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Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel Arap Moi, 1978-2001

KORWA G. ADAR AND ISAAC M MUNYAE

Introduction

Jomo Kenyatta, the founding president of Kenya, passed away in August 1978 after fourteen years as head of state. His successor, Daniel Arap Moi, served as Kenyattas vice-president from 1966 - 1978. During Kenyatta's presidency, the political realm was dominated by a small Kikuyu elite, the so-called Kiambu Mafia, from Kenyata's home district. This group undermined Kenyatta's nationalist and populist background, alienating other ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming Kikuyus. Although Moi was loyal to Kenyatta, he was never accepted into Kenyatta's inner circle. He also came from a small community--the Kalenjin. He was regarded by Kenyans to be the right candidate to steer the country towards a more accommodating human rights era, without ethnic dominance.

This general perception of Moi by Kenyans was reinforced by the decisions and promises he made immediately he took over the presidency. In December 1978 Moi released all twenty-six political detainees across the ethnic spectrum, most of whom had been languishing in jails for years.[1] He also reassured Kenyans that his administration would not condone drunkenness, "tribalism", corruption, and smuggling, problems already deeply entrenched in Kenya.[2] His administration also took quick actions against top civil servants accused of corruption, culminating in the resignations of officials including the Police Commissioner, Bernard Hinga. These actions were interpreted by Kenyans as an indication of the dawn of a new era, a conducive environment for adherence to democracy and human rights.

In due course, however, Moi became more interested in neutralizing those perceived to be against his leadership. The issues of corruption, "tribalism" and human rights per se became distant concerns. Instead, Moi began to centralize and personalize power when he took over the presidency. He pledged to follow Kenyatta's nyayo (Swahili for "footsteps"). He wanted ordinary Kenyans to perceive him as a true nationalist in his own right, and as a close confidant of Kenyatta. He traveled constantly throughout the country addressing many prearranged or ad hoc public gatherings. He popularized nyayo within the context of what he called "love, peace and unity".[3] His grand design turned out to be a strategy geared toward the achievement of specific objectives, namely, the control of the state, the consolidation of power, the

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legitimization of his leadership, and the broadening of his political base and popular support. It turned out this strategy called for little respect of human rights.

Initially, Moi's ascendancy to the presidency faced a major handicap because of the dissension against his leadership from within the ranks of the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). This came from the influential "Kiamba Mafia" that had constituted themselves into what became known as the Change the Constitution Movement.[4] The main objective of the movement was to bar Moi from taking over the presidency. The group called for the amendment of the Kenyan constitutional clause which conferred rights on the Vice-President to take over the presidency for ninety days pending the general elections should the office of the president fall vacant.[5] The movement failed, mainly due to the opposition it faced from Moi's ally, attorney general Charles Njonjo. Moi succeeded in assuming the presidency and thereafter began to systematically institute an authoritarian and oppressive one-man state rule.

Kenyatta's style of restraint and steering the country as a de facto one-party state did not conform to Moi's leadership and behavioral characteristics. Moi's style -- the centralization and personalization of power -- gradually laid the foundation for a dictatorship and innumerable human rights violations by his administration. When Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Anyona sought to register a socialist opposition party in 1982, Moi struck back by making the country a de jure one party state. He criminalized competitive politics and criticism of his leadership.[6] Throughout the 1980s to 1990s the security forces, particularly the police, were used to suppress any criticism of his regime.

To ensure his grip on power, Moi systematically usurped the functions of the other institutions of governance to the extent that the principle of the separation of powers was rendered ineffectual. A few days after releasing all the political detainees, he rushed a bill through Kenya's parliament which granted the president emergency powers for the first time in Kenya's post-independence history. Moi associated insecurity and instability with open criticisms and challenge to his policies and style of leadership. Patronage and loyalty therefore has remained characteristic of Moi's leadership style which has enabled him to centralize and personalize his rule.[7] For more than two decades as Kenya's head of state, the second longest serving president in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Moi has remained what has been described as a "tribal paramount chief writ large".[8] In return for patronage, he enjoys praise from civil servants and KANU officials to an embarrassing degree. For example, in one of the numerous public functions he attended, a senior minister stated while pointing at him: "There, is enshrined in human form the popular will ... Even lobsters and fishes of the sea, out to the 200- mile limit and even beyond, pay obeisance to our great president the Honorable Daniel Arap Moi."[9]
This article deals with the manner in which the autocratic patronage system established by Moi has undermined the rule of law and respect for human rights in Kenya. It is an authoritarian system in which the president delegates no responsibilities and becomes personally involved in almost everything in the country, particularly issues concerning the rights of individual Kenya citizens to speak their minds, assemble without hindrance, write and publish without being molested.

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THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND PERSONALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY

The trend began with presidential directives and constitutional amendments. Apart from the Constitution of Kenya, Amendment Act, Number 7 of 1982, which introduced Section 2(A) transforming the country into a de jure one-party state, Kenya's parliament, on Moi's order, reinstated the detention laws which had been suspended in 1978. Colonial era laws, like the Chief's Authority Act, the Public Order Act, the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Codes, gave the president the right to suspend individual rights guaranteed by the constitution.[10] The parliamentary privilege, which gave representatives the right to obtain information from the Office of the President, was also revoked. This meant that members of parliament, and by extension their constituents, surrendered their constitutional rights to the presidency. Parliamentary supremacy became subordinated to the presidency and the ruling KANU party.[11]

For the first time in Kenya's post independence history, the provincial administrators (Provincial Commissioners[PCs], the District Commissioners[DCs], and District Officers [DOs]) who are civil servants, were directed by the Office of the President to get involved in the internal affairs of KANU. They were to review and clear party meetings throughout the country and to isolate dissenters. KANU officials and members of parliament henceforth were subjected to these administrative procedures, undermining the meaning and legitimacy of representation in Kenya's legislature. These reorganizations and restructurings had a number of implications. First, the structures of representation both within KANU and parliament were obscured. The provincial administration now had the power to prevent an elected member of parliament from addressing his or her own constituents. Second, patronage and loyalty to the President became mandatory for one's political survival. In the 1988 general elections most members of parliament were not elected but selected by the party.[12] One of the first victims to fail the loyalty test was the man behind Moi's smooth ascendancy to the Presidency, Charles Njonjo, then attorney general and minister for constitutional affairs, who was accused of plotting to overthrow Moi's government.[13] Third, those perceived to be against the President and KANU policies were denied the right to contest electoral seats.

By 1981 all the ethnic-centered welfare associations had been banned. These included the Luo Union, the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA), and the Abaluhya Union. The president also outlawed the Civil Servants Union (CSU) and the Nairobi University Academic Staff Union (UASU). In 1986 Moi gave a directive for the Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO), a national non-governmental organization for women, to be affiliated to KANU, and in 1987 officially changed its name to KANU-MYWO.[14] The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), the umbrella body for most of the trade unions in Kenya, had been an ally of KANU for more than two decades, with most of its top leadership frequently selected by KANU, particularly in the 1980s to 1990s. These changes strengthened party-state relations and solidified presidential control of the state. Between 1964 to 1990, twenty-four constitutional amendments were enacted by parliament, all intended to strengthen the presidency at the expense of civil rights.

On the 1st of August 1982 there was a military coup attempt by some junior Kenya Air Force officers. It was put down at an estimated 600 to 1,800 lives. This accelerated the process of the control of the state and solidified Moi's authoritarian rule.[15] In 1986 parliament enacted Act No. 14 followed in 1988 by Act No.4, imposing limitations on the independence of the judiciary, with far reaching human rights violations. Sections 61(1) and (2) of the Constitution empower the president to appoint the chief justice and puisne judges respectively upon the recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) which is also appointed by the president. The 1986 and 1988 constitutional amendments provided for the removal of the security and tenure of the Attorney General, the Controller and Auditor General, the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Parliament, which at this time was under the control of the executive arm of the government, did not resist these amendments. The control of parliament and the judiciary meant that the office of the president was in a position to manipulate the functions of the two branches of the government. Both Parliament and the Judiciary ceased to have the constitutional rights to control the excesses of the executive. There were no checks and balances on Moi's personal authority.

Two major events happened before Act 14 of 1986 was passed in Parliament to symbolize the unchecked power of the executive. In his ruling in a case in which an American marine had murdered a Kenyan woman in Mombassa, a judge found the accused guilty but fined the marine only Kenyan shillings 500 (about $50) and bonded him for one year probation.[16] The issue was raised in parliament thereafter because of the light sentence imposed by the judge. The then Attorney General, James B. Karugu, as the chief legal advisor to the government, responded by criticizing the decision of the judge. He did not last long in his position. After that, the Controller and Auditor General questioned why a state owned corporation engaged the services of a private lawyer in this particular case.[17] His office became the object of executive branch criticism. Moi interpreted both of these actions as direct threats to his leadership and thus pressured parliament to enact the amendments to give him more authority over the judiciary and the audit department. The police had, through Act 14 of 1988, the prerogative to detain the critiques of the regime for fourteen days while coercing them into submission. By this time parliament was functioning largely as a rubber stamp of policies initiated by the presidency.

President Moi's control of parliament thereafter was extended to elections. The "Queue" voting system introduced by KANU in 1986 replaced the secret ballot with a system where voters lined up behind candidates. Those parliamentary candidates who secured more than 70 percent of the votes did not have to go through the process of the secret ballot in the general elections. This system encouraged electoral rigging and paved the way for what has been described elsewhere as "selection within an election". In a situation where there was a dispute over head-count, a repeat of the same process was not possible at the end of the exercise.[18] The provincial administrators, who were the election officers, were only answerable to the presidency and they declared as winners only those candidates favored by the regime. Disputes arising out of nominations were often refereed to the president personally as the final arbiter over matters pertaining to the only political party in the country. Kenyans thus lost their right to vote for parliamentary candidates of their choice.

The judicial system could not protect human rights either. The British judges who have continued to serve Kenya as part of the British overseas development aid are more susceptible to the manipulation than their Kenyan counterparts because they are seconded on contracts.[19] Under the terms of the agreement between Kenya and the United Kingdom, the renewal of contracts were at the discretion of the Kenya government.[20] A former British expatriate judge in Kenya, Eugene Cotran, openly stated that in cases in which the president has direct interest, the government applied pressure on the expatriate judges to make rulings in favor of the state.[21] It was as a result of similar circumstances, that two expatriate judges, Justices Derek Schofield and Patrick O'Connor, resigned because of what they called a judicial system "blatantly contravened by those who are supposed to be its supreme guardians".[22]

Interference with the judicial process in the late 1990s, with respect to "political" cases, rose to a new high. At a workshop held at Mbagathi (Nairobi) in April 1995, Judges Bena Lata and William Mbuya accused the government of interfering in cases that were then in court.[23] The attempts by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) to achieve the repeal of the restrictions and to handle legal cases in the courts of law without interference and intimidation landed some of the outspoken lawyers in detention in the 1980s. In 1990, the Office of the President succeeded in manipulating the LSK elections which saw its sponsored candidate, Fred Ojiambo, defeating the pro-multiparty supporter, Paul Muite, for the chairmanship.[24] This move was designed to control the legal profession by the state.

To bolster his grip on power, Moi also embarked on the gradual Kalenjinization of the public and private sectors from the 1980s. Moi is a Tugen, one of the smaller Kalenjin ethnic groups. He began to "de-Kikuyunize" the civil service and the state-owned enterprises previously dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic group during Kenyatta's regime. He appointed Kalenjins in key posts in, among others, Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Posts and Telecommunications (KPT), Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), and the Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union (KGGCU). He created Nyayo Tea Zones (NTZ), Nyayo Bus Company (NBC) and Nyayo Tea Zones Development Corporation (NTZDC).[25]

The only remaining major worry for the presidency by 1990 was the church, particularly the Anglican Church (then known as the Church of Province of Kenya), the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, which together account for over 70% of the Kenyan Christian community, a majority of the population. Together with the umbrella organization, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the church has persistently and consistently used the pulpit to criticize Moi's authoritarian regime.[26] What Moi has established over the years is a clear manifestation of an institutionalized authoritarian regime with a habit of human rights violations. It was not until the return of multiparty politics in Kenya, after demonstrations in 1990, that the situation changed.

ASSASSINATION, REPRESSION AND DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL OF DISSIDENTS

When the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), of which Moi was the chairman, crossed the floor and joined KANU in 1964, Moi was appointed by Kenyatta as the minister for home affairs. He became the Vice-President in 1967, but kept the home affairs portfolio. The

Kenyan police force, which at the time of independence out numbered the national defense forces, was under his jurisdiction as the minister for home affairs. Kenya Police includes the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), and the Directorate of Security and Intelligence (DSI). Moi therefore was exposed to the structure and functions of the police force for fourteen years before he became president. Under Kenyatta's instructions, Vice-President Moi invoked his administrative prerogatives to detain Oginga Odinga and the other eight leaders of the then opposition Kenya People's Union (KPU) in 1969 when that party was proscribed by Kenyatta. Moi explained that the KPU leaders were detained because "any government worth its salt must put the preservation of public security above the convenience of a handful of persons who are doing their utmost to undermine it".[27] As the person in charge of internal security for fourteen years, he established a network of supporters within the ranks of the intelligence community. It was one of his counter-intelligence supporters, James Kanyotu, who telephoned him when Kenyatta died in 1978.[28]

Detentions and political trials, torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality reminiscent of the colonial era have become common during Moi's tenure. He perceives human rights generally as alien and Euro centric conceptions inconsistent with African values and culture. He views the pro-democracy and human rights advocates in Kenya as unpatriotic, disloyal, and ungrateful individuals influenced by what he calls foreign masters.[29] A few years after taking over the presidency, Moi began to exercise his style of authoritarianism by detaining a number of Kenyans critical of his government. Table One indicates the extent to which detention has been consistently used as an instrument for suppressing Moi's outspoken opponents in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these detainees were former or sitting MPs arrested for demanding, among other things, the introduction of multiparty politics.

After the university staff union was banned, University of Nairobi faculty members, Willy Mutunga and Katama Mukangi, were detained for what Moi called "over-indulgence in politics".[30] This was just the beginning of the crackdown on Kenyans by his Administration in the 1980s. Apart from detaining the UASU leaders, the passports of lecturers considered to be critical of his rule were seized.[31]

Moi's actions were meant to silence the intelligent, perceived to be critical of his authoritarian rule. The emergence of the little known clandestine London based movement, Mwakenya, set the stage for more widespread human rights violations by his Administration. In 1986 alone, 100 people were arrested and detained for their alleged association with Mwakenya, the movement started by some Kenyans in Europe who had fled Moi's oppression, demanded, inter alia, social justice and respect for human rights.[32] Even though Moi made a big issue out of the movement, there was no tangible evidence of a well organized group in the country that threatened Kenya's national security and which would have warranted the massive arbitrary arrest, torture, and detention without trial of the suspects. Moi used the same tactic when he denounced the February Eighteenth Movement (FEM) which he accused of planning attacks on Kenya to be launched from Uganda in the early 1990s.33

Between 1989 to 1991 Kenya saw one of the worst human rights violations in its history. Moi accused advocates of multiparty politics of subversion, and thereby got a fresh excuse for detaining a new generation of his critics. A number of the champions of multiparty politics--John Khaminwa, Raila Odinga, Mohammed Ibrahim, Gitobu Imanyara, Kenneth Matiba and

Charles Rubia--among others, were detained under inhuman conditions and without trial. Human rights lawyers, Gibson Kamau Kuria and Kiraitu Murungi, fled to the United States to avoid being jailed.

Arrests and detentions in fact followed every one of Moi's warning against his critics. As has been the practice throughout his leadership, the police moved quickly and arrested those in the forefront for democracy, with the judiciary merely sanctioning what is commonly known in Kenya as political cases.[34] A case becomes political when Moi makes a direct statement regarding the case in question even when it has subjudice implications.[35] The ruling against the Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU) and its officials between 1993 to 1995 serve as good examples of the level of state interference in political cases.[36] The union which sought to promote academic freedom and professionalism in Kenya universities was defended by seven well known human rights lawyers: Pheroze Nowrojee, James Orengo, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Paul Muite, Kiraitu Murungi, Otieno Kajwang' and Kathurima M'Inoti, among others. The courts refused outright to hear it while the police harassed its officials.

Suppression of freedom of the press, assembly, association, expression and movement and other fundamental rights of individuals were extended to the press, and non-governmental organizations. In 1991 Moi banned the production of George Orwell's Animal Farm. He also banned Ngugi Wa Thiong's play Ngaahika Ndeenda (Kikuyu for, "I Will Marry When I Want") considered by the regime to be subversive because it attacks post-independence African dictators.[37]

By this time detention and the violation of human rights were regularly protested by civil society, with the church and the LSK taking the lead. Since the 1980s the church had remained the central locus of dissent against the Moi regime, with the pro-democracy and human rights movements using cathedrals and the compounds of churches as venues for expressing their views and drawing plans for action. But using the church as a refuge did not deter the regime from arresting, assaulting and detaining its critiques within church compounds. In one of his sermons, the late Anglican Bishop Alexander K. Muge emphasized that the church has a moral obligation to "protest when God-given rights and liberties are violated" and to " give voice to the voiceless".[38] Even though some politicians and the Office of the President condemned his criticism of the queue voting system, Bishop Muge maintained that: "I shall not protest against violations of human rights in South Africa if I am not allowed to protest the violation of human rights in my own country".[39] Yet not even the clergy was spared arrest by the police. The Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya was arrested in 1988 for suggesting that Kenyans should hold discussions on critical questions affecting the country. Bishop Muge's death in a car crash in August 1990 is still shrouded in mystery.

As demands for competitive elections and an end to detention without trial continued, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Robert Ouko, was assassinated in February 1990. Demands to reveal his real murders amplified those for pluralism and respect for human rights. To save his regime from collapse, Moi adopted even greater authoritarian tactics arguing on a number of occasions that multipartism would cause chaos in the country because Kenya was not "cohesive enough". Clergymen, lawyers, and other pro-democracy and human rights advocates were persistently arrested and harassed. The crackdown intensified during the Saba Saba (July 7) 1990 meeting, organized by the pro-democracy and human rights advocates. Some of these leaders later founded the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). The forum advocated an end to jailing dissenters without trial. The attempt by the American embassy to broker a negotiated permission for FORD to hold its first public meeting scheduled for 16 November, 1991 failed. The government refused to issue a permit and instead arrested Oginga Odinga and Gitobu Imanyara. Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, James Orengo, and Paul Muite managed to go into hiding. The FORD leaders, however, later went ahead with the meeting, but were arrested by the police who forcefully dispersed the gathering.

Instead of ending detention, the government arrested leaders who then were charged under section 5(10)(d) of the Public Security Act. The Act states that "any person who prints, publishes, displays, distributes or circulates notice of, or in any other manner advertises or publicizes, a public meeting or public procession which has not been licensed under this section, shall be guilty of an offense".[40]

The US Congress, concerned with human rights violations and corruption, passed the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991 requiring Kenya to meet certain conditions before $15 million in economic and military aid could be disbursed.[41] These conditions were based on the provisions that Kenya "charge and try or release all prisoners, including any persons detained for political reasons; cease any physical abuse or mistreatment of prisoners; restore the independence of the judiciary; and restore freedoms of expression."[42] US Congressional concerns for human rights violations in Kenya gained momentum in the 1990s, culminating in a fact finding mission to Kenya by high ranking Senators and the release of Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, Raila Odinga, and Gitobu Imanyara.

At this point the KANU government tactically gave in. It agreed to repeal Section 2A of the Constitution which made Kenya a de jure one-party state. This decision paved the way for the formation of political parties, namely FORD (Forum for Restoration of Democracy) led by the opposition veteran, Oginga Odinga, and the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) under Mwai Kibaki. There were other smaller parties. By splitting their votes against Moi's KANU, the opposition assured KANU a victory, albeit one characterized by violent repression and unfairness at the polls. Violations of human rights continued even under the conditions of a symbolic multi-party democracy.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER MULTI-PARTY RULE

When Kenya entered the second multi-party era it was assumed that by allowing opposition to exist, the government would create an enabling environment for its citizens to freely exercise their constitutionally guaranteed rights. What resulted, however, was continuity in human rights violations by the police, and government-supported armed militia and hired thugs. The arbitrary arrests, detentions, and the practice of the interference of the judiciary by the executive, also continued for most of the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, the KANU government went as far as instigating ethnic violence in order to portray the multi-party system as inappropriate for Kenya. Ethnic cleansing was introduced in order to eliminate opposition in "KANU-only zones." From various independent human rights reports, the 1992 and 1998 ethnic violence in the Rift Valley Province was deliberately inflamed for political purposes by members of the government. Violence spread in the Likoni-Kwale (Coast Province) prior to and after the 1997 general elections, in areas where opposition to KANU was strong. The 1998 clashes were different from the previous ones in that this time the Kikuyu community in the Rift Valley retaliated in an organized fashion which the attackers had not anticipated.

Independent investigators again confirmed state complicity in these 1997 violations of human rights. A task force appointed by KANU as well as a parliamentary committee reaffirmed the findings of the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK) that the state was involved in widespread ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley.[43] As ethnic conflict and other forms of human rights violations intensified in the early 1990s, the church issued statements protesting the government's inaction in maintaining order and in stopping human rights violations. In one of their pastoral letters addressed to Moi, the Roman Catholic Church wrote:

"Although our pleas, requests and advice ... seem to have been ignored by you, we on our side will not abandon our responsibilities. We have seen and heard of so much wickedness perpetrated in Kenya since the clashes began. Innocent people, peaceful and humble, and even churches and mosques have been attacked and destroyed. All these abominations are done in your name, by some of your Cabinet Ministers, your DCs, DOs, your GSU and your police."[44]

The use of militia to instigate violence on behalf of KANU and the government began with the 1991-1993 ethnic clashes. To attack opposition groups, "Kalenjin warriors" donned traditional attire and used arrows from South Korea transported by helicopters.[45] Political violence also occurred in 1997 and 1998 in the Rift Valley Province, particularly in Trans Nzoia and Nakuru Districts. As in the 1992 ethnic clashes, the conflict was between pro-KANU supporters and ethnic communities that were deemed sympathetic to the opposition.

According to human rights groups, the fact that the Provincial Administrators, the GSU, and the police were involved in the conflicts again implicated the state. An investigative report into the Likoni-Kwale violence of August 1997, produced by the Kenya Human Rights Commission, for instance, established that the causes of the violence were essentially the politicization of the socioeconomic situation in the region by local politicians.[46] The report implied involvement of the government in that Mombassa KANU politicians, Rashid Sajad and Karisa Maitha, had paid a visit to an armed militia training camp in Shimba Hills. They reassured young men recruited from Uganda, Rwanda (mainly Hutus), and Ukunda (Coast Province) that the government was not only behind but also supported the expulsion of "up-country" people from the area.[47]

Apart from the assumption based on evidence that the clashes were not being perpetrated by indigenous people, there are also other instances that indicate that the government was either not concerned about the human rights violations against opposition inclined ethnic groups or it was behind the attacks. On January 27, 1998, a group of Catholic priests and nuns, international journalists, and a unit of about thirty-eight policemen witnessed a Kalenjin raid on a Kikuyu homestead near the junction of Njoro and Molo in the Rift Valley Province. The police did not act until the nuns ran after the raiders.[48]

As noted above, one of the main objectives of the regime in instigating ethnic cleansing was to "prove" to Kenyans and the world that multiparty politics was not suitable for a multi-ethnic country like Kenya. Moi wanted to demonstrate that he is not willing to relinquish power and control of the state. Indeed, he is fearful of the potential consequences if he were to loose power because of the misdeeds and corrupt practices associated with his regime. Despite a multiparty election, detention, arbitrary arrests and torture of ordinary people -- particularly the pro-democracy and human rights advocates and the opposition members of parliament -- continued although at a declining rate throughout the 1990s. The continued arrests of members of parliament in particular undermined the right of representation. Members of parliament have been arrested for addressing "illegal" meetings even in cases where such meetings are licensed by the government.[49]

In a report on Kenya submitted to the United Nations in 1993, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) stated that although Kenya has been a party to the Convention since 3 January 1976, it had not submitted a single report as stipulated under Articles 16 and 17 of the covenant. The committee also observed that there is no institutional mechanism in Kenya responsible for the enforcement of human rights, with the High Court performing no constitutional role in this regard.[50] The state continued to interfere with court evidence as was shown in the case of Koigi wa Wamwere who had been charged with subversion in 1994. His defense attorneys discovered that the Magistrate, William Tuiyot, had interfered with the proceedings.[51]

Despite the pressure mounted by internal pro-democracy and human rights groups, another type of repression came into the scene after the 1992 elections: informal repression by the state. This involved the use of proxy agencies and groups to attack the pro-democracy and human rights supporters. Although not new to Kenya, this became an important political tool under Moi in the multiparty era.[52] During the December 1992 elections, and again in 1997, the KANU government used its control over the instruments of coercion and the Electoral Commission to place an undue advantage over the opposition. Private militia and groups of thugs were used to disrupt opposition rallies.

At the same time, KANU adopted a number of strategies that undermined free and fair elections in 1992 and 1997. Among them was lopsided voter registration which excluded opposition voters, an Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) that was biased, intimidation of journalists, and banning of print media that is critical of the regime. The Provincial Administration in both elections helped KANU undermine the opposition party's prospects from gaining ground in the elections. The commissioners of the ECK were appointed by the President alone despite protest by the opposition. It the ignored protests of nearly four million eligible voters, (particularly the youth who had attained the age of eighteen years) who were denied registration in 1992.

Voting in 1992 and 1997 was characterized by the suppression of voters' rights by the government in 1997. It was reported that in the Likoni polling stations in the Coast Province, "up-country" people could not vote because their names did not appear on the register, even though they had viable voter registration cards. In one incident, an "up-country" lawyer working in Mombassa insisted on checking the register and actually found his name.[53] The ECK was taking advantage of people's ignorance to ensure a KANU victory at the coast and elsewhere. Journalists were ill-treated and attacked by police for reporting these incidents. In February 1997, for instance, Susan Mosoke, a photographer, was assaulted by an administration policeman when covering a story on the deliberate delay in the issuance of identity cards so that people would not be able to register for voting.[54]

In the build-up to the 1997 elections, opposition demonstrations in favor of constitutional reforms to ensure free and fair elections were met with police beatings. Under external donor pressure, some amendments were made and enacted in November 1997, however, the police continued to contravene the constitution by violating the rights enshrined in the constitution. The reform champions demanded repeal of the Preservation of Public Security Act, sections of the Penal Code dealing with sedition and treason, the Public Order Act, the Chiefs Authority Act, the Administration Police Act and the Societies Act.[55] These were laws used to lock up and detain human rights campaigners and pro-democracy activists. These reforms were actively supported by church groups, opposition parties, human rights organizations, and other NGOs under the forum of the National Convention Assembly (NCA). They challenged the impartiality of the Electoral Commission, decried restrictions on opposition parties, and demanded unhindered access to the broadcast media and a fair registration process.[56]

These reforms were the result of negotiations by an inter-party forum known as the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG). It made recommendations to Parliament and some laws were indeed changed.[57] The Public Order Act gave way to a measure of freedom of assembly as long as police were notified by organizers of public gatherings. The police could now prevent the holding of a meeting if notice of another meeting had been received and there was a conflict. However, the police are still authorized to stop or prevent the holding of a meeting if no notice has been given, or if another meeting in the same venue presents "clear or imminent dangers of the breach of peace or the public order."[58] The police subsequently used this clause to stop meetings deemed as likely to undermine the ruling party's authority. The authority of the chief to regulate the movement of persons from the jurisdiction of one chief to another--another act violating the right of free movement--was repealed in the amendments to the Chiefs' Act. However, the local administration still practices the power of arrest and detention.

In May 1998, a meeting by KANU and opposition MPs at Kwanza (Rift Valley Province) was declared illegal. The police beat politicians, journalists, and the general public to prevent the rally.[59] A subsequent opposition public meeting was invaded by thirty armed raiders. The police reportedly did nothing to stop the raiders. On January 16, 1999, during vote counting of a by-election in Eastern Province, police used wooden clubs and batons to disperse a crowd outside the vote counting hall. They were protesting the announcement of a narrow victory by the KANU candidate based on the counting of the contested ballot boxes.[60] The police entered the hall and beat up opposition MPs. On June 10, 1999, police resorted to tear gas and force to break up a public rally by KANU and opposition MPs at Machakos, Eastern Province, who had met to discuss issues of concern to the Kamba people.[61] On February 26, 1999, police used tear gas and police dogs to stop MPs and farmers from holding a public rally at Eldoret, Rift Valley Province. In this context, police brutality was directed towards leaders who wanted to discuss the problems their constituents were facing; the government perceived this as criticism.

Despite the presence of a vocal opposition in parliament since 1992, the judiciary has contributed to the consistency and continuity of the human rights violations. Victims of human rights violations are thus left without judicial protection, the High Court having decided that it has no jurisdiction to enforce the human rights provisions of Chapter V of the Constitution, even though section 84 of the Constitution provides for redress before the High Court for violation of any of its provisions.[62] Undue interference with the judiciary by the executive branch in matters of appointment continued with the presidency playing a major role.

Judges who made rulings in favor of human rights victims exposed themselves to punitive transfers. In September 1994, a chief magistrate was transferred to Kitui, Eastern Province (130 km. from Nairobi) after he refused to accept as evidence the confession of six men accused of raiding the Ndeiya Chief's Camp near Nairobi. The appointment of Bernard Chunga (formerly the chief state Prosecutor) as Chief Justice by Moi in September 1999, was widely criticized by the human rights lawyers as an attempt to further reduce the independence of the judiciary. Chunga was seen as personally loyal to the President.[63] In July 1999 the High Court dismissed a petition case filed by Mwai Kibaki, the leader of the Democratic Party, against Moi for rigging the 1997 presidential elections through the Electoral Commission. The case was dismissed on a technicality that Kibaki failed to submit a copy of the petition to Moi personally.[64] The truth was that Democratic Party lawyers had been denied personal access to Moi's office by his security guards.

The existence of a strong opposition did not help the justice system. In 1999 Moi stated that courts should not interfere in land matters, affairs of public universities, or issues relating to political parties.[65] This can help to explain the reason why the courts have handled the political cases in the manner they did. In March 1997, the Chairman of the Kenya Judges and Magistrates Association (KJMA), stated that: "these pronouncements clearly threaten the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers."[66]

The war-mongers in the ruling party were again protected by the ruling party as they urged violence against the opposition supporters during and after the 1997 elections. At a KANU rally in Narok, some pro-Moi members of parliament threatened DP supporters with reprisals after Kibaki announced his rejection of the election results. A Minister in the Office of the President, Simon Kiptum Arap Choge, warned that there would be bloodshed country-wide if Kibaki's petition threatened Moi's regime, but no action was taken by the police for incitement to violence.[67]

One cannot overlook the fact that members of the opposition also contributed to incitement of violence through issuing public statements. For instance, Mwai Kibaki is quoted as having said that "Mr. Moi cannot afford to maintain silence as if nothing is happening ...[when] the killing of our citizens has been going on in the last two weeks. It is only natural that the victims will take arms to defend themselves."[68] This sentiment arose out of the government's lack of action in curbing the ethnic violence. While opposition leaders, such as Stephen Ndicho, were being arrested and charged with inciting violence, nothing was done to KANU and KANU leaders.

In 1997 Minister Francis Lotodo asked all non-Kalenjins to leave the Rift Valley, again contradicting the provisions of freedom of movement in the constitution. In September 1999 President Moi himself stated that government officials should deny "permits" to politicians who use public rallies to abuse other leaders. However, officials now have legal rights to cancel such rallies only if they are a threat to security or if there is another meeting in the same venue.[69] The KANU government continued to use force to oppress the opposition in the late 1990s, even after the incorporation of the IPPG amendments to the Constitution. Peaceful rallies calling for political and constitutional reforms were persistently violently broken up by the security forces.

On June 10, 1999, the police, complemented by a squad of "KANU youth" and the infamous jeshi la mzee (which in Swahili literally means, old man's militia), violently disrupted a peaceful rally organized by religious and civil society groups to protest the government's handling of the constitutional review process. A number of people, including the Reverend Timothy Njoya who has been vocal in criticizing the government, were seriously injured.[70] The jeshi la mzee, allegedly sponsored by the Assistant Minister in the Office of the President, Fred Gumo, again appeared on the scene in May 1997 and was used to violently disrupt pro-reform rallies.[71] Notwithstanding the elections, government was complicit to violence against its citizens who were exercising their rights of association and expression.

Conclusion

The move to strengthen human rights in Kenya has run against the authoritarian rule of Daniel Arap Moi, and his patronage system. Reforms since the introduction of multipartism have created a stalemate between Moi's government and most of the opposition members of parliament, church leaders, and other pro-democracy and human rights advocates. Despite the reinstatement of multiparty elections and attempts to annul laws that permit abuse of human rights, government security agents and armed militia continue to violate civil and individual liberties. The main explanatory factor of why so little has changed is Moi's pattern of rule and his political beliefs.

Moi's centralization and personalization of power has led to the subordination of the functions of the judiciary and of parliament. As was the case during the de jure one-party state rule, human rights violations by his administration have continued even after the post-1992 and 1997 multiparty elections. Moi has persistently demonstrated unwillingness to uphold the sanctity of human rights at home. His administration has shown ambivalence in dealing with violence which has persisted in the country, particularly in the Rift Valley and the Coast Provinces.

It has been argued in this paper that were it not for the partial success of the IPPG in allowing President Moi and KANU to maintain control, the government would have used the Likoni-Kwale violence as an excuse to declare a state of emergency and thus postpone the elections indefinitely. Despite constitutional reform, the government has been unable to fulfill its obligation to the country's citizens as enshrined in the constitution and international human rights treaties that it is party to. In and of themselves, the elections of 1992 and 1997 proved insufficient to guarantee human rights. It is clear that an independent judiciary and an accountable police force are required if human rights and civil liberties are to be secured for the majority of Kenya's peoples.

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The State and Development in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Botswana and Mauritius with Angola, Malawi and Zambia

OSEI HWEDI

Introduction

African countries inherited economies that are backward, skewed and underdeveloped as a result of Western colonial rule. Since independence, African states have embarked on the transformation of inherited economic structures with varying degrees of success. The debate about the role of the state in development in Africa reached its peak in the 1970s. Following independence in the 1960s, state involvement in the economy was welcomed, partly due to the lack of indigenous private entrepreneurs and partly due to economic distortions created by colonialism. However, the dismal performance of African economies resulting in the "economic crisis" in the 1970s, necessitated a reappraisal of the role of the state in the economy in the 1980s. The predominant view now, especially by neo-liberals, including international financial institutions (IFIs), is that the state in Africa and other developing countries should reduce its role in economic development.[1] Leftwich and White, taking the opposite view, argue that state intervention is necessary for development to take place because development requires not less state, as the World Bank contends, but better state action, and this is most likely from a developmental state.[2]

The question, therefore, is: what kind of state intervention is conducive to the promotion of development? This paper examines and compares the role of the state in development in Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Zambia in order to understand why states like Mauritius and Botswana are successful developmental states and other states like Angola, Malawi and Zambia are non-developmental, and hindrances to development. Sandbrook, makes the argument that Africa needs active, developmental states capable of complementing and directing market forces.[3] In contrast to the neo-liberals, Leftwich [4] argues that the single most important factor for the generation and sustenance of development is a developmental state, with six features including a determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy, a weak and subordinated civil society, effective management of non-state economic interests, and repression, legitimacy, and performance. Thus, a developmental state has the capability for sustained economic growth (i.e. high gross domestic product (GDP)), and development (i.e. welfare services to the mass of the population), qualities that Mauritius and Botswana have.

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THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES:

Mauritius: Real Successful Development?

Mauritius has one of the most successful economies in Africa. In general, Mauritius has modeled its development on the East Asian countries in terms of export-led growth based on manufacturing complemented by generous tax incentives.[5] Between 1990 and 1994, its GDP grew by a yearly average of 5.3 percent compared to 0.9 percent for sub-Saharan Africa.[6] In spite of being a small island, with a population of 1.3 million people of diverse racial and ethnic origins, Mauritius has enjoyed a high GDP per capita of $13,172 and a low unemployment rate of five percent.[7] Successful development is unique in view of the fact that the three dominant parties - the Labour Party (LP), Movement Militant Mauricien (MMM), and Movement Socialist Militant (MSM) - are socialist in ideological orientation. The three parties have alternated power since 1970, exist in a functioning multi-party democracy, and have allowed for a free market economy.[8]

Mauritius's economic success is attributed to three important factors. Since the 1970s, the government has implemented policies that have provided a conducive environment to the private sector to be the propeller of the economy. Of special importance has been the government's successful implementation of five successive stand-by arrangements and two structural adjustment programmes between 1980 and 1986, which put in place the preconditions for sustainable export-led growth. These measures were part of the process of liberalizing the economy, especially trade and the exchange rate, gave sufficient incentives to foreign private investors, and coincided with the global economic recovery of 1983. Together, the measures boosted output and therefore exports, and by 1990 the economy attained full employment, reaching a goal that has had top priority since independence in 1968.[9]

The restructuring targeted all sectors of the economy. In the agricultural sector, the government's reform programs included a reduction of export taxes on transfers of agricultural land and abolition of restrictions on sugarmill closures. In industry, the government eliminated restrictions on imports and reduced tariffs and promoted foreign private investment in the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) by providing fiscal and financial incentives. In 1983, the government established the Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA) to undertake investment missions and export promotions to boost the number of foreign investors and amount exported, respectively.[10] With regard to tourism, the government resorted to aggressive advertising, improvement of hotel capacity, and improvement of air access policy.[11]

In addition, the devaluation of the Mauritian rupee created a realistic exchange rate that helped to make exports internationally competitive. Traditionally, the government supplemented the rupee as part of its wage policy to ensure the competitiveness of Mauritian exports. Similarly, the adoption of a real rate of interest helped increase gross domestic savings that were used for development programs and reduced the need for foreign borrowing and the debt service burden, which fell from 20 to 6.8 percent in the 1980s.[12]

Another source of economic success is the high demand, ready market, and favorable terms of trade for Mauritian exports in developed countries. Mauritian exports have benefited greatly from the sugar protocol under the Lome Convention with the European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Community (EC). Under this law, Mauritius sells 80 percent of its sugar exports to the EC at a price three times higher than the world market price. The government has prudently utilized the revenue earned from sugar exports for diversification into manufacturing, especially by the EPZ. Like sugar, apparel exports have received special treatment because they are not subjected to import duties and quota restrictions for entering the EC market. There are no quota restrictions in the US market because Mauritian exports have not exceeded the requirement of one percent of US production. The Lome Convention has significantly contributed to the growth in exports of manufactured goods in Mauritius because the EC buys 70 percent while the US absorbs 30 percent of its manufactured goods.[13]

Finally, availability of cheap labor has fitted neatly into the government's labor intensive export-oriented strategy of development. The unemployed, which includes a large pool of women, have been absorbed into the EPZ and has greatly contributed to the growth of employment opportunities. For example, it accounted for 70 percent of the 21,000 jobs created in the economy in 1987 and helped increase income.[14]

Social progress has been the most remarkable achievement of investment export revenue from sugar and manufactured goods as well as domestic savings. Through the national development plans, the government has been able to provide social services to most of the population. Of even greater significance is the provision of education, health facilities, housing and improved life expectancy. Primary school enrollment is 90 percent of children and secondary school enrollment rose from 26 percent in the 1960s to 45 percent in the late 1980s.[15] Also, there has been improvement in life expectancy from 61 years in the mid-1960s, to 68 years in 1987, to 71 years in 1994. The infant mortality rate decreased from 67 per thousand to 24 per thousand in the same period. Similarly, the adult literacy rate stood at 82 percent in 1994. These contribute to the decline in income inequality in Mauritus.[16]

Botswana: Successful Development?

Botswana has one of the world's best rates of economic growth, surpassing that of Mauritius, Korea and other Asian tigers - the newly industrializing countries (NICs). During the 1980s it had the fastest economic growth rate in the world, with an average of 10 percent, despite six years of drought that affected the cattle industry.[17] It has a very low debt of $0.7 billion, with debt servicing accounting for four percent of exports and enormous foreign reserves. Botswana has a relatively small population but large resource base with a per capita income of $ 5,367.[18] The current economic prosperity of Botswana contrasts sharply with the situation at independence, when the state was viewed by most analysts as a very poor country dependent on foreign grants to finance its budget.[19] The transformation of Botswana from a poor agricultural country to a buoyant thriving economy makes it a developmental state.

The government has been able to transform and sustain high levels of growth because of its mineral resources, especially diamonds, which became the base of the economy in the late 1960s. Mining revenues account for 50 percent of the GDP, surpassing the beef industry. [20] With the revenue from diamond exports, the state invested in other mineral industries including copper and soda ash. It also diversified into manufacturing, particularly vehicles like Hyundai (which collapsed in 1999), textile and soap industries, and tourism.

More impressive is the investment of diamond revenues in social and infrastructural services with rapid expansion of education, health facilities, housing and roads in both rural and urban areas. Ninety percent of the children are enrolled in primary school, and primary health care is available to 80 percent of the rural population who are within 15 kilometers radius of a health clinic.[21] Similarly, households with access to potable water increased from 56 to 83 percent between 1981 and 1994. Poverty has declined considerably. The numbers of the national population who are poor and very poor declined from 59 to 47 percent between 1985/86 and 1993/94, and the numbers of poor and very poor households declined from 49 to 38 percent during the same period.[22] Moreover, the creation of state institutions, for example, for water and housing, has facilitated the delivery of services. Additionally, increases in government revenues from diamond exports has facilitated job creation, with the government becoming the largest employer in the country.

Although Botswana's liberalized economy and its reputation of a stable democracy have allowed for a greater role by private foreign capital in both mining and manufacturing and helped attract foreign investment these factors alone cannot explain the economic progress in Botswana.[23] This is because other factors played equally important roles. First, are the high demand and prices for diamonds on the world market, except for 1981/82 and 1992, have allowed the government to accumulate huge savings and trade surplus. Similarly, beef exports have given the government additional revenue for development programs. The Beef Protocol with the EC enables Botswana beef exports to earn substantial revenue because prices are above world market levels. The EC has granted a 90 percent rebate of the variable levy to all Afro-Caribbean Pacific (ACP) beef exports and buys the largest amount of beef from Botswana compared to other Southern African countries.

Second, is the commitment to development by the political and bureaucratic elite who have pursued realistic foreign exchange, fiscal, and monetary and wage policies, all of which are attractive to private foreign investment and conducive to national development. [24] Related to this is the close collaboration between the bureaucracy and politicians to harness resources and implement developmental goals, a relationship lacking in Angola, Malawi and Zambia, and other developing countries. This 'partnership' between the political and bureaucratic elite for development has allowed politicians to seek and accept economic advice from technocrats, especially where national development plans and budgets are concerned. The politicians' support for planning and finance has been expressed by placing the two in one Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) in the Vice-President's office.[25] This has ensured congruence between planning and budgeting, effective implementation of goals, and planning and channelling private foreign investment in accordance with national goals.

Third, economic success is attributed to the efficient, politically neutral and stable bureaucracy that has meant proper utilization and allocation of resources by avoiding over-expenditure, foreign debt, and rampant inflation, while maintaining high stable growth rates. While Botswana has been cited by Wallis as having an efficient bureaucracy because of recruitment and retention of expatriates (especially economists for planning purposes which in turn means a slower rate of localization), the efficiency of the bureaucracy can also be attributed to relatively low levels of corruption among the senior bureaucratic (and political) elite.[26]

Finally, the quality of leadership and careful management of diamond revenues has greatly maximized Botswana's chances of economic development. Related to this are the skill and tact displayed by the Botswana elite in successfully negotiating with de Beers Diamond Company for 50-50 percent share ownership in Botswana diamond mines in 1975 instead of the previous 85-15 percent ownership. The 50-50 share holding gives the state influence over wage policy to allows for flexible changes in minimum wages, licensing, and operations of the mines as well as authorization to expand when necessary to the benefit of both the nation and de Beers.[27]

Angola: Economy in Shambles?

Angola is richly endowed with vast oil, mineral, and agricultural resources that give it tremendous potential for economic development. Its development is based on exports of petroleum and oil products, diamonds, and coffee. At independence in 1975, the Angolan state opted to transform the inherited colonial economy into a socialist one, excluding the oil industry, which continued to operate on capitalist principles.

The oil industry is the backbone of the economy having displaced diamonds and coffee in the 1970s. The government, through its national oil policy, created the national oil company called Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (SONANGOL), with exclusive concessions for oil exploration and production rights. Its assigned task was to coordinate and control petroleum production in the country. This pragmatic arrangement in the oil sector ensured revenues to the government. A 1978 statute allowed foreign oil companies to operate in Angola, either on the basis of a production-sharing agreement or a joint-venture arrangement, with 51 percent shares for SONANGOL through such companies as CABGOC and Texaco. These two provisions by SANANGOL have won the confidence of foreign oil companies, with more than 15 currently operating in Angola.[28]

In the agricultural sector coffee plantations left by the Portuguese, who fled after independence, were nationalized with production by peasants and private estates permitted on a small scale.[29] In the diamond industry, the MPLA government nationalized the Portuguese government's diamond company by acquiring 38 percent of its shares and the shares of other small holders in 1977 and 1979, thereby accumulating a total of 77.21 percent shares. However, the government relied on contractual agreements with foreign companies to mine and sell diamonds on the world market. Since 1986, a state diamond company, Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola (ENDIAMA), has marketed the diamonds.

The revenue from petroleum exports has given the state tremendous resources with which to develop the economy and has given Angola the semblance of a rich, thriving economy. This is a facade, however, because after 24 years of civil war with its concurrent high defence expenditures of 20 percent of the GDP, the Angolan economy is in shambles. Oil revenue contributed 41.5 percent to the total GDP in 1991 and 79 percent to the total revenue in the 1992 budget. In spite of Angola having a 1993 GDP of $8.4 billion, and being placed in the middle-income group of countries in the world, the state has not been able to promote economic development. In 1993, for example, its external debt amounted to $10.9 billion, accompanied by the highest mortality rate in the world of children under five years (292 per 1000), severe food shortages, infrastructural destruction, and little diversification into manufacturing.[30] Although the civil war has been the most important factor in diverting resources from development, socialist centralized planning, subsidies, price controls, collectivization in agriculture, control of infrastructural facilities, and corruption have also contributed to the collapse of the Angolan economy.

The civil war, waged since independence in 1975 to the present, between the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and Uniao Nacional para a Independence Total de Angola (UNITA), has denied the state the peaceful environment necessary for economic development. In 1993, the government mortgaged three years of future oil revenue (on very unfavorable terms) to purchase military supplies, to finance the war against UNITA, resulting in further loss of revenue for development.[31] However, in fairness to the government, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Angola would have experienced successful development in the absence of civil war, because there are other equally important impediments to its development.

The civil war negatively impacted on diamond mining when the mines were bombarded by UNITA forces and mining was temporarily halted as large diamond areas were seized. The war and smuggling of diamonds have deprived the state of revenue from diamond mining. The war has also caused serious destruction of infrastructural facilities including bridges, roads and railroads, making it difficult to transport supplies to producers and commodities to the market. Similarly, the war has reduced production in agriculture as farmers have abandoned the sector, fleeing war and the risks associated with land mines. The production of both food export crops (e.g. coffee) has been reduced causing severe food shortages resulting in famine. Angola has become dependent on expensive food imports and food aid to avoid famine conditions and the food shortages have given rise to a thriving black market.

In addition, socialist economic policies that encourage state participation in the economy have hampered rather than facilitated the process of economic development. The state's involvement in the economy has meant a heavy role by bureaucrats. The lack of economic discipline among top leaders has resulted in a lack of congruence between plans and budgets, thus making it hard to realize the goals of development. Furthermore, state control of ports and shipping has led to their collapse because the Portuguese colonialists trained very few Angolans at the time of independence and the MPLA state was unable to retain expatriate personnel.[32] Public services like education, health, water supply, sewage, and electricity also ground to a halt in the late 1980s due to lack of funds, and bureaucratic impediments.[33] State companies such as utilities and those in productive areas have operated at a loss, primarily because of a lack of managerial autonomy to set profitable prices and economic production levels and political control by ministers. Subsidies given by the central government to companies to cover their losses are one example of the inefficient use of public resources.[34]

Corruption by top MPLA political and military leadership has resulted in state resources being used for personal aggrandisement or allocated inefficiently. In most cases there was duplication of purchases because of a lack of co-ordination and accountability for use of state funds among senior government officials.[35] Undoubtedly, corruption goes on unabated because of the government's inability to prosecute the offending officials. Fourth, the fall in world oil prices in the 1980s worsened the economic situation especially in the absence of government savings during the time of high oil prices. The government's earnings from oil exports declined from $2,000 million in 1985 to $700 million in 1987.[36] To resuscitate the economy, the government was forced to introduce economic reforms. In 1987, the government announced the Economic and Financial Restructuring Program, also known as the Saneamento Economico e Financeiro (SEF). Unfortunately, the reforms were not implemented because of a lack of commitment by top MPLA officials sympathetic to a socialist pattern of development, and the dismissal of the Minister of Finance, the architect of the SEF program.[37]

Persistent economic problems and poor results from its socialist policies forced the government to resume the SEF in 1990. However, the resumption of the war with UNITA in 1992, following UNITA's refusal to recognize the electoral results, again blocked implementation of reforms as the MPLA was primarily preoccupied with defense matters. Finally, in 1994, SEF was launched in an effort to revitalize the economy. Some reforms were undertaken. For example, in 1984, the government embarked on a program to increase food production to achieve food self-sufficiency by converting state farms into small-holder peasant associations in rural areas. Through agricultural stations, the government provided support in the form of fertilizer and seeds to peasants with limited success. Similarly, in 1990, the government embarked on the privatization of state-owned coffee plantations to boost output by selling 33 plantations to foreign companies. The sale proved expensive due to the old age of the trees and unattractive due to the war.[38]

Malawi: Frail Economy?

Malawi opted to give priority to agriculture by promoting economic development through the increase of export earnings on tobacco and tea, and to attain food self-sufficiency through increasing maize production. The state pursued a mix of private enterprise and state participation by providing economic infrastructure and investment in new economic activities such as sugar estates. To promote 'balanced' development, the government controlled and directed private sector investment, foreign trade and the location of business ventures. Its control of retail prices and workers' wages was to contain domestic inflation, reduce labour costs as an incentive to investors to use labor-intensive technology, and make exports competitive in international markets and attract foreign investment. Therefore, the government restrained the formation and operation of trade unions. In order to ensure an efficient and effective bureaucracy conducive to development, the government retained British expatriates who occupied 79 percent of senior posts at independence in 1964 because of inadequate local skills. Thereafter, the government adopted a policy of slow indigenization of the public service, as had Botswana.[39]

A three-pronged approach was embarked upon to promote development. President for Life, Banda, encouraged senior party and government officials to participate in estate agriculture. The state purchased some foreign-owned estates for distribution to small-scale producers. Parastatal companies (e.g. the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC), Agricultural Development Corporation (ADMARC), and Press Holdings) and joint ventures with foreign investors were encouraged in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In reality, President Banda overwhelmingly controlled the Malawian economy as the sole shareholder of Press Holdings, whose total gross turnover was one third of the GDP and employed 10 percent of modern sector workers in the 1970s.[40] In addition, the government created public utility companies to service productive sectors, especially electricity, roads, railways, and provided training for both public and private industry. The government also supported small farmers through, among other programs, four integrated rural development projects largely financed by foreign donors such as the World Bank and Britain.

The Malawian state experienced rapid economic growth after independence and there was an increase in socio-economic infrastructure. The four primary goals set forth in the Development Plans of 1965 and 1969 were realized by the end of the 1970s, as agricultural production expanded rapidly for domestic consumption and exports, infrastructural facilities were built for agricultural exports, educational institutions were constructed and enrollment increased to provide skilled manpower for the civil service and private sector, and the growth of the private sector was encouraged as the basis of development.[41] Malawi's share of world exports increased from 2.2 percent in 1965-67 to 3.3 percent in 1977-79, while tea exports rose from 2.4 to 3.8 percent.[42] Concurrent with rising exports, Malawi attained self-sufficiency in food production, especially maize. With economic growth averaging 7 percent per annum in 1970, Malawi was able to eliminate dependence on foreign development assistance by 1972-73, and reallocate capital to such sectors as manufacturing. Similarly, investment in education paid dividends as it was able to indigenize many positions held by expatriates with qualified Malawian personnel in the 1970s.[43]

The impressive growth performance of the 1960s through the early 1970s is attributed to a combination of a realistic exchange rate policy due to devaluation of the local currency which made exports competitive on the world market, government avoidance of luxury imports, and conservative fiscal and monetary policies which allowed the mobilization and utilization of domestic resources, reduced dependence on foreign aid, and attracted foreign investment.[44] An efficient civil service certainly helped in achievement of a good economic record, as did its non-involvement in the liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.

By the late 1970s, Malawi ceased to be a developmental state as the economy faced severe difficulties stemming from a decline in export prices on the world market, failure to build up reserves during years of good export earnings, poor judgement in policy formulation and implementation (e.g. giving priority to big private farmers instead of small farmers), expenditure on imported consumables, and accumulation of external debt. Consequently, the government was unable to finance its own development and resumed dependence on foreign development finance.[45]

Persistent economic problems made Malawi adopt the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in 1980 to liberalize the economy. However, SAPs exacerbated the economic decline primarily because the same few export crops - tobacco, sugar, and tea - with low prices on the world market, were given support by the state in terms of credit and marketing. Again, small farmers were denied an incentive to improve production.

Zambia: Struggling Economy?

Zambia's economy is dependent on copper mining, which accounts for 90 percent of its export earnings and serves as an engine of growth. At independence in 1964, the leadership was committed to the promotion of economic development and restructuring the economy by adopting a mix of public and private participation. State intervention in the economy was set in motion with the 1968 Mulungushi Reforms, which permitted the government to acquire 51 percent shares from private retail, transport, and manufacturing firms through the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), a parastatal. The Matero Reforms of 1969 resulted in the government purchasing 51 percent shares from the mining companies, Anglo American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust, leading to partial nationalization of the copper industry.[46] Consequently, the state controlled 80 percent of the economy through parastatals involved in mining, energy, transport, tourism, finance, agriculture, services, commerce, trade, manufacturing and construction.

In spite of its impressive national development plans, the Zambian state failed to realize most of the goals embodied in the plans. Admittedly, Zambia experienced reasonable growth rates in the 1960s and early 1970s, primarily due to high copper production and prices, as well as increases in maize and manufacturing outputs. Consequently, until 1970, Zambia had an export surplus from copper and accumulated huge foreign reserves due to high copper prices on the London Metal Exchange (LME). The GDP grew at an average annual rate of between 2 and 3.4 percent from 1972-76.[47] However, the economy went into decline in 1974 as copper prices plummeted on the world market, and by 1976 copper earnings contributed only 3 percent to the Zambian treasury. Primarily because of the fall in world copper prices, the economy has still not recovered.

However, state intervention in the economy, discrepancies between planned objectives and resource allocations as well as implementation, and lack of commitment to planning also contributed to poor economic performance. This in turn contributed to balance of payments problems, making it difficult for the government to import goods and service its external debt, and reducing government expenditure on development. Since 1974, budget deficits have become the norm.[48] However, other factors are also to blame for Zambia's poor economic performance. First, lack of accumulation of savings by the government during periods of high copper prices (1965-70) to cushion the impact of any fall in copper prices worsened the economic situation since the mid-1970s. Instead, government increased expenditure on socio-economic services like health, education and infrastructure, imported luxury goods and compensated workers with high wages, especially mine workers.

Second, the highly capital-intensive technology utilized in mining and manufacturing meant that parastatals contributed little to employment creation, eradication of poverty, and improvement in standards of living for the mass population. Mismanagement and corruption further reduced the effectiveness and viability of parastatal enterprises and government bureaucracy. The fact that very few officials were prosecuted encouraged corrupt and inefficient practices.[49] Third, Zambia's support for liberation movements in southern Africa seriously affected the implementation of development plans as resources were diverted from productive to infrastructural facilities, including the Tanzania Zambia Railway (TAZARA).

In 1983, the government, following recommendations of the IMF and WB, undertook economic policy reforms to rejuvenate the economy through deregulation of prices, auction of foreign exchange, reduction of subsidies to consumers and parastatal companies as part of budget deficit reduction, increase in agricultural output, and liberalization of marketing of agricultural commodities as well as devaluation of the local currency. However, such reforms worsened rather than improved the economy, as both agricultural and manufacturing outputs and exports failed to increase significantly due to inadequate incentives for farmers and the poor competitiveness of manufactured goods on the world market. The country borrowed heavily from international institutions, especially multilateral institutions on a non-concessionary basis. Consequently, since the 1970s, Zambia has become one of the most indebted countries in the world relative to its GDP. In 1990, for example, the debt was $7.2 billion, equal to 185 percent of the GDP and 719 percent of export earnings, making debt the most important cause of economic stagnation, with 67 percent of households poor and 58 percent extremely poor in 1991.[50]

SUCCESS AND FAILURE - A DISCUSSION

Botswana and Mauritius continue to perform well economically compared to the other three countries. The Human Development Index (HDI), which is a combined measure of national income, life expectancy and educational levels, ranks 175 countries from the highest to the lowest level of human development. The HDI places Mauritius at number 61 in the high level of human development and Botswana at 97 in the medium level, with Zambia at 143, Angola at 157 and Malawi at 161, in the lowest level of human development.[51] This means that Zambia, Angola and Malawi have failed to promote development beneficial to the general populace. Why? It is the discrepancy between policy decisions and implementation and how public resources are utilized and allocated, which differentiate developmental states, like Mauritius and Botswana, from non-developmental ones such as Angola, Malawi and Zambia.

Explaining why some developing countries have grown rapidly while others have not, Bradford has identified the adoption of a positive development philosophy with a policy framework that leads through market mechanisms to efficient allocation and utilization of resources.[52] This suggests that complementarity between the states and market forces has paved the way for the promotion of national development and the importance of politics in Botswana and Mauritius. Thus, the congruence between political systems and choices of economic policies is very important. As democracies, the governments of Botswana and Mauritius are most inclined to select sound economic policies to efficiently allocate and utilize resources to satisfy the majority of the population. It is the commitment to development by both the political and bureaucratic elites that underlies the pursuance of realistic economic policies and good management of economies, relatively low corruption which explains their ability to take advantage of EC and US preferential treatment and high demand and prices on the world market. The governments' sensitivity to relatively equitable distribution of public resources ensures political stability. Their reputations as stable, legitimate democratic governments have endeared the two countries to foreign investors. These characteristics are lacking in the other three countries.

Angola, Malawi, and Zambia, which were authoritarian one-party states, moved towards political liberalism with multiparty elections in the 1990s. As a result, they are more preoccupied with problems of consolidating democracy and rejuvenating ailing economies. Prospects do not look promising since they still retain some elements of authoritarianism including repression of political opposition, lack of responsiveness, accountability and transparency, corruption and misuse of public resources. They face even dimmer prospects in view of the breakdown in international negotiations, under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for export concessions for developing countries. In contrast, Botswana and Mauritius have multiparty democratic systems which have survived for a very long period of time, allowing for popular acceptance and acquisition of legitimacy by ruling governments, and relatively better prospects for growth due to a stable high demand for Botswana diamonds and high prices for Mauritian manufactured goods, guaranteeing sufficient revenues to meet electorates' demands.

Conclusion

Botswana and Mauritius have successful records of economic development primarily because of their democratic systems of government which, due to the need for accountability and responsiveness to electorates, are compelled to select appropriate economic policies for efficient allocation and utilization of resources, and to provide sufficient incentives to foreign investors to propel development. This logically means that for Angola, Malawi and Zambia to be developmental states, they have to adopt fully-fledged democratic state structures, which are legitimate and popularly accepted by society as in Botswana and Mauritius. Angola, Malawi and Zambia, as relatively newly democratizing countries, have a long way to go toward consolidation to create political environments conducive to successful development. Thus, Botswana and Mauritius as successful models of 'popular, responsive democracy and 'distributive' capitalist economic development might not be easily emulated because the factors which account for their successes are only partially present in the three countries and the rest of 'non-democratic' Africa.

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The Public Sector, Privatization, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

JAMES S. GUSEH

Abstract: At the time of independence, nearly all African countries identified capitalism with neocolonialism and therefore adopted a statist approach to economic development, with government being the major instrument of development. As a result, the size of the public sector grew through the creation of public sector enterprises. On the other hand, over the years there has been a slowdown in economic growth, especially in agricultural output. With deep internal economic crisis, shortage of foreign capital and debt obligations, many African countries adopted in the 1980s certain structural adjustment measures required by international donor organizations and creditors as a condition for economic assistance, with privatization usually being a component of the structural adjustment programs. Thus, many African countries have embarked on the policy of privatization and other market-oriented reforms. Empirical investigations as to whether or not privatization promotes development of the issue have produced mixed results.

Introduction

Privatization has become an important instrument for streamlining the public sector and promoting economic development in countries around the world. Privatization refers to divestiture of public sector enterprises (PSE)---enterprises owned and operated by the state---to private owners and, more generally, the placing of a large share of the economy into the private sector. Privatization gained a major thrust in the 1980s when international donor organizations-like the World Bank--made it a major component of structural adjustment programs, established as a condition for economic assistance. Structural adjustment itself refers to "a series of economic policies designed to reduce the role of government in an economy [by] replacing government control with market incentives." [1]

Structural adjustment programs were initiated as a result of the explosive debt crisis of the early 1980s. The rise to power of groups espousing neo-liberal economic ideas during the political tenure of the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the United States and Great Britain, respectively, accelerated the placement of structural adjustment on the economic development agenda during that period. While stabilization programs of earlier post-war decades achieved successful monetary, fiscal, and trade policies without economic restructuring, structural adjustment programs in the developing world during the 1980s and early 1990s were associated with the adoption of free-market policies as a condition for international assistance.

The 1980s can be regarded internationally as the decade of privatization. "From the middle of the 1970s, worldwide sales of state enterprises reached a record total of over $185 billion by the end of the 1980s." [2] Although the public enterprise sector expanded in most countries during much of the post-World War II period, this sector contracted or remained the same in most countries during the 1980s, principally due to privatization policies.[3] Since 1980, worldwide

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sales of PSEs have risen faster. In 1990 governments worldwide sold off $25 billion in PSEs.[4] Total sales increased to $69 billion in 1992 ([5]) and exceeded $175 billion over the period 1990 to 1993.[6] Assets of privatized entities are projected to exceed $600 billion by the year 2000.[7]

While the policy of privatization may have originated in the industrialized countries, it has been rapidly adopted in the developing world. Over the years in many developing countries, there has been a slowdown in economic growth, especially in agricultural output. Increasingly, therefore, they are reducing the size of the public sector and turning to market-oriented reforms. Moreover, as a result of the declining economic growth in these countries, international donor organizations and creditors, such as the World Bank and the United States government, have required certain structural reforms as a condition for economic assistance, with privatization usually being a major component of this structural adjustment package. Privatization has been seen by some governments and international donor organizations as a policy that will help less developed countries improve the performance of their economies by reducing the size of the public sector and enhancing the performance of the private sector. Thus, many African countries have embarked upon privatization.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors that led to the adoption of the policy of privatization in Africa, with emphasis on Sub-Saharan African, and to review the policy as an instrument of development. The paper begins with analysis of the contribution of the size of public sector to economic growth in Africa. Such an assessment is important, because the growing trend in the size of government has been criticized for the decline in economic growth.[8]

Second, with the policy of privatization perceived as a major solution to the slowdown in economic growth, the issue becomes whether or not privatization promotes development at a faster rate than would otherwise happen. This study addresses this issue through a review of empirical studies on the relationship between privatization and development. The results should provide further insights into the effects of the privatization policy adopted in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study concludes with some policy implications.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND PRIVATIZATION

In the struggle for independence from colonial rule, ambivalence toward capitalism was the hallmark of most nationalist movements in Africa.[9] At the time of independence, most African countries identified capitalism with colonialism rather than with entrepreneurship and free enterprise. As Bruce Bartlett stated, "capitalism in any form was identified with imperialism and therefore rejected as neo-colonialist."[10] As a result, virtually every African country adopted some form of socialism or statist approach to economic development. Many external advisers and the economics profession recommended a major role for the state in economic development. Thus, governments became the principal actor in economic activities and the major instrument of development in many African countries. This has led to an increase in the size of the public sector through the creation of numerous government agencies and state-owned or public-sector enterprises.

Goran Hyden described the original rationale for establishing these enterprises as follows: "In the absence of an entrenched class of local capitalists, many governments felt a need to resort to public enterprises as the only alternative to counteract the influence of foreign capital and to accelerate the development of local resources. The public enterprises would take the role played by private entrepreneurs in other countries and thus help to harness, mobilize and exploit resources which would otherwise lie idle or be developed only by foreigners. The profit generated by these bodies, moreover, would accrue to the state and thus be available for public investment and for fostering social welfare goals of the new governments. In those countries which adopted a socialist strategy of development, governments would add to this list of reasons for a rapid expansion of the public sector the objective of social equality. A dominant public sector would make equalization policies easier."[11]

Other points of view have been advanced for a larger role of government in the process of development. One point is that government should be assigned a critical role in the process of economic development. Another is that a large government can become a powerful engine in economic development. Arguments in support of the latter include, inter alia: "(i) role of the government in harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests; (ii) prevention of exploitation of the country by foreigners; and (iii) securing an increase in productive investment and providing a socially optimal direction for growth and development."[12]

Thus, since independence, the role of the state in economic activities has increased sharply in Africa through the creation of numerous public-sector enterprises. For example, in the late 1980s, "state enterprises bulk[ed] larger in proportion to total economy activity than it [did] in any other market-economy region in the Third World."[13] It is estimated that about three thousand enterprises are fully or partially controlled by governments in Africa. The size of government in the economy had grown sharply between independence in the 1960s and the era of structural adjustment in the 1980s.

Although there are various measures of the size of government in the economy, the measure employed in this study is the ratio of government consumption expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP). For many countries, government consumption expenditure consists of the following categories: "1) outlays for wages and salaries of civil servants and the military; 2) outlays on nondurable goods and services, including those for public sector employees, maintenance, and all spending on military equipment; 3) interest payments on government debt; 4) transfers to subnational government; and 5) subsidies and other transfers to individuals."[14] This measure, regarded as the standard specification of government size, assesses the effect of public sector expansion on the underlying growth rate.[15] It provides a useful indication of the overall influence of the public sector in the economy as a whole.[16]

Measured as the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP, government size in Sub-Saharan Africa increased from about 20 percent in the early 1960s and 1970s to about 28 percent and 29 percent in the early 1980s and 1990s, respectively.[17] Much of the growth during the initial period was the result of the newly independent states assuming the role of nation building from colonial states. The states tended to mobilize their physical and human resources for socioeconomic development. Countries that were endowed with natural resources, such as Liberia with iron ore, Ghana with bauxite, and Nigeria with oil, tended to use the revenue from the sales of the resources to expand their public sectors. Thus, the state became the major actor in economic activity and development.

The extent of state involvement in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa is summarized in a 1986 report by the World Bank as follows:

"Public sector employment is half of all modern sector employment, compared with only one-third in Asia. Allowing the country size, public enterprises are more numerous than in most other developing countries, and they engage in a wider array of activities. Public investment accounts for the bulk of investment in the formal sector."[18]

The early 1970s experienced a decline in economic performance as a result of the first OPEC oil crisis in 1973. The slowdown in economic growth led to a decline in income to various sectors of the economy including the public sector. As a result, the share of government spending as a percentage of GDP declined slightly during this period. To continue the trend of government expansion, oil importing countries embarked on heavy borrowing. Ironically, some of the funds for borrowing were recycled funds from oil exporting countries.

Table 1 provides external debt statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa. The external debt as a percentage of GNP more than doubled over the period 1980 to 1995. It increased from 30.6 percent to 81.3 percent. Similarly, debt as a percentage of exports increased from 91.7 percent in 1980 to 241.3 percent in 1995. With substantial borrowing to finance government activities, including public sector enterprises, the size of government increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.[Table 1]

While the size of the public sector has been growing, the rate of economic growth has been slow. A broad overview of the economy of Sub-Saharan Africa shows that the average annual rate of economic growth was over 10 percent in the 1960s and declined below 2 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s, most of the national economies were in a state of near or partial collapse. Over the period 1990 to 1998, annual rate of economic growth averaged slightly over 2 percent to 2.2 percent. In 1997-98 the average annual growth rate of per capita was negative (-0.4 percent). The growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s have been below the average annual rates of population growth of 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively.

As a result of the declining rate of economic growth, African countries are increasingly reducing the size of the public sector and are turning to market-oriented reforms. As discussed in the previous section, the declining economic growth in these countries has led international donor organizations and creditors, such as the World Bank, the European Union, and the United States government, to require certain structural reforms as a condition for economic assistance, with privatization normally being a major component of this structural adjustment package.

PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN AFRICA

Table 2 presents a summary of privatization activity in Sub-Saharan Africa in various years and by economic sectors. By 1998, 3,165 privatization transactions were completed, leading to total sales value of US$6,426 million. Of these transactions, about 50 percent were completed prior to 1994, and the other 50 percent were completed over the period 1994 -1998. It is therefore clear that by 1999 the pace of privatized firms in value terms was falling. This is due largely to the political unpopularity of privatization. Of the total transactions, manufacturing constituted about 75 percent, followed by agricultural production and process with 50 percent and services with 40 percent. The rest of the transactions consisted of trade with 10 percent, financial with 5 percent, and other with 6 percent. Most of the privatized industries had been built by state authorities to encourage manufacturing under import substitution policies.[Table 2]

Turning to strategies of privatization, a wide range of methods have been employed in Africa. Table 3 presents the methods used up to the end of 1996. The sales of shares through competitive tender appears to be the principal method of privatization, constituting about a third of the total privatization. Open competitive bidding has been one of the conditions favored by donors. However, formal liquidations and asset sales combined represent the same proportion of transactions, a reflection of the poor condition of many state-owned enterprises.[19] The number of non-competitive methods exceeded the number of sales to shareholders with pre-emptive rights, a reflection of a degree of non-transparency and skepticism about privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa.[20] It is also a reflection of the existing laws that grant current shareholders pre-emptive rights in buying out the state. It is reported however, that concerns about transparency are receding because of the availability of more information to the public by the implementing agencies and the increasing involvement of the private sector in the privatization process.[21] [(Table 3)]

The pace of privatization across the continent is not uniform. The pace is picking up in some countries, while in other countries the process is just beginning. In others it has slowed down. In terms of the number of transactions completed in each country to the end of 1998, most privatization activities have taken place in Mozambique (579), Angola (331), Zambia (253), Ghana (217), Tanzania (198), Kenya (189), Ethiopia (125), and Guinea (117).[22] It is interesting to note that the two countries that have recorded the most privatization transactions, Mozambique and Angola, are neither Anglophone nor Francophone countries, but Lusophone countries. Both are formerly Marxist command economies. This, perhaps, reflects the need and determination of these countries to move away from socialism and rebuild their war-torn economies.[23]

Despite the adoption of privatization policy, the Sub-African region still ranks low in the pace of privatization. According to the US National Center for Policy Analysis, among the regions in the world for the period 1988-1995:

"Latin America and the Caribbean was the leading privatization region with total sales of about $54 billion or 46 percent of the total amount of proceeds from privatization.

East Asia was next with sales of $28 billion or 25 percent, followed by Europe and Central Asia (which includes the formerly planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) with almost $20 billion or 17 percent.

The rest of the developing world combined [including Sub-Saharan Africa] was responsible for only about 12 percent of the value of sales."[24]

These data and the fact that state-ownership represents about 10 percent of GDP in developing countries on average suggest that a lot of assets are still controlled by states in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions.[25] The major factor that has restricted the pace of privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa is the underdevelopment of the capital markets. This limitation has affected the pace of privatization in terms of how many enterprises could be put up for sale and the methods employed for broadening ownership. As a method of privatization, capitalization schemes have not been tried in Africa [26], while they have been employed in some Latin American countries. However, according to Jean-Louis Sarbib, Vice President of the

African Region of the World Bank, a lot of effort is going into capital market developments along with financial sector reforms in Africa. [27]

Despite these problems, the lessons learned indicate an increasing number of privatized firms deserve closer attention. The question is whether or not privatization helps promote development. This issue is addressed in the next section where the relationship between privatization and development is reviewed.

PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: POLICY CHOICES

Would the limited amount of privatization help the goal of accelerated growth in Africa? One of the issues involved in assessing the impact of privatization is measurement of performance. While a private enterprise tends to be assessed in terms of financial performance, a public sector enterprise (PSE) may have multiple functions, such as commercial and developmental functions. For example, in Liberia, the state-owned radio station performed both development functions, such as operating a rural communication network, and also commercial functions. Thus, a PSE can be assessed in terms of financial performance, as well as its effectiveness, efficiency, economy and contribution to democracy.[28] To assess PSEs with multiple functions only in terms of profitability may not present an accurate assessment of the performance of such enterprises.

Another factor in measuring performance in the public sector deals with the ownership of performance measurements. Several public agencies may contribute to the realization of a certain goal or output, and how credit for these contributions should be allocated may be an issue. Graeme Hodge provides an example of this situation as follows:
"[P]olice, transport accident commission, road and traffic authorities, emergency services associated with on-site trauma, medical support and transport, hospitals, community groups, and educators are some of the contributors to the general aim of reducing road accident trauma. None of these contributing agencies, however, would be wholly responsible for the overall level of road trauma occurring over any one particular time period. In any single year, all agencies would have partial ownership of the road trauma outcome in the community."[29]

Ownership of performance measurement can also affect the performance of services. An agency may want to receive credit for providing a service that involves the cooperation and contribution of many organizations. By insisting on receiving credit, the agency may prevent the services from being provided. For example, in the United States "several law enforcement agencies knew about a major drug shipment, but they allowed it to slip through their fingers . . . because they would not agree about which of the 'cooperating' agencies would make the actual arrest and receive the media attention."[30]

Although there are different forms of privatization with different objectives, most evaluations do not distinguish the effect of each form of privatization on development. Forms of privatization include contracting out, enterprise sales, public-private partnerships through joint ventures, and delegation. Different methods of privatization result in different outcomes, and the privatization agency must use the most appropriate method of privatization for different companies, industries, and sectors.[31] For example, if the goal is to restructure PSEs with little or no transfer of ownership and management control, then the most appropriate method is commercialization of PSEs by requiring cost recovery and eliminating their subsidies and monopoly status.[32] If the objective is to reduce or eliminate the public sector's role in providing goods or services and to encourage private sector provision, the appropriate methods include delegation of responsibility of nongovernmental organizations and the private sector and provision of state guarantees or incentives for the private sector or nongovernmental organizations to provide services.[33] Whether these different forms of privatization have different effects on growth and development remains to be tested.

Whether privatization has a positive or negative impact on development seems to depend on factors such as the variables and model specifications employed. For example, studies that have regressed the rate of economic growth on government expenditure or tax revenue as a share of GDP have found a significant negative relationship, *ceteris paribus*.[34] This may indicate that growth in government activities tends to harm economic expansion overall. On the other hand, studies that have regressed the rate of economic growth on the growth rate of government expenditure have found a significant positive relationship, *ceteris paribus*.[35] Thus, the model specifications employed tend to determine the nature of the effects of the public sector on economic growth. The government expenditure variable employed in these studies is government consumption expenditure, defined in the previous section.[36]

Accordingly, a debate in the literature centers on determining the appropriate specification of government size in assessing its impact on economic growth. According to Landau, although the correct approach would be to include government in a general model of economic growth, he argued that such a model does not exist and that "Economic research is still in an underdeveloped state [with] little known about the impact of public production."[37] Thus, Landau (and others) specified government size as the share of government consumption expenditure (G) in GDP (i.e., G/GDP).[38] This specification has been found to be negatively correlated with economic growth.

Ram, however, challenged this specification. He argued that the use of the variable G/GDP in the production function lacks a theoretical foundation and thus would be ad hoc. Adapting a two-sector production function framework, he showed that the appropriate variable for investigating the effects of government size on economic growth is the growth rate of government spending (i.e., dG/G).[39] His results showed a positive correlation between government size and economic growth.

Despite the two views on the specification of government size, Conte and Dard have shown that both specifications are appropriate, with Ram's specification measuring the short-run impact of government and the other specification measuring the long-run impact.[40] Thus, the short-run impact of the growth in government size on the economy is positive, while the impact of government on the underlying rate of economic growth is negative. These differences on the impact of privatization on growth, make it hard to arrive at a hard and fast answer on the likely impact of privatization on economic growth in Africa.

Conclusions

Since independence, the size of government in African countries has grown through the creation of public sector enterprises. On the other hand, the rate of economic growth has been declining. Whatever the results of studies on the relationship between privatization and development, many African countries are placing large shares of their economies in the private sector in order to reduce the size of government and improve the performance of their economies.

Growth in the size of government, measured as the share of government consumption expenditure in GDP, has been found to be directly associated with a decline in economic growth. Growth in the share of GDP consumed by governments tends to be a drag on growth. That is, government consumption is a "net tax on society with few corresponding benefits."[41] Besides the direct negative impact of government on the economy, growth in government also adversely affects economic growth through an indirect approach. That is, more government lowers savings and investment which in turn retards economic growth.

Other studies also suggest that a larger government size may interfere with efficiency and economic growth. Some of the reasons that have been advanced include: "(i) government operations are often conducted inefficiently, (ii) the regulatory process imposes excessive burdens and costs on the economic system, and (iii) many of government's fiscal and monetary policies tend to distort economic incentives and lower the productivity of the system."[42] Additionally, corruption tends to be prevalent in the public sphere. According to the World Bank, "many privatization efforts have been racked by corruption, undermining confidence in both the government and the market economy."[43]

As Brian JL Berry, Edgar C. Canaling, and D. Michael Ray have noted:
"Centrally directed [economic] systems do not work and cannot compete. They produce only sporadic growth, assure only a low-level equality that is violated by party-membership privilege, and quite demonstrably have been far more destructive of the environment than political and economic systems of any other kind."[44]

Brian J.L. Berry, et al. recommend that economic statism of central direction would have to be replaced by individual initiatives and the discipline markets in the economic arena, and individual freedoms and democratic institutions in the sphere of politics; private enterprise and competition would have to replace state monopoly and public-sector enterprises.[45] Competition is essential, because it encourages efficiency and provides incentives for innovation. As Bruce Bartlett said, "whatever faults it may have, there is no longer any doubt that free-market capitalism has the greatest capacity to produce goods and services of any economic system ever devised."[46] According to Graeme Hodge, who has conducted an international review of privatization, "this changed intellectual climate has also been further bolstered by the failure of centrally planned economies and the relative success of Western capitalist democracies."[47] Little wonder, then, that market systems are triumphing across the globe!

With growth in the size of the public sector being associated with a slowdown in economic growth, the traditional emphasis of African countries on government as the instrument of development needs to be reexamined. For example, the World Bank compared economic performance of developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.[48] The Bank found that in 1960 per capita incomes in the Asian countries were only slightly higher than those in Africa, while consumption expenditures of African governments were higher than those of the Asian governments. However, by the 1990s, incomes in East Asia were more than five times those in Africa, while the government size in Africa had grown to one-and-a-half times that in East Asia.

Reducing the size of the public sector is seen therefore as essential to lower inflation and to allow for new domestic and foreign investments. As stated by the National Center for Policy Analysis, "Privatizations have a particularly strong influence over decisions to invest, and each dollar of privatization revenue generates an extra 38 cents in new investment with financial and infrastructure privatizations having the most positive effect on other foreign direct investment."[49] Thus, a policy based on a minimal role of government in economic activity may be the best route towards economic growth and prosperity in Africa. The need for such an institutional reform is of high urgency.

It is therefore urgently necessary to critically review and reconsider the traditional emphasis on government as the major source of employment and on State monopoly and control over productive assets and a wide range of economic activity. To translate this awareness into policy constitutes one of the major political-economic challenges facing Sub-Saharan African countries in the twenty-first century.

Tables

Table 1. External Debt for Sub-Saharan Africa

	1980	1995
Total External Debt (million $)	84,119	226,483
External Debt as Percentage of GNP	30.6	81.3
External Debt as Percentage of Exports	91.7	241.7
Debt Service as Percentage of Export	9.8	14.5
Multilateral Debt as Percentage of Total External Debt	9.0	24.3

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 247.

Table 2. Privatization Activity in Sub-Saharan Africa by Period and Economic Sector 1994-98

A. Transactions Completed by Period

Year	Number of Transactions Completed	Percent
Before 1994	1,582	50.5
1994	352	11.2
1995	485	15.5
1996	422	13.5
1997	240	7.6
1998	53	1.7
Total	3,134	100

B. Transactions Completed by Sector

Sector	Number of Transactions	Percent
Agriculture Production & Processing	655	24.1
Financial	120	4.4
Manufacturing	826	30.4
Services	636	23.4
Trade	299	11.0
Other	182	6.7
Total	2,718	100

Source: The World Bank Group, The World Bank Group-Country Data: African Development Indicators. http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/adi/adi.html

Table 3. Methods of Privatization and Number of Transactions to End 1996

Methods of Privatization	Number of Transactions
Share Sales by Competitive Tender	854
Liquidations	458
Asset Sales by Competitive Tender	421
Non-Competitive Sales of Shares	291
Leases/Concessions	187
Pre-emptive Rights Share Sales	75
Public Flotations	69
Management/Employee Buyouts	48
Joint Ventures	47
Management Contracts	39
Restitutions to Former Owners	36
Transfers to Trustees	27
Non-Competitive Sales of Assets	25
Debt/Equity Swaps	7
Unspecified Methods	100
Total	2,718

Source: Jean-Louis Sarbib. "Privatization in Africa: Present and Future Trends." The World Bank Group. Regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Abidjan, May 21, 1997. http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/afr/sarbspsp2.htm

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BOOK REVIEWS

African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation. Peter J. Schraeder. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2000. Pp. 340.

Peter J. Schraeder's book offers an excellent introductory course to Africa. He seeks to rationalize and classify various aspects of contemporary African politics and society in an interesting and novel manner. This may seem a logical and practical approach, but surprisingly few studies have undertaken such an exercise. The lack of a large body of similar literature makes this book an essential component for anyone interested in understanding Africa's politics, recent history, myriad of cultures and its role in world politics. Early on, one realizes that the author certainly does not share the view that Africa is a "lost continent" or even a "forgotten" one, but rather a complex and vibrant "mosaic in transformation."

Clearly, it is inevitable that in writing a textbook on African politics and society a certain degree of generalization is necessary. This is apparent in the extensive reference to secondary sources, which the author uses in order to better address the many issues related to the broad subject of African studies. In this regard, Schraeder incorporates secondary sources with remarkable skill, especially in the first part of the book (Sections I-III). In this section, he introduces his study, classifies the many and diverse theoretical outlooks in African development studies, gives a historical background to the various schools of political and economic thought, and outlines the policy implications of "African ideologies." The author's criticism of these models is quite interesting and insightful - particularly in Chapters 2 and 3 where he analyzes the liberal free-market tradition and its failures in its more extreme forms.

Primary sources are less present in the work, since it is not really intended for an academically trained audience. Rather, the book is oriented towards the general public and undergraduate students. Schraeder does not provide equal depth on all African countries, for example, he does not discuss North African nations in any detail. However, he offers meticulous references to further sources and reading material at the conclusion of each chapter, and provides a thorough bibliography.

The second part of the book (Sections IV-VI) is more open to criticism, and deals with socio-cultural issues (Section IV), governance (Section V) and international relations (Section VI). In this context, the author naturally concentrates on his own ideas and interpretations regarding Africa. While the inclusion of the author's opinions makes these sections interesting for the reader, there are some classifications that are debatable. For example, when the author maps out the various "African ideologies" (p. 170) he treats Zimbabwe, Sudan, Senegal, etc. as capitalist countries - or "capitalist variations" - whereas he treats countries such as Libya, or Ghana as "socialist variations". Of course, the method used in such a classification directly

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affects the outcome of the study. It is not clear what methodology is being applied in order to differentiate between the various countries and the classification thus appears rather arbitrary. Once the classification is made, the author makes a comparison between the development performance of the different African ideologies. He concludes that "capitalist" African countries did better in economic growth, autonomy from foreign control, human rights, and political participation (pp. 188-9), but the weak methodological premise makes this conclusion less than persuasive. Indeed, Schraeder places the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Chad among the "capitalist variation" category, together with more well-run countries such as Botswana or Mali. This begs the question: how can it be possible that countries which differ so much in terms of "good" governance fit into the same category?

In some sections of the book, there is a tendency to oversimplify terms and ideas, such as his treatment and discussion of "governance, for example. However, a protracted debate on the notion of governance in Africa would limit the book's wide appeal and place it within a scholarly niche. As stated earlier, the aim of the author is to make African studies accessible and fascinating to as many people as possible. From this perspective, Schraeder's decision to include a chapter on African novelists, filmmakers and other artists (Chapter 9) in relation to politics is inspired. In fact, even the author's discussion on governance, avoids a dry, theoretical approach and concentrates instead on more lively topics like the struggle between the State and the civil society and the central role of the military elite in many African countries.

Overall, the book achieves the dual goal of being easy to read while providing an informative and accessible discussion on the current state of Africa. It attempts to demonstrate that Africa does not always match our preconceived ideas and that it is in fact, a complex and multifaceted continent. Schraeder describes an Africa that counts internationally and that is conscious of its role in world politics. The author encourages the reader to rethink and reject the various biases that he/she may have held about Africa. In short, Schraeder has written an engaging and interesting book; a must-read for those new to African studies.

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The New Africa: Dispatches from a Changing Continent. Robert M. Press. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1999. Pp. 380. Cloth: $24.95.

A century ago, the travelogue - anecdote-rich adventure books by European explorers, missionaries, hunters, and early colonial administrators - constituted the most widely-read genre on Africa, helping to shape (and misshape) Western public perceptions of the continent. Over the past two decades, Western journalists appear to be assuming a similar role. Journalists have been eyewitness to the rolling wave of democracy that has swept much of Africa, the dramatic end of apartheid, and the rise of Africa's bloody complex emergencies in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and elsewhere. Given the gripping nature of these events, it is not surprising that many journalists have felt compelled to write a book summing up their experiences.

Indeed, the number of journalists' books on contemporary Africa is now large enough to constitute a distinct "journalist's dispatch" genre on Africa. Consider just a partial listing: David Lamb's "The Africans; Sanford Ungar's "Africa;" Joseph Lelyveld's "Move Your Shadow;" Allister Spark's "The Mind of South Africa;" Keith Richburg's "Out of America;" Karl Maier's "Into the House of Ancestors;" Michael Maran's "The Road to Hell;" and Robert Kaplan's "The Ends of the Earth."

Some of these books, such as "Move Your Shadow," have earned a well-deserved place as classic works on the continent. Others, such as "Out of America," have succeeded in generating heated controversy. As a group, journalists' books on Africa enjoy a vastly wider readership than even the most important academic studies on Africa, and hence have a much more powerful impact on the general public's understanding of Africa. For this reason alone, the genre merits close attention.

The most recent addition to this collection is "The New Africa: Dispatches from a Changing Continent" by Robert M. Press, a former correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. On the surface, Press's book appears to follow the successful formula of the genre - lots of gripping stories and anecdotes from the field, structured around chapters devoted to countries which the journalist knows best (invariably crisis zones, and Kenya, where the journalists are usually based). But a closer look reveals that Press sets out to carve a distinct niche in this crowded field. He does so by responding to two of the most common criticisms of the "journalist dispatch" genre - first, that such books are ahistorical, anecdotal, and disconnected from important academic studies; and second, that these books tend to be unrelentingly pessimistic and overly-focused on the disaster zones of the continent.

"The New Africa" sets itself apart from other journalistic books on Africa in three ways. First, Press attempts to place his journalistic accounts within an academic framework, citing academic analysis of the slave trade and colonialism, political philosophy, African literature, and other bodies of research as a prelude to each chapter. This is without doubt the most innovative part of the book. This approach works best in the first chapter, which concerns freedom and the wave of democratization in contemporary Africa. Unfortunately, this technique does not always succeed in other places. In some instances, the shift from his summaries of academic literature to his rich journalistic anecdotes or personal profiles is abrupt and awkward. The two are not so easily married, and one feels the author struggling to meld them. In an effort to keep the book to a reasonable length, some of the references to academic, historical, and philosophical works are pared down so much that it leads to oversimplification - a one page summary of the debate over the slave trade's impact, for instance, simply cannot deliver an adequate explanation. Overall, this attempt to integrate academic research with a journalistic account is a good idea that meets only mixed success.

A second approach, which sets the book apart from most (but not all) journalistic accounts of Africa is Press's explicit goal of making the book upbeat and positive as an antidote to the Afro-pessimism so prevalent in journalistic accounts on the continent. He does this not by willfully ignoring the horrific catastrophes much of Africa has suffered in the past ten years - an approach which would have doomed the book - but rather by highlighting the many acts of courage, resilience, and common decency of individual Africans whom he has met and interviewed over the years. This gives the book an upbeat, intensely personal and hopeful tone, and helps put a human face on crises like Rwanda's genocide, which in other hands can become numbingly statistical. Occasionally Press's agenda can come across in the text as contrived or naïve, but in general the author succeeds in spinning a hopeful portrait of average Africans managing and overcoming difficult problems. This alone makes the book a worthwhile read for students whose received knowledge about Africans is often little more than a stereotype of passive victims of drought and war. The one problem Press could not overcome is the fact that the cases he knows best and writes most about - Rwanda, Somalia, and Kenya-are all examples of things going badly wrong, and tend to work against his hopeful thesis.

The third distinct aspect of "The New Africa" is its rich collection of over 100 photographs, in both color and black and white, taken by Betty Press, the author's spouse. Betty Press is an accomplished photographer who also worked for the Christian Science Monitor, and the inclusion of some of her best snapshots from Africa gives this book an unusual added visual dimension. In keeping with the theme of the book, most of the photos are of individual Africans. The photo gallery nicely supports the book's theme that we must view Africa with a human face. Instead of a collection of crisis zones, the book portrays individuals trying to do the right thing in very difficult circumstances.

Compared to other journalists' accounts of contemporary Africa, "The New Africa" ranks in the middle of the pack, which is not bad company. It is not as brilliantly written as a work by Lelyveld, Sparks, or Maier, nor will it capture the public's imagination in the way that Richburg's controversial polemic was able to do. However, Press does succeed in carving out a distinct and hopeful niche within the journalistic genre on Africa, and his book will be remembered for that.

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Africa's Political Stability: Ideas, Values, and Questions. Muyiwa Falaiye (ed). Lagos and Ontario: Panaf Publishing Inc., 1999. Pp. 312. Paper $15.

Attempts at carving out a plausible route to political stability in Africa are not new. Students of African studies have offered divergent ideas cutting across various disciplines. Falaiye's edited volume examines "the problem of governance in Africa with a view to prescribing the minimum conditions for stability and social justice" (p.x). Ogunkoya Jolly, one of the book's contributors, spells out the intellectual challenge of the discourse by writing that there is a need to identify "which set of criteria are to be used in determining what is good in the African traditional culture or the African man and what must be integrated from the so many foreign cultures of the world" (p.66).

Divided into two sections, the first creates a fundamental framework for understanding democracy and its relevance for the common African. The book draws on the universal concepts of man and democracy and examines how they fit into specific African connotations.

The "Lagos philosophers" explore "the nature of man in society, his desires and his ontology" from the perspectives of common democratic themes including equality, liberty, and freedom (p.x). Odeneye 'Jobi, for instance, asserts that for the philosopher to actually fashion a relevant political philosophy, he must properly grasp the ontological nature of man in the particular society for which the philosophy is meant (p.8). Conversely, Jegede Babatunde submits that "man is man everywhere, anywhere - gregarious". He argues that the African concept of fraternity and communalism, upon which the African interpretation of man is based, is not exclusively African. "The fraternal interpretation has been elevated to the status of a whole but restricted to the African personality" (p.50).

Part two examines questions on democracy, military rule and social justice with special reference to Africa. Additionally, the issue of reparations is raised by both Mimiko and Falaiye, who contend that economic stability may be achieved across the Continent if some form of compensation is paid for the atrocities associated with slavery.

Some of the minimum conditions Africa needs to meet for political stability include the following: first, there is a need to reconcile the cultural question in Africa. While decrying the attempt to portray African culture as obsolete, Jolly argues that "the problem of instability in the affairs of men in Africa is cultural and as such requires a solution rooted in the proper understanding and consideration of an African ontology" (pp.54-55). She further maintains "that man's ontology can only be properly understood within the praxis of his particular culture" (p.58). Secondly, basic conditions for socioeconomic and political equity, such as poverty reduction, an end to military dictatorships, defense of justice, and promotion of rule of law need to be met. Though they contend that the concept of equity is a myth in its strict interpretation, given the uneven distribution of abilities to individuals, Alloy Ihuah and others agree that the two most important prerequisites of democracy--equity and social justice--are never promoted or protected where poverty is pervasive (pp.69-70). The provision of able leadership is another necessity identified by the authors. Falaiye argues that a majority of the problems facing Nigeria could be solved if Nigeria begins to exercise its leadership across Africa. Able leadership, he argues, commands the respect and goodwill of the citizenry (p.187). Finally, a "Neo-African" socialist state system is proposed by Falaiye, since socialism "considers the peculiar African situation and contemporary experience that is best suited to her" (p.181). According to the author, in the African context, neo-socialism has the best chance of achieving justice, the rule of law and "justified equity" (pp.181-192).

This book obviously aspired to advance an appealing political philosophy capable of motivating an "African political renaissance" as did John Locke's in the fashioning of American constitution or Rousseau's in the 1789 Revolution in France. Unfortunately however, it deals solely with Nigeria. Considering the book's high aspirations, one expected there to be a focus on other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Another controversial part of the book is its belief in a unique or specific African adaptation to democracy - a claim the authors could neither back up with a convincing logic nor a practical model. This shortcoming perhaps explains the surprising allusion to African socialism on the eve of the twenty-first century. The authors could have benefited from looking closely at the misjudgments of Nyerere's Ujaama elephant project in Tanzania, as well as the failures Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.

Lastly, their contention that Africa's political ills are the responsibility of the political elite should also be criticized. Any inquiry into Africa's political situation needs to emphasize the collective failure of democracy and the necessity for collective cooperation.

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Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa 1830-1914. Bruce Vandervort. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998. 288 pp. Paperback $16.95.

Bruce Vandervort's aim in writing this book is to examine the origins and conduct of colonial warfare in Africa in the late nineteenth century. The author investigates the history of the colonial conquests from the perspectives of the European invaders and the African resisters. Over the course of the book, he demonstrates the impact, both immediate and long-term, of these wars upon the societies, political structures and military theory and practice of both the victors and vanquished.

Vandervort describes how relations between black Africans and Europeans were carried on largely at arm's length until the 1850's. He informs us that the interior of Africa was still mainly in the hands of the African peoples, whose hostility, combined with rigors of tropical diseases, kept European penetration to a minimum. He explains that Europeans came to Africa largely for economic reasons, thus, their presence on the continent was limited to a small number of trading enclaves along the west and east African coasts.

According to Vandervort, in 1876 more than 90% of the African continent was ruled by Africans. However, by 1914, all but Liberia and Ethiopia were controlled by European powers. The author explains that the ability of the Europeans to recruit large armies of African troops and the technology advantage that European countries had over African countries were the major reasons for European success in the African colonial wars. The motives for participation in the imperial venture were multiple and complex and they varied considerably among European nations.

Vandervort describes the pre-colonial years of the nineteenth century as a time of movement toward a greater centralization of power. In larger polities such as the Zulu empire in Southern Africa, the jihad states of al-Hajj Umar, Ahmadu Seku and Samori in West Africa, the Mahdist theocratic state in the Sudan, the rejuvenated Solomonic empire of Ethiopia, the Sokoto empire of northern Nigeria, and the Ashanti empire of present-day Ghana, an internally-generated change might have opened up a distinctly African path to modernity. Given the opportunity, African nations might have eventually liberalized their political, legal and fiscal institutions to make room for their more productive classes. These classes could then have commercially collaborated with the European mercantilists. If this had occurred, African nations might have retained their political and economic independence through an open door policy of trading with the world.

This process was brought to a halt as a result of two factors: first, through conquest and subsequent imperial rule, the Europeans were able to impose their own economic and political priorities onto African institutions and society conquest. Secondly, African societies were almost entirely unable to bury long-standing ethnic and political animosities long enough to forge alliances against the Europeans. Vandervort reveals in great detail the African nations' unwillingness to rethink military strategies and tactics that had proven ineffective against European methods of warfare. He shows how their refusal to abandon hierarchical and inequitable social structures inhibited the African peoples from presenting a united front against the European invasion. Europeans were able to turn ethnic groups and religious factions against each other. Ethnic divisions, tribal rivalries, religious differences and conflicts between regions all played into the hands of the Europeans.

In conclusion, the author has written a thorough and well-documented book and is able to discuss both the European and African perspectives without bias. Additionally, the military aspects of the wars are clearly explained. The social, economic and political background is illustrated to provide the reader with a greater understanding of European imperialism in Africa and the effects it still has on the Continent. Therefore, this book is a must for those readers who want to better understand the confluence of factors that led to the success of the European conquest of Africa.

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Liberating the Family? Gender and British Slave Emancipation in the Rural Western Cape, South Africa, 1823-1853. Pamela Scully. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997. 210 pp. Paper: $23.95.

In the last two decades there has been a burgeoning of literature on the social history of the Cape. Scully's book augments this body of knowledge by focussing on the gendered dynamics of the post-emancipation period. The book begins by posing the questions "How widespread was the twinning of freedom and masculine authority, of freedom and feminine subordination, in the ideologies of abolition which led to the ending of Cape slavery? Did slave men and women share this gendered vision of freedom?" (p.1). Given the abundance of scholarly interrogation of patriarchy and slavery the answers are well known. It is the methodology employed to prove the thesis of the subordination of ex-slave women in the construction of post-emancipation familial relations however, that makes the book a valuable read.

Scully excavates archival material, primarily the criminal records, to capture the views and actions of ex-slaves and reads against the grain of official documentation to tease out the emerging representations of ex-slaves and the consolidation of a patriarchal ideology. She uses "experience as evidence" and attempts to "negotiate the tensions between experience and text through attending to both political economy and representation" (p.12). The book's larger project is to demonstrate that "slave emancipation is as much a story about culture and identity as it is a narrative of the emergence of free wage labour" (p.176). The work is divided into three sections, which detail chronologically the tensions around the constructions of family, race and sexuality. The third segment contains empirical data such as recorded instances of marriage, infanticide and rape, through which Scully attempts to highlight the struggles over the meanings of masculinity and femininity and their relationship with the meaning of freedom.

Scully argues that the "ideas held by different participants [missionaries, slaveholders, colonial officials] about the capacities and roles of men and women crucially shaped the world of freedom into which ex-slave women and men were liberated in 1838" (p.3). She also contends "that the political, juridical and economic context of colonial slavery in the Western Cape as well as the class, racial and gendered assumptions within antislavery thought helped to initiate new forms of control over black women's behaviour and limited their participation in the waged labour force" (p.10) and that ex-slaves continually contested their ascribed roles. In particular, women attempted to exert control over their bodies and also sought new forms of employment.

The book successfully weaves together the role of the different agents in subordinating women's experiences of freedom, but it is not as convincing in its attempts to highlight the "emotional lives" of slaves and their alternative conceptions of freedom and femininity. In addition, the interconnections between race, gender and sexuality could be further explored and theorized and the emerging cultures and identities more fully examined, that is, the racial and class dimensions thereof. Although she cites Ballachet and Stoler, she could have drawn more on their analyses of the mechanisms for policing racial boundaries. The work would also have been enriched through drawing on the theoretical insights of Young, McClintock and Pratt. On completing the reading of the book one is left to wonder about the implications and significance of Scully's insights. There are few connections made with the period prior to emancipation and none to the present context where the racialized Coloured identity has taken on increased political significance. Nor is there an attempt to link present gendered and familial relations and constructions of culture within the Coloured community to their experiences of the past.

Scully's work is impeded by a lack of data, which illuminates the views of slaves and therefore she often has to make assertions without having sufficient corroborating evidence. This is particularly noticeable in her discussions on marriage, infanticide and rape. For example, she claims that marriage was a signifier of freedom for the ex-slaves and that people "got married both to signify their inclusion in a religious and social community and to enhance their stature in the eyes of the missionaries, so as to receive more benefits, such as access to land" (p.121). However, the evidence she provides hardly substantiates the claim. For example, in her analysis of the Stellenbosch district there were only 400 marriages recorded in 1840 and less than 300 in 1841. The numbers continued to drop in subsequent years and therefore, many freed people did not marry, leading one to question her conclusion that marriage was a significant social practice. Scully's discussion of the Raithby mission is also dubious, as she notes that the number of marriages increased from three in 1845 to six in 1846 and then declined to one in 1847. This hardly indicates a rush to form part of a social community or to gain access to land.

Similarly, an assertion is made that the colonial state focussed on infanticide because it was an act which was at the heart of different cultural understandings of morality and autonomy and that in "killing her child, a woman declared sovereign power over both her body and the body of her child" (p.147). Here the evidence is based on six cases in the rural areas of the Western Cape. However, excluding a reference to Schapera on the use of infanticide by the Khoi and San as a means of child spacing, we are not provided with any evidence of differing cultural perspectives on the issue nor, through the voices of the women accused of infanticide, do we hear any claims to power or rights over their bodies. Instead, the narratives reveal the desperation and powerlessness of the women for it was the threat of being removed from the mission stations which motivated their actions, rather than cultural differences or the negation of motherhood -- a point she concedes at the end of the chapter

Despite the thin evidence, Scully's innovative attempt to voice the perspectives of the ex-slaves and to construct an alternative narrative is admirable. Indeed, the book paves the way for further research on issues of identity construction at the Cape. For this reason, the volume should be of interest to those studying slavery, the social history of the Cape, gender or critical race theory.

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Wringing Success from Failure in Late-Developing Countries: Lessons from the Field. Joseph Stepanek F. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999. 265pp. Cloth: $59.95.

With the end of the Cold War and the rapid pace of globalization, the intentions and objectives of foreign assistance by the United States have attracted scholarly attention. Accordingly, there is an emerging position that the design and strategies for its organization and management in the new century should reflect the circumstances of the new international environment. The United States, as the sole superpower, has had an increasing role in maintaining peace worldwide through assistance in the development and growth of free markets and democracy. These activities serve the dual purpose of enabling the United States to assist the poor and disadvantaged, while yielding benefits to US commercial interests by way of opening up new markets for exports and jobs at home. [1]

Wringing Success from Failure in Late-Developing Countries: Lessons from the Field, provides an analysis of the personal experiences of the author during a twenty-five year career with the United States Agency for International Development (AID) in Asia and Africa.

Joseph Stepanek, in a persuasive manner, injects his expert knowledge into the aid and development discourse, particularly on the topic of poverty alleviation in Africa. In ten chapters spiced with a few reader-friendly tables, he argues for well-designed development strategies and foreign assistance programs that are informed by lessons of the past and those that can also stimulate growth and reduce poverty in the least developing countries. He rightly underlines the time proven association between democracy and free market in the efforts to alleviate poverty globally.

Taking account of present realities in Africa, most notably Africa's share of the deepening problems of poverty and the degradation of the global environment, Stepanek's contends that developmental principles should not be set within an arena of purely material largesse (resource-centered), but within deeply-rooted traditions of open markets and democracy.

The author also argues that poverty in late-developing countries cannot be successfully alleviated without understanding and challenging all of its causes. Toward that end, Western governments, international development banks and donor agencies must reexamine how they design and administer aid, so as to not add to the problems that already imperil poor people or squander talent, goodwill, and resources.

These are indeed daunting tasks, but Stepanek is optimistic:

" I have argued here that a handful of market and democratic principles can create a new basis for development understanding and integration for the world's one poor continent, and for western interests there…The reader may have gained an impression that I promote these principles with such unqualified enthusiasm that global and consumer homogenization are the inevitable outcome. That is by no means the intention-but it is a risk. Better that the poor world faces these risks-ones founded, for the first time, on their full participation-than face a historic but ruinous continuation of patronizing aid prescribed by others. Poor countries must sort economic, political, and cultural priorities for themselves." (234-235)

This work is really self critical on many counts, but there are certainly downsides to a complete freeing of the markets in late-developing countries. The workings of the market will not always produce solutions to these countries problems, indeed, the evidence shows in many instances that they become worse as it fuels political resistance and harsher economic reforms. For example, how does one explain the sliding currencies and waning investor confidence in East Asian economies and the disastrous consequences on the poor in recent times? The author should have addressed these and related questions in a more convincing way than he attempted in this work.

The author notes that his primary audience is the American public, especially the younger generation, who he argues need to be convinced of the value of poor-world development, foreign aid, and the personal commitment to noble goals. It must be emphasized again and again that this a brilliant and self-critical work. Consequently, it is a must read for all stakeholders in the development of late-developing countries, all true Africans (at home and in the diaspora) who yearn for and are working towards a better sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, as with some other related works, it sets the tone for the needed and crucial development paradigm for what Africa might look like: that is, development anchored on the principles of free market and democracy by, for and of the African people. Africa must look to itself, Stepanek concludes, if it is to achieve stable and long-lasting development into the 21st century.

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Note

1. Carol Lancaster, "Redesigning Foreign Aid", Foreign Affairs, 79:5, September/October 2000; and Koehn, Peter H. and Olatunde J.B. Ojo (eds.). 1999. Making Aid Work: Innovative Approaches for Africa at the Turn of the Century. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Trevor Huddleston: A Life. Robin Denniston. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 288 pp. Cloth: $35.

Robin Denniston has written a 'celebration' of Father Trevor Huddleston (1913-1998), who was a brother in the Community of the Resurrection (CR), a High Anglican monastic group. Denniston previously edited his subject's 1956 book Naught for Your Comfort about Huddleston's Christian ministry work to the residents of Sophiatown, Johannesburg. Naught for Your Comfort ranks alongside Alan Paton's Cry the Beloved Country as an impassioned cry for human dignity and, it provides much insight on white Christians and liberal South Africans who were sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement in its infancy. Huddleston's observations are especially important, since he arrived in South Africa as the ANC Youth League was forming and became a key ally to the anti-apartheid cause until his recall in 1956, by his monastic Superior.

Denniston traces Huddleston's growth from a popular spiritual counselor into a political ally of Sophiatown's people. He became a key figure opposing the destruction of the township, since it was the only one offering Johannesburg's Africans freehold tenure. During his residency in Sophiatown, Huddleston befriended luminaries like Oliver Tambo, Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela. Huddleston's campaigning to save Sophiatown launched his 40-year anti-apartheid career, which included his leadership of Britain's Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) from 1981 to 1998 and trustee work for the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF).

Denniston's biography draws Huddleston in warm, yet evenhanded, colors. His strengths, foibles and weaknesses are detailed and the author's well-executed work remains accessible to both general readers, as well as those interested in monastic life or racial justice. The book is also invaluable to academic researchers intrigued by Huddleston's life and faith. Denniston writes frankly about Huddleston and the strains brought on him by his 1956 recall. Beyond delving into Huddleston's complex personality, Denniston discusses Huddleston's single-minded anti-apartheid crusade, his service as bishop of Masasi (Tanzania), Stepney (London) and Mauritius and his relationships and conflicts with his South African friends, such as Tambo and Tutu.

Denniston's investigation does not shy away from controversial territory. Indeed, he confronts and rejects suspicions that Huddleston had unhealthy and inappropriate attitudes and feelings toward children (p. xxii). The author also shares the reflections of Father Nicolas Stebbing CR, who was a caretaker and confidant during Huddleston's final years. Stebbing, for example, wonders whether Huddleston suffered from constant bouts of depression. To his credit though, Denniston merely provides evidence and information, but leaves it to the readers to decide if Huddleston's actions and personality displayed any depressive tendencies.

The author also stresses the importance of looking at Huddleston's career within the context of his spiritual development. Failure to do so makes his struggle incomprehensible. Huddleston saw an interconnection between faith and opposition to apartheid that many did not recognize. He could, for example, be abrasive with adversaries, such as Margaret Thatcher or Enoch Powell and equally difficult with allies. Additionally, Huddleston's recall from Sophiatown in 1956, his nervous breakdown in 1974 (fearful of public charges of child abuse), his agonizing over returning to South Africa, and the difficulties of his infirmity all exacerbated an already prickly temperament.

As for the importance of Huddleston's contribution to the broader anti-apartheid movement through his work with AAM and IDAF, Denniston acknowledges that the onus is on future historians to research both AAM and IDAF further (p. xxii). Still, one cannot help but wonder whether there is more symbolism than achievement in his anti-apartheid activity outside South Africa. Unfortunately, Denniston's failure to offer even a preliminary assessment of these anti-apartheid activities outside South Africa's borders limits the reader's ability to gauge Huddleston's political significance.

Another shortcoming in the book is the author's treatment of South African political history; the history is little more than background information and contains minor inaccuracies throughout. Mistakes like using the word "Inkomat" (p. 163) instead of "Inkomati" (site of a 1984 'truce' between Mozambique and South Africa) betray a weakness that may, for more knowledgeable readers detract from the book's many strengths.

Despite its flaws, this volume is a worthy contribution and should serve as a corrective to Africanists who see missionaries only in material roles and who fail to give due weight to spiritual concerns underlying day-to-day missionary interactions with Africans and other colonial Europeans.

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English in Ghana. M. E. Kropp Dakubu, ed. Accra: Ghana English Studies Association, 1997

English in Ghana (EIG) is a very timely book on the "new Englishes" and a welcome addition to many of its kind already published for other countries. Much, for instance, has been written on Indian English, Nigerian English, Cameroonian English, Singapore English, etc. Although the existence of a Ghanaian variety of English has long been recognized, and several articles have been written on different aspects of it (Gyasi 1990; Ahulu 1994; Owusu-Ansah 1994, etc.), this is the first comprehensive book dealing with practically all facets of this variety of English, since Sey's pioneering book: Ghanaian English (1973).

EIG is a compilation of 21 papers by language experts on English usage in Ghanaian society--although a few of them deal with some other nations of West Africa, such as Nigeria and Cameroon--and presented at the inaugural meeting of GESA held at the University College of Education, Winneba, June 13-15, 1996. The book is divided into four sections and concludes on a futuristic note with Ayo Banjo's keynote paper entitled 'Language Policy Implementation: the Way Forward'. The main body of the book is preceded by an address from the Ghanaian minister of education and the president of GESA.

The first section, "English and how we speak it," is a compilation of five papers on usage and is introduced by eminent African linguist Ayo Bamgbose whose research and publications on both Nigerian and African languages and linguistics as well as English in Nigeria are well known in Africa and internationally. His paper, 'Non-native Englishes on Trial' is full of insights on some of the hot issues that confront non-native varieties of English (NNVE), such as those of models, standards and standardization, norms, descriptive issues, errors and innovations. He unabashedly takes issue with scholars such as Prator and Quirk who have vehemently opposed the idea of NNVE.

Next is the theory/methodology paper entitled 'Nativisation and the Maintenance of Standards in Non-native Varieties of English' -- a logical follow-up to Bamgbose's paper that deals with similar issues. In this article, Owusu-Ansah grapples with one of the issues of concern in NNVEs: how to distinguish between acceptable norm breaking/norm setting forms and manifestations of lowering standards, one of the main concerns of EL teachers throughout English speaking Africa.

Gogovi's brief, but interesting paper studies the use of collocations and suggests that they be learned separately due to their complexity and peculiar and selective nature. The next paper raises a perennial concern of EL teachers all over English speaking Africa: the apparent decline in EL competence among secondary and tertiary institution students. Dako et al. blame this downward trend on inadequate teaching of grammar to students and would-be teachers alike. Wiredu's paper, the last in section one, takes a critical look at the syntactic behavior of EL catenative verbs.

Section two is entitled "English in National Contexts" and is made up of three socio-historical papers dealing with EL in Cameroon (Simo-Bobda), in Nigeria (Funso Akere) and in Ghana (John A. Sackey). Simo-Bobda's article is entitled 'English in a Multilingual Society' and takes a close look at the linguistic complex called Cameroon, a relatively small country with more than 200 indigenous languages co-existing with three other 'imported' languages -- French, English and Pidgin English -- two of which (French and English) enjoy prestige status in the society. The writer begins with a brief review of the literature on the status of EL around the world, beginning from its native soils before focussing on the specific case of Cameroon. This paper is a beautiful example of the complex chemistry that takes place when several languages come into contact, as well as the competition that also comes with the struggle for status and prestige, which, in the Cameroonian context is one between French (the dominant language) and EL. He concludes by noting that although one cannot deny that English has had a measure of influence on the indigenous languages, the latter have had a much greater influence on EL. This has therefore produced an EL that is distinctively Cameroonian in flavor.

Akere's paper examines the corpus of Nigerian English, which is part of the International Corpus of English (ICE) project. The aim of this extensive research project proposed in 1988 by Sydney Greenbaum of the University College of London is to compile and describe the different varieties of standard EL used around the globe. Akere also looks at the thorny issue of what constitutes standard Nigerian English.

The last of the articles in this section is Sackey's paper, which takes a historical look at EL in Ghana. Sackey gives a brief account of the route EL has taken from its original implantation on Ghanaian soil until the present day and the social, political and educational pressures that have shaped its course. This is must-read for the newcomer to the Ghanaian English scene, as it outlines the historical development of EL in this West African nation.

The third section of the book centers on pedagogical issues affecting the teaching of EL in Ghanaian classrooms. The first two papers by Davies and Angmor et al. focus on the teaching of literature and the important role it plays in the teaching and acquisition of EL. While the first paper is concerned with the importance of teacher training, the second emphasizes the importance of using literary texts to teach EL. Dzameshie's paper proposes a communicative approach to the teaching of English as a second language (ESL) as an alternative to the traditional grammar-based approach.

Edu-Buandoh's paper is a preliminary report on error patterns common among students in Ghanaian Senior Secondary Schools (SSS). It proposes error analysis as a means of correcting recurrent errors among SSS students and concludes with a list of recommendations on how to improve EL usage. The last paper by Adika and Denkabe proposes a linguistically based framework for literary text analysis.

"Expressing the Self in Society" is the title of the fourth section which comprises six papers, each dealing with different self-expressions in the Ghanaian society. The first paper by Opoku-Agyemang explores recent female literary voices and invites literary critics to begin to consider the works of female writers whose works have been either ignored or forgotten in critical circles. The article takes a critical look at four contemporary Ghanaian women writers -- Yeboah-Afari, Gyamfuaa-Fofie, Cudjoe-Swayne and Aggrey and encourages criticism of their works for the benefit of the larger society.

Whereas Sekyi-Baidoo's paper explores the importance of using background information in the teaching of literature to students at the secondary level, Dako's is an assessment of the competence of graduates of EL at the tertiary level of education. His conclusion is that much still needs to be done to bring graduating students to a desired level of competency in EL. The third article in this section by Kropp Dakubu entitled 'The Trope of the Nation in Kojo Laing's Poetry'. Using two poems of Laing's, Dakubu teases out what she perceives as the former's concept of the Ghanaian nation -- an unrealized yet real and ideal community. Denkabe's paper takes a critical look at the Ghanaian print media and concludes that although the chief players in this sector of society have a good command of the English language, the actual language used in print, in the final analysis, is still shaped by the reality of Ghanaian society. This is a good paper on how language is shaped by society, while society itself continues to be shaped by language. The last paper 'A study of the Embattled Heroine in two African Films' by Yankah deals with gender issues in African film and proposes the use of film to enhance the teaching of language and literature at all levels of education.

The last section, "Into the Future", comprises only one paper by eminent linguist Ayo Banjo, author of several articles and books on the English language in Nigeria. Banjo delves into the often volatile and thorny national language issue and language policy formulation and implementation -- an area of major concern in most of the ex-British colonies of Africa and Asia. Also at issue in this paper is the often ambivalent, if not ambiguous, role of EL in these so-called anglophone nations. According to Banjo, well thought out language policy has been neglected, with all the obvious implications on the educational and governmental institutions of the countries concerned. He calls for the replacement of the exoglossic EL with endoglossic languages as national lingua francas. Banjo believes EL will still maintain a co-official role with the chosen indigenous official languages (due to its international role), he suggests an endonormative, rather than an exonormative model of usage. In conclusion, Banjo calls for a working partnership, collaboration and information sharing among linguists and language policy makers within the West-African sub-region in order to achieve a more lasting solution to what is a sensitive issue for all the nations concerned.

Although the various papers in this collection differ in quality and accessibility, one must look beyond the individual articles to appreciate its overall significance. This is a high-quality volume that will be of interest to linguists, language specialists, students, teachers and educationists, journalists and policy makers, as well as anyone who wishes to familiarize themselves with the history, development, role and significance of EL in the Ghanaian society and the wider context of West Africa. It also is useful as a superior reference source for students of ESL and language variation and change.

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