATTERNS OF ELECTION RELATED INFRACTIONS IN GHANA, 1992-2012

FIGURE 2. CASE BY CASE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RELATED INFRACTIONS IN GHANA, 1992-2012

Even though party offices are privately owned, they were not spared. In May 2011, for example, NDC foot soldiers attacked the offices of the mayor of Tamale and destroyed office equipment including computers, furniture, stationery, and exhibition stands. This youth aggression was said to be in protest at a "decongestion exercise" undertaken by the assembly.[89] The occasional decongestion exercises carried out by city authorities affect the interests of party foot soldiers. Tilly and Tarrow aptly captured this scenario when they argued that conventional politics degenerates into contentious politics when political "actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests." Again, in 2011, foot soldiers claiming affiliation to the NDC in Tamale burnt down a party office to register their displeasure over a court ruling that saw certain persons accused of the murder of an important local chief acquitted.[90]

Trends and Patterns of Low-intensity Electoral Violence

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the cumulated number of incidences contained in Table 1. While Figure 1 shows the overall trends and patterns of low-intensity electoral violence, Figure 2 displays the intensity of the five categories of incidences. From Figure 2, there is no net increase because the five different categories of violence show contrasting patterns. However, Figure 1 shows the occurrence and the intensity of violence to coincide with crucial national elections. Besides, the transition election of 1992, elections held in 1996, 2000, and 2008 recorded incidences of violence. These elections were not only characterized by violent intimidation, but were also noted for voter impersonation, manipulation, and the use of defective voters registers. Cumulatively, violence increased during the open seat presidential elections of 2000 and 2008. Yet, on a case-by-case basis, there is a significant decline in ballot box theft (see Figure 2 black dots). The act of stealing or stuffing of ballot

boxes has declined considerably as Ghana deepens its democratic process.[91] This finding is consistent with studies that have assessed Africa's democratization wave. Lynch and Crawford, for example, see an improvement in the conduct and the management of electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa.[92] In the case of Ghana, Figure 1 illustrates, from a high incidence of eighty-nine reported ballot thefts in 1992; only one ballot box was reported stolen in the December 2008 election. The election of December 2012 reported no incidents of ballot box theft.[93]

Molestation or violent intimidation is a common feature of all Ghanaian elections. To be sure, molestations and violent intimidation are common in open seat elections. Localized violent intimidation characterized the general elections of 2008 and 2012. These elections were a two horse race between the NDC and the NPP. Additionally, foot soldiers claiming affiliation to the NDC and the NPP have clashed at party rallies and in crucial bye-elections. Bye-elections held in Navrongo Central constituency (4 July 1995), Ablekuma Central constituency (26 March 1999), Wulensi constituency (4 March 2003), Asawase constituency (21 April 2005) and Odododiodoo constituency (30 August 2005) recorded high levels of violence. Similarly, two bye-elections organized in the Chereponi and the Atiwa constituencies in September 2009 and August 2010, respectively, were problematic. Two observers of elections in Ghana concluded that the polls failed the democratic test because both recorded "unprecedented levels of violence and voter intimidation."[94]

In and between national elections, molestation and violent intimidation have been observed in the parties' internal conduct. As Figure 1 shows, there was a consistent pattern of physical assault or violent intimidation in open seat presidential and parliamentary primary elections and party executive leadership contests. To be sure, at the beginning of the Fourth Republican dispensation, only the NPP selected its candidates using the primary method.[95]

The institutionalization of presidential and parliamentary elections primaries in the two leading parties made competition keener. An NDC presidential primary in December 2002 witnessed a close race between former Vice-President Professor John Evans Atta Mills and former Finance Minister Dr. Kwesi Botchwey.[96] On this first attempt at democratizing the party's presidential primary, violence was used to disenfranchise Botchwey's supporters.[97] Similarly, the NDC national chairmanship contest was a two-faction race led by Dr. Obed Asamoah and Dr. Kwabena Adjei.[98] The party's December 2005 Koforidua congress saw the "Azorka Boys" using crude weapons such as cudgels and horsewhips on their opponents. Other forms of intimidation carried out by the group included the defacing of campaign posters of the opposing faction.

Meanwhile, the NPP, which portrays itself as the more democratic of the two leading parties, witnessed violent clashes in the conduct of its parliamentary primary election in 2008.[99] Nevertheless, cumulatively (as Figure 2 shows) there is a decline in molestation and other violent intimidation (see white squares). The incidences of vandalization have also not changed significantly (see white triangles). There was, however, a significant increase in the seizure of public properties and also a marginal increase in protests (see white circles and inverted black triangles). On the whole and consistent with studies elsewhere, there is a decline in election related violence in Ghana.[100]

The Use of Low-Intensity Electoral Violence to Achieve Public and Private Goals

Party foot soldiers use low-intensity electoral violence to enable elites to attain party or public office. In return the foot soldiers expect the political elites to provide political opportunities such as jobs and contracts as personal reward for their contributions.[101] In this context, foot soldiers use low-intensity electoral violence to respond to changes in material incentives. Political parties have responded to the demands of their foot soldiers by creating phantom jobs or "jobs for the boys." In justifying widespread agitations by NDC foot soldiers in early 2009, a former presidential spokesperson claimed that:

> Other political groups were totally excluded from benefiting from the national cake. If you look at organisations and institutions that emerged under the NPP, the National Youth Employment Programme, National Health Insurance, School Feeding Programme, award of contracts and jobs, recruitment into state institutions, we were running a system in which you needed to be a member of a certain political tradition [NPP] before you could benefit from any of these opportunities.[102]

The foot soldiers' demands for personal rewards can be understood within the larger context of patronage politics.[103] Broadly speaking, patronage politics thrives on the resources of the state. In Ghana, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were used in the pre-adjustment era to reward party or regime supporters. But the privatization of hundreds of SOEs starting in 1987 has deprived the incumbent parties' access to patronage resources.[104]

Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector fell from 10.2 percent in 2006 to 6.7 percent in 2010.[105] Apart from obsolete machinery, unbridled liberalization has been cited as a cause for the decline. Manufacturing is not generating enough employment opportunities. In 2011, for example, a mere 40,000 Ghanaians were employed in manufacturing.[106] *The State of the Ghanaian Economy in 2010* states that "unemployment, especially youth unemployment, is a major problem in Ghana."[107] As Abbink notes, the large and growing population of unemployed youth has become a source for recruitment as foot soldiers by the political elites.[108] Well-paying jobs for the non-literate and semi-skilled persons are scarce. All political actors, however, capitalize on the politicization of unemployment in Ghana. Consequently, there is a perception among foot soldiers that their deprivation is politicized:

> All the Big Men are the same in Ghana. The NDC party ruled the country for eight years but failed to address the numerous problems facing the youth. In the 2000 elections, the NPP said we should vote for them and they will treat us better. After eight years in power what did they do differently? The political system does not allow for consensus building among the two main parties. . . . Thus, all political parties want to claim the credit for themselves and in the end the youth suffer.[109]

The foot soldiers believe that the political system makes it difficult for the country's ruling elites to agree on a common national development program.[110] Consistent with this belief, Whitfield argues that the ruling coalitions in Ghana tend to avoid investing in the more productive sectors of the economy.[111] Development projects or investment with longer gestation period are avoided. For instance, agriculture and manufacturing that have the potential to absorb many unemployed youths are under-invested. Mindful of electoral considerations, ruling parties tend to move resources around to satisfy the short-term

interests of constituents. The foot soldiers never know if the party that won the election would continue with the policies of its predecessor. As a result, party foot soldiers expect to be compensated handsomely for their efforts. As Lindberg explained, the behavior of the political elites supports the belief that politics is a ticket to primitive accumulation.[112] Foot soldiers believe that politicians are wealthier and many would employ low-intensity electoral violence to get into pole position to receive political opportunities.

Conclusion

Increasingly, the conduct of multi-party elections in sub-Saharan Africa has come to be characterized by violence. The stakes involved in capturing state power are high and have therefore made competitive politics keener. Political parties and elite groups have bitterly disputed unfavorable poll results. While incumbent parties rarely lose an election in Africa, challengers are quick to declare victory. And when they lose, challengers allege manipulation of the voting process. In countries where electoral disputes could not be resolved through democratic means, violence determined which party or elites governed the state. The many incidences of election related violence since re-democratization in the early 1990s has compelled some scholars to claim that electoral violence is on the rise in Africa's new democracies.

To be sure, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced instability for considerable periods. These political upheavals, as exemplified by the cases in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda, were accompanied by widespread displacement of human population and mass killings. Mass political violence was common in the period before political liberalization. Pluralistic politics embraced by African states in the 1990s appears to have a moderating impact on mass political violence. According to Straus, large-scale political violence has declined considerably. Rather, contentious politics has come to characterize political participation.[113] Increasingly, poll results are disputed. Consequently, widespread violence accompanied elections in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire. In most of these cases of electoral violence, party activists or youth groups aligned with the main political parties played prominent roles to safeguard the interests of their patrons. Broadly speaking, electoral violence becomes an activity motivated principally to achieve a change in the prevailing political order. Violence is employed by incumbents and challengers to manipulate formal rules to legitimize state power. And no matter the scale or intensity of electoral violence, its eruption in relation to party campaigning taints the results of an election. Consequently, the degree of intensity of electoral violence is important in categorizing violence in all democratic societies.

The mainstream literature sees many election-related infractions in Africa as the dominant mode of political participation. Furthermore, this literature portrays electoral violence as widespread, and of course, of high intensity. This is problematic because electoral violence is never equal in any two countries. While several thousands of Ivoirians lost their lives in the country's 2010 disputed elections, the same could not be said of Nigeria's 2009 disputed presidential election. The conceptualization of electoral violence in the existing literature is uncritical. Election-related violence as reported by some scholars has tended to have over-generalized findings. This makes the concept of electoral violence problematic in academic analysis. Above all, most existing studies rarely factor the level of intensity into their analysis. As a result, our knowledge of the meso-level dynamics that sustain electoral violence in some of Africa's more stable democracies is lacking.

Low-intensity electoral violence is the concept I propose in this article to explain certain infractions or anomalies arising out of electoral contests in emerging democracies such as Ghana. Low-intensity violence is the opposite of high intensity violence. As a political phenomenon, low-intensity electoral violence is characterized by its smallness; such electoral infractions do not directly affect the overall stability of the state. Low-intensity electoral violence occurs during transition elections, open seat presidential or parliamentary elections, by-elections, and party primaries.

The agents that contribute to low-intensity electoral violence are political parties and elite groups. However, political parties by themselves do not instigate violence. The combination of a party platform, dissatisfied elites, and unemployed youth activists are the agents that cause electoral violence. In Ghana, the political parties mobilize youth activists known as foot soldiers to pursue their political agendas. Theoretically, the political activism engaged in by foot soldiers is not a voluntary activity. Foot soldiers activism is understood to be reciprocal. Engaging in contentious politics through the instrumentalization of violence among political parties in Ghana is linked to the understanding that activism by foot soldiers must be rewarded. Contentious politics is invoked when foot soldiers make claims on public properties that directly affect the interests of their opponents.

The political system in operation is one where the party that wins the presidency monopolizes all state power. The winner-take-all system makes no room for opposition parties (except in parliament) to participate in government. The winner-take-all logic contributes to electoral violence. Other contributory factors of electoral violence are structural and partisan in nature. Political parties easily recruit foot soldiers for partisan purposes because of their "availability and their willingness" to engage in any activity that would liberate them of conditions of unemployment. The foot soldiers of incumbent parties use contentious politics to protect their positions, access to power, interests and sources of livelihoods.

On the whole, however, electoral contests in Ghana are generally peaceful and the data presented here shows that cumulatively, election-related violence is on the decline. On the larger question of democratic deepening, this portends well for the consolidation of liberal democracy in Ghana.

Notes

1   Honwana 2012; Resnick and Casale 2011.
2   Abbink 2005; Rossler 2005; Richards 1996.
3   See among others, Bekoe 2012; Bratton 2008; Laakso 2007; Mehler 2007.
4   Laakso 2007; Dercon and Gutiērrez-Romero 2012.
5   Straus 2012.
6   LeBas 2006; Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero 2012; Banegas 2011; Straus 2011.
7   Anderson 2002; Bratton 2008.
8   Wienia 2011; Awedoba 2009; Lentz 2006; Lund 2003.
9   Bob-Milliar 2013, 2012a; Gyampo 2012; Asante 2006; Ninsin 2006.
10 See CDD-Ghana 2012.
11 For a comprehensive discussion of the election, see Daddieh 2009; Whitfield 2009; Gyimah-Boadi 2009.
12 Ayee and Crook 2003.

13   Auyero 2007; Tilly 2006, 2002; Olzak 1989.
14   Straus and Taylor 2012, p. 19.
15   Baiocchi and Connor 2008.
16   Staggenborg 2008, p. 342.
17   Schwarzmantel 2010, p. 218.
18   Höglund 2009, p.415.
19   Mehler 2007, p.194.
20   Ibid., p. 197.
21   Laakso 2007, p. 227.
22   Bekoe 2012.
23   Straus and Taylor 2012.
24   Ibid, p. 37.
25   Ibid.
26   Tarrow 2007, p. 5.
27   Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 4.
28   Tarrow 2011, p. 6.
29   Ibid., p.16.
30   Ibid.
31   Mehler 2007, pp. 199-211.
32   Ibid.
33   Gyimah-Boadi 2007.
34   Mehler 2007.
35   Przeworski 1991.
36   Mehler 2007.
37   Rasmussen 2010; Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Elischer, 2008; Daddieh, 2001; Toungara, 2001; Akindès, 2004.
38   Abbink 2005, p. 1.
39   Mehler 2007; Abbink 2005.
40   Abbink 2005, p. 3.
41   A large proportion of young adults in relation to the total population of a country constitute the youth bulge. For the concept in conflict studies, see Urdal and Hoelscher 2009.
42   Weber 2013, p. 348.
43   Roessler 2005; Richards 1996.
44   Abbink 2005, p. 3; Buur 2008, 2006.
45   See Olarinmoye 2008; Albert 2005.
46   Rasmussen 2010; Kagwanja 2005.
47   Bob-Milliar 2012a; Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2010.
48   Bob-Milliar 2012a, p.676.
49   For political parties membership categories, see Bob-Milliar 2012a, pp.674-76.
50   See Van Hear 1984
51   Honwana 2012; Abbink 2005.
52   In Accra, the national capital, foot-soldiers of NDC and NPP live side by side at Old Fadam, the largest slum in Ghana.
53   Whitley 2011.

54   Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2010.

55   Karlsen 2010; Scarrow 2009; Dalton 2013; Farrell and Webb 2000.

56   Personal interview, Accra, Ghana, 10 January 2011.

57   For a theoretical discussion on incentives for activism see Strøm and Müller 1999, pp.15-16.

58   Lemarchand 1988, pp.153-55.

59   Van de Walle 2007, p. 51.

60   See Utas 2012.

61   Cited in Bob-Milliar 2012a, pp. 677-78.

62   See Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012.

63   Personal interview, Tamale, Ghana, 26 January 2011.

64   Bob-Milliar 2012a.

65   See The Daily Searchlight, 24 August 2012.

66   Personal interview, Wa, Ghana, 28 January 2011; see also Kopecký and Spirova 2011.

67   Personal interview, Tamale, Ghana, 26 January 2011.

68   See Ninsin 2006; Asante 2006.

69   Personal interview, Wa, Ghana, 30 January 2011.

70   Author's observation in Accra, Ghana, 30 November 2012.

71   See the constitutions of the NPP (2009) and NDC (2002).

72   The electoral college is the body that is mandated by the party's constitution to vote at the party congress.

73   The NDC is currently compiling a new member's register and it's likely it will also expand its electoral college.

74   Personal observation in Lawra-Nandom constituency, November 2007.

75   Personal observation in Legon, Accra, December 2007.

76   Bob-Milliar 2012a.

77   Personal observation at the Wa Municipal Assembly deliberations on sanitation.

78   Lindberg 2003, p. 130.

79   Personal interview, Accra, Ghana, 21 June 2011.

80   Ibid.

81   Ghanaian Observer 29 May 2009, p. 7.

82   Ursula Owusu, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) parliamentary candidate for Ablekuma South in the 2012 election was physically assaulted during the biometric registration exercise in the Odododiodoo constituency, Accra.

83   Frimpong 2008.

84   See CODEO Report 2012, p. 5. CODEO was formed in 2000 and is a network of civil society groups operating in Ghana (see http://codeoghana.org).

85   For details on the politics of bye-elections see Frempong 2008.

86   See Ghana News Agency (GNA), "Agona West NDC youth demonstrate against MCE,"

12   March 2010.

87   See among others, Frempong 2007; Osei 2000.

88   See Modern Ghana News 25 May 2005.

89   For more details on the politics of decongestion in urban areas in Ghana, see Bob-Milliar and Obeng-Odoom 2011.

90   For details of the politics on this issue see Bob-Milliar 2012b, pp. 592-3.

91   See CODEO Report 2012.

92   Lynch and Crawford 2011

93   See CODEO Report 2012.

94   Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012, p.106.

95   Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012.

96   Bob-Milliar 2012b, p. 549.

97   Bob-Milliar 2012b.

98   Ibid., p. 550.

99   Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012.

100 See Straus 2012; Straus and Taylor 2012.

101 Bob-Milliar 2012a.

102 Mahama Ayariga, Joy FM News, Accra, (6pm broadcast), 9 November 2009.

103 See Lindberg 2003; Kopecký 2011.

104 See Appiah-Kubi 2001.

105 ISSER 2011, p. 204.

106 ISSER 2012, p. 154.

107 Ibid.

108 See Abbink 2005.

109 Personal interview, Accra, Ghana, 27 June 2011.

110 Ghana currently has no national development policy binding on all governments. The practice in place is that governments' rule based on campaign promises.

111 Whitfield 2011.

112 Lindberg 2003.

113 Straus 2012.

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REVIEW ESSAY
Not the Heart of Darkness: Introducing a Borderland Perspective to the Study of Conflict

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Benedikt Korf and Timothy Raeymaekers, eds. 2013. *Violence on the Margins: States, Conflict, and Borderlands*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 289 pp.

Andreas Dafinger. 2013. *The Economics of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Burkina Faso*. Rochester, NY: James Currey. 212 pp.

Benedict Anderson's famous description of nations as "imagined communities" proves itself the most salient at the margins of a state, where a supreme act of imagination is required to perceive the significance of map-made borders on a physical landscape that rarely conforms to the lines drawn by history and politics. But those imaginary lines have real-world consequences, from the wars that have erupted over arguments about which ruler's imagination should be instituted to the proliferation of smuggling that thrives in many border regions due to differential regimes of law and taxation among neighboring states. Another effect of those lines encasing imagined communities is to draw our focus upon the political and cultural centers as embodying the purer essence of the nation, thus reducing borderlands to a marginal role, dependent upon the center rather than independent and thus in need of the greater protection against cultural and political contamination.

Just as Richard Bulliet, in his 1995 book *Islam: The View from the Edge*, worked to dislodge Islamic history from the caliphate and other central authorities, focusing instead upon believers who lived far from their influence, so do the contributors to *Violence on the Margins* work to depict "contemporary violent conflict and state formation on the basis of people's own experiences at the border, and the way they affect the making and unmaking of political configurations" (p. 6). Divided into four parts, *Violence at the Margins* offers a series of case studies from Africa and Asia that introduce the borderland perspective and then examine issues of violence and security, sovereignty and state identity, and war and peace economies. In an early chapter, Markus Virgil Hoehne and Dereje Feyissa assert the salience of borders in a supposedly "borderless" and globalized world on the basis of "the continued relevance of mechanisms of inclusion into a privileged collective self and the exclusions of 'others,'" such as "certainly concerns the relationship between Africa and Europe" (p. 60). Regarding the Karen separatists of Burma, Sylvia Brown insists that the borderland perspective "challenges the idea

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that state-making necessarily involves the gradual diffusion of power outward, from the center to the periphery," especially given the Karen National Union's ability to provide needed services and develop relations with transnational actors (p. 90). But borderlands are not always frontiers, as Karen Büscher and Gillian Mathys observe in their chapter on Goma/Gisenyi, a conjoined twin of a city that joins the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda as much as it separates them; there, the existence in close proximity of two separate regulatory regimes "has created possibilities and opportunities bridging the two cities in a joined dependence on transborder exchange… characterized by a constant negotiation and navigation between these spheres" (p. 120).

As much as state identity might be crafted from the center outward, so, too, do states use the borders in order to build identities, as Christine Bischel demonstrates in her chapter on the Ferghana Valley, which is transected by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, all of whom encourage the cultivation, by their own populations, of disputed territory in this region so as to solidify their own particular claims on the land. A similar dynamic comes to light in Bert Suykens's chapter on the Assam-Nagaland border dispute in northeastern India, where marginal populations can "become of central importance to the state and state agents as they symbolize the inclusion of certain disputed territory within a particular nation" (p. 168). Most noteworthy in the final section on war and peace economies is Wolfgang Zeller's survey examination of what he calls a "borderland governance" in the Uganda–South Sudan borderland, in which a fundamental ambiguity about the future, due to protracted conflict, creates its own set of conditions that compromise agents of the central state, who end up "using methods straddling and transgressing the boundaries of legality and territory to pursue their political and private business interests" in both times of peace and war (p. 213).

In many respects, for example social borders between ethnic or class, groups can produce much the same dynamic as political borders between nations, facilitating conflict as these groups compete for similar resources, but also creating the possibility of friendly relations as individuals use these social borders in order to engage in profitable activities. This dynamic lies at the heart of Andreas Dafinger's *The Economics of Ethnic Conflict*, which offers a rich anthropological account of relations between the Fulbe and Bisa in Burkina Faso. Dafinger opens by placing Burkina Faso and the province of Boulgou, the site of most of his ethnographic work, within the context of global systems. He observes how the state, with the support of global donor organizations, has a vested interest in instituting the idea of private property (for the security of global investment), as well as "integrating local agropastoral production into the formal economic sector," given that traditional subsistence production "is hard to assess, difficult to control and almost impossible to tax" (p. 48). Within this framework, the pastoral Fulbe peoples are at a disadvantage, given that their transhumance patters defy easy integration into a "modern" political economy.

Dafinger spends an important chapter outlining the ethnic division of labor and how that depends upon local land rights. The receipt of land "establishes well defined obligations through the relationship with the land" and "is the symbolic expression of the incorporation in the local community" (p. 59). Fulbe herders may borrow land with the permission of Bisa famers, for whom Fulbe numbers can prove an asset in the allocation of resources from state or global institutions. However, the Fulbe largely exist outside this framework of land ownership

and are never incorporated fully into the dominant society. Rather than separating Fulbe and Bisa completely, the ethnic division of labor creates a locus of friendly interaction, given that Bisa often invest in cattle and make arrangements for their care with Fulbe herders. This allows Bisa owners "to keep them away from their own compound and hidden from their own community" and thus avoid certain obligations to share their wealth (p. 93). Conflict, in many cases, serves largely to maintain the illusion of a hard, impermeable ethnic divide and thus obscure the actors who profit by moving goods across that divide; likewise, Fulbe herders attached to a particular settled community "have a vested interest in keeping up ethnic tensions in order to ward off non-local herders" (p. 157).

The pairing of these two volumes can serve to shatter some embedded misconceptions regarding the nature of both the state and of conflict. In his conclusion to *Violence on the Margins*, Jonathan Goodhand critiques the standard tropes employed by policy makers, who tend to define the frontier regions of certain states as inherently ungoverned or ungovernable, insisting that a historical perspective of state formation reveals that "the brutal politics of sovereignty playing themselves out in many of today's borderlands are not anomalies or aberrations, diversions from the liberal, Lockean norm. To an extent, they *are* the norm historically speaking, and 'unruly' borderlands are not automatic signifiers of state breakdown" (p. 259) but rather a reflection of the centrality of violence in the emergence of stable political orders and borders. In addition, many such policy makers readily equate conflict—especially ethnic conflict—with violence, or at least ascribe to such conflict an enormous potential for such violence, particularly given the mass atrocities that have been witnessed in recent decades. However, as Michel Wieviorka observed in his 2012 book *Evil*, violence is not identical with conflict but rather its opposite, something which flares up in the absence of channels for institutional negotiation. This assertion is particularly salient in the light of Dafinger's study of ethnic conflict in Burkina Faso, for conflict between the Fulbe and Bisa peoples is both a mechanism of negotiating for advantages as well as a screen behind which relatively friendly relations might be concealed for the sake of mutual profit. As he notes in his conclusion, "the exploitation of ethnicity through over- or under-communicating ethnic differences, and the concealment of economic activities and cross-cutting ties… are strategies of dealing with economic and demographic change" and not automatically indicative of potential violence (p. 184). Indeed, though the Fulbe people go nigh unrepresented in the government of Burkina Faso, making it seem the model of an ethnicized bureaucracy, the fact is, as Dafinger reveals, the administration has ended up establishing itself "as a distinct social group that now competes with local groups over the same or similar resources" (p. 182).

Introducing a borderland perspective (with both political and social borders) serves to undermine certain myths that states and the "developed world" hold about themselves—the myth that violence is alien to the process of state formation, the myth that ethnic conflict is inherently violent, and the myth that only a "civilized" center can hold the "wild" frontier in check and provide the resources that people need to fulfill their own potential. Much of Western political discourse is built upon these myths, and we will be well served if these books can help to lessen their influence in years to come.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ronke Iyabowale Ako–Nai, ed. 2013. *Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria.* Lanham: Lexington Books. 350 pp.

This book adds to the set of books on Nigerian women, some historical (such as Bolanle Awe's *Nigerian Women in Historical Perspective*) and some literary (such as Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi's *African Wo/man Palava: The Nigerian Novel by Women*). An issue with the book is the extreme variation in the quality of the book's essays: while some, pretending to follow feminist tenets, invoke religious reasons to limit the improvement of women's situation in Nigeria, others define women by emphasizing their supposedly feminine traits ("female persons with female nature or qualities, such as caring for weak creatures, personal attractiveness, and interest in people" [p.159]), or include contradictory statements ("the Matrimonial Causes Act is bereft of any definition or description of ... domestic violence. It is noteworthy to say that the Act did define the term domestic violence" [p. 81]). However, other essays are well-researched with carefully organized ideas that lead the reader to a more profound understanding of a problem and/or situation.

Chapter 1 serves as a general introduction to the topic and an attempt to differentiate between the point of view of Nigerian and African women and general Western feminist theories. Each of the subsequent nineteen chapters, grouped in four sections, focuses on a specific topic related to Nigerian women and their life in relation to power, with variable degrees of success.

The first section, "Women's Rights under the Law" (six chapters), focuses on various problems affecting women in the public sphere: effects on them of the three different legal systems in Nigeria (customary, Islamic, and state); the scarcity of women in elected positions in public roles, the Constitution, domestic violence against women and the framework to improve women's role embodied in the National Gender Policy. The main strength of this section is the wealth of data collected, otherwise difficult to find, and the portrait of women in Nigeria in relation to the law, how it protects but also subjects them to abuse, and how measures have been put in place, though not fully implemented, to improve the realities of women's lives there.

The second, "Sexism and Women's Marginalization" (three chapters, two by same author and mainly with same set of data), focuses on benevolent sexism in urban areas of Nigeria, the general cultural barriers against the advancement of women and how traditional views of masculinity negatively affect women's lives and development. The third, "Politics and Gender Participation" (six chapters), centres on how the exclusion of women from real participation in democracy is harming the nation, how applying women's points of view enriches the concept of "security," and how efforts of "gender mainstreaming" in Nigeria are ongoing. Highlighting the importance of women in peace-building operations and in upholding societal consistency in conflict—ridden areas, such as the Niger Delta region, the book discloses the harmful effects of masculinist ideology but to society as a whole, and emphasizes gender equality as a way to improving everybody's life.

The fourth, "Feminism and Social Movement" (four chapters), explains the role of Nigerian women in maintaining social coherence and union in dire economic conditions, and in defending against an oppressive militarized state power that tries to keep citizens subservient. It also emphasizes the role of women in grassroots movements excluded from broader civil society programs, using the Niger Delta area as case study for two chapters: one on the unofficial state of war in the region over the past years, the economic circumstances, and psychosocial consequences borne on women through continuous victimization and the violence meted by the State; and the other on the efforts of women for the environment, seemingly not of any concern to the other interested parties, i.e., oil companies, the Nigerian state, and men. The remaining chapter shows the historical resistance of women against the "unknown soldier" using Mme. Olufinmayo Ransome Kuti as an example of how Nigerian women can help fight against violence from the State with any means at their disposal.

Although each chapter has a list of references, the book also includes a rather rich bibliography at the end, which may be useful to further illuminate the situation of Nigerian women, and an index that closes the volume. In addition to highlighting problems, the book suggests measures for their solution and gives recommendations on improving the situation of women in Nigeria, while providing data on legislation and on the civil service which can certainly be useful in trying to understand the conditions of life for women in Nigeria. One weakness of the book is that in contrast to the beauty of the actual physical object (elegant design and hard-binding), a great part of the text makes extremely difficult reading because of the typographical errors and a lack of grammatical correctness, which would have been avoided with more careful proofreading.

Mar Rodriguez, *Cuttington University*

Ronald Aminzade. 2013. *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania*. **Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 425 pp.**

> Nationalism is a powerful force in the modern world. It produces the boundaries of contemporary political communities that differentiate citizens from foreigners, animates violent political struggles over claims to sovereignty, and generates identities of belonging that inspire millions (p. 1).

Ronald Aminzade approaches the study of the Tanzanian nation and its dynamic and continuing creation through the lenses of race and the economic development of state and society. Aminzade traces a complicated state- and nation-building trajectory from the dawn of the Tanzanian postcolonial order through the period of state socialism and into recent decades of privatization and relative political opening. Like many authors who explore the formative and transformative power of nationalism, Aminzade tells a story that is complex and compelling, intertwining dialectics of citizenship—with its restrictions and its privileges—and economic growth and power. These conversations concerning the overlapping push and pull of economic power and political belonging unfold from the story of a country emerging from colonial rule and attempting to figure out who its members are as a nation. His methodology

fits the question; intricate historical process tracing underscores the dynamism of the process of nation-building and lends a great deal of insight to the project of nationalism by intensely focusing on a single case, Tanzania.

Tanzanian nationalism, according to Aminzade, is an "important source of cohesion, domestic peace, and political stability on a continent rife with ethnic violence" (p. 357). Although Aminzade's take on Tanzanian civic nationalism generally argues that its inclusivity decreases the salience of ethnic boundaries, a central theme throughout the book is that the process of nation-building has, perhaps predictably, erected cultural and territorial boundaries that indicate the national and racial contours of internal and external others. There is a tension embedded in the practice of Tanzanian politics that exposes the push and pull between the objectives of shoring up political legitimacy and cultivating lasting economic development, both of which have bearing on the twin processes of inclusion in and marginalization from the national polity.

Aminzade's narrative is essentially an instrumentalist one. It traces the dynamic process of nation-building by arguing that the parameters of inclusion and exclusion in the national body are tied directly to the process of economic development within the state, as well as within society. This approach highlights the centrality of race as a boundary, focusing on the position of Asian-Tanzanians in a postcolonial political and economic environment. Aminzade also considers the role of foreign aid in the development of both state and nation, further blurring the line between measures needed for economic prosperity and a rhetoric concerned with national self-sufficiency. Who makes up the nation and who is building the state? Although his argument is compelling, I would suggest that the tension ingrained in the nation-building process has components that cannot be tied to strictly instrumentally rational criteria hinging on economic growth and stagnation. Although the author does an impressive job of discussing the actions and motivation of parties, the state, and the individuals that led them throughout history, his work could benefit from asking the question of why ordinary people followed leaders within the party and the state.

Aminzade does do a brilliant job of capturing the complexity of moving parts that collaborate in the project of national identity formation. One innovative and exciting component of Aminzade's work is the extensive attention given to the interaction between political parties, the state, and the public as they each intersect with discourses of belonging to and exclusion from Tanzanian-ness. This dissection of political entities reveals the divided nature of goals and interests, within the state apparatus, as well as within the ruling party. Particularly by paying attention to the diverse interest of political actors, Aminzade rejects a path dependent frame of reference in favor of highlighting agency at multiple points throughout the course of policy and identity formation, an approach that may suggest that there is reason to be optimistic about the future of democratic, civic nationalism.

Aminzade does an exemplary job of connecting the discourse of nationalism across disciplines. As a sociologist, he engages with historians and political scientists with obvious ease, underlining the need for cross disciplinary approaches to the study of nation-building and its constituent parts.

M. Victoria Gorham, *University of Florida*

Kwame Anthony Appiah. 2014. *Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity.* **Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 227 pp.**

Part of a current resurgence in interest in arguably one of the most important African-American figures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Kwame Anthony Appiah's most recent study of Du Bois' intellectual engagement traces the multiplicity of historical, political, philosophical, and cultural influences that invariably shaped Du Bois's lifelong "project of reclaiming and redefining 'the race concept'" at home and abroad (p. 6). In *Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity*, Appiah examines the intersecting intellectual "matri[ces] from which Du Bois drew and to which he contributed" in a thoughtful attempt to better place Du Bois within a larger critical framework. In this small book of just five chapters, Appiah probes Du Bois' most seminal works and the global ideologies that contributed to his own philosophy of history, constructed and reconstructed from the 1899 sociological study, *The Philadelphia Negro*, to his 1940 *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* and beyond. By tracing the conceptual influences of William James, Heinrich von Treitschke, Gustav von Schmoller, and more, Appiah is therefore not only able to illustrate key factors in Du Bois' intellectual awakening but also to aid readers of the present day in "learn[ing] something about how to shape our own—no doubt, different—responses" to questions of identity and our roles in the modern world (p. 23).

In the introduction, Appiah emphasizes the necessary intellectual challenge that Du Bois set for himself: "to come to grips with the social reality of race in a way that both resisted scientific racism and responded to the claims of cosmopolitanism" (p. 9). Aware of the present social and cultural prejudices that skewed the histories of African and African-American peoples, Du Bois accordingly sought to interrogate this concept of race, offering "the first detailed scientific statistical sociological study of an American community"—a project not just limited to *The Philadelphia Negro* but also inclusive of his later critical and philosophical works (p. 14). As Appiah suggests, in doing so, Du Bois "had invented a new way of writing about race" and not just in the United States (p. 15).

In chapter two, "Culture and Cosmpolitanism," one of the book's more pertinent chapters, Appiah expands upon his argument, citing a movement towards more global thinking throughout Du Bois' work. First articulated in "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," the opening essay of Du Bois' most renowned work, he offers what Appiah terms, "a cosmopolitan moral idea that, whatever his duties to the Negro, he has obligations to those outside his racial horizon" (p. 63). The studies that Du Bois produced therefore served a dual role in the American cultural conversation: 1) to record a more complete and nuanced history of a people and 2) to educate in hopes of transforming the racist American cultural imagination at large. Through this approach, Du Bois asserted a movement that inevitably re-envisioned black intellectual work, connecting the issues of Jim Crow and the color line, for instance, with a larger network of oppression overseas. Moving away from the tunnel vision of sorts that threatened the black artist and thinker—a dilemma that Du Bois identifies in *Dusk of Dawn* as "group imprisonment within a group," his works thus push for a more complete understanding of the striving and struggling characteristic of the colored condition at home and abroad (p. 67).

In the end, *Lines of Descent* is best placed among the emerging body of criticism that seeks to expand the concept of the black intellectual and probe the ideological milieus created

through his work. Like Stephanie J. Shaw's 2013 critical text, *W. E. B. Du Bois and The Souls of Black Folk*—a comprehensive study of Du Bois' engagement with Hegelian idealism in his most widely read and heavily examined text—*Lines of Descent* offers its readers insight into the process and projects of Du Bois. Contrary to the ideological stagnation that seemed to constrict the black intellectual of Harold Cruse's 1967 work, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, what Du Bois offered was a dynamism and fluidity of thought, willing to adjust and reshape his ideas based upon new discoveries and new stimuli he encountered through active engagement with the surrounding world. Because of "Du Bois's disciplinary schizophrenia," he was able to view the Negro question through multiple vantage points, perhaps the greatest lasting legacy that Du Bois leaves behind (p. 79). In charting that journey of individual and intellectual growth, Appiah's work is thus a valuable contribution to Du Boisian scholarship and an asset to libraries both public and private alike.

Christopher Allen Varlack, *University of Maryland*

Andrew Bank and Leslie J. Bank, eds. 2013. *Inside African Anthropology: Monica Wilson and Her Interpreters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 354pp.

The second cover page of the book begins with praises from four scholars for the new concept of "Inside African Anthropology." In a world where women have been regarded as inferior, the time came in the history of social anthropology as is seen in *Inside African Anthropology: Monica Wilson and Her Interpreters*, when a new breed of woman anthropologists, with a wealth of experience in field work, training, teaching, supervising students' theses, collaboration, etc. challenged determinedly what is regarded as "the official" history (p.10) of social anthropology. This well-researched book also synthesizes Wilson's and her research assistants' publications through the contribution of nine scholars, most of whom are either historians or anthropologists. It gives insights into anthropology and its relation to history and sociology from South African societies, having a new feature: the contribution of women anthropologists to field research and ethnography with emphasis on Monica Wilson and the role and position of African interpreters in field research. The book captures well the definition of interpreters in the context of social anthropology, bringing together their function and qualities. Thus, the book can be described as an authentic African social anthropology as Wilson "engaged with the discipline 'from the inside'" (p. 3) and "from the tent" (p. 14), and as the explicit expression of intellectual equality with men, something quite possible to achieve. The photograph of Monica Wilson with her interpreters on the cover of the book is a good illustration of this engagement.

Carefully conceived, the book is divided into four parts, for a total of ten chapters. Part 1 deals with Wilson's fieldwork in Pondoland and the Eastern Cape. Part 2 discusses Monica and Godfrey Wilsons' fieldwork in Bunyakyusa. Part 3 is about Monica Wilson's life and career at Fort Hare and the University of Cape Town. The last part focuses on her legacy. It is important to mention here that in the first chapter, Wilson's academic success depended largely on her "geographical, ethnic, family and class background" (p. 37). There are repetitions of information in the ten chapters of the book, but they are complimentary as they relate to a common basis, social anthropology. Although disciplines like archaeology, biology, history and anthropology

are in one way or the other related or complementary, Wilson showed her limitations regarding the origin of mankind in spite of the tremendous advances made in those disciplines. So, by observing a monkey for a long time without saying anything, was she not questioning implicitly the old evolutionist theory according to which man came from monkey?

The book provides an in-depth analysis of African societies from an anthropological point of view using sociological approach as "she saw no clear distinction between social anthropology and sociology. They are 'one and the same subject'" (pp. 231-32). The book captures well the disappointment of the white missionaries and the fact that Africans are Africans in that "Leonard and others saw no contradiction in being Christian and continuing to drink the protective medicine given by the diviner" (p.180) instead of expecting a miracle from God.

The theme of authorship is well emphasized in the book. In fact, the writing of *Langa*, a study of a Cape Town African township, is an illustration of authorship conflict between Wilson and co-author Archie Mafeje that the editors carefully and intellectually dealt with as they described *Langa* as "an example of 'the co-production of scientific knowledge' in team research work" (p. 275). But after reading about Mafeje in the book, one may wonder why the editors did not find out whether Mafeje had ever been a mentor. Leslie J. Bank, in chapter 3, seems to be more critical of the works of Wilson than does Andrew Bank and identified her failure in publishing her field notes on dreams which would help to "show how the social and imaginative fabric of the urban and the rural were intertwined in the everyday worlds and interpretative frameworks of urban residents who operated across different cultural fields" (p. 123).

Nevertheless, the book is suitable not only for all who are interested in field research activities in anthropology, sociology and history, but also for undergraduate and graduate students in tertiary institutions, and researchers in psychology, pedagogy, economy, political science, international relations, literature, and law. In short, for this reason, the book could also be said to be a library as it is well and widely searched, providing a rich bibliography. A great interest in the book has already been shown in the sense that published in 2013, it has been reprinted the same year. Even though very good books are written in English, I strongly recommend this volume to be translated in many other languages for a wider readership.

Voudina Ngarsou, *Emi Koussi University and University of Doba*

Lizelle Bisschoff and Stefanie Van de Peer. 2013. *Art and Trauma in Africa: Representations of Reconciliation in Music, Visual Arts, Literature and Film.* **London: Tauris. 325 pp.**

This substantial volume explores artistic representations of violence, trauma and reconciliation in African music, visual arts, literature and film. A fascinating foreword by Jacqueline Maingard contextualizes the focus on truth and reconciliation in Africa, while opening up the questions of the relationship between violence and representation that underpin the volume as a whole. The introduction by the volume's editors Lizelle Bisschoff and Stefanie Van de Peer highlights the complexity of the relationship between ethics, poetics and politics, and makes clear that they are specifically concerned with the diversity of African representations of conflict and reconciliation in Africa, rather than 'perpetuating a simplistic image of Africa as a war torn, troubled

continent' (pp.5-6). The result is a volume that is impressive in scope, with contributions on Angola, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa. The quality of individual contributions is equally striking, and considerable care has clearly been taken in the editing of the chapters.

Part One includes Albert Oikelome's chapter on Nigerian hip hop from the Niger Delta as a tool for conflict resolution, Stefanie Alisch and Nadine Siegert's study of the transformative power of *kuduro* dance and music from post-war Angola, and Moulay Driss El Maarouf's thought-provoking study of Moroccan music festivals, which are often state-organised, as a forum in which art can overcome the unspeakable. Part Two turns to consider visual arts, and includes Amy Schwarzott's fascinating chapter on the recycling of weapons from Mozambique's civil war into art, Sarah Longair's chapter "Unlocking the Doors of Number Four Prison: Curating the Violent Past in Contemporary South Africa," which explores the role of museums and heritage sites in post-apartheid South Africa. These are followed by Frank Möller and Rafiki Ubaldo's analysis of Rwandese photography as a counterpoint to the abundance of Western representations of the aftermath of the 1994 genocide.

The chapters in Part Three focus on postcolonial African literature. Tobias Robert Klein's impressively wide-ranging contribution discusses the literary mediation of conflict in post-1990 West African fiction. Robyn Leslie's chapter explores the critique levelled by literature and theatre at the mechanism of reconciliation through the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Chapter 6 then returns to Rwanda with John Masterson's contrapuntal analysis of Philip Gourevitch's *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (1998) and Marie Béatrice Umutesi's *Surviving the Slaughter* (2000). The final section of the volume, which focuses on film, includes Lizelle Bischoff's insightful chapter on the Burkinabé director Fanta Regina Nacro's 2004 film *La Nuit de la Vérité*, which deals with the difficult process of reconciliation. Stephanie Van de Peer's perceptive analysis of Moroccan documentary, Leila Kilani's *Our Forbidden Places* (2008), engages with the failures of the Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission to come to terms with the nation's Years of Lead from the 1960s-1980s. Chapter 12 examines indigenous film from the Democratic Republic of Congo, which, Chérie Rivers argues, is emerging as a medium of individual and collective healing. Finally, Cara Moyer-Duncan's analysis of representations of truth and reconciliation in South African films Sechaba Morojele's *Ubuntu's Wounds* (2001) and Norman Maake's *Homecoming* (2005) consider the lack of justice, the legacy of inequality, and the impact of psychological trauma that have left many South Africans skeptical about the efficacy of the TRC.

As Bischoff and Van de Peer remark in their introduction, the aim of the volume is to show the role of art and the function of creative expression to bear witness to trauma and become repositories for individual and collective memories. The difficult relationship between ethics, poetics and politics is carefully unpacked by contributors who provide us with valuable insights into a diverse range of art forms from across the African continent that engage with the impact of trauma and reconciliation. The result is a volume that academics in a range of different fields will find informative, but that is accessible to interested general readers and undergraduate students.

Charlotte Baker, *Lancaster University*

Catherine Boone. 2014. *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics.* **New York: Cambridge University Press. 416 pp.**

Catherine Boone's excellent new contribution to the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Series deals with the topic of rural land tenure regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and their effects on power relations, electoral politics, and the scope and scale of civil conflict. The book is directly inspired by the works of Homer-Dixon (1999) and Kahl (2006) who have argued that environmental and demographic stress can lead to various forms of conflict, but that this is dependent on other political and institutional characteristics. This argument is now advanced further by Boone, who demonstrates how variations in land tenure regimes, in a context of rising pressures on land, determine whether conflict remains hidden in individual and household relations, is restrained to the local level, or becomes absorbed by national-level politics where it can lead to more widespread political violence.

The crucial distinction in land tenure regimes is the one between neocustomary and statist regimes (Chapter 2). In neocustomary regimes national governments control land access in rural areas indirectly via local chiefs or leaders who have considerable authority to define property relations in their locality and to determine who has a right to land possession through communal legacy. In statist regimes national governments directly control property relations in rural localities via powerful executive agents on the ground. Statist land policies are particularly visible in resettlement schemes benefiting favoured (ethnic) groups. Tenure regimes are therefore intimately linked with questions of citizenship and rights to entitlement, particularly salient issues in contexts of high in-migration.

An extensive literature overview reveals a universe of cases which have been coded according to land tenure regime, land competition, migration patterns, and the form land conflict undertakes (Chapter 3). Cases are identified at the subnational level as tenure regimes tend to vary within countries. This leads to a typology of five possible situations in a context of rising land pressure. In zones of high in-migration, land competition follows ethnic lines yet is constrained to the local level in neocustomary regimes (I), whereas in statist regimes ethnic demands are expressed in the national political arena (II). In zones of no or low in-migration, land conflicts are restrained within the family (III) or against the local chieftaincy (IV) in neocustomary regimes. In statist regimes they could give rise to expression in national politics, but this last type is mostly seen as hypothetical (V). The typology supports the argumentation throughout the book, which is itself structured around three topics: ethnicity, political scale of conflict, and elections.

The book is supported by several in-depth case studies based on literature studies and field work (Chapters 4-10). In neocustomary regimes, land conflicts are shown to be generally limited. In western Burkina Faso and western Ghana, for example, ethnic insiders are privileged over foreign strangers, whether from different countries or other regions of the country (scenario I). Outsiders rely on informal land borrowing arrangements, which are increasingly reneged upon due to scarcity. Powerless and poorly represented in political institutions, outsiders are restrained to loyalty and exit strategies. In cases where there is active opposition ("voice"), like in northern Cameroon, conflict is contained within localities and the central state does not wish to intervene. In areas with low migration, such as the Kisii region of western Kenya, land conflicts play out in the family and weak status members such as women (widows)

and youth can be excluded from land access in apolitical ways (e.g. by accusations of witchcraft) (scenario III). Most attention goes to high-profile cases which include Côte d'Ivoire (southwest), Kenya (Rift Valley), Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kivu), and Zimbabwe, where statist land tenure regimes have promoted political violence on a national scale (scenario II). With perhaps Zimbabwe as an exception, in these cases national political leaders have sponsored and privileged the migration of closely tied ethnic groups to rural communities, which has led to ethnic grievances and opposition to the central state. These grievances are also capitalized upon by opposition forces in the national (electoral) arena (e.g. "Ivoirité" in Côte d'Ivoire), leading to a quick reversal of tenure positions when political patrons are overturned and escalation into zero-sum politics.

Catherine Boone delivers a compelling account of rural property relations and the expression of land conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a risk of over determining conflict based on land-tenure regimes, yet this is acknowledged by the author, who nonetheless convincingly argues for their importance. Boone also demonstrates the importance of rural Africa in national conflicts and a need for disaggregated, sub-national analyses. Based on extensive empirical evidence and supported by a strong analytical approach, this work provides an extremely valuable contribution to the conflict literature.

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Leila Demarest, *Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), University of Leuven*

Clifton Crais and Thomas V. McClendon, eds. 2014. *The South Africa Reader: History, Culture, and Politics*. **Durham: Duke University Press. 605 pp.**

Clifton Crais and Thomas McCledon have compiled a volume of well-selected texts describing various aspects of South African history, culture and politics. The reader is divided into eight chapters. The topics are more or less chronologically arranged, making it a history reader in which politics and culture play an important role. Instead of focusing on seminal academic texts as is common in the field, this reader includes materials drawn from a variety of sources: texts written by South Africans of all walks of life, speeches, legal texts, songs and prose. The majority of the texts describe personal views and experiences of particular encounters between European and African individuals, and groups in the various geographical, political and social spaces of what became the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the Republic of South Africa in 1961. In each chapter Crais and McClendon give a brief introduction to the theme, the selection of texts and the topics relevance for present-day South Africa. In addition, Crais and McClendon provide individual background information on each source. This in turn enables the reader to easily place each text into its context, and to conduct further reading and research.

The publication of the reader comes at a time when South Africans are celebrating twenty years of democracy. Across the country, South Africans are looking back at the events and developments of the last twenty years. The general feeling is that important achievements, particularly in the political realm, have been made but that many challenges remain. These challenges are predominantly of a socio-economic nature. Frequently, they are attributed to the policies of the apartheid era. From its inauguration, apartheid influenced almost every aspect of life in South Africa. "Apartheid and the Struggle for Freedom" (Chapter 6) and "From Soweto to Liberation" (Chapter 7) give various examples thereof. Even today its effects are still felt and continue to be an important element of the political discourse. Some of the key points of this discourse such as controversies surrounding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Nelson Mandela's successors Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, AIDS, and continuing poverty are discussed in the final chapter, "Transitions and Reconciliations."

The complex history of South Africa is more than apartheid. It has been shaped by encounters between European and African individuals and groups. Early encounters as described in Chapter 1, "African Worlds, African Voices," show how the first European settlers were often relying on the help of African individuals and groups. Over the course of time, the encounters were growing more violent as European settlers were trying to subject the various African groups. Diverse stories of this are recounted in Chapter 2 "Colonial Settlement, Slavery and Peonage." With the creation of the Union in 1910, more and more policies and laws were put in place to divide South African society. As a result, a privileged "white" and an exploited "black" class emerged. Chapter 6 "United and Divided" depicts how this artificial division influenced the lives of South Africans and planted some of the seeds for the current day challenges.

South Africa's history is also a history of migration. There is internal migration accelerated by the expansion of the Cape Colony, the discovery of gold on the Rand, the population growth and later the Groups Areas Act. However, there is also international migration. This is reflected in the importation of slaves and later of indentured laborers from India and China, then the exodus of political activists into South Africa's various neighboring countries, and shortly after 1994 of whites to the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. Stories emerging from migration flows are recounted throughout the book. Accounts of internal migration are especially prominent in "Frontiers" (Chapter 3) and "All that Glitters" (Chapter 4).

From my perspective, there are only two minor points to criticize about the book. First, in trying to capture the views of the various groups constituting South African society, Crais and McClendon display a tendency to follow the narratives of the dominant groups: the whites, the blacks, the coloreds, and Indians. Accounts of minority groups such as "naturalized" South Africans are excluded. Originally, they immigrated from neighboring countries, but also from as far away places as China. Subsequently, they regarded South Africa as their home and today and they are an established part of South African society. Second, the book only deals with the immediate developments after 1994. Often the texts for the post-apartheid era deal with aspects of Apartheid. Apart from flowery political speeches, there are few texts trying to tackle the question of how South Africans can advance the project of constructing a united South Africa. Of course, apartheid continues to be a permanent element of the political discourse in South

Africa. Yet, twenty years after the end of apartheid, it would have been interesting to have some more future-oriented texts.

By giving a short introduction of the topic, the selection of texts and their implication for present-day South Africa at the beginning of the eight chapters as well as each text, Crais and McClendon masterfully provide a comprehensive understanding of the history, culture and politics of South Africa. Many of the selected texts and accounts were written by prominent persons who had a lasting impact in South Africa. However, what makes this book a real gem is the inclusion of less-known authors and the many cross-references. Hidden within the numerous personal accounts, the reader will find references to the larger historical context and transnational connections beyond the thematic focus of a particular text. This makes it a must-read for students interested in South Africa and a useful sourcebook for scholars working on South Africa.

Sarah Hanisch, *University of Vienna*

Sebastian Elischer. 2014. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 336 pp.

Elischer's text is both one thing and another: it is at once a straightforward taxonomic exercise, and yet, the results of this exercise produce something more profound. At the outset, Elischer highlights the problematic nature of studying and conceptualizing political parties in Africa. First, the study of African politics has tended to be reluctant regarding analysis of African political parties due to the historical tendency to characterize politics on the continent through aspects of personal rule and neopatrimonialism. Secondly, when the study of African politics has considered the role of political parties, it has often treated ethnicity to be the general organizing principle, and has additionally regarded ethnic politics as inimical to the advancement of democracy on the continent. Thirdly, general analyses and typologies of political parties tended to be based on the European experience. As a result, discussion of political parties in Africa were likely to be dismissed as secondary to the politics of personal rule, and if they were considered at all, would furthermore be problematized for their failure to comport with the Western model of party formation.

In taking on this challenge, Elischer explains the intellectual history of party formation and shows that the study of African politics not only ought to consider the dynamics of political parties in the era of post-Cold War democratization, but also that extant typologies of political parties remain insufficient in explaining the variety of political parties in Africa. In correcting for these challenges, Elischer proposes an alternative typology that, in his view, correctly accounts for the variety of parties on the continent. Utilizing an amended version of Diamond and Gunther's (2001) previous party typology that distinguishes parties by their goals, electoral strategy, organization, and social base, Elischer produces a five-fold typology for the African context: 1) mono-ethnic parties, whose interests primarily reside within the promotion of the ethnic group; 2) ethnic-alliance parties, where, despite transcending parochial ethnic interests, generally produce alliances of convenience usually lasting no longer than a single election; 3) (ethnic) catch-all parties, where alliances among ethnic groups being generally more robust than

their ethnic-alliance counterparts effectively transcend ethnic politics; 4) programmatic parties, whose interests concern the promotion of ideas or a particular ideology; and 5) personalistic parties that are built around the promotion and advancement of a particular leader or elite-member of society. The author then assesses the validity of this typology through in-depth investigations of contemporary party formation in Kenya, Namibia, and Ghana, with supplementary comparative case studies in seven additional countries.

While the contribution of an alternative typology of political parties in Africa initially appears a rather straightforward affair, the implications derived from Elischer's case studies provide additional insights to the study of African politics. In brief, in studying the dynamics of parties across Africa, the author finds that contrary to prior assumptions of ethnic politics dominating the political landscape, ethnic parties indeed exist, though are not the dominant party type on the continent. Second, Elischer additionally finds that ethnic parties are not necessarily inimical to democracy, as evidenced by Benin's democratic development within an ethnic party system. Thirdly, over the course of repeated electoral cycles ethnic parties tend to transform into non-ethnic parties, or at least learn to coexist with other non-ethnic parties. Lastly, in attempting to briefly investigate the reasons as to why some countries possess non-ethnic parties while others do, Elischer finds some salience in an "ethnic bandwagoning" hypothesis, where countries with a dominant ethnic group will tend to have the dominant group co-opted and dispersed into competing political parties (as opposed to being balanced against by other, smaller ethnic groups).

In sum, what begins as a rudimentary exercise turns out to be something much more: that in advancing an alternative typology of African political parties, the results produce insights that challenge general understandings of contemporary African politics. To be sure, though such findings require further investigation and will no doubt provoke an academic debate, these findings nevertheless serve to promote the intellectual advancement of understanding contemporary politics in Africa. In so doing, Elischer's text contains utility not only for those interested in studying party development in Africa, but also for a wider audience with general interests in African politics.

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Nicholas Knowlton, *University of Florida*

Peter Geschiere. 2013. *Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust: Africa in Comparison*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 293 pp.

Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust: Africa in Comparison examines the complexity of witchcraft accusations in Africa, specifically in Cameroon, within the context kinship, intimacy, and (dis)trust. It is concerned with the triangulations of witchcraft, intimacy, and trust. Author Peter Geschiere, an African anthropologist at the University of Amsterdam, is very familiar with

witchcraft issues in Africa, especially in Southern Cameroon, where he actually began performing student fieldwork for his Ph.D. in 1971. In the book's six chapters, Geschiere argues that an ethnographical approach—his forty years of fieldwork in Cameroon—has positioned him in deconstructing and articulating the topic of witchcraft in Africa.

The author points out how the meaning of witchcraft has evolved over time as well as how it differs from one country to another, sometimes even within one country. He warns against the "sweeping generalizations about witchcraft omnipresence" (p. 13). He then states: "There is good reason to be prudent with generalizations, especially on a continental scale. Africa and Europe certainly cannot be compared as homogeneous blocks—there are too many internal variations" (p. 133). Geschiere notes that generalizations of witchcraft tendency topics are openly discussed nowadays and often vary. He argues that the media outlets such as newspapers and TV are contributing tremendously to these variations. Of course, social media outlets also contribute to the disparities.

Geschiere notes that anthropologists working in Africa have paid less attention to the relationship between intimacy and "treacherous attacks from the inside" (p. 25) even though there is enough evidence that links witchcraft with intimacy and with implicit aggression from the kin. He says that distances do not prevent witchcraft accusations in African societies, noting that "even the phone calls across huge distances can re-create the intimacy that is both highly valued and feared. Yet there are also increasing signs that kinship relations become strained to a breaking point by new distances and even more by new inequalities" (pp. 62-63). He writes that in Africa as well as in India and in America, witches may likely be kin to each other, unlike in Europe where they are likely to be only neighbors and where the major accusations involve not the kin but outsiders.

The author notes in the Maka area of Cameroon, it is indisputable that *nganga* (witch-hunters) themselves deeply participate in the very *djembe* (witchcraft) they are expected to combat. He observes that *ngnaga* he knew in the 1970s kept a low profile but nevertheless "were regularly in trouble with the government for creating unrest; they could easily be accused of defamation" (p. 83). On the other hand, from the 1980s to the present *ngnaga* aggressively and openly offer their services to families who can afford to pay, even though they still have major doubts. The *ngnaga* are even considered alternatives to judges. According to Geschiere, the increase of the intertwinement between the city and the village also impacted the trust built between the *nganga* and the communities. Hence, the village remains the point of reference as far as witchcraft is concerned.

The author argues that colonialism and modernity have impacted and reinforced witchcraft in Africa. He notes that "[a]fter independence—for most African states around 1960s—a belief in modernization inspired both the new African elites and the expatriate development experts to promote rapid westernization" (p. 162), which led to the degradation and dehumanization of African culture and the people, respectively. He claims that the contemporary "Pentecostals and other currents in popular Christianity continue this with their equation of tradition and an omnipresent devil" (p. 12). Geschiere observes that some media outlets and the emergence of video film production in Ghana and Nigeria have played a part in reinforcing witchcraft in Africa. He argues that the modern mass media contribute to the magnification of witchcraft rather than the weakening of it.

This critical book adroitly deals with witchcraft, intimacy and (un)trust—a crucial, underlining theme that has been overlooked in the study of witchcraft in Africa. Geschiere's work could serve as a therapeutic measure in dealing with and deconstructing the witchcraft phenomenon in Africa, which has too often ruined families. I would recommend that a shorter, less-scholarly version of this book for the general public be titled *A Handbook on Witchcraft in Africa: Family, Intimacy and Trust*. It could help many people and educate them on the issue of witchcraft in Africa within the context of family and kinship.

Uchenna Onuzulike, *James Madison University*

Susan Gilson-Miller. 2013. *A History of Modern Morocco*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 306 pp.

A Modern History of Morocco, Susan Gilson-Millers' latest book, is a most informative, convincingly wrought, well-documented and up-to-date general history of Morocco extant in English. The book covers two centuries of the country's history, thus offering a new masterfully conceived approach to both the periodization and the thematization of the history of Morocco. The author's methodology and her investigation of primary and secondary sources in Arabic and other languages make *A Modern History of Morocco* a thoroughly researched *oeuvre* that not only reconstructs a history but also provides a panoply of sources which will be extremely useful to the historians of the Maghreb.

A Modern History of Morocco is divided into an introduction and nine "sections" covering the period between 1830 and 2011. Each section deals with a specific theme within a clearly periodized time frame. The first two sections, titled "The Closing Era of Jihad (1830-1860)" and "Facing the Challenges of Reform (1860-1894)," expound the multiple challenges faced by a weakened Morocco in its relationship with an industrialized Europe whose expansionist policies were becoming more aggressive. Furthermore, Morocco's endeavor to implement reforms and its failure to stave off this increasing European hegemony is cogently argued based on "Arabic chronicles," which "form the substance of the early chapters of the book" (p. 6). The rest of the chapters, "The Passing of the Old Makhzan (1894-1912)," "France and Spain in Morocco: The Early Years of the Protectorates (1912-1930)," "Framing the Nation (1930-1961)," "The First Age of Hassan II: The Iron First (1961-1975)," "The Second Age of Hassan II: The Velvet Glove (1975-1999)," "Summation: In Search of New Equilibrium," and finally a "Postscript: The Long Decade of Muhammad VI: (2000-2011)," are divided into sub-themes dealing with specific topics relevant to the theme of the chapter.

Gilson-Miller provides an innovative reading of Moroccan history. Two salient qualities of *A Modern History of Morocco* are its positive reading of the stories of "outlaws" in Moroccan history and its long exposition on state violence in the country. She inscribes the Rogui and al-Raysuni's stories within a general atmosphere of revolt against the sultans and the makhzan. Thus the widely mischaracterized role of these figures in opposing the hegemony of the political center is unsilenced. Consequently, these outcast elements are refigured as agents of change who "represent a new strain in political life that redefined how opposition to the state could be expressed" (p. 69). Moreover, the book's discussion of 'Abd al-Hafiz's assassination of

Muhammad al-Kattani unveils the brutal struggle between the forces that defended Moroccan autonomy and those who were willing to achieve pragmatic compromises with European imperialistic states to maintain their position in power.

Unsilencing watershed events and inscribing the "years of lead" into the Moroccan history are among the many contributions of Gilson-Miller's book. From the use of poisonous gas in the Rif to suppress Abdelkarim's resistance to the Spanish colonization to the disbanding of the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (1956), hidden aspects of Moroccan history are cast in new light. While most of the facts about the tumultuous "years of lead" are widely known, thanks to prison memoirs and other testimonial literature, *A Modern History of Morocco* is probably the first history book to have written these events into the history of the nation. Therefore, the author undertakes the difficult task of canonizing this history, which institutional conditions in Morocco have yet to accommodate. Gilson-Miller underlines her awareness of the constraints, both objective and subjective, that restrict the work of Moroccan historians when investigating a history that directly implicates the monarchy.

The historical narrative presented in *A Modern History of Morocco* "revolves around three principal axes: the monarchy, the state [...] and society" (p. 215). The intertwined nature of these guiding elements forms the backbone of Gilson-Miller's narrative. The interaction of the state, society and the monarchy, sometimes in cohesion and in opposition at others, allows the author to weave the genesis of Moroccan nationalism, the emergence of opposition(s), the issue of Western Sahara, the Amazigh question, the socio-economic crises, and the role of *'ulama* in Moroccan society into a compelling and coherent story. Even though the interpenetration of these triadic elements is underscored, this deftly constructed narrative still illustrates the central role of the monarchy within the *makhzanian* system.

Apart from some controversy that may emanate from the book's positive take on some political figures, A *Modern History of Morocco* is a most welcome addition to the academic study of the history of Morocco and the Maghreb. Both professors and students will find this magisterial study both useful and informative. Moreover, scholars will find its numerous reinterpretations of Moroccan history worthy of creative emulation in the future.

Brahim El Guabli, *Princeton University*

Richard Grant. 2015. *Africa: Geographies of Change.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 356 pp.

Africa: Geographies of Change offers students a largely realistic and optimistic portrayal of modern Africa in thirteen chapters of approximately twenty-five to thirty pages each. Chapter 1 is an introduction to Africa as an urbanizing world region and millennium development frontier; 2 examines how readers might begin "Reframing and Re-representing Africa" as a continent of bloggers, podcasters and more; 3 delves into African environments from rainforests to savannas, deserts, grasslands, and Mediterranean and montane settings; 4 looks at "The Scramble for Africa and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region" from Mary Kingsley to Timbuktu, Great Zimbabwe and colonial city planning; 5 discusses rural Africa from the failed Green Revolution to new efforts to genetically modify crops, improve

sustainable development and gender issues; 6 explores Africa's mobile phone revolution along with its creativity, informal economies and spaces; 7 addresses migration (colonial-related, circular, forced) along with the role of remittances from athletes, entrepreneurs, and other professionals; 8 identifies challenges that remain in the realm of water; 9 enlightens readers on health from ongoing struggles with HIV/AIDS, Neglected Tropical Diseases and mental health, to the staying power traditional medicines and how technology is transforming healthcare; 10, on "Land and Food," highlights debates over the value of large scale agriculture; 11 gives information on climate change and the likely impacts on locations from the Sahel to Mount Kilimanjaro; 12 takes a look at China and Africa from Chinese investments, entrepreneurs, and migrants in Africa to Africans in China; and 13 addresses African futures and returns to themes of urbanization and sustainable development while also taking on issues such as terrorism and Washington's engagement with the continent.

Each chapter has two to three boxes with special topics on contemporary issues from fair trade, to Mandela's leadership, to the mining of coltan for electronic components, to slum and pro-poor tourism. Several chapters have as many as six thought-provoking topic boxes. All chapters end with a summary section and a relatively detailed bibliography separated into references, many of them web-based, and web sites. Black and white photographs and tables illustrate the topics being addressed in the chapters. Maps are also used effectively to convey relatively standard topics such as colonial boundaries, main climate types, HIV-prevalence, and GDP by country. Students likely will especially welcome the more contemporary-themed maps, such as climate change vulnerability by region and country, human trafficking routes, terrorist corridors, and Chinese sector investments in Africa.

Although the emphasis is on contemporary Africa, there is some coverage of history. A welcome aspect of the book is its intentional inclusion of at least some African perspectives, particularly in Chapter Two in terms of Africans' thoughts on development from within and changes to current forms of development assistance. Additional coverage of key exports from coffee, tea, and tourism to oil and diamonds would have been welcome along with some coverage of Nollywood and Africa's other film studios and their depictions of the continent. In some cases, the rather positive view on the African situation is tempered by the multiple major changes that will be required for improved development, but the lack of a realistic plan for making the changes needed. Mention is made of the Millennium Development Goals being underfunded and how the 2015-2030 Sustainable Development Goals may "fall short," but rather than expressing great distress over these failings, Grant seems to take solace in the improvements to some quantitative tools for measuring tools development, such as the "extended Human Development Index" (p. 330). The changes required for improved healthcare and access to clean water are quite monumental, but the book's final chapter focuses largely on opportunities for partnerships and positive change.

Grant makes additional overly optimistic statements. The chapter on African futures begins "2018 will be a benchmark year for Africa: the contemporary independence era (1951-2018) will have lasted as long as the colonial interlude (1884-1951)." Given that only Libya gained independence in 1951 and that five other states did so in the 1950s, but that the vast majority of the continent only emerged from colonization in 1960 (a year when seventeen countries gained

independence) or several years later (at least another twenty-five states), Grant's benchmark seems overstated.

Overall, Grant's book will be a welcome addition to the reading materials for any course on African geography or development. The range of topics from new businesses to population growth and Africa's global connections are well laid out and should be of interest to students not only in geography and development, but also urban studies and public health. Grant challenges those adopting a position of Afro-pessimism and reveals an Africa that is a diverse, increasingly urban, and complex, as well as a good place for strategic investment.

Heidi Frontani, *Elon University*

John Hannigan. 2012. *Disasters without Borders: The International Politics of Natural Disasters*. New York: Polity Press. 195 pp.

Disasters without Borders is about natural disasters like hurricanes, tsunami, volcanic eruptions, floods, and earthquakes. Despite the title's reference to the NGO "Doctors without Borders," the book is not about "man-made" disasters like wars, and the medical and famine conditions that wars often cause. Rather the focus is on the international politics of government-led assistance for natural disasters and the development of policies by governments in rich countries to deal with such events whether at home or as part of foreign aid programs.

As the author describes the response to disaster often occurs via UN agencies, and NGOs, but in the context of rhetorical flourishes cultivated for the international media. Such rhetoric is important for international bureaucracies like the UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) whose budgets depend on attracting the attention of rich donor governments whose publics are tuned into CNN and its news cycles. But as Hannigan points out, such disaster assistance is also undertaken in the context of the same governments seeking *realpolitik* advantage in the international system.

In developing such points, *Disasters without Borders* focuses on how governments, international agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, NGOs, and the ever-present international press frame natural disasters, and as importantly, how governments respond. Much of this work takes places in the context of international meetings where standards, policies rules, and international laws about responses are negotiated, and hopes for "mitigation of risk" are debated beyond the cameras of CNN, but nevertheless with an awareness that emotional media attention makes or breaks funding for natural disaster relief. Hannigan's discussion about how the "rhetoric of claims making" develops in the context of national interests, humanitarian need, and international politics is well-developed.

Hannigan emphasizes that disaster response is often "at the whim of [CNN's] electrons" and uses as examples the responses to Hurricane Katrina, the Indian Ocean Tsunami, and Australian floods. He is an effective story-teller, and there are numerous asides in the form of text-boxes, and examples, although these "lessons learned" are at times only loosely tied together. Indeed, one of my favorite disaster examples was the Icelandic volcanic eruptions of 1783 which devastated Iceland, and killed an estimated six million people worldwide over the

following six years as worldwide temperatures plunged. This disaster demonstrated nicely how disasters inevitably cross national boundaries. Still, it would have been nice to know though how this example fits in with the type of international disaster relief regime, which the author dates to the turn of the twentieth century.

But despite the interesting and engaging vignettes of natural disasters sprinkled throughout the book, few are from Africa. In part this is because natural disasters are quickly defined there as "complex disasters" because many Africsan catastrophes of the last decades include both "natural" and "man made" elements, and therefore are beyond the coverage of this book. Thus there is no discussion of the Ethiopian Famine response of 1984-1985 or the tragedy of the Great Lakes genocide and wars since the mid-1990s. Still, could there really be so few disasters from Africa which received international attention/relief? The Lake Nyos disaster in Cameroon of 1986 where carbon dioxide suddenly escaped from a volcano killing thousands comes to mind. The Nyiragongo eruptions near Goma, Congo, of 2002, are even a success story with respect to disaster mitigation; mass evacuations in anticipation of the eruption successfully averted many deaths. Floods and drought in many other places in Africa are also recurring events. As an Africanist, I cannot help but observe that including such events would have enriched the analysis in *Disasters without Borders*.

Still, the point of this book is to add a new twist to the already voluminous literature about sexier human-caused disasters, and it does this. The chapter on how Global Warming is framed as disaster mitigation (rather than perhaps as a complex emergency), makes well Hannigan's point about how claims-making rhetoric work, and will be of interest to anyone seeking to understand why and how disaster mitigation is difficult. While in some ways I think that this book steps too far away from the "complex emergency" literature, it is nevertheless understandable that the policy-makers in natural disaster mitigation would want their own book.

Tony Waters, *California State University, Chico*

Zelda La La Grange. 2014. *Good Morning, Mr Mandela.* New York: Allen Lane. 370 pp.

After working for the "most famous man in the world," Nelson Mandela's long serving secretary-turned assistant decided to document and somewhat analyse the life of Mandela through the eyes of the inner circle. Let us start with the thought that La Grange's work is not a secret diary of a secretary of one of the world's most renowned political figure. It is a narration of events in the author's life and reflection of her experiences with Mandela. It is a busy diary of 370 pages where every paragraph and section is presented with timely interventions to suit the situation. Her story is somewhat similar to that of working in a tight bureaucracy with a VIP. Diaries of private secretaries have always been an interesting point of reference for people in general. They offer insightful information and reveal secrets. Moreover, *Good Morning Mr Mandela* is a document on Mandela's presidential and post-presidential public life written by a white secretary that served him for nineteen years.

La Grange sets out her background by confessing many "wrong doings" as she sees it: voting for the apartheid government; being distant from the mainstream socio-political

situation in the country; and expecting the annihilation of black identity in South Africa are some of her past confessions. Her adolescence two decades ago reflects similar experiences of contemporary young white groups who can be found in cliques in somewhat similar situations of being conservative and lauding white supremacy. Her innocent childhood and young family environment kept her aloof from the South African situation. The apartheid government did not give her enough chance to think and instead inserted their ideals of racialism into the younger generation.

It took some time for a conservative "boer" with French ethnic roots to gain the confidence and pride in working for the "black" head of state. As she opens up herself, she accuses the white community in South Africa oft still retaining their white supremacy outlook. Racism was so blatantly rooted in South African life that it took a few years of Mandela's presence to convince her about racial equality. Mandela, a politician himself, used her "whiteness" for his own needs, be it for a state visit or hosting some international delegates. He empowered the image of multi-racial South Africa by having a white secretary. La Grange explains how this political statement turned into an inter-dependency relationship. This thick book is useful for not only those people who are interested in Mandela's life but also an internal and not-so-discussed life of famous personalities. Mandela's international trips and his love for travel after his twenty-seven years in prison give an extraordinary glimpse into his private life. His diplomatic interventions in international affairs, stardom in the US, friendship with Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and the crown family of the Saudi Arabia are explored meticulously. La Grange had limited access to Mandela's sensitive life and its related incidents. There must be many undisclosed and classified pieces of information which La Grange is unwilling to disclose. However, if this is the case one would have expected his long-time chief of staff Prof. Jakes Gerwel to write a book about his experiences. Sadly, however Prof. Gerwel recently passed away, but La Grange does slightly hint about Gerwel having penned down his experiences in the presidency.

La Grange however, attempts to reflect on everything and anything that happened to her with Mandela. Caring, protecting, frustrating, honesty, loyalty, and dedication are a few among many repeated clichés in La Grange's work. For every incident she wants to teach readers how morally and philosophically important it was for her to be with this great man. These lessons sometimes become intolerable for readers who want to know more about Mandela. La Grange wants to reassure herself and the people that she was always available for Madiba (or *Khulu* as she calls him) and her sacrifices were immutable. Her repetition of loyalty only makes one re-think her presence in the narration of Mandela.

For someone who is interested in knowing the private life and gossip of the former president and famous personalities, it is a treat. But for someone who is reading this book expecting to reveal some secrets of national importance, the content remains lacking, as it happened with Gandhi's private secretary Mahadev Desai who maintained his diary and published it in *Day-to-Day with Gandhi* (1968) to keep us updated about the happenings of Gandhi. Similarly, Hitler's close confidant Alfred Rosenberg and many other famous personalities maintained the works of their bosses. These works have helped us to see the truth in a different and inclusive way through the written notes of secretaries. Mandela did very little wrong according to La Grange. This is not to say that she should have pointed out mistakes, but

instead should have presented some facts which might be more exciting and interactive. However, La Grange is not a political thinker or an ideologist as were Desai and Rosenberg. Therefore, those expectations remain in vain. This book is an account of her (counter) actions with the prejudices of a young, white Afrikaans woman during the 1990s. She explains how Mandela's life was stardom internationally and "intolerable" domestically. In the later years he was seen as some old man denying attention and acknowledgement. It runs through the top office of former President Thabo Mbeki to the cabinet ministers of the later government. Mandela was accepted and unaccepted at the same time. Although a timely piece of work, one would expect La Grange to write another book compiling her old documents to disclose something that is of national importance apart from ideological differences in the family, ANC party and international delegates. Instead, it drives us through the last years of Mandela. She discusses how in his 80s, Mandela was concerned about his financial limitations to support his extended family for which he thought he had responsibility for after being imprisoned for twenty-seven years.

Biographers and historians might find this work worthy to quote or footnote. Readers will enjoy its simple and communicate style of writing. At times when things are unfamiliar to a non-South African, La Grange attempts to explain the complete situation for the readers to make sense. She is not necessarily a terrific, best-seller type of writer, but she is a good communicator and this makes her book a readable experience. Whatever the case may be, La Grange has invited us to listen, discuss and think about her experiences. Moreover, she is hesitant to finish the whole book until she shares more stories. And you become restless reading as you feel like you are making your way out of a labyrinth of La Grange's experiences. Both at times exciting and somewhat tiring reading, you will mark some pages as adventurous.

Suraj Yengde, *University of the Witwatersrand*

Laurenti Magesa. 2013. *What is Not Sacred?: African Spirituality*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. 256 pp.

Laurenti Magesa is a Roman Catholic priest and is one of Africa's most noted scholars. He has authored *African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life* and *Anatomy of Inculturation: Transforming the Church in Africa.* He has also been a visiting Fellow at the Woodstock Theological Center at Georgetown University. *What is Not Sacred?* is a work that attempts to show how different elements of African daily life leads not only to God, but towards a better understanding of how creation, nature, and other elements of African spirituality interplay with many different concepts of Christianity on a daily basis.

Magesa does a fine job of explaining the concept of African Spirituality in the first section of the book. He explains the concepts of *ubuntu* throughout the entire life cycle. The African understanding of spirituality can be seen as human participation in the total, universal existence, the whole of human existential experience in the world (p. 40). One of the more powerful influences on African spirituality is the understanding that you are a reflection of yourself and that good actions are a result of good intentions. Conversely, those with evil intentions pass them on as well. The ability of one to "perform" or become a participant in the

dance of life, is essential to African spirituality. The ability to adapt and use music, dance, art, and other expressive venues as expressions of spiritual life completes a person's journey into becoming one with nature. He concludes with showing how the spirit returns and is made one again with the universe. God can act through ancestors or other spirits because they share in His power. Their understanding of *ubuntu* encourages them to act hospitably towards all because of our powerful connection to each other through all religions, both Christian and African.

The second part of this work examines the contribution that African spirituality has made to the world at large. Magesa uses specific African religious symbols and explains their parallel to a Christian worldview. One of the more interesting sections dealt with the African idea of eating together. The concept of laying aside one's differences and sharing a meal together crossed familial, cultural, and religious boundaries. Magesa argues that this ritual of constant transformation is similar to the Christian Eucharistic Celebration. It should change our perspective and leave us transformed and stronger in both our friendships and relationships (p. 156). The concept of working together while also learning from each other is really helpful. He argues that Africa and its countries have sacrificed *ubuntu* and mutual aid for each other for the perceived advantages of the capitalistic West. The concept of mutual respect and aid for each other disappears while the lust for power and wealth take over. This is detrimental to the society that is bent on helping each other (pp. 155-56). The author laments that during the "Christianization" of Africa, many Christian missionaries attempted to downplay, neglect, and forcibly change the positive features of African religious cultures rather than trying to understand and incorporate their Christian teachings into the African religious society (p. 178). He outlines the way forward while recognizing the positive aspects of the African spiritual world (pp. 193-94).

The book's conclusion provides seven steps that will help harmonize the two religions and aid in their mutual co-existence. They are as follows: 1) no type of spirituality, whether it is in the form of personal piety or a religious system of a community, can endure without firm roots; 2) spirituality for the people of Africa is not a passive "given" it is played out in everyday life, through observance of moral codes, rites and rituals, and patterns of relationships; 3) the cosmos is a "moral" reality in the African worldview (pp. 195-196); 4) relations for the promotion of the force of life must embrace "others" in all of their differences, for all creation and the various ways it is experienced and expressed contain the spark of divine, "spiritual" life; 5) patient dialogue rather than forced conversion, therefore, is the direction indicated by intertwining of both religions and should be both encouraged and nurtured (p. 196); 6) the goal of African spirituality, and African *Christian* spirituality for that matter, is the good life (John 10:10); and 7) African spirituality can inspire Christian theology and pastoral approaches to "unbind the Spirit," that Jesus promised to send after His departure (p. 197).

This work provides great insight into the richness of African religious cultures. It also is a helpful tool for both religious groups to appreciate the benefits of while not ignoring the richness of their own cultures and religious practices. If everything is sacred, then our relationships with God, each other, the environment, and other cultures, will begin to change and our global appreciation will begin to increase as well. One must carefully define terms within other faiths and beliefs. Defining less familiar terms and concepts for one who is

unfamiliar with African terminology was helpful, but more explanation might need to accompany certain concepts of African spirituality that are unfamiliar to the Christian West. In the increased interest of interreligious dialogue, this book provides a good starting point from which to launch further conversations

John Williams, *Trinity Baptist College*

Chrispen Matsika. *Traditional African Education: Its Significance to Current Educational Practices*. Harare, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press. 206 pp.

Chrispen Matsika's purpose in *Traditional African Education: Its Significance to Current Educational Practices* is to demonstrate how aspects of traditional African education could be incorporated into the current Western based systems, if education in Africa should achieve its intended outcomes. In the process, he has written an extremely thoughtful book that will certainly be controversial but will greatly broaden the conversation about the nature and purpose of education in Africa in the twenty-first century. Education in any society, Matsika argues, should be rooted in the worldview and philosophical assumptions of that society in order to be successful. While Western education, with its emphasis on rationality and individualism, is based on the Cartesian doctrine "I think, therefore I am," the worldview of most African societies would assert the doctrine, "we are, therefore I am," thus emphasizing African communalism and its adherence to the role and wisdom of the ancestors. An educational system based on that kind of epistemology is likely to be different from a Western based educational system.

Matsika uses his own native Zimbabwe as a case study. This is likely to be the first point of controversy because there are those who will assert that the dynamics of the Shona situation cannot be applied to Africa as a whole. The book starts with a very informative presentation of the history of Zimbabwe from the origins to the present day, documenting the ancient rivalry between the Shona and the Ndebele, the coming of the master manipulator Cecil Rhodes and his imposition of British rule over the territory, followed by the imposition of a two-tiered educational system, one for Europeans and a much diluted version for Africans that failed to take African traditions into account. Education in the entire colonial period, which included the period of Ian Smith's nefarious unilateral declaration of independence, was characterized by the continuing existence of two parallel educational systems, the one for Africans being designed solely to ensure that the African continued in a state of servitude. At best, he was trained to become an effective farm worker or industrial worker and provide a pool of forced labor that the European could tap into if he so desired.

Matsika then goes on to discuss education in the post- independence period under Robert Mugabe. He objectively demonstrates that although the new regime advantageously saw education as being essential to development, abolished the colonial two tier system of education and considerably increased expenditure on education, its policy in this area was doomed to failure because Mugabe's Marxist orientation led him to heighten political (which meant socialist) consciousness in the young. The socialist values it sought to inculcate were just as

divorced from the traditional worldview and philosophic outlook of the people of Zimbabwe as the colonial ideology had been.

Although this book is generally about traditional African education, its most compelling aspect is arguably its discussion of traditional African philosophy and worldview. In his very thorough treatment of the subject Matsika has given one of the most admirable discussions of the traditional African outlook since the publications of Mbiti. He first stoutly rejects the notion, promulgated, not just by uninformed westerners, but also by some African scholars like Wiredu and Hountondji, that there is nothing like African philosophy, and then goes on in a masterful way to illustrate the nature of that philosophy and worldview. This is likely to be the second note of controversy. He shows that African traditional thought is collective and communal, rather than individualistic; that traditional thought, like Plato's, includes notions about the nature of government, the moral justification for violence and revolutions, and the connection between economic conditions and moral standards, something that Adam Smith would applaud; that the African view of the world is holistic, with the physical and the spiritual co-existing in one continuum; that where rationality has been the cornerstone of Western thinking, African thought focuses more on the community of persons. He then goes on to discuss the African view of reality, suggesting that the African belief in symbols stems from the fact that Africans attribute a force or spirit behind every object. Most interesting is his discussion of the concept of "force." Of course, the notion was first promulgated by Tempels in his 1937 *Bantu Philosophy*. Existence is defined by force and means possessing force. The world of spirit is the source of all force and every person, animal, plant, or object has force by virtue of being related to the world of spirit. Inevitably, Matsika relates all this to what he considers the African ontology, or the composition of the universe. Right at the top is God who is the center of all creation and the source, giver, and ultimate controller of all force; next come the spirits and the dead ancestors of the tribe who are the link between humans and God; then come human beings, then come animals, plants and the rest of biological life; and finally the world of objects. The higher up one is in the hierarchy, the more force one has and the more one is able to use that force to manipulate those that are lower.

Matsika then goes on to discuss the nature of traditional education which he sees as incorporating vital aspects of the African worldview. Tremendous emphasis is placed on informal education and the role of oral tradition and the importance of rituals. In his discussion of formal education, he stresses the importance of the formal initiation rites and then, in one of the most memorable sections of the work, that on vocational training, he describes in detail how the N'anga apprenticeship system, the system whereby traditional healers are trained, incorporates vital aspects of the Shona worldview.

The inevitable and controversial question remains: how is the traditional African worldview that Matsika so eloquently describes to be incorporated into a modern formal educational system? He answers the question in chapter 7 where he asserts that the school should be seen as a community, one that everyone belongs to and everyone feels a part of. He also stresses the importance of the classroom which is the place where the students develop new dispositions, values, attitudes and new ways of thinking, and which should be seen as the center for the transmission of cultural heritage. Classroom practice, he asserts, should mirror the teaching and learning practiced at the initiation academies of the past. Listening, watching,

and dialoging should form the core of the activities. The classroom should be seen as a spiritual space where teachers and students feel they are part of the context, and where no one should feel insecure. In every class, whatever the nature of the discipline, values central to African life such as togetherness, responsibility, truthfulness, selflessness, spirituality, respect for elders and authority, and the importance of family can be emphasized. After listing the characteristics of indigenous knowledge and presenting a detailed Traditional African Worldview and Education Course designed to introduce students to the African worldview (although he does not say at what stage this course should be taught), Matsika in his final chapter proceeds to give a list of useful recommendations.

No one will deny that the conversation *Traditional African Education* has started is necessary and that it should be on the reading list of everyone interested in African Studies.

Eustace Palmer, *Georgia College and State University*

Temitope B. Oriola. 2013. *Criminal Resistance? The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers*. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 243 pp.

Organizationally, the text has a total of eight related chapters. However, the aim-findings nexus was established between chapters one and seven. The centerpiece of the two chapters was the question of criminality or otherwise of kidnapping episodes carried out by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (hereafter MEND). In other words, is MEND a criminal social movement organization (SMO) or a repertoire of protest in the Niger Delta (hereafter ND)? Is it motivated by grievances or simply greed? According to Oriola, perceptions of the ND insurgency vary from community to community (p. 183). A community with a benevolent insurgent "general" considers the insurgency as a repertoire of protest to advance their interests, whereas communities without a benevolent insurgent "general" see the insurgency as outright criminality. Contrary to this assertion, inhabitants of the ND whether in communities with a benevolent insurgent commander or communities without a benevolent commander perceive the ND insurgency, especially the kidnap phase as a political protest, agitating for justice in the distribution of oil rents.

Political kidnapping episodes are more of grievance motivated with exceptional cases (Chap. 3). More so, the question of one being benevolent or not depends on the internal make-up of a person. Again, a commander's benevolence to his community depends on his connections to the government house within a time period in any of the ND states. For example, in oil rich Bayelsa state, a then serving governor had cordial working relations with a number of insurgent commanders that lived in the Creek Haven, the state government house. Such commanders are more likely to be benevolent to their communities vis-à-vis those without such government house connections.

Furthermore, reframing the title of the text to read, *"The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers: Criminal Resistance?"* elicits diverse interpretations. Conflict is inevitable where unevenness exists in the distribution of oil rents; whereas to others kidnapping oil workers for whatever cause is criminal. What is disheartening is the name associated with such violent groups in different places. Insurgency in the ND is often seen by the Nigerian state as criminal. But is it

seen as a criminality among the people in the ND? Why the difference? Who does the naming? Oriola's work, a text on Social Movement Organization, is the first of its kind on the ND insurgency with MEND as its focus SMO, unravels this daunting question.

Achieving social change as against elite hegemony is often a ruse unless there is power aggregation of different persons into organized groups. MEND emerged to champion the cause of the impoverished ordinary ND people through the kidnapping of oil workers as a repertoire of protest. Specifically, MEND demanded the convocation of a sovereign national conference, fiscal federalism, and protection of the ND ecosystem; demands, which earn MEND public sympathy in the ND. However, MEND's modus operandi mostly political kidnapping in achieving this goal is often the subject of sharp disagreement which oftentimes amounts to name calling as militants, pirates, insurgents, terrorists, etc.

As a SMO, MEND was/is astute in the use of frames to resonate with allies, the public, the media (Chap. 6), etc., but why did MEND attract so many derogative terms to itself in the process? Whereas SMOs in other resource-rich regions attract much sympathy and even financial support from international organizations, NGOs, the media, etc., MEND instead attracts derogatory names with no known support organization. Clifford Bob posits that "winning NGO support is neither easy nor automatic but instead competitive and uncertain…the development and retention of support are best conceived not as philanthropic gestures but as exchanges based on the relative power of each party to the transaction…the choices of insurgents-how they market themselves matter."[1] Thus, even as MEND's insurgency has proved effective, a myriad of armed groups still exist in the ND that deny MEND the collective identity needed to undertake a "war of maneuver."

Presenting the ND insurgency as a melodrama with untold consequences for the global oil industry (Chap. 2), Oriola categorized the dramatis personae into a "First-Order Cast" (p. 25) and a "Second-Order Cast" (p. 40) as direct beneficiaries of the insurgency who prefer an unending insurgency. Contrary to Oriola's assertion, researchers as members of the 'Second-Order cast' would prefer ending the insurgency in the ND despite perceived 'benefits' in the form of academic publications. Instead, recent academic trends on the ND insurgency have changed to reflect the changing security horizon in the ND to focus on amnesty, post-amnesty, oil industry and climate change related issues.

Oriola's text is a must read for the public. However, a revised edition of the text is urgent, one which must reflect the impact of kidnapping on the oil industry and the Nigerian state, the trend in kidnapping since MEND came into the scene in 2005, what hostage percentage was released or rescued without payment of ransom, those killed or escaped, how much ransom has been paid especially for oil workers, an increase in the interviewee scope to include oil workers, non-oil bearing communities, and erstwhile hostages, a definition of ND that reflects a true Delta, etc. More so, the insurgency in the ND is not a threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria as envisioned in the Kaiama Declaration (1998). Thus, the analysis of MEND as a criminal resistance or a repertoire of protest should further be considered within the context of the Kaiama Declaration, which served as the principal platform for violent protest movements in the ND. Finally, the textual language is complex which undoubtedly limits its reach to all, especially those living in the ND region who principally are farmers and fishermen.

Notes

1   Bob Clifford. 2005. *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgency, Media, and International Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.ii.

Olawari D.J Egbe, *Niger Delta University*

Adebayo Oyebade, ed. 2014. *The United States' Foreign Policy in Africa in the 21st Century*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 202 pp.

In *The United States' Foreign Policy in Africa in the 21st Century*, Adebayo Oyebade (Tennessee State University) assembles an impressive group of scholars to analyze the historical and contemporary dynamics of US foreign policy in Africa. Moses E. Ochonu provides useful historical context; Victor Eno and Kenneth E. Kalu explore health and development; Adebayo Oyebade, Olayiwola Abegunrin, and Diane Chinoso Orefo examine counterterrorism and security; and John P. Miglietta, Felix Omoh Okokhere, and Faith Okpotor analyze conflict resolution, democratization, and good governance. The book should prove useful to readers interested in US foreign policy, Africa, and the relationship between the two.

The collection of essays reveals that while current US foreign policy is more attentive to Africa than in the past, it still faces some major challenges. The contributors demonstrate convincingly that US foreign policy toward Africa has shifted from periods of disinterest to increased engagement embedded within the Cold War context to more active attention on Africa thus far in the 21st century. While the book delves into a broad array of topics, one central theme is the emergence of international terrorism and its significant impact on US foreign policy in Africa. Referring to the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, Diane Chinoso Orefo reasons that "since then, international terrorism has displaced nuclear war, the fear of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and rivalry with other world powers as the principal security issue for the American people and their government" (p. 100). As a result, US policymakers increasingly have focused on terrorist organizations operating in Africa such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Moses E. Ochonu reminds readers that the current state of tension between African Islamic leaders in northern Nigeria and American policymakers has not always been the case. Ochonu explains how northern Nigerian leaders such as Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Alhaji Ado Sanusi, and Malam J. H. Cindo often expressed interests that converged with those of US policymakers, with both groups eschewing radicalism. Adebayo Oyebade discusses Islamist terrorism in Nigeria, focusing on Boko Haram and their ascendance since 2009. He analyzes the 2011 attacks on the police headquarters in Abuja and the bombing of the UN headquarters located there. Olayiwola Abegunrin explores the United States' activation of Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008. This move followed the expansion of the US military presence in Djibouti and resulted in the newest US unified combatant command, which maintains overall responsibility for US military efforts in the Africa region. Diane Chinoso Orefo explores US-African security cooperation in the 21st century, detailing specific examples such as the Trans-

Sahara Security Symposium (TSS), NATO intervention in Libya, the Pan-Sahel Initiative, and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), among others.

While international terrorism forms a key concept of the book, the work also explores other important topics, such as the intersection of US foreign policy and international health. Beginning in 2003, the United States launched the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in sub-Saharan Africa. US policymakers followed that move by introducing the Global Health Initiative (GHI) in 2009. The volume also examines the relationship between development and trade, highlighted in 2000 by the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). All of the contributors utilize a broad array of sources to support their essays. Examples include UN reports, US government documents (e.g., those of the White House, Department of Justice, Agency for International Development, and Congressional Research Service), non-governmental organizations' statements (i.e., Amnesty International), historical and contemporary newspapers, scholarly books, academic journals, and magazines.

A particular strength of the work is its multi-disciplinary approach. The nine contributors and their respective topical chapters vary in discipline and methodology, ranging from history to international relations to political science. *The United States' Foreign Policy in Africa in the 21st Century* is a useful addition to an understanding of the many opportunities and challenges *vis-à-vis* the United States and Africa. Students, scholars, and general readers alike should benefit from its detailed exploration of the relationship between US foreign policy in Africa and the contributors' cogent suggestions for improving upon that important relationship in the future.

William A. Taylor, *Angelo State University*

Terence Ranger. 2013. *Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-67*. Woodbridge, UK: James Currey. 206 pp.

The cover of *Writing Revolt* features a grinning Terence Ranger—sporting a fur hat, and standing slightly in front of his wife, Shelagh—next to a variety of his colleagues from Southern Rhodesia's nationalist movement. They include Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. The occasion: Ranger's deportation from the colony in February 1963. Above the photograph is the book's title, and the two combined reveal Ranger's major aims for this work: "producing a record of the African awakening which I had witnessed…. And the process which led me to write that first book" (p. xi). "That first book," of course, was Ranger's now-classic 1967 *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, which told the story of Ndebele and Shona resistance against the British South Africa Company in 1896-1897.

In some ways, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* feels like a mirage in this book. It flits swiftly in and out of the narrative, ever-present, but often overshadowed by Ranger's methodical account of early nationalist action in Southern Rhodesia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Ranger's own contribution to multiracial nationalism was initially tied to his position as warden of the three residence halls of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: here, he began his fight against segregation (in the face of difficult Rhodesian parents, including the "fat, florid and mediocre" parliamentary opposition leader [p. 18]). Ranger would soon extend this struggle to the colony via Citizens Against The Colour Bar. At every stage, Ranger's politics and historical

research were intertwined: as he asked himself in the late 1950s, "[N]ationalist rallies grew in size and fervour, [and] I began to wonder. Where had all this come from? What were the antecedents of African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia?" (p. 37).

Readers of *Writing Revolt* experience the same rollercoaster as its author half a century ago. Ranger's use of his extensive personal papers written at the time (now archived at Oxford) permits this closeness, but also the daily diaries of his dear friend and colleague—to whom *Writing Revolt* is dedicated in part—John Reed. Reed's text provides an alternative view of the often-agonizing decisions which Ranger faced in his personal and public lives. Thus we feel the heady excitement of hard-won victories against segregation; but it is tempered by tragedy: the failure to create a coherent nationalist movement in the 1960s; the divisions between ZAPU and ZANU; the travails of tribalism and regionalism; and more personally for Ranger, the death of Sketchley Samkange, and his increasing isolation from politics and friends in Southern Rhodesia after his exile. We are constantly cautioned against neat, teleological understandings of nationalist movements: balancing the desires of moderates like Nkomo, radicals like Robert Chikerema, and trade unionists—all in the face of state pressure—was almost impossible, and the outcome of the struggle unpredictable.

One cannot help but admire Ranger's enormous energies, despite his modest statements to the contrary. Unlike most academics, secure in the ivory tower, Ranger lived and created history. He juggled the running of a university with the production of a journal (*Dissent*), and undertook serious scholarship while working as a political activist. At all times, his position was insecure: arrest meant deportation. Ranger faced the challenges of maintaining his commitment to multiracial nationalism, while variously pressed by more radical, "African" versions. We admire the courage it took to "be Ranger," as the author puts it—periodically disliked and criticized by a wide variety of characters ranging from President Hastings Banda of Malawi to the members of various nationalist factions, but nevertheless sticking to his convictions. African history comes to the foreground toward the end of *Writing Revolt*. At University College in Tanzania, the first generation of professional Africanist historians (today's professor emeriti) built the discipline under Ranger's leadership (this collective and its approach was soon known as the "Dar es Salaam School"). Freed from the business of direct activism, Ranger threw himself into the publication of a variety of scholarly works, not least "that first book." The end of *Writing Revolt*, and especially the useful appendix detailing Ranger's scholarship, is sobering: the appendix is the sort of list one reads and discovers that Ranger published on your "new idea" several decades ago. (One is also reminded that Ranger was doing transnational history almost half a century before it became popular).

Here, then, is a book that will be (of course) vital reading for anyone concerned with the history of nationalism in Zimbabwe or Africa, and indeed the roots of the discipline of African history. But the book should also challenge scholars to avoid quietly writing articles solely for one another, and to have the courage to take if not our activism, then our work, to broader audiences.

Myles Osborne, *University of Colorado Boulder*

Robin Law, Suzanne Schwarz, and Silke Strickrodt, eds. 2013. *Commercial Agriculture, the Slave Trade, and Slavery in Atlantic Africa*. Woodbridge: James Currey. 272 pp.

The so-called "legitimate commerce" between African and European polities from the seventeenth through the nineteenth century has often been framed in the context of abolitionism. As the standard narrative goes, abolitionists through their myriad programs and forms of propaganda, particularly those emanating from Britain, articulated a desire to replace the trade in African bodies with a trade in African agricultural produce and products. An attendant historiographical concern relating to the European desire for legitimate commerce with Africans along the Atlantic coast is the ostensible link between the attempts to maneuver commercial activity away from a focus on human chattel to agricultural exchange and how this move influenced imperial projects. *Commercial Agriculture, the Slave Trade, and Slavery in Atlantic Africa* is able to present a coherent narrative, across time and space, which simultaneously questions the validity of the abolitionist paradigm as well as the seemingly direct correlation of legitimate trade to more insidious imperial machinations.

The present volume, compiled from a selection of papers presented at a conference held by the German Historical Institute London in 2010, offers a fresh perspective on the extant historiography of slave trading and European colonialism in Atlantic Africa. What is abundantly clear from the various research projects that produced this volume is that while commercial agriculture (legitimate trade or commerce) constituted a potential alternative to slave trading, the degree to which this is true varied widely and was contingent on various social, economic, political, spatial, and temporal factors. As the editors note in their introduction, wherever commercial agriculture provided an alternative to the trade in human cargoes, there was a multiplicity of social interactions and political desires that produced wide ranging reactions and "protracted and uneven" processes as to the implementation of legitimate commerce. Furthermore, while a "commercial transition" from slave trading to agricultural trade was often a part of the abolitionist agenda, there is ample evidence presented in this volume that in certain areas such developments antedated the rise of abolitionist campaigns in Europe.

The first chapter, written by David Eltis, operates as somewhat of a continuation of the introduction and positions the present volume in historical and historiographic context. Eltis reminds us that African commercial agriculture was well established prior to the nineteenth century (the time period generally associated with the rise of legitimate commercial activity along the West African littoral) and that its emergence was not as fluid as historians have previously posited. Eltis also suggests that the slave trade worked in tandem with some forms of commercial agriculture, specifically palm-oil production, complicating the model of slave trading as beneficial to African elites popularized by Walter Rodney and Joseph Inikori, amongst others. The ten remaining chapters of the book deal with specific case studies, generally revolving around specific commodities and how the friction between legitimate commerce and slave trading influenced Afro-European socio-political interactions.

The variegated history of legitimate commerce and its relation to slave trading in Atlantic Africa is evinced beginning with Gerhard Seibert's contribution on São Tomé and Príncipe. Seibert is able to demonstrate that São Tomé and Príncipe operated as slave entrepôts and that sugar monoculture, once central to the island economy, was in fact replaced by other foodstuff

production. A declining sugar industry, the result of internecine planter conflict in conjunction with a slave revolt and an emerging Brazilian sugar industry, resulted in the islands becoming not suppliers of human cargo, but food purveyors for journeys from Africa to the Americas. Toby Green's chapter on Upper Guinea demonstrates that for some societies, the commercialization of agriculture had "no direct connection" to the wider Atlantic slave trade. And when a connection did exist, it was generally, like in Seibert's analysis, to provision outbound slave ships.

Colleen Kriger also utilizes the Upper Guinea coast for her analysis of indigo production. She effectively shows how the Royal African Company of England was willing to facilitate legitimate commercial enterprises around indigo planting and export in addition to slave trading ventures. In examining Dutch and English plantation projects along the Gold Coast, Robin Law concludes that the logic of labor productivity in the Americas (being apparently superior than in African locales) precluded any feasible project of supplementing the slave trade with agricultural production for European or American markets. Per Hernæs' work on the Gold Coast reveals the failed Danish colonial projects and how increasing peasant production (principally in palm oil) overtook the abolitionist impulse in developing an export-oriented colonial agriculture.

Many other contributions in this work serve the interest of presenting a more nuanced discussion of slavery and the (rather uneven) rise of so-called legitimate commerce. Christopher Leslie Brown's piece on the origin of the political rhetoric around legitimate trade in opposition to slaving, Roquinaldo Ferreira's chapter on how agricultural enterprise formed a bulwark for increased slave trading and slavery within Angola, Kehinde Olabimtan's work on Christian missionaries and their failed attempt to instill an agricultural work-ethic geared for export, and Bronwen Everill's chapter on the fractious exchanges among Europeans regarding the implementation of legitimate trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia all help demonstrate that there is not a single linear narrative where this topic is concerned. This volume is important for Africanists, students of the slave trade and the African diaspora, those interested in the history of abolitionism (and how its legacy colors contemporary portrayals of the past), and individuals interested in early-modern as well as modern Afro-European commodity exchange that go beyond slaving.

Gordon R. Barnes Jr., *The Graduate Center, City University of New York*

Vivian Seton, Konrad Tuchscherer, and Arthur Abraham, eds. 2013. *The Autobiography of an African Princess: Fatima Massaquoi*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 274 pp.

Autobiographies, biographies, and memoirs from some of Africa's leading writers and public figures have continued enriching a literary tradition that has a long history on the continent dating centuries back. From Olaudah Equiano, the eighteenth-century ex-slave/anti-slavery campaigner, to Nelson Mandela, South Africa's first black president, Chinua Achebe, Nigeria's pioneer novelist, and Wole Soyinka, Africa's first laureate, we have seen the literary production of extraordinary life stories from childhood through adulthood that exemplify timelessness in their distinctiveness, richness, and diversity. While *The Autobiography of an African Princess* may not have come from the pen of one of Africa's well-known literati, Fatima Massaquoi's lived

experiences in Africa, Europe, and America, which she documented between 1939 and 1946, share the richness, distinctiveness, and diversity we have come to expect from our more celebrated authors. Edited by Vivian Seton, Fatima's daughter, in collaboration with two accomplished historians of Africa, Konrad Tuchscherer (a specialist in the history of written traditions in Africa) and Arthur Abraham (a specialist in the history of Sierra Leone), this posthumous publication of Fatima's autobiography comes almost seventy years after she completed the initial draft. It recounts her colorful lived experiences including her close encounters with racism, sexism, and unequal power relations in the male-dominated public spaces she traversed in Africa, Europe, and North America.

Born around 1904 in southern Sierra Leone, the daughter of Momo IV (Momolu Massaqoui), ruler of the Gallinas people (also Vai of both Sierra Leone and Liberia), Fatima lived her life across the Atlantic world before she returned to Liberia in 1946, where she passed away in Monrovia, in 1978. Her extraordinary life story is enriched by the expertise of Tuchscherer and Abraham, whose knowledge of the histories, cultures, and languages of the indigenous peoples of Sierra Leone and Liberia gives the autobiography a rich historical and ethno-linguistic texture that set it apart as an "[auto]biography as history."[1]

For the sake of accessibility and readability, Fatima's complex and eventful narrative is divided into three parts with each representing a crucial phase of her life. A common thread running through her story is Fatima's ability to live a fulfilled life that recognized both her triumphs and disappointments. The first part of her story comprises Chapters 1 to 9 that look at 1904 to 1922, the period of her infancy in southern Sierra Leone and her early childhood and teenage years in Liberia. In the second part, Chapters 10 to 15, which concentrate on the years 1922 to 1936, she recounts her experiences as a young African woman living in Hamburg at a time her father Momolu Massaqoui was Liberia's consul general to Germany. With Germany under Nazi influence and "Aryan" supremacist beliefs rife in the country, Fatima, as an African woman, had to come to terms with the harsh realities of both racism and sexism. Sensing that this might result in an ugly situation that would be difficult to handle, her father's friends helped Fatima migrate to the United States in 1936. There she pursued higher education at Fisk University in Tennessee, where she came face to face with Jim Crowism and racial segregation that the US south epitomized at the time. The third part of Fatima's narrative, Chapters 16 to 19, is about her life in the United States from 1936 to 1946, until she decided to depart for Liberia.

The strengths of this autobiography could be gauged at two or more different levels. First, its down-to-heart and honest account of even the most disturbing personal experiences, such as Fatima's childhood physical abuse suffered at the hands of her stepmother, makes it a compelling reading. The injury left Fatima with fractured bones in her hands that caused her a nagging pain while growing up. Although she forgave her stepmother for her indiscretion, Fatima remained extremely self-conscious about her hands and scars well into adulthood. Second, the larger canvas of Sierra Leonean and Liberian cultural and ethno-linguistic history against which Fatima's story is told is rich in content and well orchestrated across the book's 274 pages. This is due to the intervention of two knowledgeable historians, whose imprints are easy to detect in the meticulous presentation of oral traditions (songs, folklore, proverbs, and so on), the explication of the Vai script, and interpretative repertoire that give the book a unique quality. Additionally, people who knew Fatima very well complement her first-hand account.

As "the primary Massaquoi family conservator," her daughter Vivian's role in publishing this autobiography is a posthumous fulfillment of her mother's lifelong wish "to see her story brought to the world" (xxi). Likewise, Fatima's nephew, Hans J. Massaquoi, a journalist and former editor of *Ebony* magazine, whose contribution includes an anecdotal "Foreword" for his aunt's autobiography, brings the book in dialogue with his own publication titled *Destined to Witness: Growing Up Black in Nazi Germany*.[2] Indeed *The Autobiography of an Africa Princess* takes us on an extraordinary trans-Atlantic journey from Gendema in Sierra Leone, to Monrovia in Liberia, Hamburg in Germany, Geneva in Switzerland, Tennessee in the United States, and back to Monrovia. During that journey, local histories, cultures, languages, and values crossed part with the darker side of human nature that found expression in racial bigotry—Nazism and Jim Crowism—sexism, and ethnocentrism.

Notes

1   For more on the dialectical relationship between biography and history, see Lois W. Banner. 2009. "Biography as History." *The American Historical Review* 114.3 (June): 579-586.
2   Hans J. Massaqoui. 2001, *Destined to Witness: Growing Up Black in Nazi Germany*. New York: William Morrow Paperbacks.

Tamba E. M'bayo, *West Virginia University*

Chantal Zabus. 2013. *Out in Africa: Same-Sex Desire in Sub-Saharan Literatures and Cultures*. Suffolk, UK: James Currey. 298 pp.

A wonderful and exhaustively extensive work, Chantal Zabus's *Out in Africa: Same-Sex Desire in Sub-Saharan Literatures and Cultures* presents exciting theoretical and literary critiques of a vast swath of European and African literatures. Zabus considers works ranging from Henry Morgan Stanton's *My Kalulu* and Pierre Loti's *Le roman d'un spahi* to Sierra Leonean Yulisa Maddy's underappreciated novel *No Past, No Present, No Future* to more recent works by K. Sello Duiker and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie to South African male writers Mark Behr and Stephen Gray. Geographically and temporally expansive, Zabus's *Out in Africa* promotes a diachronic history of literary representations of same-sex sexualities and the socio-political possibilities within these narratives.

Zabus succinctly summarizes *Out in Africa*'s overarching manifesto in the chapter "Trans Africa": "I have, over six chapters, identified those texts by a handful of colonial writers and some thirty African postcolonial writers that present homosexuality-as-an-identity, however nebulous, rather than an occasional or ritualized practice as was the case in the early ethnographic imagination" (p. 251). The notion of "homosexuality-as-an-identity" guides Zabus's encyclopedic work as she exposes how literatures allow room for explorations of sexualities that are at times in conflict with prevailing socio-cultural and political norms. Indeed, Zabus notes that the novel as a genre "has been signaled out for its capacity for dialogic amplification and its polyphonic aesthetics, which can comfortably host the homoerotic dimension of African societies" (pp. 4-5).

Out in Africa adds to the growing compendium of works dedicated to the discussion of African same-sex sexualities. Drawing upon prominent queer theorists such as J. Jack Halberstam, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and David Halperin, Zabus's methodological approach unambiguously supports pairing Western queer theories with African socio-cultural constructs of identity. The Introduction, "To Make Things Perfectly Queer," harkens to Alexander Doty's *Making Things Perfectly Queer*, thereby signaling her works' relationship with queer theory. Zabus does not, however, remain unperturbed about potentially enacting cultural imperialism by overlaying Western identity constructs onto African bodies as evidenced by the first chapter's central concerns about European writers, explorers, and academics naming and identifying African bodies and sexualities. Self-aware and highly conscious of such culturally and intellectually colonizing possibilities, Zabus centrally positions African literary and cultural works while queer theory resides visibly in the background. This dual focus on place and gender becomes part of the work's structure as Zabus organizes chapters by gender as well as region as evidenced through chapter titles and sub-titles. For example, the chapter "The Stuff of Desire: Boarding School Girls, Plain Lesbians & Teenage Dykes" features works from Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda, as well as multiple incarnations of lesbian sexualities ranging various genres, such as the gothic to boarding school narratives.

The first chapter, "Anthropological Wormholes," frames Zabus's arguments regarding Western anthropological and ethnographic development and deployment of African sexualities. The influence Western literary representations had and continue to have upon African bodies and sexualities is the central focus of the chapter "The Text that Dare not Speak its Name: Male Colonial Intimacies." Zabus argues that Western novelists, as much as they rendered Africans as secondary characters, "postulate a form, however inchoate, of African same-sex desire" (p. 74). Yet the common question still lurks: do these Western novels reinforce the notion that homosexuality in all its various guises is a European import? Whereas chapters dedicated to imaginary representations of male and female same-sex sexualities by African authors explore this question, Zabus's most unique treatment occurs in the chapter "Male & Female Mythologies," wherein she argues that a number of African novelists establish an African lore surrounding same-sex sexuality by connecting characters to Egyptian and Hausan mythologies. "This annexation of myths," writes Zabus, "reveals a certain level of insecurity in dealing with male and female same-sex desire, as if these writers wished to demonstrate their culture is ancestrally hospitable to gender variance, while it points to larger issues such as the African range of sexualities and the link between homosexuality and spirituality" (p. 217). Whether such myth-making indeed exposes "a certain level of insecurity" is up for debate, as Zabus occasionally wavers between critique and celebration of these narrative frameworks as she questions the potential ramifications of such narratives in regards to socio-cultural acceptance of non-heterosexual sexualities and sexual identities.

Chantal Zabus's *Out in Africa* may greatly benefit scholars interested in contemporary African literatures and global queer identities. *Out in Africa* confirms Zabus's intellectual depth, vast range of literary and theoretical knowledge, and her commitment to exploring the dynamic literary of sexualities within Africa.

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