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When Necessity Begets Ingenuity: E-Waste Scavenging as a Livelihood Strategy in Accra, Ghana.

MARTIN OTENG-ABABIO

Abstract: This paper describes how due to lack of formal job opportunities, e-waste scavenging has emerged as a major livelihood (survival) strategy for a rapidly growing urban population. It documents how the process has been fueled by neo-liberal economic policies adopted since 1983 that not only failed to create a "vibrant urban economy" but also exacerbated the unemployment and under-employment rates and created a general economic crisis. The study relied on both qualitative and quantitative data as well as discussions and interviews with stakeholders, affected, and interested persons to provide data for analysis. The paper explores the various aspects of their work: economic, financial, environmental and social. Since the equipment has both pollution and resource potentials, the need for proper control and monitoring of the informal handling and recycling practice is highlighted. The study calls for the formalization of the informal activity not only to sustain the livelihood for the urban poor but also for efficient e-waste management.

Introduction

Many individuals within urban space, especially in developing nations, have adopted multiple and diverse means of seeking a livelihood. One such strategy is e-waste scavenging that has in recent years attracted many diverse disciples. The situation is aggravated in Ghana where years of economic decline resulted in the institution of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that was negotiated with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This culminated in trade liberalization, privatization of state–owned enterprises, removal of government subsidies, and retrenchment, among other "austerity" measures.[1] The shrinkage in the formal economy was further propelled by neo-liberal globalization, increasing unemployment levels, and a weakening of government's capacity to respond to growing poverty.[2] These challenges assumed a pivotal position in defining the contemporary urban change. The substantial cuts in expenditure on social services and the introduction of service charges on health care, electricity etc affected the basic livelihoods of many individuals and households.[3] Many had to depend on "survival industries" for livelihood and according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) (2002) more than 50 percent of the urban workforce in sub-Saharan Africa is engaged in this informal sector.

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In Ghana, the private sector remains the largest employer, accounting for two-thirds (66.7 percent) of employment, with 28.5 percent in formal public sector employment.[4] This realization is reflected in the government's medium term objectives in the Vision 2020 document (1996-2000) that sought to create an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive. One of the "nouvelle" enterprises that has recently attracted many disciples is e-waste scavenging. Until the last three to four years, this practice was virtually unknown in the Ghanaian urban livelihood vocabulary.[5] However, the failure of the formal sector to generate enough job opportunities to meet the growing numbers of urban job seekers has compelled many who are qualified but unemployed and those with low employability to turn to the informal sector for survival.

E-waste (also known as waste electrical and electronic equipment [WEEE]) refers to discarded electrical and electronic materials that enter the waste stream and are destined for reuse, resale, recycling, or disposal. It contains secondary raw materials such as copper, steel, plastic, etc. The term scavenging is used in this context to describe the act of:

- Picking recyclable elements from mixed waste wherever it may be temporarily accessible or disposed of; and
- Manually dismantling computers monitors and TV sets for resalable items at numerous small workshops.[6]

Conceptualizing the Informal Urban Economy in Ghana

The informal sector of urban economy has been well studied.[7] The consensus is that the sector offers the best alternative to formal sector employment. It is said that the sector's contribution to the overall restructuring and functioning of the urban economy is most appreciated through the livelihood strategy perspective though initially that strategy was an instrument for assessing the dynamics of rural economy.[8] The application of the livelihood strategy in the urban milieu acknowledges that a household's ability to achieve increased well-being is determined by its access to capital assets and also that the effects of external conditioning variables constrain or encourage the productive use or accumulation of such assets.[9]

Owusu (2007), however, suggests an alternative framework for understanding contemporary livelihood in urban areas—the "Multiple Modes of Livelihood Approach" that according to him has its antecedent in the household survival strategy and the informal sector literature. He supports the definition of a "livelihood system" as "the mix of individual and household strategies, developed over a given period of time that seeks to mobilize available resources and opportunities."[10] The present study also resonates with this thinking and focuses on how a transient population makes a living in a globalizing city where formal employment is not only limited but for which access may be restricted.

Increasingly, studies in most African countries have shown that individuals and households of all social and economic backgrounds within the urban milieu engage in multiple economic strategies to earn a living.[11] These micro level strategies have been inspired by macro level economic changes that are primarily the results of the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s that culminated in the adoption of neo-liberal reforms.

This economic restructuring intensified poverty and negatively affected livelihoods because of the government's response which led to policies such as liberalization of trade, privatization of state owned enterprises, and the introduction of cost recovery measures under a negotiated World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).[12] The results included the state's withdrawal from economic management leading to an escalation of prices of critical urban services while the real salaries of formal sector employees stagnated and in some cases, even declined.[13] Other effects included employment freeze, public sector labor retrenchment (redeployment) and limited job creation potentials of the private sector.[14]

Ultimately, the unemployment, and by implication poverty, levels in most African countries increased during the restructuring period, and this was quite pronounced in urban areas.[15] As SAP weakened the state's capacity to respond to the growing poverty situation in the city, individuals and households of varying socio-economic backgrounds also adopted different practices to withstand, cope with, and manipulate the combined effects of the neo-liberal economic reforms and urbanization of poverty.[16]

In Ghana, the informal economy, whose recent growth is a direct response to the economic crisis of the 1980s, has become the biggest receptacle for the urban poor in particular.[17] It accounts for 60 percent of the total employment generated in the country and 93 percent of the private sector, contributing 22 percent of real GDP.[18] The agricultural sector, which traditionally employed about 55 percent of the population, is being shunned, probably because of the un-remunerative commodity prices.[19] The situation in the northern part of the country is worsened by protracted chieftaincy conflicts and intensified climate variability that have rendered farming not only a tremendously risky venture but has also given impetus for households to move southwards in search of better livelihood opportunities.[20]

To such a vulnerable society, the development of multiple household strategies and the dispersal of family members geographically is one of a variety of strategies for surviving the effects of both the neo-liberal policies and internal contradictions. Other activities include street trading and hawking, the provision of "street services" such as shoe repairs, vulcanizing, and hairdressing, all of which currently appear very saturated. The situation has made e-waste scavenging one of the most visible manifestations of such livelihood strategies, particularly in the capital city Accra and principally among the transient population from the north. Some studies have highlighted the e-waste activities at Agbogbloshie disposal site.[21]

Analyzing critically the nature and scope of e-waste scavenging as an efficient livelihood strategy and asset accumulation process, however, has received very little scholarly attention. Such data deficiency tends to give justification for the occasional castigation of the practice by some media and environmental NGOs.[22] This study contributes in filling this information deficiency by examining how e-waste scavenging serves as a source of livelihood and its impact on the urban space. The study is informative by documenting the changing livelihood strategies of a transient population, its implication for development, and possible guidance for future research. It also helps bridge the gap in this nascent literature by examining the validity and variability of e-waste scavenging as a livelihood strategy, using findings from Agbogbloshie, the biggest e-waste recycling site in Ghana. The findings will help in developing an appropriate regulatory framework for e-waste management in the country.

Methods

Data Collection

The data for the study were collected at Agbogbloshie Scrap Yard whose genesis dates back to the early 1980s.[23] The area is about 31.3 hectares, and currently less than a kilometer from Central Business District (CBD) of Accra, with an estimated population of 79,684 (see Figure 1).[24] E-waste scavenging as a work category emerged some five to six years ago.

Using participant observation, this study builds on earlier work.[25] The study adopted an ethnographic approach that involved three months of critical participant observation of the operations of the scavengers, thus giving better insight into the diverse ways of organizing the e-waste activities. The field work also incorporated other instruments like questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The purposive random sampling technique was employed in order to obtain maximum information about the e-waste space economy.[26] This technique helped in identifying the chain of activities associated with e-waste recycling: collection, disassembly, open-burning, refurbishing, and metal trading.

A total of eighty participants (sixty of them directly involved in e-waste recycling and twenty in e-waste related activities) were surveyed using a structured questionnaire. Critical issues addressed by the questionnaire included respondent's socio-economic characteristics, roles in the process of recycling, wages, profitability, among others. The refusal rate was generally high (46 percent) and this could be attributed to the growing public negative commentary about the activities of the recyclers in the study area in particular.[27]

In order to obtain a more balanced perspective, additional twenty in-depth interviews were also conducted with selected key stakeholders whose activities impact on the current e-waste management. These include shop owners, executives of the Scrap Dealers' Association, and some public officials from the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Ministries of Local Government; Environment; Employment and Social Welfare; and Health to ascertain their perspective on the practice. I conducted the interviews with the recyclers personally at their "work places" which also provided another opportunity to observe labor intensities and recycling processes. I also observed the recyclers disassembling computers and their retrieval of resalable and reusable parts using rudimentary tools (e.g., spanners, screwdrivers). Further, I also observed the open incineration, retrieval of byproducts, weighing, and metal trading during my fieldwork.

This participatory methodology was carried out conscious of the fact that such qualitative research (and in this instance, the luxury of previous studies in the area) entails the possibility of building relations and familiarity with research participants, which could introduce some biases.[28] The interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees and later transcribed to draw patterns along the themes identified. The processes were supplemented with a comprehensive literature review. This facilitated the appreciation of the possible impact

Figure 1: Map of AMA Showing the Agbogbloshie E-waste Recycling Site

Source: Author's own construct.

of their livelihood on their health and the environment as well as its implications for development.[29] The primary data was computed and analyzed with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 17), while the personal observations and responses to open-ended interviews were organized into themes and used to complement the survey research results.

An Overview of E-waste Scavengers at Agbogbloshie

The demographic aspects of respondents captured during the survey include gender, ethnicity, level of education, age, and marital status. As was expected, the scavengers were male dominated (86 percent) with only 14 percent female representation. This is mainly because most of the activities involved rigorous hours of pulling handcarts to transport waste electronics from different parts of the city to the scrap yard for processing. The few women engaged with the industry center their activities on providing complementary services in the value chain, including the sale of collectors' tools (i.e. hammers, chisels, and spanners), which is quite a crowded activity, the merchandising of the end products, and "life support" services such as food, water, etc.

In terms of nationality, out of the total respondents, 82 percent were Ghanaians, while the remainder were either of Nigerian or Liberian origin. Of great significance is the fact that as many as 90 percent of the respondents were born outside their current place of abode (Accra) and are possibly seeking greater economic opportunity in Accra. The results show that about 63 percent of the respondents were of northern extraction (i.e., people from the three northern regions of Ghana). This is an important indicator of the regional inequalities that partly sustain out-migration and scavenging, mainly becoming an occupational niche for male migrants from the north.[30] The findings also show that scavengers are mostly youthful, with fifty-nine of them (81 percent) below twenty-nine years of age. The Ghana National Youth Policy (2010) defines a "youth" as "a person who is within the age bracket of fifteen (15) and thirty-five (35)." Apart from this group, the rest consists of the above thirty-year olds (about 19 percent) who probably have been unsuccessful in their quest for employment or have been retrenched. However, the unifying factor is that all these groups depend on e-waste as their source of employment and livelihood.

In terms of education, 19 percent of the respondents had no formal education, 40 percent had either primary or secondary education, and only one respondent (a Nigerian) had a university education. By implication, the low level of education of most scavengers makes it difficult for them to obtain alternative employment opportunities in the formal sector of the economy, and as noted by Holmes (1999), higher school completion is an important determinant of one's future earnings.

E-waste scavenging can be seen as a direct response to the influx of used computers into the Ghanaian waste stream when the government, in 2004, zero-rated their importation in terms of import duties, and secondly, the widespread unemployment after SAP.[31] Currently, it is estimated that three hundred to six hundred shipping containers arrive at the Tema port monthly without any official regulatory framework or infrastructure for its end-of-life management.[32] This has created an opportunity for some individuals to ingeniously adopt and recycle the contents as a source of livelihood. Today, e-waste scavenging plays a pivotal role in the constitution of the urban economy, at least because it employs about 4,500 to 6,000 people in

Accra directly and about 30,000 within the broader chain of activities, but also because it generates about $105 million to $268 million annually and sustains the livelihood of about 200,000 people nationwide.[33]

Unlocking the Scavenging Trajectory in Ghana

The current functional inter-relationship involved in e-waste scavenging (commodity chain) is shown in Figure 2. It would suffice to state that reuse of older electronic products is a common practice and the most environmentally preferable option in dealing with electrical and electronic equipments (EEE). Economically, it is also the means through which many people in Ghana (where 28.5 percent of the population live below the poverty line) can access such products.[34] It also conserves energy and raw materials needed to produce new products and reduces pollution associated with energy use and manufacturing.

After discussions with importers of second-hand EEE, refurbishers, scavengers, and civil society as well as my personal experience after years of research into e-waste, it is estimated that less than 5 percent of used e-products get back to the dealers (importers and wholesalers) for possible exchange. Apart from the fact that the warranty system is non-functional in the country, the dealers also have very limited outlets aside from Accra (and possibly, to a limited extent, Kumasi, Takoradi, and Tamale) where non-functional EEE could be deposited. Furthermore, there is currently no official policy, regulation or channel in respect to used EEE. These setbacks in the face of growing importation of used EEE and poorly organized or monitored second-hand markets have made e-waste one of the fastest growing items in the Ghanaian waste stream.

It is therefore not uncommon to see most individuals (about 95 percent) discarding their waste electronics directly into the main waste stream or leaving it "permanently" with local repairers. The few that get to the dealers are tested for functionality and, if repairable, re-enter the second-hand market. Those unserviceable ones are cannibalized for workable components that are then used to repair others for the second-hand market. Those that cannot be used end up at the backyard of the scrap dealers where every object, component, and material tends to have some value. It was gathered during the study that these scrap dealers were initially enticed by the importers of these gadgets "to clear the waste." However, today, they are required to pay "a token," and the amount is increasing steadily as the market gets saturated with the daily entrance of new migrants.

From the informal sector perspective, waste pickers collect used EEE from waysides, seashores, waste bins, dumpsites, etc. and because of the abundance of "cheap labor," the recycling economy has not only generated income earning opportunities for thousands of mostly extremely poor people, but it has also led to the emergence of dynamic entities with intense linkages between the formal and informal economy. Agbogbloshie has currently earned the reputation as the hub for the most rapid installers of used components and has an extensive inventory of accumulated parts that others travel from far and near to source. Even the non-recyclable components meant for disposal such as wires are burned to harvest copper, which also has ready markets both internally and internationally.

Figure 2. The Current Recycling and Disposal Practices in the Study Area

Formal Sector Collection	Disposal of Electronic & Electrical Equipments	Informal Sector

- *Cooperate institution*
- *Individuals*

5p

Beneficiaries

95p

- *Street sides*
- *Seashore*
- *Households*
- *Waste bins*
- *Cooperate*

Dealers/Importers/Wholesalers

-*Collection*
-*Segregation*
-*Check for functionality*

Refurbished/Second hand Market

Main Waste Stream

-*Building bulk (collectors)*
-*Segregation*
-*Disassembling*

Service Station

-*Refurbishing*
-*Extraction of usable materials*

Middlemen

(Building bulk of extracted/ recovered materials)

Refurbishing

-*Repairs*
-*Extraction of usable material*
-*Generation of feedstock for new products*

Scrap Dealers

(Wholesaling – for recycling in industries)

Final Disposal

(Crude dumping of waste)

Recyclers

-*Open burning to harvest metals*
-*Metal trading*

⟶ Formal linkage

----⟶ Informal linkage

Source: Author's own construct 2011

Table 1 presents a comparison of local and international metal prices. Evidently, most local prices with the exception of that of steel are well below international market prices, which range from 40 percent to 150 percent higher than local prices. It can be inferred that the e-waste enterprise is growing mainly due to the availability of market and the high price of its components (e.g., gold and copper). One significant aftermath of the current practice of retrieving copper is that, the site is constantly on fire, which is also possibly an attempt to reduce the volume of waste generated. Be that as it may, these fires lead to the accumulation of ash and partially burned materials which have health implications, and probably explains why the Odaw River, which lie alongside the settlement has become "lifeless" to marine species.[35]

Table 1: Local and International Scrap Metal Prices

Metal	Agbogblosie market price per kilogram in US dollars	International market price per kilogram in US dollars	Quantity in a PC (in grams)
Copper	3.91	6.11	4.13
Brass	3.13	5.78	n.a.
Zinc	0.93	2.33	25.9
Aluminum	0.78	1.80	550.2
Steel	0.78	0.67	6,737.5
Iron	0.21	0.30	n.a.
Gold	n.a.	48,834.97	0.26

Source: Author's fieldwork (2010); Prakash et al (2010)

Micro-geographies of E-waste Scavenging: Economic Impact

The study explored the working conditions and economic viability of e-waste recycling in Accra. Broadly, it captured three main categories of workers directly involved in the chain of activities: the waste collectors, popularly called "recyclers", the middlemen, and the scrap dealers.[36] The collectors who are the lowest barrier of entry for most collectors specialize in the picking of actual recyclable elements from dump sites, houses and companies to sell to the middlemen before or after processing. The middlemen build bulk and eventually sell to the scrap dealers who also sell to big companies and exporters in Tema.

Like in most informal activities, these scavengers do not maintain any records on quantities of collected commodities or financial revenues that accrue from their transactions. However, the estimates of income derived from the sale of items, underscored the financial contribution of scavenging to the household economy. In terms of earnings, most collectors seemed to have no difficulty in remembering expenditure and profits, although they did not keep written records of their cash flows. All participants described the "industry" as providing a better livelihood than the official daily minimum wage of GH¢3.11 ($2.15).[37]

The study reveals that, e-waste collectors earn on the average US $3.50 daily, which is about two and a half times the official average income for informal economic worker in Ghana.[38] Further, those e-waste collectors who also engage in dismantling and metal recovery earn even more (US $8 a day) while the youth under fifteen, many of whom participate in the process as part-time collectors mainly after school activities or as truants, earn approximately

US $20 per month. Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of informal workers have very low working capital, it is not surprising that most of the scavengers earn "small profits" from their activities. Nevertheless, the findings show that e-waste scavengers make a reasonable profit from their activities, and that this return is favourable in comparison to other available and accessible alternative sources of income.[39]

The study was however challenged when it came to assessing the earnings of the middlemen and scrap dealers partly because of tax fears. However, a few middlemen who obliged to this question reported earning averagely US $20 a day, while some scrap dealers mentioned netting US $50 daily, though that may be an exception rather that the rule. One important feature about their livelihood identified by all respondents was the variability of their earnings. That withstanding, the picture still appears positive when viewed against the fact that unemployment rate among the economically active population in Ghana is about 17.6 percent while about 28.5 percent of the total population lives below the poverty line.[40] Indeed, studies have shown that the national unemployment rate to be 3.6 percent compared to 6.3 percent recorded in urban areas and 8.9 percent recorded in Accra (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Unemployment Rate in Ghana

Source: GLSS, 2008

To fully appreciate the impact of the "new enterprise" attempts were made to analyse respondents, previous occupational experiences. The results clearly demonstrate why any enterprise whose start-up capital is next to zero with virtually no entry requirements but "substantial" monetary returns is likely to attract the army of unemployed "distressed" population, as exhibited in the study area. Figure 4 provides a breakdown of the previous employment of respondents before entering into the e-waste trade. The number of workers in each category is expressed as a percentage of the sample.

The findings shows that 31 percent of the respondents were either unemployed or retrenched and therefore were participating as a matter of survival while 41 percent were either into farming or self employed and 28 percent civil and public (formal) sector employees. Significantly the findings show that participation in e-waste scavenging is not limited to the urban poor, but it also include other social class (formal sector employees) that were previously assumed to be immune to the pressures of economic change.

This observation similarly supports Mustapha's (1992) argument that although the involvement in multiple economic activities has a long history in Nigerian society, recent economic conditions have led to the intensification of the practice, bringing the professional class which traditionally was not part of the practice, into the dynamics. He distinguishes between the survival strategies of the working class and livelihood strategies of the professional class, arguing that, for most members of the latter (working) class, engagement in multiple modes of activities is critical to individual survival. For the professional class however, the threat to survival is not that "stark and dire," as the case of those "condemned" to the informal sector appears, and thus, is seen as a "means of containing, and possibly reversing the slide in their living standards."[41]

Figure 4: Previous Employment of Respondents

Source: Field Survey, February/April, 2010

Admittedly, this study did not estimate the previous earnings of the respondents. However, earlier studies have revealed that public and civil servants earn an average basic monthly salary of approximately GH¢ 137.28 or GH¢ 0.78 per hour.[42] In the same vein, farming, which is mostly subsistence, appears poorly paid and unattractive, with the lowest basic hourly earnings of GH¢ 0.41.[43] The situation is even worse for the youth from the northern Ghana (forming 63 percent of respondents) who have very little control over the proceeds of their labour which is often at the discretion of the father.

A partial comparative analysis was conducted between the ''before'' and ''after'' economic status of respondents. It is important to state that one has to treat incomes and expenditures generated from the operators in the informal economy with caution due partly to the significant

fluctuations in their fortunes, and as already noted, they hardly keep books on their business transactions. They also tend to mix businesses, and these present a challenge when estimating their average monthly income. However, to have an idea of how well they were performing regarding capital accumulation, the waste collectors (the lowest paid in the industry) were asked to indicate the amount they earned in the month preceding the interview, after accounting for "all their expenditure." This approach was adopted due to the poor responses to questions on profit level during the pilot test of the research instrument.

The result shows that, an average e-waste collector at Agbogbloshie earns a monthly gross income of about US $380 whilst those engaged in metal recovery earn about US $460. Although they should account for their daily expenditure including shelter, bathing, food, and hiring of push trucks for their daily expedition, the result glaringly puts them far and above that of an average public servant in Ghana who earns approximately US $93.04 a month. This is significant not because the national daily minimum wage is GH ¢3.11 (US $2.15), but because most participants (63 percent) hail from the northern regions where majority live below the lower poverty line.[44] This might explain why e-waste chain of activities remains the second largest employment category for the 79,684 residents of Agbobgloshie after retailing.[45]

The findings contradict some other studies on the informal sector activities in other parts of Africa. Lighthelm (2004) for example states that the average monthly gross profit for informal market activity in Pretoria is R1010 (approximately US $151.00), which is only half the amount required to sustain an average African household in Pretoria.[46] This compares favorably with craft and trade workers in Ghana who earn GH¢ 114.4 (US $70.2) monthly.[47] The study however, resonates with the study of Yankson (2007), which revealed that the mean daily profit levels per male and female street traders in Ghana were US $5.3 and US $7.62 respectively. The study has also empirically demonstrated that e-waste scavenging provides a livelihood for many urban poor and that at least in the short to medium term, it has the potential of moving many out of the poverty zone. During the study, 65 percent of the respondents rejected any suggestion for the ban of the current practice.

Micro-geographies of E-waste Scavenging: Environmental and Health Impacts

The literature on e-waste is replete with studies indicating that e-waste contains intricate blends of plastics and chemicals, which when improperly handled, can be harmful.[48] Lead and mercury, for example, are known to be highly potent neurotoxins, particularly among children, who can suffer IQ deficiency and developmental abnormalities (BAN/SVTC, 2002) while the brominated flame retardants (BFR) in plastics pose serious health risks.[49] It is therefore to be expected that at Agbogbloshie where e-waste is dismantled and recycled by hand, harmful chemicals and plastic are possibly introduced into the environment via water, air and soil, while workers who burn the e-waste to retrieve valuable metals are also exposed to heavy metals, and organic acids, which have long term health risks.[50]

This possibility was re-echoed in an interview with a medical officer from the Ghana Health Service, Accra. Citing a World Bank Report (2007), she noted that "in Ghana, about five million children die annually from illness caused by poor environment. . . . poor resource management costs the country about 10 percent of GDP, with 40 percent attributed to water and air pollution." She further conceded that although no epidemiological studies have been

conducted in Agbogbloshie, the recent increase in cases of convulsion in the area could be a striking coincidence that warrants further studies.

Ironically, participants in the study demonstrated some knowledge of the health and environmental impact of the practice. However, their perceived impact was restricted mainly to accident-related and other obvious effects (burns, cuts, etc) that are in sharp contrast with those reported in other epidemiological studies.[51] In this study, 51 percent of the respondents complained of incessant chest pains and this is to be expected in a "profession" which involves carrying heavy loads and pulling handcarts over long distances across the city to the scrap yard. Additionally, in an environment where waste is routinely burned in an uncontrolled manner and in open dumps (burning to harvest metals, copper wires), coughing can be expected.[52] A waste collector re-counted: "I normally have to receive intense massaging from my friends every weekend (Sunday). I normally experience severe body and chest pains when we have to haul huge loads from outside Accra."

One commonality among most participants (90 percent), however, was their perception that the emission of smoke through the constant burning of e-waste to retrieve metals could pollute the environment. An executive of Scrap Dealers Association recounted rather pessimistically: "The burning of electronic cables and other electrical components in order to melt off the plastic and reclaim the copper wires may affect our health; I am not very sure. However, I am very certain that it negatively affects the environment as toxic chemicals are constantly released into the atmosphere."

Incidentally most shop owners, who are at a distance from the burning sites, see the open burning on the hitherto derelict waterlogged land as a means of controlling the breeding of mosquitos, which has been their major challenge.[53] The position taken by this group appears to have been informed by the apparent poor sanitation, including open defecation, which they see as more environmentally polluting and threatening. Indeed, the participatory technique helped to uncover an emerging but virtually neglected health hazard where some local butchers operating within the study area use e-waste generated fire to singe livestock for the local restaurants (chop bars). Although the observation is beyond the scope of this paper, its potential to cause impairment of public health is very high and thus needs a detailed epidemiological investigation.

It is important to stress that it is not possible from this study to comprehensively evaluate the damage likely to be caused to human health and environment from these widespread practices. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the likelihood of exposure to hazardous chemicals arising from e-waste scavenging (though the practice remains a major source of livelihood for many people from diverse background) can be locally severe and nationally costly. It can affect development and therefore warrants further studies.

Rethinking E-waste Scavenging as a Livelihood Strategy

The changing dynamics of the Ghanaian urban economy especially in the capital city, Accra, orchestrated by neo-liberal globalization and rapid urbanization, has made some informal activities like e-waste scavenging not only a survival strategy but perhaps, an opportunity for others (including formal sector employees) to either alleviate or shore against uncertainties. The study has shown how migrant populations, particularly from the northern regions of Ghana,

subsist mainly on e-waste scavenging not only by choice but also as a result of necessity. There is also empirical evidence to infer that some participate in the industry to cushion themselves against the vagaries of neo-liberal policies.

This finding thus questions whether theoretically, the long held notion that a segment of the urban society that exclusively participates in informality tells the complete story.[54] It demonstrates the functional linkages and fluidity between the formal and informal sector. For example, the reuse of older electronic products is a common practice and the only means through which many formal sector employees can economically access electronic products and participate in the information technology revolution. Also the separation of working components for repairs of faulty electronics has become a common practice. It is also instructive how people move seamlessly from the civil/public sector or the dominant poorly remunerative agricultural sector to participate in this new industry.

Admittedly, the scope of the present study is limited. However, it provides useful insights on how e-waste scavenging serves as a strategic response to macro-economic change and political contradiction within the broader urban space. Further studies will perhaps help to establish in details for example, the socio-economic background of those involved in the chain of activities associated with e-waste, and its impact on the national economy as a whole. Ultimately, this will impact how contemporary urban economies and spaces are conceptualized and how urban planning are conceived and executed.

Proper appreciation and understanding of the nature and scope of activities and the geography of the opportunities for participation will inform policy makers and city authorities to design targeted policies that take advantage of the spatial variations and nature of such activities. This is particularly important since Ghana's pursuit for economic growth cannot be independent of the ICT revolution, and the fact that inefficient management of the end-of-life of e-products can cause serious environmental and health hazards. Hence, the need for policies that are based on empirically ascertained data to help regulate and integrate the practice into the formal sector.

The overall goal for such integration should be to build a better functioning, more inclusive, healthier and socially sustainable city. This new partnership should see the local government playing a pivotal role and should be given greater authority, discretion and enhanced capacity to mobilize local support and resources, and take stakeholder needs and views into account in formulating and implementing policies and programes. This is premised on the fact that local authorities are better placed than distant central governments to broker and harmonize the new partnerships among the various stakeholders. To play the envisaged role effectively, local authorities need improved technical, administrative and financial capacity through genuine decentralization and increased support from national and international development agencies, including NGOs.

At the national level, government ought to realize that the informal sector in most cases fills in the niches created by government inefficiencies. In that perspective, the creation of dual and parallel urban systems—the "formal" and "informal"—should give way for an appropriate mix. This is in line with the current advocacy for endogenizing formal institutions to reconcile them to local conditions, and give them greater social legitimacy. In the words of Mabogunje, African cities still look like houses built from the roof down:

> All the institutions of modern urbanization are in place—the banks, the factories, the legal system, the unions, etc., but all these appear to be suspended over societies that have no firm connections to them, and whose indigenous institutions, even when oriented in the right direction, lack the necessary scaffolding to connect to their modern surrogates.[55]

The government also has a legitimate duty to explore more actively, national policies in order to slow down the rate of population growth in the cities and elsewhere through programs for reproductive health and family planning, which, together with purposeful urbanization policies, could help to lower fertility, and not overburden but ease pressure on the cities and urban services.[56] Ultimately, the informal sector also has a role to play in terms of organizing and developing the much needed civic engagement skills to be able to engage more constructively with governments and other development partners, and to increase their power to lobby, negotiate and influence public policy in favour of their sector.[57]

Finally, this study supports the assertion by Owusu (2007) that planners who refuse to think creatively about the emerging challenges risk becoming irrelevant. Kazimbaya-Senkwe also rightly argues:

> If urban planners want to be relevant to the urban development agenda, then they should rethink their fixation with master planning ideas which hitherto has limited their role in the development of the informal sector. They must adopt approaches in which solutions do not come from master planning textbooks but rather are developed with the people concerned using planning tools that respect the economic reality of the city and the voices of other stakeholders.[58]

After all, the informal sector activities take advantage of the failures of the formal sector and use sweat equity instead of money to create a living environment, however marginal.

Conclusion

Under the limitation of this study the following can be concluded. First, e-waste scavenging as a livelihood strategy in Accra can be seen as a direct response to rapid urbanization, neoliberal globalization, and a lack of formal job opportunities. Second, based on the abundance of "cheap labor," the e-waste recycling economy has not only generated income earning opportunities for thousands of mostly extremely poor people but has also led to the emergence of dynamic entities with intense linkages between formal and informal economy. Third, significantly the findings show that participation in e-waste scavenging is not limited to the urban poor, but it also include other social classes (formal sector employees) who were previously assumed to be immune to the pressures of economic change. Next, though the practice remains a major source of livelihood for many deprived urban poor, the results indicate the likelihood of exposure to hazardous chemicals that locally can be severe and nationally costly. Finally, it is clear from these findings that there is the need for well-coordinated and deliberate technical and non-technical integration of the formal and informal sectors. The study thus concurs regarding the need to restore "the structural and functional disconnect between informal indigenous institutions rooted in a region's history and culture, and formal institutions mostly transplanted from outside."[59]

Notes

1   Owusu 2007; Ferguson 2007.
2   Grant 2009; Grant and Oteng-Ababio 2012.
3   Francis 2000; Rakodi 2002.
4   GLSS 2008.
5   Brigden et al. 2008; Oteng-Ababio 2010.
6   Kuper and Hojsik 2008.
7   Owusu 2007; Yankson 2007; ISSER 2009.
8   Oberhauser and Yeboah 2011.
9   Rakodi 2002.
10 Grown and Sebstaed 1989, p. 941.
11 Briggs and Yeboah 2001; Owusu 2007.
12 For effects of restructuring, see Jeffries 1992 and Rakodi 2002. For the government's response, see Owusu 2001.
13 Aryeetey and Ahortor 2005; Baa-Boateng and Turkson 2005; Aryeetey and Codjoe 2005.
14 Lourenço-Lindell 2004.
15 World Bank 2001; UN-Habitat 2003.
16 Wood and Salaway 2000; Hapke and Ayyankeril 2004.
17 Owusu 2007.
18 GSS 2008.
19 Ibid.
20 Awumbila and Ardayfio-Schandorf 2008.
21 Brigden et al. 2008; Prakesh and Manhart 2010; Oteng-Ababio 2010.
22 Brigden et al. 2008; Frontline 2009; Afrol News 2010.
23 Grant 2009; Oteng-Ababio 2010.
24 Housing the Masses 2010, p. 2.
25 See Grant and Oteng-Ababio 2011; Oteng-Ababio 2011.
26 See Grant and Oteng-Ababio 2011.
27 Ibid.
28 Skelton 2001.
29 Pinto 2008; Brigden et al. 2005.
30 Post 1999; Oteng-Ababio 2010.
31 Baud and Schenk 1994.
32 Afrol News 2010; Frontline 2009.
33 Prakash et al. 2010, p. 51.
34 GSS 2008.

35 For health implication, see UNEP 2005; Pinto 2008; Brigden et al 2008. Regarding the Odaw River, see Boadi et al. 2002.

36 Bridgen et al. 2008.

37 As of December 2010, 1 Ghanaian New Cedi (GHS) = 0.67425 US Dollar (USD) accessed on 26th Dec, 2010 http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.

38 GSS 2007.

39 See GLSS, 2008; Oberhauser and Yeboah 2011.

40 GSS 2008.

41 Mustapha 1992, p. 201.

42 GSS 2008.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. In Ghana, poverty profile as the measure of the standard of living is based on household and consumption, expenditure, covering food and non-food (including housing). Hence, a lower poverty line focuses on what is needed to meet the nutritional requirements of household members. Individuals whose total expenditure fall below this line are considered to be in an extreme poverty position, since even if they allocated their entire budgets to food, they would not be able to meet their minimum nutritional requirements. Thus, there are two lines: a lower line of GH¢700 per adult equivalent per month, and an upper line of GH¢ 900 per adult equivalent per month.

45 Armah 2008, p. 8.

46 Martins 2004, p. 4.

47 GSS 2008.

48 Caravanos et al 2011; Widmer et al. 2005.

49 Ching-Hwa et al. 2002.

50 Caravanos et al. 2011.

51 Pinto 2008; Caravanos et al. 2011.

52 Sepulveda et al. 2010.

53 Oteng-Ababio 2011.

54 ILO 1995.

55 Mabogunje 2005.

56 Population Reports 2002.

57 World Bank 2003.

58 Kazimbaya-Senkwe 2004, p. 119.

59 Dia 1996, p. 25.

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Africa to the World!
Nkrumah-era Philatelic Images of Emerging Ghana and Pan-Africanism, 1957-1966

KENNETH WILBURN

Abstract: Kwame Nkrumah was one of the most fascinating, revolutionary Africans in world history. From humble origins, US-educated Nkrumah led the effort to overthrow colonial rule in Ghana and Africa, sought vast sums of economic aid from the West for Ghana's Volta River Project, and as the leading Pan-Africanist and vocal member of the world's non-aligned leadership worked to create the United States of Africa. Nkrumah promoted these goals, and more, in a novel form of historical evidence—philately. This article examines Ghanaian stamps and argues that Nkrumah used them overtly and symbolically to advance his national and international agendas. It also compares and contrasts Nkrumah's use of stamps to promote Pan-Africanism with the approaches of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Sékou Touré of Guinea. Additionally, the philatelic reflections of Nkrumah-era Ghana illustrate the brilliant colors, stunning beauty, clever art, enduring optimism, and African themes of the Nkrumah era stamps.

Introduction

Ghanaian philately is a treasure trove of evidence that documents with creativity and beauty the efforts of "Africa's Man of the Millennium" to fulfill his Ghanaian and Pan-Africanist agendas.[1]   Ghanaian stamps reveal many of Nkrumah's ambitious goals, including his quest for independence, economic development, social justice, Ghanaian culture, and the unification of Africa. The semiotics of Nkrumah-era Ghanaian stamps between 1957 and 1966 display an optimism and purpose that are directed not only to Ghanaians, but also to all humans--to global Africans across time and place.

Stamps have become increasingly accepted as historical evidence to support the more traditional forms of letters, photographs, government documents and newspapers. In *Miniature Messages: The Semiotics and Politics of Latin American Postage Stamps,* Jack Child argues that stamps have an international impact through their semiotics ("the study of signs and the messages they contain"), which include overt and hidden signs and messages created by governments and handled by the public worldwide.[2] Child also argues that stamps are products of popular culture because a significant number of the world's population sees and uses them.[3] He credits philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce with establishing the science of semiotics and David Scott for applying semiotics to philately.[4] These views are in harmony with those of Ghanaian philately's greatest artist, Kofi Antubam, who believed the images on Ghanaian stamps should educate through symbolism.[5]

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v12/v12i3a5.pdf

Prior to Child's book, Merrick Posnansky, Agbenyega Adedze, and Donald Reid argued persuasively that stamps could be used as evidence to access African history and culture. They noted the important depictions of indigenous objects, representations of power, conveyance of cultural heritage, and the proclamation of values and policies. Posnansky encouraged historians to view stamps as evidence of anti-colonial imagery.[6] Adedze explored chiefship in West African philately and Ghana's history in Ghanaian stamps.[7] Reid examined the spirit and values of Egyptian history through that country's stamps.[8] Scholars now enter the philatelic past to analyze how imperial elites and their revolutionary successors portrayed themselves, their cultures, and their histories.

Origins of Ghanaian Philately

British postal services in the Gold Coast began in 1853, though the first stamps were not issued until 1875.[9] Like the world's first adhesive stamp, the "Penny Black" and its British successors, up to 1902 the stamps of the Gold Coast featured Queen Victoria's westward facing profile.[10] After almost a century of colonial philately, African cultural images on Gold Coast stamps finally appeared in mid-1948, seven months following Kwame Nkrumah's return to the Gold Coast after thirteen years abroad in the United States and England. Yet the African images (talking drums, sacred Lake Bosomtwe, and surf boats) remained subordinate to themes of

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Gold Coast": "Queen Victoria," 1883, p. 253, no. 11 and
(Right) "Gold Coast:" "Various," 1 July 1948, pp. 254, no. 136**.**

colonial authority and resource extraction (Christianborg Castle, Mounted Constabulary, and manganese).[11] All were punctuated by the directly facing imperial head of King George VI. None reflected the two months of prison time Nkrumah was given just prior to their issue for leading anti-colonial protests.

With imperial rule in the Gold Coast about to end, Nkrumah and his Ghanaian advisors considered several applications for the contract to produce and market Ghanaian stamps.[12] The Ghana Philatelic Agency (GPA), based in New York, submitted the successful bid.[13] Its creator, Manfred Raphael Lehmann, had since 1953 established the Ghana American Corporation, met

Ghanaian officials in New York and Ghana, including Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, Krobo Edusei, and Kojo Botsio, supported their struggle for independence, and was present at Nkrumah's inauguration during Ghana's independence ceremonies in 1957.[14] Lehmann contracted with Krobo Edusei to plan, design, manufacture, and market Ghana's stamps for twenty-five years, amended later to five years at Lehmann's suggestion.[15] Previously, Crown Agents had produced Gold Coast stamps in London and Washington and restricted sales to several wholesalers.[16] Entrepreneurial philatelist Jacques Minkus, who expected to gain the contract through his connections to Nkrumah, lost out.[17] Later, Manfred and wife Anne Lehmann took on Togo and other newly independent countries. For a while, they formed separate country agencies named after each client nation (Ghana Philatelic Agency, Togo Philatelic Agency, and others). The Lehmanns also broke open the restricted philatelic market established by the Crown Agents and the "Syndicate," which was an oligopoly that marked up face value prices of new issues sold to collectors.[18] They promoted Ghanaian stamps on radio talk shows, in film, through press releases, at stamp clubs, and arranged for their display at the Smithsonian.[19] By 1969, the Lehmanns combined the separate country agencies into what became the Inter-Governmental Philatelic Corporation (IGPC) and sold the business.[20]

> There was a clear profit motive to producing stamps beyond the value of a contract with Ghana's Post Office. As the son of a Lehmann neighbor, who conducted a stamp business out of his home, noted, Ghana's "1957 independence set... was one of the best all time stamp sellers" for their business. Collectors thought that Ghana's first stamp issues would increase in value, especially since "Ghana had overprinted the old Gold Coast definitive issue and . . . there would be limited quantities available." The "Nkrumah set of four" became a great seller, as did three additional stamps printed on demand in 1958.[21] The neighbor then advised Lehmann to take up the Ghana government's offer of selling stamps to collectors on behalf of the Post Office, "and then Manfred started to import the stamps. This was the beginning of Inter-Governmental Philatelic Corporation, which today is one of the world's leading philatelic stamp marketing companies."[22]

Once the IGPC entered into a contract with the Ghanaian government to produce stamps, the two entities developed a stamp production program to meet the needs of both the local and international stamp markets. Thus, given the routine process of creation and production, Nkrumah and his agents provided GPA (IGPC) with the original concepts that GPA forwarded to its stable of graphic artists to implement.[23]

Between 1957 and 1966, GPA employed an international group of some twenty-two graphic designers to produce approximately 250 Nkrumah-era stamps.[24] Few of these designers have obvious Ghanaian names.[25] Of the group, only Maxim and Gabriel Shamir appear to be internationally renowned. Latvian Zionists, they designed Israel's coat of arms, early currency, and stamps. Thus, it is somewhat ironic that two Zionists, whose country Nkrumah condemned as a "base of imperialism" at conferences of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) at Conakry in April 1960 and at Casablanca in early 1962, designed about ten of Ghana's Nkrumah-era stamps and that the GPA's founder was himself a life-long Zionist.[26] Hidden beneath that apparent irony, however, were state visits to Ghana by Zionist

General Moshe Dayan in September 1957 and Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in March 1958, Nkrumah's statements to President Dwight Eisenhower in 1958 that he intended to establish close relations with Israel, and Nkrumah's invitation to Israel to set up the first embassy in newly independent Ghana. Furthermore, Israeli water-planning and construction specialists assisted Ghanaian rural water development projects and Israel loaned Ghana $20 million from 1958-62.[27] The Israelis also participated in the establishment of Ghana Airlines and Black Star Shipping Lines (which were issued as commemoratives) and Ghana National Construction Company, which helped complete the Volta River Project.[28] Lehmann's access to Zionist financial assistance may help explain why Ghana awarded him the contract to produce and market Ghanaian stamps and rejected bids from friends of Ghana far more experienced in the stamp business and apparently closer to Nkrumah.[29] Nevertheless, Nkrumah soon loosened his diplomatic ties with Israel, due largely to the Palestinian issue in 1962 and Israel's opposition to Patrice Lumumba during the Congo Crisis in 1961.[30]

Not surprisingly, given their recent production, catalogue values for Nkrumah-era stamps are modest compared to Gold Coast rarities of Queen Victoria. Yet Nkrumah-era philately is an African cache of striking colors, beautiful designs, and indigenous and international subjects. Clearly, Nkrumah-era stamps are far more interesting than the British Queen's repetitious, ageless Gold Coast profiles. By the time of Harold MacMillan's "Winds of Change" speech in Accra on 10 January 1960, which was a reference to independence movements in Africa and which Nkrumah re-characterized as more like a "raging hurricane," over seventy issues of Ghanaian philately had since 6 March 1957 appeared in the world's mailboxes with imagery of Africa's awakening from colonial rule.[31]

Early Nkrumah-Era Philately

Between 1875 and 1957, Ghanaians, then Gold Coasters, had only seen symbols of imperial and colonial rule on Gold Coast stamps. Kwame Nkrumah, who was imprisoned in 1950 for opposing colonial rule, elected to office while incarcerated, and released in 1951 to serve in Ghana's Legislative Assembly, led the successful effort to end British rule on 6 March 1957.[32] Understanding the iconic value of stamps, Nkrumah replaced the Queen's image with his own on Ghana's first postage stamp (see below), designed by gifted Ghanaian artist Kofi Antubam.[33] Nkrumah exclaimed: "Many of my people cannot read or write. When they buy stamps, they will see my picture--an African like themselves--and they will say. 'Aiee, look, here is my leader on the stamps. We are truly a free people.'"[34] Imperial imagery on remaining Gold Coast stamp stock met the same fate. Nkrumah cancelled British rule by overprinting their imperial themes with "Ghana Independence 6th March 1957."[35]

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Gold Coast Overprint," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, no. 5; and (Right) "Ghana:" "Kwame Nkrumah," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, no. 2.

Beginning in 1960, later issues often combined images of independence and the transition to a republic with Nkrumah's portrait, as in the proclaimed holiday issues of Founder's Day and Republic Day.[36] Nkrumah cleverly combined pictures of himself with Ghana's national flag, national seal, the black star, Kente cloth, Pan-Africanism, annual festivals of independence, world leadership, anti-colonialism, economic development, communal African life, and Abraham Lincoln.

Nkrumah eventually appeared in some form on thirty-four of the approximately 250 Ghanaian Nkrumah-era stamps. If Nkrumah the "Osagyefo" (Redeemer) is guilty of developing a cult around himself, Nkrumah stamps pale in number and longevity to the British Queens' philatelic presence between 1840 and 2011.[37] Just as the Queens' images were intended to symbolize the unity of the British Empire and entrench legitimacy of rule, so those of Nkrumah sought to unite previously fractious Ghanaian ethnic groups and the emerging countries of Africa. Arguably, Nkrumah's philatelic imagery reflected more his vision than his conceit. Shortly after his overthrow, Nkrumah insisted he had no pretensions. He wrote, "I am a human being and I am fighting imperialism and neo-colonialism (the greatest evils of our modern times) as a human being and not as a god."[38]

Nkrumah-Era African Philately: Issues Common and Unique

The further African nationalists forced the colonial era into the past, the more frequently newly independent African states issued stamps of common themes related to human rights, social justice, medicine, and sport. This increasing trend began shortly after Nkrumah came to power. While in October 1958 only Tunisia joined Ghana from the group of seven independent African countries to issue a commemorative stamp celebrating UN Day, two years later in 1960, thirteen of twenty-five independent African countries recognized the seventeenth Olympics.[39]

Common issues among Ghana and contemporaneous independent African countries included the Olympics (1960 and 1964: 13 of 25 and 24 of 36 African countries respectively); the WHO Malaria Eradication Campaign (1962: 24 of 30 African countries); Freedom from Hunger Campaign (1963: 29 of 33 African countries); Red Cross Centenary (1963: 24 of 33 African countries); UN Campaign to Preserve the Nubian Monuments (1964: 17 of 36 African countries);

International Cooperation Year (1965: 25 of 37 African countries); Centennial of International Telecommunications Union (1965: 25 African countries); Abraham Lincoln (1965: 15 of 37 African countries); and John F. Kennedy (1965: 22 of 37 African countries).[40] Ghana's most beautiful commemorative related to science, concurrently issued with nine African countries, celebrated "The Year of the Quiet Sun." Ghana, with its connection to New York City-based GPA, used the symbol of the 1964 New York World's Fair, which was the twelve-story, stainless steel, and transparent globe—the Unisphere, as the striking vignette of this striking souvenir sheet.[41]

Common philatelic issues provided a form of Pan-African expression, but individual African countries could also use philately to promote their visions of themselves and of the world. Well aware of their powerful semiotics, Nkrumah often cleverly used stamps to animate Ghanaian national consciousness and demonstrate that "the emancipation of the African continent is the emancipation of man."[42] Nkrumah-era Ghanaian stamps provide significant evidence that Nkrumah the Osagyefo used philately to restore Ghanaian ethnic dignity and establish Ghana as a world presence in the aftermath of the long century of colonial rule in Africa.

While doing so, he also promoted ethnic culture to strengthen Ghanaian national identity. His Asante Minister of Communications, Krobo Edusei, must have encouraged Nkrumah to wear Asante Kente cloth and promote Adinkra symbols related to Asante culture, especially the four issues of *Gye Nyame*, a troubled Asante symbol transformed by Ghanaian philately to incorporate all Ghanaians.[43] The traditional Adinkra symbols (below left) are fascinating choices from over a hundred possibilities. They are likely variations of *fofoo* (envy), *mmomudwan* (unity), and *duafe* (female beauty). More obviously national in scope are Nkrumah-era stamps that celebrate Ghanaian football, which precede by thirty years Nelson Mandela's use of sport (rugby) to unify South Africa.[44]

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Kente Cloth with Adinkra," 6 Mar. 1959, p. 209, no. 42; and (Right) "Gye Nyame [God's Omnipotence]," 29 Apr. 1961, p. 210, no. 96.

Nkrumah also sought to develop Ghana's economy quickly by establishing both aviation and shipping industries. The semiotics of Ghana Airways and the Black Star Line support his efforts. Ghana Airways is flying directly into the technologically advanced world, suggesting with its waving flag partly revealed that Ghana has taken flight from colonialism and is now an equal in international diplomacy. The Black Star Line, whose name was taken from Marcus

Garvey's defunct shipping line, is also a remarkable issue. Ghana, apparently symbolized by the nimble flying fish, is flying above Ghana's country name and appears to welcome the

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Inauguration of Ghana Airways," 15 July 1958, p. 209, no. 33; and (Right) "Black Star Line Inauguration," 27 Dec. 1957, p. 208, no. 16.

arrival of Ghana's shipping industry. The shipping issue may demonstrate that innovative nature and advanced industry can thrive together under the light of the black star.

Unique among African countries was Ghana's provocative four-stamp series, "World Without the Bomb." Their issue eerily predated by two years the anti-Barry Goldwater "Daisy"

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "World Without Bomb," 15 Apr. 1962, p. 210, no. 116; and (Right) "Five Continents at Peace," 15 Apr. 1962, p. 210, no. 115.

attack ad created by Lyndon Johnson's campaign staff, which depicted a child counting daisy pedals that symbolized the countdown of an atomic explosion, and suggested what would happen if Goldwater won the election.[45] The catalysts for Nkrumah's anti-nuclear philatelic series were the French *Gerboise* nuclear tests (1960-1961) in the Sahara Desert.[46] In protest, Nkrumah recalled the Ghanaian ambassador to France and in the spirit of Gandhi's *satyagraha* (peaceful resistance) threatened an African march to the Saharan test sites. On 7 April 1960, Nkrumah announced his Positive Action campaign calling upon African nations to

demand the end of atomic tests in Africa.[47] Ghana issued the anti-nuclear series on 21 June 1962. In contrast to M. Goaman's hopeful "Five Continents at Peace," Israeli Maxim Shamir transformed the mushroom cloud of an atomic explosion into a human skull to demonstrate the pervasive fear and devastation of atomic war.[48] Soon the anti-bomb series took on even more gravity.

Four months later on 22 October 1962, Kennedy announced that the US had discovered Russian missiles in Cuba. As a non-aligned leader, Nkrumah had visited Russia and other socialist countries for two months in 1961 during which he established friendly relations with the Russians and attended the Conference of Non-Aligned States in Belgrade in early September.[49] Nonetheless, Nkrumah refused to permit the Russians to refuel their planes in Ghana to break the US boycott around Cuba.[50] Nkrumah's opposition to Nikita Khrushchev's request may have contributed to the Russian leader's decision to remove the missiles.

Another powerful image of Nkrumah-era philately had nothing to do with fear. The friendship handshake between black and white hands, which was the only African issue in 1958 to celebrate UN Day, conveys Nkrumah's growing international presence and support for diplomacy. [51] Africa was now emerging as an equal partner to Europe. The semiotics also supports his views on ethnic equality, national sovereignty, and the end of colonialism.

Scott 2002 3, "Ghana": "UN Day," 24 Oct. 1958, p. 209, nos. 36 and 38.

Nkrumah said:

> The foulest intellectual rubbish ever invented by man is that of racial superiority and inferiority.... I do not believe in racialism and tribalism. The concept 'Africa for the Africans' does not mean that other races are excluded from it.[52]

In early 1958 Ghana issued the first African stamp series commemorating Abraham Lincoln. Arguably, Nkrumah's motivations were idealistic and economic. The Osagyefo sought to associate himself and Ghana with Lincoln's struggle against slavery, secession, and restoration of national unity. Nkrumah's alma mater in Pennsylvania, Lincoln University, was surely on his mind when this Lincoln series came out. Calling upon iconic Lincoln also symbolically helped him in his effort to gain economic assistance from the US for the Volta River project. The first of two Lincoln series during the Nkrumah era was also the most

powerful, portraying the Osagyefo in western dress with the Lincoln Memorial in the background.[53] This was Ghana's first issue featuring a foreigner, even predating the Queen and her husband.[54]

Nkrumah must have had similar aspirations in mind when Ghana issued its prominent Eleanor Roosevelt four-stamp series in 1963, which celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[55] The vast majority of African countries did so with variations of the UN emblem and scales, avoiding direct association with the United States.[56] Just Ethiopia, Sudan, Guinea, and Ghana chose the image of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, who was a primary contributor to the declaration, as central to their series. Arguably, Nkrumah took the opportunity to use Eleanor Roosevelt's iconic image to nurture the warm relations he had established earlier with the United States as the Cold War era turned cooler.

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Lincoln Memorial and Kwame Nkrumah," 12 Feb. 1959, p. 209, no. 41; and (Right) "Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man," 10 Dec. 1963, p. 211, no. 162

The Volta River Project, the Akosombo Dam, and International Capital

In 1957, euphoric Ghana, the first post-Second World War African country to achieve independence from European rule, now had to move beyond short-term festivity to long-term prosperity. Nkrumah's economic centerpiece was the Volta River Project, which included the construction of modern port facilities at Tema. Upstream, the project included building the Akosombo Dam to generate electricity for consumers, power aluminum production, offer employment, supplement fishing, and create a tourist industry proximate to the dam. To fulfill these goals, Nkrumah required significant international investment capital. Nkrumah knew first-hand the wealth of the US and UK and that their financial support could fund his effort to accelerate the industrialization of Ghana. Not surprisingly, Ghanaian philatelic imagery strongly reflects such connective aspirations.

Just over a year after becoming Ghana's prime minister, Nkrumah carried out state visits to Canada and the United States. During 23-26 July 1958, Nkrumah visited Washington, D.C., where he met President Dwight Eisenhower (23-24 July), gained his support for the Volta River Project, and addressed the Senate (24 July) and House (25 July).[57] Nkrumah simultaneously recognized this important diplomacy by issuing a commemorative postcard of himself in Kente cloth, overprinting Ghana's first Nkrumah stamps with "Prime Minister's Visit U.S.A. and Canada" and creating a special cover that paired Nkrumah with Eisenhower.[58] Krobo Edusei and Manfred Lehmann likely arranged the commemorative postcard of Nkrumah in Kente, a cloth associated with power and the Asante royal family, for Nkrumah's US trip.

Two years later on 21 September 1960, Nkrumah and Eisenhower met again—this time in New York. According to Nkrumah, Eisenhower expressed exasperation with the slowness of direct US support for the Volta River Project and then demanded from a subordinate, "Why don't you get on with the damned thing?"[59]

Nkrumah and his advisors also directed philatelic semiotics toward their former colonial power to gain British support for the Volta River Project. Keen to relieve the British taxpayer from colonial expenses, British entrepreneurs and government officials had already carried out several surveys between 1914 and 1950 related to power and aluminum production on the Volta River.[60] During his anti-colonial campaign to achieve independence, Nkrumah never sought expulsion of British capital. Instead, Nkrumah remained dependent on British officials and finances with some £500 million invested in long-term, low-interest British bonds.[61] With a governor general in place as late as 1960, three years after independence, Whitehall listened to the newest member of the Commonwealth. After his state visit in Canada and the United States ended in 1958, Nkrumah flew to England to negotiate financial support for the Volta River project and to arrange for royal visits to Ghana. In 1959, Nkrumah welcomed the royal visit of Prince Phillip, who along with the visit of Harold MacMillan in 1960 set the stage for Queen Elizabeth's visit in 1961.[62]

For Nkrumah to gain access to British capital, the success of the Queen's visit was essential. Her royal highness was appropriately cosseted and apparently impressed. Both visits were commemorated in Ghanaian philately. Ghana Post celebrated the Queen's visit with an attractive souvenir sheet.[63] She was only the second foreigner, after Abraham Lincoln, to receive the honor of a souvenir sheet. Shortly after the Queen's visit, Tema Harbor, near the mouth of the Volta River, officially opened. Ultimately, the British invested in the Volta River Project.[64] The Americans also noticed. After the success of the Queen's visit and with additional support from the State Department and CIA, President Kennedy announced on 12 December 1961 that the US would participate in the Volta River Project.[65]

The Akosombo Dam's opening in January 1966 was the result of years of skilful negotiations between Kwame Nkrumah, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and others, including Kaiser Aluminum, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the US Agency for International Development, the UK Export-Import Bank, and the UK Board of Trade on behalf of the Exports Credits Guarantee Department.[66] Nkrumah argued that he had borrowed funds carefully, under strict conditions, and with Ghana's self-interests primarily in mind while retaining sufficient power to prevent developed socialist and capitalist supporters from taking advantage of Ghanaians.[67]

Critics and supporters of the Akosombo Dam and the Volta River Project have had much to say over the years.[68] Yet, Nkrumah negotiated with skill and personal charm with world leaders and consummate capitalists. He formed a friendship with Edgar Kaiser who interceded on Nkrumah's behalf on several occasions when the project seemed doomed yet again for fear of serious financial and political Cold War-induced risks.[69] Such were the complexities of the negotiations and goodwill between Nkrumah, Kaiser, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Nkrumah declared as much in his speech opening the Akosombo Dam. He said:

> Edgar Kaiser, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy were genuinely interested in this project because they saw, behind the cold figures and the rigid calculations, that the Volta River Project was not only an economically viable project, but also an opportunity of the United States of America to make a purposeful capital investment in a developing country. In other words, they saw in the Volta River Project a scheme with new dimensions of growth and development, which they felt could benefit both Ghana and the United States.
>
> It was on this common ground of our mutual respect and common advantage that our two countries—Ghana and the United States of America—made the contact from which grew this project. The result of this contact is living proof that nations and people can cooperate and coexist peacefully with mutual advantage to themselves despite differences of economic and political opinions.[70]

Critics have also condemned the human costs of the resettlement schemes, arguing that the long-term costs of relocating 80,000 Ghanaians outweighed the long-term economic benefits of the Volta River Project. Experts discussed the resettlement experience at length at a conference in Kumasi, Ghana in March 1965 and reassessed it in 1968. Most of those who presented papers were involved in the resettlement program. Robert Chambers, who carried out an objective assessment of the resettlement program, concluded that its shortcomings should be balanced with its successes. He noted that whatever the long-term effects proved to be, Ghanaians "were well-endowed in dedication and energy" and that "the Volta resettlement operation will stand as a brave and imaginative attempt with limited resources to tackle a challenging and urgent crisis."[71]

Scott 2002 3, "Ghana": "Opening of the Volta River Dam and the Electric Power Station at Akosombo," 22 Jan. 1966, p. 212, nos. 240 and 242.

Such controversies were lost among the perforations bordering the Volta River Project stamp series issued when the dam opened in January 1966.[72] One of the cleverest Nkrumah-era stamps is the reservoir's water running through the letters of GHANA to commemorate the opening of the dam and the electrification of much of Ghana and her neighbors. Individual workers also appear on two stamps in that series—one faces west, the other east. The semiotics suggests that non-aligned Nkrumah used capitalist and socialist policies to create the Volta River Project.

Nkrumah-era John F. Kennedy memorial stamps are intriguing, given the CIA's consent to support Ghanaian dissident efforts to overthrow Nkrumah in a conspiracy led by one of Nkrumah's ministers, Komla Gbedemah in September 1961 and probably later in July-August 1962.[73] Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist policies seemed to challenge Eisenhower and Kennedy's policies of orderly change in the status quo.[74] Yet Nkrumah was immensely impressed with Kennedy and his family during his visit to the White House on 8 March 1961 and appreciated both Kennedy's support for African nationalist movements and reactivation of suspended US financial aid for the Volta River Project.[75] Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 shocked and grieved Nkrumah.[76] Ghana Post was still selling JFK stamps, issued in mid-December 1965, when dissidents overthrew Nkrumah in February 1966. Nkrumah-era philately, with its beauty, African imagery, noble goals, and humane messages, could not save Nkrumah's government.

Ghana and Pan-Africanism

From its Diasporic roots to the Nkrumah era, Pan-Africanism became more Africa centered. Nkrumah symbolized this process, as he was personally advised by the great Pan-Africanists George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois. The first Pan African Congresses were held outside the continent: London (1900), Paris, London and Brussels (1919-1921), London and Lisbon (1923), New York (1927), and Manchester (1945). At the latter Nkrumah served as co-organizational secretary with Padmore. Afterwards, a working committee comprised of Nkrumah as secretary and Du Bois as chair provided continued leadership.[77]

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "First Conference of Independent African States," 15 Apr. 1958, p. 209, no. 24; and (Right) "Africa Freedom Day," 15 Apr. 1960, p. 209, no. 75.

Immediately after Ghana's independence in March 1957, Nkrumah established a Pan-Africanist activist foreign policy to liberate Africa from colonial rule. Only united and non-

aligned, he believed, could African states be sufficiently powerful to overcome neo-colonial forces. The Conference of Independent African States in Accra in 1958, at which Nkrumah argued his views on unity and world peace, set much of the foundation for an informal UN secretariat, and strengthened African collaboration on nonaligned issues.[78] From 1959 to 1963, Nkrumah annually commemorated the growing number of newly independent African countries with "Africa Freedom Day" issues.[79] Ghana Post also commemorated the locations of Nkrumah's most powerful Pan-Africanist speeches.[80] The Casablanca Group, which formed under Nkrumah's leadership, attempted to spur unity among African states emerging from colonial rule. From 3-7 January 1961, six African countries met in Casablanca to lay the basis for what eventually became the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and to throw its support behind Patrice Lumumba in the Congo Crisis.[81]

In 1965, two years after the establishment of the OAU with its headquarters in Ethiopia, member nations met in Accra and Nkrumah succeeded Haile Selassie and Gamal Abdel Nasser as the organization's third chairperson. The OAU was not the strong United States of Africa that Nkrumah had sought to establish, but it was a step forward. Rising nationalist and ethnic identities of emerging African elites experiencing independent power and sovereignty for the first time, as well as opposition by some to any form of Pan-African political union, weakened the OAU.

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Casablanca Conference," 6 Mar. 1962, p. 237, no. C6; and (Right) "Organization of African Unity," 6 Jul. 1964, p. 211, no. 172.

While Nkrumah knew creating a United States of Africa would be difficult, he probably did not expect the US to be such an obstacle. Adam Hochschild recently reminded US citizens of the collective shame they shared in the collaboration of the US in the gruesome torture, execution, and multi-burials of the democratically elected Congo leader, Patrice Lumumba.[82] Nkrumah and Lumumba were friends, and discussed a union between their countries and opposition to imperialism and colonialism when Lumumba twice visited Ghana—from 5-13 December 1958 for the Pan-African Padmore-organized All-African People's Conference and 7-8 August 1960 for further negotiations.[83] To memorialize his pan-Africanist ally, Nkrumah issued

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Patrice Lumumba," 30 Jun. 1962, p. 210, no. 120;
and (Right) "Lt. General Emmanuel Kwesi Kotoka," 17 Apr. 1966, p. 23 no. 328.

the Lumumba series on the first anniversary of his death, perhaps wondering whether western collaborators in Lumumba's death had now targeted him.[84]

On 24 February 1966, Ghanaian military and police dissidents overthrew Kwame Nkrumah while he was in China on a peace mission to end the American war in VietNam. He ignored both the lack of US endorsement and Ghanaian advice to remain in Ghana, as there was evidence of a forthcoming coup. With the connivance of the CIA Accra station, General Joseph A. Ankrah, Colonel Emmanuel Kwesi Kotoka, and J.W.K. Harley led the successful conspiracy.[85] Thus began some twenty years of agreements between Nkrumah's successors and the IMF, which together undermined local self-sufficiency and development.[86] Whether this would have happened anyway, given the cost of the dam and the decline in cocoa production and profits, is uncertain. Nkrumah was overthrown before he was able to act on recommendations from the advisory committee sent out by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to analyze and offer improvements to his Seven Year Plan, which in 1965 had four more years until completion. The commission only completed its analysis with some twenty recommendations three weeks after Nkrumah was overthrown. Thus, Nkrumah never had the chance to gain crucial support of the IBRD by adopting its recommendations.[87]

Although Nkrumah's non-aligned foreign policy tilted somewhat toward socialist countries in the early 1960s, given his Pan-Africanist policies, anti-colonial speeches, and visits to non-aligned and socialist countries, he always kept one leg more firmly in the capitalist camp. And that leg sensibly carried the bulk of GPA-produced Nkrumah-era philately around the world emanating from its New York City headquarters on Wall Street near the New York Stock Exchange until late 1959, and from early 1960 on West 34th Street near Madison Square Garden. With some irony, given that capitalists worked for his overthrow, Nkrumah's philately was far more capitalistic than socialistic in origin and semiotics.

In contrast to western capitalists, no foreign socialist leaders or symbols received such attention. Imagery related to socialism is subtle, usually commemorating the creation of state-owned industries and agriculture, and presented semiotically as background themes depicting state farms, and communal agriculture.[88] Although capitalist critics during the Cold War often accused Nkrumah of being too close to Moscow, there is little semiotic evidence of this in

Nkrumah-era Ghanaian philately. Rather, the relevant stamps are almost all friendly to capitalism.

Pan-Africanists George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois, who advised Nkrumah in Ghana until their deaths, were buried in Accra in 1959 and 1963 respectively, and were far more friendly toward socialism than capitalism have never been depicted in Ghanaian philately.[89] Obviously, the Ghanaians who overthrew Nkrumah sought to shun the Osagyefo in the popular mind, but now half a century has passed since the great Pan-Africanists began their eternal rest in Ghana. In 1998, Ghana issued a stamp of Henry Louis Gates, Jr., the director of Harvard University's W.E.B. Du Bois Institute, but Du Bois's commemoration remains unfulfilled.[90] Even the US Postal Service has commemorated Du Bois twice—in 1992 and 1998.[91] Ghana Post has some unfinished Pan-African business.

Pan-Africanism Philately Elsewhere in Africa

Nkrumah was not alone among his contemporary Africa leaders in utilizing stamps to promote Pan-Africanism, but not all of them shared his particular vision of a United States of Africa nor did they necessarily utilize philately in the same manner. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was one of Nkrumah's most noted contemporaries, but he held different views about how best to achieve the unification of Africa. In contrast to Nkrumah's federal union approach Nyerere sought to form regional groups first. With prior British combinations of Zanzibar, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania in various alliances, for Nyerere an East African Federation seemed a good outcome after independence. Nkrumah rejected Nyerere's regional unification approach because he believed it was a form of balkanization that would slow and impede the unification of Africa.[92]

For Nyerere, the answer was not so simple. Philatelically, one must consider three nomenclatures—Tanganyika (Tanzania's independent predecessor) and two Tanzanias. Tanganyika issued fifteen stamps between 9 December 1961 and 9 December 1962 commemorating independence and the republic.[93] Tanganyika was succeeded philatelically by the merging of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form Tanzania on 26 April 1964. Shortly thereafter in 1965, "Tanzania" the country and "Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania" the regional federation, began to produce stamps concurrently under the East African Common Services Organization. The tripartite regional entity, however, stopped issuing stamps when the East African Community collapsed in 1977. While the federation existed, stamps issued by Tanzania alone were also valid in Kenya and Uganda.[94] Assessing Tanzanian stamps from mid-1962 through mid-1971 reveals the philatelic degree of Nyerere's Pan-Africanist vision.

Tanzania issued three series totaling thirty-four stamps to 1971. The first series issued under the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and valid only in Tanganyika recognized their newly established unification.[95] The second stamp series, which hails as Tanzania for the first time, appeared in December 1965 and depicts such Tanzanian topics as animal life, Dar es Salaam, Olduvai Gorge, and the country's coat of arms.[96] The third series is devoted to fish.[97] Tanzania's first overtly Pan-African stamp did not appears until 1980 and commemorated the Pan African Postal Union.[98] Tanzanian stamps commemorating economic union in Africa followed in 1983.[99] Of the first 289 Tanzanian stamps to 1985 during the Nyerere era, only these two issues promoted Pan-Africanist themes.[100] One can find occasional support for regional African causes, but no Tanzanian stamp advocated African political union,

which was both Nkrumah's immediate concern and Nyerere's long-range goal.[101] This is hardly surprising, given Nyerere's comments about Pan-Africanism five months after Nkrumah was overthrown:

> In order to fulfill its responsibilities to the people it has led to freedom, each nationalist government must develop its own dominant nationalism. This is true however devoted to the cause of African unity the different national leaders may be. For while it is certainly true that in the long run the whole of Africa, and all its peoples, would be best served by unity, it is equally true, as Lord Keynes is reported to have said, that 'in the long run we are all dead.'[102]

After Nyerere, Tanzanian postal officials began an aggressive "pop philately" campaign to lure revenue from international stamp collectors. Since 1988, Tanzania has issued at least sixty-five Disney-character stamps.[103] Tanzania has commemorated Queen Elizabeth, Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, and Jerry Garcia, but Kwame Nkrumah has yet to appear.[104] While it may be true, as James N. Karioki stated in 1974, that Tanzania was "much more committed to the cause of African unity than any other East African country," Tanzania has expressed it poorly in philately.[105] Yet what of the regional stamps valid in Tanzania? Perhaps the "Kenya Uganda Tanzania" issues to 1976 convey strong Pan-Africanist themes.

From April 1965 to January 1976, the regional tripartite entity empowered the East African Common Services Organization to produce about 175 stamps valid in Tanzania.[106]   Three series indirectly promoted Pan-Africanism.[107] Another ten, however, celebrated regional unity with topics that largely support the first step of Nyerere's vision of Pan Africanism—regional cohesion.[108] As expected, the semiotics of Nyerere's regional Pan-African philatelic legacy contrasts with that of Nkrumah's continental vision in scope and intensity.

In contrast to Nyerere, Guinea's Ahmed Sékou Touré shared Nkrumah's vision of Pan-Africanism, and he offered him sanctuary in Conakry when the Ghanaian leader was overthrown in 1966. As in Ghana, Kaiser Aluminum had industrial interests in Guinea. The two leaders must have compared notes on Kaiser. Like Nyerere and Nkrumah, Touré had led his country to independence. On 23 November 1958, shortly after successfully leading the independence movement against France, Touré and Nkrumah signed an informal agreement pledging to create a union of West African states, and solidified their Pan-Africanist efforts in the Conakry Agreement on 1 May 1959.[109]

In contrast to Tanzania, Guinean stamps reflected a more Ghanaian Pan-Africanist perspective and more consistently resemble Nkrumah-era philately than issues from Tanzania or "Kenya Uganda Tanzania." This is probably due in part to organizational similarities used by Nkrumah and Touré to achieve independence.[110]   Guinea commemorated themes of social justice, human rights, the UN, and Pan-Africanism before Nkrumah was overthrown and took up exile in Guinea at Touré's invitation.[111] Even Guinea's first stamps, the proclamation of independence series that depict Touré and the African continent, resemble Ghana's initial series.[112] Both countries also overprinted pre-independence colonial stamps with independence proclamations. Guinea likewise issued a version of Ghana's profound black and white handshake.[113] During Nkrumah's exile and afterwards, Guinea continued to issue stamps of similar themes. To celebrate the tenth anniversary of the OAU, to associate Pan-Africanism

with the OAU, and subtly to commemorate Nkrumah's death a year earlier, Guinea's OAU series is surely a political statement—four portraits of Nkrumah.[114]

Scott 2002 3, "Guinea": "Proclamation of Independence, 2 Oct. 1958," 1959, p. 465, no. 173; and "Ghana": "Independence, Mar. 6, 1957," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, no. 2.

Differing from both Ghanaian and Tanzanian philately, before Nkrumah was overthrown Guinea issued semiotic stamps depicting socialist accomplishments. Touré attempted to balance out the capitalist and communist adversaries of the Cold War by philatelically celebrating both American and Russian accomplishments in space.[115] Five years later during the height of the American War in Viet Nam and Nkrumah's exile in Guinea, Touré went further and commemorated Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in a five-stamp series.[116] Shortly after Nkrumah died, Touré also commemorated the Bulgarian communist leader, George Dimitrov.[117] These two series had much in common with the scholarly work on socialist political philosophy Nkrumah applied to Africa and published during his exile in Guinea.[118]

Post-Nkrumah Era Ghanaian Philately

After Ghanaian military leaders overthrew Kwame Nkrumah on 24 February 1966, Ghana Post discontinued Founder's Day and Republic Day issues. As is the routine, those who assume power after regime changes soon produce philatelic semiotics that attempt to legitimize and promote their governments. The Ghanaians who succeeded Nkrumah were no exception.[119] Nonetheless, there was some continuity with Nkrumah-era philately. Through the 1980s, Ghanaian leaders continued to issue stamps dedicated to human rights and social justice.[120]

By 1989, however, Ghana Post joined many other countries and adopted pop philately to raise revenue. Some of the first issues included a series of Japanese paintings, symbols of the French Revolution, and Shakespeare. The Beatles, Frank Sinatra, Sylvester Stallone, and Mickey Mouse followed shortly thereafter. Ghana Post has continued this trend ever since.[121] Semiotics of revolutionary fervor and Afrocentric imagery initiated in the Nkrumah era are now less frequently issued and have been largely replaced by Western images of popular culture. Where is Nkrumah's philosophy of Consciencism today?

Kwame Nkrumah has nonetheless made three appearances in Ghanaian philately since his death: in 1980 as part of the "National Leader" series, in 1991 as part of the "10th Non-Aligned Ministers Conference, Accra," and in 2001, a year dominated by pop philately, in name only on the "50th Anniversary of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology."[122] That year Ghana Post also issued such disparate topics as James Cagney, The Supremes, Queen Victoria's

100th Anniversary and Mao Tse-Tung.[123] One wonders what the Osagyefo would have made of it all.

(Left) *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Second Anniversary of Independence," 6 Mar. 1959, p. 209, no. 45 and (Right) "Founder's Day," 21 Sept. 1963, p. 211, no. 149.

Conclusion

The philatelic history of the Nkrumah-era stands as an artistic tribute to the quest for independence, economic development, social justice, Ghanaian culture, and the unification of Africa. The semiotics of Ghanaian philately between 1957 and 1966 both provokes and inspires. Philatelic reflections of Nkrumah-era Ghana are clever in design, colorful in spirit, and pregnant with meaning. They extol a noble testament to all humans; that is, to global Africans, that there is hope for the future.   As Kwame Nkrumah, the Osagyefo, once said, "We face neither East nor West: we face forward."[124] And forward it has been since 1980, philatelically speaking, when Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist dream found expression in the Pan African Postal Union, comprised of forty-four African countries in 2011, among whose goals is to create a single postal territory in Africa.[125]

Notes

1   Biney 2008, p. 130.
2   See Child 2005, pp. 112-15 and Child 2008, pp.13-42. A brief article for non-specialists is Krause 2002, pp. 430-33.
3   Child 2005, pp. 110-12, 136. For more detail from an African perspective, see Adedze 2009, pp. 1-24.
4   See Atkin in Zalta 2010, pp. 107-24.
5   Adedze 2009, pp. 6-7.
6   Posnansky 2004, pp. 53-54.
7   Adedze 2004, pp. 68-73, 96 and Adedze 2009, pp. 1-26.
8   Reid 1972, p. 209.
9   Adedze 2009, p. 1.
10   *Scott 2002* 3, "Gold Coast": various "Queen Victoria," July 1875-6 Oct. 1901, p. 253, nos. 1-37a.

11 *Scott 2002* 3, "Gold Coast:" "Various," 1 July 1948, pp. 254, nos. 130-41. See Adedze 2009, pp. 2-3 where he provides additional information on Ghanaian artists and photographers involved in this series.

12 For details about controversies over the bidders, see Adedze 2009, pp. 8-9.

13 Email interview with J. Yossi Malamud, New York City, 23 Dec. 2010. Unfortunately, pre-1970 contracts and records of IGPC (GPA) have been lost or destroyed.

14 A. Lehmann, unpublished memoir, p. 1 and 5; email interview with A. Lehmann, 16 Feb. 2012. Komla Agbeli Gbedemah served as Minister of Finance from 1954-May 1961 and Minister of Health afterwards. During Nkrumah's independence (1957-1960) and republican (1960-1966) governments, Krobo Edusei was Minister Without Portfolio, Minister of Interior, and Minister of Transport and Communications. Kojo Botsio served as Minister for Trade and Labor, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Agriculture.

15 A. Lehmann, unpublished memoir, p. 1.

16 Adedze 2009, p. 8; A. Lehmann, unpublished memoir, p. 2.

17 Adedze 2009, p. 8.

18 A. Lehmann, unpublished memoir, pp. 2-3.

19 Ibid., p. 4.

20 For more information, see "About IGPC," <http://www.igpc.net/about.html>.

21 For information on the early Ghana stamp issues, see *Scott 2002* 3: "Ghana": Gold Coast definitive issue, p. 208, nos. 5-13; "Kwame Nkrumah," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, nos. 1-4; and probably "Black Star Line," 27 Dec. 1957, p. 208, nos. 14-16.

22 Rob Moelis, *Stamp News*, interview with Bill Herzig, Herrick Stamp Company, n.d.

23 Email interview with J. Yossi Malamud, 23 Dec. 2010.

24 Names of the graphic designers of Ghanaian stamps are identified in *Stanley Gibbons Stamp Catalogue, Part 1, British Commonwealth 1989*, "Ghana," pp. 286-290. *Scott Standard Postage Stamp Catalogue* does not list graphic artists for Ghanaian stamps.

25 The six graphic artists identified in *Stanley Gibbons* who contributed the most to Nkrumah-era Ghanaian philately are M. Goaman (14 issues/sets), R. Hegeman (8 issues/sets), A.M. Medina (7 issues/sets), A.S.B. New (9 issues/sets), M. Shamir (10 issues/sets), and W. Wind (13 issues/sets).

26 Levey 2003, pp. 163-65. For an argument that Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism and Zionism were incompatible, see Adewale 1995, especially pp. 129-44. On Manfred Lehmann, see http://www.manfredlehmann.com/biography.html.

27 Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. "Memorandum of Conversation" between President Dwight Eisenhower, Kwame Nkrumah, D. A. Chapman (Ambassador of Ghana), and Joseph Palmer (Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State), 24 July 1958; Levey 2003, pp. 159-61; Adewale 1995, p. 132; Biney 2011, p. 105.

28 Levey 2003, pp. 159-61; M. Lehmann, n.d., p. 216.

29 Adedze 2009, pp. 8-14.

30 Levey 2003, p. 169. In a further example of apparent irony, the Israeli ambassador to Ghana, Ehud Avriel, may have introduced Kwame Nkrumah to Patrice Lumumba.

31 Nkrumah 1961, note 1, p. 203. MacMillan visited Accra in 1960, not 1950 as dated.

32   For Nkrumah's eloquent speech of 10 July 1953 to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly calling for independence from Great Britain, see Padmore 1971, pp. 375-389. Another copy appears in Nkrumah 1973, *Revolutionary Path*, pp. 100-115; for Nkrumah's "Midnight Speech" of 5-6 Mar. 1957 on the occasion of independence, see pp. 116-121.

33   Child 2008, p. 19. These are *Scott 2002* 3: "Ghana:" "Independence, Mar. 6, 1957," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, nos. 1-4. See Adedze 2009, p. 6, where he corrects *Scott's* description of the stamps, identifying the bird in Kofi Antubam's creation as an eagle, not a palm-nut vulture.

34   "The Redeemed Empire." *Time* 29 June 1956, p. 6.

35   *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Map of Ghana and Queen Elizabeth," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, included in nos. 5-13.

36   Founder's Day was Nkrumah's birthday, 21 Sep.. Republic Day was 1 July. For Founder's Day issues, see *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": Founder's Day 1960, p. 210, nos. 86-88; 1961, p. 210, nos. 104-06a; 1962, p. 210, nos. 124-27; 1963, p. 211, nos. 147-50; and 1964, p. 211, nos. 175-78a. For Republic Day issues, see *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": Republic Day 1960, p. 210, nos. 78-81a; 1961, p. 210, nos. 98-100; 1962, p. 210, nos. 121-23; 1963, p. 211, nos. 143-46; 1964, p. 211, nos. 167-70a. Neither Founder's Day nor Republic Day issues were produced in 1965, Nkrumah's last full year in office.

37   For the essay and film critical of Nkrumah, see Mazrui 1966 and Mazrui 1986.

38   Nkrumah to Erica Powell, 28 Mar. 1966, cited in Powell 1984, p. 217.

39   *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "UN Day," 24 Oct. 1958, p. 208, nos. 36-38. The other independent African countries in 1958 who recognized UN Day were Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco. The thirteen African countries who recognized the seventeenth Olympics in 1960 were Ghana, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Mauritania, Somalia, and Gabon.

40   An analysis of African country entries in *Scott 2002,* 1-6 and listed here in order of independence, Ghana excepted, reveals the following ten significant common issues during the Nkrumah era: ***Olympics*** (1960: Ghana, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Mauritania, Somalia, and Gabon); the ***WHO Malaria Eradication Campaign*** (1962: Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Somalia, Congo, Gabon, Cameroun, Sierra Leone, and Burundi); ***Freedom from Hunger Campaign*** (1963: Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Somalia, Congo, Gabon, Cameroun, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda and Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania); ***Red Cross Centenary*** (1963: Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, Congo, Cameroun, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda and Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania); ***Olympics*** (1964: Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Somalia, Congo, Gabon, Cameroun, Burundi, Rwanda and Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania); ***UN Campaign to Preserve the***

Nubian Monuments (1964: Ghana, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Cameroun, and Algeria); *International Cooperation Year* (1965: Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Dahomey, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Togo, Congo, Gabon, Cameroun, Algeria, Burundi, Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania, and Zambia); *Centennial of International Telecommunications Union* (1965: Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Somalia, Cameroun, South Africa, Algeria, Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania, Zambia, and Gambia); *Abraham Lincoln* (1965: Ghana, Liberia, Egypt, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Gabon, Cameroun, and Rwanda); and *John F. Kennedy* (1965: Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Congo, Gabon, Cameroun, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Uganda).

41 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "International Quiet Sun," 1 June 1964, p. 211, nos. 164-166a and Oct. 1964, p. 211, nos. 186-88a.   Other African countries commemorating "International Quiet Sun" included Dahomey, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, and Gabon.

42 Nkrumah 1970b, pp. 4, 78. See also Nkrumah 1968b, p. 100.

43 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Independence, 2nd Anniversary," 6 Mar. 1959, p. 209, nos. 42-45 and the general issues, 5 Oct. 1959, p. 209, nos. 48-60. See especially nos. 48 and 53, reissued in Akan as "Gye Nyame [God's Omnipotence]," 29 Apr. 1961, p. 210, nos. 95-96.

44 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "West African Soccer Competitions," 15 Oct. 1959, p. 209, nos. 61-65, see especially no. 61 and "African Soccer Competition," 15 Nov. 1965, p. 212, nos. 233-235. See also "Ghana's Soccer Victory" overprinted with "Black Stars Retain Africa Cup/21 Nov. 1965," 7 Feb. 1966, p. 212, nos. 244-246.

45 "Daisy Ad 1964" and "Daisy: The Complete History of an Infamous and Iconic Ad."

46 French nuclear bomb test data: 13 Feb. 1960: *Gerboise Bleue* ("Blue Jerboa"), 70 kt; 1 Apr. 1960: *Gerboise Blanche* ("White Jerboa"), <5 kt; 27 Dec. 1960: *Gerboise Rouge* ("Red Jerboa"), <5 kt; and 25 Apr. 1961: *Gerboise Verte* ("Green Jerboa"), <1 kt. *Gerboise* is French for jerboa, a hopping desert rodent.   Data are contained in Bataille and Revol 2001.

47 McKown 1973, p. 125.

48 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "World Without the Bomb," 21 June 1962, p. 210, nos. 115-17.

49 R. Mahoney 1983, pp. 168-73. *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Belgrade," 1 July 1961, p. 210, nos. 98-100.

50 R. Mahoney, p. 180.

51 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "UN Day," 24 Oct. 1958, p. 208, nos. 36-38.

52 Nkrumah 1967a, p. 78.

53 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Abraham Lincoln's Birth Sesquicentennial," 12 Feb. 1959, p. 209, nos. 39-41a. The second series is *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Centenary of the Death of Abraham Lincoln," Apr. 1965, p. 212, nos. 208-211a.

54 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Prince Phillip," 24 Nov. 1959, p. 209, No. 66 and "Queen Elizabeth Souvenir Sheet," Nov. 1961, p. 210, nos. 107-09a.

55 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Eleanor Roosevelt," 10 Dec. 1963, p. 211, nos. 160-163.

56 The twenty-four African countries who philatelically recognized the Declaration of Human Rights were Ghana, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Guinea, Morocco, Peoples Republic of Congo, Chad, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Gabon, Cameroun, Algeria, Burundi, and Rwanda. Data were extracted from the country entries in *Scott 2002,* 1-6.

57 For Nkrumah's official state itinerary, joint Ghana-USA statement, and addresses to Congress, see "Visit of Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, 23-26 July 1958," *United States Department of State Bulletin, 1958,* pp. 283-86.

58 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana:" "Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah's Visit to the US and Canada, July, 1958," 18 July 1958, p. 209, nos. 28-31.

59 For Nkrumah's version, see "Kwame Nkrumah: Speech at the Formal Inauguration of the Volta River Project." 22 Jan. 1966.   For the US version, see Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, "Memorandum of Conversation" between President Dwight Eisenhower, Kwame Nkrumah, D. A. Chapman (Ambassador of Ghana), and Joseph Palmer (Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State), 24 July 1958, pp. 283-86.

60 Hart 1980, pp. 13-16.

61 R. Mahoney 1983, p. 161.

62 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Prince Phillip," 24 Nov. 1959, p. 209, no. 66.

63 See *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Queen Elizabeth," 10 Nov. 1961, p. 210, nos. 107-109a, especially the latter for her commemorative souvenir sheet.

64 Hart 1980, p. 31.

65 Ibid., pp. 175-78.

66 Nkrumah 1968a, p. 84.

67 Nkrumah 1966b, pp. x-xi. For his reassuring statement to the West in 1958 defining his policy of non-alignment, see Nkrumah 1968, pp. 45-53.

68 For example, see Mazrui 1966, p. 17; Mazrui 1967a, pp. 48-52; Mazrui 1986; Onoge and Gaching'a 1967, p. 25; Agyeman 1992, pp. 171-74; W. Mahoney 1968, pp. 248-250; Grundy and Weinstein 1967, pp. 23-24; Karioki 1974, p. 63; Hart 1980; Killick 1978, pp. 249 and 337; Boateng 1995, p. 119; and   Roger Rowe et al. 1966, especially pp. 7-11.

69 Siekman 1961, p. 206.

70 "Kwame Nkrumah Speech at the Formal Inauguration of the Volta River Project," 22 Jan. 1966.

71 Chambers 1970, pp. 267-68.

72 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Opening of the Volta River Dam and Electric Power Station at Akosombo," 22 Jan. 1966, pp. 212, 240-43.

73 R. Mahoney 1983, pp. 172-174; see also Stockwell 1978, 160n and 201n and Hersh 1978. *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "President John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963," 15 Dec. 1965, p. 212, nos. 236-39a.

74 R. Mahoney 1983, pp. 232-33; analysis is attributed to Henry Kissinger.

75 W. Mahoney 1968, p. 248. See especially R. Mahoney 1983, pp. 168-70 and 175-78.

76 R. Mahoney 1983, pp. 235, 244-45.

77 Nkrumah 1963, p. 135.

78 Ibid., p. 136; R. Mahoney 1983, p. 163.

79 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "First Conference of Independent African States," 15-22 Apr. 1958, p. 209, nos. 21-24; for the annual five-year series (1959-1963) of the anti-colonial "Africa Freedom Day" see: 15 Apr. 1959, p. 209, nos. 46-47; 15 Apr. 1960, p. 209, nos. 75-77; 15 Apr. 1961, p. 210, nos. 92-94; 15 Apr. 1962, p. 210, nos. 112-14; and 15 Apr. 1963, p. 211, nos. 135-38. African countries that joined Ghana in commemorating "Africa Freedom Day" follow: Liberia and Tunisia (1959); only Ghana (1960); Egypt, Tunisia, and Ethiopia (1961); Tunisia (1962); and only Ghana (1963).

80 For Nkrumah's Pan-African and foreign policy comments and speeches at events generally commemorated by Nkrumah-era stamp issues, see Nkrumah 1973, for speeches [not italicized] and *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana" for stamps [italicized]: Independent African states at the Accra Conference, 15 April 1958, pp. 127-29 [*15 Apr. 1958, p. 209, nos. 21-24*]; Lighting the Torch of the Flame of African Freedom at the Declaration of the Republic, 1 July 1960, p. 144 [*1 July 1960, p. 210, nos. 78-81a*]; Non-Aligned States in Belgrade, 1-6 Sep. 1961 and Cairo, 5-10 Oct. 1964, pp. 436-438 [*1 Sep. 1961, p. 210, nos. 101-103; the Cairo conference was not commemorated*]; close of the Casablanca Conference, 7 Jan. 1961, pp. 138-40 [*"First Anniversary," 6 Mar. 1962, p. 201, no. 111*]; to Ghana's National Assembly on the formation of the OAU at the Addis Ababa 25 May meeting, 21 June 1963, pp. 259-75 [*"First Anniversary," 6 July 1964, p. 211, nos. 171-74*]; and his OAU speech in Accra, 21 Oct. 1965, pp. 302-09 [*21 Oct. 1965, p. 212, nos. 227-232*].

81 Nkrumah 1963, pp. 141-49.

82 Hochschild 2011.

83 Nkrumah 1967b, pp. xv-xvi and 28-31. For a copy of the Lumumba-Nkrumah secret agreement and Nkrumah's analysis, see Nkrumah 1973, pp. 145-150.

84 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "First Anniversary of the Death of Patrice Lumumba," 30 June 1962, p. 210, nos. 118-120. Lumumba's actual death date was 12 Feb. Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, and Mali also issued memorial stamps.

85 R. Mahoney 1983, p. 235. For the involvement of the CIA, see Stockwell 1978, pp. 160n and 201n. For comments on Stockwell's book, see Hersh 1978.

86 Hutchful 1987, p. 38.

87 Rowe et al 1966, especially pages 7-11.

88 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Black Star Line Inauguration," 27 Dec. 1957, p. 208, nos. 14-16; "Inauguration of Ghana Airways," 15 July 1958, p. 209, nos. 32-35; "60th Anniversary of Ghana Railways," 1 Nov. 1963, p. 211, nos. 156-59; "Fourth Anniversary of the Republic: Communal Labor and Harvesting Corn on a State Farm," 1 July 1964, p. 211, nos. 167-70a; and "Centenary of the International Telecommunications Union," p. 211, 12 Apr. 1965, nos. 204-07a.

89 For a summary of the strong relationship between the three Pan-Africanists, see Afari-Gyan 1991, pp. 1-10.

90 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Great Black Writers of the 20th Century," 25 Mar. 1998, p. 234, no. 2027f.

91   For W.E.B. Du Bois, see *Scott 2003* 1, "United States": 31 Jan. 1992, p. 72, no. 2617 and 28 Jan. 1998, no. 3182l. The turbulent relationship between Du Bois and the US is well known. Given that the US agency responsible for selecting, designing, and issuing US stamps, the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee (CSAC), carries out its discussions in secret and whose minutes are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, one wonders how discussion went when the CSAC granted approval for two separate issues of Du Bois.

92   Shivji 2010. For a lengthy examination, see Agyeman 1992, pp. 78-95. A complete copy of Nkrumah's comments is in Nkrumah 1973, pp. 276-97.

93   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanganyika": "Tanganyika's Independence," 9 Dec. 1961, p. 324, nos. 45-56 and "Establishment of the Republic," 9 Dec. 1962, p. 324, nos. 57-60.

94   *Stanley Gibbons 1989*, "Tanzania," commentary, p. 878.

95   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar," 7 July 1964, p. 325, nos. 1-4.

96   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "Various," 9 Dec. 1965, p. 325, nos. 5-18.

97   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "Fish," 1967, p. 325, nos. 19-34.

98   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "Pan African Postal Union Plenipotentiary Conference, Arusha, 8-18 Jan. 1980," 1 July 1980, p. 327, nos. 153-58.

99   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "25th Anniversary of Economic Commission for Africa," 12 Sept. 1983, p. 327, nos. 225-28a.

100   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "Various," 15 Apr. 1976 - 25 Nov. 1985, pp. 325-28, nos. 54-289.

101   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania": "Rail Transport in East Africa," 4 Oct. 1974, p. 326, nos. 62-65a; "Anti-Apartheid Year," 24 Oct. 1978, p. 326, nos. 113-16a; and "5th Anniversary of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference," 1 Apr. 1985, p. 328, nos. 254-57a.

102   Nyerere 1968, p. 211.

103   *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania:" "Mickey Mouse, 60th Anniversary," 9 Sept. 1988, p. 330, nos. 424-31; "Disney Characters, Automobiles," 20 Mar. 1990, p. 331, nos. 570-579; "International Literacy Year," 12 Dec. 1990, pp. 332-33, nos. 679a-i, 680a-i, and 681a-i (a Disney character for each letter of the alphabet, plus similar issues in Hebrew and Russian); "Mickey Mouse," 11 Feb. 1991, p. 333, nos. 689-98; "Mickey's Portrait Gallery," 30 Nov. 1992, p. 335, nos. 913-927. For a commentary on revenue-raising "pop" postage (Mickey Mouse, Elvis Presley, and Marilyn Monroe, for example) produced by IGPC for countries other than the US, see Jack Mingo 1997.

104   For example, see *Scott 2002* 6, "Tanzania:" "Queen Elizabeth," 23 Nov. 1977, p. 326, nos. 87-90; "Elvis Presley," 15 Feb. 1992, p. 334, nos. 808a-i and "Marilyn Monroe," nos. 809a-i; and "Jerry Garcia," mid-1995, p. 341, nos. 1412-13b.

105   Karioki 1974, p. 58.

106   *Scott 2002* 4, "Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania": various issues, 15 Apr. 1965 to 2 Jan. 1976, pp. 125-28, nos. 148-323.

107   *Scott 2002* 4, "Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania": "Rinderpest Campaign by the OAU," 5 July 1971, p. 127, nos. 233-36; "First All-Africa Trade Fair, 23 Feb. 1972, p. 127, nos. 242-45; "OAU Summit Conference," 28 July 1975, p. 128, nos. 308-11.

108   *Scott 2002* 4, "Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania": "Tourist Publicity," 4 Apr. 1966, p. 126, nos. 160-63; "Archaeological Relics of East Africa," 2 May 1967, p. 126, nos. 176-79; "Establishment of the East African Community," 1 Dec. 1967, p. 126, no. 180; "Opening of the East African

Satellite Earth Station," 18 May 1970, p. 126, nos. 213-16; "10th Anniversary of the Independence of Tanzania," 9 Dec. 1971, p. 127, nos. 238-41; "5th Anniversary of the East African Community," 1 Dec. 1972, p. 127, nos. 258; "10th Anniversary of Independence," 12 Dec. 1973, p. 127, nos. 276-79; "Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 10th Anniversary," 24 Apr. 1974, p. 127, nos. 284-87; "Game Lodges of East Africa," 24 Feb. 1975, p. 128, nos. 300-03; "African Artifacts," 5 May 1975, p. 128, nos. 304-07; and "East African Airways," 2 Jan. 1976, p. 128, nos. 320-23.

109   McKown 1973, p. 123.

110   Ibid.

111   For example, see *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "Patrice Lumumba and Map of Africa," 13 Feb. 1962, p. 465, nos. 229-31; "First Anniversary of the conference of African Heads of State at Casablanca," 15 Mar. 1962, p. 465, nos. 232-33; "Heroes and Martyrs of Africa," 2 Oct. 1962, p. 466, nos. 258-62; "Conference of African Heads of State for African Unity, Addis Ababa," 22 May 1963, p. 466, nos. 305-08; "Eleanor Roosevelt, 15th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (in 1963), p. 466, nos. 336-39; and "UNESCO Campaign to Preserve Nubian Monuments," 19 Nov. 1964, p. 467, nos. 350-54.

112   Compare *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "Kwame Nkrumah," 6 Mar. 1957, p. 208, nos. 1-4 with *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "Proclamation of Independence, 2 October 1958," 1959, p. 465, nos. 170-74. *Scott* has given Gold Coast and Ghana separate enumeration, but French West Africa and Guinea have a combined system, which explains the high numbers for Guinea's first non-overprinted independence stamps.

113   Compare *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "United Nations Day, Oct. 24," 24 Oct. 1958, p. 209, nos. 36-38 with *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "Conference of African Heads of State for African Unity, Addis Ababa" 22 May 1963, p. 466, nos. 305-08.

114   *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "OAU, 10th Anniversary," 25 May 1973, p. 470, nos. 642-45.

115   *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "American Achievements in Space," 19 July 1965, p. 467, nos. 382-87a and "Russian Achievements in Space," nos. 388-393a.

116   *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "Lenin (1870-1924), Russian Communist Leader," 16 Nov. 1970, p. 469, nos. 564-69.

117   *Scott 2002* 3, "Guinea": "George Dimitrov (1882-1949), Bulgarian Communist Party Leader and Premier," 28 Sept. 1972, p. 470, nos. 630-33.

118   Nkrumah's scholarly work while exiled in Guinea includes *The Last Stage of Imperialism* 1966, *Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah* 1967, *Challenge of the Congo* 1967, *Dark Days in Ghana* 1968, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* 1968, *Neo-Colonialism, Class Struggle in Africa* 1970, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* 1970,* and *Revolutionary Path* 1973.

119   For example, see *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "First Anniversary of the Revolution which Overthrew the Regime of Kwame Nkrumah," 24 Feb. 1967, p. 212, nos. 273-76a; "2nd Anniversary of the February 24th Revolution," 24 Feb. 1968, p. 213, nos. 319-22; "Lt. Gen. Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka (1926-1967), Leader of the Revolution of 1966 Against Kwame Nkrumah," 17 Apr. 1968, p. 213, nos. 327-30; "International Human Rights Year--Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Joseph Boakye Danquah," 7 Mar. 1969, p. 213, nos. 348-51a; "3rd Anniversary of the Revolution," Sept. 1969, p. 213, nos., 352-55a; and "Inauguration of Kotoka Airport," Apr. 1970, p. 214, nos. 382-85.

120 For example, see *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "WHO, 20th Anniversary," 11 Nov. 1968, p. 213, nos. 336-339a; "International Human Rights Year," 7 Mar. 1969, p. 213, nos. 348-51a; "International Education Year," 10 Aug. 1970, p. 214, nos. 390-93; "International Book Year," 21 Apr. 1972, p. 215, nos. 445-49a; "World Food Program, 10th Anniversary," 1973, p. 215, 490-94b; "Examination for River Blindness," 15 Dec. 1976, p. 217, nos. 592-95; "TB Bacillus Centenary," 9 Aug. 1982, p. 219, nos. 812-16; "Namibia Day," 26 Jan. 1984, p. 220, nos. 881-85; "UN Child Survival Campaign," 16 Dec. 1985, p. 221, nos. 997-1000; "International Peace Year," 2 Mar. 1987, p. 221, nos. 1021-24; and "Solidarity with South Africans for Abolition of Apartheid," 18 May 1987, p. 221, nos. 1033-37.

121 For example, see *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "European Painters Birth Anniversaries: Peter Paul Rubens, Titian, and Thomas Gainsborough," Sept. 1977, p. 217, nos. 626-30d; "Japanese Paintings," 21 Aug.-20 Nov. 1989, p. 222, nos. 1097-1123; "425th Birth Anniversary of William Shakespeare," 9 Oct. 1989, p. 223, nos. 1147a-u; "The Beatles," 8 Dec. 1995, p. 231, nos. 1851-53; "Sylvester Stallone in Movie, Rocky II," 21 Nov. 1996, p. 232, no. 1911; and "Mickey and Friends," 29 Jan. 1998, p. 233, nos. 2008-12a.

122 *Scott 2002* 3, "Ghana": "National Leaders," 21 Jan. 1980, p. 218, no. 702; "10th Non-Aligned Ministers Conference, Accra," 2 Sep. 1991, p. 225, no. 1341; and in *Scott 2009* 3, "Ghana": "50th Anniversary of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology," 2001, p. 276, nos. 2275-80 featuring scenes of the university.

123 *Scott 2009* 3, "Ghana": "James Cagney," 16 Apr. 2001, p. 274, no. 2210; "The Supremes," 16 Apr. 2001, p. 275, nos. 2240g-i; "Queen Victoria's 100th Anniversary," 27 Aug. 2001, p. 275, nos. 2248-49; and "Mao Tse-Tung," 27 Aug. 2001, p. 275, nos. 2241-42.

124 Nkrumah 1967a, p. 66.

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The Transformation of the US-Based Liberian Diaspora from Hard Power to Soft Power Agents

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Abstract: As a result of a "hurting stalemate" and the failure to capture power through coercion, moderate elements within the US-based Liberian diaspora resorted to soft power in order to have a greater impact on homeland affairs. The effectiveness of the diaspora is aided by the attractiveness of diaspora success and US culture, the morality of diaspora policies, and the credibility and legitimacy of the diaspora. The US-based Liberian diaspora exerts soft power influences towards peace building via the following mechanisms: persuasion and dialogue; public diplomacy; media assistance; and development assistance/job creation campaigns. The study concludes that development assistance/job creation campaigns are the least sustainable because of cost compared to the other mechanisms that attract a buy-in from the community. This research is based on snowball and in-depth interviews with forty US-based Liberian diaspora leaders that also includes leaders of non-Liberian advocacy groups and participatory observation of selected diaspora activities from 2007-2010. It is also supplemented with content analysis of US-based Liberian diaspora online discussion forums and archival records of congressional hearings on Liberia during the civil war.

Introduction

The emergent literature on diasporas and conflict as captured by Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen (2006); Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (2007); Feargal Cochrane (2007); Terrence Lyons (2004), and Camilla Orjuela (2008) points to contentious politics and the exercise of hard power which tends to generate conflict in the homeland. In international politics, "power" can be defined as "having the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Hard power is the capacity to coerce them to do so."[1] The diaspora often exerts hard power influence via military and/or economic coercion of its opponents in the pursuit of a desired political outcome. This form of political power often relies on confrontational policies imposed by one powerful political body upon a lesser economically or militarily endowed body. The US-based Liberian diaspora by virtue of its relative economic strength vis-à-vis its home-based compatriots exercised wanton hard power in the course of the fourteen-year civil war.

This paper argues via the US-based Liberian diaspora case that in a post-conflict environment, diasporas are capable of exercising soft power influence towards peace building even when some of its prominent members have expended hard power for conflict. Hard power such as financial resources that were channeled for coercive purposes can be channeled for

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persuasive purposes and co-optation in order to achieve a desired outcome towards moderation or peace. Buttressing this point, Nye has observed that "hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others."[2] The transformation of the US-based Liberian diaspora's hard power into soft power occurred when the use of hard power for coercive powers failed and led to a "hurting stalemate" among stakeholders in the Liberian conflict. The effectiveness of the diaspora in exercising soft power was boosted by the following: attractiveness of diaspora success in the US; diaspora credibility and legitimacy; morality of diaspora policies; and attractiveness of US culture, values and norms. The following are the avenues through which the US-based Liberian diaspora uses to exerts soft power influence: persuasion and dialogue; public diplomacy; media assistance; and development assistance/job creation.

Methodology

The Liberian diaspora in the US is organized along different types of voluntary associations that play various roles on behalf of its members in the host country and at home. Some of the identified groups include the following: (i) Liberian county organizations which are organized along ethnic county lines; (ii) local community organizations-organized geographically by US state/city chapters and loosely federated at a national level under the Union of Liberian Associations in America (ULAA); (iii) political organization—branches of political parties at home; (iv) advocacy groups i.e. Association of Liberian Journalist in America (AJLA); (v) immigration advocacy groups organized to lobby for permanent residents for Liberians; (vi) religious groups (Christian and Muslim organizations); and (vii) alumni associations.[3] The above organizations are the formal channels via which members of the US-based Liberian diaspora exert their influence at home from abroad and how they collaborate with some non-Liberian advocacy groups in the USA. This paper is based on snowball technique interviews with forty leaders of the aforementioned organizations made up of at least two leaders from each category of voluntary associations as well as leaders of non-Liberian advocacy organizations and Liberian government officials. Interviewees were promised confidentiality and anonymity in order to solicit participation in the interview and to encourage candid responses. Hence, this paper uses pseudonyms for their names and organizations where appropriate. For verification purposes and to check for bias, these interviews were supplemented with US Congressional records on Liberian hearings in the heat of the civil war and participatory observations via visits to meetings and annual conventions of selected county organizations and regional branches of ULAA. In addition, the discourse on popular diaspora websites and list-serves were monitored in order to provide more contexts for data analysis.

From Hard Power to Soft Power

Joseph Nye defines soft power as the "ability to affect others to obtain outcomes you want. One can affect other's behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion (sticks), inducements and payments ('carrots'), and attraction that makes others want what you want."[4] Also, soft power relies on three main resources: cultural—places where it is attractive; political values—when the promoter adheres to them at home and abroad; and foreign policies regarded as legitimate and having moral authority.[5] This is contrasted with hard power, which relies on military and

economic might to make others change their position. Hard power utilizes inducements or threats in the form of "carrots and sticks"that might not necessarily be the best alternative in achieving a desired outcome.[6]

Charles Taylor, the primary architect of the civil war, was a major leader of the US-based Liberian diaspora, having chaired the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA), the umbrella organization of US-based Liberian diaspora organizations in the 1980s. This position enabled Taylor to raise his profile among fellow US-based Liberians, some of whom gave him financial, moral, and material support for his armed rebellion in 1989, which triggered the civil war. One such member of the US-based Liberia diaspora who provided moral and financial support for Taylor's rebellion is the current President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. In a February 12, 2009 testimony before the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the President admitted to contributing US $10,000 to Charles Taylor's rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) via the Association of Constitutional Democracy (ACDL), ostensibly for relief operations in Nimba County at the height of the conflict. Also admitting her moral support for Charles Taylor's rebellion before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, she said: "I will admit to you that I was one of those who did agree that the rebellion was necessary… But I was never a member of the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia)."[7]

In spite of the role that the diasporas plays in conflict, it is indeed very troubling that when it comes to peace building, they are under-utilized by the international community in the quest for a viable peace. According to United States Institute of Peace's (USIP) digital records on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), forty-one TRCs have been set up since 1973, aimed at find a lasting solution to a conflict as part of a post-conflict mechanism for peace building.[8] Regrettably, only one commission, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, explicitly made provision for the inclusion of the diaspora in the process of healing war-afflicted wounds. The existing literature on the positive role that the African diaspora plays in the development of the continent is often centered on its potential or ability to contribute towards the economic development of the continent mostly via remittances. While this focus is understandable, the African diaspora's ability to exert soft power influence towards post-conflict peace building, particularly after using hard power for conflict has been under-explored.

Failure of Hard Power

After exerting hard power via financial and material support for Liberia's fourteen year civil war, a consensus emerged among the US-based Liberian diaspora and compatriots in Liberia that indeed the use of hard power had created a "hurting stalemate" and hence a change in strategy was needed. "The concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or way out."[9] In addition, hurting stalemates create the conditions for warring parties to suspend violent confrontation and seek a negotiated settlement. This is because a hurting stalemate creates via prolonged violence an elusive military solution, and the cost becomes unbearable to all vested parties.[10] In the case of the US-based Liberian diaspora,

although some aided Charles Taylor to capture power through hard power (military means), most were disappointed that Taylor failed to abandon hard power and operated without a democratic system. Thus, after Taylor was forced out of power via a combination of international and domestic pressure, the US-based Liberia diaspora was determined to support a candidate who could adopt soft power by adopting democratic ideals. Hence, the overwhelming US-based Liberian diaspora support for Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who went on to win the presidency in 2005. Ikram warns that "advocates for hard power must remember that its use in the 'global village' will have adverse consequences about their image, however just the cause. "[11]

Factors Enabling the Effectiveness of Diaspora Soft Power

Nye adds that the ability to obtain the desired outcome depends on a set of intangible assets that includes "an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions and policies that are seen as legitimate or having morality. If a leader presents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead."[12]   Although the US-based Liberian diaspora does not fully possess all these intangible assets, they certainly have some attractive attributes that gives them an advantage in affecting the behaviors of their fellow compatriots at home. These include attractiveness of diaspora success, morality of diaspora policies, attractiveness of American culture and diaspora credibility and legitimacy.

Attractiveness of Diaspora Success

The ability to shape the preferences of others lies at the core of soft power. This can be manifested at the personal level through the power of attraction and seduction. In the course of a relationship or marriage, the bigger partner does not necessarily have the power; instead power is manifested through the mysterious chemistry of attraction. Smart leaders in the corporate world know that effective leadership involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want instead of just barking out commands. Also, the success of any community-based policing is dependent upon a friendly police force that is attractive and approachable enough in order to illicit community support to help achieve mutually-shared objectives.[13] One of the biggest assets of the US-based Liberian diaspora and a source of attraction to their compatriots in the homeland is the fact that the former is the most educated constituency of all Liberians. This is mainly due to the favorable educational opportunities available in the United States for anyone willing to work hard.

US-based Liberians place a very high value on education as evidenced by the fact that working adults often seek avenues for self-improvement and general education classes. Some Liberian organizations in the United States support scholarships for prospective students while graduates maintain strong loyalties to their high schools by forming and joining high school alumni associations. Even though young Liberian immigrants enrolled in the US educational system face a myriad of challenges such as poor preparation due to the civil war, which broke down the Liberian educational system and interrupted the educational calendar for years, many are able to persevere, attend college/universities, and eventually earn degrees. They are able to secure employment in various fields such as teaching, medicine, science, and technology.[14] Thus, the average Liberian sees the educational and financial success of their US-based Liberian

counterparts as something worthy of aspiring to and thereby giving the latter leverage in affecting the behavior of their fellow compatriots at home.

Morality of Policies

US-based diaspora institutions such as the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) have built a reputation through years fighting against dictatorship and human rights abuses in Liberia such that its members are generally viewed favorably at home. However, this trust is in jeopardy because of growing concerns that the current leadership is too close to the current Liberian government to be an impartial player for peace building in Liberia. Furthermore, members of the Liberian County Associations which represent the various ethnic groups of Liberia in the US have also earned the trust of their fellow Liberians at home because of numerous material, financial, and moral support that these associations continue to offer their respective communities back home. In fact, during the brutal civil war, the remittances of the US-based Liberian diaspora were very crucial for the sustenance of thousands of Liberians who remained in the country and those who fled to neighboring countries as refugees.

Some members of the US-based Liberian diaspora have not always promoted legitimate policies such as funding the civil war and, as such, have jeopardized their standing in Liberia. However, most Liberians are discerning enough not to use the illegitimate actions of a few to over-generalize about the stance of the overall diaspora community in the US. In addition, US-based diaspora funding for the war in Liberia was not done in the name of the various organizations representing the Liberian diaspora in the US. This is because these diaspora organizations have membership that cuts across the ethnic, religious, and political divides along which the war was fought in Liberia. Second, US laws governing non-profit status under which most diaspora organizations operate forbade the raising of money for war or violence abroad. However, the funding occurred in an informal way where like-minded people rallied together and were able to send money via the normal channels of diaspora remittances such as money orders and Western Union.

Thus, when it comes to the ability to exercise any degree of soft-power influence, US-based Liberian diaspora members who are deemed to have pursued illegitimate policies by their fellow citizens at home will not be able to lead by example or promote any changes no matter how needed and useful their polices or ideas may be. For example, although President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf initially supported violent rebellion against the Doe regime, she is not perceived by many Liberians as a hardliner who crossed the red line compared to fellow former diaspora members such as Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah who went on to lead rebel factions that committed major atrocities. Thus it will be inconceivable for the aforementioned rebel leaders to ever exercise soft power in Liberia because of their bloody past. On the other hand, US-based Liberian diaspora members recognized at home as having a track record of pursuing legitimate polices aimed at peace and reconstruction are more likely to be effective in exercising soft-power. This influence could be demonstrated through leadership by example backed by a reservoir of good will among the people. The conferment of the Nobel Peace Prize on President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf further enhances her soft power influence in Liberia because it bestows a high degree of moral authority. In addition, former President Amos Sawyer, who was a professor at Indiana University, returned to Liberia to head the Governance Commission, an important organization mandated to propose government reforms. Similarly, Massa

Washington, a longtime diaspora stalwart, served as a member of the TRC in charge of diaspora affairs.

Diaspora groups often fall under the purview of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) claiming to act as "a global conscience."[15] They represent broad public interests beyond state boundaries and seek to create new norms by indirectly pressing governments and corporations to change policies. Indirectly, NGOs shape public perceptions of what constitute appropriate actions and behaviors of governments and corporations. The soft power of these non-state actors is fueled by the information revolution that enables them to attract followers. As such, governments have to consider NGOs as both allies and adversaries.[16] In the case of US-based Liberian diaspora, most of them served as adversaries to the governments in power in the course of the civil war but are now serving as allies to the current government and new democratic experiment via soft power in peace building.

NGOs such as diaspora associations and organizations have become adept at penetrating states with a disregard for state boundaries. This is because they build partnership with citizens who are well placed in the domestic politics of several countries. These local partners are able to focus media attention and pressure governments on issues of their interests, thereby creating new types of transnational political coalitions.[17]

Attractiveness of American Culture

Liberians have a long and unique historical connection with the United States compared to other African countries. Further, the Liberian diaspora can be classified as a "state-linked diaspora'' for as Sheffer (2003) defines it, "state-linked diasporas are those groups that are in host countries but are connected to societies of their own ethnic origin that constitute a majority in an established state."[18] This is because the Liberian diaspora, unlike other stateless diasporas such as the Kurdish diaspora, is actually connected to a recognized state that it seeks to influence or solicit its assistance in times of need.

Liberians have always viewed American culture as desirable and equate "civilization" with Americanization. This phenomenon can be traced to the early freed American slave settlers who came to Liberia with a set of values and culture rooted in the New World and used it to dominate the indigenes. David Wippmann, citing Alao et al, sums up the superiority complex of the Americo-Liberians over the indigenous people as follows:

> They created the social hierarchy they had experienced in the ante-bellum (of the United States) but with themselves as the socially dominant, land-owning class. They considered the indigenous population primitive and uncivilized, and treated it as little more than an abundant source of forced labor.[19]

Through their dominance of the indigenous-born Liberians, they frowned on native culture as backwards and institutionalized a set of norms that included literacy, Christianity, monogamy, dress, etc. which denoted "civilization." For example, in most Liberian parlance, the word "native" is used to denote "uncivilized," a person unfamiliar with western culture.[20] Thus most Liberians of all persuasions that make up the US-based diaspora are looked upon favorably at home for their acculturation to western culture, courtesy of their sojourn in the

United States. A US-based Liberian diaspora leader traces the historical background behind Liberians affinity with American culture and values as follows:

> The only difference between the Liberian flag and the United States flag is they have 50 stars and we have one star. If you look at the American Constitution, the Liberian Constitution is modeled after it. So pretty much everything was transported from   Liberia; all the values because of the culture, eh the language we are speaking, the education you know, the book, the textbooks are from the United States. And so the United States has a greater influence on the culture and on the values of Liberia.[21]

The aforementioned historical and cultural connection between the US and Liberia makes it relatively easier for the US-based Liberian diaspora to receive a favorable hearing vis-à-vis any peace building message being promoted by the latter.

Credibility and Legitimacy

The aforementioned historical connection between the US and Liberia enhances the credibility and legitimacy of the US-based Liberian diaspora in their quest to exert soft power influence in Liberia. According to Nye, the reputation and credibility of a state or group seeking to exert soft power influence also matters particularly because of the "paradox of plenty." Thus any information perceived as propaganda may not just be treated with contempt but may also be counterproductive if it undermines the reputation of the provider of the information.[22]

Fortunately for the US-based Liberian diaspora, the United States is the most popular foreign country among Liberians based on its unique position for founding Liberia and as its biggest donor and investor. In fact, in the course of the civil war, it was not uncommon for many Liberians to seek refuge in the US. embassy in Monrovia even when security was not guaranteed. Furthermore, the long exposure of Liberians to American culture and norms courtesy of the freed slaves who settled in Liberia made it easier for the promotion of what is referred to as the "American Creed."[23] According to interviewees, aspects of the American creed that most attracts them are: the relative racial harmony among the various races in the US in spite of a history of animosity; political, ethnic and religious tolerance; value for education; a culture of rule of law; and respect for human rights. In Liberia, American culture, values and norms have become the measurement of civility and hence worthy of emulation.[24] This is in spite of the fact that the promoters of the "American Creed" have not always been worthy ambassadors as evidenced by the fact that some prominent members of the US-based Liberian diaspora provided financial and material support towards the brutal civil war. With such popular friends, the US-based diaspora is able to exert soft power influence in Liberia by mobilizing resources from the United States for peace building.

Although there are large Liberian diaspora groups within the West African sub-region and Europe, they do not have the same domestic legitimacy as their US-based counterparts enabling them to actively exert soft power influence. Both the West African countries and European countries that host Liberian refugees do not have the unique historical relationship that the US has with Liberia as the founding nation of modern Liberia. In addition, these countries do not have the level of influence that the US has had over Liberia for years when it comes to foreign policy. As such, the Liberian diaspora in Europe and the West African sub-region have very

limited leverage in deriving any soft power influence via their presence in the aforementioned regions. Third, the Liberian diaspora in neighboring West African countries such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire are viewed with suspicion in Liberia because some of them were supported militarily by the governments of the aforementioned countries in the course of the civil war. In fact, Charles Taylor launched his rebellion from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire in December of 1990 with a small band of dissidents that had received training in Libya and were based in Cote d'Ivoire. Lastly, unlike their US-based counterparts, the majority of the West African-based Liberian diaspora is less resourced and leads a difficult life as refugees because of unfavorable host country conditions. This inhibits their capacity to effectively mobilize and exert any form of soft power influence in their homeland.

Diaspora association with an unpopular host country in the view of compatriots in the homeland de-legitimizes the diaspora regardless of the utility of whatever peace building initiative that the diaspora may be promoting. For example, the overwhelming anti-American/Western sentiment among Afghans and Iraqis has seriously compromised the ability of the Afghan and Iraqi diasporas to exert soft power influence over their homeland compatriots. This is because the Afghan and Iraqi diaspora are viewed as traitors by their compatriots for collaborating with an immoral power in support of an unjust cause—invasion. Buttressing this point, Turner (2008) points out that Ahmed Chalabi, whose Iraqi National Congress was propped up by the US. as the "government-in-waiting," faced a hostile reception from Iraqis and resistance which ultimately fueled the Iraqi insurgency.[25]
Similarly, in the Afghan case, the fact that three-quarters of President Kharzai's transitional administration was made up of Afghan diaspora members transplanted by the international community eager to re-shape war-torn societies sparked a lot of resentment from local stakeholders.[26] Under such circumstances, the credibility and legitimacy of the diaspora led-government is compromised because in the view of local stakeholders, the government was constituted by an immoral external power. Such perception seriously undermines the effectiveness of any diaspora entity to exert soft power influence because the latter is viewed in the same unattractive and negative light as its benefactors.

Mechanisms for the Exercise of Soft Power

The diaspora has the leverage to manipulate conflict situations towards desirable peaceful resolution. Apart from exercising the roles of communicator or facilitator, diasporas are capable of effective persuasion as well. Diaspora leverage in conflict resolution is backed by the ability to wield carrots and sticks in the form of continuous political and financial support or a withdrawal of such support. Any withdrawal of diaspora support could be devastating for the homeland if the government lacks political legitimacy and is facing economic difficulty.[27] "Withdrawal of remittances and investment is another strong card diaspora groups can play. Diaspora's financial support is extremely important for the homeland country's economy, particularly if the country is a developing one."[28] This is further reinforced by the neo-patrimonial nature of Liberian society where many families depend on their diaspora relatives for sustenance, thereby giving diaspora members much clout in communities. Thus the US-based Liberian diaspora exercise soft powers influence through persuasion/dialogue, public

dialogue, public diplomacy, diaspora civic engagement, and development/job creation programs.

Persuasion/Dialogue

Some members of the US-based Liberian diaspora have been exercising soft-power influence on their fellow Liberian citizens back home on an inter-personal level through the power of persuasion and dialogue. In a post-war environment where ethnic and factional nerves are still raw, such attempts are helping in the reduction of tensions, confidence-building and reconciliation. A US-based Liberian diaspora leader discovered some of the simmering ethnic tensions during an encounter with an elderly woman who was refusing to acknowledge her own grandchildren because her son had married a woman from a rival ethnic group. The diaspora leader recounts his successful attempt to soothe the elderly woman's prejudice as follows:

> … when I was in Liberia, I came across a woman whose son was married to a girl from Nimba and this lady told me those children will never be my grand-children. And this lady told me that as long as those children have Nimba blood, they will never be my grand-children. I told her to look at it this way, even though they have Nimba blood, they have your blood too. So don't give up. It is a wrong indictment of the entire Nimba race if there is anything like that. My brother, it's not like one person does something bad we have to blame everybody… I managed to convince them.[29]

Most African countries lack effective conflict resolution mechanisms, and in a country such as Liberia that is recovering from a brutal civil war, the situation is very precarious, particularly in the hinterlands. This is because there are inadequate and often corrupt law personnel and infrastructure. Such a situation does not inspire confidence among the local populace who are quick to take matters into their own hands thereby blowing petty local disputes out of proportion and risking the escalation of conflict. The leadership of County Associations in the US has often intervened in cases of stalemates in their respective counties by using their good offices directly to mediate and resolve conflicts and disputes.

Sometimes these diaspora leaders use their privileged positions to refer a conflict or grievance to the relevant central authorities in Monrovia for redress. For example, in one such instance, the leadership of the Bong County diaspora in the US resolved tensions that arose between the Bong County Superintendent and a local contractor that threatened peace. The diaspora leadership issued a position statement on the dispute to the President, resulting in a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Describing some of the unique advantages that members of the diaspora have over their Liberian counterparts that enable them to be effective at exerting soft power influence, a diaspora leader I refer to as "Mark," posits as follows:

> I have certain authority that an ordinary Liberian in the street does not have … I can speak to the minister, I can speak to the solicited general or the dean of the law school or the president of the university, heads of civil societies, international NGO's ... So you have to recognize your placement in society... Socially, in the family context, if you are a male in the African family, you may have older sisters but you are the male, you are   much respected and people

> listen to your views. Much more so if you are from America. You have
> education, you have money, and you are from America. They listen to you![30]

A major post-war legacy of the Liberian civil war is the thousands of former child-soldiers who are now young adults that the Liberian government and international community struggle to integrate into the society at large. "Aid workers estimate up to 20,000 child-soldiers, some as young as seven or eight, were recruited by both government and rebel forces during Liberia's latest war."[31] This legacy, coupled with the inadequate avenues for conflict resolution, provides a breeding ground for angry youth that can escalate into violence if left unchecked. Thus, one of the avenues used by some US-based diaspora members to assist in peace building is by training some of the youth on how to channel their grievances to appropriate authorities without resorting to mob action and demonstrations. For example, a visiting US-based Liberian diaspora lecturer who served temporarily in the University of Liberia pointed out that when he once heard that students, some of whom were ex-combatants, were about to go on demonstration against the government's delay in paying the salaries of lecturers, he reached out to the student leadership to tone down their heated rhetoric. Instead, he taught them how to write petitions, organize press conferences, and articulate their grievances in a non-threatening manner. The visiting lecturer argued that these were skills and leadership tools that someone needed to teach these students and he was glad to have offered it. Although the demonstration still went ahead, it did not escalate into violence as previously feared.

Members of the US-based Liberian diaspora community also played crucial roles in preventing post-election violence after the 2005 elections when George Weah and his supporters threatened to reject the outcome of the run-off elections. A US-based Liberian diaspora leader, who was himself disqualified from contesting the elections on a legal technicality, worked behind the scenes to convince Weah's camp to eventually accept the outcome of the results. In doing so, he cited the case of Al Gore who conceded defeat to George W. Bush in 2000 in the face of pressure not to and urged Weah's camp to concede in order not to plunge the country back to war. He points out that he was granted the necessary audience and was successful in convincing senior members of Weah's camp to concede because he reiterated to Weah's camp that he had personally exercised moderation when the Supreme Court upheld his disqualification from participation in the 2005 election as a presidential candidate. He did not make a fuss about his disqualification as his supporters urged at the time. Instead, he resorted to a peaceful avenue in the form of a press conference where he announced his acceptance of the verdict and admonished his disappointed supporters to remain calm and realign themselves with any other political party of their choice. This personal experience gave him the necessary credibility to call for moderation with Weah's camp. It also demonstrates the utility of soft power via leadership by example.

The situation changes dramatically, however, when locals have to compete with diaspora returnees for much coveted top government positions and economic opportunities. Such circumstances have created a cold war between the diaspora returnees and locals fueling resentment from the latter who believe that they deserve more opportunities over their diaspora compatriots because the latter did not endure the war and the former did.

A high-ranking US-based diaspora woman leader summed up the tensions between returnees and their local compatriots over high profile jobs as follows:

You know, there is always little tension that people think that some of us were not there during the civil war and some Liberians want to go back to take their jobs. These are little tensions but overall we run the economy. You know through MoneyGram and Western Union organizations, people have put money into the country to make sure that people will start to uplift themselves.[32]

In addition, while some US-based diaspora members are using their privileged positions to reduce tensions, mitigate and resolve conflicts, their efforts are not sustainable and should not be a substitute for the provision of long-term conflict resolution institutions throughout the whole of Liberia. This is because most diaspora members have permanent bases abroad and only come back to Liberia periodically. Also, most of the diaspora strategies for peace building seem to be ad hoc. Whatever influences the diaspora brings to bear on peace building and the overall benefits of their efforts each require institutional backing to be sustainable.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is another avenue where the US-based diaspora exercises soft power to promote peace building in Liberia. "Shaping public opinion becomes even more important where authoritarian governments have been replaced by new democracies."[33] A parallel can be drawn with Liberia, where the 2005 elections ushered in a new democratic dispensation after a long period of complete state collapse and anarchy. National platforms at important national events such as Independence Day celebrations offer an opportune forum for the US-based diaspora to help shape the national debate towards peace. This is because such occasions have a national character with high public participation that can be a mass communication gold mine. The occasion is also a unifying one devoid of partisanship or divisive ethnic and factional politics so it tends to attract a bipartisan audience. As a ritual in Liberia, during national occasions such as Independence Day, a national orator is chosen based on his/her accomplishments to deliver an inspirational national speech.

The speech is meant to address an important issue of concern that affects the country and acts as a call to action for the nation. For example, during the 160th independence anniversary, the national orator for the occasion was US-based Liberian Kimmie Weeks, a child advocate and founder of Youth Action International, who talked about the importance of education. A 2007 government press release reported that Mr. Weeks stressed in his address that the government should prioritize education and youth development. He also warned that Liberia's development goals will be in vain unless the government invested in development of the youth and admonished the government to come up with a National Educational Policy to address the educational needs of the country.[34] The views on education that Weeks championed on the independence anniversary occasion went a long way to persuade President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to introduce a free and compulsory primary education policy for Liberia.

Diaspora leaders such as Weeks, a successful international advocate and speaker on children's rights, have been described as "alternative" peacemakers.[35] This category also includes poets, writers, musicians, prominent scholars, and sports stars such as football players. They are chosen to speak during important occasions because "they have a moral authority and command public respect across ethnic, clan, and group lines and, above all, cannot be accused

of seeking political office. This innovative initiative is commendable and deserves to be more widely popularized."[36]

Diaspora Civic Engagement

The involvement of the Diaspora in the social and political dynamics of the homeland is not confined to the realm of politics. Indeed, some diaspora groups choose neutrality over political partisanship with regards to homeland conflicts and instead focus on domestic development through civil society. These diaspora groups sense a natural affinity with homeland civil society rather than the political class. As a result of this, diasporas bolster civil society's peace constituency in the homeland. The impact is felt at the sub-national, local, and village levels rather than national levels. Civic-minded diaspora groups believe that for viable peace to be attained in the homeland, there should also be a bottom-up approach that compliments a top-down approach as part of due diligence. They believe that peace building can only be effective if there is a linkage of national, sub-national local processes and initiatives with different strategic sites and actors. Hence, support is provided for local human rights organizations, women's associations, and sponsorship of civic-oriented programs.[37]

The US-based Liberian diaspora exercises soft power influence through civil engagement via local media assistance aimed at changing the attitudes of fellow Liberians towards peace building norms. This takes the form of diaspora media persons and their organizations offering professional training to their counterparts or providing funds and equipment for the establishment of radio stations. In doing so, the US-based diaspora is able to shape the agenda for broadcast and as the saying goes, "personnel is policy." Once the agenda is shaped, the content will also reflect peace building norms and values preferred by the diaspora and this goes a long way to shape the public debate and ultimately, public policy. A characteristic of these radio stations are that they de-emphasize political issues which have the tendency to polarize the society. Instead, the focus is on community empowerment and social issues such as human rights, democracy, corruption, and women's issues that all spheres of society can embrace. In other words, divisive political issues that could lead to tensions are avoided. Another characteristic is that these diaspora-assisted radio stations are community based and as such address issues that are of critical importance to peace building in a particular community thereby allowing for a well-targeted audience.

The US-based Tappita District Development Association (TADDA) has upgraded the Voice of Tappita (VOT, 89.9FM) from a 50-watt community radio station into a 500-watt station that has extensive coverage throughout central Liberia. The UN originally donated station to help with information during the 2005 elections. TADDA's assistance also included studio equipment such as computers, mixers, digital recorders, studio microphones, etc. In recognition of the radio station's overhaul and its increased utility in peace building, the government of the Netherlands selected Voice of Tapita as one of three local radio stations in Liberia for collaboration. As part of the benefits of this collaboration, three operators of the station were chosen to undergo further training in the Netherlands.[38]

With the US-based diaspora providing the funding for equipment and personnel of some FM stations and also educational materials, the latter is able to influence coverage on issues that promote peace building, provided the issues are deemed legitimate by the targeted audience. However, while technological advances have led to a "dramatic reduction in the cost of

processing and transmitting information" it has also led to the explosion of information creating what Nye dubs a "paradox of information."[39] He cautions that under this paradox, too much information can lead to a scarcity of attention. This is because people become over-saturated with information to the point where attention instead of information becomes the scarce resource. Thus "those who can distinguish valuable information from background clutter gain power."[40] The ability of the US-based Liberian diaspora to select the relevant peace building issues and policies for promotion that people can rally around goes a long way to enhance their soft power influence.

In conducting public diplomacy and advocacy, the diaspora should guard against the perception of pursuing a hidden agenda otherwise their messages risk being viewed as propaganda. Under such conditions their credibility and reputation as an attractive agent for change becomes tarnished. In many African countries such as Liberia, the state has a stranglehold on the broadcast media such as radio and television and oftentimes they serve as the official mouthpieces of the government devoid of any critical national debate. As a result of this, the public tends to be very skeptical about state media programming contents and seeks alternative sources of information. This is where diaspora-assisted media that is devoid of partisanship or parochialism can fill the void with credible peace building programs. Citing two RAND Corporation experts, Nye observes that in an information age, politics "may ultimately be about those whose story wins."[41]

Development/Job Creation Programs

Another avenue through which the US-based Liberian diaspora is exerting soft power influence towards peace building is direct development assistance and job creation avenues. This is essential with the high unemployment rate in Liberia particularly among the youth. Liberia's unemployment rate is currently estimated at 80 percent, slightly down from a 2003 high of 85 percent.[42] The country's unemployment rate also ranked 199 out of 200 countries. The government recognizes that a high unemployment rate poses a great security threat to the stability of the country and hence has launched a national poverty reduction plan to tackle the problem. President Johnson-Sirleaf has acknowledged the correlation between unemployment and violence by stressing that "one overarching aim of the poverty reduction plan is to enable the country to break away from its violent past."[43] In addition, the poverty alleviation plan also includes the rehabilitation of basic infrastructures, revitalizing the country's shattered economy, building a post-war security system to consolidate peace, and the provision of basic social services such as healthcare, road network, water, and electricity.[44]

For some diasporas, one of the most effective ways to peace in the homeland is through development. The rationale behind this approach is that most domestic conflicts are caused not only by power struggles at the national level but also by unequal distribution of the national resources, extreme social and economic imbalances, marginalization, and widespread poverty. Therefore it is imperative that all these conflict triggers be separately addressed. In this regard, diaspora groupings seek to address some of the economic causes of conflicts by making a positive contribution towards the reduction and stabilization of the social tensions of the downtrodden in society.[45]

This effort is undertaken at the local level through community and welfare projects set up by the diaspora. Diaspora-funded projects are targeted at rehabilitating health centers and

facilities, building schools, supporting rural farmers, and initiating income-generating activities for destitute and marginalized groups. Projects initiated by diaspora groupings are carried out through individual and collective efforts. For example, some individual diaspora members and groups within a diaspora community donate cash, materials, and needed equipment to various bodies and institutions in the homeland in order to help improve community facilities at the village and town levels. Not only do these efforts greatly contribute towards poverty alleviation among individuals through job creation but also provide much-needed services to the communities through the provision of basic public goods and service delivery.[46]

With all the post-war challenges faced by Liberia, it is obvious that the government cannot meet the challenge of job creation alone. As such, other non-governmental bodies such as the US-based Liberian diaspora have a role to play in creating job opportunities. It is in this arena of job creation that the US-based Liberian diaspora can exert soft power influence through its ability to marshal financial and material resources. The more jobs that are created by government and the diaspora, the higher the likelihood that the youth, some of whom are ex-combatants, will stay away from violent and criminal activities that are inimical to the peace. A president of one the Liberian diaspora county associations in Maryland points out that his organization has an ongoing project in Bong County aimed at rehabilitating former child-soldiers. Aiming to kill two birds with one stone via the provision of safe drinking water and employment, former child-soldiers have been hired to install water pumps in local communities in order to keep them engaged and out of trouble.

A leader of a ULAA breakaway faction also noted the job creation work of the Alumni Association of Konola Academy. This includes hiring and paying local artisans to work on the rehabilitation and maintenance of the school and providing school uniforms to encourage school enrollment. The group links job seekers to diaspora returnees in positions of authority for job assistance and relevant information about rehabilitation programs. In addition, the Konola Alumni Association has supplied farming equipment to promote local agriculture, which is a major source of employment for the community.

According to this leader, because there are several competing needs and demands from home, the Konola Academy Alumni Association only supports projects that have been initiated by the community. This is also aimed at reducing the dependency syndrome that can stifle innovation and also to promote a culture of self-help. A society that is striving towards self-sufficiency is more likely to be stable than one that is dependent on handouts. A self-help society is more likely to be motivated if it gets the extra assistance and encouragement being offered by the members of the US-based diaspora. The society will also be more amenable to persuasion and dialogue in the resolution of disputes instead of resorting to violence to settle disputes for fear of jeopardizing any future assistance from a major benefactor such as the diaspora. "Diaspora, in using the threat of withdrawal of support can potentially move the hard liners in the homeland to soften their views and opt for a negotiated settlement."[47]

The US-based diaspora is also exerting soft power influence in the areas of refugee resettlement by providing financial and material support towards reintegration into society. Such assistance minimizes the risk of returnees pursuing violence or a path of crime out of necessity. According to the Liberian Refugee and Resettlement Commission (2009), in the prior year 10,567 Liberian refugees were repatriated from West African refugee camps. The

breakdown of the number is as follows: Ghana (9,703), Nigeria (422), Guinea (170), Sierra Leone (230), Cote d'Ivoire (14), The Gambia (27) and Senegal (1). This number is made up of 9, 329 returnees from the organized voluntary repatriation program and 420 documented spontaneous returnees.[48]

Returning refugees face a myriad of problems. Most of them are vulnerable when they arrive with virtually nothing and face a tough time re-adjusting to life in Liberia after having lost family members and all their possessions. According to the Liberian Refugee and Resettlement Commission (2009), the Commission is raising funds in the form of loans and grants for the successful reintegration of both the skilled/unskilled and vulnerable people into their communities. The Commission is also training unskilled returnees in vocations that will enable them obtain employment or become self-employed. However, the Commission is seriously constrained by inadequate funding and resources. The ability of Liberia to effectively resettle and integrate its refugees will impact the security and stability of the country as desperation and destitution among returnees could lead to a spike in crime and violence.

Thus any support from the Liberian diaspora towards the resettlement and integration of returnees will go a long way in ensuring the stability and security of Liberia and thus guarantee peace. An example of US-based diaspora support for the resettlement of refuges has been demonstrated by Rev. Hananiah's Ministry of Hope in the Diaspora, which has provided returning refugees with basics such as water wells and education on water safety across the country. The US-based Liberian diaspora has also provided financial assistance towards the sponsorship of the education of returning refugees. For example, in 2008 the leadership of ULAA under then President Emmanuel S. Wettee instituted a US $5,000 Scholarship Fund to aid the education of needy but bright young refugees returning from Ghana. As of 2009, two students had received scholarships to attend technical colleges.[49]

The Tappita District Development Association (TADDA) is also heavily engaged in the rehabilitation of some basic amenities that were destroyed in the Tappita District of Nimba County. Nimba County was one of the places that experienced massive physical destruction in the course of the civil war. As part of its efforts, TADDA has rebuilt Tappeh Memorial High School, the only public high school in Lower Nimba County, which was burned down during the war. The rebuilt school has been equipped with a functional library and computer lab. The organization has also built the new Gblougeay Elementary School and the one in Towehtown.[50] Such diaspora development assistance goes a long way toward restoring normalcy to war-torn communities. This in turn attracts refugees to resettle whenever they hear such progress via word of mouth from trusted relatives and friends even in far away refugee camps.

The importance of providing educational opportunities in the resettlement and reintegration of refugees and former combatants as part of a peace building strategy cannot be under-estimated. According to a 1999 research by Collier "the presence of a high proportion of young men in a society also increases the risk of conflict, whereas the greater the educational endowment, the lower is the risk."[51] Thus, diaspora efforts at providing support for educational opportunities constitute a soft power that contributes immensely in minimizing the prospect of the renewal of war in Liberia. The same research also shows that an increased level of education significantly reduces the risk of war even with a higher population of young men: "Education is relatively more important than the proportion of young men. For example, if we double the

proportion of young men its effect can be offset by increasing the average educational endowment by around two months. Each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by around twenty percent."[52]

Diaspora assistance empowers people to use their maximum potential for self-development, abandon the past, and take control of their lives. Many diasporas pursue the aforementioned development projects in order to build peaceful constituencies and to promote a culture of good governance in their homelands. They therefore persuade donor partners and development organizations in their host countries to channel their development assistance in the homelands toward these goals. In so doing, the diaspora sets an alternative agenda for peace building. An alternative approach is a welcome development because good governance can only emerge in homelands if it is rooted in solid sub-national and local social institutions.[53]

Conclusion

The US-based Liberian diaspora is able to exercise soft power influence in aid of peace building by transforming some of its hard power assets, i.e. financial advantage from coercive activities such as war into persuasive ventures aimed at promoting peace. The US-based Liberian diaspora is a major source of attraction to their compatriots in Liberia because of the following: the attractiveness of diaspora success, morality of diaspora policies, attractiveness of US culture/norms/values, and the credibility and legitimacy of the US-based Liberian diaspora in the eyes of home-based Liberians. This soft power influence manifests itself via the combination of diaspora persuasion of fellow citizens towards liberal ideas that are backed by economic incentives aimed at making life bearable for fellow citizens in the homeland. However, not all US-based diaspora members will have an automatic capacity and credibility to effectively exercise soft power influence: history and track record matter. Thus moderate diaspora members who may have initially supported war but were considered less radical and later on promoted peace by advocating negotiation or moderate views are more likely to be effective at exercising the needed soft power influences for peace. Such people can lean on belligerents by citing their own transformation and experiences as role models.

Not all the soft power efforts of the diaspora are sustainable, however. For example, diaspora job creating efforts are directly linked to the state of the economy in the host country and with the US economy still recovering from a recession the diaspora is likely to be more cautionary in charitable giving and financial investments in the homeland. The most sustainable of diaspora soft power efforts are public diplomacy, interpersonal persuasion, and civic engagement involving the sharing of peace building norms either on the interpersonal level or via radio stations or public forums. This is mainly because they are less costly. While the reach of interpersonal prodding is limited as it involves a few people at a time, it is sustainable in the long run as it requires less financial cost. In addition, because a relationship is built in a micro setting between the purveyor of change and the receiver of change, mutual trust develops that helps in attitudinal change. Similarly, once radio stations are set up to provide public service awareness and to promote civil discourse, it becomes a community project with the community becoming responsible for its future sustainability through voluntary service or token financial donations. In addition, the interactive nature of most radio stations makes it possible for listeners and communities to build long standing relationships with those stations that can

empower moderate voices in the community. In terms of policy, there is the need for stakeholders in Liberia's post-conflict peace building to identify and institutionalize sustainable diaspora mechanisms for soft power influence in order to prevent a backslide to destructive hard power tendencies.

Notes

1   Wilson 2008, p. 114.
2   Nye 2006, p. 4.
3   Lubkemann 2008.
4   Nye 2008, p. 4.
5   Ibid., p. 11.
6   Bohorquez 2005.
7   BBC 2009.
8   http://www.usip.org/search/google_appliance/TRCs.
9   Zartman 2001, p. 8.
10   Schrodt, Yilmaz, and Gerner 2003.
11   Ikram 2003.
12   Nye 2004, p. 6.
13   Ibid., pp. 5-6.
14   Wells, accessed online on 29 April 2010.
15   Nye 2004, p. 90.
16   Ibid.
17   Ibid., p. 91.
18   Sheffer 2003, p. 74.
19   Whippmann 1999, p. 14.
20   Moran 1990, p. 2.
21   Author's interview with US-based Liberian diaspora leader, 2009.
22   Nye 2004, p. 107.
23   Yossi 1999.
24   Moran 1990.
25   Turner, 2008, p. 13.
26   Ibid.
27   Basar and Swain, p. 21.
28   Ibid., p. 22.
29   Author's taped interview with US-based Liberian diaspora leader, 2008.
30   Author's taped interview with US-based Liberian diaspora leader, 2008.
31   CNN 2003.
32   Author's interview with a US-based Liberian diaspora leader, 2009
33   Nye 2004, p. 105.
34   Weeks 2007.
35   Mahamoud 2005, p. 9.

36   Ibid., p. 19.
37   Ibid., pp. 7-8.
38   Tapita.org 2009.
39   Nye 2004, p. 106.
40   Ibid.
41   Ibid.
42   CIA 2003.
43   The Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) 2007.
44   Ibid.
45   Mahamoud 2005, p.10.
46   Ibid.
47   Baser and Swain 2008, p. 23.
48   Union of Liberian Associations in Americas (n.d.)
49   Ibid.
50   Tappita District Development Association (TADDA), 2009.
51   Collier 1999, p. 6.
52   Ibid.
53   Mahamoud 2005, p. 8.

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Sons of the Soil and Conquerors Who Came on Foot: The Historical Evolution of a West African Border Region

OLIVIER WALTHER

Abstract: This article discusses the historical evolution of Dendi, a border region now located across Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. Drawing on colonial literature and mythological accounts collected in the city of Gaya, the article shows that the two subgroups at the origin of the historical identity of Dendi were affected very differently by colonization and the independence of West African states. While Songhay chiefdoms managed to build alliances with colonial powers and have adapted to post-colonial political changes, Kyanga religious authorities have been progressively marginalized under the pressure of Islam, urban development, and the state administration. The article also shows that the historical distinction between first settlers and conquerors has been challenged since the 1980s by the arrival of businessmen from Niger and neighboring countries, which turned the Dendi into a regional economic crossroad. Some of these new immigrants have become important actors in the local urban market, challenging the distinction between the "sons of the soil" and the conquerors of aristocratic origin "who came on foot," which had long served to define the Dendi identity.

Introduction

Since colonial times West African socio-political systems have often been discussed in terms of binary societal oppositions between "indigenous people" and "conquerors," "first-comers" and "late-comers," "autochthones" and "immigrants," or "natives" and "strangers." These oppositions played a key role in the construction of identities of West African societies and remain highly significant in the control over land and building development, political privileges, labor, and taxes as well as in defining belonging in West Africa.[1] In Yatenga, for example, a strong opposition was documented between the Nyonyose indigenous people who were responsible for the religious cults with the spirits of the land and the Nakombse conquerors, who held political authority.[2] In the Borgu states of Benin and Nigeria, the socio-political system was also dominated by an alliance between the Baatombu autochthonous people and aristocratic conquerors.[3] A similar phenomenon was also observed in the

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Keleyadugu chiefdom in southern Mali, in the Mawri society in Niger, and in the Hombori Mountains in Mali where local power was divided between animist Dogon populations and aristocratic conquerors of Songhay origin.[4]

The Dendi region examined in this paper shares strong similarities with those case studies that have been documented in the historical and anthropological literature. In Dendi, conquerors coming from the declining Songhay empire of Gao supplanted the authority of local Kyanga chiefs. The former are said to have "come on foot" and are responsible for political authority. The latter are regarded as the "sons of the soil" and have long retained their religious power over animist cults, land administration, and natural resources. This division of function between Songhay and Kyanga subgroups, unified by a common language, is the basis of Dendi identity.

In contrast to other studies, what makes the Dendi interesting from a scholarly perspective, however, is the fact that the region was divided between French and English colonial powers in the early twentieth century and then by three nation-states in the early 1960s (Map 1). This permits an investigation of the historical evolution of the binary opposition between "autochthones" and "immigrants" when a historical frontier area is divided by different colonial rules and, later on, by a modern state border. As discussed in studies by Lentz, Miles, and Nugent, West African border regions offer interesting and original characteristics for the analysis of local political systems.[5] In such regions, the political border between states is added to the well-known social boundary between "autochthones" and "immigrants." Our paper explores two related questions. First, we wish to know whether the interaction of internal social stratification remained constant between warriors vs. religious subgroups even in the context of changing political boundaries. Second, we wish to examine how the relationship between autochthones and conquerors has been transformed over time by the arrival of more recent immigrants.

Using a corpus of colonial literature and mythological accounts referring to the foundation of the border city of Gaya (Niger), the article shows that the two subgroups at the origin of the Dendi were very differently affected by colonization and the independence of West African states. While Songhay chiefdoms have managed to build alliances with colonial powers and have adapted to post-colonial political changes, Kyanga religious authorities have been progressively marginalized under the pressure of Islam, urban development, and the state administration. The article also shows that the historical distinction between autochthones and conquerors has been challenged since the 1980s by the arrival of businessmen from elsewhere in Niger and neighboring countries. These new immigrants were strongly attracted by opportunities in the border region and turned the Dendi into a regional economic crossroad populated by vigorous trade diasporas. Some of the large entrepreneurs of the region have become important actors in the local urban market, challenging the distinction between Songhay and Kyanga, which had long served to define Dendi identity.

This article is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly present the main characteristics of the Dendi border region and discuss our methodology. In section three, we present the urban myths of foundation regarding the city of Gaya, in which the distinction between indigenous and conquerors took root in Dendi cultural consciousness. Sections four and five then presents some of the changes which occurred in colonial and post-colonial times

to both Songhay political authorities and Kyanga religious powers. In the final section, we conclude with a summary of our key findings.

Case Study and Methodology

The term "Dendi" means "down the river" in Songhay. It is used to refer to two different regions in West Africa: the southernmost historical province of the Songhay empire (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries), located downstream from the capital of Gao, and the contemporary border area intersected by the Niger River over 120 km between Niger, Benin, and Nigeria (Map 1).[6]

Map 1. Location of the Dendi Border Region

Cartography: the author, adapted from Dambo 2007.

The latter, which will be investigated in this paper, is populated by six main ethnic groups: Kyanga, Zarma, Songhay, Hausa, Baatombu, and Fulani.[7] The region was long situated on the fringe of pre-colonial socio-political entities, such as the Hausa states, the Songhay Empire, and the Borgu states and was not recognized as a major political or commercial center in pre-colonial times. Far from being an autonomous political entity, the Dendi was a peripheral set of cities and villages connected by a similar language known as Dendi. The region was also characterized by the dominance of aristocratic and warrior groups that emerged from the disintegration of the Songhay Empire over a Kyanga population responsible for traditional cults

and ownership of the land. The descendants of these two populations are still called Dendi today whatever their Nigerienne, Nigerian, or Beninese nationality.

The transformation of the Dendi from a periphery into a regional commercial center resulted from its strategic location on the border of three West African countries. Petty trade had been present since colonial times, but it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that the region emerged as a commercial hub specialized on regional agricultural products (rice, millet, maize), manufactured goods (second hand cars and clothes, cement, cigarettes), and oil. Such development was mainly due to alien traders, who established vigorous trade diasporas in the main cities of the Dendi. Previous studies show that the majority of Zarma, Hausa, and Igbo merchants that settled in the Dendi came from other regions in Niger and West African countries.[8] This pattern is comparable to that found in the northeast of Ghana or the north of Benin where commercial diasporas are also strongly attracted to border regions.[9] These merchants contributed to the growth and prominence of the three main border markets of the Dendi: Malanville (Benin), Kamba (Nigeria), and Gaya (Niger), whose evolution we investigate in depth in this article.

With an estimated population of 36,709 in 2010, Gaya is now composed of four old neighborhoods (Koyzey Kounda, Lawey, Sakabatama, and Badjeizey) that are controlled by the Songhay and two neighborhoods (Koussou Kourey and Sokondji) that are dominated by the Kyanga.[10] These six neighborhoods, which make up the old town of Gaya called

Map 2. The City of Gaya

Cartography: the author, adapted from Department of Geography 2006.

Dendikourey, are surrounded by the more recent developments of Kwara Tegui, Plateau, Carré, Acajou, and Wadata that have expanded around the old city of Gaya since the 1950s and that are populated by more recent immigrants from Niger and the surrounding countries (see Map 2 above).

The city of Gaya is an ideal case in which to study the interaction of internal social stratification and external influences because it combines both a strong chiefdom and a booming border market dominated by recent immigrants. In the neighboring city of Malanville, located across the River Niger, representatives from the former chiefdom have experienced difficulties in regaining their power in local politics despite a recent revival of traditional chieftaincies that followed the advent of democracy in the early 1990s. Consequently, this case is less instructive in examining the contemporary relevance of the binary opposition between first and late-comers. In the Nigerian city of Kamba, located fifteen miles east of Gaya, traditional chiefdoms are still influential, but the market has severely declined, due to the increase in customs checks, a state of insecurity marked with armed attacks, increasing petroleum product prices, and the implementation of Sharia law. As noted by Walther (2009), this situation has led to the departure of most of the foreign (Christian) traders from southern Nigeria, which also limits the utility of this case in examining contemporary economic elites arrangements with local authorities.

We draw on urban foundation myths which establish the boundaries between first-comers and late-comers to examine how binary oppositions could legitimize the respective positions of social groups and how they evolved over time. In doing so, we were interested in the various arguments used by local actors to support their own classification of the society. The myths were collected from different sources: We used colonial literature devoted to the cities located in Dendi and conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with fifteen different key informants from 2004 to 2005 selected on the basis of their genealogical and historical knowledge.[11] This included local community leaders (village, neighborhood and *canton* chiefs) as well as town elites, local historians, and teachers.[12]

Different versions of how Gaya was originally founded were collected from oral histories. In this article, we focus on the two main Kyanga and Songhay historical accounts, without trying to identify which is the more legitimate. Our interest is rather to establish the social and political consequences of the division between the two populations on the organization of the society. Particular attention was paid to ensuring the diversity of the sources of oral historical information, because foundation narratives very often hide the conflicts which take place between indigenous people and conquerors in West Africa.[13] The Dendi border region is certainly no exception in this, and we thus attempted to collect as many different versions of the same myths as possible in order to get beyond the standardized accounts that aim to preserve harmony vis-à-vis the outside world.

The Foundation of Gaya

Gaya was founded at the end of the eighteenth century by Kyanga and Songhay populations. The following sections present different versions of the foundation myth and discuss the opposition between the so-called "sons of the soil" and conquerors "who came on foot."

"There Were Only Wild Animals"—The Kyanga Version

Oral history indicates that the origin of the Kyanga population, which today occupies both banks of the River Niger, dates back to the battle of Badr in 624 AD in which the armies of the Prophet overcame a caravan of Quraysh pagans. Kyanga populations claim to have fled to Yemen and crossed the Red Sea before embarking on a long journey across the Sahara to their current location.[14] These elements of the myth, which are also reported in the Borgu region, contradict linguistic studies, which find that the Kyanga and other Mande family language groups are of West African origin in which the Kyanga/Busa group was the easternmost of all.[15] Nevertheless, such a mythological origin is an important element in the construction of the identity of the Kyanga who, in contrast to Songhay groups, cannot claim a Muslim origin but nevertheless wish to situate their history within a larger mythological framework.

For the Kyanga "Gaya" means "it shall last a long time." The oral tradition identifies three pivotal moments: the quest for the perfect location; the urban foundation; and the meeting with the Songhay. The story indicates that Kokoa Monzon, the founding ancestor, arrived at Dallassié, a village opposite the current city of Gaya. In Dallassié, the Kyanga came into conflict with Borgu people whose political entities were located around Bussa, Nikki, and Illo in contemporary Nigeria and Benin. Kokoa Monzon consulted his religious adviser, who told him: "This is what is going to happen: if you decide to stay here, you and your family will live, but

everyone else will die."[16] Unwilling to take such a risk, Kokoa Monzon decided to leave Dallassié and settled in front of Kombo, a small hill located close to the current Nigerien Customs Authorities. But Kombo was not safe, and the Kyanga were once again forced by the Borgu people to find another location. At this point, Kokoa Monzon confided in his own spirit and said: "Today is your day. Today, I will see if you are really powerful."[17] Having uttered these words, he noticed a large snake extended across the Niger River, which served as a bridge to help him and his people to cross the river.

Oral myths state that after several temporary settlements, the Kyanga reached Sokondji, one of the neighborhoods of contemporary Gaya. There, according to collected accounts, the Kyanga asked Lâta and Ouza, their two main protective spirits, whether the location was safe enough to build a new city and received a positive answer. Kokoa Monzon said: "Be a mother to me. I will suck your breast. Be a father to me, defend me and protect me from all things."[18] At the foot of a baobab tree located close to what is now the Koussou Kourey quarter, the religious leader (locally known as *gagna-koy*) responsible for traditional worship, the bountifulness of the harvest, and the ownership of the land, was inducted. At this point the stories collected state that the bush surrounding Koussou Kourey was inhabited only by "wild animals" emphasizing that the freshly-founded human settlement was the first. Very soon, however, the Kyanga were forced to come into contact with the Songhay, who also arrived in the region.

According to the Kyanga elders interviewed, the Songhay conqueror Samsou Béri chose to settle in Koyzey Kounda, one of the oldest parts of the city of Gaya, whose etymological meaning, is "the neighborhood of the king's sons" in Zarma-Songhay. The Kyanga remained in Sokondji and Koussou Kourey. Mythological accounts state that "the Kyanga and the Songhay were separated by a forest. They heard noise [coming from the other group] but they could not see each other at the beginning. Then, they finally met in the forest but were unable to understand each other. The Songhay waved their hands at the Kyanga, indicating that they were thirsty and wanted to drink some water. The Kyanga showed them the [Niger] river [our translation]."[19]

Later, the Kyanga and the Songhay agreed on the need to build a city wall to protect Gaya from slave raids conducted by the Fulani. At this time, the spirits of the earth warned the two groups that this construction would have important consequences: the man in charge of the construction of the wall would, they said, die after completing his work. The Songhay Samsou Béri refused to build the wall, which symbolized the foundation of the city and instead urged Kyanga chief Kokoa Monzon to take on the task. Despite the risk involved in building the wall, Kokoa Monzon accepted and designated Fara Monzon as his successor in a symbolic gesture of resignation to the military superiority of the Songhay.[20] When the city of Gaya was finally surrounded by its wall, the division of functions between the Songhay and the Kyanga was completed: the former would be responsible for political authority, and the latter would exercise religious authority. The Dendi identity would from now on be based primarily on the historical alliance between native and immigrant, these two groups being unified by a common language of Songhay origin.

### *"We Have Kept the Place"—The Songhay Perspective*

Songhay populations established themselves in the Dendi in several waves of settlement, the oldest dating back to the campaigns of Askia Muhammad from 1505 to 1517.[21] The second wave was linked to the fall of the Songhay Empire in 1591, and the third gave birth to the current Songhay chiefdoms of the region that probably left the region located between Ansongo and Niamey at the very beginning of the eighteenth century and reached Gaya after having followed the Niger River. Among them, the two brothers Daouda and Hanga—often considered as descendants of Askia Mohammed in local accounts—are regarded as the first Songhay immigrants. Daouda and Hanga are said to have founded the city of Tanda and Gaya before establishing themselves on both banks of the Niger River. Their descendants still rule the neighborhood and *canton* chiefdoms of Gaya.

The Songhay have their own narrative of the founding of the city, which differs significantly from that of the Kyanga. While the Kyanga claim that their ancestors established themselves in Gaya prior to the arrival of the Songhay, the descendants of the Songhay claim that the Kyanga had only temporarily occupied Gaya. Chief Ekoye (1985), former *canton* chief of Gaya from 1970 to 2011, tells the following story about the establishment of the Songhay: "El Hadj Hanga, founder of Dendi, left the Songhay [Empire] to settle in Garou (Benin). There, he married Tassa, Village Chief Dakou's daughter. Tassa gave birth to Samsou Béri and Hari Gani. When Dakou died, Dizi was designated as his successor. When Samsou grew up, he tried to overthrow Dizi and proclaim himself village chief. But his mother objected. Faced with opposition from his mother, he crossed the river to the left bank with a few disgruntled allies and founded the village of Tara [our translation]." After the founding of Tara, the story indicates that Samsou Béri looked for another site, which eventually became Gaya.

This story shares many similarities with the historical socio-political organization of Borgu, notably because in both regions the aristocracy allied with the indigenous people by marrying the village chief's daughter. Such an alliance had the advantage of ensuring some security for the indigenous leaders and allowed aristocrats to secure the support of traditional deities and a legitimate political sovereignty.[22] Furthermore, both regions have faced significant conflicts among members of the aristocracy, which in turn led to the migration of small groups of conquerors, who then increasingly imposed their cultural characteristics on indigenous peoples over whom they ruled.

When in Gaya, the Songhay apparently found a clearing and, after having consulted their religious advisors, said: "*ir na gayi nago*," Songhay for "we have kept this place." Chief Ekoye adds that when the Songhay arrived in Gaya, they found that the Kyanga were cultivating the area but had not founded a village. Kyanga populations lived on a river island for fear of Fulani raiders from the east. The encounter between the two groups occurred once the Kyanga were informed of the peaceful intentions of the Songhay. "Kyanga and Songhay met in a place after having pledged their word of honor, says Chief Ekoye. The Songhay then asked to see the village of the Kyanga, which did not exist at the time. They

Figure 1. Genealogy of the Songhay princes of Dendi

Askya Mohammed (Mamar Kassey)
1493-1528

6. Askya Issihak/Ishak II
1586-1591, 1592†

5. Askya Mohammed Bani
1586

4. Askya Mohammed III
1582-1586

3. Askya Daouda
1549-1582

2. Askya Mohammed II
1531-1537

1. Askya Moussa
1528-1531

Askya Nouhou,
1592-1599

Askya Mohammed-Sorko   Askya Moustapha   Askya Haroun-Dangataï
1612

Askya El Amine
1612-1619

Askya Daoud 1er
1630

Askya Ismaïla/Ismaël/Soumaïla
1635

Kabarchi Binta

Dakou Moribani
Garou

Fari Monzon

Moribani

Binga Farma
(Karma)

El Hadj Hanga   Tassa Dizi
Gaya   Garou   Garou

Harigani
Gaya, Tanda, Karimama
1779-1793

Samsou Béri
Tara, Gaya
1761-1779†

Daouda
1700

Koudarou
Tara

Zougara
Tara

Samsou Kaïna
Gaya
1793-1798†

Madi   Ganta   Oumarou   Souley Faram Maïgounia
Madécali Madécali Madécali

Wankoy   Samsou

MADECALI

Dendakoy   Baba Konguizé   Faram
Karimama   Karimama   Tanda

Bagni Aboroukou Gani Guirey Maïnassara Aliou Faram

KARIMAMA

Guiré Mokassa
Bagueyzey (Gaya)

Koda Makoni (Boumi)
1842-1845
/

Bassarou Missizé
1823-1842
Sakabatama (Gaya)

Koyzé Baba
1845-1864

Koyzé Baba Bari
1864-1865

Tomo
1805-1823
Lawey (Gaya)

Mougamou   Fodi Marounfa
? – 1798   1798-1805†
           Koyzey Kounda
           (Gaya)

Mallambou Koda Makoni
1905-1907

Bari Koda Guiré
1907-1919

Beïdou Bari Koda
1923-1929

Wankoye Tanda
1865-1866

Daouda
1882-1887

Igoumou
1901-1905

Bio Birma
1868-1882

Malam
1887-1901

Maïdanda
1919-1923

Ekoye Saka
1929-1960

Moussa Ekoye
1970-

Yantana Bagna Diarra
1962-1970

GAYA

Sources: Tilho 1911, Delafosse 1912, Perron 1924, Ardant du Picq 1931, Urvoy 1936, Périé and Sellier 1950 and author's enquiries, 2004-2005. The dates indicate the reigns. Names mentioned in the text are in bold type.

asked the Kyanga for permission to build a village [our translation]."[23]

Another Songhay version states that the city of Gaya was founded from the neighborhood of Lawey.[24] Stories collected in Gaya indicate that El Hadj Hanga, the Songhay ancestor who came to the border region in the eighteenth century, had several religious advisors who settled

with him in Tara. These religious advisors noticed smoke coming from the east, indicating that other people inhabited the area where the current city of Gaya is located. The Songhay went in that direction to try to get in touch with those unidentified people through a thick bush. When they found the burning fire El Hadj Hanga and his people saw an uninhabited clearing. The Kyanga had obviously left. Their own earth priests had indicated that another group of people was trying to get in touch with them. Over the following days a competition between the Kyanga and Songhay religious advisors took place, and after several unsuccessful attempts a meeting was organized between the two groups. On this occasion the question of why the Kyanga were not permanently settled in their clearing but had instead taken refuge on the islands of the river was raised; the Kyanga claimed, as in other oral accounts discussed so far, that they feared being enslaved by the Muslim Fulani.

The Colonial Period and the Rise of Nigerien Chiefdoms

After the foundation of Gaya the history of the Songhay princes of Gaya appears rather hectic and involves a large number of towns along the Niger River. Often rivalries of succession led to open or latent conflicts based on shifting and conflicting alliances.[25] During the two centuries preceding colonization the leadership of Gaya dominated political disputes. In 1798, for example, the chieftaincy passed to the descendants of the Songhay Samsou Béri, as described in the genealogy in Figure 1. The reigning princes of Gaya built on this genealogy to justify their exclusive right for the chieftaincy of the city against the descendants of Harigani and Samsou Kaïna, who also ruled Gaya from 1779 to 1798 and inhabit the nearby towns of Tanda and Tara. Again, this evolution presents interesting similarities with that of the Borgu states, which are marked by a strong tendency towards territorial division. This lack of centralization has been interpreted in the literature as a result of the elective system of succession, which induced conflict between brothers because all sons were eligible to succeed their father. This forced them to look for new villages to rule and cultivated a strong attachment of the *Wasangari* aristocracy to the values of honor and war.[26]

Starting in the late nineteenth century the British, French, and Germans worked to expand the dominion of their colonies of Nigeria, Dahomey and Togo, respectively. Over the course of several campaigns and settlements military outposts were established such that the territorial limits of English and French territories and those separating the French Soudan from Dahomey were finally fixed. In 1909 a permanent outpost was constructed at Gaya attaching the region decisively to the *Cercle* of Niamey, part of the Colony of Niger.

The colonial period radically changed power relationships in favor of the traditional chiefs eager to ally with the French and establish their own zone of influence. The local chiefdom of Dosso, for example, located north of Gaya, progressively became a regional power extending over the Zarma country through the skills of Aouta, the chief of the Zarma or Zarma-koy, who actively collaborated with the French.[27] The memory of this episode remained alive among the people of Gaya. As one elder reported: "Upon arrival of the White Men, the Zarmakoye destroyed the Tessa kingdom and other chiefdoms . . . . Finally, the whole district of Dosso belonged to him, whereas before the arrival of the whites, there were chiefs who had their portion of land and Dosso was only a village, which was controlled by rotation."[28] Locally, the privileges and spatial limitations of the chiefdoms were transformed according to the attitudes

of local elites vis-à-vis the French military. A new territorial division was introduced by the creation of the *cantons* (districts) and *quartiers* (neighborhoods) and their respective chiefs. As a consequence certain representatives of the Songhay gained significant power in terms of traditional chiefdoms. This division enabled the French commander to levy taxes and to mobilize local workers for forced labor.[29]

This fragmentation of political territory also sharpened the emerging hierarchy of chiefdoms within the Dendi.[30] For example, in Gaya the creation of *canton* chiefdoms in 1927 allowed the city chiefs to administratively control the affairs of the neighboring village of Tanda, which had comparable influence in the region during the pre-colonial period. The institutional inequality between the central *canton* and the villages increased as village boundaries outside of Niger grew by incorporating neighboring hamlets while those of the *canton* remained static.[31] One consequence of this manipulation of political territory was that the chiefs of important villages refused to allow the secession of hamlets located within their jurisdictions. If they did allow hamlets their independence it came at the price of a reduction of their territorial power and of their share of taxes collected from the village.

The socio-political evolution of the Kyanga followed a very different trajectory. In contrast to other West African regions such as the southwest of Burkina Faso, where territorial chiefs maintained their traditional authority, the power of the Kyanga chiefs progressively declined.[32] This occurred for two reasons. First, colonization contributed to reducing the influence of the chiefs of the land (*gagna-koy*) in subordinating them to the village or *canton* chiefs. The former did not have official status in the colonial political administration and were not permitted financial compensation, while the *canton* chiefs were granted the right to collect taxes on harvests and livestock in 1953. Secondly, the power of the chiefs of the land also declined as a consequence of the expansion of Islam, which contributed to the declining legitimacy of the traditional animist cults that sustained them. The Gaya region was well known for the Hausa *bori* cult that included special rituals, dances of spiritual possession, and a distinctive music as well as unique therapeutic practices. The cult was forbidden by the caliphate of Sokoto and by the British administration in Nigeria, but it continued to be practiced in the region of Birni N'Konni, Dogondoutchi, and in the Dendi.[33] In time *bori* practices were limited to individual and family observance before they become stigmatized as fetish by the expansion of Islam that affected every rung of society and in the rural areas of the Dendi region. The cult temporarily gained popularity following catastrophic events such as droughts or epidemics, but by the mid-1950s it had almost completely disappeared. The decline of animist cults profoundly affected the Kyanga who, in the process, lost their traditional privileges. By contrast, the traditional chiefdoms of the Songhay were legitimized by the colonial structures.

Since Independence

Following the independence of Niger in 1960 the religious authorities of the Kyanga became further marginalized and were replaced by different actors whereas the Songhay chiefs emerged as territorial administrators.

Songhay Chiefdoms and the State

In contrast to Benin where after independence in 1960 the Marxist regime of Mathieu Kérékou restricted the power of traditional chiefs, Nigerien traditional chiefs have retained their influence. [34] Thus, in Niger, traditional political leaders first became closer to the government of Diori Hamani (1960-1974), when the President found it necessary to consolidate national unity and fight the Sawabe Party, before gradually moving away from the regime because of its heavy taxation of rural populations. Later, President Seyni Kountché (1974-1987), himself from a noble Zarma family, showed a strong willingness to reform traditional chiefdoms so as to exert greater control over them. [35] Yet there never was a fundamental questioning of the chiefdom in Niger, perhaps because "as colonization, the ruling Nigerien bourgeoisie rely on the (reformed) traditional aristocracy and entrusted the aristocracy to 'hold firm' the rural areas and control the peasant masses [our translation]." [36]

In the ensuing decades the Nigerien chiefdoms adapted to political change. In some areas, such as land use, they become privileged interlocutors in land conflicts. They also benefited from reforms designed to align land use and agricultural administration that charged traditional chiefs with certain decisions about the use of land for development or cultivation by newcomers. [37] In other areas, such as urban governance, traditional chiefs were forced to redefine their prerogatives. Neighborhood chiefs and *canton* chiefs, in particular, have seen their influence diminish considerably in local affairs in urban areas. Chiefs look back with nostalgia on earlier years: "In this time, people made things easier for the chiefs. Today, only the duties and the title of chief remain. We the chiefs are obliged to work and we can no longer count on the chieftaincy to make a living." [38] Traditional authorities currently perform a mediation role in local affairs between households, or between state representatives and the decentralized municipality on one side and the citizens on the other side. State or municipal authorities, as well as numerous community committees set up by aid agencies, multiply the possibilities of action or protest and allow urban dwellers to circumvent traditional leaders and to air their grievances to official bodies, which are sometimes regarded as more legitimate than chiefdoms.

State representatives and the new mayors of urban agglomerations must engage with the traditional chiefs in order to prevent them from obstructing their agendas. Despite their waning official and traditional power in local affairs this relationship vis-à-vis state and local officials means that they remain important players in local politics. Similarly, even though the political decentralisation project of the 1990s has diluted the prominence of the traditional chiefdoms in according more responsibility to the locally elected officials of new municipalities it has simultaneously increased the capacity of chiefs to function as political impediments due to the persistence of statutory provisions that predate the reforms. The interesting relationship between the former *canton* chief of Gaya on one side and the current departmental prefect of Gaya and the mayor of Gaya on the other side illustrates the degree to which traditional chiefs have retained their customary functions as intermediaries and mediators. The *canton* chief of Gaya held office since 1970 and has remained an important local authority despite the accession of the prefect and the mayor. Drawing on his vast experience he has been able to maintain an interesting position relative to the prefect, whose assignment has evolved and powers eroded in the course of successive regime changes. Confronted with the transfer of some of his power to communal authorities, the prefect must also be careful to avoid affronting the traditional chief.

In this sense the chief has retained a certain, if informal, influence in neighborhood concerns, issues related to health, taxes, education, and conciliation.

The chief has also retained impressive influence relative to the mayor by affirming that his support is necessary to "communicate with the population" and to effectively collect taxes. Mayors must, therefore, take traditional structures into account in the expectation that they will then permit them to impose sufficient taxes to fund the urban improvement projects that, they hope, will secure their re-election. As the mayor of Gaya impatiently commented: "In the current situation I would prefer to focus on infrastructure investments first . . . to show the people that the local government is here and effective even if it's still quite new."[39] The mayor's relationship with traditional authorities is actually less conflicted than it would appear at first glance since decentralization did not significantly affect the balance of power at this level. A certain kinship exists between traditional and local government institutions in the same way that there is a strong bond between the new local and prefectural governments that are united under the banner of the National Movement for the Society of Development (MNSD)—the ruling party from 1989-1993 and from 1999-2010. This type of relationship is not isolated to the department of Gaya, where mayors have managed to balance local issues by positioning themselves as authorities that listen to the demands of their citizens and mediate between different neighborhood and village chiefs.

New Immigrants and the Marginalization of Kyanga Authorities

Since the 1980s, when Gaya first emerged as an international commercial center, the merchant elite have become more active in local real estate markets. These investors have been most interested in agricultural land that can be exploited with modern irrigation techniques situated in the Niger River Valley on the periphery of the city of Gaya. Recent studies have shown that real estate investments in the region have increased since the 2000 to the benefit of a small group of brokers responsible for 17 percent of agricultural land sales in the region between 2001 and 2008.[40] For new immigrants from other parts of Niger and neighboring countries acquiring land is one of the only ways to invest in agricultural production to the extent that they cannot rely on land gifts or inheritance.

The real estate investments of new immigrants have also focused on suburban areas, which allowed them to take part in real estate speculation that accompanied the urbanization of Gaya. At the time of Niger independence in 1960 Gaya had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants and occupied only the eastern area around the road to Benin (around the present site of Dendikourey). Internal growth and the influx of migrants encouraged by the trading opportunities close to the border subsequently reorganized the dense urban space of the neighborhood of Dendikourey. The explosion of residential growth initially occurred in the west in Kwara Tegui, the customary seat of the *canton* chief since 1957, and h   oused a significant population of migrants from the Dosso region. In response to an annual growth rate of over 5 percent the city embarked on massive residential development to the north—167ha for the neighborhood of Acajou, 21ha for Carré, and 44ha for the area known as Fara—in a total of over 257ha of subdivisions. This figure is in stark contrast to the original area of Dendikourey, which covered only 24ha, indicating that the area of subdivision development represented more than ten times the area of the historical center of Gaya.

These residential real estate developments, strongly colored by speculation and clientelism, did not generate revenue windfalls for the Kyanga. Kyanga property owners were able to purchase land (one lot per hectare or half a lot per group of ten bounded parcels) and settle in these new neighborhoods. However, in several instances agents appropriated their properties without adequate compensation under the pretext of developing public infrastructure (i.e. Koranic schools or high schools) to serve the expanding city.[41] These practices created grievances among Kyanga property holders whose agricultural land was losing value in the face of urban development. As one Gaya representative stated: "When you own a field you have less chance than one who wants to develop it and build a house. You can build a house on a field but you can't do the opposite. This means that everyone who owns a field near the city is sure that one day he's going to lose his land as the city expands."[42]

Traders became important actors in the urban real estate market as land speculators but also as developers of industrial areas for the warehouses that supported booming commerce. These investments served the traders based in Niger as well as their Nigerian counterparts based in Malanville, the neighboring city in Benin, who had also invested heavily in the development of Gaya in the 1990s.[43] In Gaya these property acquisitions served the thrift and illegal export trade to Nigeria that both required large scale storage capacity. In the space of several decades the massive real estate investments combined with increasing public investments transformed the urban fabric of the small city of Gaya but also affected the ancient balance of power between the Songhay and the Kyanga.

Conclusion

Founded in the second half of the eighteenth century jointly by the Kyanga and Songhay populations, the Dendi border region has long been structured around a binary opposition between "indigenous people," who used to be responsible for the traditional religion, and "conquerors," responsible for the political power, a common occurrence in West Africa. For the Kyanga, the narratives collected evoke a succession of key moments: forced migration with the spread of Islam, the search for the ideal location under the leadership of a founding hero, the attempts to establish contact with the newly-arrived Songhay conquerors, and the sharing of power which results from this encounter between the Kyanga religious leader and the Songhay political leader. For the Songhay, oral history emphasizes the important lineage linking the former *askias* of the Songhay Empire to the populations who rule today's village and *canton* chiefdoms, and the superiority of a highly hierarchical society over peasant chiefdoms. The foundation myths present two different historical justifications for this social structure. The Kyanga defined themselves as the first settlers of an estate whereas the Songhay, in contrast, claim permanent occupation of the region to justify their social seniority.

Since colonization, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the authority of traditional chiefdoms of the Songhay and the religious classes of the Kyanga has evolved along starkly different paths. Niger's independence was hardly a historical break for the Songhay chiefdoms, which managed to forge alliances with the colonial powers and develop a formal political status within the apparatus of the young Nigerien state. By contrast, the authority of Kyanga chiefs began to decline in the colonial period, and then disappeared completely in the second half of the twentieth century in both of their traditional domains. On the one hand this decline was a

result of the disappearance among all segments of society of animist cults and practices. On the other hand Kyanga authority was profoundly affected by its loss of control over natural resources and land use, which became the domain of the state (in the areas of water, forests, flora, and fauna) and the *canton* chiefs (resolution of land disputes and property tax collection).

In terms of recent external influences, the development of Gaya as a regional commercial center played an important role in the decline of Kyanga influence to the extent that the attractiveness of the city led to the development of massive subdivisions on their ancestral lands on the urban periphery. These developments certainly benefited local officials and the numerous merchants that established themselves in the region. These actors dabbled in profitable real estate speculation with the parallel goal of developing commercial properties to stock the goods from cross-border trade. The arrival of these "new immigrants" led to an historical decline of Kyanga influence over real estate and the consolidation of the Songhay chiefdoms and realigned the binary opposition that had, until recently, characterized the Dendi.

Notes

1   Kuba and Lentz 2006, pp. 1-30; Meillassoux 1971, p. 23; Lentz 2010.
2   Izard 1985, pp. 378-93; Izard 2003, p. 185.
3   Jones 1998; Lombard 1998; Brégand 1998, pp. 23-30; Kuba 1998.
4   Amselle 1990, p. 59; Piault 1971, p. 286; Walther 2006.
5   Lentz 2003; Miles 1987; 1994, pp. 42-51 and pp. 145-74; Nugent 2008.
6   Urvoy, 1936.
7   Bako-Arifari 1998; Dambo 2007.
8   Walther 2008, pp. 173-202; Walther 2009; 2012.
9   McKim 1972 ; Grätz 2004.
10 Demographic projection based on Africapolis, a harmonized database on urbanization in West Africa available at: http://e-geopolis.eu.
11 Tilho 1911, pp. 505-12; Delafosse 1912, pp. 238-52; Perron 1924; Ardant du Picq 1931, pp. 477-500; Urvoy, 1936 pp. 23-117; Périé and Sellier 1950.
12 See Walther 2008 for a more detailed description of the methodology; see also Walther 2011 for an earlier version of this paper published as a working paper.
13 Amselle 1990, p. 61.
14 Interview with M. Moumouni, notable, 06.12.05, Gaya.
15 For Borgu, see Kuba 1998 ; for the relevant linguistic studies, see Jones 1998.
16 Interview with A. Amadou and M. A. Diafago, notables, 25.11.04, Gaya.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Interview with A. Béri, A. Amadou and A.A. Diafago, notables, 23.11.04, Gaya.
20 Ibid.
21 Périé and Sellier 1950.
22 Kuba 1998.
23 Ekoye 1985.

24   Interviews with M. Gani, chief of Lawey, 20.11.04, and 06.10.05, Gaya.
25   Dambo 2007; Séré de Rivières 1965, pp. 79-83.
26   Lombard 1998.
27   Rothiot 1988, p. 11.
28   Interview with A. Na Argoungou, notable and former teacher, 22.11.04, Gaya.
29   Interview with Sambou Daouda, chief of Koyzey Kounda, 15.12.04, Gaya.
30   Bako-Arifari 1997, p. 5.
31   Ibid. 1997, p. 19.
32   Lentz 2006; Kuba 2006.
33   Pasian 2010; Masquelier 2009.
34   Jones 1998.
35   Abba 1990.
36   Olivier de Sardan 1984, p. 203.
37   Bako-Arifari 2002, p. 4.
38   Interview with M. Gani, chief of Lawey, 29.11.04, Gaya.
39   Interview with H. Dan Barro, mayor of Gaya, 04.09.05, Gaya.
40   Walther 2008, pp. 130-132; Cantoreggi et al. forthcoming; Jaubert et al. 2011.
41   Bako-Arifari 2002, p. 22.
42   Interview with A. Na Argoungou, notable and former teacher, 19.11.04, Gaya.
43   Bako-Arifari 2002, p. 21.

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The Challenges of Transnational Human Trafficking in West Africa

WILFRIED RELWENDE SAWADOGO

Abstract: A major challenge to good governance, transnational trafficking in human beings has been a serious problem for years in West Africa. Attempts to understand the phenomenon have then been initiated, which unfortunately have resulted in contradictory viewpoints amongst researchers and the impacted populations. Indeed, seen by some as a mere entertainment, a source of profit, or an abstract notion with no influence and no bearing upon their lives, transnational human trafficking is, in contrast, considered by others as a crucial preoccupation, a deadly reality that has drastically influenced their daily routines. Complex in its nature and forms, transnational human trafficking has raised deep divisions on issues of principles, theories, perceptions, and the strategy to address it; hence the necessity for domestic and international actors to pay serious attention on the phenomenon. My present work seeks to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon, its causes and consequences while trying to draw out suggestions and recommendations which could contribute to better strengthen the West African regional security framework. In a word, governance in West Africa needs to be transformed into an effective cooperative framework where enhancing the dignity of human beings and their rights becomes a priority.

Introduction

The majority of West African states, despite their huge and enviable natural resources, have failed to develop their economies. Empirical evidence demonstrates West Africa's peripheral role in the world economy. For example, West African countries have in common the lowest standards of living in the world. Eleven out of the fifteen members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are among the bottom thirty countries in the 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).[1] The conscientization of African people in general and West African population in particular has led to the creation and proliferation of regional entities to address the obstacles of African economic development. ECOWAS, founded by the Treaty of Lagos (1975), aims to promote the region's economy. To this, can be added the West African Monetary Union (or UEMOA, Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine), which is limited to eight mostly Francophone countries that employ the CFA franc as their common currency. The Liptako-Gourma Authority, composed of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, also seeks to jointly develop the contiguous areas of the three countries. All these regional organizations denote West African

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countries' ambition to unite and their eagerness domestically and regionally to fight common threats such as, among others, transnational crimes and their perverse consequences.

Despite being an old phenomenon, transnational crimes have recently taken complex, dramatic, shocking, and even deadly new dimensions with the wake of globalization. In much of Africa, globalization has ironically increased the power vacuum by empowering criminal networks so much that assaults on human dignity continue to increase proportionally to the growing globalization. Such a claim can be supported by the realist perspective according to which the weakening of state power has resulted in the empowering of criminal activities, because with the wake of globalization, political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer as relevant. The consequences thus of this new-old threat to West African society are as destructive as the 2004 tsunami that hit Southeast Asia and Hurricane Katrina (2005) that caused horrendous damages in the United States.[2] A serious threat to the international community and Africa in particular, transnational human trafficking has become a global industry.

The lack then of a real African perspective on the subject, the timeliness of the topic, and the exciting nature of the debate that surrounds this question in the contemporary globalizing world are the main reasons that drive us to explore the problem and negative influence of transnational human trafficking on the domestic and regional security framework in West Africa. To do so, this article examines from an African perspective the causes and consequences of transnational human trafficking in West African context (part one). Beyond such a theoretical and empirical approach, it will also attemt to figure out practical mechanisms that could help frame a viable regional security framework aimed at tackling transnational human trafficking in West Africa, a framework that could also be applied to other regions as well (part two).

Causes and Consequences of Transnational Human Trafficking in West Africa

The causes of transnational human trafficking in West Africa are multiple. But for the purpose of synthesis, we would like to organize our ideas around, on the one hand, the socio-economic causes and consequences and, on the other hand, the politico-institutional causes and consequences.

Socio-Economic Causes and Consequences of Transnational Human Trafficking in West Africa

West African economies are mainly based on the exploitation of natural resources. Mining and agricultural activities constitute the leading economic sectors of most West African countries. The fast growth of West African populations, the uncontrolled urbanization in the region, poor security, and economic hardships associated with wide inequalities in the distribution of wealth contribute to an increased salience of human trafficking as an available option to break out of poverty.[3] For example, trouble and violent unrest across West Africa in late March and beginning of April 2008 were undoubtedly potential factors leading to transnational and intercontinental human trafficking as a potential means for both traffickers and trafficked persons or victims to cope with surging food prices, bridge poor economic conditions, and overcome hunger.[4] As we have seen across the African continent and elsewhere in the world, the soaring prices of commodities remains a security risk since it destabilizes vulnerable governments and can therefore constrain people to behave even in contradiction with social

moral norms in order to break through their miserable conditions. By the same token, on April 22, 2008, the UN World Food Program (WFP) compared the escalating global food crisis to a "silent tsunami" due to the fact that it has threatened to plunge more than 100 million people into hunger and poverty.[5] The current growing economic crisis coupled with rising food prices will remain, without any doubt, fertile ground for transnational human trafficking in West Africa and Africa in general.

Besides poverty, West African cultural patterns fertilize the expansion of human smuggling. For example in the context of the extended family, tribal, and religious affiliation, children are often placed outside their biologic family with the objective of securing better education and working opportunities for them. Parents' ignorance of the risks involved in entrusting their child to other persons in this era of a greedy race for economic achievement associated with the desire of young people for emancipative adventure contribute inexorably to the growth of transnational trafficking in persons.[6] For instance in Africa, family solidarity is sometimes so over-valued that parents usually do not pay much attention on inquiring on the morality of the relatives to whom they entrust their children.

According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), backing the statistics of the International Labor Organization (ILO), around 200,000 to 300,000 children are trafficked each year for forced labor and sexual exploitation in West and Central Africa.[7] In addition, according to a 2001 survey on child labor in West and Central Africa, about 330,000 children were employed in the cocoa agricultural industry in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. Out of the 230,000 children working in Côte d'Ivoire, around 12,000 had no family connection to the cocoa farmer or any local farm in the country, and 2,500 were recruited by intermediaries in Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire.[8] An alarming reality is that girls are more frequently the victims of child trafficking than boys. Table 1 shows the empirical evidence from a 2003 study for Benin, Nigeria, and Togo.

Table 1: Gender and Age of Victims by Country

Gender	Benin*		Nigeria**		Togo***		Total
	Minor	Adult	Minor	Adult	Minor	Adult	
Male	85	37	3	1	2		128
Female	112	65	16	10	17	20	240
Age Gender Unknown	Age and gender unavailable for 18 victims				6 (+3 girls; age un- known)		24

* The Benin sample includes information on gender from the 284 (182 children and 102 adults) victims interviewed and the information contained in the 13 case files.
** The Nigerian sample includes information on 30 victims interviewed.
*** The Togo sample includes information on 45 victims obtained from case files. One of the case files involved 16 Nigerian girls and young women stopped in transit through Togo. They were being trafficked to The Netherlands and Italy for work in prostitution.
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006a.

In addition, in a study on child trafficking between Benin and Gabon, 86 percent of the 229 children interviewed were female, and more than 50 percent were under the age of sixteen.[9] Table 2 below corroborates our argument with empirical data from three West African countries (Benin, Nigeria, and Togo).

Table 2: Age of Victims

Age	Benin*	Nigeria**	Togo***	Total Number
0 – 5		2	-	2
6 – 10	1	11	5	17
11 – 15	9	6	11	26
16 – 18	5	-	9	14
19 – 20	-	-	10	10
21 – 25	-	-	7	7
26 – 30	-	-	2	2
30+	-	-	1	1
(Exact) information unavailable	18		3	21
Total	**33**	**19**	**48**	**100**

* Benin sample based on data gleaned from 13 case files; ** Nigeria sample based on interviews with 19 child victims; *** Togo sample based on data gleaned from 10 case files. Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006a.

Moreover, in transnational trafficking, as revealed by a research done under UNICEF sponsorship, followed by a field study published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo constitute the main countries from which child workers are exported to the main urban centers and agricultural sites of countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Nigeria, and Senegal.[10] As an example, Table 3 below shows a sample of Togolese recruitment regions and destination sites.[11]

Table 3: Togo Regions of Recruitment, Transit, and Destination Countries

Region	Locality	Transit Country/ City	Destination
Savanna	Dapaong, Cinkasse (Togo-Burkina Faso border)	Burkina Faso: Tenkodogo, Ouagadougou Ghana: Accra, Kumassi, Yendi Benin: Cotonou, Seme	Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Benin, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Persian Gulf States, Europe
Kara	Kara, Kabou, Kambole		
Centrale	Kemerida, Aledjo		
Plateau	Akebou		
Maritime	Lome		

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006a.

To illustrate our argument, the maps below show the itinerary and destination sites of transnational human trafficking victims from three West African countries (Maps 1, 2, and 3). Even though they display specific areas of recruitment, transit, and destination, it is worth noting that it is also common for a country to both supply and receive young boys, girls, and young women while also serving as a transit country. Children are most of the time trafficked for exploitation in the agricultural, fishing, and informal sectors, or for begging.[12] Most of them are exploited on cocoa farms in Côte d'Ivoire, the world's largest cocoa producer. The remaining children usually labor on farms in Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria. Another sad reality of transnational human trafficking in West Africa is that many young victims are employed neither in the primary nor in the informal sectors but on battlefields as soldiers known under the appellation of "children soldiers."[13] This was also the case in Cote d'Ivoire during a particularly the troubled period of the country from 2002 to 2010 as well as in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the wars in those countries.

Transnational Human Trafficking Routes in West Africa

Map 1. The Case of Benin **Map 2. The Case of Nigeria**

Map 3. The Case of Togo

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006a.

As human rights organizations have noted, after the end of the war in Liberia in 2003, 11,000 children aged thirteen to seventeen were demobilized under the UN-sponsored program.[14] The situation could even be worse, for according to Amnesty International, Liberian government and rebel forces alone recruited up to 21,000 children, sometimes as young as six years old, over the course of the civil war. With respect to Cote d'Ivoire, when the armed insurrection broke out in September 2002, money (around US $300 to $400), food, and clothing were offered to encourage children to fight on behalf of the Ivorian government.[15] The same situation held for the rebel camp as well, raising the total number of child soldiers in Cote d'Ivoire to thousands.[16]

The severity of transnational human trafficking is further aggravated by, among other things, the porosity of regional and continental boundaries and the shocking scope of this deadly reality. For instance, trafficked girls and young women are mainly destined for either domestic services or forced into prostitution in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States (refer to Maps 1, 2, 3 above). As a palpable example, Nigerian and Italian authorities estimate that there are 10,000 to 15,000 Nigerian prostitutes in Italy (See Table 4 below for further details on the global reach with regard to repatriated victims based on the single case of Nigeria).[17] And according to the US Department of State 2004 data, the Moroccan police arrested seventy Nigerian traffickers and rescued 1,460 Nigerian victims hidden by traffickers near Mount Gourougou, outside the Spanish enclave of the Autonomous City of Melilla.[18]

Traffickers of children are both women and men, and in many cases they are relatives of the victims who are animated by the deadly agenda of maximizing profit. Trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation or forced labor is one of the largest sources of revenue of organized human trafficking. And as a clandestine activity, transnational human trafficking is hard to measure. Nevertheless, in a typical child-trafficking scenario, as Antonio L. Mazzitelli has argued, "the recruiter may earn from $50 to $1,000 for a child delivered to the 'employer.' Profits vary according to the source country, destination and 'use' of the trafficked person."[19] By going a step further, Mazzitelli added, citing the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, "An African child taken to the United States might net a trafficker $10,000–20,000."[20] According to a July 2006 UNODC report, the business of smuggling migrants from Africa to Europe has a turnover in excess of $300 million per year.[21] Mazzitelli highlighted the situation by affirming: "A recruiter and transporter of a woman to Europe for commercial sexual exploitation spends approximately $2,000 to bribe appropriate officials, procure travel documents and safe houses, and transport the woman to a 'madam,' who pays approximately $12,000 for the victim."[22]

Although it is not clear how the above data were collected and calculated, the figures may even be higher since there is a crucial lack of reliable data due to various reasons such as, among others, the underground and illegal nature of human trafficking, the lack of anti-trafficking legislation in many African countries, the reluctance of the victims to report their experiences to the authorities, and the lack of a governmental priority given to data collection and research on the subject in West Africa and in Africa in general. To reverse the crucial lack of data collection systems, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2005 formally launched a "Program Data for Africa" with an initial duration of three years. Nevertheless the change expected still remains barely perceptible. With strict rational principles

aimed at minimizing risk and maximizing profit, traffickers, as argued by Mazzitelli, have diversified their portfolios in order to tactically mitigate risks and make difficult, if not impossible, the traceability of their criminal activities by law enforcement agencies at various levels.[23]

Table 4: Number of Repatriated Persons to Nigeria, 2001-2004

Country from which repatriated	Male	Female	Children	Total
Europe				
Italy	4	800		804
Spain		327		327
Netherlands	107	174		281
Ireland		6		6
Germany		2		2
Swizerland		2		2
Total Europe				**1422**
Africa				
Cote d'Ivoire	6			6
Republic of Benin	150	154		304
South Africa	13			13
Libya	13,150			13,150
Niger		6		6
Total Africa				**13,479**
USA				
USA	40	14		54
Total USA				**54**
Other				
Saudi Arabia	6,486	7260	281	14,027
Turkey	13			13
Thailand	237	55		292
Total Other				**14,332**
Total	**20,206**	**8,800**	**281**	**29,287**

Source: Nigeria Immigration Service, Anti-Human Trafficking Unit, Abuja, "Record of Deportations 2001 – 2004"[24]

In a word, human trafficking is an egregious and profound abuse of human rights. It maintains people in a state of dependence since it hinders the freedom of individuals, which is akin to modern-day slavery and thus a serious human rights violation. For example, the way trafficked people are treated on plantations in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana or in mines in Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, and Liberia reveals the extent to which human rights violations appear to be rampant in West Africa. To corroborate our claims with respect to Burkina Faso, one can take as example gold-rich localities such as Djibo and Kongoussi, where children, mainly young girls, are often trafficked for the purpose of profit-maximization.[25] Trafficking in persons appears to

be a particular form of violence against women and children. It deteriorates human relationships since it drives the trafficked persons from their families and regions, thus creating an atmosphere of social frustration and a negative influence on the dynamics of regional integration, thereby compromising the national and regional efforts of West African states to change the destiny of their societies.

Corruption and laundering of money, which are sometimes directly related to human trafficking activities, remain so far the most essential means by which criminals benefit from their illicitly acquired revenues and expand their activities and power. For instance, through corruption criminal operators can obtain protection from public officials, influence political decisions, and infiltrate legitimate businesses. Therefore, corruption and money laundering contribute to the maintenance and proliferation of transnational human trafficking activities in West Africa.

In sum, the transnational crimes in the form of trafficking or smuggling human beings are primarily and basically caused by limited economic alternatives, disparate socio-economic conditions, regional imbalances, feminization of poverty, discrimination against women, patriarchal socio-cultural structures, lack of social supports for single mothers, shortage of employment and professional opportunities, and the universal greed for money and power.[26] They are also facilitated, among others, by: cultural perversion (due to the influence of illicit activities from foreign nationals); illiteracy and partial literacy (due to the lack of an adequate educational environment); the lack of accurate information (due to a certain negligence from local authorities and communication channels); and the unregulated enticement and movement of human capital via use of the internet (due to an unregulated access to the internet that has encouraged cybercriminal activities), leading *ipso facto* to disastrous socio-economic instability.

Actually, human trafficking impedes legitimate economic activities (as the trafficked persons do not freely contribute to legitimate economic activities in their home countries), disorganizes the national economy (as human trafficking activities constitute an economic loss to the country of origin of the trafficked persons), and slows down foreign investment and its linked-advantages (as transnational human trafficking activities send a negative message to foreign investors with respect to the financial security risk that their investments may face in the host country which may have failed to tackle corruption and criminal activities or create a business-friendly environment). It increases the cost of doing business to both foreign and domestic investors by eroding West Africa's social and human capital, degrading the quality of life, and pushing skilled workers overseas due to the lack of opportunities. It also damages access to employment and educational opportunities, discourages the accumulation of assets, and encourages tax evasion (as criminal networks avoid paying taxes due to the illegal nature of their activities). It deters potential tourism (as tourists may be afraid of being themselves kidnapped as prostitutes and forced labor), displaces productive investments, and fosters consumption of imported items (as domestic industries remain disorganized due to transnational human trafficking having taken away many of the younger generations that would have played a central role in domestic economies as productive forces). In short, it diverts national and regional resources and drives business away from Africa, affecting *ipso facto* West Africa's financial sustainability.

Besides the above-mentioned socio-economic causes and consequences, it is worth noting that transnational human trafficking in West Africa to a certain extent is also caused and aggravated by the failure of domestic, regional, and international politico-institutional systems, which in return have a boomerang effect on state institutions. One must therefore be aware that the socio-economic causes and politico-institutional causes pointed out throughout this paper remain to a certain extent embedded in each other just like the two sides of a coin. So trying to separate them from one another appears to be a misleading enterprise. However, here the separation in two different sections is only for academic purposes and the search for better clarity. So the next paragraphs seek to analyze the impact and consequences of politics and state institutions on transnational human trafficking.

Politico-Institutional Causes and Consequences of Transnational Human Trafficking in West Africa

The false conception that national natural and financial resources belong to the individual(s) in power has led to a disregard for domestic and regional regulations and a trend towards the use of institutional prerogatives for private goals; hence the spread of corruption as an easy way to achieve extraordinary ambitions. Acting in the belief that the end justifies the means, an attitude of impunity has assumed horrendous proportions. Human traffickers in West Africa have gained more power and influence leading, *ipso facto* to a relative weakening of state power vis-à-vis globalizing criminal networks.[27] Traffickers were enjoying nearly complete immunity because until recently the vast majority of West African states did not consider trafficking in women and children a punishable offence. Most states, even now, have done little to integrate human rights concerns or strategies into their laws or policies relating to human trafficking or smuggling. With few exceptions, trafficking in human beings remains a relatively low priority among officials. So for criminal networks West Africa was a "haven" and still presents a comparative advantage in reducing risks and consequently maximizing profits via transnational trafficking in human beings.

The available literature from NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and scholars of global governance such as David Held and Anthony G. McGrew (2002) makes it obvious that the causes of transnational crimes can also be explained through certain theories of international relations. These include the political philosophy that promotes individual liberty and the free exchange of goods and market privatization that has in turn led to the illicit human trafficking for economic gain. For instance, linked to economic liberalization illicit human trafficking has taken a dramatic worldwide upturn and no more so than in West Africa. This in turn threatens the integrity of the region's countries and undermines their political stability. Furthermore, human trafficking inhibits the processes of democratization and development. It challenges state authority, threatens public order, and undermines the rule of law and citizens' confidence in government, which will be increasingly viewed as weak and lacking credibility. In addition, human trafficking weakens the social contract between people and state or regional institutions, and leads to tremendous national tragedies. It can even be a potential source for financing terrorist activities, giving *de facto* roots to political and institutional insecurity at the national, regional, and international levels.[28] In a word, it goes without saying that transnational human trafficking has a negative impact on West African

regional endeavors to promote and implement good governance, a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. Hence, the crucial need for a regional security framework to combat transnational human trafficking and which guarantees civilian safety and advances the national interests of West African countries.

A Security Building Framework for Combating Human Trafficking in West Africa

Responding to West African transnational human trafficking requires developing a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to tackle the phenomenon. No country or region is immune from such trafficking. The experience of West Africa and elsewhere clearly demonstrates that human trafficking can only be successfully resisted when those concerned work together; hence the necessity of the creation of appropriate cooperation mechanisms at the national, regional, and international levels to tackle this deadly phenomenon. West African efforts to combat transnational human trafficking have been accompanied by the efforts of diverse NGOs and inter-governmental organizations, whose contributions have helped lead to a West African strategy to set up a regional security framework.

Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

International, regional, and local NGOs have been at the forefront of efforts to combat transnational human trafficking and build a West African regional security environment. Most government officials are ill informed about the causes and consequences of this trafficking. They also are unaware of the appropriate rights-based approach to this issue. Therefore, NGOs, as the "conscience of government" and are representative of the civil society, usually bridge this gap by bringing in their expertise. Advocates for the development of human rights-based responses to transnational trafficking, NGOs traditionally show up in situations where governments have failed to take crucial initiatives.

Fear and distrust towards state-based organizations have led trafficked persons to give preference to NGOs. So NGOs have always been the first line of action, raising awareness, lobbying for change, and providing assistance. As an example for the very first time, a Lome-based NGO, WAO-Afrique, was able in April 1998 to bring together officials from Togo and Benin to discuss the problem of transnational child trafficking in the presence of representatives from NGOs and UNICEF. During the same year, a Beninese NGO called ESAM also investigated child trafficking from Benin to Gabon. A newspaper in Cote d'Ivoire in 1998 denounced the trafficking of children from Burkina Faso and Mali into Cote d'Ivoire. This denunciation led in September 2000 to the creation of a commission of inquiry aimed at curbing the phenomenon.

Nowadays, a panoply of NGOs such as Save the Children, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Union for Human Rights, Global Survival Network (GSN), the Foundation for Trafficking in Women, the Global Alliance against Traffic in Women (GATW), and the Human Rights Law Group, to only name a few, are very active in the West African region, and their contributions remain very crucial to the West African regional security building. For example, Save the Children has addressed the escalating threats to children, including gender-based violence and trafficking, in emergency situations resulting from severe economic and social disruption.[29]

The Dutch-based Foundation Against Trafficking in Women was created in the early 1980's in response to the then highly publicized issue of prostitution tourism, especially in the regions where mass tourism was becoming an alternative paradigm for development. It has worked worldwide to spread anti-violence programs and pro-rights campaigns to benefit vulnerable women. In 1993 it launched a campaign to develop an international lobby to review existing instruments to prevent and combat human trafficking, a campaign that has also generated benefits in West Africa.

The Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) was created to provide a critical analysis of counter-trafficking efforts and their implications for women as key players in social change and development. n 2007, GAATW published an in-depth study, "Collateral Damage," about the impact of anti-trafficking initiatives on the rights of trafficked persons and migrant workers. This study has covered eight countries, among them Nigeria, and spelled out recommendations on behalf of its members.[30] This has been a tangible contribution towards setting up regional and global strategic alliances against transnational human trafficking.

Despite their cultural, political, and geographical differences, NGOs have been able to provide services to West African victims and survivors of transnational human trafficking. For example, NGO support for trafficked people and other vulnerable groups often includes social and psychological assistance, shelter provision, financial, return, and reintegration assistance, advice and counseling, housing, vocational training, legal advice, and documentation assistance. However, NGOs remain powerless to protect a victim if s/he decides to testify in court, because witness protection is basically a state prerogative. Hence, the need of a real political will to accompany NGOs actions. Without such political will, NGOs can essentially only hope, as Marina Tzvetkova states, "to dress the wound with sticking plaster.[31]

Initiatives by Inter-Governmental Organizations

Various inter-governmental organizations have been created to promote directly or indirectly human rights. These include the various agencies of the United Nations. For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) focuses on the criminal justice element of crimes that include human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. In 1999, it proposed a "Global Program against Trafficking in Human Beings" that would focus on the role of organized crime groups in smuggling and trafficking and on the development of criminal justice-related responses.[32] In May 2011 it issued a report on organized crime's role in smuggling West African migrants into the EU.[33] The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states at the outset on its web site that "At a time when some 214 million people are on the move globally, the UN Human Rights office has identified migration as a priority and is working to identify the protection gaps in law, policy and practice that leave migrants vulnerable to abuse at international borders."[34] Also, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3, states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery and servitude; slavery and slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms."[35]

Other specialized UN agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are addressing trafficking in relation to their education, relief, and development work. It was particularly in 1998 that the issue of human trafficking began to receive the attention of international organizations starting with UNICEF which, in July 1998,

held a sub-regional workshop on "Trafficking in Child Domestic Workers, in particular Girls in Domestic Service in West and Central Africa."[36] The UN Center for International Crime Prevention, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank also stepped in by engaging themselves to work with ECOWAS to produce an ECOWAS Declaration and Plan Action against Trafficking in Persons in December 2001.[37] These international organizations have sponsored programs and helped local and regional organizations in West Africa. Unfortunately, there is a lack of coordination among them that has diverted their strategies and led to contradictory demands on governments and societies involved. Such a situation has hampered the efficacy of their actions.

The European Union (EU): Since 1996, the European Commission (EC) has taken a number of initiatives at the European level in order to assist West African countries' efforts to address transnational human trafficking. For instance, the EU has funded African regional collaboration to combat trafficking, especially of children, involving seven French-speaking countries in West and Central Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Mali and Togo).[38] The EU aid was disbursed mainly through the Italian NGO "Alisei" and with the help of the ILO. So the EU has been able to squeeze the potential of West African countries by having them pledge to expand their preventive capacity and harmonize their legislation against the trafficking of human beings. The EU has also funded awareness-raising campaign on child trafficking in Benin.[39] By deduction, then, the EU has helped establish an inter-regional network to fight human trafficking in West Africa.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM): The IOM has been active in conducting research on migration trends, including human trafficking in West Africa. It has provided technical cooperation on migration management and capacity building to West African countries through information dissemination for the prevention of irregular migration. It is currently playing a key role in assisting voluntary return of trafficked children in the ECOWAS zone. Moreover, the IOM has organized various international and inter-sessional workshops aimed at discussing migration policy issues, in order to explore and study policy issues of common interest and cooperate in addressing them. Its activities have also benefited West Africa throughout its programs dedicated to Africa in general and specifically to the West African region. For example, the IOM has taken a leading role, together with West African governments, to promote and enhance research and information dissemination, policy advice, capacity-building and technical cooperation, and project implementation with a goal of tackling West African socio-economic problems, major factors in the flourishing of transnational human trafficking.[40] IOM has also developed a resource book containing best practices, recommendations, and techniques for combatting child trafficking.[41]

The International Police Organization (Interpol): One of Interpol's priority crime areas is to provide its expertise toward ending human abuse and exploitation. Thus, it has worked globally to support police forces to counter the rise of transnational crimes. For instance, Interpol has produced many documents, held several conferences on trafficking, and is attempting to help co-ordinate transnational law enforcement efforts against trafficking in women and children. It has also offered its experience in the investigation of various offences against human beings such as transnational commercial exploitation of human beings. Interpol continues to be a valuable resource for law enforcement agencies.[42] However, it is significantly

underutilized in West Africa, and the need for Interpol services in West Africa should be better promoted. Interpol and has recently initiated steps to enhance its anti-trafficking work in West Africa. One example has been to organize an Advanced Trafficking in Human Beings Training Programme to focus on transnational trafficking. Workshops were held in 2009 and 2010.[43]

In sum, despite several incongruities, new laws have been implemented, international conferences hosted, new and existing conventions signed for the sake of alleviating, if not eliminating, transnational human trafficking in West Africa. In addition, the UN, the EU, and other IGOS have dedicated substantial resources to West Africa in order to develop more effective solutions to combat trafficking. Beyond such international support, however, it is worth stating that the resolution of West African problems lies in the hands of West African leaders and people. Therefore it is imperative that West African states and Africa as a whole unite to address transnational human trafficking on the continent. This requires political will, a strong engagement, and commitment as well as regional and national unity. Confronted with the problem of scarce resources, regional and continental cooperation could help alleviate human capital, economic, infrastructural and other resource shortages to set up a workable and results-oriented cooperation framework. An important element is for West African states to overcome their differences by defining shared objectives through a mutual understanding that the common denominator underlying all their efforts is the protection of the victims of trafficking and the punishment of its perpetrators.

TABLE 5: Overview of the Organizational Personnel Interviewed

Individuals Interviewed	Number
Public Administration (Provincial, District, City, and Social Services)	69
Security and Defense Forces (Police, Gendarmerie, Customs)	45
Justice	19
Entrepreneurs, Businessmen	31
Financial Institutions, Tax, or Fiscal Services	40
Insurance Companies	4
Information Technology	6
Media	22
Grassroots Associations, Organizations	38
Other Sectors	6
Total	280

Source: "Promotion au Burkina Faso des Principes de la Gouvernance Internationale en Matière de Criminalité Transnationale," final document of the field research undertaken by the Ouagadougou Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations (IDRI) in August 2005, p. 9.

Efforts must be made to raise domestic and regional awareness on the reality and deadly consequences of human trafficking in domestic, regional, and international frameworks. For example, the Burkina Faso Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the sponsorship of the European Union conducted research on trans-frontier criminality in August 2005, a project in which this author participated.[44] Such field research can make an important contribution to the fight

against transnational human trafficking. Indeed, throughout this fieldwork, we collected information and disseminated information on the dangers of transnational criminality in Burkina Faso and similar developing societies. The research project covered the major cities of Burkina Faso. A questionnaire was addressed to a number of specific important public and private local entities in order to measure their awareness of the phenomenon (Table 5 above). Its objective was broader than just the issue of human trafficking, for it also included questions on drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, economic infractions (money laundering), and the phenomenon of cyber criminality (See Tables 6 and 7 for further details). These tables highlight the degree to which local officials and other notables knew or had heard about the phenomenon

TABLE 6: Answers to Research Questionnaire by Category

Infractions and Level of Knowledge		Individuals Interviewed			
		Gendarmerie	Police	Customs	Justice
Human Trafficking	Known	7	15	2	13
	Unknown	3	4	5	3
	No Comments	4	1	4	2
Drug Trafficking	Known	12	19	10	17
	Unknown		1	1	
	No Comments	2			
Arms Trafficking	Known	12	16	7	17
	Unknown		1	1	
	No Comments	2	3	3	
Economic Infractions	Known	x	x	x	17
	Unknown	x	x	x	
	No Comments	x	x	x	
Cyber Criminality	Known		3		16
	Unknowns		1	1	
	No Comments	14	16	10	1

Source: "Promotion au Burkina Faso des Principes de la Gouvernance Internationale en matière de Criminalité Transnationale," final document of the field research undertaken by the Ouagadougou Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations (IDRI) in August 2005, p. 31.

of transnational crimes in their country. There were three categories of answers:
- Known: for those who have clearly said that they have heard and know about the phenomenon of transnational crimes in Burkina Faso and its neighboring countries.

- Unknown: for those who have clearly expressed their opinion by saying that they do not know about the phenomenon of transnational crimes in Burkina Faso and its neighboring countries.
- No comment: for those who have categorically refused to provide any clear answer by saying that they do not have any comments on the phenomenon of transnational crimes in Burkina Faso and its neighboring countries.

TABLE 7: Answers (by Percentage) to Research Questionnaire by Category

Infractions and Level of Knowledge		Individuals Interviewed			
		Gendarmerie	Police	Customs	Justice
Human Trafficking	Known	50	75	18.18	70.59
	Unknown	21.43	20	45.45	17.68
	No Comments	28.57	5	36.36	11.76
Drug Trafficking	Known	85.71	95	90.90	100
	Unknown		5	9.09	
	No Comments	14.28			
Arms Trafficking	Known	85.71	80	63.63	100
	Unknown		5	9.09	
	No Comments	14.28	15	27.27	
Economic Infractions	Known	x	x	x	100
	Unknown	x	x	x	
	No Comments	x	x	x	
Cyber Criminality	Known		15		94.12
	Unknowns		5	9.09	
	No Comments	100	80	90.90	5.88

Source: "Promotion au Burkina Faso des Principes de la Gouvernance Internationale en matière de Criminalité Transnationale," final document of the field research undertaken by the Ouagadougou Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations (IDRI) in August 2005, p. 32.

The findings of our field research have had a positive influence with regard to policy changes and concrete steps that have been undertaken to tackle transnational human trafficking both in Burkina Faso and in the West African region in general. Our research has contributed to identifying the main actors involved in the fight against transnational crimes, measuring the scope of the phenomenon in Burkina Faso, and finally making proposals for national and regional capacity building to combat transnational crimes. Our enterprise has also contributed to an assessment of the judicial and institutional mechanisms put in place to address transnational organized crimes in the country. The follow-up on our findings has contributed to

raising rural and urban authorities' awareness of the phenomenon. This has spilled over to the central government, which in turn has begun taking initiatives to consolidate democratic principles defined in terms of human rights promotion and good governance implementation with respect to transnational trafficking in human beings. Based upon the study's recommendations, concrete actions have then been taken at regional level to strengthen transnational controls. This led to the establishment of the joint Ghana-Burkina Faso and Benin-Burkina Faso border commissions, thus helping promote regional stability and the security of the populace of these countries.

Conclusion

Highly complex by nature and interlocked with other phenomena such as globalization trafficking in human beings in West Africa is a crucial issue that constitutes a recent challenge to good governance for the entire region. Addressing the phenomenon requires a sharper strategy and an intelligent implementation of theoretical and practical solutions. The starting point is for West Africa governments to understand and objectively accept the existence of the phenomenon as a serious regional and international problem instead of somehow naively denying it.

The only viable option for eradicating human trafficking in the foreseeable future is to fully cooperate and pool West African human and material resources in order to expand regional capacity and to form robust strategic alliances against crime and trafficking. This requires creating and strengthening a West African border security management entity (or entities) with joint regional capacity-building mechanisms based upon common training and exercises. On this specific point, West African authorities have already established joint border controls such as the joint border posts initiatives between Ghana and Burkina Faso, Benin and Burkina Faso, and Mali and Burkina Faso. These initiatives `contribute to the better regulation of transnational movements, enhance regional border security, and strengthen West African initiatives to fight transnational human trafficking.

Combatting transnational human trafficking also requires the strengthening and universal ratification of anti-trafficking protocols such as the UN Anti-trafficking Protocol (which has been ratified by thirteen out of the fifteen West African countries), and the unification of regional and international institutional frameworks, for coordination and strategic monitoring remain indispensable in the fight against transnational crimes, including of human trafficking. The fight against transnational human trafficking, however, will remain ineffective if regional legislation and judicial systems are not properly harmonized to

effectively respond to the lack of mechanisms for the expedient extradition and readmission agreements with countries of origin. To this can be added the necessity of exchanging crucial intelligence, expertise, and security information between and among West African states.

In addition, a successful strategy against transnational human trafficking requires both the implementation of projects to fight human trafficking at local, regional, and international levels and the enhancement of public awareness through programs aimed at sensitizing local and regional populations about the problem. Furthermore, it is necessary that regional and international actors maintain an accessible regional data bank that will also be a reference

source for future generations. Actually, the absence of reliable information and data collection techniques and effort contributes to the limited attention devoted to resolving human trafficking. It may also hamper the proper development of targeted technical assistance. This situation may then negatively impact the overall development of West African countries and all efforts by African governments and the international community to reverse the situation. Finally, the findings of our research should not be regarded as absolute and may require different approaches, dependent on time and place.[45] Hence the necessity of ongoing research to define the sectors of priority related to transnational trafficking in human beings.

Notes

1 For further details UNDP 2011.
2 Ibid.
3 Africa is registering the fastest population growth in the world. See, for instance, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an-overcrowded-planet.html?_r=1.
4 Countries such as Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritania, Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone have seen violent unrest due in part to food making up a disproportionately large share of household spending and imports.
5 *Taipei Times* 2008.
6 The shift is nearly always from more economically disadvantaged areas (and countries) to those more economically secure (urban areas and more developed countries, but also rural areas offering seasonal job opportunities).
7 UNICEF 2001.
8 IITA 2002.
9 For further details please see: http://www.dol.gov/ilat/media/reports/iclp/cocoafindings.pdf (Accessed January 21, 2008).
10 UNICEF 2004.
11 UNODC 2006c.
12 Regarding begging children, see for further details Lagunju and Diop 2006.
13 There are many conflict areas in West Africa. As examples, we can cite Cote d'Ivoire 2002-2011, Niger and Mali with the longstanding issue of the Touareg who have been claiming more consideration from the Malian and Nigerian governments. In the aftermath of Qaddafi's overthrow and death in 2011, the flow of arms and return of Toureg mercenaries from Libya, organized as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), has led to their March 2012 seizure of the northeastern two-thirds of Mali in the aftermath of the army coup that overthrew that country's civilian government. On April 6, 2012, the MNLA declared the area independent from Mali (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437). Niger has taken steps against Touraeg leaders to try and forestall a similar outcome (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17462107). In other countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the question of "child soldiers" is not yet fully resolved and thus continues to constitute a crucial problem in their democratic transition.
14 Human Rights Watch 2005.
15 Ibid.

16   UNICEF 2007. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/cotedivoire_39645.html (accessed November 25, 2011).

17   For further details and research, see also UNICRU 2004.

18   US Department of State 2005.

19   Mazzitelli 2007, p. 1079.

20   Ibid., p. 1079.

21   UNODC 2006b.

22   Mazzitelli 2007, p. 1079.

23   By the term "at any levels" I mean domestically, regionally, and internationally as regards the worldwide reach of international organizations in the fight against transnational crimes such as Interpol.

24   The relatively high number of Nigerians being sent to Saudi Arabia can first of all be explained by the politico-diplomatic proximity between the two countries that facilitates movement between the two countries. For example, former President Umary Yar'Adua was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia for his ill health instead of in Europe or the US as is usually the case for African leaders when they are seriously ill. Nigerians perceive Saudi Arabia as a country full of opportunities, which leads for a growing number of them to seek to immigrate at any cost, even illegally, to this imagined "Eldorado." According Nwogu (2006, p. 32), "Nigerians constitute the largest population in a growing flow of migrants from developing countries" to industrialized countries. Some emigrate from their own free will and others have been trafficked. This also helps explains the large number Nigerians in Saudi Arabia.

25   *Le Pays* 2011. 28 November. For further details see: http://www.lepays.bf/?TRAFIC-DES-ENFANTS (accessed December 27, 2011).

26   In principle, the term "human smuggling" is distinct from "trafficking in persons." In the case of human smuggling, migrants pay to cross international borders because of their lack of adequate formal travel documents or prior approval to enter the destination country. But in the case of trafficking in human beings, only the traffickers find their subterfuges to cross the borders with the trafficked person(s). Basically, it is this link between the transport of migrants and the purpose of the transport that differentiates "trafficking" from "smuggling."

27   Realists such as Robert Gilpin (2002) have claimed that the weakening of state power has resulted in the empowering of criminal activities, because in the wake of globalization political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant.

28   Many experts maintain that terrorists are increasingly funding themselves through crime. They have been linked with criminal groups in money laundering, counterfeiting, use of children as soldiers and "kamikazes," and other activities. For a comparative case it is interesting to note Wagley's (2006, p. 3) citation of US Treasury Assistant Secretary Juan Zarata's press release of February 1 that noted that funding for the March 2003 Madrid train attacks came the illicit drug trafficking. Wagley also cited Lal (2005) reporting that

"the Dubai-based Indian mobster Aftab Ansari . . . is believed to have helped fund the September 11 attacks with ransom money earned from kidnapping."

29   Save the Children 2005. Save the Children is a leading international organization that was founded in London, England in 1919.

30   As already noted (Nwogu, 2006) Nigerians the largest flow of migrants from developing countries to industrialized countries in Europe and elsewhere. For further details see GAATW 2007.

31   Tzvetkova 2005.

32   UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 1999. This office was established in 1997 and renamed the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 2002.

33   See UNDOC 2011.

34   See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx. Joy Ngozi Ezeilo of Nigeria serves as the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons with a particular focus on women and children (2008-2011).

35   For the UNDR see http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a3.

36   Jordan 2005.

37   The Meeting of ECOWAS Heads of States, in December 2001, adopted a Declaration and the ECOWAS Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2002-2003). It directed the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat to prepare proposals for controlling trafficking in persons in the sub-region, with special consideration to the situation of trafficked children.

38   For further details please see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/traffic/index.htm (accessed November 25, 2011).

39   For a US official cable assessing Benin and EU efforts, see http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07COTONOU912.

40   The IOM has worked since 1997 to counter trafficking in persons with some 500 projects in 85 countries. Its Counter Trafficking Division has also developed the "IOM Human Trafficking Database." ww.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/.../iom_ctm_database..pdf.

41   For the IOM resource book, see www.iom.int/jahi.

42   For an overview of Interpol's efforts, see http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/Trafficking-in-human-beings.

43   For more on the workshops, see http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2010/N20100414.

44   This research has been conducted in Burkina Faso during fifty days (from 25 July to 15 September 2005).

45   What is urgent in Burkina Faso may not be the same in Ghana. Also what was a priority for the 2005 research project might not have the same importance in 2012.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

Gail M. Gerhart and Clive L. Glaser. *From Protest to Challenge.* **Volume 6.** *A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990, Challenge and Victory 1980-1990.* **Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2010. xxxiv, 778 pp.**

Struggles over memory are commonplace in contemporary South Africa. The 1980s are an especially contested part of its past. That decade witnessed a mass resurgence of popular struggles that picked up a thread of civil opposition going back to the 1976 Soweto uprising. From outside South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) stepped up its armed struggle and sanctions campaigns; inside the country the United Democratic Front (UDF)—a loose federation of women's, youth, and civic organizations founded in 1983 in Cape Town as a response to tepid government reforms—coordinated rent, service, and consumer boycotts; and a new national trade union federation privileged political struggle. The state responded with more "reforms," states of emergency, proxy wars, assassinations, and mass detentions.

Today legal apartheid is a distant memory for most South Africans. The reasons are multiple: a youthful society because of poverty and, more recently, an AIDS pandemic; preoccupations with consumption and class mobility; and a rush to forget on the part of most whites. For the most part the ANC's current behavior—associated with corruption, cronyism, and personalism—is presented as an extension of how the ANC and other opposition groups operated throughout the 1980s.

This revisionism is contested, however, by ANC and other struggle figures. The poet-politician Jeremy Cronin has decried such "revisionism" (Cronin 2003). He denies that the history of the ANC's armed wing can be reduced to what happened at "Quatro detention camp" where ANC generals executed dissident members, or that the legacy of township self-defense units that defended communities against a "bitter apartheid-launched low intensity conflict strategy" can be downgraded to a story of "indiscipline." Apartheid-era struggles over education similarly cannot reduced to a call for "No education before liberation," a slogan that "was roundly condemned by both the ANC and the UDF at the time."

Cronin may be right that such revisionism pervades popular culture. Fortunately, however, the data about the "real thing" is out there. Documentation of struggle history (and of the extent of oppression and its legacies) is increasingly available in and outside South Africa, particularly online. Think, for example, of Padriag O'Malley's 2007 biography of Mandela's Robben Island colleague Mac Maharaj (the book comes with an online database of interviews and commentaries); or the website sahistory.org.za with its short essays, biographical sketches, scanned books, and copious references maintained by photographer Omar Badsha in Cape Town. Similarly, I can recommend Overcoming Apartheid (overcomingapartheid.msu.edu), an online compendium of video interviews, rare photographs, and historical documents. (There, for example, I saw a former colleague, Shepi Mati, recall his activist roots in the Eastern Cape.)

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The progenitor of all these is the *From Protest to Challenge* series, the invaluable multivolume collection of documents from South Africa's liberation struggle, of which the sixth and final volume recently appeared. It's worth recalling the history of the series. Tom Karis, an American diplomat, had been an observer at the treason trial of 156 opposition leaders from 1956 to 1961 and had befriended one of the defense lawyers, George Bizos. A few years after the trial ended, Bizos gave Karis, now an academic, a set of the thousands of documents collected by the state to use as evidence in the trial. Karis, now working with another academic, political scientist Gwendolen Carter, also obtained a set of the trial transcript. In 1965, the Hoover Institute decided to publish some of the trial, to be selected and introduced with historical essays by Karis and Carter.

Originally Karis and Carter had planned to publish a single volume with an introductory text and a biographical appendix. This proved insufficient, and eventually they produced four volumes spanning the period 1882-1964. Volume one covered the period 1882 to 1934, volume two 1935 to 1952, and volume three (which was banned in South Africa) 1953 to the 1964 Rivonia trial. Volume four was a series of short biographical sketches of resistance personalities. Karis wrote the texts of volumes two, and together with Gail Gerhart, the texts of volumes three and four; Sheridan Johns III authored the text of volume one. Carter provided editorial oversight. All are or were American political scientists. These books, published in the 1970s, are now out of print, but revised editions are currently in preparation by Gerhart. After a long hiatus during which the South African government denied them visas for many years, Karis and Gerhart resumed the series in 1997 with a fifth volume that examined the period 1964-1979. Volume six, edited by Gerhart and Clive Glaser, a historian at the University of the Witswatersrand in Johannesburg—and the first South African to be a co-author in the series—focuses on the 1980s.

Like the previous volumes, number six consists of introductory text plus primary documents. The text chapters are broken up thematically and historically, with sections on "reform and repression in the era of P. W. Botha," the securocrat president whose regime and response to the lingering political and economic crises came to define the decade; the wide spectrum of internal protest politics; exile and underground politics; and, finally, the secret early phase of political negotiations. Part Two, the bulk of the book, consists of primary documents organized to parallel the essays in Part One. The book ends with a bibliography and a detailed index.

As with previous volumes of this series, the essays in Part One are well researched, clearly written and concise, providing useful context for the selected mix of organizational minutes, reports, letters, statements, pamphlets, interviews with struggle leaders, and other documents that follow. Part Two opens with Percy Qoboza's March 1980 speech at Wits University calling for the release of Nelson Mandela and closes with Mandela's speech from the balcony of the Cape Town City Hall to a crowd of thousands on February 11, 1990, the day he was released after serving twenty-seven years in prison. The 180 documents in between offer stark evidence of police brutality, executions, forced removals, and multiple states of emergency. But we also get a sense of how resistance movements sought to define their own struggles. The documents also reveal the ideological and strategic contests that presaged the revisionist debates of today.

Protest politics in the 1980s were dominated by piecemeal government reforms that included new local government structures for Africans and separate and unequal parliamentary legislatures for coloureds and Indians at the national level alongside the whites-only legislature.

The latter institution, of course, held real power. Documents of religious, sports, labor, and community organizations show that instead of dividing resistance, these reforms served to galvanize and unite opposition to the state. Though localized concerns drove the UDF, these struggles were always linked to an overarching opposition to apartheid, and in some senses, to the negative effects of an exploitive capitalist production system.

We also see evidence of the ANC's work to win the propaganda war in Europe and the United States. For example, Gerhart and Glaser include a transcript of a meeting at Britain's House of Commons in October 1985 at which Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki respond to hostile questions from British MPs. In one exchange MP Ivan Lawrence lists a number of instances of ANC bombings in public places and assassinations of security policemen, community councilors, and former ANC members turned state witnesses. He wanted Tambo and the ANC to condemn any future terrorist acts. Tambo responds:

Let me get back a little to the first part of the question … In 1981
one of our most outstanding leaders [Joe Gqabi] was assassinated by
South African agents … In that year South Africa had raided our
people—raided Mozambique—and massacred very brutally some 13 of our
people who were simply living in houses in Mozambique. That was 1981.
In 1982 the South African army invaded Lesotho and massacred not 19
but 42 people, shot at point blank range. 42. Twelve of them nationals
from Lesotho. So there was this mounting offensive against the ANC. I think your
question fails to [relate to] this aspect: that we were victims of assassinations, of
massacres, and in return for what? We were not killing anybody … An armed
struggle is an armed struggle. People die. It has been fortunate perhaps, in that time
that there have not been so many people dying on the other side of the conflict …
[On our side people] have been hanged, they have been sentenced to
long terms of imprisonment, for exploding a bomb, [a] bomb that
destroyed a pylon; sentenced to life imprisonment. That is violence.
This is what we are going through. As to these other people you are
mentioning, we cannot condemn it. That is part of the struggle. The
enemy is the enemy (p. 584).

Scholars of social movements and of South African history will especially appreciate the extensive cataloging of the ideological and strategic debates within and outside of the ANC and the UDF, its allies, and member organizations. Like all movements of its size and ambition, the 1980s antiapartheid movement was riven by contradictions, differences, and violence. We see debates over tactics and ethics (e.g. the use of the infamous necklace to punish informers), race versus class, factionalism, the role of whites, the efficacy of armed struggle, etcetera. Documents also shed light on the role of religious groups, especially Christian churches and some Muslim clerics, in framing the struggle against apartheid in a religiously conservative country and in combating the state's interpretation of religious texts. Here Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Cape Town cleric Allan Boesak, and Catholic Archbishop Denis Hurley feature prominently.

While the emphasis is on documentary evidence of black resistance, the editors include documents of a few white dominated organizations like the Black Sash and the End Conscription Campaign; in the mid to late 1980s the latter proved a welcome home to the small band of war

dissenters (white men who resisted compulsory service in apartheid's army). There is also documentary evidence related to black political figures deemed traitors by some in the UDF, such as homeland leaders; the coloured Labour Party; members of the President's Council created by the 1983 constitution, and, especially, on Mangosuthu Buthelezi (the self-declared prime minister of the Zulu king) and his Inkatha movement.

Through the documents we witness the intensifying tensions between the ANC and Inkatha and Buthelezi as Inkatha's ambitions increasingly coincide with the machinations of apartheid's "Third Force." Documents also include surprising twists. For example, in April 1989 cleric Beyers Naude, traveling to Malawi, stopped over in Lusaka to brief ANC leaders on political developments inside South Africa, including requests from Buthelezi to meet Mandela in Pollsmoor prison. Apparently Mandela wanted to know whether he should agree to a meeting with Buthelezi. We do not get to see what is in the letter, but the ANC Youth League and the ANC leadership in exile were opposed to even responding to it. Inside South Africa, however, Walter Sisulu (still in prison) advised that they at least acknowledge the letter. Archie Gumede, president of the UDF, did so too. But we also learn, curiously, that Harry Gwala, who had a largely unfair reputation as a hardliner, advised Mandela to reply to Buthelezi. Gwala's reputation stemmed from the fact that his base in northern Natal faced daily attacks from Inkatha paramilitaries and the police and had taken up arms to defend themselves. (Incidentally, we also learn that Mandela, impatient, had decided to take his own counsel in the meantime and wrote to Buthelezi.)

A widely popular view of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a 1959 spin-off of the ANC, as self-destructive is confirmed by pamphlets and party reports filled with accusations of murder, assassinations, and plots. In one instance, supporters of former PAC president Potlako Leballo insult his rival David Sibeko by calling him a "bon viveur" who serves the interests of Zimbabwe and Tanzania's governments. But the ANC's own excesses and embarrassments also get proper treatment. We see ANC leaders hedging on including whites and other "minorities" (i.e. coloureds and Indians) in leadership positions—something the leadership only agreed to as late as 1985. (They could though serve in the ANC's armed wing, starting in 1969.) There are also references to ANC violence against its own members (in military camps in Angola, such as the Quatro of Cronin's quote above). The final pages of the book also illustrate the ANC's quick transformation of its goals of radical transformation to a more narrow definition of political power.

As in previous volumes, the editors are careful to emphasize that these documents on the liberation struggle only represent a tiny fraction of what's out there. Other documents can be found online (www.aluka.org.za and www.disa.ukzn.ac.za); many more are on microfilm in the Cooperative Africana Microform Project (CAMP) collections at the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago; and important archives in hard copy exist at South African universities, particularly at the University of Fort Hare in the Eastern Cape. Sadly, the latter archives are only accessible to researchers with the time and resources to go there. Realizing that these documents are available at a few locations raises the question why the documents are not online. Most serious students of political history increasingly turn to online databases (not always digitized versions of the originals), and a number of holdings have caught onto this potential for popularizing history by easing access to primary documents.

Even if all the archival documents were available online, the *From Protest to Challenge* series would still be an invaluable entry point for both undergraduates and serious researchers. South African public culture and scholarship have been impacted by a series of discourses and real political choices over recent decades. These include the culture of "reconciliation," which dominated from the mid-1990s, adopting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) moral equation of the violence of oppression with the violence of resistance (cf. Bell 2003). In time, in the view of many, acts of "terrorism" by those resisting a system deemed a crime against humanity by the UN was equated with state-sponsored death squads and torture perpetrated by the armed forces and secret police units loyal to the apartheid government.

Another significant discourse is a postmodern turn in South African scholarship, in which the past appears less important in shaping the present and where people can invent and reinvent new identities. Some whites have also taken on identities of victims—the work of organizations like the rightwing Solidariteit and Afriforum come to mind—and minority discourses (previously used to justify apartheid) are reignited. Separately, in some circles the struggle against apartheid is delegitimized in one stroke by the actions of outsized individuals like expelled ANC youth leader, Julius Malema.

A recent incident is indicative of the new politics of memory. In May 2011, a leading gallery in Johannesburg exhibited recreations by South African artist Brett Murray of 1980s era anti-apartheid posters. Murray focused especially on a series of posters produced by the Medu Arts Ensemble, a group of South African exiles living in Botswana during the 1980s. The most iconic posters celebrated women's struggles or slain resistance fighters like Solomon Mahlangu, an ANC guerrilla hanged by the apartheid regime in 1979. A 1981 poster by Medu featured the silhouette of a hunched soldier—representing Mahlangu—with a gun and the words: "Tell my people that I love them and that they must continue the struggle." In Murray's rendering the words are changed to, "Tell my people that I love them and that they must continue the struggle for chivas regal, mercs and kick-backs." An earlier exhibition in Cape Town of Murray's work featured five plaques lampooning resistance leaders: Chris "Hush Money" Hani, Walter "The Sweetener" Sisulu, Joe "Mr Ten Percent" Slovo, Steve "Kick-Back King" Biko, and Oliver "On The Take" Tambo.

Murray's work was generally praised in South Africa. For local playwright Mike van Graan, the work transgressively reflected popular disaffection with ANC rule. Murray's "politically correct" critics were playing the "tiresome race card," and shooting "the white messenger." Their objections would merely provide cover for "the politically opportunistic," who appropriate blackness "as a smokescreen under which to pursue and justify dubiously-gotten gains" (Van Graan 2011). But Judy Seidman, who as a member of Medu worked on the Mahlangu poster, wrote in an open letter to the *Mail & Guardian* (July 10, 2011) that Murray's work misappropriated Medu's images and distorted history. In her words, "Reworking these images conveys rather a deep and more sinister message, quite other [than Murray's] brave and laudable condemnation of bad morals and greed rampant amongst our current rulers. In re-constructing and undermining historical struggle images and messages, even to misquoting the words of our heroes, Murray suggests that bad morals and greed formed the underlying motivation for our struggle." For Seidman, Murray was "suggesting that the 'real' demand, in 1979 and 1982 and 1984, was for BMWs and Chivas [Regal] and kick-backs." To make plaques 'commemorating' heroes that label

them as corrupt negates our history, and insults their memory."

Which is why a series like *From Protest to Challenge* is so useful. It gets us out of the false dichotomy of heroes/villains and forces us to confront South Africa's history in its complex specificity. Given the contested present, it would be a shame were this its last volume.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Nwando Achebe. *The Female King of Colonial Nigeria Ahebi Ugbabe*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011. xiii, 305 pp.

The Female King of Colonial Nigeria reconstructs the life and legacy of a powerful female leader in an appealing and engaging manner. Through substantive oral and archival research, Achebe provides an in-depth and extensive analysis of Ahebi Ugbabe. She begins by eloquently engaging her audience with a theoretically narrativized description of initial research undertakings and planning before the study. She takes the reader through her research journey from when she first set foot in Nigeria to study the female leader she curiously terms *The Female King*, echoing Ifi Amadiume's *Male Daughters, Female Husbands* (1989).

Achebe's historical study indeed sheds light on significant issues of women and gender in Africa. It is packed with illuminating insights on the fluidity of gender and the colonial experience. A panoply of different issues become visible in her discussion, especially the centering of issues of gender performances and female masculinities, as well as the conceptions of female enslavement, female independence, and the definitions of prostitution in an African context. To illuminate the significance of the issues discussed, Achebe provides evidential excerpts from interviews that give voice to oral expressions and society's knowledge of Ahebi even though some may question issues of memory and the validity of their expressions.

Achebe begins by describing her initial research preparations and then grounds her study by contextualizing it around and about all other similar studies. *The Female King of Colonial Nigeria*, as Achebe notes, speaks to all and above all criticisms she places or have been placed on other women (auto) biographies. But rather controversially, Achebe criticizes and discounts critics of her earlier critical works and elevates her text above other (auto) biographical texts written beforehand. Granted, Achebe clearly supports her text as critical in filling a gap in women's literature and unlike other women (auto) biographical texts, it is grounded on several indigenous oral expressions, it advances an interdisciplinary approach to biographical study, and it forwards theoretical debates on sex, sexuality, gender, and enslavement as well as critical narrative conventions on the study of self. However, flaunting her text as the best is somewhat jarring.

In the subsequent chapters, Achebe remarkably traces and reconstructs Ahebi's family ancestry and genealogy. She takes the reader on a journey surrounding Ahebi's origins, and development through photos, and oral history. Achebe makes sure to include minute but necessary details such as the meanings of names and their significance to Ahebi's story. Thereafter, Achebe explores Ahebi's gendered performances as a female headman and as a female warrant chief that seems to be the gist of the book. Ahebi's gendered performances are seen through her relationship with the British colonials as an informant, which may have impacted her various performances. Nonetheless, the author reveals the fascinating ambiguity whereby colonialism empowered women as much as it eroded their power in traditional societies.

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v13i1-2a7.pdf

Finally, Achebe concludes by explicating the typical daily activities of an all-powerful *Female King* and warrant chief in her palatial palace. Part of her activities included adjudicating cases spanning from land to adultery, cases that she judged even without help and in opposition to the liking of the British colonial administrators. It is unfortunate that even though Achebe examines the conflict between Ahebi and the male elders in the community who felt emasculated by Ahebi's association with the British colonials to keep her position as king, headman, and warrant chief, Achebe does not speak to or about the men in the society and how they negotiated their place under *The Female King*, thus forwarding the case of Ahebi's as all-powerful. To further, establish Ahebi's power, the author chooses to recount her self commissioned burial rights. Achebe claims that Ahebi instituted her burial performances because it was an empowering performance and she "did not trust that her society would accord her a befitting burial" (p. 187). Similarly, to keep Ahebi's all-powerful stature alive, the story ends by a reconstruction of how Ahebi is presently remembered by her community.

In my judgment, the book provides a comprehensive story of Ahebi. There is no doubt that Achebe made an effort to construct and create a detailed analysis of Ahebi, whose life story would otherwise be told in a single chapter. There is ample evidence that the book was cleverly crafted, pieced together to reconstruct Ahebi's story from multiple sources and especially oral history and vignettes from the community including the authors own reconfiguration of the connections surrounding Ahebi. The *Female King of Colonial Nigeria* makes a solid contribution to the literature on women's (auto) biography and the cogent treatments of gender, and sexualities. The book will benefit scholars, students, and those interested in issues of women and gender.

There are, however, lengthy musical excerpts in the final chapters that may encourage or discourage a (non) musically oriented audience. Also, the text may push away readers who insist on gender parity, as Achebe's text significantly ignores the place of men in Ahebi's life. Nonetheless, the text complements and advances Achebe's earlier works and that of other scholars who have written on and provided insights on powerful Igbo women and studies on African women leaders.

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Heike Behrend. ***Resurrecting Cannibals: The Catholic Church, Witch-Hunts, and the Production of Pagans in Western Uganda***. **Suffolk: James Currey, 2011. 214 pp.**

Africa is often regarded as home to witchcraft and cannibalism, two phenomena which have often been described in derogatory terms. *In Resurrecting Cannibals* Behrend ventures into the world of cannibals and witches and comes out with a book that is a must read for all interested in Africa. It is a useful resource in the study of history, religion, anthropology and sociology of Africa. With its catchy title readers would not be disappointed in the way cannibalism has been demystified in an unbiased professional manner.

Behrend pinpoints some dimensions of African religion and sociology which have often been overlooked by researchers. For example, the fact that food produces substantial connection

between persons other than just being a quench for hunger has not been fully explored. As a framework for the book, he identifies two factors as responsible for the origin and rise of occultism (cannibalism/witchcraft) in Africa—AIDS and modern Christianity. He states that the strong increase in death rates caused by AIDS with its attendant quest to find meaning has contributed to the rise of cannibalism. Again, modern Christianity in Africa has not put an end to witchcraft and occultism but has provided a new context in which they make perfect sense (p. 70). Using Tooro, a community of Western Uganda as the study area, Behrend shows in his book how Christianity and African religious practices such as cannibalism and witchcraft on the other mirror each other.

The first section of the book, "Eating/Being Eaten," analyzes the history of Tooro and discusses extensively the concept of "eating" and its bonding effects. This part is followed by the section "Terror and Healing" in Tooro that gives an account of how the encounter with missionaries changed the socio-cultural dynamics, creating a situation of mutual suspicion between Africans and whites. Finally, Behrend takes time to do a comparative analysis of complementary relationship between Christianity and cannibalism and how the former reinforced the latter instead of destroying it. The book identified paradoxical relationships; religion is supposed to promote peace but can also create violence (p. 112); Christianity condemns magic but promotes miracles (p. 124); eating and fasting are opposing actions with a common effect (p. 113); "Falling down" in the spiritual sense could be good and bad (p. 125).

The book brings up an interesting story about the implementation of a democratic means of identifying witches (p. 80). In an attempt to ensure fairness, suspects were put at the mercy of community members who voted to decide whether or not they were witches or cannibals. Although the emphasis of this story in the book was to show how helpless government was in resolving the "culturo-religious" challenges of witchcraft, it has a far reaching implication for the wholesale adoption and implementation of ideas from the West to promote the development agenda of Africa. Another interesting observation is how Mbiti's description of the African as notoriously religious plays out in advertisements and signboards in towns in Uganda (p. 85). Signs as hilarious as "End Time Disco" and "Christ-Net Computer and Business Holdings" only go to prove, in Parrinder's terms, how incurably religious the African can be.

It is unfortunate that such an interesting and well researched book may appear to invite a limited number of readers because of its specialized and abstruse language that could cause it to be accessible to only academicians. For example, a sentence such as ".... synthesis between massacre and bureaucracy in the colonial world was the subject of experiment in a twilight zone of suspended law" (p. 178) could potentially affect its possible readership. Moreover, even though Behrend did very well in presenting a fair and an unbiased account, the supplementary material in the form of a DVD included with the book portrayed stereotypical images of poor Africans in tattered clothes walking barefooted, images that negate his attempt to correct the misrepresentations of Africa.

These observations notwithstanding, *Resurrecting Cannibals* is a great book. I would highly recommend it to researchers, students, and even those who would want to read for fun. In spite of its sole focus on Western Uganda, the book creates linkages with other African nations such

as Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, et cetera, and the issues raised in the book are common and could conveniently be related to most African cultures. Coming from a Ghanaian background, I saw myself as an active participant in the stories as they unfolded in the book and I believe others would relate the same way upon reading it.

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Elisabeth Bekers. *Rising Anthills: African and African American Writing on Female Genital Excision 1960-2000*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2010. 262 pp.

Rising Anthills is a chronological analysis of various literary works on the ritual of female genital excision (FGE). This custom, which is practiced on almost every continent and across the three major monotheistic religions, is attacked, defended, or a source of conflict in the plots of the texts covered in the book. Bekers attempts to relate over twenty texts of "contemporaneous literature, to one another as well as to the general debate on female genital excision" (p. viii). The book is organized into three flexible time periods with the first looking at literature during the colonial period, where the characters are in conflict with Western missionaries over their traditional rites in rural villages. The second period focuses on authors writing in the newly independent states of Africa, situated in urbanized and growing towns. They are not battling European colonialists for progress but trying to find freedom in their own society. The third covers authors publishing in the 1990s with a more international perception of African women and their bodies. The introduction provides the reader with historical, linguistic (various terminology for FGE), and some cultural background to the significance of FGE to gender and ethnic identity and how the discourse of this practice has evolved in the latter half of the twentieth century. The timepieces she analyzes are a reflection of those changes and are undoubtedly shaped by local, national, and even global political thought and movement.

The first time period of writings focuses mostly on literature of the Gikuyu ethnic group from Kenya. The author gives a detailed account of origin stories, social construction, and eventually ethnic solidarity that inscribes or literally carves womanhood onto the bodies of women in this community. The analyzed works—*The River Between* by Ngugi, *Daughter of Mumbi* by Waciuma, and *They Shall be Chastised* by Likimani—all take place in Kenya, in which the rural communities are colonized and occupied by European missionaries. The author carefully analyzes themes, narration point (female characters as focalizers), and deconstructs each fictional work to show how FGE's role in colonial Kenya served as a marker of ethnic identity in a struggle against European antagonists, and a post-colonial critique of "the disastrous effects of colonization and evangelization on the indigenous population" (p. 57).

For the women in these novels, converted or not, mission-educated or traditionally trained in their ethnic rituals, FGE remained a nonnegotiable, significant marker of Gikuyu identity versus "the dirty mud of sin" in the Christian European context (p. 38). Bekers goes on to explain (p. 39) that both Christian and Gikuyu identities in the texts were drawing distinct ideas and values of "purity" and "cleanliness" of their own. Thus, the attempts to fully unite both cultures failed in death of converted and excised Muthoni in *The River Between*, the segregation of excised and unexcised girls at the missionary school in *Daughter of Mumbi*, and Mr. Obadiah's staunch defence of FGE and Gikuyu women's submission to men, despite his western education and status as a school headmaster, in *They Shall be Chastised*.

This first chapter introduces the reader to many views of gender identity in the African vs. Western context, as well as socio-political ramifications of FGE and for the women who may or may not choose to undergo the procedure (unexcised girls not able to marry, being banned from community). This first wave African authors and literary pieces was a strong beginning to discussion of FGE and how it was politicized during this era, and what it meant for African women who seem to lose no matter what side they stood on. However, there is one connection which was not iterated in Chapter One, with how FGE may have been a status marker in Gikuyu community. The missionaries were successful in converting many Africans, but as in Chinua Achebe's *Things Falls Apart*, some of the converts were already outsiders, men and women with little or no status in their community, or those who were already questioning their beliefs. When missionaries introduced their new way of life and perspective of "proper society" it challenged those with high status within the Gikuyu community. Unexcised women are now able to wed, have children, and gain status without "suffering" through the patriarchal constraints of the gender system in Kenya, and this challenged the status of excised women who gained respect and deference by following the norms of their community's sociocultural structure. They valued their tradition since they invested so much (physically and emotionally) to uphold it. Thus, this connection could also have contributed to politicization of ethnic identity and womanhood.

The second time period brings us to the newly independent states of Africa with a new generation of authors and literary characters. Bekers analyzes a more diverse group authors who are from different countries, languages, and even genders. However, the omnipresence of FGE links the tragedy of the female principle characters. The writing styles and conflict have also shifted: there are no European missionaries or colonial antagonists to defend a way of "pure and moral" living. The ritual of FGE is more physically and emotionally described in the works of Kourouma's *Les Soleils des Indépendence*, Farah's *From a Crooked Rib*, El Saadawi's *The Circling Song*, Maïga Ka's *La Voie du Salut*, and many more. The protagonists are struggling for freedom and equality within their own society and culture. Many of the main characters in these second generation writings live in urban towns rather than small rural villages and suffer oppression at the hands of their kin, husbands, partner, or society at large. In these texts, however, it is really the violence of rape, military subjugation, poverty, forced marriages, war, and political corruption (on a national level) that take thematic precedence in these novels rather than FGE. The excision ritual, for protagonist Salimata in *Les Soleils des Indépendence*, or

Ebla in *From a Crooked Rib*, or Hamida in *The Circling Song*, is a distant but recurring memory that is part of a chronic chain of suffering, oppression, and violence against these women. Our principle characters are questioning the entire gender system that oppresses them and regulate their bodies as the properties of men, such as the rape of Amina in *Sardines* by Farah. "In a society where women are treated as man's exclusive property, a daughter's violation is a means to punish her father..." (p. 120). In the end, the reader sees that the plight of African women continued after independence, the end of colonization brought no change to the oppressive gender system, and our focal characters' personal suffering (FGE, rape, difficult childbirth/infertility) paralleled the suffering of the nation on a whole.

The second wave of authors brought more diverse insight into the plight of African women post-independence, one highlighted by Bekers in a connection to FGE. However, the diversity of voices may have made a weaker connection than in the first chapter, because it is only a connection and not a discussion. The second wave of authors do not seem to have a level of dialogue and congruity with each other, but seem to be writing inattentive to the FGE debate specifically and more to national politics. However, in contrast to the third chapter's literary analysis, this wave does highlight how African women viewed their plight of gender and national oppression versus how women in the African diaspora (living in America and elsewhere) viewed the scope of FGE and gender oppression. As Bekers states in her opening of the third generation wave, "[M]any Africans objected to the condescension and reductionism of Western (feminist) interference, which sensationalized such issues as female genital excision instead of giving priority to African women's self-defined needs." (p. 153). Perhaps, second generation authors, are addressing what they believe are women's self-defined needs, in which FGE plays a role, but not one that is central to gender oppression, as one may have originally believe.

This brings us to the final chapter in Beker's book and the third generation of literary authors, who are more culturally diverse than our first two generations. The first few are African Americans like Gloria Naylor, Breena Clarke, Glenda Dickerson, and Pulitzer Prize winner Alice Walker. And some are African expatriates living in Europe and elsewhere like Fatou Keïta, Saida Hagi-Dirie Herzi, and Evelyne Accad. First, there is an undoubtedly, united consensus that the authors and their characters are opposed to female genital excision. The controversy lies in the way these works were composed to typecast Africa and its people in a negative light. Alice Walker is the only author in this generation to receive a high level of criticism despite the fact that her work, *Possessing the Secret of Joy* gave more agency and positive light to her protagonist, Tashi, than other compositions during this time period; according to Bekers, "Tashi is one of the most vocal and powerful protagonists discussed in this book..." (p. 164).

In other works, such as Naylor's *Outcast Virgin Mary* or Clarke and Dickerson's *Re/membering Aunt Jemima*, the excised female (or the woman avoiding her excision in *Aunt Jemima*) hardly say any lines or narration in the story. It is the American women that speak on their behalf, for they are silent victims relying on enlightened Westerners to save them. In fact, as Bekers also point out, the protagonists end up emigrating from their native repressed culture

to another country (such as America) to find liberation and peace. In these works, as well as Accad's *L'excisée*, patriarchy, prejudice, and lack of understanding are also relevant to the debate of whether these "outsiders" could discuss FGE without denigrating African culture. African men are the primitive violent aggressors in Walker's, Clarke and Dickerson's work, while African women were victims looking towards the West for salvation.

The authors' focus of FGE has again shifted from ethnic identity to psychological trauma, to a physical health and human rights issue. Walker, Clarke and Dickerson, and Herzi, all bring up various health complications that may occur to a circumcised (specifically infibulated) women: hemorrhaging, infection, infertility, difficult childbirth, the pain of defloration, etc. All of the works in this chapter homogenizes the practice of FGE to all Africa, even though only some parts of Africa practice FGE (p. 173) and all of the writers use infibulation (which is the most extreme form of genital excision) as the ritual in question or they interchange between clitoridectomy and infibulation (p. 172) which may confuse an audience not familiar with the practice. These errors may work to further alienate African audiences and scholars from the debate, who may once more see ethnic and national identity under attack from imperialist westerners.

Bekers ties up this final category very well in describing the last shift in literary writing of FGE and gender identity. However, there is no comparison between the second and third generation writings in her summation of how second generation Africans writers, as (cultural) insiders, describe their plight of gender oppression versus third generation African diaspora writers seeing FGE as central to the oppression and violence of African women. My earlier comparison of how these two generations saw the plight of African women showed a significant shift in the FGE debate; not only have the faces changed (African women to American women) of literary activists, but also the intended audience. Some of the erroneous assumptions and prejudices risk alienating African readers, the very people needed to instill change in the culture.

Thus, one may ask, where are we today thirteen years after the latest work published in Beker's review? Is the plight of African women still in the global discourse, which vehemently opposes FGE as a central barrier to gender equality and freedom? Or has it returned back to national and local discourses of politics and social status? What will the fourth generation (assuming that we are in the fourth generation) of writers look like and how will they contribute to the debate of post-colonial, feminist, human rights, medical, economic, and gender construction of FGE?

In the first chapter, due to the nature of colonialism and the growing grassroots efforts for independence, the authors described FGE as a marker of ethnic identity and not just patriarchy. Traditionalists (men and women) supported this rite as necessary for the cohesion of their community and their asymmetrical gender system as well as social status. In the second chapter, there is a shift in the debate; FGE is not the central theme in most of the works. However, it is explained in more detail as the physical and psychological pain as part of the protagonists' suffering through their long events of tragedies. Many of these post-independence authors are criticizing the oppressive state of newly formed African governments and the lack

of improvement in women's status after colonialism. However, the dialogue of FGE in this generation is not a strong consensus, perhaps because FGE is not seen as central to plight as African women as it was in the first or third generation. By the late 80s and into the 90s, the debate goes global and literature now shows a unanimous disapproval of FGE. However, the lack of understanding of cultural traditions and prejudices that typecast Africans as homogenous and primitive may work to alienate African audiences; and in turn stall the debate or hinder any intercultural dialogue.

The author chronologically reviewed over twenty works of literature to show the dynamic but yet sometimes subtle intricacies that helped shaped this complex cultural rite into the international discourse we have today. Bekers also shows a fascinating but albeit lesser known evolution of female African writers who have pioneered a genre since at least the mid-twentieth century. The general debate has many faces and perspectives that prove valuable to determining the plight of women (not just African); and how we can all work together to liberate ourselves from the subjugation of gender, violence, and race.

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Megan Biesele and Robert K. Hitchcock. *The Ju/'hoan San of Nyae Nyae and Namibian Independence: Development, Democracy and Indigenous Voices in Southern Africa.* **New York: Berghahn Books, 2011. 269 pp.**

Megan Biesele and Robert H. Hitchcock provide an ethnographic account of the Ju/'hoan (San people) and their struggle for autonomy and political representation in Namibia under the colonial and the post-colonial administrations. While the authors emphasize the agency of the San in the realization of these goals, this book is about multiple actors, authors included, and how the interaction between the San and the outside world changed their plight. The political struggles of a group that constitutes less than 1 percent of southern Africa's total population is well articulated in the book's nine chapters and introduction. In summary the authors are able to demonstrate how the San, who were previously abducted to work on farms and mines and threatened with invasion by powerful local tribes, not only reorganized to defend their rights but also managed to start advocating for other San groups in Botswana. This book is a detailed anthropological piece; a must read for anyone interested in ethnic minorities, democracy, development, and southern Africa.

The introductory chapter describes the earlier ethnographic work by Elizabeth Marshall Thomas and how her presence in Nyae Nyae transformed the lives of San people between 1951 and 1961. The encounter with Thomas created a "positive sense of self" among the Ju/'hoan that motivated them to transform their society.

Chapter 1 traces the history land of reforms in Namibia and how the post in-dependence changes relegated some Ju/'han traditional leaders. Chapter 2 focuses on Ju/'han traditional governance and their livelihood strategies and how they had to deal with the paternalism of the the colonial government that chose to relocate them to Tsumkwe instead of giving them secure rights on their land (Nyae Nyae). Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Ju/'hoansi skepticism toward top-

down planning and the increasing role of formal institutions in transforming the Ju/'hoansi from the "Old Way" (p. 5). Later, John Marshall and Claire Ritchie established the Ju/Wa Bushman Development Foundation (JBDF) "to help Ju/'hoansi to get out of of Tsumkwe, start farming on their own n!oresi "(p. 68), to escape the social problems related to government subsidized alcohol, and to return to places where their ancestors were buried and they could live in contentment. The participation of externals, however, provided a basis for the colonial government to dismiss Ju/'hoansi demands. Chapter 5 details political developments in Nyae Nyae between 1988 and 1989, a period where the Nyae Nyae Farmers' Co-operative (NNFC) provided an overarching framework for locals to speak with externals, including discussing Resolution 435 of the United Nations that ended "petty apartheid" (p. 130) and enabled the Ju/'hoansi to participate in the 1990 election.

Chapter 6, "Independence: The Years of Hope," looks at the role of NNFC and JBDF during the transition to independence. In particular, these institutions managed to deal with the South Africa Defense Forces (SADFC) anti-liberation propaganda. After the 1990 elections, the number of visitors in Nyae Nyae increased and the new land reform proposal by the new government sought to dispossess the Ju/'hoansi of their heritage based claims over Nyae Nyae. By 1991, Ju/'hoansi were politically sensitized and were able to strategically defeat the prescribed land reform models that were proposed by the post-independence government. When President Sam Mu-joma visited Nyae Nyae in 1991, he felt the area was fertile to sustain large herds of cattle, a view that was not shared by all Ju/'hoansi who felt other people should not be rewarded for poorly managing their environment—including the Herero who were eager to exploit Nyae Nyae for grazing resources.

Chapter 7 details the work of the Nyae Nyae Development Foundation (NNDF) of Namibia, founded in 1981 by Marshall and Ritchie. The establishment of the development foundation was followed by an influx of international workers that created coordination and communication challenges. Chapter 8 looks at the role of NNDF after independence and highlights how the internal changes impacted internal power dynamics, the shift of San governance from "each one of us as headman" p.181 to formal leadership, and the challenges of youths taking a leading role. Chapter 9 focuses on the first conservancy project in Namibia, an institution that legally empowers communities to derive financial benefits from wildlife resources.

The book also references useful sources for example, John Marshall's 1958, 1979, 2003 films. It also provides carefully selected Ju/'hoani voices that illustrate their perspectives of governance (see pp. 91, 92, and 110-11). Despite the challenges of dealing with externals, the Ju/'hoansi faced internal challenges that they had to resolve on their own. In my view this work is facilitative rather than directive and provides a model for empowering local communities in a way that often times is not possible through short-term NGO projects.

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Graham Bradshaw and Michael Neill (eds.). *J.M.Coetzee's Austerities.* **Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010. 272 pp.**

This volume consists a collection of twelve essays by different contributors that analyze creative works of J.M.Coetzee from different angles and present an all-round depiction of his creative activities, his deep psychological penetration into the inner world of his characters and, none the least, his treatment of the language as an indispensible tool of individual characteristics and the national South African English language as a whole. The volume will be of interest to literary critics, psychologists, sociologists, men and women of letters, linguists, and all lovers of good reading. The book's appearance is timely and significant, in particular to those who are interested in the development of English literature in South Africa and the trends in the South African English language.

The literary work of J.M. Coetzee exerts a noticeable impact upon both South African public opinion and social consciousness and upon the existence and functioning of the national English language of South Africa. J.M.Coetzee is a protagonist and cultivator of a specific English style of South African prose, which presumes that narration referred to the past, is expressed in the present, events immediately preceding the narration in perfect, and those referred to a remoter past in simple past. In this style the function of the Definite Article is also somehow modified. These grammatical features are worth mentioning, since if this tendency persists and they become grammaticalised, it may lead to profound and fundamental structural changes in South African English. This was marked by J.Lamb who presents Coetzee as a realist, the realist who devoted much attention to the structure of the language (p. 179) and who, as one could see in his works, managed to introduce original specificity into the English of his own country.

Editors Bradshaw and Neill formulate their main goal as "to align or realign the South African Coetzee with the 'late modernist' Coetzee" and to "pay particular attention to Coetzee's most recent fiction" (p. 2). The book's significance, however, goes far beyond these limits.

The editors try to treat the whole span of Coetzee's work, while, in my perception, the most interesting is his South African period. It is this period when the specific language style and the controversial attitude to the events in the country were formed. Coetzee raises questions to which he often does not answer unequivocally and leaves them for the reader to answer. One can agree with D. Attwell that the Australian provenance of Coetzee's fiction is distinctive and striking but it is unlikely to produce as rich a harvest (p. 176).

D. Attrige justly remarks in his essay that the most favorable situation for the writer was that of political tension rather than relaxation that he met in Australia. Attrige tries to show the role of fine arts and nature in depicting the South African reality, which was characteristic of Coetzee, as well as of such South African writers as A. Brink, Z. Mda, and others. According to C. Clarkson,"'several of Coetzee's characters 'look long and hard at words'" (p. 43). It is quite possible that the portrayal of such characters prompted Coetzee to create such language peculiarities that in future may grammaticalize and become established properties of the national version of English in South Africa.

L. and T. Dovey discuss possibilities of adapting Coetzee's fiction to cinema and filming his novels. They agree with Attridge that "reading occurs as an event, a living – through the text which responds simultaneously to what is said and the intensiveness and singularity of the saying" (p. 59). According to this statement, a question arises whether it is possible at all to film fiction without losing its properties and intention. It is no wonder that Coetzee himself was very much concerned with the "South Africannness of the film" (p. 61). In agreement with that, one may express apprehension whether filming of Coetzee's works beyond South Africa (as well as works of any other writer beyond the place of its origin) will not distort the very idea of the original work.

Attwell discusses the role of the writer in society and the message the author is supposed to bear (p. 163). He evaluates Coetzee's message in literature as something much wider and more profound than teaching young people how to live. Coetzee's fiction invites the reader to share the experience and point of view of a particular personality whom the author portrays (p. 173).

All in all, one can agree with B. Dancygier in her concluding essay that "the framework represented here is an interdisciplinary attempt to look at specific features of literary discourse through the lenses of conceptual structure" (p.251). An attempt, one may add, that is very successful, instructive, and attractive.

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Padraig Carmody. *The New Scramble for Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011. Xi, 194 pp.

I was an avid student of African history during my high school years in the late 1980s where I had a chance to study the first scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century. Consequently, Carmody's *The New Scramble for Africa* motivated me to learn about the new and second scramble. As the title suggests, the current scramble is new, therefore, different from the first one that was mediated through the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. In my mind, the following questions arise, "does book describe the newness of the new scramble, its cause and consequences and also offer policy recommendations?"

The nine chapters (plus an introduction and a conclusion) are concerned with one of the most debated issues today; the new scramble for Africa, or appropriately put, the new scramble for Africa's resources. The importance of Africa as a major source of resources is showcased from the very beginning (top of page 1). In this regard, Carmody appropriately borrows from then EU Commissioner for Development who, in 2009, stated that "there is no denying that Africa has become a sought-after continent in a short space of time, thanks to its strategic importance" (p. 1). Carmody poses pertinent questions right at the beginning; i.e., why has Africa suddenly become strategically important for great and emerging powers? The book argues that the scramble is a consequence of the deepening process of globalisation and that one of the distinguishing features of the process is the increased competition over Africa's resources. Having laid out the key features of the new scramble, the author states that the overarching

objective of the book is to explore reasons behind the new scramble, its nature and impacts? Thus, this review seeks to answer the question, "did Carmody achieve this objective?"

Chapter One delimits the universe of the discussion by comparing/contrasting the old and new scrambles for Africa. Particularly, Carmody dispels the notion that Africans are helpless, passive, and bemused spectators in the new scramble. Thus, through negotiations, African governments enter into deals that result in economic benefits, although in some, the rent is appropriated by the political elites (Angola's oil is such an example). Chapter Two is concerned with the mosaic of powers, e.g., US, China, EU, Japan, etc, that are competing for the economic hearts and minds of the Africans. Of particular interest is South Africa whose footprint has been planted all over Africa. Chapter Three discusses the hottest topic in political economy; that of China's resource interests and strategies in Africa. Worthy of mention is the principle of *flexigemony* whereby China uses soft power and "prioritises the economic over political and security concerns" (p. 79). Relatedly, unlike western donors (the US as an example), Chinese aid is not tied to issues such as governance.

Chapter Four comfortably links with Chapter Three whereby the role of other Asian investors, India and Japan, are discussed. In addition, the chapter discusses relatively new players in the new scramble for Africa; Brazil and Russia. Chapter Five deals with the familiar if not controversial topic of oil. Thus, given supply issues in the Middle East, African oil is regarded as a safer alternative. At the same time, Carmody argues that rent from oil extraction benefits a small section of the population as instanced by pockets of corruption in Equatorial Guinea and Angola. In Chapters Six and Seven, the book takes the reader through the extraction of non-oil resources: uranium and coltan (these are conflict-causing), timber, bio-fuels, plants, food, and fisheries. Chapter Eight discusses Chinese investment in Zambia, highlighting issues of lack of skills transfer and strained labour relations. Chapter Nine discusses Africa's development *vis-à-vis* the new scramble.

The conclusion, drawing from the nine chapters, asks, "What is Africa's benefit from the scramble?" Carmody optimistically opines that there are potential benefits and hence exhorts African governments to develop win-win situations with their suitors. Amongst others, they must sign mutually beneficial resource deals.

The book has a number of strengths: objectivity, it is widely researched through the use of multiple sources and both the author and co-authors are experts in the area. Importantly, the book is an excellent reference source for those interested in understanding the new scramble for Africa. Notwithstanding these, it could do with shorter *verbatim* quotations. Did the book successfully explore reasons behind the new scramble, its nature and impact? Yes, it does as evidenced by its extensive coverage.

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Stephen Chan. *Southern Africa: Old Treacheries and New Deceits*. **New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. 302 pp.**

The beauty of South Africa is always commented upon. It is only on arrival and taking in the tastes and smells and energy of its peoples, animals and environment can one begin to understand more keenly why throughout the twentieth century such a bitter battle was fought for its control. South Africa epitomizes the "land of contrasts" cliché. Arriving into the outstanding beauty of the Western Cape one is easily seduced. But Cape Town has its darker side like any city. From the wine growing regions of the Cape and the accompanying plethora of cuisines reflecting the multicultural heritages of the inhabitants; African, Mediterranean, European,, or Asian, the tourist can easily get lost in the romance. Nevertheless the contrasts are there to see and cannot be hidden. Just riding from the airport the tourist is confronted with the harsh realities of life lived there. This is a pattern replicated throughout the country; Durban, Pretoria and Johannesburg all boasting modernity and pockets of affluence juxtaposed against enormous township areas dominated by the poor, dispossessed, and increasing numbers of foreign migrant laborers.

To be fair this picture is the case to varying degrees for most cities around the world, though disparities of wealth are more or less obvious from place to place. In South Africa's case it is more, and the situation ensures that the crippling legacies of Apartheid live on. The shortcomings of the current political leaders perpetuate what is human misery writ large. No surprise then that crime is endemic and ethnic conflicts threaten social cohesion as the unemployed compete for work with the foreign migrants fleeing their own nightmares. Cross-border neighbors, the Zimbabweans (not the only ones) also vote with their feet to escape the political and economic horrors of their rulers. Harare, too, offers contrasts of fate for its inhabitants, and thousands head into South Africa. These challenges and more lie at the center of the politics of the region. The grand aspirations fed by decades long fighting against Apartheid and its exports would have been difficult to meet under any circumstances. Furthermore the unrelenting long suppressed necessity to attend to domestic needs, such as job creation, housing, public health, building up of infrastructures, educational systems, and social justice would be a challenge for any country even without the extravagancies of an ambitious political class.

The insight provided by Professor Chan's well informed analysis allow the political challenges of the region to be foregrounded in a more multi-layered way than is often the case. Chan is well able to do so from a standpoint of the many years of work and travel in the region. In places the book is hard to put down, and one is reminded more than once of Chan's "insider" knowledge and access to the key movers and shakers. This can at times be grating, but one cannot doubt the authority of experience from which he speaks. He contextualizes domestic politics against the history and interconnections of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. Chan's humanizes the political characters by revealing these often misrepresented African caricatures as complex astute politicians and diplomats. Chan's purpose is "to endow what the Western media has turned into black caricatures with the same sort of life we would

automatically assume was inherent in Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron, Nick Clegg, George Bush, Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy" (pp. xii-xiii). Further by referring to the political intrigues of other central and southern Africa states in his analysis, readers are provided with a comprehensive and microscopic summary of the political, social and economic transitions of this region over the past thirty years. Refreshingly there are no hagiographic profiles or rose tinted visions. The colorful characters of Mandela, according to Chan "not a good president," Mugabe (speaks for itself!), Kenneth Kaunda, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Morgan Tsvangirai (few women are mentioned) present a warts and all portrait of these particular African leaders in their domestic and regional environs. This makes for a more nuanced and multi-dimensional analysis so often missing from the "saint versus demon" one-dimensional portraits beloved by the Western media. Mind you, with a character like Mugabe, it is hard to be balanced, though Chan manages not to make him a pantomime baddie. Chan is forensic when analyzing Mugabe's regime, especially the surprisingly sophisticated vote-rigging, the ugly violence, and the corruption of generals siphoning off wealth from mineral deposits of neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, his ambivalent relation with Mbeki makes for interesting reading. Ambition and deceit often underpin political life, and Southern Africa is no different.

Chan is no great fan of Mbeki, and in the areas in the narrative where he attempts to deconstruct Mbeki's character, later contrasting him to this nemesis Jacob Zuma, it is hard to put the book down. Zuma himself emerges as a chameleon able to reinvent and communicate with the mass in a way that the urbane Mbeki is clearly unable to do. He fatally lacks the "common touch," and Chan leaves the reader in no doubt of that. Neither does Chan spare his critique of European and other foreign interlopers. Whether it's the Russians, Chinese, Cubans, and Americans manipulating the resource rich region for their national and geo-political roles, or the perfidy of former colonial masters such as Britain, though their language is cloaked in political- speak suggesting nothing but judicious propriety. Chan's subtle shift from academic analysis to journalist commentary, peppered with anecdotes, does make for a compelling read about a complex region and state of political affairs.

After the end of Apartheid and Mandela's rise to the political leadership, western attention turned elsewhere. There were periodic dramas, however, that ensured the region kept in the news; xenophobic killings, Mbeki's puzzling HIV/AIDs stance (which Chan dissects), the FIFA World Cup, the ascendency of Jacob Zuma, a media dream if there ever was one, and the irritating and deadly pantomime of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe and his nemesis Morgan Tsvangirai, the main (but not exclusive) challenger. Through his easy writing style Chan enhances our understanding in a way that would appeal to a broad readership. We get a taste not only of the top table political strategizing but we are given an insight into the world of the current "big men" of Africa and the individuals who are affected by their governance. From the start, the story of the Zimbabwean Joseph, a migrant in South Africa, draws in the reader and presents the dilemmas facing individuals daily, while their political leaders try to outmaneuver each other for power. Chan's description of the ideological differences that developed in South Africa between the African National Congress exiles and the "inziles" delves into an

organization that for too long has managed to hide behind its formidable mythology. For Chan, "the ANC did not become the authoritarian party and fractious agglomeration of factions that it did simply from Day One of Thabo Mbeki" (p. 59). The problem started (some would argue it stretched back further) during Mandela's term with his detached leadership style and his failure to mediate intra-ANC conflicts played a role too. We are provided with a portrait of a far from liberal organization in its political ideology, or in its internal bureaucratic structure. It is a party in danger of betraying its people and the nation's future prosperity. South Africans not only can see what is happening across the border, but its effects are felt on their own soil in the shape of the numerous Josephs that live among them. In Chan's analysis the country's politics under ANC hegemony "turned from its mission to the people into a soap opera of personalities and vendettas" (p. 65). Ironically this assessment sounds very much like the final years of Thatcher, Major and Blair's governments. It is probably indicative of any government as politicians cling to power no matter early promises made to the electorate. It is Chan's purpose to explain these personalities, their "old treacheries and new deceits," and he does so with skill. It is a shame the publication of the book missed the current ANC crisis over Julius Malema. Like other Southern Africa watchers, no doubt Professor Chan will be watching the unfolding events closely.

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Alison Liebhafsky des Forges. *Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896-1931*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. 306pp.

Des Forges carefully incorporates the rich culture of the Rwandese people and also portrays the manner in which the Court system appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She drew on oral histories and extensive archival research that shows how the separation of various groups in Rwanda led to their response of the colonial government, the traders, and the missionaries. Through her exploration and research she shows how Rwandese people used resources of the Europeans so as to enlarge their power even as they were seeking to preserve the royal court's autonomy. The author brilliantly narrated the history; David Newbury introduced and edited it thoroughly in order to provide a context that is deep to better understand the civil war in Rwanda a century later.

Defeat Is the Only Bad News is important for its content as well as its method. Through her comprehensive study of the ins and outs of the royal Court at a key time in its history, des Forges provides one of the most detailed and logical accounts available of an African political elite facing the twofold challenges of the early twentieth century through the establishment of colonial rule and the presence of large numbers of Christian missionaries. These were chaotic years, first as Germany then Belgium pursued a hostile plan of colonization in the country whereas the missionaries challenged the rite basics that had sustained kingship in Rwanda.

The author portrays how the Rwandan court served as the center stage of Shakespearean proportions, which eventually emerges from her intelligent prose. By focusing on valuable oral accounts, missionary diaries, and a variety of other sources Des Forges sheds some light on the

intense atmosphere of the scheme, perceptive calculation, brutal betrayal, and sometimes murder that were the characteristics of the Court at this central moment in its history.

The reign of Yuhi Musinga offers rich material on the innermost rivalries that had long eroded the Rwandan Court against the powerful notables who ruled in its name or under its governance. It also gives perfect examples of the long old struggle between the Court and its agents, who were then trying to diversify their control on all sides, which was something that the common people opposed. The author also used one hundred and two Rwandans who took her through Rwandan history and shared their knowledge of their past experiences. They also helped des Forges understand how the court system of Rwanda operated back in the days.

The book well accomplishes the authors stated goals in various ways. There was the refinement of the royal culture where the Court developed its own beliefs, one which justified the rule of the leaders and expressed through an impressive array of highly formalized rituals and a set of historical stories explaining the origins of the dynasty. These elaborate ritual patterns justifying the royalty were the third attribute of court development. Des Forges writes that as the legitimacy of the Court's power grew, authoritative men hardly opposed it in public but rather saw fit to control it from within. Therefore, the struggle for power and influence intensified at the court, as illustrated in the manner of Musinga's succession to power.

The background to des Forges study introduces the social groupings of Rwanda to the reader, and the initial pages of her exposition gives a summary of the accepted social groups of pre-colonial Rwandan society as a set of clear, fixed and standardized administrative institutions.

Her thorough research reveals much more than the apprehension of power by a kinship group competing with the royal family. By examining the powerful politics at the Court over a range of fundamental issues, her study is seen to unveil the contested relations with many regions as the Court sought to expand its rule over the people in the southeast, north, the northwest, and southwest areas where the majority of people were opposed to rule by the Rwandan Royal Court at the beginning of the twentieth century and in some cases opted for outright resistance. This carefully researched, readable, and well detailed study about a critical period that was experienced in Rwanda's history becomes a significant contribution to people's understanding about court politics prior and after the beginning of the colonial rule. The author's work cannot be compared to any other, whether in English or in French, as its gives us the problems, anguish and turmoil that the people went through under the reign of Yuhi Musinga, who was a ruler who never valued the feelings of the common people and thus subjected them to a lot of suffering through the ruling that was made in the courts.

Musinga's interpretation about his governance in Rwanda under a foreign dominance, brings an understanding to the colonial situation that resulted in the rise of an uncertain future for Rwanda. The book's potential audience is anyone who wishes to understand the catastrophe of this country's history in recent times. Another potential audience could also be the young people who live in Rwanda, and it can also be kept in the archives for children yet to be born, which will in turn aid in understanding how Rwanda's people suffered in the face of Belgian

colonial rule, thus knowing the reason as to why Rwanda is in its current state, though it is now coming up from the ruins.

Ilunga Tchoma Kitenge, *Institut de Recherches et d'Etudes en Relations Internationales et Européennes, IRERIE*

Mamadou Diawara, Bernard Lategan, and Jörn Rüsen. *Historical Memory in Africa: Dealing with the Past, Reaching for the Future in an Intercultural Context*. **New York: Beghahn Books, 2010. vi, 248 pp.**

This is a diverse collection of essays related to an international research project sponsored by scholarly institutions in South Africa and Germany. For American scholars it provides a chance to read work based in a German and French bibliography, representing interdisciplinary academic networks from Germany, South Africa, and Canada. The articles are loosely organized around the analysis of historical memory, sometimes defined as public history or commemoration, in Africa during times of violence. The example of South Africa, and particularly its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), dominate the book, with some space given to other places in Africa, like the Congo, and comparative examples from India, South Korea, and the Holocaust. The book ends with two articles on the praxis of forgiveness and reconciliation.

What this collection adds to an already prolific field is attention to the link between memory of the past and anticipation of the future. The editors ask us to read history from the future backwards as we prioritize the possible over the real (p. 3). They posit that collective memory has been used in both constructive and destructive ways in postcolonial Africa. Memory is analyzed in its "sense making" role of identity formation and group mobilization, with explicit consequences for human life. The authors are clearly concerned not just with documenting history but also with prescribing positive ways of using historical memory for inclusion rather than the justification of violence. They warn that those who appropriate historical memory, whether for building up or tearing down, control its future (pp. 104-5).

While my first assessment of this book was its lack of coherence and clear contribution, I find myself still mulling over and talking with colleagues about many of its provocative points. Better editing and vetting for consistency, with a more theoretical introduction, would strengthen its impact. The wide range of writing genre and style is often distracting. It would be hard to assign the book to my undergraduate students. It took until I got to Lategan's Chapter 8 for me to fully grasp the role of the future in the process of memory, even though based on European theological examples. The theme of historical memory in relation to the future is only marginally addressed in many, nonetheless, interesting articles. For example, Macamo writes about the need for an African-generated Sociology to make sense of the experience of modernity (Mozambique). Diawara makes the case for the future-minded development industry to gain historical perspective (Mali). And Joubert argues that oral memory is still a significant way to

access lived experience (South Africa). The collection will be useful to scholars already versed in the field but not as an introduction.

The collection will certainly be useful for scholars interested in South Africa, the TRC, and the politics of memory. Many of the articles explore South Africa's attempts to reconfigure oral memory around a new majority democracy and the need for unity after apartheid. South Africa provides a model for studying the effects of investing enormous energy and public funds in historical memory. Other articles on South Africa take up commemoration of the South African War (Grundlingh), the politics of memory (Harries), and the TRC (Gobodo-Madikizela), while others use the TRC as a comparative case. These scholars explore South Africa as a nation founded on trauma yet seeking to include all citizens.

Other provocative issues surface without being fully resolved. New media, like internet and film, for housing public memory and transformations in concepts of time and space that affect historical memory (Jewsiewicki, Jourbert) suggest new avenues for research. Other authors focus on the use of public memory by the state to "perform the nation." A challenging point in this discussion is the current preference for the "voice of the witness" in public space, assumed to be unmediated and more authentic than a historian's interpretation. A "feel good" public/commercial history in South Africa thrives while the historical profession sinks into crisis (Harries). Similarly, the discourse of victimhood and identification with suffering is increasingly powerful in the commemoration of genocide. The victim narrative of colonialism however begins to ring false fifty years later and a new narrative of meaning has not unfolded (Bisanswa). The unifying message is that how we commemorate the past matters for lives today and can be influenced by how we think about possible futures.

Jan Bender Shetler, *Goshen College*

Donald L. Donham. *Violence in a Time of Liberation: Murder and Ethnicity at a South African Gold Mine, 1994.* **Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. xiv, 237 pp.**

Violence in a Time of Liberation captures the oddity and enigma of political violence that accompanied the luster and euphoria of 1994 in South Africa. To the outside world 1994 represents a year liberation, first democratic elections, and the historic voting in of Nelson Mandela as the first president of democratic South Africa. However, to many black Africans inside South Africa 1994 also represents extreme violence symbolic of the last dying breaths of a brutal regime. Conflicts along political lines especially between Inkatha, the African National Congress (ANC) members, and the third force engulfed many townships before and after the historic elections.

The author's goal in the book is to show the complexity of the roots of violence, which was often mislabeled by western media as ethnic conflicts between Zulus (Inkatha) and Xhosas (ANC). The author states that reading violence as simply Zulu (Inkatha) and Xhosa (ANC) conflict is inaccurate as the founding president of the ANC was Zulu, as is the current president. The book is based on an ethnographic case study of a goldmine in Johannesburg in 1994. The author reveals complexity of violence in the gold mine through narratives from

various stakeholders within the context of apartheid.   The book is divided into eight chapters excluding the preface and the post-script. It is a must read not only for anthropologists but also for people who want to understand the daily and intimate workings of the South African apartheid system within an institution, and the contradictions that marked the end of apartheid and the transition into political democracy. Photographs in the book (by Santu Mofokeng) enrich and complement the book's narratives.

The first chapter introduces the narrative of murders within the gold mine. The rest of the book provides an explication of why murders occurred according to the African workers, white workers, and the author himself. The author warns that narratives should be understood in the context of the general framework of apartheid, which simplified everything along racial and ethnic lines. He points out that simplification of everything along racial and ethnic lines was dialogic, externally imposed, and internally reified.   Narratives in the book are reflective of the dialogic nature of apartheid's imposition of racial and ethnic boundaries.

Above all, Donham delineates connectivity of forces, such as racialized capitalism and enforced segregation, which nurtured violence and brutality of the apartheid system. The author asserts that "blood and money" sustained the economy and brutality of apartheid and also psychologically occupied a significant space in the narratives of both black and white gold mine workers.

While the book is well researched, in the post-script the author implies that ANC aligned labor unions were well armed with modern weapons whereas Inkatha members had traditional weaponry. This implication overlooks evidence that emerged during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, which revealed that Inkatha and the third force were systematically armed with modern firearms by the apartheid government sympathizers. In sum, the book is well written and meets the goal of problematizing simplification of African conflicts to decontextualized ethnic conflicts. The author excellently delineates that narratives of violence in South Africa, or anywhere else, should be read as partial, incomplete, subjective, and located within a larger socio-political and economic context.

Shirley Mthethwa-Sommers, *Nazareth College*

David T. Doris. *Vigilant Things: On Thieves, Yoruba Anti-Aesthetics, and the Strange Fates of Ordinary Objects in Nigeria.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011. 420 pp.

According to the author, "This book, a study of objects, is also inevitably an ethnographic project. It is people, after all, who create, deploy, and interpret *à\lè*, and my goal has been to understand the objects as they fulfill their roles in the lives and thoughts of those people" (p. 27). Doris's book is of inestimable socio-cultural value because it thoroughly documents an aspect of Yoruba cultural semiotic, *à\lè*. To the best of my knowledge the book is the first of its kind that seems to fully put in book form hitherto apparently under-researched aspect of Yoruba objects or "things" of vigilance. According to the author, these are objects or "things" believed to possess or imbued with some kind of power or authority to protect valuables and

ward off or punish thieves who make away with such valuables. The enormity of the content of this book of *à
àlè* is a testimony to the relevance of the subject itself as an element of the traditions that organize the Yoruba ethnic group of Nigeria. The unreduced presence of *ààlè* in the Yoruba socio-semiotic life is palpable, as recorded in the book.

Putting the subject matter of *ààlè* in an interesting and clearer perspective, Doris pervades his study with history and origin, cultural definitions, forms and kinds, power and authorities, functions and essences, people and places, photographs and images, witnessed demonstrations, translations and interpretations, graphic descriptions (p. 140), cultural boundaries and linkages (p. 148), cultural memes, idiosyncrasies and significances (pp. 148-59). Clearly, according to the author, *ààlè* is n*ot* a pretty thing, it is repulsive and meant to repel with a promise to punish transgression of accepted behaviors in Yoruba society.

In the *Introduction*, Doris begins with a glimpse into the Ifé-Modákéké age long conflict brought into the picture by the author's encounter with one Mr. F.F. Afolábí, a victim of Ifé-Modákéké conflicts. The subject of attraction was the *ààlè* which Mr. Afólábí erected on a pile of wood. The pile of wood, on which the *ààlè* lies, makes meaning in the symbolic representation of Mr. Afolábí's poverty that the author significantly links to the larger thievery and pillaging of the Nigerian nation perpetrated by both military and civilian rulership. Doris's narration and encounter with Afolábí's *ààlè* cascade into description and definitions of what *ààlè* is and what it is not (pp. 14-20), drawing contrastive and relationship perspectives in the episteme of *àse*, "fetish," "medicinal *ààlè*," "artwork," and "*àwòrán*" (visual image) (pp. 16-20) in the Yoruba semiotic world.

The book is divided into three parts apart from the "Introduction" and "Coda": Part I, Crea*ting Ààlè* (segmented into two: Presence, Power and the Past, and Palm Fronts; *màrìwò*), II, *Call-and-Response* (segmented into two as well: What We Look at and Remember, and Color; *Àwò*), and III, Portraits and Punishments (segmented into four: An Ontology of the Broken, Corncobs; *Sùkù Àgbàdo,* Snail Shells; *Ìkarawun Ìgbín*, and Brooms; *Ìgbàlè*).

According to the book, no particular locale or origin could be associated with *ààlè*. However, the book, citing and abstracting possible multiple sources in Yoruba orature, historical narratives, social origin linked to *Ògbóni* society of honored elders, allegory drawn from Ifá divination, which proffers mythic origin, documents left by foreign travelers and British explorers, concludes that "*ààlè* have long played a significant role in the Yoruba cultural landscape, and that Yoruba people have long regarded them as powerful" (p. 38). In Part I, Doris engages both the relational dependency and epistemology of *ààlè* to how it is created, the power it issues, its essences and significances in Yoruba semiotic milieu, This account is integrated with demonstrated photographs (pp. 46-48, 52-55) and the semiotic of meaning which *ààlè* signifies. Most enlightening in this part is *ààlè* relational power dependency on and abstraction of authority from Yoruba semiotics of *ojú* (the index of power), *Ìlutí* (good hearing and appropriate response), *Ìpínhùn* (making agreement with *ààlè*), *Àyajó* (we borrow the day), and *Ìjúbà* (paying homage to the source of power). For example, on how it is created, readers will experience a first-hand documentation of the ritualistic processes of *ààlè* creation with the use of *màrìwò* (palm fronds) in which the author was directly "involved" (pp. 100-19). In this

relational dependency of creation and power of *àalè*, Doris concludes thus: "In the production of *àalè*, the person enters into a set of constitutive combinatory relationships, not only with the object, but also with the institutional forces that precede and exceed both subject and object. These collective forces- divine, social familial- authorize all utterances of power in Yoruba culture, sanctioning a person to act on their behalf. In this way, *àalè*, like better-known works of the Yoruba artistic canon, come to represent in traditional form- enduring, genuine, and very real- the lawful forces that bind the society together" (p. 49).

Parts II and III are replete with categories of well-documented "things" that can serve as *àalè*. These elements range from those that may be imbued with sacredness to ordinary disused things like a piece of red cloth, a worn shoe, *màrìwò* (palm front) (pp. 86-119), corncobs (pp. 280-302), rags, snail shell (pp. 303-23), brooms (pp. 324-42), broken pots and combinations of other things. Doris found that the creator of *àalè* has the latitude in the choice of objects depending on the object's limiting power (p. 123) and the context of application. These sections are particularly interesting because the author, in her categorization, apart from explaining the ontology of "things" in relation to *àalè* and how power issues to and from it, details the forms and types of things for the making of *àalè* (pp. 135-37). Their sources and descriptions (140), interpretation and symbolism (pp. 240-47) from Yoruba oral genre of *Ifá´* and orature, their ordinary and semiotic uses, their power abstractions and significances in relation to Yoruba people's existence and how they construct their world (pp. 123-24) are documented. In this, Doris discovered that the creation of 'fear," an abstraction of the power of *àalè*, is derived from the three-dimensional understanding of the presence of *àalè* image, the creator and the *èrí òkàn* (conscience) (p. 174) on the Yoruba metaphor of *seeing* (pp. 218-21) and semiotics of *àwòrán* (p. 163) "what we look at and remember" of the would-be thief.

Four major factors serve this book well: (1) an avalanche of sources of information; people and places, oral traditions, books and journals, history and archives, interviews and witnessed demonstrations; (2) a translation of Yoruba source language and cultural semiotics and interpretation into English; (3) photographs and images; and (4) an interpretive explanation of Yoruba semiotics like *àwò* (color) in interdependency relation with *àalè* and its signifying essence. These compelling factors will particularly attract Yoruba and none Yoruba readers to enjoy and understand the semiotics of *àalè* and its wider hermeneutics in Yoruba cultural milieu.

Yomi Okunowo, *University of the Western Cape, South Africa*.

Toyin Falola and Saheed Aderinto. *Nigeria, Nationalism, and Writing History*. Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2010. xiii, 333 pp.

It is not strange that Nigeria has been the subject of important publications on Africa by Africanist writers as well as Nigerian historians of different ilk and perspectives in the last two decades. The fact is that there are more publications on Nigeria written by non-Africans than those by Nigerians and other Africans. The cumulative effect of the ever-increasing interest in

Nigeria by non-Nigerian writers has been the projection and popularization of the country's history and traditions beyond its limited confines. The book under review is majorly concerned about the representations of Nigeria by pre-colonial and post-colonial Nigerian historians as they sought to counter Eurocentric stereotypes about the peoples and cultures of Nigeria during the particular historical epoch of their preoccupation. Spurred by nationalist fervor, Nigerian historians of the first and second generations, according to the authors, reconstructed the politics and economy of Nigeria's pre-colonial societies. The authors' main objective in addition to reflecting on historical renditions on Nigeria, was to re-introduce Africans into history writing about Africa in view of the diminishing share of African historians in the global output of literature on Africa.

In its sixteen chapters, the book chronicles the careers of nine of Nigeria's notable historians comprising K.O.Dike, Adiele Afigbo, J.F. Ade Ajayi, J.A.Atanda, Bolanle Awe, Obaro Ikime, G.O.Olusanya, Tekena Tamuno, and Yusufu Bala Usman. A chapter each was devoted to the works of these historians which also detailed their educational attainment as certified historians. The authors compared and contrasted the works of these historians to show how each of these historians interpreted such important topics as indirect rule, Christian missionary activities, the evolution of Nigerian state, the utility of oral traditions in historical writings, the origins of Nigerian peoples, and the formation of states and empire, among other subjects. In addition, the book classifies Nigeria's history into political, economic, social, and women's history. The concluding part of the book comprises two chapters which situated Nigeria's history within the context of African historiography while portraying the fragmented nature of the Nigerian nation as the trigger of its fragmented histories.

It is evident that the authors all through the book believe that by reviewing the scholarship of their selected Nigerian historians, they could generalize on the important role of historians in the production of knowledge. There was a celebratory tone in their analyses of the works of these "pioneers of Nigerian history, and indeed African history". Although the authors tried to justify the selection of the nine "notable Nigerian historians" as one made on grounds of their specific and unique focus, there is every reason to believe that some of the excluded Nigerian historians could have added value to the quality and substance of the book. For instance, the exclusion of E.A. Ayandele and Bolaji Idowu, foremost chroniclers of the Christian missionary incursion into Nigeria and Africa, makes the authors' historiography on Christian missionary activities in Nigeria an incomplete account.

Aside from the fact that the selection of Nigerian historians would appear to be unrepresentative of the diverse schools and thoughts in Nigerian historiography, there is an erroneous belief that only those who studied history and acquired postgraduate degrees in the discipline deserve to be spotlighted as celebrated historiographers as our authors have done. It was this mindset that influenced the authors' selection of Yusufu Bala Usman's radical scholarship while in actual fact notable Nigerian scholars such as Claude Ake, Bade Onimode, Ola Oni, etc rendered richer and incredibly pungent radical historical analyses than Yusufu Bala Usman.

However, the book under review is a well-written piece which highlights the different phases of Nigeria's history from pre-colonial era to the post-colonial times as captured through the historical prisms of some of Nigeria's foremost historians. The book presents a unique methodological approach to the study of Nigerian history. It is analytical in its presentation of historical facts and renders its arguments in logical sequence under some selected themes and sub-themes—a format that runs through the book. This style of presentation makes the book orderly and organized. The language usage of the authors is lucid and elegant thereby making the book comprehensible.

It would appear that the objective of the authors for writing the book is achievable especially when viewed against the backdrop of the growing realization across developing countries of the world that globalization has the potential of obliterating their cultures and values. Thus, our authors' counsel that Nigerian historians should study their country's history in new ways to comprehend its modernity and frame a new set of questions on Nigeria's future and globalization is sagacious. This book is a must-read for students and teachers of Nigerian history and anyone who is interested in Nigerian, and indeed African historiography.

John Olushola Magbadelo, *Centre for African and Asian Studies, Garki-Abuja, Nigeria*

Timothy Derek Fernyhough. *Serfs, Slaves and Shifta: Modes of Production in Pre-Revolutionary Ethiopia.* **Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2010. 344 pp.**

Tim Fernyhough passed away in 2003, and this book, which is based on his doctoral dissertation (University of Illinois, 1986), was later completed by his wife, Anna Fernyhough. The book offers new and original insights to economic structures and changes in various parts of Ethiopia. It is rich in details, well-documented, and treats a highly complex subject matter in a consistent manner. The phrase "pre-revolutionary Ethiopia" may be somewhat vague, as the period under question is from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries.

The discussion of this vast theme is structured around three main topics (which also constitute the book's three parts); that of feudalism, slavery, and the characteristics of banditry in Ethiopia. The investigation of feudalism in the first part (which is merely one chapter) is firmly situated within relevant research and contains interesting details and convincing arguments. Fernyhough embarks on a discussion of the relevance of the term feudalism for the Ethiopian context in general, and for southern Ethiopia in particular. He offers new and interesting insights to the existence of a feudal order in the states of south-western Ethiopia and argues that Menelik's conquest there merely brought a modification of this order. This was in clear contrast to other parts of southern Ethiopia, where the feudal system was a novel introduction, and where ethnicity and religion exacerbated tensions between northern settlers and the indigenous population. The bulk of the chapter is, however, devoted to the south-western part, and one could have wished for additional investigation into the economic structures of the south-east.

The second part (chapters 3-7), devoted to slavery and slaving in Ethiopia, discusses slave as a mode of production, the trajectories of the slave trade, and the gradual decline of slavery in the twentieth century. Fernyhough offers original insights into the institution of slavery in the south-western states, demonstrating that slavery coexisted with a feudal mode. Arguing that enslavement was "on a scale without parallel in the Horn of Africa," he amply demonstrates that the majority was engaged in domestic service, and that servile labor never surpassed forced agricultural labor and feudal rent. Whereas he touches upon the role of Muslims in the slave trade and Christian attitudes to slavery, more attention to this in relation to the particularities of Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia would surely have added value to the analysis. Fernyhough provides highly interesting insights on how international pressure and Haile Sellassie's attempts to curb provincial powers gradually led to a decline in slavery, yet argues convincingly that the increasing importance of tenant cultivators was a main factor in its demise. As he concludes, slavery became commercially irrelevant and socially anachronistic.

The third part (chapters 8-9) discusses the topic of banditry in Ethiopia. With Hobsbawm's concept of the "social bandit" as a point of departure, Fernyhough connects banditry to the feudal order, and rightly argues it was an expression of social protest, as well as a form for political and social mobility. He distinguishes between noble and peasant bandits, and provides relevant insights into differences between the north and the south, as well as within the southern regions. While the concept of banditry may be fitting for some cases, its general application arguably conceals some important nuances. My own ongoing research on this has revealed that armed insurgency in the south was, rather than banditry, an expression of political resistance to the Ethiopian state, and that ethnicity and religion were far more important factors than assumed.

This latter point relates to the theoretical perspective of the book, in which Fernyhough applies Marxian concepts with that of a mode of production as the primary analytical tool. The argument is that the unity of relations and forces of production determine the form of state authority and class structure, and the overall analysis is framed within a perspective in which economy and material realities are the fundamental forces. This consequently reduces the role of forces of a more ideological nature to merely a supra-structure. The book would have benefited from a broader approach, in which kinship, ethnicity, and religion ought to have been incorporated, and where such issues had been recognized as operating interchangeably with that of class. These comments notwithstanding, the book is a very important contribution to the field of Ethiopian studies, and should moreover be relevant for those interested in the economic history in Africa in general. Unfortunately, Shama Books has not done a very good job in producing this book, and a work like this would have deserved a better layout and copy-editing.

Terje Østebø, *University of Florida*

Jonathan Glassman. *War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar.* **Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011. xii, 398 pp**.

In *War of Words, War of Stones*, Jonathan Glassman seeks to reconcile the contradiction between "primordialist explanations of Zanzibar's racial divisions" and the common representation of cosmopolitan Zanzibar as "the epitome of ethnic fluidity and racial indeterminancy" (p. 5). Glassman challenges the perspective that Zanzibar's racial tensions were a direct result of colonial policy by arguing that it was in fact the influence of ideas produced by nationalist thinkers. This led to the "racialization of politics" that precipitated the violent pogroms of early 1960s Zanzibar (p. 108). Against the colonial backdrop where British rulers and educators played "important supporting roles" he analyzes how African protagonists developed the racial thought that precipitated and justified acts of violence in the years leading up to independence. The overarching narrative concentrates on how and why "Africans' efforts to imagine a postcolonial political community resulted in racial violence and dehumanizing racial thought" (p. ix).

Readers familiar with Glassman's previous book, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888* (Heinemann 1995) will see continuities in his approach to history. Here, in a study of a massive rebellion against the German colonial presence, he breaks from the mold of earlier "resistance" histories by reconstructing the motives of lower-class rebels "in settings where the most pervasive languages ordering social relations were those of paternalism and community rather than of class and nation, and where popular struggles were rarely concerned explicitly with issues of state power or the organizing of economic production" (p. xi). His analysis in this earlier work is also embedded in a comprehensive understanding of how cultural idioms shaped the motivations of local actors. In both works, Glassman is careful to stress that these historical trajectories were not inevitable. In *War of Words, War of Stones*, he tries to go beyond the simple stereotypes, despite the fact that his analysis may offend "many politically engaged Zanzibaris" because it breaks from the reigning normative mold of typecasting clear heroes and villains (p. x).

In Part I's two introductory chapters, Glassman critiques dominant instrumentalist and structuralist "misapprehensions" of African ethnicity and race to explain why he instead focuses on the "role African thinkers played in the construction of race" (p. 8). Part II, "War of Words," looks at the emergence of "exclusionary ethnic nationalism" amongst the secular intelligentsia before turning to subaltern intellectuals' discourse. Glassman then emphasizes transformations in civil society during the late 1950s and early 1960s, which can be seen in the "newspaper wars" where the racially charged vitriol of the press contributed to "politicizing every day life" (p. 149). In the final part of the book, he shows how the "war of words" influenced and led to the "war of stones," the June 1961 election riots. The substantive part of this book ends on the eve of the 1964 revolution, which means the coup and its aftermath are not discussed. In his conclusion and epilogue he connects his argument to the formation of contemporary Zanzibari identities.

Glassman offers a bold and persuasive argument that challenges much scholarship on

ethnicity, race, and colonial influence in Africa. He contends that "the rise of racial thought in colonial Zanzibar was largely the work of indigenous intellectuals, including those at the forefront of mainstream nationalism, who in their debates and disputations created a locally hegemonic discourse of racial difference" (p. 7). This contrasts with much of the prevailing literature, which assumes that ethnic conflicts arise from colonial created social structures.

Contrary to growing trend to use and insist on oral evidence, Glassman discounts oral traditions as understandings of the past, not recordings of them, and instead relies upon "the words of Zanzibari historical actors as they were recorded" (p. xi). He is critical of the "ingrained propensity in African studies to privilege oral sources" as more authentic, which he sees instead as "allowing nationalists to shape the historical record with their own post factor self-representations" (p. 7).

This book is a well organized and well written account of Zanzibar's "time of politics," a period spanning from the first elections in 1957 until independence in 1963. A critical political and intellectual history, this book is required reading for anyone interested in Tanzania's history. It, moreover, is a valuable contribution to literature on racial thought and relations in Africa that will appeal widely to both scholars and students.

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Robert A. Hill and Edmond J. Keller (eds). *Trustee for the Human Community: Ralph J. Bunche, the United Nations, and the Decolonization of Africa.* **Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010. 205 pp.**

This essay collection focuses on Bunche's academic and diplomatic relationship to Africa. Unpacking the Nobel laureate's relationship to the continent, then, is the most useful purpose for the work. Although *Trustee for the Human Community* is comprised of conference papers from events celebrating Bunche's centennial birthday, it does not aim to serve as a comprehensive biography or examination of the subject's personal or professional life away from Africa, but it is notably the first major study of Bunche's role there.

Trustee for the Human Community contains ten essays that analyze Bunche and Africa in three specific contexts. In Part One, Martin Kilson, Robert Edgar, Elliott P. Skinner, and Pearl T. Robinson discuss Bunche's academic relationship to Africa, writing on his experiences during dissertation research and the degree to which these intellectual pursuits influenced the future statesman's career. Part Two expands upon this discussion, with Neta C. Crawford, John Olver, Crawford Young, and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja writing primarily on Bunche's role in developing the United Nations' Trusteeship system and discussing his contentious relationship with Patrice Lumumba during work in the Congo. These two parts do of course overlap. It becomes readily apparent that Bunche saw his intellectual and diplomatic pursuits as intricately connected, and the essayists take care to describe the inner dissonance their subject often experienced when theoretical ideals and practical ones did not seem to prove compatible. Ralph A. Austen and Charles Henry conclude in Part Three by providing general reflections on Bunche and his accomplishments in both arenas.

Though this book initially adopts a celebratory tone toward Bunche at his centenary, it does so with a fairly nuanced view of the subject. Rather than being a saviour or visionary, Bunche becomes a complex individual whose legacy remains subject to interpretation, as each essayist interprets it slightly differently. This, again, is the strength of the book. It is purely a work on Bunche, rather than meeting Hill and Keller's goal of an examination of decolonization and African Americans in Africa more generally. Several of the authors do debate whether Bunche should be viewed as representative of Westerners involved in Africa or African Americans interested in Africa, and while the answer may sometimes be yes, Bunche remains unique in many important respects.

The role of the United Nations in Africa may be a little overplayed, particularly toward the end of the book when essayists describe the international body's interactions with the newly-independent Congo but largely exclude a description of United States or European actions there. The UN does become a useful space for analyzing the connection between Bunche's academic and practical interests, as his work within the organization is based both upon the theoretical conclusions of his dissertation and its ramifications for reforming the Trusteeship system as well as on his lived experiences as an African American living in an imperial society. Bunche's work within the UN is portrayed as both radical and pragmatic, as well as somewhat contradictory; the man who believed so strongly in the need for decolonization and independence still viewed African and Asian countries as needing guidance from the West under the Trusteeship and Mandate systems and refused to accept Pan-Africanism as a productive mechanism for facilitating decolonization despite his belief in connections between Africans in the Old and New Worlds.

Bunche also becomes both a pawn of the UN and one of its directors. The differing viewpoints of each essayist set up this dichotomy. Thus, the work's subject becomes a complex and complicated person. *Trustee for the Human Community* remains, however, a highly Bunche-centered work, not only in terms of subject matter, but also in its discussions. While the essays focus on Bunche's perceptions of Africa and Africans, there is little indication in any of them as to how African leaders—or his UN colleagues—viewed Bunche. Integrating these perspectives would have added to the discussion on the complexity of Ralph Johnson Bunche. Additionally, the book indirectly argues that Bunche's greatest achievements are his ones in the diplomatic field. Although his intellectual and practical pursuits are related, they eventually culminate with his role at the UN. Toward the beginning of the book, Martin Kilson notes that Bunche became the first dissertator at an American university to utilize African fieldwork in his studies. The focus, however, remains on Bunche as a diplomat rather than an intellectual.

Trustee for the Human Community does fulfil its goal of presenting an in-depth look at Bunche's role in African decolonization and his relationship with the continent. While more information on perceptions of Bunche would have been welcome, it is overall a nuanced view of an often-celebrated and occasionally-maligned African American. As a short and fairly simple read, it should be appropriate for generalists or undergraduate audiences, as well as Africanists seeking a better understanding of Bunche.

Myra Ann Houser, *Howard University*

Douglas H. Johnson. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce?* **Suffolk: James Currey, 2011. xix, 236 pp.**

Following the overwhelming vote of southern Sudanese for independence from Sudan in January 2011 and the establishment of the new Republic of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, Douglas Johnson has revised *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, first published in 2003. This revised (and final) edition contains a new preface and concluding chapter and is targeted at students, policy makers, and activists seeking a thoughtful and succinct analysis of Sudan's history.

Johnson is well-qualified to explain the root causes of Sudan's civil wars to those unfamiliar with that country. He holds a PhD in Sudanese history and is the general editor at James Currey, which publishes quality academic works on Africa. The book under review relies on Johnson's considerable knowledge of Sudan, built from considerable time living and travelling in the country. Johnson's work is characterised by his sympathy for those peoples marginalised by the central government, particularly in the south, but he is no apologist for the often destructive actions of some southern leaders.

Johnson's intent is look into Sudan's past to identify the root causes of conflict, which defy resolution and threaten the long-term reconciliation between the central government and excluded peoples throughout the country. The root causes are:

- An exploitive relationship between the centre and the peripheries
- Militant Islam
- Premature granting of independence in 1956
- A nationalist movement narrowly based on the northern elite
- Economic weakness in the north, compounded by growing awareness of the south's natural resources
- Self-interested involvement of foreign governments and investors in Sudanese affairs.

Each root cause is strongly woven into Johnson's narrative, giving the reader a nuanced analysis of Sudan's history and an understanding as to why any "solution" to Sudan's conflicts must address the grievances of the marginalised who have had little reason to date to trust the state (and international mediation efforts for that matter). Johnson concludes that these root causes of conflict can only be addressed by replacing the authoritarianism of the past with a long term process of democratic transition. However, his assessment of whether the current peace initiative based on the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement will deliver peace is gloomy but spot on:

> Self-determination for the South has finally resolved the longest running dispute of Sudan's independence, but it has done so by deferring a comprehensive peace for all Sudanese. The principles of 'democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens' have yet to be established. Peace may finally come if they take root in the new republic of the South at the same time that the struggle to realise the promise of the CPA continues in the old Sudan. (p. 180)

Although Johnson traces the origins of at least one of his root causes – the exploitation of the peripheries by the centere – to the early Nile states prior to the Turco-Egyptian conquest of

the Sudan in 1820, the focus of the book remains firmly on Sudan's recent history. The history of the early Nile states is completed in under four pages. In contrast, Johnson's analysis of colonial and post-colonial Sudan takes 171 pages. Johnson is at his best in discussing the post-independence period and does an admirable job in making sense of the intricate politics of Sudan from the 1970s onwards.

Those readers new to Sudan will find the chronology invaluable, but the usefulness of the bibliographical essay, which was a strength of the original edition, may be limited for some. Apart from a new section at the end of the essay on Dafar and the CPA, the rest of the esssay does not appear to have been updated since the book was first published in 2003. Thus, the essay omits reference to Robert O. Collins' *A History of Modern Sudan* (2008), which is also an excellent survey of Sudanese history. Similarly, the essay lists the Human Rights Watch publication, *Sudan, Oil and Human Rights Abuses* as forthcoming, when it was in fact published in 2003.

My comment on the currency of the bibliography, however, is a very minor quibble that should not detract from the value of this book to the non-specialist reader. Johnson's analysis of the conflicts in Sudan is clear and incisive. By updating the book to include southern Sudan's independence, Johnson has given us a very important and useful survey history of Sudan.

Sonny Lee, *Independent Scholar, Adelaide, Australia*

Michelle T. Kuenzi. *Education and Democracy in Senegal.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. xiii, 190 pp.

Education and Democracy in Senegal is an important contribution in the field of education in Senegal and in Africa. Kuenzi's book presents her research on Senegalese education that examines the effects of non-formal education (NFE) on civic participation and behaviors. Kuenzi compares NFE to both formal and Koranic education in Senegal and argues that NFE "tends to be more supportive of democratic values and less authoritarian than those without NFE" (p. 22-23). To advance her argument, Kuenzi engages a qualitative research study in Senegal's non-formal education. Moreover, to investigate NFE at its core, she chooses to utilize a survey methodology of rural Senegalese citizens.

Kuenzi's book consists of seven chapters. The first chapter highlights the theoretical foundations of the NFE in general, and specifically NFE in Africa. She posits that NFE is more culturally relevant in comparison to formal education and therefore more pertinent to Senegalese citizens. Thereafter, the author takes the reader through a literary analysis of literature in modernization theories that support her argument that non-formal education fosters positive political and democratic attitudes in its citizens. Chapter Two provides a contextual background of the politics of Senegal from the pre-colonial to the post-independence period and how this contextual background influenced and continues to influence education in Senegal. Further in the chapter, Kuenzi brings in a discussion of the Senegalese presidential election in 2000 and its remarkable impact on ethnicity, history, politics, and religion in the

country. Chapter Three offers an overview of the history of education in Senegal beginning with the French colonial rule and its influence on the education system through to the current education system.

In Chapter Four, Kuenzi embarks on her qualitative research study by presenting the different aspects of her study including its design, sample population and its applicability to the countries around the world. Chapter Five presents an analysis of the findings as it relates to and supports civic and social political attitudes and participation. The results as is expected from the modernization theories advanced at the outset, suggested that NFE considerably appears to promote positive changes in political and civic behaviors and attitudes. Both Chapters Five and Six analyze research findings from the survey conducted in rural Senegal. While chapter five discusses at length a bivariate analysis of the findings, Chapter Six focuses on multivariate analysis of the findings. The final chapter offers Kuenzi's thoughtful observation and presents policy implications of NFE in Senegal. She particularly focuses on how the findings affect and impact women empowerment in general, as this is the group mostly benefiting from NFE. In conclusion, with regard to validity of the study, Kuenzi applies different qualifying checks including giving specific details of the research context and methodology. She particularly presents the minute details as to the qualifying checks and measures that were put in place, most importantly, to minimize errors and to give the reader a comprehensive and substantive picture of the study.

Kuenzi makes a solid contribution to the literature on education in Senegal and on non-formal education in general. She succeeds in advancing her argument that NFE has positive effects in its adult citizens by influencing their democratic choices in voting and in approaching community leaders. However, Kuenzi does not explicitly and evidentially show how the NFE helps individuals to reach for leadership positions or provide examples of individuals who benefited from NFE and made discernable changes in their lives, society or in their country as a whole. Rather the positive democratic behaviors and attitudes seem superficial and do not demonstrate active political participation and involvement. Also in putting emphasis on NFE as being more favorable to democratic practices, the author tends to underestimate the impact of other forms of education such as Koranic education in empowering its recipients. Furthermore, I found her selective use of modernization theory as appropriate but rather contrived, particularly when ideas are wheeled out to support the author's own position. The qualitative study would benefit more if an a priori research design was utilized to give room for emergent frameworks from the field.

In conclusion, besides filling a gap in literature on non-formal education in Senegal, the book is a noteworthy addition to literature in education in Africa and literature on the development of democratic citizenship education. Kuenzi's book will likely be valuable to scholars and students in the education field and to those engaged in African studies.

Anne Jebet Waliaula, *University of Wisconsin, Madison.*

Janie L. Leatherma. *Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict.* **Cambridge and Oxford, UK, and Boston: Polity Press, 2011. 242 pp.**

Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict offers a comprehensive look at the issue of sexual violence in modern warfare. Leatherman asserts at the outset that sexual violence is neither a new or modern day phenomenon. History has informed us that rape has been part of warfare since time immemorial. It may not have been openly discussed as Leatherman explains that historically it was taboo to investigate sexual violence in armed conflict, one reason being it is seemingly impossible to understand these acts. But what has changed? Many people still find it hard to understand the barbaric acts of sexual violence, more so in an information age where graphic images of victims of modern warfare are easily accessible.

Notwithstanding, the present information overload can lead to viewer fatigue and an ensuing lack of understanding and empathy. I recently read an article about "Land of Blood and Honey," the upcoming movie by the actress Angelina Jolie based on the Bosnia War. The readers were asked to comment on the article. The following comment was quite striking: "War is war. Rape is a consequence of war. Every war known to man has had rapes in them. As wrong as it may be, it has happened and will always happen. Just as people are killed, Collateral damage is always there too. Stop looking for the ultimate answer because nothing you do or anyone else does will stop torture and rape in wars. I wish it would but that is not reality" (http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/04/opinion/lemmon-jolie-movie-women-war/index.html?iref=allsearch). Nonetheless, in this highly conceptualized book, Leatherman offers an analytical framework to define the many reasons that have been put forward for sexual violence in armed conflict. The book offers a much needed structure to studying the issue as a subject in its own right and is a must read for students pursuing courses in modern warfare and other related courses.

Leatherman draws from three theories—essentialism, structuralism, and social constructivism—which she used to complement the wealth of information drawn from case studies and research on conflict and post conflict countries like the DRC, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Bosnia. She regards sexual violence in war as a runaway norm that crosses four thresholds: (i) the type of violence of which rape is the act most commonly associated with sexual violence in war,(ii) its target, (iii) agency, and (iv) the loss of neutrality and safe space.

At the heart of Leatherman's argument is the feminist concept of patriarchy. Gender inequality predisposes women to the type of violence experienced not only in war but peace time. In true Feminist style it is argued that this subordinate position women occupy is no coincidence. In chapter 3 Leatherman successfully argues this point by drawing from cross-national studies that demonstrates the role of gender inequality in the social construction of violence. Numerous studies conducted by reputable organizations show that social and cultural practices in many societies go unquestioned and increasingly portray women and girls as vulnerable thereby exposing them to further risks when law and order breaks down. Leatherman's feminist approach cannot be overstated and is bound to spark the debate with critics of feminism, who are quick to draw from the few successes of gender equality to claim

that the feminist movement has achieved its goals. It is against this token achievement that I wish to urge caution when Leatherman claims that with the creation of national and international laws prohibiting the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war the day of impunity is over for the militarized capitalist system. But which of the players in that system can be held accountable? We know that key players mentioned in chapter—the most insightful chapter of the book—such as the mining companies in the eastern Congo are not. In 2011, Global Witness, a whistle blowing NGO, withdrew from the Kimberley Process citing KP's refusal to address the clear links between diamonds, violence, and tyranny. There is also the herculean task of institutional reforms in highly patriarchal countries like Sierra Leone where gender inequalities are entrenched through discriminatory laws and customs. High levels of poverty and illiteracy also prevents women in such societies from seeking to uphold their internationally recognized rights.

The silence may have ended but justice for women like Boali, "one of 13 women who had the courage to testify before the King's Commission in the Congo Free State" (p. 11), is a long way off. Nonetheless, *Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict* is another milestone in the effort to end sexual violence, be it in peace or war time.

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Simon Lewis. *British and African Literature in Transnational Context*. Gainesville: Florida University Press, 2011. 257 pp.

This book is a powerful call for ceasing to write the story of Africa and Africans from Anglo-centric, metropolitan, racist, and hegemonic or narrowly nationalist perspectives. It advocates a liberation of African literature from any tutelage and insists on the place, contribution, and centrality of African literature in the British literary and world canons. Equally, it is about intersections, interrelations, and interconnectedness and shows how Africans and the British share a great deal of their literary and historical traditions. This, however, has not been reflected in the writing and rewriting of Africa and Africans, since African literature is still perceived as an appendage to the British one.

A wide and rich variety of texts for analysis provide dialectical readings of nation, race, ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality. Some belong to authoritative writers such as Chinua Achebe, Buchi Emecheta, Wole Soyinka, T.S Eliot, and Caryl Churchill; others are not yet part of the canons like Abdulrazak Gurnah, Alan Hollinghurst, Yvette Christianse, and Chris Van Wyck. All these writers belong to British and African traditions; span a long span of time extending from 1958 to 2007; represent different parts of Africa and different African identities; and come from different political orientations in terms of their national, racial, ethnic, gender, class, and sexual affiliations.

Simon Lewis is a staunch Saidist. He is driven by Edward Said's ideological motivations and uses the same conceptual tools the latter used in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993): "a new integrative or contrapuntal orientation in history that sees western and non-western experiences as belonging together because they are connected with imperialism;" " an imaginative, even

utopian vision which re-conceives emancipatory theory and performance" and "an investment in a particular sort of nomadic, migratory, and anti-narrative energy" (Said, p. 279).

Lewis's significant addition is his capacity in his analysis of these diverse readings of the constructions of Africa and Africans to go beyond the contrapuntal reading of africanism of colonialist discourse and that of pan-Africanist rhetoric. He rejects racially exclusive nationalism, which can solely produce narrowly national literary canons accompanied by local tyranny and advocates hybridity to subvert such nationalism. Yet, Lewis maintains that the national identity of individuals within a given state together with the national sovereignty for the national within the international community should be affirmed.

One of the major objectives of this book is to thoroughly oppose Manichean impulses, which view history exclusively in conflict terms and reduces it to an ongoing binary opposition between them and us. Lewis is strongly critical of nativism, racism, and European colonialism and the supporting discourses that have lasted well beyond the formal period of colonialism. Race is a social construct, he suggests, with no biological basis, and this argument partly aims at undermining and eventually do away with it. That is the humanist aspect of the book in asserting the transnational nature of the whole field of writing in English about Africa in the second half of the twentieth century by demonstrating that British literature about Africa and African literature in English are one and cannot be perceived as separate lexicons because the history of Britain and that of Africa have been intersecting for long. For this purpose, Lewis claims the recognition and full inclusion of African literature written in English in the orthodox canon and histories of English-language literature.

Similarly, though inspired by Said's model of contrapuntal reading, Lewis does not champion any single and uniform approach and does not claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of the selected texts in spite of the wide geography and history they cover. His motive is rather to undo whatever damage colonial Africanist and African nationalist discourses have done to Africa and African identity with words.

The main part of Lewis's critique is directed at authors' representation of Africa and Africans and their stubborn insistence in reproducing generalizing tropes of African otherness and neglecting local specificities. His texts show the hegemonic role of English as a linguistic medium in which the narrative of the world became the sacred word. Englishness is moreover depicted as an exclusively male construction based on an amalgam of attitudes towards others, whether their otherness is defined in terms of race, nation, class or gender.

For Lewis, English is still a racially exclusive category not yet prepared to house African writers of the calibre of Achebe or Soyinka. These and others remain invisible in the still selective and nationalist English literary history. It is not striking, therefore, that these Anglophone African writers each in his/her way travel between and most often blend narratives that focus on local differences and narratives that highlight universal commonalities.

Adel Manai, *University Tunis El-Manar*

JoAnn McGregor. *Crossing the Zambezi: The Politics of Landscape on a Central African Frontier.* **Suffolk: James Currey, 2009. 237 pp.**

JoAnn McGregor undertakes a challenging endeavor: to historicize the processes of claim-making developed between 1850s and 2000 along both margins of a mid-Zambezian landscape. This history of competing cultural, political, and economic claims to and appropriations of the Zambezi is limited to the section of the river between Victoria Falls and Lake Kariba. According to the author, imperial explorations of and colonial interventions in the mid-Zambezi and their unsettled legacies influenced post-colonial conflicts over the waters in this part of the river. Thus, McGregor begins this history of competing claims over the mid-Zambezi frontier during a series of "dramatic episodes" (p. 4) and their impact on the landscape and the river populations. This constitutes the basis for the first of the author's two storylines. These episodes include David Livingston's "discovery" of the Falls in the mid-nineteenth century, followed by the construction of the Victoria Falls Bridge in 1905 and of the Kariba Dam in the early1950s. The second storyline focuses on the struggle over the Zambezi as a borderland, an analysis that embraces both the complex dynamics of the pre-colonial frontier as well as the subsequent formation of the colonial state border. Here the author pays special attention to the politics of border identity and explores how imaginary as well as material aspects of colonial and post-colonial frontiers relate to pre-colonial hierarchical relations between decentralized groups and the major state systems in the nineteenth century.

The book consists of ten chapters. The introductory first chapter sums up some of the recent scholarship on landscape that informs and frames the study. Drawing on the borrowed notion of "sites of memory" (p. 9), however, with an emphasis not only on narratives but also on counter-narratives, contestation, and alternative sites on the river, McGregor aims to avoid depoliticized and ahistorical constructions in this excellent study. Her analytical approach is clearly trans-disciplinary, combining concepts raised in historical geography, history, and anthropological oriented theory. The following two chapters contain insights into pre-colonial history and examine imperial discourses about the mid-Zambezi. Thus, chapter two discusses oral histories told by present-day "river people" – specifically those related to river-crossing and to some ritual practices at particular landscape sites – for they evince "pre-colonial modes of discourse" (p. 18) of chiefless people, the politics of a late nineteenth century frontier, and people's material relations with the river at that time. Chapter three reevaluates Livingston's ethnographic writings, tracing accurately the way local interpreters' ideas along the route influenced him and shaped his writings, as much as the transition process by which the river changed from being considered a "natural border" to its definition as a boundary between colonial states. The consequences of marking the border are analyzed in chapter four. Here, McGregor goes into detail on the impact that the new state structures of authority and colonial law had on the decentralized "river people," and their gradual marginalization from the new political and economic centers. Chapters five and six turn to the construction of two mega-engineering works, the Victoria Falls Bridge and the Kariba Dam, emphasizing their political uses within the expansionist colonial state and the way they affected the formation of identity of the Tonga communities. Chapter six reconstructs the process of their displacement and

resettlement in Northern and Southern Rhodesia after the damming of the river. Chapters seven and eight focus on the development of a nationalist consciousness in the Zambezi borderlands exemplified in the Tonga and Nambya ethnic mobilizations and on the politics of cultural recognition, its demands and stress on cultural difference, which took shape after independence. Methodologically innovative, chapter nine deploys commissioned diaries from Kariba Tonga gillnet fishermen to explore their present-day fishing and trading livelihoods, which shed light on local networks and on both legal and unregulated practices in relation to state authority. The last chapter discusses the post-colonial political uses of the landscape, tourism, and heritage industries at Victoria Falls, analyzing their influence on local claims today.

This excellent work is a pleasure to read and will be of interest not only to historians, geographers, and anthropologists concerned with southern and central Africa, but also to Africanist scholars and students at large. Perhaps a glossary listing the acronyms used in some chapters could be of help for readers unfamiliar with the area and the research topic. Despite the good selection of photographs and other visual aids supportive of the text, the addition of some more maps to locate the area of study in the districts of Hwange and Binga would have been welcomed. Nevertheless, McGregor's ability to deploy an extensive array of different sources throughout her analysis is exceptional and doubtless one of the attractions of this stimulating and well-documented book.

In sum, McGregor's study contributes significantly to historicize complex claim-making processes in Africa within a framework of *longue durée*, skilfully including the pre-colonial past into the analysis. Arguable is to what extent present-day oral sources of the Tonga (in myths, tales, and rituals) may be regarded as "pre-colonial modes of discourse." The author's goal in this study is less about theorizing than about historicizing processes and transitions, and this goal is masterly fulfilled.

Olga Sicilia, *University of Vienna*

Elias Mpofu (ed.). *Counseling People of African Ancestry*. **New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. xix, 332 pp.**

This book is aimed at psychologists, counselors, social workers, and other helpers "working with Africans, people of African ancestry, or with an African cultural heritage" (p. xv). As defined in this book, "an African ancestry identity goes beyond race, skin color, or geographic location to include anyone who proclaims African self-hood" (p. xv). The twenty chapters in the book are divided into three parts, and a concluding chapter synthesizes and integrates the discourse on the book's themes. The first section of the book focuses upon the foundations of counseling in African settings and includes chapters on such topics as the role of indigenous healing practices in Sub-Saharan Africa, the role of oral tradition, issues regarding assessments for counseling, the history of counseling research in African settings, and building an empowerment model in the context of racial oppression and colonization. The second section of

the book examines counseling in various contexts, and chapters here focus on school counseling, counseling students at tertiary institutions, family therapy, pastoral care and counseling, refugees, orphans and vulnerable children, and the relationship of the social psychology of peace-building and conflict resolution to counseling. One chapter in the book focuses upon diversity counseling with African-Americans, and reviews issues regarding understanding culturally appropriate counseling interventions, notes barriers to counseling, considers the impact of counselor-client discussions of race, and identifies a paucity of research with such populations as elders and multiracials. The third part of the book offers several chapters devoted to various counseling applications, including trauma, HIV/AIDS, substance use disorder (including the most commonly abused substances in Africa, alcohol, cannabis, and khat, and lesser known ones, such as tik), careers, and people with disabilities.

The book's editor, Elias Mpofu, is a professor of rehabilitation counseling in Sydney, Australia. He brings over twenty years of experience to this project, with research interests in disability, complementary, and alternative health (CAM), and, of course, Africa. Most of the chapter contributors hail from Southern Africa (predominantly South Africa, as well as Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), though several are based at universities in the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and other nations around the globe. Most of the authors are PhD psychologists, though contributors also include a MD and a MSW. This geographic range permits discussion of a range of essential topics. One hopes that future projects adapt this volume's format and expand it to consider more fully other regions in Africa. As Lopez and colleagues note, the "ethnocultural milieu of contemporary Africa is highly heterogeneous, contrary to the stereotypes held by many Westerners" (p. 57). Of course, periodically some authors do discuss other regions in Africa and around the globe, for instance when discussing Somali refugees to Australia (p. 287) or refugees and displaced persons from the Great Lakes Region. Furthermore, Mpofu reminds readers that "within African cultural heritage settings, there is considerable diversity in cultural aspects salient to subgroups within the same generic mix, for which creative or innovative approaches to counseling services provision would be necessary" (p. 313).

A number of the chapters emphasize the challenges involved when Western psychological approaches meet African cosmologies and ways of knowing. Repeatedly, the chapter authors note the value and importance of respecting traditional healers and indigenous healing and spiritual systems. In fact, according to the authors of the present book, "about eighty percent of Africans seek health care services—and by extension mental health care services—from traditional healers" (p. 314). Authors here argue that rather than accept a situation in which old and new systems operate at cross purposes, as has often been the case since colonial times, counselors and other helpers should focus on facilitating and improving collaboration and dialogue between counselors and traditional healers, and on improving integration of more formal counseling systems with indigenous healing systems. For thousands of years, traditional practices have been a source of comfort and healing for Africans in times of unbearable pain and despair. Rather than attempting to overturn such practices, which would largely be impossible, the authors argue for integration, collaboration, and mutual respect.

Several chapter authors point out that research methods appropriate for the African context may include more qualitative, ethnographic, narrative, and phenomenological approaches in contrast to the positivistic, quantitative approach of some Western psychological work. However, one approach of the West that may more easily apply to Africa is family therapy, as the role of the extended family and community in many African societies has long been recognized by traditional healers and by people of African ancestry. Thus, the fact that published family therapy research thus far hails mostly from the USA is troubling, especially in light of such facts as in forty-seven years not one article with a first author from the Middle East or Africa has been published in the journal *Family Process* (p. 143).

Indeed, many contributors note the paucity of research on psychological issues in Africa, particularly regarding questions concerning the appropriateness of Western psychological assessments and diagnoses in the Africa context. For instance, Western psychometric assessments for career development are often inappropriate for use in the South African context, where narrative approaches and qualitative career assessments may offer a better fit (p. 290). Other issues in cross-cultural assessment include differing conceptualizations and classifications of illnesses, linguistic equivalence of instruments such as surveys, appropriateness of test content, measurement, and delivery method, and the cultural relevance of the assessment. For example, does a given assessment really measure cognitive ability or only amount of formal education? Since "in many societies the formal education system is essentially chauvinistic, patriarchal, racist, and sexist," with "research based on dominant white groups in America and other Western countries" (p. 142), an assessment that in reality only measures such education and its correlates is problematic at best.

The present book never shies away from revealing uncomfortable information regarding racial oppression and the impact of colonization, or troubling statistics regarding health issues, yet it also offers evidence based reason for optimism and hope. For instance, readers learn that over eleven percent of South Africans have been victims of a violent crime in a one year period, twenty-three percent of adults there have been exposed to one or more violent events and eighty percent of adolescents in Cape Town have experienced at least one traumatic event (pp. 236-37). However, elsewhere in the book, authors point to inspiring stories such as how a community intervention in Stellenbosch (near Cape Town), based upon liberation and empowerment concepts transformed a group of youth. Approaches such as mentored field trips, including one to Robben Island, aimed at engaging youth with history and encouraging them to rise beyond adversities which may currently limit them. While such techniques seem far from the standard fifty-minute therapeutic counseling hour common in the Unites States, evidence presented in this book suggests that these positive psychological techniques are an appropriate fit for this African setting.

One concept that is referred to extensively throughout the book is *Ubuntu.* The importance of this concept for counseling is underscored by the fact that it appears in so many of the book's chapters. This complex term is difficult to simply translate, but Watson and colleagues offer an extended discussion of it in their chapter, explaining how this Nguni term and related terms are common in Southern Africa, and how it derives from a Bantu word referring to personhood (p.

282). The term implies, among other dimensions, the meaning of life through human relations, communal spirituality and ceremony, the importance of respecting, caring for, and helping others, group solidarity, and human interdependence. The authors emphasize the process dimension of the concept, in the sense of becoming fully (that is, a moral) human and note that Nelson Mandela refers to a proverb which reflects the *Ubuntu* concept: "A person is a person because of other people" (p. 282). The concept relates profoundly to the topic of counseling people of African ancestry as several authors make clear.

In sum, this book represents a landmark contribution to our understanding of counseling people of African ancestry and offers an indispensable resource for psychologists and other care providers working with such populations. Additionally, each chapter of the book is carefully designed with features that make the book attractive as an instructional text, appropriate for college and university level students. Such features include chapter overviews and learning objectives printed at the start of each chapter, and full bibliographies, lists of useful websites, self-check exercises, and field-based experiential exercises at the end of each chapter. Chapters also include ample research, discussion, and case study boxes, each of which includes several questions that will certainly inspire reflection and stimulating conversation. Beyond those helping professionals already mentioned, all who care about Africa should read this book.

Omar Ahmed and Grant J. Rich, *International Psychology Bulletin,Juneau, Alaska*

Mara Naaman. *Urban Space in Contemporary Egyptian Literature: Portraits of Cairo***. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2011. Xxv, 227 pp.**

Mara Naaman's *Urban Space in Contemporary Egyptian Literature* is part of the exciting growing literature situated at the disciplinary crossroads of literary/cultural studies and urban studies/social geography. Writing in the tradition of the theoretical explorations of space and place pioneered by the likes of Walter Benjamin, Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord, Edward Soja, and Mike Davis, Naaman and other similarly oriented contemporary critics takes as their point of departure how—space being zoned, politicized, and symbolically laden—places produce texts, which in turn make these sites "legible" for readers (pp. 1, 11-12). Naaman's study focuses on recent novelistic representations of the Wust al-Balad district of Cairo, a quarter developed—based on the model of Hausssmann's Paris—during the eighteen sixties and seventies in order to present a "modern" face of Egyptian to the wider (i.e. Western) world. In doing so, she focuses specifically on the manner in which Radwa 'Ashur's *A Piece of Europe* (2003), Khayri Shalabi's *Salih Hisa* (2000), Idris 'Ali's *Poor* (2005), and Alaa al-Aswany's *The Yacoubian Building* (2003) negotiate the confluence of colonization, incipient nationalism, modernization, and spectacle that Wust al-Balad marked over the course of the twentieth century.

Naaman admirably follows her program of charting literary responses to the manner in which "the battle over the modern Egyptian subject was waged in [the] space" of Wust al-Balad (p. 177), whose spatio-social psychological importance was recently highlighted by the

revolutionary protests that erupted in its Tahir Square during the early months of 2011, leading to the downfall of pro-American dictator Hosni Mubarak. In her analysis of *A Piece of Europe* Naaman argues that for 'Ashur Wust al-Balad represented a European model of modernity foisted upon the people of Egypt and thus alienating them until, with the looting and burning of January 1952, they could popularly resist and reclaim this exogenous spatial imposition. Shalabi's Salih Hisa, on the other hand, poses an alternative, indigenous form of being modern and urbane through its evocation of the society and cultural exchanges of a *ghurza* (hashish café) located adjacent to Wust al-Balad, according to Naaman. Much more critical of Egyptian society due to its marginalization of its Nubian population, as Naaman shows, 'Ali poses the rejection of European encroachments onto Egypt marked by the 1952 uprising celebrated by 'Ashur as a failed revolution that simply substituted an Egyptian military elite for the privileged Westerners whose former abodes in Wust al-Balad they came to occupy after Egypt achieved independence under Nasser. Finally, Naaman traces how in the popularly successful *The Yacoubian Building* al-Aswany nostalgically enacts "the literary version of a cultural heritage project [. . .] speak[ing] to a collective Egyptian past" (p. 140) by celebrating the grandeur of Wust al-Balad and the public spaces it afforded Cairo's population, while nonetheless critiquing the corruption and stark socio-economic stratification of early twenty-first century Egyptian society.

All told, *Urban Space in Contemporary Egyptian Literature* serves as a sterling example of how a work of literary criticism can take up the complex intersection of social and cultural forces that diachronically inform a people's sense of place. In restricting itself to not just one city, but one quarter loaded with so much cultural and political significance, this study maintains an accessible level of focus and illustrates how the different registers of urban place (immediate physical surroundings, neighborhood, city, nation, region, etc.) mutually inform each other. Recommended for students and scholars of Arab-Islamic literature, postcolonial literature, and critical place studies (aka geocriticism).

Michael K. Walonen, *Bethune-Cookman University*

Krijn Peters. *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone*. London and Cambridge: International African Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2011. xvi, 274 pp.

By now there are a number of in-depth ethnographies that are essential if we are to understand properly the violent civil wars in West Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular. For example, while Chris Coulter's *Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers* (Cornell UP, 2009) addresses the lives of young Sierra Leonean women under, before and after the war in a most powerful and straightforward way, Danny Hoffman's *The War Machines* (Duke UP, 2011) is an path-breaking ethnography that offers a completely novel analytical framework for the anthropology of war in general, and for the interconnected wars in the West African Mano River Basin region in particular. Another must read to add to the list is Krijn Peters's *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone*.

Peters's book is fresh, provocative, and brilliantly honest. He stresses that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel movement started out as something unexpectedly coherent, which proves it as something very different from the chaotic agent of the coming anarchy so infamously declared by journalist Robert Kaplan and others. Peters's account in part builds on his PhD research in rural development sociology, mostly carried out in the post-war context, in three periods between 2001 and 2006, with some preliminary fieldwork carried out in 1996 and 2000. He ends his book with a useful chronology that helps the reader contextualize his fieldwork: the RUF rebels entered Sierra Leone in 1991, to finally demobilize and leave the scene around 2002, while the movement's leader Foday Sankoh died in custody in 2003.

In positioning his work, Peters notes that most of the material that has been produced on the RUF so far is based on the accounts of the movement's victims. It is a general story of the enemies and opponents of the RUF. Only a token effort, Peters argues, has been made to include information gathered from the RUF itself, whether leadership or rank-and-file. This is the gap that Peters sets out to fill, and he wants to "gain a better understanding of why so many young people proved to be vulnerable to militia conscription in general, and more specifically how the RUF was able to create an armed movement which did not fall apart for more than a decade." But also, his aim is "primarily ethnographic" as he wants "to aid understanding of how war was experienced by its protagonists," namely the cadres of the RUF. His methodology in achieving this, he says, is simplicity itself: "go there, listen, report, examine critically, and then try to understand" (pp. 11-12). It is a powerful portrayal of the simplicity of participant observation and reflection. Still I personally would have appreciated reading more about how exactly the ethnographic field unfolded in front of the researcher, e.g. the everyday procedures of going there and listen to stories of war that were narrated after the fact. Anyway, in pursuing his ethnographic agenda, Peters formulates the central hypothesis of the book. The RUF is to be considered, he says, an extremely violent revolt of marginalized young rural Sierra Leoneans. And, he continues, young people's involvement with the RUF was triggered by weaknesses in a collapsing neo-patrimonial one-party state.

Peters combines a background description with a contextual and qualitative analysis presenting the reader with a clear narrative of the rise and fall of the RUF. It started out as a genuine revolutionary movement which however, with no way out for those part of it, soon changed and became a world of its own, to finally plunge itself "into a fatally unstable paranoia" (p. 17). If this was the end station of the RUF journey, it has also become the generalized description of the movement. Peters' important analysis does in no way deny this end station; indeed, as already mentioned, he outlines the general crisis that gave birth to the RUF, but also the evolving crisis that changed the movement, and finally, with some kind of peace at the horizon, destroyed it.

What Peters basically does with his book is to start the analysis where many other observers effortlessly end up: if the RUF was something extremely unstable and unpredictably paranoid, the movement has only too easily been dismissed as incomprehensive. Even if the RUF indeed made itself into something that may be difficult to comprehend, emotionally more than intellectually perhaps, Peters offers an indispensable analysis of a violent social and

historical process of collapsing powers, oscillating from the local to the global and back again, whereby incomprehensiveness was made.

Well aware that he enters an academic debate that has turned out to be a bitter parallel to the Sierra Leonean war itself, Peters is careful to always position himself and his material in relation to the conventional wisdom he sets out to scrutinize. Written in a clear and frank way, it is a very revealing account, and an essential reference to the war in Sierra Leone. It is really suitable for any kind of readership, Africanists and non-Africanists alike, even if I doubt that students will think that they can afford yet another ridiculously expensive hardback of the International African Institute, now with a new partner in publishing, Cambridge University Press. There are Kindle and eBook editions as well, but also these are surprisingly expensive.

<div align="right">Sverker Finnström, Uppsala University, Sweden</div>

William Reno. *Warfare in Independent Africa: New Approaches to African History*. **Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 271 pp.**

Organizing the totality of post-independence African history may be considered a reasonably daunting task when reflecting on the multiple influences – from both the domestic and international environment – affecting the trajectory of state development. However, Reno's account of armed conflict on the continent, as viewed through the milieu of rebellion, provides an intriguing examination of African history that succeeds in summarizing the general characteristics of African state development while simultaneously contributing detailed descriptions of rebel groups and their operations through the post-independence period. In other words, by examining the history of rebellion and conflict one gains an insight into how such rebel groups comprise elements of the state building project in independent Africa, as well as an alternative perspective of the historical record with regard to the manner of intrastate conflict, as opposed to interstate conflict.

Through this lens of rebel conflict, Reno organizes post-independence African history by the nature of rebel groups operating in distinct periods. This includes a typology rebel groups categorized in five areas: (1) anti-colonial rebels (1961-1974), largely exemplified by rebel groups in Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola; (2) majority-rule rebels (1960s-1990s), incorporating rebel groups from Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe; (3) reform rebels (1970s-1990s), including the National Resistance Movement in Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia; (4) warlord rebels (1990s-2000s), largely characterized by groups in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo seeking private interests with little regard to public administration; and (5) parochial rebels (1990s-2000s) consisting of groups with interests in protecting their perceived neglected communities. Reno organizes the text largely around this typology, with chapters dedicated to each type of rebel group. One noteworthy and recurring theme is the manner in which each type of group acted as a reflection of the state system in which they were embedded. As such, the manner in which rebels recruited supporters was heavily influenced by structural elements derived from within and outside of the state (p. 4).

Furthermore, Reno highlights how rebels of all types exploited available "fields of leverage," described as areas of society where the state held little control, but where rebel groups could thrive through the extension of networks of support and obtainment of other needed resources (p. 32).

Unlike earlier explanations of statebuilding that emphasize the significance of interstate warfare in relation to capacity-building endeavors (Tilly 1992; Herbst 2000), Africa remains rather distinct in not experiencing a similar trajectory of capacity-through-warfare that other regions experienced. In contrast to explanations emphasizing the development of the state through conflict across political communities, Reno instead highlights how "leaders of these rebel groups had to build the extractive tools of administration to collect taxes in their liberated zones and ensure the compliance and support of local people through courts and effective policing. In short, they had to create a state-within-a-state." (p. 30; Tilly 1985)

In sum, what Reno's text provides is a means of explaining the development of the state in Africa in a manner that links with traditional explanations of statebuilding while also retaining its distinctiveness for an African context. Just as Tilly once wrote that "war made the state and the state made war" (1975, p. 42), so too may this assessment be relevant to African history with regard to rebel conflict in the post-colonial era. This text not only describes the evolution of rebel conflict on the African continent, it furthermore provides a link towards theorizing the relationship between rebellion and state development. As such, this text would be a worthwhile addition for anyone interested in the development of the African state, as well as for those with more general interests in international security and state building.

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Nicholas D. Knowlton, *University of Florida*

Mahir Şaul and Ralph A. Austen (eds.). *Viewing African Cinema in the Twenty-First Century: Art Films and the Nollywood Video Revolution.* **Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010. 237pp.**

This a collection of essays focuses on contemporary African video and art cinemas. According to the opening acknowledgements, this book is the fourth and most recent product in a string of conferences and anthologies that began with the International Film and History Conference at the University of Cape Town in 2002 (p. vii). In the current volume, Şaul and Austen aim to bring together the two distinct traditions of art cinema and video films in Africa in order to "give readers a good introduction into what has been happening in African cinema over the last forty-plus years[,] and to analyze specific FESPACO and Nollywood films from a fresh

comparative perspective" (p. 3). Although ultimately this comparative analysis is somewhat uneven in its considerations of African art cinema, for those interested in African video films and culture the collection offers useful analyses.

The thirteen essays assembled in this anthology are organized into three sections. Following a brief introduction by Şaul and Austen outlining the volume's purpose and structure, the five essays in part one, titled "The 'Problem' of Nollywood," consider video films in Africa, and examine topics relating to the Nigerian video industry including its study (Haynes, Chapter 1) and criticism (Okome, Chapter 2), its impact on other national video industries (Meyer, Chapter 3 and Krings, Chapter 5), and a look at religion and censorship in northern Nigerian video films (Adamu, Chapter 4). In part two, "Imported Films and Their African Audiences," the focus shifts to issues of audience reception. The two essays comprising this section consider the ways African audiences engage with foreign films by discussing commentary and oral viewing practices (Bouchard, Chapter 6) and audience tastes in Tanzania (Fair, Chapter 7). Finally, in part three, "FESPACO/Art Film in the Light of Nollywood," the remaining six essays address African art films, covering topics including art and politics in francophone cinema (Şaul, Chapter 8), the art film industry in Tanzania (Bryce, Chapter 9), style in Sembene's *Emitaï* (Rist, Chapter 10), differences between art films and Nollywood videos in pedagogy (Sereda, Chapter 11) and modernity (Green-Simms, Chapter 12), and California Newsreel's impact on African art cinema (Moore, Chapter 13).

Despite these many chapters on art film, the primary strength of this collection is in its engagement with African video films. In chapter 2, "Nollywood and Its Critics," Onookome Okome offers an insightful analysis of the critical discourse surrounding Nollywood, arguing persuasively that such practices are attempts at cultural mediation, and that they ultimately overlook the value and significance of the Nollywood video industry. In Chapters 3 and 5, "Ghanaian Popular Video Movies between State Film Policies and Nollywood: Discourses and Tensions" and "Nollywood Goes East: The Localization of Nigerian Video Films in Tanzania," respectively Birgit Meyer and Matthias Krings successfully articulate the effects of Nollywood on the development of the Ghanaian and Tanzanian video industries. In addition, although Lindsey Green-Simms' essay (Chapter 12), "The Return of the Mercedes: From Ousmane Sembene to Kenneth Nnebue," is located in part three of this volume because of its engagement with art films, it examines these films by putting them in conversation with video films, tracing the automobile as a metaphor for modernity through both forms and drawing meaningful conclusions about shifting attitudes in African society. Although the bulk of this volume is best suited for the study of video films and culture, for those interested in African art cinema, Mahir Şaul's essay (Chapter 8), "Art, Politics, and Commerce in Francophone African Cinema," offers a well-researched and clearly written analysis of celluloid cinema in francophone Africa. Similarly, Cornelius Moore also discusses art cinema in "U.S. Distribution of African Film: California Newsreel's Library of African Cinema: A Case Study" (Chapter 13). However, while the succinct history of California Newsreel and its relationship with African art cinema is enlightening, the essay is short and includes no citations for future reference.

Overall, *Viewing African Cinema in the Twenty-First Century* is a useful reference for those interested in African video cinemas; and despite the editors' assertion that it is more for students generally interested in Africa than for film and media scholars in particular, both are likely to find value in the anthology. Although the volume's organization is somewhat unfocused after the first section on Nollywood, most essays are thoughtful and well written, and provide a valuable contribution to the study of contemporary cinema in Africa.

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Symphony Way Pave Dwellers. *No Land! No House! No Vote! Voices from Symphony Way.* Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2011. xvii, 141 pp.

No Land! No House! No Vote! is a campaign and a movement of the poor in South Africa. It is a campaign that demands for the boycott of the vote as a way to make the government deliver on issues of basic importance to the poor –such as land and housing. The title of this book is derived from this movement. It is written by some victims of South Africa's draconian land and housing policies. These people were illegally evicted from their homes by government with nowhere to go. They built shacks on pavements opposite the housing project from where they were evicted from and then organized themselves into the Symphony Way Anti-Eviction Campaign as a way to demand their housing rights. The theme of this book is hinged on their struggle for land and housing rights as well as for their dignity as human beings. The book is a compilation of different short stories from different persons and families in the pave-dwelling community.

Beginning with an introduction, each of the stories forms a chapter of the book. All stories in the book draw solely from the personal, family, or community experiences of the contributors. The book comes with high quality illustrative color photographs showing the numerous plights of the contributors. It also begins with a glossary of people, places, and terms. Then a Foreword written is by Raj Patel (activist and author) and an Introduction written by Miloon Kothari (former UN Special Rapporteur for housing). This does not mean that the book makes for very easy reading. It is entirely written in the raw street style of the pave dwellers – the Cape Flats slang. In general, the book challenges the assertion that there is only one genuine way of writing or speaking the English language. In keeping with the authors' desire, the book gives readers an authentic peek into their community. There is no thematic order to this collection of stories. The stories are only arranged according to where the authors live in the community. A community map showing aerial layout of Symphony Way community is included in the book (p. 6).

If the authors' main objective for writing the book is to expose the injustices inherent in South Africa's land and housing sectors, then this has been well achieved. They have been successful at laying the weaknesses of South Africa's housing and land policies to the outside world. To those who might have viewed South Africa as the "Eldorado" of sub-Saharan Africa, these writers may have bluntly exposed their ignorance by showcasing the poverty that lies in the heart of that country. The story of Lola Wentzel (p. 15) describing an unusual account of

sexual violence is bound to haunt a reader long after the book is read. The story of Florrie Langenhoven (p. 63) brings to fore the fact that poverty and hardship can have positive consequences –the spirit of sharing. The story of Sharon and Conway Payn (p. 117) describing their "sea of troubles in Symphony Way" would leave tears of sympathy on the cheek of readers. These true stories throw more light on the insecurity of poor South African urban communities and how such a situation could result to strong community spirit amongst residents. Furthermore, they depict how residents of an informal settlement developed survival strategies through media press statements, popular education; as well as legal through direct and solidarity actions.

In sum, the Symphony Way Pave Dwellers have written a uniquely unprofessional and thoroughly stimulating book. It will be of wide general appeal to many readers. However, it is an interesting anthology that seems primarily written for human rights activists, development experts, activist poets, and African politicians who have the courage to listen to poor voices on the street. Researchers with interests in urban community development, sustainable housing or land tenure security issues would find the book very resourceful. Readers with a general curiosity for the turbulent recent past of South Africa will find it really revealing. Within its covers many important issues related to South Africa's development are identified and expanded upon.

Uchendu E. Chigbu, *Technische Universität München, Germany*

Aili Mari Tripp. *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. **Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. 222 pp.**

Museveni's Uganda serves as the case study of hybrid regimes, popularly known as semiauthoritarian regimes. Such regimes find themselves fraught with contradictions for while their leaders adopt trappings of democracy, they at the same time pervert democracy and this through patronage and largesse, use of violence, and repression for the sole purpose of remaining in power. And so, hybrid regimes like that in Uganda embody two divergent impulses: they promote civil rights and yet unpredictably curtail those same rights and liberties.

After two decades of authoritarian governments, Ugandans broke from chaos under president Yoweri Museveni who brought much of the country under his control, pacifying and drawing in various fighting factions under the rubric of a national army and, for a long time Museveni was widely acclaimed by foreign correspondents, donors, diplomats, and some academics as a new style of African leader to be emulated. But though the conception was that Uganda was an oasis of stability, economic progress, and democracy, many Ugandans felt that this was a frustrating mirage and grossly deceptive image which, to them the true picture was different.

That NRM government never built its house the way it said and was expected to build; its house became a troubled house and a home of dissention and NRM leadership experienced tensions between contradictory needs of maintaining control and pressure for greater openness

and democracy. A group of loyal supporters of NRM known as Malwa Group resisted the efforts to change the constitution in order to lift presidential term limits, and some of their members were fired. Moving from a no-party state, the country opened to multipartyism and brought about opening up space for civil and political society. And, when in 1998 parliament began to show some independence, it was soon beaten to submission, sometimes quite literally. Though the human rights and political rights situation in Uganda improved considerably after Museveni came to power and has continued to improve overall, it eroded.

Economic growth under Museveni's watch, which, unlike previous governments, has promoted business and is less apt to interfere with the private ownership of property, liberalization of trade, lifting producer prices on export crops and liberalization of investment laws to facilitate export of profits and encourage foreign investment, opening up of capital markets has encouraged not only export growth but at the same time encouraged legitimizing some of his more undemocratic tendencies.   The same can be said of donor support, which with the intension of strengthening political liberation at times unintentionally done the same.

With Uganda as the case study, the book has brought to the fore the plight of semiauthoritrian states in Africa. However, the book has 'hidden' Museveni's direct role in building such regimes and presented him as a captive of the same system. If Museveni is only a captive of such, who is responsible for its construction or perpetuation? Does it mean the system builds and sustains itself? What is Museveni's direct involvement, encouragement or benefit of the system? If such leaders as Museveni step in leadership with an aim of democratizing and changing the leadership structures they find in place, what makes them not to go full throttle into system and leadership change? Why do they retract along the way?

I find a common characteristic in semiauthoritarian regimes, the need to hold on to power: presidents like Gabon's Omar Bongo, Libya's Maummar Gaddafi, Ali Abdulla Saleh of Yemen, Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Cameroon's Paul Biya, Daniel Arap Moi, Tunisia's Zine-al-Abidine, and Yoweri Museveni remained or have continued in power for more than twenty years. Elsewhere I have asked that when leaders lead for such prolonged periods, what enable them to remain in power for such prolonged length of time in leadership. Are they endeared, endowed with capabilities, entrenched, viewed as entitled, or simply oblivious? (Kihiko, 2010) Is Museveni's prolonged period of leadership based on his belief that he is the one who hunted and killed the animal (liberated Uganda from authoritarian regimes) and so is now entitled to eat at the table without being told to leave?

Indeed, another dimension to this is that after the father has stayed for so long in leadership, he feels that the only person he can safely and comfortably hand over power to is his sibling, especially his son. How can donors keep an eye on the situation in a way that they do not in any way fund and thus entrench such a system? What can citizenry do to get themselves out of such a system? This book appropriately brought to the fore the issues underlying such a system, but more questions must be confronted to heal the wounds the writer notes.

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Moses Kibe Kihiko, *Practicum Leadership*

Peter VonDoepp. *Judicial Politics in New Democracies: Cases from Southern Africa.* **Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009. vii, 185 pp.**

Thus far, research on African democracy has focused predominantly on elections, political parties, and voting behavior. However, in a region traditionally characterized by powerful executives, Africanists increasingly are studying the pivotal role played by institutions of horizontal accountability. Peter VonDoepp's book on African judiciaries represents a very welcome addition to this small but growing area of scholarship.

VonDoepp's central goal is to understand why leaders in Africa's new democracies have either respected or undermined judicial autonomy and, in turn, how judiciaries have responded to instances of interference. VonDoepp argues that judicial autonomy in Southern Africa cannot be sufficiently explained by the "thin" strategic models that have been applied in other regions of the world. According to these models, judicial autonomy relies on the electoral market and the degree of power dispersion within the party system. Where electoral uncertainty is high and political power is broadly dispersed, political leaders are less likely to interfere in the judiciary because independent judicial institutions provide an insurance mechanism to such leaders when they leave office. By contrast, low electoral uncertainty and a high concentration of power encourage greater interference with judiciaries.

VonDoepp prefers a "thicker" model that incorporates three key variables. The first is "judicialization," or the placement of key policy and political questions in the hands of the judiciary (p.26). In his view, political leaders become more interested in restricting the institution's autonomy as judicialization grows. The behavior of judges themselves, including their preferences and patterns of decisions, constitutes a second important factor. Finally, VonDoepp asserts that the broader political system in which a judiciary is embedded influences leaders' incentives to intervene as well as determines the range of tools available to do so. In this regard, he focuses specifically on the prevailing degree of state weakness and neopatrimonialism.

To test his hypotheses, VonDoepp engages in a careful comparison across Malawi, Namibia, and Zambia as well as applies process-tracing techniques within these countries over time. Based on fieldwork conducted between 2001 and 2006, he examined parliamentary records, statements by government officials, and press reports on judicial issues as well as interviewed a range of knowledgeable stakeholders and analyzed high and supreme court decisions. He convincingly demonstrates relatively high levels of interference in the judiciaries across the administrations of Bakili Muluzi and Bingu wa Mutharika in Malawi and those of Frederick Chiluba and Levy Mwanawasa in Zambia. These leaders did not use overt means of interference, such as institutional restructuring or packing the courts with supporters. Instead,

he argues that as weak states with high levels of neopatrimonialism, the mode of influence was primarily through patronage, personal attacks, and personal linkages between executives and the judiciary. By contrast, in Namibia, where party concentration is higher and state weakness and neopatrimonialism is lower, judicial interference was relatively infrequent during the presidency of Sam Nujoma.

Yet, while he illustrates that greater power dispersion can lead to more interference in the judiciary than is traditionally acknowledged, it is not clear whether this contradicts the essence of a "thin" approach. If such strategic models are distinguished primarily by their emphasis on the electoral market and the party system, their explanatory power is reaffirmed by the cases. Leaders' decisions to interfere in the judiciary, and in turn the degree of judicialization, was indeed very much driven by electoral uncertainty and the party system. Fissions within the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) in Zambia and inter-party competition in Malawi reduced leaders' certainty over their time-horizons in office. Cases of interference in these countries often were more extreme near elections or bids to change the constitution to stay in office. By contrast, not only was Nujoma widely accepted by the Southwest People's Organization (SWAPO) as the party's leader but also SWAPO has remained incredibly dominant in Namibian politics since independence. Consequently, less was at stake for Nujoma, even when politically-relevant cases went to court. Thus, even though electoral uncertainty and power dispersion encourage *more* rather than less judicial interference in VonDoepp's cases, this does not seem to contradict the logic of a thin model but rather simply reverses the causal patterns traditionally associated with such models.

An additional concern is the book's relatively opaque data and operationalization of key concepts. The coding of judicial decisions as either anti- or pro-government is difficult for the reader to determine, as is the index of government interests that he presents in the Namibian chapter. Though he notes that these codings were done by expert observers, an appendix that briefly summarized what the cases were about and how the codings were deduced would have helped the reader draw her own conclusions about the strength of his evidence. Likewise, this would assist the reader with understanding how he differentiated between cases that were only "political," meaning that they affected government, opposition, or civil society interests, and those that he classified as directly affecting the president or major opposition figures (pp.52-53). State weakness, an inherently relative term, also is not sufficiently operationalized and is equated alternately with neopatrimonialism, aid dependence, and a high penetration of the state by civil society groups.

Nevertheless, this book represents a valuable contribution to the literature on judicial politics and horizontal accountability. VonDoepp's findings reinforce the importance of the underlying political context for judicial strengthening, which is a key lesson for the international democracy assistance community. In addition, scholars of African democracy should welcome VonDoepp's observation that even when faced with interference by executives, the judges in these countries have continued to assert their authority. This indeed bodes well for many of the continent's other nascent democracies.

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Elke Zuern. *The Politics of Necessity: Community Organizing and Democracy in South Africa.* **Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. xvii, 242pp.**

The movement toward democratisation in South Africa in the 1990s has inspired a diverse range of academic study, from biographical accounts of key political and cultural figures, to investigations on the forms and evolutions of political representation. In *The Politics of Necessity*, Elke Zuern adds to this rich body of work by illuminating the often overlooked role played by community organising pre and post-independence. The end of apartheid presented new opportunities for South Africans, not least the extension of political rights for all citizens to participate in parliamentary democracy. In spite of this, modern South Africa is a country of vast socioeconomic inequality with significant challenges regarding access to food, housing, and jobs. Such economic disparities are at the heart of Zuern's "politics of necessity'; considered by the author as 'where engagement in the public sphere is defined in an environment in which many struggle just to get by" (p. 13). In tracing the development of community organising in South Africa, Elke Zuern argues convincingly that the success and sustainability of the democratic state is dependent on addressing such socioeconomic inequalities.

The book is structured thematically. The first two chapters are concerned with the construction of community associations and rights based discourses in South Africa, while the remaining three focus on the relations between protest and democracy at periods in South African history. Chapter 1 begins by tracing the rise of civic associations ("civics") in townships as forms of community organisation, exploring their expansion and relations with the apartheid state and exiled ANC leadership. Chapter 2 investigates the role played by community leaders in "conscientizing" citizens in South Africa, through linking local material demands to national political processes. The politics of resistance in apartheid South Africa were not uniform, yet activists drew common connections between rights, inequalities, and material necessities. Understandings of democracy were constructed that placed economic issues to the fore. Zuern shows how socio economic demands were not abated by democratisation; rather they remain central areas of concern around which people mobilise—not least due to the state's failure to reduce economic inequality, introduction of neoliberal reforms, and attacks on the right to protest.

Chapter 3 asks whether successful democratic organising is possible under a repressive regime, analysing the role of democratic principles in township organisation against apartheid in South Africa, and drawing from the experiences of social movements in Nigeria and Mexico. Chapter 4 explores the role played by community organisations in the formal democratic system, examining to what extent they are empowered by the creation of democracy and their relationship with the democratic state. In Chapter 5, Zuern moves to consider the viability of protest to effect change and the interactions between protesting groups and the state. As in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 draw from the experiences of movements elsewhere in Africa and in Latin America. In the final chapter Zuern exposes the evident divergence between the actions of the elites who shape the state on the one hand, and the expectation of citizens who

brought them to power on the other. At the heart of this is the peoples' loss of faith in what democracy offers them due to a failure to address material demands. South African communities succeeded in achieving a democratic state, yet many are still waiting for the socio-economic benefits which were so acutely present in calls for democratisation. Until these material concerns are addressed, Zuern contends that the South African state will continue to be challenged by social movements.

Eloquent, timely, and influential, *The Politics of Necessity* is rich in both comparative analysis and empirical data. The author conducted interviews with over two hundred local residents and activists during more than a decade of political change in South Africa, supplementing this with a significant study of archival records, court transcripts and national newspapers. *The Politics of Necessity* is a must read for those interested in the power of social movements to effect change and the challenges they face in doing so. Owing to its accessible and readable style, it will be of appeal to the scholar and layperson alike.

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