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Table of Contents

Articles

Identity Management: The Creation of Resource Allocative Criteria in Botswana
Angela Gapa (1-22)

Impact of Forest Carbon Sequestration Initiative on Community Assets: The Case of Assisted Natural Regeneration Project in Humbo, Southwestern Ethiopia
Padmanaban Murugan and Fekadu Isreal (23-42)

Democratization and Public Accountability at the Grassroots in Tanzania: A Missing Link
Matrona Kabyemela (43-60)

Three Objections to Gyekye's Functionalist Conception of Development
Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani (61-78)

At Issue

Ethnicity, Violence, and the Narrative of Genocide: The Dangers of a Third-Term in Rwanda
Ryan Goehrung (79-100)

Review Essay

Rich, Undisciplined, and Poetic: A New Writing of the Colonial Past
Florence Bernault (101-106)

Book Reviews

Mensah Adinkrah. 2015. *Witchcraft, Witches and Violence in Ghana*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 325 pp.
Uchenna Onuzulike, James Madison University (107-108)

Akinyinka Akinyoade and Jan-Bart Gewald (eds.). 2015. *African Roads to Prosperity: People en Route to Socio-Cultural and Economic Transformations*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. 278 pp.
Tochi Brown Adimiche, Kennesaw State University (109-110)

Iris Berger et al. (eds.). 2015. *African Asylum at a Crossroads: Activism, Expert Testimony, and Refugee Rights*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 272 pp.
Elizabeth Juhasz, The University of New Orleans (110-111)

John Collins. 2015. *Fela: Kalakuta Notes*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. 344 pp.
Nate Plageman, Wake Forest University (111-113)

Dominica Dipio. 2014. *Gender Terrains in African Cinema*. Pretoria: UNISA Press. 227 pp.
Theresah P. Ennin, University of Cape Coast (113-114)

Kristin Conner Doughty. 2016. *Remediation in Rwanda: Grassroots Legal Forums*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 283 pp.
Enock Ndawana, University of Zimbabwe (114-116)

Amina Elbendary. 2015. *Crowds and Sultans; Urban Protest in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 276 pp.
Kenneth W. Meyer, Western Washington University (116-117)

Stephen Ellis. 2016. *This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organised Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press. 313 pp.
Benson Ohihon Igboin, Adekunle Ajasin University (117-119)

Randall Fegley. 2016. *A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma, The Mythmakers' Victims*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 169 pp.
Jonathan Beloff, SOAS University of London (119-120)

Edda Fields-Black. 2015. *Deep Roots: Rice Farmers in West Africa and the African Diaspora*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 277 pp.
Anthony J. Stanonis, Queen's University Belfast (120-121)

Benjamin Gardener. 2016. *Selling the Serengeti: The Cultural Politics of Safari Tourism*. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press. 256 pp.
Maxmillian J. Chuhila, University of Dar es Salaam (121-123)

Anthea Garman. 2015. *Antjie Krog and the Post-Apartheid Public Sphere: Speaking Poetry to Power*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 224 pp.
Rebekah Cumpsty, University of York (123-124)

Ch. Didier Gondola. 2016. *Tropical Cowboys: Westerns, Violence, and Masculinity in Kinshasa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 352 pp.
Jeremy Rich, Marywood University (124-126)

Shannen L. Hill. 2015. *Biko's Ghost: The Iconography of Black Consciousness*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 394 pp.
S. Nombuso Dlamini, York University /Thato Bereng, Independent Consultant, Canada (126-127)

James A. Joseph. 2015. *Saved for a Purpose: A Journey from Private Virtues to Public Values*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 299 pp.
Amy Crofford, Africa Nazarene University (128-129)

Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P. Rotich (eds.). 2016. *Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 277pp.
Fatuma B. Guyo, Wright State University (129-130)

Roberta Laurie. 2015. *Weaving a Sunrise: A Woman, A School, A People*. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press. 418 pp.

Rosemary Asen, Benue State University (130-131)

Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron (eds.). 2016. *Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 302 pp.

Yusuf Abdullahi Yusuf, University of Jos (132-134)

Philip Muehlenbeck. 2016. *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 271 pp.

Paul Chiudza Banda, West Virginia University (134-135)

Casimir L. Nyaki. 2015. *Nyerere's Philosophy of Economic Equality*. Peramiho, Tanzania: Benedictine Publication Ndanda. 183 pp.

Sandra Ekpot, Ahmadu Bello University (136-137)

Ebenezer Obadare and Wale Adebani (eds.). 2016. *Governance and the Crisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa: Leadership in Transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 298 pp.

Emmanuel Botlhale, University of Botswana (137-138)

Mutiati Titilope Oladejo. 2016. *Ibadan Market Women and Politics, 1900-1995*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 183 pp.

Usman Ladan, Ahmadu Bello University (138-140)

Femi Osofisan. 2016. *The Muse of Anonymy: Essays on Literature and the Humanities in Nigeria*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 297 pp.

James Yeku, University of Saskatchewan (140-141)

Jesse Salah Oviya. 2016. *The Petro-Developmental State in Africa: Making Oil Work in Angola, Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea*. London: Hurst and Co. 246 pp.

Philip Attuquayefio, University of Ghana (141-142)

Justin Pearce. 2015. *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 1975-2002*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 184 pp.

Olubukola S. Adesina, University of Ibadan (143-144)

Steven Pierce. 2016. *Moral Economies of Corruption: State Formation and Political Culture in Nigeria*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. xii, 282 pp.

John Olushola Magbadelo, Centre for African & Asian Studies, Abuja (144-146)

Hannah Azieb Pool (ed.). 2016. *Fashion Cities Africa*. Bristol, UK: Intellect. 143 pp.

Victoria L. Rovine, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (146-147)

Paul Schauert. 2015. *Staging Ghana: Artistry and Nationalism in State Dance Ensembles*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 342 pp.
Courtney Micots, Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University (148-149)

Kate Skinner. 2015. *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914-2014*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 298 pp.
Alison K. Okuda, New York University (149-150)

Pauline Ada Uwakweh, Jerono P. Rotich, and Comfort O. Okpala (eds.). 2014. *Engaging the Diaspora: Migration and African Families*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 192 pp.
Serah Shani, Westmont College (150-152)

Goolam Vahed and Thembisa Waetjen. 2015. *Schooling Muslims in Natal: Identity, State and the Orient Islamic Educational Institute*. Pietermaritzburg: KwaZulu-Natal Press. 457 pp.
Caitlyn Bolton, The City University of New York (152-153)

Al J. Venter. 2015. *Biafra's War, 1967-1970: A Tribal Conflict in Nigeria That Left a Million Dead*. Solihull, England: Helion and Company Limited. 314 pp.
Emah Saviour, University of Uyo (154-155)

Hannah Whittaker. 2015. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Social History of the Shifta Conflict, c. 1963-1968*, Leiden: Brill. 176 pp.
Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, National University of Lesotho (155-156)

Elizabeth Williams. 2015. *The Politics of Race in Britain and South Africa: Black British Solidarity and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle*. London: I. B. Tauris. xi, 316 pp.
Todd Carter, University College, University of Oxford (157-158)

Identity Management: The Creation of Resource Allocative Criteria in Botswana

ANGELA GAPA

Abstract: Botswana's escape from the "resource curse" is an anomaly in the trend toward low economic growth and political instability in resource-rich developing economies. In literature on the resource curse, distributive injustices of resource wealth have traditionally been understood to occur along ethno-linguistic and sectarian lines and potentially cause weak institutions, social unrest, and, at times, violent conflict. Because of their high levels of ethnic diversity and abundant natural resource wealth, African countries are especially prone to these effects. The present article argues that part of the reason Botswana escaped the resource curse was a bid by Botswana elites to buffer the negative effects of ethnicity on resource distribution through identity management, specifically assimilation, at various points in the country's history. This was mainly achieved through the political entrepreneurship of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial elites, and through social and colonial discourses predicated upon materialistic production and exchange, that led to the establishment of a new identity category. In doing so, Botswana elites created a new criterion for resource access based on successful assimilation that largely excluded those who failed to assimilate.

Introduction

Botswana's escape from the "resource curse" is an anomaly in the African trend toward low economic growth and political instability in economies heavily skewed toward exports of non-renewable natural resources.¹ This trend is largely explained through analyses of ethnic fault lines. One idea is that in order to maintain power, political incumbents use natural resource wealth to establish patron-client relationships with members of their ethnic groups.² Another is that violent conflicts arise due to grievances about the unequal distribution of resource wealth among ethnic clusters.³ Botswana is widely cited as an anomaly to this "resource curse" and is branded an "African miracle," a designation it has held since its independence in 1966.⁴ Botswana's good institutions, particularly in the private property area, its political leadership's choice of sound policies, and its elite's motivation to reinforce strong institutions have led to its relative economic success in the face of resource abundance.⁵ Many allude that without the discovery of diamonds, it is unlikely that Botswana would have been able to prosper to the extent it did.⁶ One key reason cited for the Botswana miracle is its relatively high level of homogeneity.⁷ The general view is that because more than 80 percent of the population speaks

Angela Gapa is Assistant Professor of International Relations at California State University-Chico. She received her PhD in International Relations at Florida International University. Her research primarily centers on resource politics and African political development, with a particular focus on Botswana.

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Setswana, the country is homogenous.⁸ This view is further compounded by the fact that the country's diamond resources have generally benefitted most Botswana citizens.⁹ This assumption is misguided, however, because the notion of ethnic homogeneity in Botswana is superficial at best.

The present article challenges the basic explanation that views Botswana as primordially homogeneous under the umbrella of "Tswana" and attributes this as a primary reason behind Botswana's escape from the "resource curse." Instead, this article contends that Botswana's purported ethnic homogeneity was the result of a combination of political strategies of the instrumentalist kind on the part of elite political entrepreneurs in the various phases of Botswana's history establishing a social hierarchy of identity that engendered the notion of "Tswanaedom." Tswanaedom here refers to both the product and the process that saw the political, economic, and social ascendancy of the Tswana identity in Botswana. Tswanaedom, the paper argues, became central to the post-colonial assimilationist objective of unifying Botswana into a homogenous political, social, cultural, and geographic national entity.¹⁰ Assimilation here is defined as the process whereby a minority group gradually adapts to the customs and attitudes of the prevailing culture and customs.¹¹

Botswana illustrates a case of identity management. Its systematic assimilation to "Tswanaedom" transformed Tswana identities and activated new norms within society, albeit at the expense of minority cultures. The extent to which the country is today viewed as homogenous, and the extent to which diamond wealth is viewed as not being based on ethnicity, is largely due to identity management and the construction of ethnic categories emerging from both political engineering and socio-cultural discourses built upon historic mercantile relationships. Although a central tenet of Tswanaedom was that resource wealth would not be distributed along ethnic lines, the present paper argues that through its exercise of identity management, Botswana inadvertently established a new mechanism and criterion for resource wealth and allocation of public goods. Today, those whose identities were successfully managed and transformed enjoy the wealth that diamonds have produced, and groups and identities resistant to identity management are largely excluded from the "African miracle."

Ethnic Resource Competition and the Case for Managing Identity

One key reason cited for the relative instability of African countries and their inability to develop economically and politically for the past half century is the colonial legacy that left most states ethnically heterogeneous.¹² It is a well-known story. African political boundaries were determined in a series of tragicomic negotiations in Berlin in 1884 among European powers, following an extensive "scramble for Africa." This resulted in the division of some ethnic groups, the juxtaposition of many others, and the exacerbation of pre-existing levels of ethnolinguistic diversity in Africa. Additionally, colonization formed new ethnic clusters from previously smaller groups. As a result, although African countries were expected to surpass the growth rates of their counterparts in the global south due to natural resource wealth, one key factor impeded this goal: their levels of ethnic heterogeneity and fractionalization. The observed inverse relationship between growth rate of GDP per capita and the degree of ethnic fractionalization within African societies has come to be well known as Africa's growth tragedy.¹³

One consequence of ethnic fragmentation in Africa is the absence of a socially cohesive force, akin to nationalism in Europe, to facilitate social mobilization within post-colonial states. African states have experienced a multitude of violent conflicts based on ethnicity or on grievances about perceived biases of resource allocation along ethnic fault lines.¹⁴ Additionally, authoritarian regimes facilitated by neo-patrimonial networks based on the loyalties of the ethnic or tribal bases of rulers, have become the bane of African politics.¹⁵ Today, ethnic wars make up the majority of the continent's civil wars, with the escalation to violence in these cases being anticipated due to social upheaval, tribalism, resource scarcity, and overpopulation.¹⁶

Ethnic cleavages tend to be more pronounced in cases where non-renewable natural resources constitute a significant portion of a country's national product. The geography of conflict is currently skewed towards countries with large oil and gas reserves.¹⁷ Similarly, natural resources have motivated violent secessionist movements such as those in Cabinda and Biafra.¹⁸ The assumption here is that when a constituent of a specific ethnic group seizes control of the state, essential economic assets are transferred to the members of his or her respective ethnic community.¹⁹ Ethnic conflict is usually accompanied by substantial structural crises, existence of historical memories of inter-ethnic grievances, institutional influences that stimulate ethnic intolerance, and manipulation of historical recollections by political entrepreneurs to evoke sentiments such as fear, resentment and hate toward other groups.²⁰ This is particularly so where competition over resources exists. Here groups have incentives to wrest control from the rest of the population, with the victorious group allocating resources to ensure the exclusion of non-members, because infiltration would result in fewer dividends being shared among the group. When groups form along ethnic lines, ethnic identity becomes a marker for recognizing potential infiltrators. Ethnicity thus provides a means of group membership and exclusion, which is used to avoid indiscriminate access to the economic spoils of conflict.²¹

Three theoretical perspectives have dominated the literature on ethnicity: primordialist, constructivist, and instrumentalist.²² According to the primordialist view of ethnic identity, there is a historical biological link between members of the same ethnic group, which accounts for the emotions and conflict potential of ethnicity.²³ Furthermore, the existence of ancient hatreds among ethnic and cultural groups, and the urge to fear and reject non-co-ethnics is natural and primal, dating back to humankind's remotest ancestors. Accordingly, human beings are conditioned to exhibit xenophobic tendencies and intolerance to an even greater degree than they are influenced by liberal politics of interest.²⁴ The instrumentalist perspective of identity emphasizes the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who heighten the importance of identity in order to claim government resources, gain recruits to a cause, and increase their personal power. This theory describes three approaches as the interfaces of institutional and political factors with ethnic sentiments that result in ethnic intolerance, competition, and ultimately conflict: the "institutional," approach, the "political entrepreneur" approach, and the "competition over resources" approach.²⁵ Using the institutional approach, the theory views states as capable of guiding identity politics into diplomatic political competition, provided that credible assurances are made to shape and uphold agreements made among culturally demarcated actors. Conversely, political mobilization is stimulated when the state's institutions and resource

allocation are based on ethnicity. Under the political entrepreneurial approach, the “perfect” conditions for political entrepreneurs to manipulate ethnic emotions for the purpose of mobilizing groups for their own political purposes occur when instability and uncertainty arise from major structural changes.²⁶ This is because the resulting institutions are inept at regulating inter-ethnic relations. Ethnic differences are exploited by politicians as they draw upon historical memories of grievances and encourage hatred in order to reinforce their legitimacy. The resulting dynamic between political entrepreneurs and their followers creates an inter-ethnic security dilemma. Finally, the “competition over resources” approach emphasizes the role of resource scarcity in allowing the capitalization of the conflict potential of ethnicity by political entrepreneurs.²⁷

The constructivist theory proposes that ethnic identity is socially constructed and fluid, and can be transformed through various means. As a result, constructivist theory perceives ethnic identities as being in a constant process of construction and redefinition, and highly dependent on social interaction.²⁸ Constructivists argue that “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”²⁹ As a result, constructivists examine ethnic identities as fluid and dynamic, changing according to subjective evaluation by individuals and groups of circumstances at various times and points.³⁰ As such, constructivism rests on the intersubjective nature of human action. An identity thus “serves the practical needs and interests of the members of the community. The durability of [an] identity is contingent upon its ability to provide security, social status, and economic benefits for its members more than do other existing alternatives.”³¹

Regardless of which view of ethnicity one might find most convincing, there is a general view that homogenous societies are more efficient resource allocators. In information technology, identity management is a broad administrative area that deals with identifying individuals in a system and controlling systematic resource access by associating user rights and restrictions with an established identity.³² Parallels can be drawn to how identity is a criterion for resource allocation, whether tangible capital intensive resources and public goods, or intangible resources such as language and cultural resources. Homogenous communities usually draw on identity commonalities of culture and language, giving them an advantage in public goods distribution and resource allocation.³³ They have a shared understanding of modes of interaction that facilitate communal cooperation, which in turn advances prospects for effective collective action that heterogeneous groups generally lack. Greater cooperation among co-ethnics is thus observed, since public goods production and resource allocation are reliant on expectations of reciprocal cooperation. In addition, sanctioning produces norms and social institutions of cooperation and defector punishment, creating a cooperative equilibrium among co-ethnics. An underlying assumption is that co-ethnic cooperation re public good provision will be reciprocated under threat of sanctions while cooperation with non-co-ethnics will not. This is because membership in an ethnic group automatically places constraints on individual behavior that do not extend to those outside the group. As a result, the provision of resources is more advanced in homogeneous communities, where the norms and social institutions apply to everyone within the group equally, than in heterogeneous communities, where potential cooperating partners are sometimes excluded.³⁴

This article argues that identity management in Botswana occurred through mechanisms of assimilation to reduce “ethnic distance” and encourage nationalistic feelings, in order to mimic the benefits of homogeneity. The concept of “ethnic distance” describes the degree of understanding between members of different identity groups, manifested in levels of readiness to establish close social relationships with members of the group.³⁵ This article further contends that due to political entrepreneurship, indigenous and colonial discourses as well as material exchanges of the mercantilist kind, Tswanaedom, a socially constructed and politically engineered identity category, not only emerged as the dominant identity in present day Botswana, it also became the basis of resource allocation and distribution. Political elites implemented an assimilationist policy in order to artificially reduce “ethnic distance” in Botswana society, creating peace, albeit artificially, and successfully eliminating discernible ethnic differences, particularly language. The main strategy was to create a cursory social category through linguistic homogeneity, in order to ameliorate the perils of ethnic diversity that would otherwise lead to conflict and undermine resource allocation.

Ethnicity and Identity Management in Botswana

Delineations of the ethnic composition of Botswana are highly subjective and mostly related to who is asked and how they determine what constitutes ethnicity. The nomenclature of identity groups in Botswana is also ambiguous and confusing, particularly the term “Tswana.” It can be used to refer to the Botswana nationality where a single national is called *Motswana* and the plural is *BaTswana*. It could refer to the eight Tswana tribes recognized by the Botswana constitution: BaKgatla, BaKwena, BaLete, BaNgwato, BaNgwaketse, BaRolong, BaTawana, BaTlokwa and BaHurutshe. It could also refer to any person who speaks the language Setswana. This ambiguity has allowed many to characterize Botswana as an ethnically homogenous society when it is not. There are about fifty distinct indigenous groups in Botswana speaking about twenty-six languages.³⁶ These ethno-linguistic groups can be divided into Bantu and non-Bantu groupings. Of the non-Bantu identity groups, the Khoisan are classified into eleven main ethnic groups and speak about twenty-three languages and dialects. The rest of the languages and ethnic groups are Bantu, with eight speaking Setswana as their first language. When grouped together, BaTswana is the largest ethnic group in Botswana and BaKalanga is the largest tribal group. BaKalanga do not form a majority ethnic group, as they only account for 17.9 percent of the total population. The term “tribe” here is used to describe a social group that existed before the development of the post-colonial state and was largely based on kinship and descent. It is also the term used in Botswana’s constitution. Hence, BaTlokwa and BaKwena are described as different tribes, but constitute one ethnic group, BaTswana. The term “ethnic group” is operationalized along ethno-linguistic lines. Therefore, groups that speak the same language as their first language are considered co-ethnics. With this designation, the BaTswana ethnic group would designate “tribes” that speak Setswana as a first language. Since ethnic groups in Botswana are delineated along linguistic fault lines, the rest of the identity groups are interchangeably considered to be both tribes and ethnic groups.

It is important to note that although BaKwena, BaNgwaketse, BaTawana, and other tribal groups that speak Setswana as their primary language are significantly lower in number than

BaKalanga, it is BaKalanga who are considered a minority group in Botswana and not the Tswana tribal groups. This is because in Botswana, the term “minority” has very little numerical value but bears considerable political significance. From an ethnic and linguistic viewpoint, it is inaccurate to speak of majority and minority groups in Botswana; one should speak rather of marginalized versus non-marginalized linguistic and ethnic groups.³⁷ The present study simply distinguishes those who speak Setswana as a first language from those who speak it as a second language. Those who speak it as a first language are henceforth referred to as Tswana groups, and those who do not speak Setswana as a first language are referred to as non-Tswana groups. Each of the eight indigenous groups whose first language is Setswana are thus considered BaTswana, a majority group. Accordingly, BaKalanga, which is numerically the largest single identity group in Botswana, will be considered a “minority group” because of its suboptimal political influence and the fact that its constituents speak Setswana as a second language. This classification has significant implications about how identity is managed in Botswana and how resources are allocated in the country, and it is in accordance with an elaborate identity management system implemented by post-colonial elites in Botswana to counter the effects experienced elsewhere of ethnic fragmentation.

Pre-Colonial Identity Relations and Resource Allocation

Non-Tswana groups predated Tswana settlement in modern day territorial Botswana. BaSarwa, a Khoisan/non-Bantu group, were the first inhabitants of the territory.³⁸ The first and second migratory waves in the area were represented by BaKgalagadi, BaRolong and BaThlaping, respectively, and only later did BaTswana arrive. The influx of BaTswana into territorial Botswana initiated a process of disruption of indigenous non-Tswana economic production and resource tenure, specifically land. BaTswana recruited non-Bantu pastro-foragers into becoming commodity producers primarily through ostrich feather and ivory hunting. In addition, indigenous pastoralists were prompted to take on the daily maintenance of Tswana cattle.³⁹ Rarely were coercive means a prerequisite to this recruitment as the Khoisan-speaking peoples were then not subordinates but economic and political equals of their Bantu-speaking neighbors. At this juncture of pre-colonialism, the concept of an overarching Tswana identity category defined in political, social, cultural, and geographic terms did not exist. Instead, there were only several independent polities whose leaders were descendants of eponymous Tswana founders.⁴⁰ Personal and political allegiances were directed by kinship relations to one or another of these local leaders, with the actuality of the kin link more probable among close relations of the *kgosi* (“king,” “chief,” “ruler”) while that of those further removed was often invented.⁴¹

Two main events altered the configuration of power among Tswana and non—Tswana populations: the *Mfecane* and the insertion of European mercantile capital into the region.⁴² The period 1815 to 1840 was a time of widespread chaos and warfare among indigenous ethnic communities in southern Africa historically referred to as the *Mfecane*. Many groups in territorial Botswana were pillaged by a set of large invasionary forces, plundering and killing many people in the way. Both of these invasionary forces continued to travel north from modern day Lesotho, across Botswana territory without establishing any sort of state.⁴³ The Tswana chiefdoms were however quicker to recover and were successful in rapidly assimilating

new groups into their societies, and relegating others, specifically BaSarwa to the periphery.⁴⁴ European mercantile capital saw the consolidation of power into the Tswana groups. This was a consequence of struggles to control commodity production for a newly established market, i.e. to control labor units and to channel access of the resultant product to its market. From the second quarter of the nineteenth century, direct force was increasingly relied upon to extract larger levies of ground rent from non-Tswana groups, in the form of tusks, feathers, hides, livestock, and labor.⁴⁵ This progressively dispossessed non-Tswana Bantu-speaking and Khoisan-speaking peoples.

The resultant political organization was a constellation of Tswana-ruled proto-states called *merafe*.⁴⁶ *Merafe* were multi-ethnic clusters, with the larger Ngwato and Tawana proto-states being more heterogeneous than their counterparts. A complex system of hierarchy emerged, with non-Tswana variably designated. BaKalanga were considered commoners, BaHerero foreigners, and BaSarwa and many BaKgalagadi were considered serfs. In order to exercise rights, one had to be a member of an organized ward as well as a subject of a given *morafe*. This set the stage for some of the identity undercurrents that would later characterize contemporary Botswana. BaSarwa and BaKgalagadi were placed at the periphery of Tswana polities. BaTswana groups established themselves in the 18th century, displacing, absorbing, or subjugating other ethnic groups when they first established themselves in the territory.⁴⁷ As a result, BaSarwa, a largely nomadic, pre-agricultural hunter-gathering group, steadily lost out to more centralized groups.

Kgari, Kgosi of BaNgwato c.1817-28, rationalized the nascent socio-economic stratification in Tswana dominated *merafe* to control both its demographic increase of people subordinate to the chief and their productive potential.⁴⁸ He instituted the *kgamelo* (royal patronage, or lit., “milk jug” system), thus augmenting the class structure in Tswana dominated *merafe*, and increased the power of local Tswana elites by giving them direct economic and administrative control over the lower non-Tswana classes in their respective spheres of influence. The *kgamelo* system bound the commoners of the tribe very closely to the Tswana chief, making them fully dependent upon him for their subsistence.⁴⁹ The system was adopted in BaNgwato, BaKwena and BaTawana polities and was well suited to tributary extraction of capital value when, as in hunting, the means of production remain largely with subordinated ranks. It saw older forms of property relations replaced by the robust suzerainty of Tswana elites. The forces creating this expansion of peoples and production were external, primarily European-driven trade; the motivation behind the creation of *kgamelo* was to strengthen Tswana control of this trade.⁵⁰

By the 1890s, the largest proportion of income of Tswana chiefs was derived from ivory, feathers, and skins collected by BaSarwa and BaKgalagadi. The power held by the BaSarwa and BaKgalagadi as primary producers during the years of mercantile hunting had declined as state capital consolidated its strength and hunting became less remunerative. They were relegated to obligatory herders, completely at the mercy of the Tswana. In this atmosphere, the indigenous category, Sarwa was constructed to acquire negative ethnic denotations and was applied collectively to all Khoisan-speakers without distinguishing the heterogeneity of their languages, economies, and histories. BaSarwa were increasingly consigned to a peripheral, wild, uncontrolled nature in Tswana ideology, while in much, but by no means all, San ideology,

Batswana took on the central attributes of overlordship.⁵¹ Thus both indigenous and Tswana ideology constructed an identity hierarchy based on resource allocation and power dynamics. Other groups were drawn into positions between these polar nodes.⁵²

Colonialism would see the further consolidation of Tswana identity and institutions as dominant. In most other parts of Africa, British colonial administrators employed “divide and conquer” tactics in relation to ethnic groups, a circumstance blamed for contemporary ethnic violence and political unrest. This was not the case in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, where colonialists preferred to maintain the power of the chiefs as the most convenient form of government, maintaining the status quo. Since BaTswana groups were larger, the colonialists opted to engage primarily with them, and colonial efforts and interests were highly skewed in their favor. Attempts by minorities to resist Tswana power were actively swatted, with the colonial government largely backing the Tswana chiefs. Colonialism relied heavily on BaTswana chiefs to administer their colony, resulting in the further marginalization and assimilation of smaller identity groups.

Non-Tswana and weaker Tswana speaking peoples were categorized according to the dictates of hegemonic Tswana *merafe*, and were increasingly subjected to tribute levies, labor extraction, land appropriation, and resettlement.⁵³ This was the case of BaPedi, a weak Tswana group that was dominated by BaNgwato and resettled in the Tswapong Hills. BaPedi, BaKaa, BaHurutshe, and other Tswana-speakers acquired the designation BaTswapong as a mark of their collective subordination. It was only through assimilation to a Tswana social and political organization that many of these groups gained access to resources. When BaTawana, a Tswana group, established themselves in Ngamiland, they quickly subordinated indigenous WaYeyi and other Okavango Delta peoples. While WaYeyi constituted a majority of the population in Ngamiland, there were very few Yeyi wards.⁵⁴ This came about because Tswana policy incorporated the subjugated groups into their regional *merafe* by creating separate wards for them under the administration of a junior elite member of the local Tswana *morafe* appointed by his chief.⁵⁵ Hence, only through absorption into the Tswana polity could these peoples gain access to land and other resources.

The case of Botswana illustrates how a culturally transformed material world led to the construction of newer identities and power dynamics. Tswanadom was constructed through the emergence of an adaptability hierarchy during the Mfecane as well as the European mercantilist modes of production both during pre-colonialism and colonialism, which had the effect of relegating identity groups on the basis of modes of production and their ownership. Two main sources of identity management and construction emerged as a result of the political entrepreneurship of elites like Kgari as well as in Tswana and colonial discourse. However, it would be the postcolonial elites who consolidated ethnic relations and identity management through an assimilationist experiment aimed at mitigating the perceived ills of ethnic diversity and ethnic competition once and for all. These policies would have a drastic impact on identity and resource allocation in contemporary Botswana.

Assimilation as the New Criterion of Resource Allocation in Post-Colonial Botswana

At the time of independence, a significant number of African leaders in various countries began to use rhetoric that rejected the legitimacy of ethnic identities, even while at the same time relying upon them to bolster their power.⁵⁶ Tribalism had become the continent's greatest stereotype and political liability, particularly as viewed in European countries, which viewed African ethnic relations as primitive, rather than accepting them as similar to the nationalism that existed in their own states. The post-colonial African elite differed from the traditional elite in that they were usually western-educated, and they thus were quicker to reject the notion of ethnic differences, not because of their link to conflict, but largely as a reflection of western practice and desire to do so. Botswana had also learned the evils of racialization and tribalism from its neighbors, then Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and South Africa. As a result, in 1966 the Seretse Khama administration embarked on a series of policy interventions aiming to reduce cleavages in society in order to build a unified society: a modernist assimilationist policy of social development. In the case of Botswana, the desire was to create a culturally homogenous society that also functioned as a political nation-state through a series of assimilation policies highly skewed in favor of the culture and language of the eight Tswana identity groups. The primary feature of Botswana's assimilation policies was the promotion of "Tswanadom," a concept that is both philosophical and territorial, leading many to believe that post-colonial Botswana is a mono-ethnic state. The declaration of Setswana as the national language and the promotion of Tswana culture in all social, political and cultural realms of Botswana were pivotal to the consolidation of Tswanadom. This included education, the media, and activities in all social domains in Botswana, such as the *kgotla*, which can only be conducted in English and Setswana.⁵⁷ Since independence the government of Botswana has worked tirelessly to achieve the ideal goal of a homogenous nation-state in which ethnic identities lose their significance. As a result, there are three social, economic, and political issue areas where the effects of assimilation are most acutely felt by minorities in Botswana: the issue of chieftaincy recognition, the issue of access to land, and the issue of cultural rights and autonomy.

Central to the Botswana assimilation policy is the issue of chieftaincy recognition. Traditionally, chiefs (*dikgosi*) were revered as the custodians of land, cattle, and other resources, and the distribution of these resources was fundamentally their responsibility. Post-colonial Botswana's House of Chiefs (*Ntlo ya Dikgosi*) is part of the legislative branch of government, which has oversight over diamond resource allocations. Although mainly symbolic, the House of Chiefs is highly revered, because chiefs are deemed the custodians of culture and are the pinnacles of cultural expression and recognition. The House currently has thirty-five members; eight are hereditary and referred to as paramount chiefs, and each paramount chief presides over one of the eight Setswana-speaking tribes. Succession to the chieftaincy is via primogeniture, a custom that existed prior to colonial rule. The Chieftaincy Act of 1966 defines "tribes" as "the BaNgwato tribe, the BaTswana tribe, the BaKgatla tribe, the BaKwena tribe, the BaNgwaketse tribe, the BaLete tribe, the BaRolong tribe and the BaTlokwa tribe." All other ethnic groups and subgroups were allocated to one of these eight principal identity groupings. The Tribal Territories Act of 1966 reinforced the identity absorption of the "minority" groups by

defining tribal territory only with respect to Tswana ethnic groups and establishing that land could only be distributed under the jurisdiction of the territories of these groups.

Botswana is divided into eight regions: the Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, Kweneng, Central, Ngwaketse, Kgatleng, Ngamiland (Northwest), and Southeast Districts. In districts in which Tswana tribes are dominant, the district name is directly derived from that tribe. The Kgatleng District has its capital in Mochudi Village, where the BaKgatla reside, and the land governing body is the Kgatleng Land Board. The BaLete and BaTlokwa live in the Southeast District, which is given a geographic rather than tribal name designation. The designation of group rights in Botswana is not sensitive to numerical measures, nor is it on a first-come first-served basis. Instead, the only thing that matters is the primacy of the spoken language. Tribes residing in Ngamiland, including BaHambukushu, OvaHerero, BaSubia, WaYeyi, BaCiriku and BaSarwa, are represented by BaTawana and are officially regarded as and referred to as such. Tribes whose first language is not Setswana are not represented by their hereditary chiefs.

While the Botswana government's official position is that assimilation helps foster peaceful coexistence, Reteng, a minority lobby group, views these policies as tools for marginalization and disenfranchisement. Reteng is a multi-cultural coalition of organizations devoted to the promotion and preservation of the linguistic and cultural diversity of Botswana's heritage, and as a body is one of the most platforms that is most critical of Botswana's assimilation policy. Reteng argues that since Botswana became a republic in 1966, its laws have permitted discrimination based on ethnicity, language, and culture. Making reference to Sections 77 to 79 and Sections 15 (4) m (d) and 15 (9) of the Botswana constitution, Section 2 of the Chieftainship Act, and the Tribal Territories Act, they argue that the following rights are denied to non-Tswana groups:

- The right to recognition as a tribe with a distinct language and culture;
- Group rights to land;
- Representation in the House of Chiefs;
- The right to educate their children in their languages;
- The right to educate their children about their histories, customs, values and cultures;
- The right to access information and enjoy their languages and cultures on national radio and television;
- Access to certain jobs, especially those pertaining to management of land, such as land board secretaries.⁵⁸

In 2005, a constitutional amendment failed to address the issue of exclusion of non-Tswana groups from permanent membership in the House of Chiefs; the three unequal categories of membership remained. No efforts were made to amend legislation that permits non-prohibition of discrimination and gives group rights to land to the Tswana tribes as sovereigns of their districts. As a result, in contemporary Botswana, all non-Tswana children are taught in the Setswana language about Setswana cultures at the expense of their own. As a result they develop low self-esteem and are underachievers in school.⁵⁹ The eight Tswana tribes account for 18 percent of the population, while the non-Tswana make up 60 percent. To date, Botswana's executives have all expressed reluctance to concede to minority group pressures to change assimilationist practices. The first president, Seretse Khama, stated in his campaign that he

stood for the gradual evolution of a nation-state in which tribal groups, while still existing, would be secondary to a national identity. He stated:

When I say the greatest enemy of independent Africa is tribalism....it becomes dangerous when it leads people to think in exclusively tribal terms. It becomes a threat to the stability and security of our state when it is carried out to the point when a man in a responsible position thinks of himself as a tribesman before he thinks of himself as a Motswana.⁶⁰

Similarly, his successor, Quett Masire, reiterated the orientation towards Setswana to the exclusion of other languages by warning Botswana citizens to stop fighting for the right to have ethnic languages taught in school, as this would break up the nation. The third president, Festus Mogae, when asked to mediate a dispute between the BaNgwato and the BaKalanga, urged the BaKalanga to consider themselves BaNgwato, a Tswana tribal grouping. In 1999, Vice President Ian Khama reinforced this statement to BaKalanga in Nkange, justifying Ngwato hegemony over BaSarwa, BaKalanga, BaBirwa, BaTswapong, and others considered to be minority groups. Furthermore, on March 25, 2000 in Etsha, an area dominated by marginalized groups such as BaHambukushu, WaYeyi, and BaSarwa, Khama stressed that as long as they are members of the ruling party, they should not support organizations that are formed along tribal lines, since that would be tribalistic and divisive.⁶¹ This was an attempt to emphasize political loyalty over ethnic loyalty.⁶² At the policy level, there is an illusion of achievement veiling the actualization of Tswanaedom through the assimilationist model. BaTswana have group rights to land and use of language, and the privilege of living their culture. The success of Tswanaedom has led many to believe that Botswana is a mono-ethnic state.⁶³

Another major impact of the assimilation policy in Botswana concerns property rights, particularly land and resource rights. The Tribal Land Act of 1968 established guidelines on the acquisition, transfer, and use of customary land (i.e., land owned by indigenous communities).⁶⁴ Additionally, tribal land boards were created in 1970 to regulate issues pertaining to customary land. Traditionally, such activities were the responsibility of chiefs.⁶⁵ However, since only the chiefs of the eight principle Tswana tribes are recognized by the constitution, non-Tswana individuals can only gain access to land through assimilation; only under this provision is there no discrimination in access to land and resources. Thus while purporting to allocate land resources non-ethnically, assimilation to Tswanaedom established a new criterion for land access. An example is BaTawana who are a numerical minority but a political majority in their district, and hence control the land. All district residents, including WaYeyi, are officially referred to as BaTawana tribesmen, a political rather than cultural categorization. They are expected to sing to BaTawana chiefs in Setswana, not in their language Shiyeyi.

Another example of this phenomenon is illustrated in the 1977 case of a Mosarwa man employed by a Motswana who applied for a field to plough to the Sub-District Land Board for Kgatleng District. As he was not Mokgatla, he could not be allocated land in Kgatleng District and was told to return to the place of his birth—where he had not been since childhood—to obtain a letter of identification. In this case, the Land Board resorted to measures to discourage an application from a person stigmatized by class and ethnicity, in order to safeguard increasingly scarce land in Kgatleng for a more centrally perceived Kgatla constituency.⁶⁶ This

case illustrates that without reference to the Tswana tribal designation of the land, non-Tswana groups had no access to land. Land allocation in contemporary Botswana largely continues to follow this pattern of land control. Thus, socially constructed divisions are reproduced consistently because land allocation is based on them. This process has allowed Tswana populations to retain most of the benefits it consolidated in the pre-colonial and colonial periods at the expense of non-Tswana groups, only extending these benefits to those who assimilate.

In terms of access to diamond mining revenues, during early negotiations, former president Seretse Khama's tribe, the BaNgwato, stood to benefit the most. By making these revenues a tribal right, Khama could have heavily skewed the benefits of diamond mining towards his own tribe, a situation that would probably have resulted in civil conflict. Understanding this tradeoff, Khama and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) decided to address the revenue issue in the BDP election manifesto of 1965, stating:

Leaving mineral rights vested in tribal authorities and private companies must necessarily result in uneven growth of the country's economy, as well as deprive the Central Government of an important source of revenue for developing the country...It will be the policy of the BDP Government to negotiate with all parties concerning the takeover of the country's mineral rights by the Central Government....⁶⁷

Khama's decision to foster greater centralization of mining activity was instrumental in firmly laying down the political foundations of Botswana's subsequent development by facilitating a justifiable distribution of mineral wealth. His careful political maneuvering and ability to balance different interest group pressures helped Botswana develop economically, a legacy that has been maintained in the more than thirty years since his death. Khama's most important contribution was to coordinate the interests of Botswana's eight major tribes. Immediately following independence, he made the critical decision that diamond revenues were to be placed in a national savings fund, as opposed to being allocated to individual tribes. As a result, diamond revenue would be non-ethnically distributed throughout the state in the form of investment, instead of exclusively privileging specific regions or identity groups. In the short term, his decision was not popular among BaNgwato, Khama's tribe; however, the sustained results of Khama's national savings plan achieved greater legitimacy and resulted in minimal tribal conflict.

Proponents of assimilation emphatically argue that no ethnic discrimination exists in Botswana, but they acknowledge that there are groups such as the BaSarwa and BaKgalagadi who have legitimate concerns. Pertaining to an ongoing conflict between the Botswana government and BaSarwa over land tenure in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, where the government wants to relocate BaSarwa, the government has sought to defend its position by invoking its responsibility for protecting the viability of wildlife protection in the reserve. Yet another justification is the prohibitive cost of providing BaSarwa with basic goods and services, particularly within the settlements.

The central government has expressed a desire to assimilate BaSarwa into mainstream Botswana society. Beginning in 1977, the Botswana government provided BaSarwa with drinking water, borehole maintenance, rations for registered destitutes and orphans, transportation to and from boarding school, and healthcare through mobile clinics and

ambulance services. However, critics have viewed this as the government's paternalistic urge to "develop" the BaSarwa, not addressing their desire for self-determination.⁶⁸ Traditional Sarwa tradition dictates that when a person gets ill, they do not go to the hospital. Instead they must go to the gravesite of that person's ancestor to seek help. In addition, Sarwa tradition believes that water is provided through prayer to the ancestors in the form of rain, and not from faucets. These cultural practices are at the center of arguments that BaSarwa shun modernity and development. Instead of establishing capitalist property rights regimes, BaSarwa have maintained a spiritual relationship with their ancestral land, opting for a hunter-gatherer lifestyle. Recently, however, large tracts of land once used for hunting and gathering have been allocated by the government for grazing, pushing those who wish to continue traditional lifestyles farther into shrinking veld areas. Declining animal populations caused by habitat degradation and globalized markets for game have induced the government to constrain further San hunting practices culminating in a nationwide hunting ban that the government imposed on all species.⁶⁹ One Sarwa activist, Juamanda Gakelebone, summarized it in his statement: "The government is trying to turn us into pastoralists, which we are not. We are ecological hunter-gatherers which have a lot to teach the world about how to coexist peacefully with Mother Earth."⁷⁰ It is mainly the resistance of BaSarwa to assimilation that have left them out from the "Botswana miracle."

The process of assimilation in Botswana, much like that of minoritization, must be conceptualized as a changeable negotiation of opposition and cooperation, and at times through deliberate co-optation of potential enemies. Minoritization in Botswana has historically not been a uniform process, varying regionally and across minority groups. However, what facilitated assimilation was the fact that many minorities legitimized homogeneity, conforming to majoritarian expectations and were attracted to opportunities for upward mobility by concealing what might be denigrated as their minority origins.⁷¹ This type of minority was the most amenable to assimilation, since it gave them a sense of "belonging" in a larger, more powerful group. Acceptance of the greater Tswana identity and Tswana ideology was thus argued to foster democracy and unity and provide Botswana identity groups an inclusive orientation:

They don't try to discriminate against me because I am a Kalanga. Instead, they try to incorporate me into that larger group. They make you feel at home and are able to relate with you on a positive note. They work under the idea that all small groups should identify with a larger group. You cannot go to war because you are being included in some large group. You go to war because you feel excluded.⁷²

Other groups have however become assertive about their marginality, insisting upon recognition and demanding affirmative action as compensation for historically negative discrimination.⁷³ Minorities in Botswana have not been given the same levels of cultural autonomy and as the dominant Tswana. The introduction of new languages in schools is viewed as an expensive endeavor. The only avenue for minorities to gain air time on TV is through organizations like the Society for the Promotion of the Ikalanga Language (SPIL), but such broadcasts are only slotted after midnight. Resultantly, the pursuit of autonomy by

minorities can be viewed as “democracy being tested,” since the national Tswana culture is being challenged through the expression of people’s tribal identities. Assimilation has had a cultural impact too. The BaTswana are patrilineal while the WaYeyi are matrilineal in inheritance and resource allocation. Through identity management, the WaYeyi have had to abandon their heritage and adopt the patrilineal patterns of ownership and inheritance observed under Tswana custom and marry according to Tswana customary norms. This is one of the group’s major grievances.

The only caveat was that minorities subordinated themselves to the principal Tswana tribes in order to access mineral wealth. This came at the expense of the right to cultural expression. The process of ethnic assimilation, including the sacrifice of the cultural heritages and customs of marginalized groups, is sometimes brutal. Critics of assimilation, like Dr. Nyati-Saleshandoo of the University of Botswana, criticize the assimilationist model and the promotion of Setswana languages.⁷⁴ Prior to independence, languages like Ikalanga were taught, but later the pursuit of a cohesive Tswana identity led to the banning of all minority languages from classroom instruction. Although the people initially accepted the assimilationist model as a way to ensure safety and security, they were unaware of its ramifications. Ultimately, the villages where non-Tswana-speaking people lived became the least developed, particularly those of the BaKgalagadi and BaSarwa. Overwhelmingly, the eight Tswana tribes are centered in large, developed urban centers with access to administrative and social services and healthcare, while minority ethnic groups have access only to poor roads and unmanaged clinics. Marginalized minority groups are the most vulnerable, and in their areas poverty is rampant and they are distant from basic social services.

Group grievances of minority groups receive very little attention. A petition by the Kamanakao Association, a non-governmental organization with the basic objective of maintaining and developing the remnants of the language and culture of the WaYeyi people of northern Botswana, was rejected in 2000. Both the Kamanakao Association and SPIL, which are working on the development and promotion of the Ikalanga and Shiyeyi languages, have met government resistance; sometimes being as tribalistic by government officials, indicating intolerance of minority group grievances.

The plight of minorities in Botswana is characterized by one opposition party leader as the “brutal suppression of the expression of culture” and “suppression of dissent.”⁷⁵ The term “brutal” was employed in the sense of brainwashing and instilling the belief that speaking Setswana would propagate the concept of one united national government in people’s minds. He critiqued the Botswana government’s suppression of the desire of minority groups to express culture and language freely. He argues that “cultural groups are not political in nature, they just want their languages to be taught.”⁷⁶

The assimilationist policy in Botswana has however managed to limit the evils associated with ethnic diversity by creating an inclusive ethnic identity and promoting it as Tswanaedom. Having observed the negative impact of “othering” and tribalism in other African nations, the Botswana elite decided to approach the issue from a pragmatic viewpoint, constructing an inclusive identity that would take priority over individual tribal identities. This national identity, branded Tswanaedom, would mitigate the ills of ethnic diversity by creating a sense of togetherness that does not exist anywhere else on the continent, and it became the basis of

resource allocation. Unfortunately, those like the BaSarwa who failed to assimilate under Tswanadom have largely been excluded from the developmental miracle.

Conclusion

This article challenges the basic view that Botswana is ethnically homogenous, an assumption which has been incorporated in many explanations of Botswana's avoidance of the resource curse phenomenon. Instead, it contends that Botswana's purported ethnic homogeneity was the result of a combination of political strategies of the instrumentalist kind on the part of elite political entrepreneurs in the various phases of Botswana's history establishing a social hierarchy of identity that engendered the notion of Tswanadom. While not an ethnic marker for resource allocation and provision as is otherwise seen worldwide, Tswanadom with its origins during pre-colonialism, its consolidation during the colonial era, and its institutionalism in post-colonialism, became the symbolic delineation of Botswana's have and have nots. As a result, the Botswana case reflects a persuasive approach to fostering simulated ethnic unity and social cohesion, and it demonstrates the state's ability to channel identity politics into peaceful political competition, albeit at the expense of cultural autonomy for minority groups.

The article illustrated the origins and evolution of Tswanadom, as a process and product of the social construction of identity through indigenous and colonial discourse, mercantile exchange, and through the elite's political entrepreneurship across Botswana's history in an attempt to efficiently distribute resources. Tswanadom was however most robustly instituted in the post-colonial era through legal frameworks that recognized the legitimacy of Tswana institutions such as the recognition of Tswana chiefs in the country's legislature, the allocation of land along the lines of membership to various Tswana *merafe*, and the promotion of Tswana culture and custom mainly through language in all facets of Botswana civic life. The government privileged the culture of the eight Tswana tribes, ordaining their hereditary chiefs as paramount and making all other identity groups subservient to their chiefdoms. Resistance to assimilation was rhetorically condemned as tribalistic, in an effort to superimpose Tswana culture with nationalism. Botswana's assimilation policies placed constraints on social behavior and provided tangible incentives only for those who were amenable to absorption, cooperation and compliance with rules and procedures for allocation, participation, representation and accountability. Those who were willing to assimilate into the larger ethno-linguistic clusters of Tswanadom benefitted more than those who rejected assimilation, as was the case with BaSarwa.

Within its context, the phenomenon of Tswanadom created a sense of social cohesion not found in most other African countries and has thus been critical to nation-building. Although gratified by the economic progress, diamond wealth, and general international acclaim that their country has achieved globally, minorities in Botswana continue to share a common belief that the government has failed to acknowledge that it is not just access to economic resources that satisfies identity groups. Rather, these resources also encompass cultural and language resources, which the Botswana government has for the most part taken away from minority ethnic groups through forced assimilation. The government continues to justify the promotion

of Tswanadom as a cultivator of nationhood and unity and credits it for limiting the threats and perils associated with ethnic heterogeneity.

Notes

- 1 Gapa 2013, p. 1.
- 2 Thompson 2010, pp. 109-124.
- 3 Williams 2011, p. 113.
- 4 Iimi 2006. However, for opposite sides of this view see Good (1992, 1993, 1994, and 2002).
- 5 Acemoglu and Robinson 2002.
- 6 Hillbom 2008.
- 7 Du Toit 1995, p. 7.
- 8 Baker and Prys Jones 1998, p. 355.
- 9 Interview with Balefi Tsie, Professor of Political Science, University of Botswana, in Gaborone, September 13, 2011. Also see Werbner 1984.
- 10 Parson 1985, p. 27.
- 11 Chowdhury 2012, p. 71.
- 12 Easterly and Levine 1997, p. 1206.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Collier and Hoeffler 2004, pp. 563-95.
- 15 Thompson 2010, pp. 109-124.
- 16 Fearon and Laitin 2003, pp. 75-90.
- 17 Klare 2001, p. 49.
- 18 Ross 2002, p. 35.
- 19 Esman 1994, p. 229.
- 20 Blagojevic 2009, p.3.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Chandra 2012.
- 23 Blagojevic 2009, p. 5.
- 24 Crawford 1998, p. 11.
- 25 Blagojevic 2009, p. 2.
- 26 Ibid., p. 10.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Williams 2015, p. 149.
- 29 Palan 2000, p. 576.
- 30 Eminov Ali 2007, p. 1.
- 31 Sahliyah Emile1 1993, p. 178.
- 32 John et al. 2013, p. 1132.
- 33 Habyarimana et al. 2007, pp. 709-25.
- 34 Ibid., 2007, p. 711.
- 35 Caselli and Coleman 2011, p. 3.
- 36 Nyati-Ramahobo 2008, pp. 1-16.
- 37 Ibid.

- 38 Schapera 1953, p. 14.
- 39 Wilmsen 2002, p. 826.
- 40 Ibid., p. 827.
- 41 It is important to note here that although there has been a recent upsurge in Africa and beyond of the notion of autochthony, the notion of indigeneity inspiring discourses on the need to safeguard ancestral lands and resources against strangers or allochthons, in Botswana indigeneity is challenged on the basis that all Tswana people are indigenous to Botswana and hence no one should lay claim to resources or land on indigenous lines.
- 42 Wilmsen 2002, p. 828.
- 43 Tlou 1985.
- 44 Morton Ramsay and Mgadla 2008, p. 65.
- 45 Wilmsen 2002, p. 828.
- 46 Singular: *morafe*.
- 47 Bennet in Mazonde 2002.
- 48 Wilmsen 2002, p. 828.
- 49 Schapera 1970, p. 103.
- 50 Wilmsen 2002, p. 828.
- 51 Ibid., p. 829.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid., p. 831.
- 54 Ibid., p. 830.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Ottaway 1999, p. 303.
- 57 A *kgotla* is a formal public assembly associated with the institution of traditional leadership.
- 58 Reteng 2008, pp. 1-5.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Nyati-Ramahobo 1991, p. 201.
- 61 Radio Botswana News Bulletin, 03/25/2000.
- 62 He was a supporter of the Serowe Development Trust, a BaNgwato owned and run NGO.
- 63 Parsons 1985, p. 27.
- 64 Amended in 1993.
- 65 Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla 2008, p. 169.
- 66 Wilmsen 2002, p. 832.
- 67 Botswana Democratic Party Election Manifesto 1965.
- 68 Woof 2014, p. 19.
- 69 Survival International n.d.
- 70 Tarvainen 2014.
- 71 Werbner 2004, p. 673.
- 72 Interview with Dr. Zibani Maundeni, Professor of Political Science, University of Botswana. Interview conducted at the University of Botswana, September 20, 2011.

73 Werbner 2004, p. 673.

74 Interview with Dr. Lydia Nyati-Saleshando (previously Nyati-Ramahobo), Professor of Education, Dean of the Faculty of Education, University of Botswana, co-founder of the Kamanakao Association, a pressure group for WaYeyi linguistic and cultural rights, and founder of Reteng, a multicultural coalition of Botswana people. Interview conducted at the University of Botswana, October 11, 2011.

75 Name withheld. Interviewed in Gaborone October 5, 2011.

76 Ibid.

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Impact of Forest Carbon Sequestration Initiative on Community Assets: The Case of Assisted Natural Regeneration Project in Humbo, Southwestern Ethiopia

PADMANABAN MURUGAN and FEKADU ISRAEL

Abstract: This study was aimed at unveiling the impact of a forest carbon sequestration initiative on community level livelihood assets by examining the case of local communities involved in the management of a restored forest in Humbo district of Southwestern Ethiopia. A triangulation of key informant interviews, focus group discussions, non-participant observations, and in-depth interviews were employed to gather the required data. Findings of the study reveal that at the community level, the project achieved positive outcomes such as the formation of Forest Development and Protection Cooperatives (FDPCs) and strengthening their local leadership capacity, building some physical assets though some of them were not in line with the priority needs of the stakeholder local communities, improved microclimatic conditions, and increased savings of FDPCs. On the other hand, the weakening of certain long existed informal institutions for joint ownership of livestock (*Kottaa*), share breeding of livestock (*UloKottaa*), and the exchange of farm oxen (*BooraaGatuwaa*) were worth mentioning as negative outcomes associated with the project. Therefore, letting the community decide over what to do with the carbon revenue in general and which community level assets to build in particular are likely to meet the priority needs of the concerned communities, enhance the sense of ownership of the forest among the members of the communities, and thereby contribute to the sustainability of forest management and carbon sequestration. Moreover, social impact assessments need to be exhaustively conducted during the replication of similar projects in order to anticipate their possible dysfunctions and thereby to save the long existing informal social institutions of target communities.

Introduction

In Ethiopia, forest resources play a significant role particularly in the livelihoods of rural people as important sources of energy, food, employment, medicine, fodder, and income.¹ Studies undertaken in various parts of the country show that tens of thousands of rural people while depending on forests and woodlands for domestic energy are also engaged in

Padmanabhan Murugan, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology Addis Ababa University whose specialization includes the sociology of health, gender, poverty and HIV, migration, and rural livelihoods. His most recent work was on human trafficking in Ethiopia, which focused on factors contributing to human trafficking and the context of vulnerability and patterns of victimization.

Fekadu Israel, Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Dilla University, Dilla, Ethiopia who works on poverty, food security, migration, rural livelihood, and other related issues.

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i1a2.pdf>

the commercial supply of wood, charcoal, and other non-timber forest products to urban areas to earn their livelihood.² In the same vein, the connection between forest resources and livelihoods of rural people in developing countries has been enunciated clearly in the literature.³ For instance, the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) indicated that over two third of the Africa's 600 million people rely on forest products for their livelihood; its contribution to domestic energy alone, wood is the primary energy source for at least 70 percent of households in Africa.⁴ From this, it is clear that the importance of forests and woodlands play a prominent role in the developing countries where highest percentage of people are poor and rural based.

The atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) and several detrimental effects associated with them has recently attracted global attention. As a result, various bodies like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the subsequent Conferences of Parties (COPs) raised the level of concern about stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to avoid climatic calamities. Consequently, the signatory parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol accepted legally binding constraints that bound some industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emission by an average of 5.2 percent relative to the 1990's level.⁵ In the face of worrying global climate change and increasing global concern for it, in addition to the role forests play as source of income for rural people, the crucial role forests play as an alternative reservoir for carbon dioxide and thereby controlling and maintaining the stability, functioning, and sustainability of global ecosystems mushroomed as a source of relief for global society.⁶

Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries are not obliged to reduce their GHG emissions, whereas industrialized countries have to fulfill such targets through one of three flexibility mechanisms: international emissions trading (IET), the clean development mechanism (CDM), and joint implementation (JI).⁷ Of the three mechanisms, it is only the CDM that is related to developing countries. The CDM is intended to help industrialized countries meet a portion of their emission reduction at lower cost by either purchasing carbon offsets that were generated through CDM-registered projects or by initiating CDM projects in the developing countries. In addition, according to the protocol, CDM projects are geographically limited to non-industrialized countries in order to achieve its second objective of helping developing countries achieve sustainable development.⁸ By complying with the protocol, some industrialized countries have now started to purchase emission offsets from projects in developing countries and some others finance carbon sequestration projects in developing countries in order to reduce their respective emissions of greenhouse gases.⁹ Consequently, having twin objectives of reducing greenhouse gasses and promoting sustainable development in host countries, the CDM projects are being implemented in non-industrialized countries since 2005.¹⁰

Within the aforementioned framework, World Vision Ethiopia (WVE) in partnership with World Vision Australia (WVA) in 2005 introduced the first carbon forestry project to Humbo communities of Southwestern Ethiopia.¹¹ The initiative introduced farmer-managed natural regeneration techniques to restore degraded communal forestland and thereby generate income for local communities through the sale of carbon credits. In introducing the carbon forestry project to the area, however, the initiators appear to be more influenced and driven by the hostile socio-economic and environmental conditions that characterized the Humbo area than by the global agenda. Furthermore, the initiators of the project intended "to stimulate ongoing community development and to test new funding streams such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)" through it.¹² Accordingly, the stated goal of the

Humbo project was “to regenerate 2,728 hectares of previously degraded forest land in Ethiopia, with the aim of enhancing the local communities’ livelihoods through improved environmental conditions as well as financial inflows to be achieved through linkages with carbon markets.”¹³ Thus, putting the Clean Development Mechanism into practice, the initiators of this specific project incorporated livelihood objectives into the project design documents (PDDs) as a main part of their contribution to the sustainable development of local communities.


It is well established in the livelihood literature that livelihood assets can be held at household as well as at community levels. However, in the case of the project under consideration, it is clearly stated and specified that the carbon revenues would primarily be utilized for building community level assets. Therefore, it is very important and timely to investigate the state of community level livelihood assets of the stakeholder local communities as they have been receiving carbon revenue since 2009. Accordingly, this article exclusively considers the impacts of the project on the community level assets of the stakeholder local communities. This study was conducted on Humbo Community-based Natural Regeneration Project located in Wolaita zone of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State with the aim of making explicit the positive and negative impacts of the carbon sequestration project on the community level assets.

Description of the Study Area

This study was conducted in 2014 in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), which is one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia. Humbo *Wereda* (District), the research site, is one of the twelve *Weredas* in Wolaita zone, which is one of the thirteen zones of SNNPR.¹⁴ The district is located 420 km southwest of the capital city, Addis Ababa, and eighteen kms from Soddo town, which is the administrative seat of Wolaita Zone. The *Wereda* is composed of forty-one *Kebele* administrations, of which thirty-nine are rural and two are urban.¹⁵ The total land area of the district is about 859.4 km². The district had a total population of 144,739 (72,729 males and 72,011 females) in 2013. Only 7,897 were urban dwellers and 136,842 were rural.¹⁶ The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants belong to the Wolaita ethnic group, but there are also Amhara, Sidama, Gamo, and others.¹⁷

Like the other *Woredas* of Wolaita Zone, agriculture (mainly crop and livestock production) constitutes the most important economic sector in Humbo *Wereda*. The main crops are cereals such as maize, sorghum, *teff*, haricot beans; cash crops like coffee; root crops like sugar potato, *Enset*, and onions; and fruits like banana, mango, avocado and others.¹⁸ However, severe soil erosion, fragmented land size, and erratic rainfall have negatively affected crop production.¹⁹ Farming is mainly rainfall dependent though inhabitants along rivers like the Hamassa and the Bilate and aside Lake Abaya use irrigation. Livestock (e.g. cattle, sheep, goats, poultry, and donkeys) also has an important place next to crop production in the economy of the inhabitants of the *Woreda*. Furthermore, other economic activities like handicraft industries, trade, and others also play important roles.²⁰

Map of the Study Area (Wolaita Zone in Ethiopia, and Humbo Wereda in Wolaita Zone)



Description of the Project

This study was concerned with Humbo Assisted Natural Regeneration (ANR) Project. Based on a partnership of World Vision, the World Bank, the Ethiopian Government, and the Humbo communities, the project was introduced to the area starting from 2005.²¹ But, here it is important to discuss the socio-economic and environmental conditions that evidently led to the perceived need of said project by its initiator, World Vision Ethiopia, before discussing the nature of the project itself. As mentioned under the description of the study area, Humbo Wereda's diversified agro-ecological conditions range from semi-arid to tropical humid and sub-humid climate types that allow the production of different commercial and food crops and sustain diversified flora and fauna. Nonetheless, the district is often characterized by poverty, high population density, variable rainfall, landlessness and increasing demand for agricultural land, environmental degradation, and the like, which in turn accounted for hunger, food insecurity, and recurrent drought proneness in the area.²² These socio-economic and environmental conditions have driven local communities to encroach on the forest for expansion of farm and grazing lands, charcoal production, fire wood collection, and a search of construction materials among other objectives and consequently resulted in the gradual deforestation of a communal forest that historically covered a significant land area in the district.²³

World Vision Ethiopia is one of the non-governmental organizations that have striven to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Humbo Woreda, as the area is one of the country's drought prone regions. It started its relief work in Humbo in 1970s. Since then the organization has been involved in the distribution of relief assistance, the distribution of food-based safety nets, and food security related aid.²⁴ Its engagement in economic development (i.e., mainly agriculture) as one of its priority areas and on land degradation that characterized the areas where the organization works led it to integrate environmental issues at the heart of all its programs.²⁵ Relying on its long history of community

development work in Ethiopia in general and Humbo district in particular, in 2005, WVE took the initiative to introduce Farmer Managed Natural Forest regeneration (FMNR) as a means to alleviate the situation and improve the community's resilience capacity in the face of climate change and ensure sustainable development. Thus, it pioneered involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism in Ethiopia as part of its effort to respond to local and global issues. Accordingly, in 2006 the field operations of the initiative began "to regenerate 2,728 hectares of previously degraded forest land in Ethiopia, with the aim of enhancing the local communities' livelihoods through improved environmental conditions as well as financial inflows to be achieved thorough linkages with carbon markets."²⁶ However, the project's aim is not just limited to stimulating ongoing community development and testing new funding streams such as the Clean Development Mechanism but it also subscribes to the other equally important goal of CDM—mitigating climate change through forest restoration and preservation. Thus, involvement in the CDM thereby to simultaneously respond to local and global issues was an opportunity that no one in the country was aware of until WVA came up with the idea and expertise.²⁷

As discussed above, WVE in collaboration with WVA took the initiative to formulate and design the project, organized the concerned communities into forest development and protection cooperatives, and continues to solicit as well as mobilize funds for the project. Furthermore, it backs up the project by giving technical and human resource support and by facilitating its management. As mentioned in Biryahwaho et al., WVE's responsibilities include:

- Ensuring that the project obtains all the necessary approvals by government and other players in the carbon business;
- Providing a link with carbon buyers, providing linking and mediation services;
- Entering into an Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement with the carbon buyer on behalf of the cooperative societies;
- Conducting training for members of the cooperative societies to ensure they are technically competent to implement forest management interventions as well as managing affairs of the cooperative society;
- Facilitating the formation of a Cooperative Union that would eventually take on the project leadership responsibilities beyond September 2012;
- Serving as an external member of the Board of Directors and participating in the general assembly as a non-voting member;
- Rendering technical, professional and advisory assistance to the society since its inception and will continue providing an ongoing advisory role;
- Jointly monitoring the reforestation carbon project with members of the executive committee;
- Acting as a liaison with the relevant governmental, non-governmental and international financing agencies for the effective implementation of the project;
- Assisting in the formulation of internal regulations and forest management plans;
- Providing assistance in case of potential disputes over unauthorized forest usage;

- Recommending a general manager for the project who has the adequate personal capacity for the administration of the project.²⁸

In addition to WVE and WVA, some multilateral institutions and governmental organizations at the national, regional, and local levels have been involved in the project as stakeholders in order to help it attain its local and global goals of sustainable development and climate change mitigation respectively. The World Bank, Federal Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD), Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD), Humbo *Woreda* (District) Agricultural, Rural Development and Forestry Development Coordination Office (ARDFCO), Humbo *Woreda* Government Cooperative Office and Community Forest Protection and Development Cooperative Societies are the major stakeholders in the project.²⁹ Since each of the stakeholders carry out specific responsibilities based on their mandate, it goes far beyond the scope of this article to discuss the specific roles of each actor. However, it is imperative to disclose the primary role of a few of them.

The World Bank has been involved in the project as a buyer of sequestered carbon due to the project using financial resources from some developed countries. The Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement was signed between the Bank and World Vision Australia and World Vision Ethiopia. Then, “WVE receives carbon payments through WVA on behalf of the community and disburses the funds to respective cooperatives proportionately upon the amount of emissions they have reduced.”³⁰ Aynalem indicated that the Bank’s involvement in this project purports to be limited to a business deal unlike the role it has played in the Ethiopian economy and environmental programs since the 1950s, and, furthermore, disclosed that it is very much involved in the project shaping it in a number of ways and “paying for the technical support and expertise that is locally inaccessible.”³¹

At the national level, the Federal Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) acts as an autonomous government body for environmental management and protection of the country’s resources. Among its responsibilities are: negotiations of international environmental agreements; reviewing and approve project development documents (PDD); ensuring an environmental and social impact assessment, if required, has been conducted; issuing a letter of approval to confirm that the proposed carbon project is in line with the country’s sustainable development priorities. It also acts as Designated National Authority (DNA) for activities that fall within the ambit of the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol. In addition to EPA, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) and the Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD), Humbo *Woreda* Agricultural, Rural Development and Forestry Development Coordination Office (ARDFCO), and the Humbo *Woreda* Government Cooperative Office have been involved in the project from its very inception in accordance with their mandates.³²

At the basic level there are community institutions namely, Community Forest Protection and Development Cooperative Societies in the seven *kebele* administrations of Humbo district. During the introduction of the project in 2006, World Vision Ethiopia and the Cooperative office of Humbo *Woreda* assisted forest user households in establishing forestry cooperative societies in their respective *kebeles*. Thus, these seven community cooperative societies were formed for the purpose of this particular project, which was “aimed to rehabilitate a communal land area that, it is claimed, has neither formal nor informal institutions that can represent the community or manage the resources in question.”³³ The seven cooperative societies have their registration certificates from the

sector office and now have a legal identity and also a user right over the communal land. These cooperatives were established with the following objectives:

- To undertake reforestation and conservation activities of the area designated as forest land within the locality;
- To mitigate the degradation of natural resources and climate change in the designated area and restore the natural balance by planting indigenous tree species;
- To ensure that the development, protection, and conservation of the reforested area is carried out under the full control and active involvement of the community living around the area;
- To improve the livelihood of the members of the society by promoting an investment and saving culture within the community;
- To encourage sustainable forest management and natural resource conservation;
- To ensure that members share the responsibilities and the benefits from the reforestation of the designated area;
- To increase forest cover in the community managed areas and ensure improved forest conditions;
- To use the income derived from the reforestation project to meet the various development needs of the community.³⁴

All these were cooperatives were established with these objectives. Accordingly, these community institutions are ultimately responsible for undertaking forest development activities such as tree planting, thinning, pruning, weeding, guarding, etc. of the enclosed reforestation area, protecting and conserving the reforestation area by fencing and/or guarding the area, growing seedlings by establishing nurseries and planting them when necessary, and many other specific activities in line with the bylaws of their forestry cooperative societies.³⁵

The Farmers' Forest Union was another institution in place to bring the seven cooperative societies under one umbrella organization. It was established to serve as the main link between forest cooperatives, local government, WVE, and gradually with the carbon buyers. Furthermore, the Farmer's Forest Union is expected to gradually assume all the responsibilities WVE has been playing since the introduction of the project though WVE will continue to play an advisory role throughout the project's sixty-year lifespan.³⁶ Accordingly, by the time this study was conducted (i.e. early 2014), WVE reportedly transferred its previous responsibilities to the Farmers' Forest Union and was playing an advisory role, providing technical support, and engaged in capacity building activities.

With regard to the participation of local communities in the project under consideration, WVE and WVA claim that the project is under implementation with the consensus and a high level participation of the concerned community members.³⁷ Furthermore, WVE, WVA, and the World Bank present the Humbo Project as the first successful large-scale forestry CDM project in Africa. In contrast to this, by investigating the power relations between the above international and local actors, Aynalem concluded that the implementation of the project under consideration is characterized by a clear power asymmetry (i.e. local actors are powerless) and pseudo-participation of the local communities:

The local community was directly or indirectly forced to take part in the management of the communal land. Their interest and concerns are not given due consideration, even if they were recorded in various ways, such as through WVE's socio-economic assessment and consultation meetings. The reason for such disregard for the interest of local participant is because the conservation agenda and practices are already defined globally, so there appear to be no ways of accommodating community demands within the project framework without compromising the main carbon offset targets.³⁸

Decisions taken far from the site of local rural resources can have major impacts on the associated rural livelihoods.³⁹ The costs incurred or the benefits enjoyed by a given community in turn significantly influences the way that community views and manages the natural resource under consideration. If the afforestation/ reforestation (A/R) project is perceived as being a barrier to local livelihoods, it may create an incentive for illegal harvesting and clearing of the forest and thereby threatening the sustainability of the forest and the permanence of carbon sequestration. Thus, investigating and disclosing the changes the project has so far brought about on community level assets would be of a great theoretical and practical significance in the midst of ongoing controversial claims over power relations between the local and global actors, the degree of local communities' participation in the project, and the genuine and primary goal of the project.

Research Methods

The study employed a qualitative research approach. It is a research approach that uses a range of methods to focus on the meanings and interpretation of social phenomena and social processes in the particular contexts in which they occur. It is concerned with exploring the subjective meanings through which people interpret the world, i.e., social events and phenomena are understood from the perspective of the actors themselves, avoiding the imposition of the researcher's own preconceptions and definitions.⁴⁰ Therefore, a qualitative approach is the ideal one for this study as the objective of the study is not aimed at generating numeric data for quantification and measurement. As indicated above, during the introduction of the project, one Forest Protection and Development Cooperative (FPDC) was established in each of the seven *kebele* administrations in order to manage a designated area of the forestland under consideration. For this study, out of the seven FDPCs, only three, namely BollaWanche, BossaWanche, and HobichaBadda FDPCs were considered. Out of the range of methods that fall in the category of qualitative research, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, non-participant observations and in-depth interviews were used to generate data in order to identify changes in community level assets due to the A/R project. Key informants and participants of FGDs of the study were recruited from members of executive committees and senior members of the selected FDPCs. The data collected in the aforementioned ways were analyzed by employing a thematic analysis method.

In order to disclose changes observed on community level livelihood assets, the researchers made use of the sustainable livelihood framework that has been forwarded by the British Department for International Development (DFID) as an analytical framework. The framework summarizes the main components of livelihoods and complex relationships among the components such as transforming structures and processes, vulnerability contexts, livelihood assets, livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes. This framework

serves not only to present the main factors that affect people's livelihoods, and typical relationships among them but also it can be used in assessing the contribution to livelihood sustainability made by existing activities.⁴¹ Hence, the framework has been selected and used in the present study with the later view in mind, i.e., to assess the impact of Humbo Assisted Natural Regeneration Project on community level livelihood assets. Furthermore, DFID indicates the possibility of focusing on any part of the framework, while keeping the wider picture in mind. Accordingly, in this study's focus was on community level livelihood assets while keeping the rest of the framework's components in mind. Thus, the researchers adopted DFID's sustainable livelihood (SL) approach as an analytical tool for this study, for the approach stresses that poverty-focused development activity should be people-centered, responsive and participatory, multi-level, conducted in partnership, sustainable, and dynamic; and the approach coincides with the approach the initiators of the project under study claim to have used.

Results and Discussion

A pentagon of livelihood assets that can be utilized for achieving the outcomes of livelihood strategies is central to the DFID's Sustainable Livelihood Framework. They refer to the resources upon which people draw in order to carry out their livelihood activities. The framework identifies five types of capital (human, social, financial, physical, and natural capital) upon which livelihoods are built.⁴² Accordingly, this sub section of the paper analyzes and discusses the impact of forest based carbon sequestration initiative on each type of the livelihood assets of the stakeholder local communities.

Impacts on Community Level Human Capital

Human capital represents skills, knowledge, the ability and potential to labor, and good health that in combination with other assets enable people to engage in different livelihood activities and achieve their livelihood objectives. It is enhanced with good health services and investments in education and training.⁴³

In the present study, the provision of a series of new training by the initiative was its well-recognized contribution to the human capital of the stakeholder local communities. Key informants from the selected local communities indicated that the project created a number of training opportunities to local communities on issues related to environmental protection, forest management, land and water conservation, financial management, carbon monitoring, credit and saving management, agroforestry, and wide range of income generating activities. And the informants attributed the enhanced awareness of local communities about the importance of forest resources to the training given by the project. In this regard, a key informant from BossaWanche indicated that:

Training changed initial unfavorable attitude of some of our community members towards the conservation of the forest. In fact, not only the knowledge gained from training, but also the per diem allowances we received during training sessions were meaningful to convince us. Most importantly, the training equipped our community members with basic skills on how to restore the forest and manage it. Now they are the members of this community who run our FDPC.

A key informant from HobichaBadda also described the importance of training provided by the project as "access to training reduced initial resistances to protection of the forest land by

raising community members' awareness about benefits to be enjoyed and made us have a common vision to manage our common property and benefits from it."

Capacity building was, therefore, one of the important outcomes of various training as stated by key informants. In this regard the key informants at each site indicated that the training provided, particularly on forest management, financial management, carbon monitoring, and credit and saving management, has built the capacity of community members to manage the forest and associated benefits of their respective cooperative with some technical assistance and human power assistance from World Vision Ethiopia and the cooperative office of the *Wereda*. From this, it is evident that the project has built the institutional capacity of the local community, which in turn positively contributes to the sustainability of forest management. This finding agrees with Corbera where it was indicated that a small carbon forestry project in the state of Chiapas, Mexico contributed to strengthened local capacities and leadership and to reinforcing community based natural resource management across the region.⁴⁴

Transfer of various skills was mentioned as another important contribution of the project to human capital of the local communities. Key informants indicated that skills transferred through training in various income generating activities like tailoring, bee keeping, poultry, cattle fattening, and other activities have created a conducive environment for learning and transfer of skills among community members. Participants of focus group discussions also recognized the delivery of training in various income-generating activities. However, only bee keeping has been identified by participants of focus group discussions as an income-generating activity that has been better adopted by some farmers. In HobichaBadda, participants of focus group discussions explicitly disclosed the difficulty of practicing cattle fattening due to a severe shortage of fodder. Similarly, in all of the study sites participants mentioned the difficulty of raising poultry due to rampant attacks from wild animals that have been returned the area due to forest restoration. From this it can be argued that some skill training has not thoroughly anticipated the feasibility of and potential hurdles for application in the communities, which in turn limited diffusion among members of the cooperatives.

Impact on Community Level Social Capital

Social capital represents the social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of their livelihood objectives. In this regard, vertical as well as horizontal social networks and interconnections, memberships in formal and informal groups, relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchange, and access to wider institutions of society are of paramount importance. They play significant roles in enabling people to work together, extending people's access to and influence over other institutions, reducing transaction costs, and reinforcing adherence to mutually agreed upon or commonly accepted rules, norms, and sanctions.⁴⁵

The emergence of institutions for governing access to the forest and securing of property rights over the forest were worth mentioning impacts of the project on the social capital of the local communities as described by key informants. A key informant from BossaWanche stated:

In the time of Emperor Hailesilassie [1930-1974], the area (i.e. the area currently used by carbon forestry project) was covered by dense forest and belonged to individual landlords. At the time, the inhabitants of the area access forest products based on the periodic permissions of the owner of the

forest. Starting from the beginning of Dergue regime [1974-1991] until the introduction of the afforestation and reforestation project in 2006, the area remained open to public which gradually resulted in unmerciful destruction of the forest and killing and chasing of wild animals that used to live in it.

The enclosure of the forest accompanied the institutionalization of rules and regulations for utilizing the forest products and benefits associated with its protection. This can be further cognized from the account of a key informant from BollaWanche who said:

Unlike the open access condition that long existed before the establishment of our cooperative, nowadays there are specific rules that govern access to the forest by members of our cooperative. On top of that, since we have legal certificate over our forest, non-members of our cooperative cannot exploit it as before.

Initially, the impact of the project was divisive in the case of HobichaBadda. In-depth interviews and focus group discussion revealed the severe extent to which the community was divided during the conception and implementation of forest area enclosure. The participants attributed the then resistance of some community members to the perceived greater opportunity cost of the forest area enclosure to a majority of the community members. In this regard, participants disclosed the hitherto unresolved issue of restriction of grazing in the area. However, the participants indicated that the apparent environmental benefits of forest protection and the expected financial benefit of the project have enabled them to work together to protect the forest. Furthermore, as one informant from HobichaBadda stated:

Though the protection of the forest prevented us from taking our livestock for grazing to the area, it made the forest our property, which had previously been exploited by people from other *kebeles* of Humbo *Wereda* and even SodoZuriya *Wereda*. Though nobody is allowed to cut trees from this forest, every member of our cooperative is sure that the carbon revenue from our forest belongs to us.

Hence, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that the formation of cooperatives with specific rules for access to the forest, for participation in its protection, and for benefit sharing secured property rights over a portion of the forest, the current environmental benefits of the forest and expectation of future financial benefit have boosted the cooperation among cooperative members. Furthermore, the enforceability of the bylaws of cooperative, and the legal recognition of their property rights were found to have contributed to their mutual trust and confidence in their effort to develop and protect the forest. However, the existence of disincentives for forest protection, such as exclusion of grazing and restriction on collection of forest products is worth noting.

The organization of forest users into cooperatives has been reported to have facilitated community access to other formal institutions. In this regard the key informants from BollaWanche and BossaWanche specifically indicated that their respective cooperative is working in collaboration with the Water Supply Desk of the Zone to increase the number of water points initially planned by the latter. A key informant from BossaWanche commented:

In addition to giving us a user right over the portion of the forest and financial return associated with its protection, the formation of forest development and protection cooperative has enabled us to easily

communicate with water supply desk of the zone. For instance, our forest protection cooperative has arrived at consensus with water supply desk of the zone to support the establishment of four water points.

This statement shows that the organization of forest users into cooperatives has boosted the power of local communities to access and influence other formal institutions for the betterment of their respective community.

Although the project managed to assist the development of new institutions for forest management in the community and enabled members to work together more than they used to, it is not exempt from notable negative latent impacts on other long existing local institutions. One of the institutions the community members almost stopped practicing was *Kottaa* (joint ownership) and *UloKottaa* (share breeding) of livestock. Participants of focus group discussions in all of the study sites explicitly indicated that *Kottaa* and *UloKottaa* had been the main mechanism of owning livestock among poor community members. However, the participants indicated that the enclosure of the forestland marked the collapse of these arrangements, for the poor do not have any marginal land for grazing and fodder extraction. Consequently, the relatively wealthy people would not give livestock to poor people on the basis of the aforementioned arrangements, since the latter could not access sufficient fodder for the livestock. This shows that the protection of the forestland has detrimentally affected the long existed institutions for the flow of wealth among social classes of the community, i.e. the flow of wealth from relatively wealthy to poorer people through joint ownership and share breeding of livestock.

Another local institution identified as having been adversely affected due to the protection of the forest was that the arrangements for *BooraaGatuwa* (farm oxen exchange). There was a strong consensus among the participants of focus group discussion in HobichaBadda that farm oxen exchange among farmers has been weakened due to massive cattle selling induced by fodder scarcity and restriction of grazing immediately after enclosure of forest area for the purpose of the carbon forestry project. The participants indicated that the few people who have maintained their draught oxen are practicing farm oxen exchange. This shows that the detrimental impact that the project caused on one livelihood activity, i.e. livestock rearing, has ruined several institutions, which in turn detrimentally affected another livelihood activity, i.e. crop production. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude from the above evidence that the project has inadvertently weakened informal social support arrangements.

Impact on Community Level Physical Capital

The impact of the carbon forestry project on physical capital was more or less identical across the concerned communities. In all of the study sites, the carbon revenue received by each cooperative was primarily used for the installation of cereal milling machines in each FDPC. A key informant from BollaWanche stated: “priority was given to planting the cereal milling machine in order to ease the burden of women and children travelling longer distance carrying grains in search of a mill. Accordingly, a cereal milling machine was planted in a place central to member households of the cooperative.”

Although glad for having a cereal milling machine as property of their respective cooperative, there was a strong consensus among focus group discussions participants of BollaWanche that their priority need was not a cereal milling machine which they occasionally use but rather potable water which consumes two to four hours labor of women and children of the area per day. They also questioned the priority given to community level

physical capital in general and the installation of cereal milling machines in particular. They indicated that it would have been better if the carbon revenue had been distributed among members in order to support change in their livelihoods. As the private flourmills at HobichaBadda town are easily accessible to members of the cooperative, the participants agreed that the installation of an additional flourmill was not a priority need of their community. Instead, the road connecting HobichaBadda to *Wereda* and Zonal town was identified by the participants as a pressing issue preventing them from using modern transport services.

Therefore, the above results of focus group discussions from both HobichaBadda and BollaWanche show that the endeavor made by the project to contribute to the physical capital of the communities was not in line with the priority needs of the communities. In turn, the observed incongruence between the priority needs of communities and the physical capital built in their communities show that the effort was not participatory. Furthermore, the similarity of physical capital given priority across cooperatives indicates that the socio-economic differences among communities have been underestimated.

Road constructed across the forest by members' participation was mentioned as another physical capital that emerged in association with forest protection project. As the key informants indicated, the road was constructed with the objective of controlling accidental fires, accelerating pruning processes, and easing fodder and firewood collection for the inhabitants. However, focus group discussion participants at all sites indicated that the roads were constructed primarily for the purpose of forest protection rather than meeting the immediate livelihood needs of their community. There was consensus among participants particularly at HobichaBadda that they use the roads only occasionally where fodder and firewood collection is allowed. In this case, though the road makes little direct contribution to the immediate needs of the concerned communities, it has a big potential role in preventing or mitigating forest fires, which can nullify the sacrifices they hitherto made for the sake of forest protection and it's hoped for benefits.

Key informants from BollaWanche and BossaWanche reported that the construction of grain stores was another contribution of the project to the physical capital of the communities. Their main purpose was keeping cereals purchased during harvest time to sell back to members and non-members with some discount in food deficit seasons. There was consensus among participants of focus group discussions that some cooperative members are able to get grain at nearby with 30-70 cents (Ethiopian unit of currency) discount per kilogram of a given grain. From this it is possible to argue that the construction of grain stores has contributed to the availability of food at community level though access to the available food by households depends on their wealth conditions. Furthermore, construction of grain stores next to cereal milling machines reduces the burden and saves the time of women and children.

Impacts on Community Level Financial Capital

The carbon revenue resulting from protection of the forest has strengthened the financial capital of each forest development and protection cooperative. As key informants from each FDPC mentioned, the amount of carbon revenue is increasing from year to year. For instance, HobichaBadda FDPC has received 82,844.80 ETB (Ethiopian Birr) in 2009, 128,495.70 ETB in 2010, 172,159.60 ETB in 2011 and 415,974 ETB in 2012.⁴⁶ Similarly, BossaWanche and BollaWanche cooperatives have received carbon revenue four times proportionately upon the amount of emissions their respective portions of the forest have

reduced. Though in some cases the revenue utilization was not in line with the priority needs of the concerned communities as indicated in the foregoing section, some of it was utilized to build some physical capital, e.g. flour mills, grain stores, as key informants indicated.

The forest development and protection cooperatives have started receiving carbon revenue since 2009, yet none of them as of 2014 had started loan services. Though cash generated through carbon stock sales is deposited in the bank in the name of each cooperative, participants of FGD at each study site explicitly stated that individual members do not have access to loan services from their respective cooperatives. There was a consensus among participants of focus group discussions at each study site that the most common mechanisms for getting loans in the communities are based on social networks, e.g. friends and relatives, and informal social arrangements for loan such as local *Dichchaa* (money lenders).

Interviews with key informants also revealed that providing loan services is only a long-term plan of their respective cooperatives. In this regard, the lack of an institutional framework for providing loan services was mentioned as one of the obstacles for providing the loan service. Hence, the cooperatives' failure to provide loan services to their members prevents the endeavor from having similar favorable impacts on financial capital at the household level. Since financial capital is the main asset that poor people lack most, the member households could have used it for investing in the other household capital if they had access to it.⁴⁷

Impact on Community Level Natural (Environmental) Capital

Key informants and participants of FGD identified the environmental impact of the project as the most noteworthy result. Those from BossaWanche mentioned restoration of degraded forest areas and the resultant improvement in local environmental resources, mainly improvement in rainfall conditions, improvement in soil moisture retention capacity, reduction temperature, reduction of soil erosion, and restoration of wild animals as key environmental benefits resulting from the project. While similar environmental benefits were identified by a key informant from BollaWanche, additional environmental benefits such as restoration of more than three water springs and reduction in wind erosion were identified by a key informant from HobichaBadda. A key informant from BossaWanche observed improvements in rainfall conditions:

The volume and time of rainfall in our vicinity is gradually restoring back to the condition that existed before 1984 [the time when the area was covered by dense forest]. In 2012 we received first autumn (*Belg*) rain in mid of April. In 2013 we received it around March 11 and in this year (2014) even earlier. Furthermore, we get sporadic rainfall even in January and February, which was uncommon in the last thirty years. This is due to the park.

Thus, the evidence shows the existence of perceived improvement in rainfall conditions due to the restoration of vegetation in the area. However, these perceived changes in the microclimatic conditions of the areas require further comprehensive studies in order to establish a causal relationship.

Participants of focus group discussions in each of the study sites strongly acknowledged the contribution of the project to environmental assets of their respective communities. There was strong consensus among participants in each study site that the observed significant positive changes in the environmental assets of their respective community, e.g.

increased vegetation cover, reduction in temperature, timely and adequate rainfall, increased moisture retention particularly in land adjacent to the forest, reduction of wind and water erosion, and so on were due to the rehabilitation of the forest. The improvements in microclimatic conditions of the area have in turn contributed to agricultural practices in the area though they alone are not sufficient conditions. For instance, in each site of the study, there was good deal of consensus among participants that the improvements in local climate has allowed them to cultivate a variety of crops at least twice a year though the small agricultural land that characterizes the area, but damage to crops caused by wild animals is a significant limitation on exploiting the opportunity.

There were opposing views concerning the restoration of wild animals to the protected forest. Key informants at each study site considered wild animals as potential sources of financial benefit to their respective cooperatives. They indicated the possibility of ecotourism in the area in the near future. Their positive view towards the restored wildlife was partly due to their repeated trips to various parks. They had a number of opportunities to do so as they were members of forest management committees as all of them indicated. Different views were expressed by participants of FGDs and individuals with whom in-depth interview have been conducted. There was a strong consensus among participants of focus group discussion at each study site that the restoration of wild animals is a major threat to livestock and crops of farmers neighboring on the forests. Though households near the forest area are able to produce a variety of crops like enset (false banana, a staple and drought resistant crop for both human consumption and animal feed), sweet potato, yam, potato, cassava, and so on, the participants indicated that it is a vain effort for their crops are severely damaged by wild animals, mainly pigs, monkeys, hedgehogs, and wildebeest. Furthermore, there is a difficulty in raising livestock around the forest due to frequent attacks from wildlife like hyenas, monkeys, leopards, and some bird species. Consequently, participants of focus group discussion, particularly at BossaWanche, indicated that unless an appropriate measure is taken to resolve the human-wildlife conflict, it is hardly possible for neighboring households to sustain their life there.

The issues raised in the foregoing discussion indicate the differential impact of the rehabilitation of the forest. Households at near distance from the protected forest became the main victims than beneficiaries of the endeavor. This is evident from the detrimental impacts of initial area enclosure and the later increasing attack from wild animals on agricultural produce and livestock of households closer to the forest. Here, a resource considered by some as a source of potential financial benefit has become an actual threat to the life of households in close proximity of the forest.

Restoration of grasses to the forest floor and hillsides was another important issue identified by the key informants as the contribution of the forest protection to the improvement of environmental capital of their respective community. Key informants from HobichaBadda stated: “every member of the cooperative is allowed to harvest grasses from the forest at a low price. Periodically, based on the availability of grass in the forest, we issue coupons for members thereby they can harvest grass for allotted weeks/months. They pay 4-6 Ethiopian Birr to get the coupon.” In the same vein, focus group discussion participants from all of the study sites acknowledged the restoration of grass to the forest floor and hillsides. They recognized that initially the availability of grass has increased around and in the forest with the increase in forest cover and exclusion of livestock. However, they indicated, as trees grew in height, the availability of grass in forest floor has gradually

declined. Consequently, participants indicated that the fodder they get from the protected forest lasts for only a few months.

To sum up, the establishment of FDPCs, building institutional capacity of FDPCs, helping the FDPCs secure property rights over the forest land, enabling FDPCs to secure carbon revenue, and contributing to the improvement of microclimatic conditions of the area are recognized community level positive impacts of the project. However, the outlawing of animal grazing in the project area and the resultant fodder scarcity and lack of grazing land has contributed to the weakening of the long established social arrangements for joint ownership and share breeding of livestock and draught oxen exchange.

Conclusion

The forest carbon project under consideration had both positive and negative implications for community level assets of the stakeholder communities. A series of training sessions provided on several issues including income generating activities contributed to the human capital of the concerned communities. However, training, especially on some income-generating activities, has not fully anticipated the feasibility of and potential hurdles for their application in the communities. With regard to social capital of the concerned communities, the project managed to enhance the capacity of the communities to work together in order to sustainably manage their respective portion of forest. However, it is plausible to conclude from the evidences that the project has inadvertently weakened some informal social support arrangements. In this regard, important social institutions such as arrangements for joint ownership and share breeding of livestock, arrangements for exchange of draught oxen, and other informal social support systems were unwittingly weakened due to the project activities. The environmental capital of the concerned communities was enhanced in a number of ways. But, it was accompanied by the opportunity cost of losing fuel wood, fodder and grazing land, and more disturbingly the security of crops and livestock, which in turn may act as disincentives for the affected communities in the course of the sustainable management of the restored forest. Though the physical and financial capital of the stakeholder communities were enhanced due to the project, the way they were enhanced was not in line with the priority needs of the concerned communities. In this regard, it is appropriate to conclude that the project initiators imposed plans for enhancement of physical assets in particular and for the utilization of financial capital. This was also evident from the similarities of physical assets built across communities and plans for the utilization of financial capital. Therefore, letting the community decide over what to do with the carbon revenue in general and which community level assets to build in particular are likely to meet the priority needs of the concerned communities and thereby enhance the sense of ownership of the forest among the members of the communities. Moreover, social impact assessments need to be exhaustively conducted during the replication of similar projects in order to anticipate the latent negative impacts and thereby to save the long existed informal social institutions.

Notes

- 1 See Alemayehu 2010; Yemiru et al. 2010; and Aynalem 2012.
- 2 See Kasahun 2008; Alemayehu 2010; and Yemiru et al. 2010.
- 3 For example, Byron and Arnold 1997; Gibson et al. 2000; Asquith et al. 2002; Homewood 2005; Winkler et al. 2005; Timko et al. 2010; Winkler et al. 2011; World Bank's Carbon Finance Unit 2011; Yasuoka et al. 2012; FAO 2013.
- 4 CIFOR 2005. This is the Center for International Forestry Research.
- 5 Smith and Scherr 2002; Maraseni et al. 2005.
- 6 Streck et al. 2008; World Bank 2008.
- 7 Maraseni et al. 2005; Streck et al. 2008; UNFCCC 2010.
- 8 UN 1998.
- 9 World Bank 2008.
- 10 Maraseni et al. 2005; Streck et al. 2008; UNFCCC 2010.
- 11 World Vision Ethiopia 2006; Brown et al. 2010.
- 12 World Vision Australia 2011, p. 3.
- 13 Ibid., p. 4.
- 14 *Wereda* is an administrative division which is equivalent to a district.
- 15 *Kebele* are lower level administrative units (division) or farmers or peasant associations in rural Ethiopia.
- 16 Wolaita Zone Finance and Economic Development Department 2013.
- 17 Bisrat 2011.
- 18 Wolaita Zone Finance and Economic Development Department 2013.
- 19 World Vision Ethiopia 2006; Elias 2006.
- 20 Bisrat 2011; Wolaita Zone Finance and Economic Development Department 2013.
- 21 Aynalem 2012; World Vision Australia 2011.
- 22 Elias 2006.
- 23 World Vision Australia 2011.
- 24 Desalegn 2007; Aynalem 2012.
- 25 Aynalem 2012.
- 26 World Vision Australia 2011, p. 4.
- 27 Aynalem 2012.
- 28 Biryahwaho et al 2012, p. 3.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid., p. 3.
- 31 Aynalem 2012, p. 56.
- 32 Ibid.; Biryahwaho et al 2012.
- 33 Aynalem 2012, p. 59.
- 34 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
- 35 Biryahwaho et al. 2012.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 World Vision Australia 2011.
- 38 Aynalem 2012, pp. 98-99.
- 39 Dev et al. 2003; Homewood 2005.
- 40 Jupp 2006.
- 41 DFID 1999.
- 42 DFID 1999; Neefjes 2000.
- 43 DFID 1999; Ellis 2000.

44 Corbera 2005.

45 DFID 1999.

46 One Birr was equal to 0.0455 USD as of October 2016.

47 Ellis 2000.

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Democratization and Public Accountability at the Grassroots in Tanzania: A Missing Link

MATRONA KABYEMELA

Abstract: Democratization processes in most developing countries like Tanzania generate concern as to the extent to which they promote public accountability at the grassroots. Although there have been various interventions to improve governance at the national and grassroots level, little is known about citizens' ability to hold accountable their village government resulting from such interventions. This article argues that despite the democratization process that started in 1992 in Tanzania, citizens at the grassroots are still structurally and politically disempowered to hold their village government accountable. This is due to poor legal provisions and regulations guiding the functioning of village government and a poor information flow between village government and citizens, the low level of civic competency, and the poor participation of citizens in the decision-making process. This article draws on data that was collected in 2010 from the Kagera region utilizing interviews, questionnaires, observation, and documentary review. The sample size of the study was 120 respondents.

Introduction

Tanzania has embarked on democratization since 1992 following the adoption of multiparty politics with the aim of improving governance at all levels. Constitutional amendments in 1992 led to the multiparty system. This was followed by Local Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 (No.8), which made corresponding changes in the local government machinery so as to accommodate the multi-party system. The important changes as far as accountability at the grassroots is concerned included making of the offices of the chairpersons of the village assembly and the village council elective, subdividing the village into *vitongoji* (hamlets; sing. *kitongoji*) and making elected hamlet chairpersons members of village councils. Accordingly, it led to increased access and availability of information, which is important in enhancing democratic governance by influencing people's opinions and awareness of their rights and responsibilities towards their government. Despite the above reforms, there is a missing link between democratization initiatives and public accountability at the grassroots in Tanzania due to poor legal provisions and regulations guiding the functioning of village government, poor

Matrona Kabyemela is Assistant Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam. She is engaged in consultancy, research and teaching public administration. Her interest is on grassroots governance, democracy and public policy issues. Currently she is undertaking her PhD with a focus on health services delivery at the local level through traditional medicine.

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information flows between village government and citizens, a low level of civic competency, and poor participation of the citizens in the decision-making.

The article is divided into five sections: a presentation of the methodology used in data collection and analysis; conceptualizing public accountability with the aim of identifying its necessary conditions; a discussion of public accountability in Tanzania during the single party era; examining democratization processes in Tanzania since 1992 and their effect on public accountability at the grassroots level; an analysis of the data from both primary and secondary sources with the view of establishing why there is a missing link between the democratization process and public accountability in Tanzania. The article ends with the conclusion.

Methodological Issues

This article utilizes data from research that was conducted in Bukoba District of the Kagera Region. Bukoba was chosen because it is a typical rural area located on the northern periphery of the country and thus far from where major political decisions are made and implemented by the government. It is also one of the districts that have enjoyed various interventions as a pilot district—for example, the first Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) and Research and Education on Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), which aim at educating citizens about democratic values. Moreover, the district has a fairly well educated and generally politically enlightened citizenry, which could influence citizens' ability to demand accountability from their village government. The study used questionnaires, observation, and interviews to collect primary data. Data generated through questionnaire were quantitatively analyzed, and those from the interviews were qualitatively analyzed.

The selection of the four wards, one village, and four hamlets for the study was done randomly. From each ward one village was selected and from each village one hamlet was selected as the final unit of study. One of the reasons for this was to collect diverse views from citizens and their leaders. Forty household respondents were randomly selected from each hamlet, and five village government leaders from each village were selected purposively and randomly. Village government chairpersons and Village Government Executives (VEOs) were purposively selected due to their official positions that rendered them key informants; the other three members from village council were randomly selected. Also five leaders of the randomly selected registered autonomous associations were contacted for the study.

Public Accountability: Conceptual Overview

Public Accountability is defined as the social relations that involve the actor and forum, where an actor feels an obligation to explain and justify his/her conduct to some significant other or the forum.¹ Accordingly, it is viewed as an institutionalized practice of account giving.² Accountability assumes four characteristics, one being an agent or institution that is to give an account of his/her actions.³ Second, an agent should have some discretionary power over a certain domain of responsibility. Third is the right of the principal, who are citizens, to require an agent to inform and explain decisions with regard to the domain, and the fourth is the right of the principal to sanction an agent who fails to inform and justify decisions with regard to

their domain of responsibility. Public accountability is the way of being answerable or liable for one's action and/or inaction and conduct in office or position.⁴ It involves making elected and other public officials responsible to the citizens. When viewed from above it is to be noted that elected village government is an agent that is supposed to be accountable to the citizens and required to release necessary information to them on how it is doing its business. Information given by the village government to citizens should be relevant and detailed. Second, principals who are citizens should be able to sanction the village government leaders on the basis of the information given. Third, there should be institutional arrangements that create a conducive environment for the village government to feel obliged to explain its conduct. Lastly, citizens must be legally empowered to hold the village government accountable. In totality, this means that if citizens are not exposed to information then it becomes difficult for them to generate facts and the evidence necessary for demanding accountability. Moreover, if citizens are exposed to misdeeds but not enabled by laws to impose material consequences it will make accountability appear as weak, toothless and diminished.⁵ In totality, public accountability exists when power holder must justify their actions and face sanctions.

Public accountability has two dimensions: vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability, the focus of this article, is divided into two: elections and societal demand for accountability. Citizens can enforce accountability for their elected village government if elections are free and fair and where voters have several qualified candidates to choose from.⁶ However, given the conditions that prevail in Tanzania and elsewhere, elections can alone be the means of enforcing accountability. For instance, state-party fusion in which the state has been acting in favor of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania at the expense of the opposition political parties makes the whole process of elections unfair and uncompetitive.⁷ Similarly, weak opposition political parties guarantee that candidates contesting under the CCM umbrella are assured of victory, thus diminishing the competitiveness of the elections. For instance, in the 1994 hamlet and village elections, CCM won 97.9 percent of the contested seats. Similarly, in the 1999 neighborhood, hamlet, and village council elections, CCM won 94.7 percent of the contested seats and in the 2004 grassroots elections 97.9 percent of the contested seats.⁸ This indicates that CCM is still the dominant political party in Tanzania and demonstrates that a candidate is at least assured of winning if she/he is a member of CCM, which in turn makes such elections uncompetitive.

Table 1.1: General Scores of CCM in Neighborhood, Hamlet, and Village Council Elections

| Year of elections | Percentage of seats won by CCM |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1994 | 97.9 |
| 1999 | 94.6 |
| 2004 | 97.2 |

Source: Chaligha, (2008)

So from the above, it is apparent that elections alone are insufficient to enforce accountability in village government. Societal demand for accountability becomes inevitable

and important in holding village governments accountable. This in turn means demands that can be articulated without suffering state coercion against wrongful acts of the public authorities performed either individually or by means of some kind of organized or collective action with reference to those officials who occupy elected and unelected positions in village government.⁹ However, the ability of citizens to demand accountability depends among other things on their access to information from different media, their participation in decision-making, and their awareness of their rights and responsibilities, all of which enable them to become accountability seekers.¹⁰ Although Tanzania since 1992 has embarked on a democratization process that allows citizens to elect their village government leaders from different political parties, citizens are still structurally and politically disempowered to demand accountability from their village governments.

Historical Account of Public Accountability at the Grassroots in Tanzania

Public Accountability at the Grassroots in Tanzania During the Single Party Era (1965-1990s)

Elected local authorities in Tanzania were re-established in 1982 to replace the decentralization structures of 1973. This was followed by a series of local government laws, including Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982 that established village governments and recognized them as the smallest unit of governance with a corporate status on mainland Tanzania. They have two organs of governance: the village assembly and the village council. The former consists of all adult members of the village and the latter of twenty-five members, including the chairman and secretary of the ruling CCM.¹¹

Although local government was re-introduced, its orientation remained firmly within the one-party system. The fusion between the party and government personnel was extended to all levels including that of the village. For instance, the village party chairperson, who was elected by the party branch conference, became chairperson of the village government. Similarly, the village secretary was a party appointee who also automatically became the secretary of the village government.¹² When viewed from this context it can be fairly argued that leaders of the village government were accountable to the party as the employer rather than to the citizens. It was difficult for the citizens to remove an unpopular village chairman or secretary unless the higher organs of the party sanctioned such a removal.¹³

Moreover, the party was responsible for the formulation of policies, which the local government like other public institutions had to implement. The party was responsible for explaining those policies and making sure that the local authorities did what was expected. Any failures or neglect by the local authorities was to be reported to the superior organs in the party hierarchy.¹⁴ This article further argues that the supervisory role which local party organs had in their relationship with local authorities made it possible for local party leaders to issue orders to local authorities at times and which were readily obeyed mainly out of fear of being reported as neglecting party directives. There was a poor performance of village government under the single party system. Such poor performance was attributed, among other things, to party supremacy that resulted in the party's dominance in decision making. Villagers just had to

implement the decisions that were arrived at by the party organs, in most cases without their consent.¹⁵

The above discussion needs our attention as far as public accountability at the grassroots is concerned. First, it means that citizens at the grassroots during this period of single party system were not involved in the formulation of policies and plans. That is, there was no participation in decision-making; citizens were just called on to implement policies made by higher organs of the party. Second, the village government like any other local authorities was accountable to the party when carrying out its day-to-day activities. This means that the supervisory role, which was supposed to be exercised by citizens over their village government, was now taken over by the party.

Democratization Processes in Tanzania since 1992 and its Effect on Public Accountability at the Grassroots

As noted above, in 1992 Tanzania amended its constitution to adopt a multi-party system in place of the single-party system that for thirty years had existed under CCM rule. The Local Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 (No.8) made corresponding changes in the local government machinery to accommodate the multi-party system by making the village assembly and village council chairpersons elective office. It also subdivided villages into *vitongoji* (hamlets) with elected chairpersons who were members of the village councils. The elected village councils were to consist of fifteen to twenty-five members. *Vitongoji* and council chairpersons could be removed even before the expiry of their terms.¹⁶ These changes need our attention in order to understand the current functioning of village government, particularly the ability of citizens to demand accountability. Due to these changes citizens now elect their village chairpersons and members of the village councils. This implies that citizens hire their leaders and that village government leaders are now accountable to the citizens rather than to the party as was the case during the single party era. Similarly, citizens can remove their elected leaders before the expiry of their tenure.

Moreover, the multiparty system paved the way for more changes in terms of access and availability of information, which is very important in enhancing democratic governance by influencing people's opinions and awareness of their rights and responsibilities towards their government. Accordingly, after the adoption of political pluralism, Tanzania experienced an increased amount of print and electronic media. Tanzania now has about eighty newspapers and magazines compared with only four daily papers under the one-party system.¹⁷ In addition, the number of radio stations increased to about thirty-eight compared with only one radio station during the previous era.¹⁸ The study that was done in 2010 revealed that 81 percent of the respondents in the studied districts listened to the radio.¹⁹

Furthermore, Tanzania has experienced the emergence of various types of civil society organizations (CSOs) and intervention programs to enhance governance. For instance, by 2007 Tanzania had more than four thousand lobbying and advocacy groups that educate citizens on their rights and responsibilities through radio and television.²⁰ Moreover, intervention programs to enhance governance include Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), which was introduced in 1992 with the aim, among other things, of cultivating a

democratic culture that nurtures civic participation, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in governance. With this orientation, REDET has engaged in different activities and strategies throughout its pilot districts with the aim of improving governance at the grassroots. For instance, Discussion Fora (DF) constitutes one of the strategies to enhance governance. One of the specific objectives of DF is to enable the people to hold local leaders accountable through people's participation in discussing issues that affect their lives.²¹ A study by Mhina revealed good functioning of these DFs as the vehicles for advocacy and lobbying at the grassroots.²²

Another intervention to enhance governance at the grassroots is the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), which was initiated in 1998. Among other things, the reforms aim at improving governance in the Local Government Authorities (LGAs), establishing broad-based community awareness and participation, promoting principles of democracy and transparent and accountable local government. Since then, different interventions have been adopted to improve governance at the grassroots. For instance, there has been the introduction of Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), where citizens are expected to participate in decision making from *kitongoji* to ward level before their decisions are taken to the district council. Despite the above democratization processes, citizens at the grassroots are still structurally and politically disempowered to hold their village governments accountable.

A Missing Link

Legal Provisions and Public Accountability at the Grassroots

The interventions that the government has introduced since 1992 to improve governance at the national and grassroots level have not helped citizens to hold their village governments accountable. This may be attributed to among other things legal provisions and regulations guiding the functioning of village government.

Poor legal provisions and regulations of governance at the grassroots have hindered the ability of citizens to demand accountability from their village government. Local Government Authorities (LGAs) do not exist in a vacuum, they are product of legal framework that provide for their creation and existence. The Tanzania constitution provides for the creation of public authorities in Articles 145 and 146. Likewise, the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982 Act provides for the creation of local government, more specifically District Authorities. Furthermore, village governments are established under Act No. 7 of 1982.²³ The Act provides two organs of village governance—the village council and the village assembly. The village council is the executive arm of the village assembly with elected members delegated with powers to oversee the day-to-day activities in the village and to make decisions on behalf of the village assembly. On the other hand, the village assembly is composed of all adult members of the village who are empowered to make general policies for the village through their participation.²⁴ Moreover, Article 146(1) of the Constitution provides that the purpose of having local government authorities is to transfer the power to the people, and the LGAs shall have the right to involve the people in the planning and implementation of development

programs within their respective areas and throughout the country.²⁵ As far as public accountability is concerned, village governments like any other local government authorities have corporate status. Thus they can sue or be sued in case of violating human rights or any legal provisions in their daily activities.²⁶

Section 142(1) of the Local Government Act No. 8 of 1992 provides that every member of the village council shall, unless he ceases to be a member by death/resignation, continue to hold office as a member of that council until the village assembly next meets for the election of the member council.²⁷ However, the above provision is not clear if the member has to resign at his/her own discretion or because of the pressure from the citizens due to poor performance. Moreover, it does not say what citizens can do if members of the councils are not performing to citizen expectations. Although it was indicated that the power to remove from office any village government leader who is not performing well is with the citizens, this is not supported by any legal provision in local government laws and Principal Legislation of 1999 as revised in 2000.²⁸ Such inconsistency between the two has contributed to poor accountability at the grassroots.

Another area within legal provisions and regulations of governance that have caused poor accountability at the grassroots is the dual accountability of Village Executive Officers (VEOs). The VEO is an employee of the district council and is accountable to the district council and the village council. It was provided that among the powers and responsibilities of the village council is to suggest to the District Council the removal of a VEO from office after consultation with the village assembly²⁹. This is one way of keeping VEOs accountable. However, as a matter of fact, the VEO is likely to be more accountable to his/her employer than to the village council. Since the council has only the power to suggest the removal, the extent to which the VEO is accountable to the village council is at the discretion of the district council and not the village council, which is the executive organ of the village government. For instance, one of the household respondents revealed that citizens have no power to hold accountable their VEO: "The VEO stole all the money we contributed for a secondary school building in our village, we complained, we wanted the VEO to be fired, but instead the VEO was transferred by higher organs to another village near our village."³⁰

Another area of weakness in the provisions governing village government is that which established the relationship between the village government and other organs of government in Tanzania. The village government functions under the general framework of national policy through various organs of the central government recognized by the local government laws. Act No. 14 of 1999 section 171(1) confers power on the minister responsible for local government to dissolve LGAs at all levels in the case of default. Section 172 (2) of Act No. 14 provides that where the minister is satisfied that any LGA, including a village government, has failed to comply with any written law or carried its business in a manner incompatible with any of the provisions in the local government laws or any other written law, the minister may dissolve the authority.³¹ Moreover, Act No. 6 of 1999 section 174(d) provides that one of the functions of the central government in relation to the local government is to develop policies and provide a regulatory framework to ensure that district councils lead other agencies in their jurisdiction in the proper execution and implementation of those policies.

The above provisions have implications as far as accountability at the grassroots is concerned. First, the minister has power over the authorities as he/she has can dissolve any LGA in the case of poor performance. Although this is one way of enhancing accountability in village government, it also creates the potential for the central government to interfere in the LGAs, something that weakens the power of citizens to hold their village government accountable. Second, the power given to central government by section 174(d) can make village government implement ready-made programs that originate from the central government, hence inhibiting citizen participation at the initial stages of the programs and reducing their ability to hold their village government leaders accountable during the implementation process. For instance, the project of building a community school in every ward that started in 2000 at the grassroots was initiated and imposed by the central government organs. During interviews with the citizens at the grassroots it was discovered that they are involved at the implementation stage through the compulsory contribution of money and labor. In a situation like this their ability to demand accountability from their village government can be limited, because they lack enough information about the project and therefore can hardly hold the village government accountable.

Prerequisites of Effective Accountability Regime at the Grassroots

Prerequisites for an effective grassroots accountability regime have also hindered citizens holding their village government accountable. The ability of citizens to demand accountability depends on an awareness of their rights and responsibilities, participation in decision-making and access to information about the performance of their government from their leaders.³² It was revealed through primary data gathered through interviews with household respondents and the questionnaires administered to village government leaders and autonomous associations that these prerequisites are inadequate and sometimes absent altogether.

In the case of information flow between village government and citizens the interviews revealed a poor information flow. Among the interviewed citizens, three-quarters indicated that they did not get information from their village government, while only a quarter did. During interviews, citizens complained that most of the activities undertaken by the village government were not disclosed to them, while decisions on the issues of revenues, taxation, and land allocation were minimally or not disclosed to the citizens. Most of the respondents from Izimbya B and Bulambizi hamlets, for instance, were dissatisfied with the way their village governments have been allocating and selling village land without informing them. One of the male household respondents had the view that:

Our village government has been allocating and selling the reserved village land without notifying us. They have sold the area around the village government offices and therefore we do not have more area to expand the village government office. They have also sold the whole land we used to graze our cattle and therefore we do not have the place to graze our cattle because the land now is protected by the owners, who have planted trees.³³

Although some respondents indicated that they received information, the data that was gathered from the village government leaders revealed that about 40 percent of the information given to the citizens was about developmental issues, especially on how much citizens have to contribute to school buildings in the ward; 35 percent of information provided was about peace and security in the village; and 15 percent of the information provided was about the revenue and expenditure of the village government. Suffice to mention, therefore, citizens seldom receive vital information, such as planning, budget estimates, taxation, revenue, and applications for land and its allocation. While 75 percent of them said that they do not receive information, only 15 percent of the village government leaders indicated providing information on revenue and expenditure to the citizens. In a situation like this it is practically impossible for uninformed citizens to demand accountability from their leaders due to poor access to important information.

Moreover, citizens do not participate in decision making at the grassroots. In a democratic country citizens are supposed to participate in decision making through various avenues available so as to increase their ability to hold accountable their village government.³⁴ Accordingly, where citizens participate in decision making, they know the decisions and this can make them committed to those decisions and therefore able to demand accountability if the government is acting contrary to the agreed objectives.³⁵ Citizens at the grassroots therefore have to participate in passing different decisions like budget estimates, land allocation, and taxation if they are to demand accountability.

The interview with household respondents revealed that most of the citizens at the grassroots do not participate in decision making. For instance, 70 percent of the respondents said they have never been involved in taking various decisions by the village government while 30 percent said they were involved in decision-making. Of those who said they were not involved in decision making 38.8 percent said they were not informed by the village government about the whole process of decision making, 22.5 percent could not reveal why they were not involved and 8.8 percent said they did not have power to make major decisions. The interview further revealed that citizens were involved at the implementation stage, especially when it came to development projects at the grassroots initiated by the village government. When asked whether there were projects being implemented or already implemented, the household respondents revealed that various projects had been implemented under the auspices of the village government or organized by the village government. They were involved only in implementing decisions but had not been involved in their deliberations, like providing compulsory money and in-kind contributions. This might be the result of the relationship between the village government and central government, where most of the projects imposed at the grassroots come from the central government. For instance, regarding the secondary school building project going on in every ward, 76.3 percent of household respondents who were aware of the projects being implemented or which had been implemented claimed that they were not involved at the initiation stage but rather they were told to contribute money and in kind (services and/or goods) by the village government. In a situation like this, it is not possible for the citizens to hold their leaders accountable because

they did not know exactly what had been agreed at the planning and initiation stages and had not been involved at the evaluation stage of projects already implemented.

Related to the above are inadequate avenues of participation at the grassroots. Despite the fact that the readily available avenue is the village assembly, few citizens attend it. For example, in Izimbya village there was a poor attendance at two consecutive village assemblies. At a meeting on 28 May 2008 only 246 citizens were in attendance out of 5,991 registered adult citizens in the village, and at the meeting held on 19 March 2008 there were only 186 citizens. Moreover, for even those few citizens who do attend the agenda did not provide for citizens to effectively participate in decision-making, as was revealed by the questionnaire and interview data. For example, 91.4 percent of the eighty interviewed citizens said that they had never participated in setting a meeting agenda. The agenda always originated from the village government leaders. Similarly the questionnaires which were administered to the village government leaders revealed the same thing, because all of the leaders that were involved in the study indicated that the village council prepared the agenda for the village assembly meetings, although there was no provision in the local government laws nor in the *Kiongozi cha Utawala Bora Ngazi ya Kijiji (Handbook for Good Governance at the Village Level)* directing that the village council should always be the source of the agenda of the village assembly.³⁶ This is in line with Mukandala who argues that village councils do not hold the meetings regularly, and if they do, the agendas are set administratively.³⁷ These readymade agendas could be one of the reasons why citizens do not attend the village assembly, but they also do not provide room for citizens to discuss issues that directly affect their affairs since village government leaders are likely to bring an agenda that serves their interests rather than an agenda that might challenge their power. For instance, one female household respondent had the following to say with regard to the agenda of the meeting:

If village government leaders know that a certain agenda will be harmful to their power they will not bring it until we claim it through the meetings, and the citizen who seems to demand such an agenda be brought to the meeting is subject to persecution like closing our business or denying us essential services.³⁸

This comment suggests that citizens made at least some attempts to challenge the ready made agenda from the village council although they would be persecuted by their leaders and therefore discouraged from attending village meetings.

Moreover, the village assembly, which for a long time has been considered as an avenue for citizens' participation at the grassroots, is not truly an avenue for participation as the findings revealed. This was observed through the source and type of the agenda discussed in the meeting. From the interviews and questionnaires, it seems that citizens were just told what to do by the village government officer. For instance, more than 40 percent of what was discussed during the meetings was about how much citizens should contribute for school buildings in the ward. In addition, in one of the *kitongoji* meeting, the village chairman had the following to say in the agenda: "Every adult citizen from 18 years and above will have to pay a further 10,000/= by 31st January, of 2009 as a contribution for school building in the ward." Although citizens

complained about the amount, he went on to say: "This is the resolution that has been passed already and anyone who opposes it will be punished by adding a further 5000/=.³⁹" Such complaints indicated that citizens were not happy with already made decisions or agendas; they wanted participation. Thus village government leaders need to set the agenda after consultation with citizens so as to meet the needs and interests of the citizens.

A lack of autonomous lobbying and advocacy associations or civil society organizations at the grassroots has contributed to the poor accountability. The roles of most of the autonomous associations at the grassroots do not aim at helping citizens to demand accountability at the grassroots. The interviewed citizens and the data from the questionnaires that were administered to the leaders of autonomous associations revealed that most of the associations at the grassroots level aimed at helping their members on different social occasions, for example, funerals, and weddings. For instance, 53.8 percent of the eighty household respondents belonged to autonomous associations whose aims were to help members to enhance their economic status and with social issues (funerals and weddings). In addition, of the twenty autonomous associations studied at the grassroots, 95 percent of them indicated that their main objective was to help each other and enhance their members' development. This suggests that people joined these associations in order to help each other, and not to get civic education that could help them hold their village government accountable. This in totality suggests that it will take some time before the objective of civic activities takes over as the motivating force of autonomous associations at the grassroots

What is interesting is that most of the citizens were members of autonomous associations; 53.8 percent of the household respondents were members of autonomous associations. However, the data from the questionnaires that was administered to the leaders of autonomous associations revealed that the village government did not involve autonomous associations at the grassroots during decision-making, although these associations are recognized as key players in governance in local authorities.⁴⁰ Also on the issue of their participation during decision-making by the village government, 50 percent agreed they had. But, when asked how, 30 percent of those who said yes were involved in discussing what had been decided by the village government, for example, convincing members to pay various contributions that had been the village government leaders had already agreed to, 10 percent could not answer on how they participated, and 10 percent said they participated in planning various developmental projects in the village.

Another area that has undercut the ability of citizens to hold their village government accountable is low citizen civic competency. Civic competence refers to the perceptions that individuals have about the amount of influence they can exercise over government decisions.⁴¹ It includes direct attempts to influence the government as well as other influence strategies. One of the indicators of civic competence is citizen awareness of their rights and obligations to make sure that the government is performing well, which is based on the fact that knowledge of such rights and obligations is a minimal condition a person needs to function at least as subject citizen.⁴² A person without such awareness is inherently barred from the realms of subject and citizen competence, and therefore the ability to demand accountability is expected to be low.⁴³

The eighty interviewed citizens revealed low civic competence, as 71.3 percent claimed that they did not know their rights vis-à-vis their village government. This was supported by 33 percent who also failed to answer the question that aimed at knowing if citizens perceive themselves as having any obligations in the day-to-day functioning of the village government; 13.8 percent said they did not have any obligations, while 28.8 percent said that they were responsible for paying all the contributions that village government leaders passed. Moreover, when asked about what they could do if the village government was not performing to their expectation, 51.3 percent said they could do something like going against the decisions in the meetings, reporting it to the District Commissioner and to the ward councilor. But 48.7 percent said they could not do anything since the village government was more powerful than the citizens, and so they have no rights and avenues whereby they could air their concerns. This is in line with what Jingu found in a study that revealed a lack of political competence among citizens.⁴⁴ His study indicated that citizens felt completely powerless and submissive before the government. He was trying to elicit their feelings about what they could do if the government officials made decisions that violated their basic constitutional rights.

Two observations can be made from the discussion above. First, most citizens at the grassroots have a subject culture. A citizen who is not aware of his/her rights and obligations can hardly try to use any means available to influence the village government decisions. Although 51.3 percent of eighty interviewees said they could do something in the case of poor performance of the village government, it does not necessarily mean that citizens did something because most of them were not aware of their rights and obligations. Secondly, it seems that the village government is regarded as the principal instead of being the agent; this is due to the relationship between the village government and the citizens in the day-to-day functioning of its activities. For instance, 48.7 percent who said they could not do anything in the case of poor performance by the village government claimed to be powerless and unable to go against the decisions passed by leaders who were more powerful.

Conclusion

From the above analyses it is clear that the democratization processes that started in 1992 with the aim of improving governance in the country have not helped citizens at the grassroots to hold their village government leaders accountable. Citizens are still structurally and politically disempowered due to legal provisions and regulations guiding the daily functioning of the village government, a poor flow of information between the village government and the citizens, a low level of civic competence, and the generally poor participation of citizens in the decision-making process. If the above situations are not addressed there is the danger of ending up having despotic village government leaders in Tanzania.

Therefore, there is a need to improve some sections in the existing laws and regulations governing the functioning of the village government so as to increase its autonomy and power. In this regard the ongoing constitution review process that started in 2012 but has seen delays should take into account the relative autonomy of village government.⁴⁵ This should go hand in hand with a review of some of the sections in the Government Laws Principal Registration.

Thus Act No 14 of 1999 section 171(1) of the Local Government Laws Principal Registration as revised in 2000 and which confers power on the Minister of Local Government to dissolve LGAs in case of default, should be amended to include a section that state that the minister shall dissolve village government in consultation with the district council and village assembly, which are highest organs of governance whose members are representatives of citizens. Related to the above Act No 6 of 1999 section 174 (d), which provides the central government power to develop policies and regulatory frameworks that village governments have implement. The amendment needs to include a section that allows village councils to discuss and adapt policies in consultation with village assemblies in order to increase citizen ownership and ability to demand accountability in case of poor implementations by leaders. This will increase citizen participation in policy-making, which will position them well to demand accountability in case such policies and programs are ill implemented. Related to this, village executive officers (VEOs) should be employed by the district council due to their financial capacity, but the law should allow village councils to check and hold accountable VEOs in case of poor performance. Lastly, there is a need to intensify the provision of civic education to citizens and village government leaders by both state and non-state actors, especially to use the ready available autonomous associations at the grassroots level to help citizens become accountability seekers but also to make village government leaders feel obliged to provide important information in the fear of being punished by civically enlightened citizens.

Notes

- 1 Boven 2005.
- 2 Lindberg 2009.
- 3 Adeyemi et al. 2012.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Schedler 1999, p. 26.
- 6 Chaliga 2002.
- 7 Makulilo 2007.
- 8 Chaligha 2008, p. 66.
- 9 O'Donnell 1998.
- 10 Killian 2008.
- 11 Max 1991, p. 113.
- 12 Mwaikusa 1985; Ngware and Haule 1993.
- 13 Ngware and Haule (1993) conducted a study focusing on village government.
- 14 Mwaikusa 1985.
- 15 Kawemama 1999.
- 16 Shivji and Peter 2003.
- 17 Killian and Mukandala 2000.
- 18 Baregu 2001.
- 19 Killian and Mukandala conducted a study in REDET pilot districts in 2010.

- 20 Ndumbaro and Kiondo 2007.
- 21 Kilian 2008.
- 22 Mhina 2008.
- 23 URT 2000.
- 24 Max 1991.
- 25 URT 2002.
- 26 Nchimbi 1994.
- 27 URT 2000.
- 28 The power to remove local government leaders who are not performing well was indicated in the *Kiongozi cha Utawala Bora Ngazi ya Kijiji (Handbook for Good Governance at the Village Level)*. URT n.d.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 The interview was conducted in November 2008 in Bukoba district.
- 31 URT 2000.
- 32 Killian 2008.
- 33 This was one of the respondent of Bulambizi hamlet who was responding to the question of whether they receive important information.
- 34 Killian 2008.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 URT n.d.
- 37 Mukandala 2002.
- 38 Such statements featured much during the interview with household respondents.
- 39 This meeting was attended by the researcher; apart from having poor attendance the village chairperson also used intimidating language.
- 40 URT n.d.
- 41 Baregu 2001.
- 42 Gasarasi 2001.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Jingu 2007.
- 45 The government was in the process of a constitutional review, which did not proceed due to the 2015 general elections but rather ended at the stage of the Constituency Assembly. With the post-election leadership change the review process remains on the table waiting to be put to a vote by the citizenry.

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Three Objections to Gyekye's Functionalist Conception of Development

EMMANUEL IFEANYI ANI

Abstract: I consider three objections to Gyekye's functionalist conception of development. According to the first objection, the goal of development is ultimately economic development. I examine this objection but find Gyekye's integrative functionalist conception vindicated. The second objection pertains continuity: it argues that development must be a continuous process. I agree with this objection because (a) there will always be goals to create and accomplish, (b) certain goals, such as the exhibition of certain behaviors, will remain goals in as much as they can never be totally achieved, and (c), existential challenges are ever changing, necessitating that behavioral adaptations to (dealing with) them remains a continuous process. The third objection results from the second: it argues that if development is a continuous process, then no society qualifies to be called "developed." Since I agree with the second objection, it seems I have to agree with this: in as much as no society has fully captured all of the behavioral attributes necessary for a society to respond adequately to its entire physical and socio-cultural environment, no society should strictly be called "developed." But we can, nevertheless, use that attribution in a loose or attenuated sense for ease of convenience in a relative context. I conclude with a few reflections about the implications of this discussion for debates in post and alternative development.

Introduction

The subject of "development" is highly significant, given that it forms a central point of comparative evaluation between countries ranked on the higher side of development and others on the lower. We normally call the former the "developed" nations and the latter the "developing" or "underdeveloped." As currently constituted, this seems the single most important way of categorizing the world today, as it influences most of other international decisions on international politics, migration, aid, the nature of international relationships, educational rankings, sources of knowledge production, and so on. While "developed" nations see themselves as developed, "developing" and "under-developed" nations are still embroiled in the struggle to become "developed."

Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani is Lecturer, Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Legon and holds a PhD in Philosophy from Nnamdi Azikiwe University. His research interests are with the philosophy of culture, deliberative democracy, and theistic humanism. He was editor of *Fact Magazine* and is co-founder of *Teleads Career Services*.

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Post development and alternative development scholars have criticized these ideas and categorizations as a Western imperialistic contraption. Whilst alternative development seeks local and indigenous alternative development ideas, post development rejects the very concept “development.” Whilst alternative development struggles to find alternative models, post development is saddled with offering credible alternatives to “development” itself.¹ It seems that the problem is that the entire debate about development has raged with no one critically examining the concept “development.”

Perhaps we may need to step back from what we (and all parties to the debate) assume to be “development.” Not only could this offer the realization that we may not be dealing with the strictly correct conception of “development,” but also that those that see themselves as developed may not have even arrived at their condition through the currently presumed notion of development. It is in this regard that it is fruitful to examine Kwame Gyekye’s functionalist conception of development. Gyekye’s notion of development does not come without its own difficulties, however, and I shall present and discuss these as three major objections to his conception. The outcome of this discussion is that I support Gyekye’s integrative functionalist conception of development, but I disagree with his notion of non-continuous development. The disagreement leads to a logically extended disagreement with the prevailing notion behind the current categorization of nations in development terms, and a concession to that categorization only on the basis that it is used in a somewhat loose sense, which I will explain. The discussion also serves to clarify the debate, particularly in correcting the meaning of development that has made the last century of debate about “development” such a gridlock.

Gyekye’s Functionalist/Integrative Conception of Development

Kwame Gyekye, one of the most prominent philosophers in Africa, argues that the economic conception of development, which has all along been touted by development “experts,” and which has become the monolithic framework for understanding and tackling the problem of development in post-colonial and other Third World countries, is lopsided and terribly inadequate. According to him:

That conception, it seems to me, fails to come to grips with the complex nature of human society and culture. That complexity...calls for a comprehensive, not segmented, approach...development must be perceived in terms of adequate responses to the entire existential conditions in which human beings function, conditions which encompass the economic, political, social, moral, cultural, intellectual and others.²

Gyekye observes that “development” is clearly an urgent term in Third World countries: it is the reason for aid from First World countries, the reason for military coups, and usually the promise of those who want to lead/rule. But Gyekye notes that almost all of these rationales see development as economic development. As a result it has been taken to be the problem solely for economists, engineers, agriculturalists, technologists, bankers, populations experts, town planners, and others whose professions are directly connected with the production of material means of livelihood.

Gyekye also notes that it is because of the economistic notion of development that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have geared most of their activities in the developing countries towards the production of material things, increases in food production, provision of electricity and good drinking water, the building of roads, and the reason why centers of research, called Institutes of Development, around the world have devoted almost all their attention to problems of economic development or economic growth.

Given the complex nature of human society, however, Gyekye faults this notion of development. He argues that the very concept of development needs to be examined. Thus it does not do to answer the question "What is development?" by pointing at particular facts or symbols of development, since this would be begging the question. Gyekye argues that we can answer the question "What is development?" by trying to answer the question "What is it to say that something is developed?"³ On what grounds can we judge that *x* is developed while *y* is not?

First of all, Gyekye denies that development is simply "growth" and argues that interchanging "development" with "growth," as has been commonly done, is a mistake. This is because that while growth is a physical concept measurable in quantitative terms (such as economic growth) development is essentially a behavioral concept. Using a brief example, Gyekye argues that "when a person who has not seen his nephew for six years suddenly sees him looking tall and big," he is likely to refer to his "growth" rather than "development." He is likely to say "Hi, Opata, you have *grown*." He can only say "Hi, Opata, you have developed" if he wants to refer to behavioral attributes that Opata has acquired over the years.⁴ Gyekye urges us to see development in this way—the acquisition of certain behavioral attributes rather than simply growth.

What, however, are the behavioral attributes of development? Gyekye asks us to consider a zoological model—the development of an insect from an egg to larva, pupa and then adult bee or mosquito. Because the adult, the end process, functions in certain ways, we say it is *developed*. The reason for the zoological model is that we can easily see the developed nature of the insect, but the limitation is that while the insect develops *intransitively* (that is, mechanistically, automatically, predictably, without any conscious effort on its part), human development is *transitive* (has to be conscious, deliberate, planned, and is unpredictable). Despite the simplicity of the insect model, Gyekye argues that it helps us to objectively know when an object has reached a stage in its development that we can call "developed."

Gyekye admits that someone might reject the insect model and argue that if all human societies belong to the same *species*, then we can perhaps arrange them all on one linear scale of "degrees of development" and use the characteristics of the "more developed" societies as the objective criteria for defining development. Gyekye disagrees with this and argues, "... it is not as easy to come to a definite and *objective* conclusion about the nature of a more developed society as it might be supposed. For what might be regarded as a "more developed" human society may nevertheless fall short of certain ideals, norms and expectations."⁵ This fact, for him, calls for adequate and comprehensive criteria for determining the nature of a "more developed" human

society; criteria that he thinks could be more fruitfully explored in an oblique or less direct manner.

Applying the insect model to human society, Gyekye defines development as “the capability to perform satisfactorily the functions appropriate to the object, such as a society or institution, said to be developed.”⁶ Gyekye is quick to point out that functions of various objects differ, and the nature and purpose of an object determines its function. But in spite of this, the capability of an object to perform its functions satisfactorily would include certain signs such as a high degree of independence, self-reliance and self-sufficiency, being able to face serious challenges to its existence, being able to control its environment and feed itself, demonstrating signs of inventiveness and innovativeness, and others. Gyekye argues that although these behaviors are manifested in different ways by different objects, they are expected of a rational human society. Taken together, they mean that development should be seen as “adequate responses to the environment in all its complexities.”⁷ Gyekye points out that by environment he does not simply mean physical environment, but the whole gamut of socio-cultural conditions, the complex of existential conditions in which people live, move and have their being. Such conditions would include social, cultural, economic, political, technological and moral conditions. The complex nature of these conditions makes development a comprehensive, multifaceted concept, but for the same reason, it unleashes a legion of problems on human society to grapple with. A society that is developed should be able to take care of the social, economic and political problems threatening its existence. To respond adequately to the environment – to face squarely the challenges generated by those complex circumstances – is to function satisfactorily, and thus, to be developed.⁸

Back to economic growth, Gyekye argues that equating development with economic growth is clearly without conceptual or empirical warrant, because, although growth is involved in development, “it is clearly not economic growth that is immediately or particularly intended [italics are mine for analysis further on].”⁹ Gyekye concludes that economic growth, as such, can only be considered “as a consequence or measure or manifestation of (economic) development.”¹⁰ We cannot deny that economic growth is essential to the concept of development, but to equate development to it is to perceive only a tip of the iceberg whose base is more complex and ramifying. The relationship between economic growth and development is this: economic growth is only a manifestation of economic development, and economic development is itself (only) a species of the genus development, a genus that is made up of other species such as cultural, moral, social, political development. No species is identical with its genus. The relationship between the species is not automatic: none is sufficient for the other. Economic development, for instance, does not guarantee high standards of morality and justice. There is, however, one species that, although not sufficient for other species to thrive, is necessary for them. It is political development: nothing would work without a congenial and conducive political atmosphere. In spite of this, Gyekye concedes that economic growth can, in some cases, be a necessary condition for development in democratic politics.¹¹

The above forms the major part of Gyekye's functionalist conception of development. Most prominent is the proposition that development is behavioral: what we usually saw as development, things such as economic growth, are *results* of development, not development themselves. Behavior (or behavioral competence) comes first, then the results of behavior (or behavioral competence) would follow. When we have acquired behaviors necessary and ideal to function satisfactorily in tackling our existential challenges, then development has happened. That is development. If we are referring to human societal development, then the appropriate behaviors must be reflected in the prevailing habits, attitudes, behavioral patterns, mental outlooks, values, institutions and social practices of the people.¹² Those of these that are obstacles to development effort must therefore be re-evaluated and revised to suit the arduous task of development.¹³

Let me pause at this point to entertain the first objection that can arise to Gyekye's conception of development. According to this objection, development at societal level is ultimately economic development, and therefore, Gyekye is mistaken about his conception of development.

What is the Ultimate Goal of Development?

This is the most common question that arises from treating Gyekye's functionalist conception of development. It is normally understood that the goal of a society's development, at least in the context of modern nations, is economic wellbeing. This can be confirmed from the promises usually made by candidates who are vying to be elected leaders of political units. We do not normally hear an electoral candidate in today's politics promising moral or spiritual development, or some other such related normative ideal; what is obtainable is to promise economic wellbeing. Even if there were already some measure of economic wellbeing in a society, then it is usually wise to promise more economic wellbeing.

However, now that we are confronted with a behavioral conception of development (development as the acquisition of certain behaviors) as well as a multi-dimensional and integrative notion of development (development as adequate response to a complex of social, political, cultural, moral, technological, and other challenges) we must answer that question "What is the ultimate goal of development?" This question is certain to persist even after understanding Gyekye's concept of development because there is the persistent intuition that the goal of every society is economic wellbeing, and that the other aspects of behaving to tackle challenges are in service of this wellbeing. I think there is a point to this intuition: let me provide a few conceptual warrants for this worry.

We not only have different dimensions of development (moral, social, cultural, economic, and so on), we can also discuss development at two levels: the individual and societal levels. An individual can aim for integrative development: to be a better person. This involves not just improving one's economic wellbeing, but improving intellectually, morally, psychologically. An individual could be working to increase her financial income. She could also be working on eliminating certain behavioral defects. She could also be working on improving her attitude to life (to, for instance, stop being suicidal at

times). She could also be working on improving her religious practices and spiritual development (whatever it may consist). This, in fact, is what many individuals would do. But what about societies: can they aim for integrative development? It would rather appear that societies (only) aim for economic development, and that integrative development at societal level (the development of political, social and economic frameworks) are means to this goal, the economic goal. Thus when, for instance, we aim to ensure political stability or a conducive political atmosphere, it is because we know that a lack of it would hurt economic growth. When we aim at democracy, it is because we know it would enhance economic growth. When we fight terrorists, it is because we know that if we do not, we would be starved of foreign direct investment, arresting economic growth, and so on. As such, societies can only aim for things material. In fact, we may remember that individuals go to heaven; societies do not. As such, the non-material goals of development (some of which we have just enumerated) are valid only at the individual level.

As much as I am impressed with this objection, I find some difficulties with it. First is that not every society is focused solely upon economic goals, since focus on economic pursuit (if we are to conceptually agree that it is the case) is largely a product of modernity. Secondly, it can be argued that sole preoccupation with economic pursuit, together with its technological implications, is a vicious cycle that is terminable only with the destruction of the planet. Conserving nature would automatically mean going beyond solely economic pursuits. Third is that when societies tackle existential challenges, such as environmental disasters and even terrorism, it is not solely with economic growth in mind. I would still want to be free from terrorism even if I do not want to get richer. And fourth, there are electoral candidates who run, not on an economic ticket, but on things like environment, education and equality, which are ethical issues, especially when economic indices are encouraging but there are threatening social, moral and environmental challenges. As such, we can still say that societies aim, not simply or solely at economic goals, but at societal wellbeing, wellbeing understood as having physical, moral, psychological and intellectual elements. We can thus say that the notion of a multi-faceted or integrative development also applies at the societal level. So in my view, Gyekye's integrative functionalist conception of development survives this criticism. But does he survive two others? Let me look at them.

Development is a Non Continuous Process

Ultimately, Gyekye must tackle the question "Is development a continuous process?" This question arises because of his denial that development is economic development, and his view that development is a behavioral concept, that development is development in behavior. We all know that economic development is a continuous process: we can never stop economic pursuits. But when development is a behavioral concept, do we have such a thing as continuous behavioral development?

Gyekye notes that it would be intuitive and common for people to think development is continuous, after all that follows from the view that development is

economic development. But he disagrees, because he thinks the notion of development as a continuous process raises some logical and epistemological problems. The epistemological problem is that if development is continuous, then it would be impossible to justify a claim to the knowledge of a developed object: "... an object in continuous, infinite process cannot be fully known, and cannot therefore be characterized as developed."¹⁴ The logical problem, which is a corollary of the epistemological, is that development as continuous process means that we would have no justification for using the past and perfect tenses of the verb "to develop": "... we would not be able logically to say of an object *O* that it developed or has developed. The reason is that past and perfect tenses are used of actions and processes that have come to completion."¹⁵ But completion is denied by continuous process. Importantly, Gyekye then remarks that we seem to know, or at least we feel convinced, that an object is developed (such as the insect, or a society), and we can contrast it to another object that is less developed (behaviorally), hence the contrast between the developed world and the developing or less developed world. Such contrast implies that we should reject the notion of continuous development.¹⁶

Gyekye further illustrates his defense of development as non-continuous process with a diagram showing two vertical lines, represented as figures 1 and 2.¹⁷




Figure 1 (NCP)

Figure 2 (CP)

The difference between the two vertical lines is that one represents development as continuous process (CP) while the other represents non-continuous process (NCP). The CP line has an arrow at the top pointing upwards, while that of NCP does not. Gyekye says that the CP arrow shows that the process simply continues. He differentiated both lines by simply marking the CP alphabets with single quotation marks ('). As such, we have A', B', C', D', and E' for CP, and A, B, C, D, and E for NCP. Since the process of development in CP continues beyond E', Gyekye argues that at no point (at none of the CP alphabets) can we say that the object is developed. But since development in NCP is non-continuous, we can place the completion of development somewhere, such as D. So we can say that at D the object is developed. But what happens to E? To answer this question, Gyekye reminds us that we are using the insect model of development, and that at D, we can say that the object has acquired the necessary behaviors, ways of acting

and reacting, that are necessary to *function* successfully to effectively tackle its existential challenges.¹⁸ Earlier before D, such as B and C, the object has not begun to function satisfactorily. Gyekye also argues that the decision to regard the object as developed at a particular point such as D is not arbitrary or capricious, since, according to the insect model, the developed character of the object that emerges (that is, the bee or mosquito) can hardly be questioned (because there are clearly objective criteria for recognizing the nature of a developed mosquito). Since successful functioning (development) emerges at D, whatever comes after D, such as E and others, can be regarded as *more* developed: whatever comes after D must be regarded as

... refinements, trimmings, prunings, embellishments, higher levels of sophistication, realisations of greater hopes, plans and ambitions, *etc*, all of which result from the fact of the developed character of the object, that is, from D. [I add the word "might" in order to accommodate the historical fact of the decline or demise of nations, empires, civilisations, institutions, cultures].¹⁹

So, concludes Gyekye, despite the fact that we can say that human history is continuous, we can say that development cannot be endless. Gyekye concludes with several implications of his functionalist conception of development. First, the transitivity of the concept of development when applied to human society means that development is purposefully deliberated upon, planned and executed, not mechanistic like the development of the mosquito. This means that development is not only a creative act but also an ethical one, since it involves the setting of rational and consciously defined goals, and the goals must be values cherished by a human society.²⁰ This in turn means that development must be a cultural activity, since a few isolated persons cannot bring it about.²¹ Development must therefore be based in culture. But since development is a behavioral concept, the fact that it must take place in a culture, or must be based in culture, does not mean that every culture is a viable framework for development. Every society has a culture, but not every society is developed.

Let me now proceed to entertain the second objection that can arise to Gyekye's conception of development. According to this objection, development cannot but be a continuous process.

Is Development a Non-Continuous Process?

This is another question that can intuitively arise in response to Gyekye's conception of development. It will be recalled that Gyekye denies that development can be a continuous process. At this point, let me quote Gyekye directly on his reason for denying that development is a continuous process:

It is obvious that CP (continuous process) bristles with absurd and difficult consequences which we can hardly accept. For we seem to know or at least feel strongly convinced, with respect to some particular object, that it is developed. This is the reason why we are able confidently to contrast it to another object which is undeveloped or less developed: thus

the contrast between what is referred to as the developed world and the developing or *less* developed world. The contrast implies that the process of development cannot be held as continuous and unending.²²

But the intuitive feeling that development is a continuous process is so strong that it persists even upon confronting Gyekye's defended denial. However, I think that this intuition is still based on the economic notion of development, since we all know that there is usually no end to economic growth. Such intuition is likely overlooking the fact that Gyekye is talking about development in behavior, and has deployed the insect model to support his position. What he is saying is that when behavioral development comes to a point when the behavior is adequate for tackling life's challenges, the development is non-continuous in the sense that there is no need for further behavioral development, although the results of the developed behavior continue to accumulate.

In spite of this mistakenly intuitive way of expressing this objection, however, the objection itself has led me to continue to examine Gyekye's arguments for non-continuous development more closely, and, on close inspection, find logical problems with even his notion of non-continuous (behavioral) development, and hence his subsequent denial that development is a continuous process. First is that when Gyekye was defending his insect model against a potential objection that it translates to a linear model of development where all societies can be arranged in "degrees of development," Gyekye had argued: "... it is not as easy to come to a definite and *objective* conclusion about the nature of a more developed society as it might be supposed. For what might be regarded as a 'more developed' human society may nevertheless fall short of certain ideals, norms and expectations."²³ That argument is a direct contradiction of his argument above:

...we seem to know or at least feel strongly convinced, with respect to some particular object, that it is developed. This is the reason why we are able confidently to contrast it to another object which is undeveloped or less developed: thus the contrast between what is referred to as the developed world and the developing or *less* developed world.²⁴

So he has already taken a position earlier that undermined his epistemological argument for development as a non-continuous process.

Second, there is an over-simplified analogy between knowing that an object (any object) is developed (such as a mosquito) and knowing that a human society is developed. This analogy informs the hyper-simplified movement from knowing that an object is developed to knowing that some societies are developed, resulting in an endorsement of the common distinction between the developed and the developing or less developed world. It is obvious that a mosquito can acquire certain simple and basic functions that it needs to suck blood and fly away from danger. But can we make the same simple conclusions for a human society in its encounters with complex existential challenges? Gyekye thinks that all a society needs is to (1) acquire certain basic behaviors necessary for responding to existential challenges; (2) that those behaviors would keep solving problems as we go along; and (3) once such satisfactorily functioning behaviors have been attained, no further changes in existential condition would render them

unsatisfactory, necessitating yet a further drive toward a new standard of satisfactory behavioral function. But here I must disagree. Development is a continuous process since (a) there will always be goals to create and accomplish, (b) certain goals, such as the exhibition of certain behaviors, will remain goals in as much as they can never be totally acquired, and (c) existential challenges are ever changing, necessitating that behavioral adaptations to (dealing with) them remains a continuous process.

I will begin with (a). It is impossible for an individual to be a behavioral perfectionist or to function satisfactorily, much less an entire society. Crime will always exist (it is a basic human temptation); corruption must always rear its ugly head one way or another. History has shown that rather than eliminate corruption, punishment and reforms can only engage it in a hide and seek game that reduces but does not eliminate it.²⁵ The same appears to obtain for issues of racial differences: every society, including all of the so-called “developed” countries, is (still) grappling with racial animosity and, as yet, has not evolved competent ways of dealing with it. Worse, not all leaders of any society or successive regime will be guaranteed to behave well: some will lead the society (and entire regions of societies) into political, military or/and economic quagmires (such as George W. Bush landed both the USA and the entire Middle East with the unjustified invasion of Iraq and its ever-spiraling effects on the entire region).

Gyekye notes that the political initiative is so necessary for other aspects of society’s functioning. But there is no guarantee that every successive leader and regime of any society will be well behaved. What it means is that the acquisition of all the behavioral attributes necessary and sufficient for development can never become a perpetual possession: it will remain, at best, a goal. One reason for this is that behavioral attributes cover, not just economy-related behaviors, but moral and political ones, and it is hard to imagine that a perfection of all these three behavior segments will converge in a society or even an individual. Another reason is that progress in the acquisition of certain behaviors can be lost, either partially or completely, at any time. As individuals we know that there can be backslides to our moral progress, in our quest to be better ethical entities. The same should apply to a society’s quest for progress in its developmental functional efficiency. Causes of functional backslides could include complacency, vain glory, senses of entitlement, the growth of the mentality of rent-seeking, feelings of accomplishment, and so on. These psychological dangers are real and ever present. They ensure that no society or individual can ever lay claim to all the behavioral attributes necessary and sufficient for development as a *perpetual* possession. Here, we see that the analogy of the mosquito becomes too simplistic as a way of showing us what it means to have all the functional characteristics necessary for development.

Let me put the argument against the non-continuous notion of behavioral development in another way: from the dynamic nature of existential challenges. It is said that development consists in adequate responses to the environment in all its complexities. But environmental challenges are not static; they are dynamic. The physical environment could have escaped this, since a lot about it is static. But since Gyekye talks about the entire gamut of socio-cultural conditions, or existential conditions, these conditions are dynamic, and since they are dynamic, they present ever-

changing challenges. If they do this, then responses to their challenges must be always and continuously developed. What it means is that development construed as the acquisition of behavioral attributes in order to function satisfactorily, in terms of responding adequately to existential challenges, is a continuous process, a perpetually on-going process. We are therefore condemned to continue to learn to respond adequately to our existential circumstances. As such, the notion of satisfactory function is possible only in attenuated, transient, indeed fleeting senses. This is perhaps why every society, including those with the currently-regarded advanced economies, are still (and seems will always be) in the process of grappling with behaviors that are appropriate to dealing squarely with the entire range of their existential challenges, challenges that are not just economic, but moral, political and cultural.

Can We Term Any Society as “Developed”?

This question is a logical consequence of the previous question. And I raise this question because of my acceptance of the second objection that development is a continuous process. As such, my response to this third question is a logical consequence of my support for the notion that development is a continuous process. So from foregoing analyses, it would seem that the response to the above question is quite obvious, and it is that no society strictly qualifies to be called “developed” in as much as no society has fully captured all of the behavioral attributes necessary for a society to respond adequately to its entire physical and socio-cultural environment; in this regard, all societies are, not just a work in progress, but will remain so. As such, development is a constant struggle, a goal that beckons us towards itself, but simultaneously keeps us somewhat away.

In questioning why any society should be called “developed” however, let me revisit the possible reason for the use of that categorizing terminology. The characterization of “developed,” “developing,” and “under-developed” are obvious economic characterizations, since they synchronize with the economic achievement of the member countries of the characterization. But the economic disparities that give rise to the characterization are a reality, and they are so clear-cut that we need to find a way of referring to them when we undertake economic discussions. Since we have seen the logical futility of using the term “developed” to describe any society, an idea would have been that we consider an alternative term. The best way to look for such an alternative is to take into consideration the reason for the economic disparities in the first place. If we agree with Jared Diamond that those on top of the economic ladder enjoyed an agricultural (and hence, economic and technological) head start thousands of years ago, then we can call them the First World (as is often used) while those coming up the ladder would be the Third World or “emerging economies.”²⁶ The problem with this is that many of the “emerging economies” are possibly catching up, in economic pace, with the First World, and it is easy to see that fulfilment of the economic status of a First World nation would qualify a Third World nation to change categorization and characterization. But what if the greater number of Third World countries achieve the economic stability of the First World in the course of time? Then we would have to

either collapse/remove the First/Third-World categorizations or invent some other terminology to suit the new situation. That brings us back to where we started in seeking categorizations.

At this point, we can still assume that the economic disparities are obvious. We have little choice but to re-examine the “developed” and “non-developed” categorization to see if we can still salvage it for use. But again, these characterizations (“developed/non-developed” and “First-Third Worlds”) focus mostly upon economic disparities (although there are also disparities in institutionalized leadership accountability, these are not as clear-cut as the economic). While it makes sense to talk of economic and technological head starts because progress in these areas is cumulative, it does not appear to make sense to speak of moral, spiritual, or cultural head starts. In fact, if we were to argue about superiority in moral development, we can refer to the Akan of Ghana, who preside over a culture that promotes peace to the extent that all manner of verbal (and hence, physical) aggression (even to foreigners) are tabooed.²⁷ Beyond this, if we want to refer to disparities and stages in multi-faceted and integrative development, what kind of characterization would we use? There seems none possible, since the Human Development Index, the closest candidate, is by no means integrative, and as such does not account for many of the facets of behavior necessary and sufficient for responding to a society’s entire range of existential challenges.²⁸ When we take full stock of Gyekye’s concept of development, there is, on the whole, hardly any justification why certain nations should then be called “developed” — contrary to Gyekye’s view.

At this point, a legitimate objection can be raised. According to this objection, the conclusion that development is a continuous process does not have the force of necessity needed to conclude that no society should be called “developed.” This is because not all attributions presuppose their meaning in the perfect sense. An example would be that when we call someone a physician, it is not because she has acquired all the expertise in that field. We can agree to call someone a physician at a certain point even though it is true that learning to be a physician continues throughout life. From this perspective, there would be no need to question why we call such a person a physician if it happens that there is a problem in medicine that still puzzles her. Although this analogy may not be perfect, we can say roughly the same thing about calling certain societies “developed.” According to this objection, we all know that the nations we call “developed” have not reached some end of development, become static, and hence stopped developing. As such, we must be using such attribution rather because they embody the capacity to deal with their existential challenges more than other nations (they have come a longer way in acquiring these capacities to deal with their existential challenges), and so the attribution “developed” is for ease of convenience in discussing them relatively to others who are yet to acquire such capacities as much as they have done.

I would call this the ease-of-convenience-in-comparison argument (or the relativity argument). I would grant it a certain point, which is that it is the so-called “developed” societies that have shown, in the way they have, that human societies can develop

systematic capabilities to deal more effectively with their existential challenges. It can, for instance be argued that their political organization exerts accountability from their leaders in a way we exert it from servants and house helps; their crime-solving capabilities are, at this point, equal to solving even the most carefully planned crimes; their average (or middle class) citizens are "quite rich" in the metrics of other nations; one would expect a relatively fair (at least not embarrassingly nepotistic) treatment at the hands of their court judges; and so on. But we have seen earlier that these nations are nowhere better than others in handling certain other challenges, such as racism, verbal aggression, physical violence, climate degradation, and others. These are serious challenges in themselves. It means that the "developed" nations are still saddled with existential challenges, and their rendezvous with these are far from over. We must then distinguish between the strict and loose senses of qualifying something as "developed."

In the strict sense, it is obvious that the ease-of-comparison argument does not provide sufficient justification for attributing a society as developed. It is strictly logically inconsistent to conclude that development is a continuous process and then maintain that some societies are developed. In fact, accepting that development is a continuous process means that the word "developed" lacks epistemological warrant, strictly speaking. It seems to me that it was the lack of this distinction between the strict and loose senses of the attribution that left Gyekye with the only option of attempting to demonstrate that development is a non-continuous process in order to justify why some countries can be called developed. But we have shown that it is not necessary to argue that development is a non-continuous process in order to justify the attribution. Rather, the attribution "developed" is a matter of ease of convenience in comparing societies than that development can come to an end at some point. And once the distinction between the strict and loose senses of "developed" is made, it becomes obvious that the relativity argument attributes certain nations as developed only in the loose sense of pointing to something that is making some relatively significant progress in dealing with (at least some of) their existential challenges. Taking the distinction between the strict and loose senses into account means that one who insists that the attribution "developed" to certain countries is strictly not warranted is strictly correct, and one who, on the contrary, decides to make this attribution can then be assumed to be correct only in the context of a universal informal consensus about its use in a somewhat attenuated sense.

Conclusion

We have treated Kwame Gyekye's functionalist conception of development and entertained three objections that logically arise in treating it. Since he departs from the notion that development is economic growth, the first objection arises from the obvious feelings of intuition we normally have as human beings that development is ultimately economic. One would therefore expect this kind of objection to arise routinely from reading Gyekye's conception of development. But I rejected this objection and have marshalled enough arguments to show that Gyekye's departure from the notion that development is ultimately economic growth is correct. The second objection is a

continuation of the battle from the first objection. According to this objection, development must be continuous since there is no stop to economic growth. I pointed out that this misses Gyekye's reason for arguing that development is a non-continuous process: Gyekye argues that since development is behavioral, we must reach a certain point where we have acquired the necessary behaviors for effectively tackling the environment. But here I disagree with Gyekye and argue that existential challenges are complex and continue to change, necessitating that we continue to search for behavioral responses that can respond to existential challenges. So I argue that even in behavioral terms, development is a continuous process. I also raise a third objection as a consequence of the second objection, which is that if development is a continuous process no nation can be called developed. Since I agree with the second objection, I am logically obligated to agree with this objection too, and I presented reasons that also follow logically from the reasons that support the second objection. The justification for using the attribution can only be that it is being used in a relatively loose sense for ease of comparison when discussing development in the context of the (behavioral) development disparity of nations rather than that development is a non-continuous process.

We can now situate Gyekye's conception of development within the context of the debate about post-development and, in a way, alternative development. For instance, post development scholars mainly reject the very idea of development. Their reasons for this are that it "has to be seen as an invention strategy produced by the 'First World' about the 'under-development' of the 'Third World,'" does not work, is an imposition of science, is the religion of the West, amounts to Westernization and homogenization, and so on.²⁹ Alternative development, as the name implies, is concerned with alternative models of (or approaches to) development, in terms of alternatives to the mainstream models of development, which are seen as linear.³⁰ What to note is that these criticisms are directly chiefly at economic (and, to some extent, political) theories of development.³¹ This is reflected even when it is doctored to pay some attention to "people" or human development. But the implication of Gyekye's functionalist conception is that the entire debate is mistaken because it takes place on a platform that is too narrow and strictly insufficient to represent the concept of development, strictly speaking. It is largely because development is couched mainly in socio-economic terms that the persistence of poverty leads to scepticism about the validity of the term "development." It is precisely because "development" has been assumed to be largely only economic (and to some extent political) development that the whole debate about development has entered such a gridlock; those who oppose the very concept "development" are saddled with the unenviable task of crafting what to do next in the wake of the rejection of the very concept. Another difficulty that is emerging from the discussion of the last century about development is that, paradoxically, economic development cannot be achieved only by economic or material initiatives; the functionalist conception argues that even economic development is better guaranteed when society begins to tackle its existential challenges in their much broader perspective.

Both post and alternative development presuppose the idea of specific development models. These scholars are tasked with the burden of seeking credible alternative models of development (in the case of alternative development) or alternative to the phenomenon "development" itself (post-development). And of course, development theorists (the objects of criticism) have proposed models of development, which is the reason for the agitation of post and alternative development theorists in the first place. But Gyekye's functionalist conception does not need to begin discussing models that cut across any societies (even across Third World societies) for tackling the entire range of existential challenges. This is because, although certain existential challenges are common across humanity, the integrative functionalist conception implies that each society faces a unique set of challenges. This is why he clarifies that the function of an object is appropriate to its nature and identity, and it is only in relation to this that we can determine (if we can) when its functioning is satisfactory. It means that each society has a unique set of assignments on its hands: to respond to its environmental challenges as they come, be committed to the task, and that becomes its model. The model is for itself, and we can only talk of a model that can cut across several societies when we are discussing the species or sub-sets of development (ideas for tackling particular [aspects of] existential challenges), and that is where the politico-economic development discourses (development, alternative development, and post development) could come into the picture.

Finally, post-development scholars accuse development thinking as being driven by the desire to engineer the society, a kind of interventionist and managerial discipline.³² In short, development theorists are, by this view, trying to tell people what to do in the name of modernizing. But here one must make a distinction between telling people what particular things to do and offering a general moral imperative. Political and economic development theories may be telling people what to do about particular day-by-day issues, but the functionalist conception of development does not offer such retail services. Its only imperative is that every society needs to rise up to its environmental challenges. The uniqueness of objects in their nature (such as societies and institutions) does not encourage such retail services, especially from someone who is not embroiled in the existential challenge in question. It (the functionalist imperative) is as such a moral imperative, which is seen in the fact that there is no alternative to it (such as do not rise up to your own environmental challenges). This is why Gyekye argues that development is predominantly a moral affair. The moral imperative acts as a guide for particular and mundane strategies for developing.

Notes

1 Pieterse 2000.

2 Gyekye 1994, p. 45.

3 Ibid., p. 46.

4 Ibid., p. 47. Italics are used when Gyekye has used them in the original article.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 48.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 49.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 50.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 55.

14 Ibid, p. 51.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 50.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 52.

20 Ibid., p. 53.

21 Ibid., p. 54.

22 Ibid., p. 51.

23 Ibid., p. 47.

24 Ibid., p. 51.

25 See Ani 2015, p. 19.

26 Diamond 1997. Incidentally, journalists and media houses, such as Richard Quest of the Cable News Network (CNN), are now using the term 'emerging economies' more frequently. For a specific example of growing usage of the term, see discussions at: <http://www.peeplo.com/search/?type=web&from=adw8&q=list%20of%20emerging%20economies>.

27 See Obeng 1994 and Agyekum 2010.

28 The Human Development Index (HDI) was the first serious effort to shift the development paradigm from gross domestic product (GDP) to human development (HD). It is contained in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'s Human Development Report (HDR) for the year 2010.

29 As invention strategy, see Escobar 1992, p. 22; for does not work, Kothari 1988; as an imposition of science, Nandy 1988; is the religion of the West, Rist 1990; amounts to Westernization and homogenization, Constantino 1985 and Latouche 1993.

30 See Sheth 1987 and Pieterse 1998.

31 Also, see Ziai 2007.

32 Pieterse 2000, p. 182.

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At Issue: Ethnicity, Violence, and the Narrative of Genocide: The Dangers of a Third-Term in Rwanda

RYAN GOEHRUNG

Abstract: Rwanda's upcoming August 2017 presidential election provides a unique opportunity for the international community to reflect upon the past and contemplate the future of a nation that has struggled with intense ethnic factionalism for much of its history. In particular, incumbent President Paul Kagame's bid for a third-term is cause to consider the merits and dangers of his continued rule. While Kagame is often hailed for his role in ending the 1994 civil war and ushering in an era of stability and economic growth, in recent years his regime has faced widespread criticism for rampant human rights abuses, repression of civil liberties, growing income inequality, clandestine involvement in regional conflicts, and suppression of political opposition. Despite strong evidence for many of these allegations, to date Kagame and his ideologues have escaped any major international censure by virtue of his brash indignation toward any indictments and his willingness to utilize the memory of genocide to deflect criticism. However, closer analysis of the Kagame government reveals that in many ways it is recreating the economic, social, and political conditions that have in the past led to the proliferation of ethnic tensions and heralded outbreaks of violence. Therefore, it is a critical juncture for the international community to consider intervention prior to the 2017 elections to compel more substantive democratization characterized by ethnic power-sharing in order to forestall any potential resurgences of violence and ensure that Rwanda continues on its path towards reconciliation and stability.

Introduction

Modern Rwanda is a land of contradictions, a country with two pasts and two presents. One Rwanda is an unabashed African success story, lauded by the international community for a GDP growth rate that averages 8 percent, its impressive halving of infant and maternal mortality ratios, and for exceeding parity in women's representation in parliament. This Rwanda not only returned from the brink of self-destruction in 1994, but went on to achieve stability and prosperity. The man at the forefront of this Rwanda and the recipient of praise for its successes is Paul Kagame. The hero of Rwanda, who upon seeing his country destroying

Ryan Goehrung is an adjunct professor at Naropa University and an independent researcher currently on contract with One Earth Future Foundation. His primary research interests involve efforts to increase political representation of women and other marginalized groups in democratic systems as a means of improving governance outcomes.

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i1a5.pdf>

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itself marched on the capital to put an end to genocide, restore order, build a lasting peace, and usher in an era of prosperity. In this Rwanda there are no Hutus or Tutsis, ethnicity has been erased, and hostilities forgiven. In the other Rwanda, both the past and present are much more complex. Ethnic hatred in and of itself never loomed as a monolithic terror waiting to strike. The civil war was neither a one-sided slaughter nor a manifestation of intrinsic racial tension. Rather it was an outpouring of anger, frustration, and resentment built up for decades along social, economic, political, and ethnic fissures both real and imagined. There was no hero of this war, no savior to be found. Rather, one man who had been raising an army for years took advantage of the chaos to fight his way into power, killing hundreds of thousands of the opposition in the process to violently secure his position. The victor of this Rwanda built a post-conflict government based upon the exclusion and marginalization of his enemies. He consolidated power through fear and repression of civil liberties all the while deflecting criticism against his authoritarianism by manipulating the memory of genocide to perpetuate shame and guilt. The face of this Rwanda is also Paul Kagame.

Which narrative we believe is of crucial importance for the future of Rwanda and its people. If the international community continues to praise Kagame as the hero and savior of Rwanda, with the license to maintain stability at all costs and of his own accord, there is a very real risk that the fragile democracy will continue to be degraded and the despotism of Rwanda only further increased. Under these conditions a majority of the population will continue to be politically excluded, economically disadvantaged, socially devalued, and increasingly marginalized. Under these conditions there is ample reason and motivation for unrest, discord, resentment, and eventually even renewed violence. In fact, it is those very conditions that led to the outbreak of one of the worst civil wars of recent memory and all of its corresponding humanitarian atrocities. If, however, the international community chooses to censure Kagame for his increasingly dictatorial tendencies and endeavors to hold him accountable for the ever more brazen breaches in good governance, perhaps there is a chance for Rwanda to complete its democratic transition and achieve a truly peaceful and stable civil society. Though the scars of Rwanda's civil war may take many more decades to heal completely, a just and inclusive society with democratic institutions and governance is the best way to ensure that the wounds of the past do not fester and reopen.

In this regard, the upcoming August 2017 presidential election will be a critical moment in Rwandan history, one that could be an affirmation of the country's progress or an indictment of its failure to move beyond exclusionary ethnic politics. President Paul Kagame has already announced his intentions to run for re-election as a third term president in defiance of the 2003 post-genocide constitution drawn up by his very own government. While this announcement officially came after a referendum in December of 2015, which resulted in a majority vote in favor of altering the constitution to accommodate a third term for Kagame, the improbable 98 percent approval was accompanied by widespread reports of voter intimidation and coercion by the state.¹ In addition to the questionable nature of the process by which Kagame's bid for a third term was legalized, the decision is all the more concerning after the recent events in neighboring Burundi. The controversial election of President Pierre Nkurunziza to a third term of office in July of 2015 led to public protests and an attempted military coup by the opposition

followed by severe repression and violent retaliation by Nkurunziza's government and supporters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and driving nearly 280,000 Burundians to flee their country.² This conflict in Burundi is nothing new. Though not as infamous as the 1994 genocide, Burundi shares a similar history of ethnic conflict and violence between Hutu and Tutsi populations. Indeed, ethnically rooted conflict between these two ethnic groups in one country has often been a catalyst for reactionary violence in the other.³ The recent outbreak of violence in the Burundi under such similar circumstances, therefore, should be an obvious warning as to the risks of renewed conflict in Rwanda should Kagame seek a third term, and one that the international community must seriously consider as the 2017 election approaches.

History of Ethnicity and Conflict

In order to understand the potential danger to Rwandan society posed by the continued rule of Paul Kagame and his ideologues, it is important to understand the past, in particular, the complex interplay between ethnic identities and Rwanda's political, social, and economic history. Additionally, it is necessary to understand Kagame's rise to political power within the context of the 1994 civil war when ethnic tensions and socio-political divisions were at their worst. Going beyond the narrative of genocide perpetuated by President Kagame, to examine the more complex dynamics of ethnicity and the outbreak of conflict is the only way to see the concerning parallels to modern Rwanda. The history of ethnicity in Rwanda and the political events leading up to the 1994 war have been exhaustively covered by several other scholars.⁴ A few aspects of this history, however, merit explicit emphasis here, especially those which challenge the dominant narrative of genocide perpetuated by the Kagame government.

First, The Rwandan civil war was not the inevitable outcome of deep tribal divides, intrinsic or imagined, rather the outbreak of violence was the culmination of increasing social, economic, and political tensions, which were radicalized along ethnic lines drawn from a complex tribal and colonial history. The narrative presented by ideologues of the Kagame regime insists that pre-colonial Rwanda was a society of perfect harmony, absent of ethnicity and its corresponding social stratifications. In reality, the socioeconomic and political system that exploited the Hutu majority was not a colonial invention; rather, it was an extrapolation or pre-existing dynamics based upon divergent modes of production.⁵ However, it is true that the permeable social class boundaries of pre-colonial times were institutionalized and racialized first by colonial authorities and then under the government of Juvenal Habyarimana.⁶

Second, the Hutu revolution of 1959-1961, which secured governmental authority for the Hutu, was not merely the product of intrinsic ethnic hatred, but sprang from a list of grievances with the social, political, and economic conditions of the time, which privileged the Tutsi minority at the expense of the Hutu majority. Importantly, however, this revolution was fought explicitly along ethnic lines, demonstrating the extent to which the racial hierarchy had been internalized and radicalized by this point. For both groups it established the relationship between ethnicity and power as a foundation of independent Rwanda, and cemented the antagonistic notion that one group in a position of authority almost necessarily excluded the other.

Finally, it is imperative to understand that throughout the majority of Habyarimana's regime ethnic violence and anti-Tutsi rhetoric were minimized, and at least superficially the sense of a united Rwanda was promoted even if the ethnic disparities in power were well-known. It was not until the 1990 invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that the Habyarimana regime (1973-94), capitalized on the ethnic make up of the RPF to cast Tutsis as enemies of the state.⁷ The politicization of ethnicity at this time was what Olaluwa Olusanya in his study of mass participation in genocide calls a "cumulative radicalization process."⁸ The emergence of anti-Tutsi rhetoric was thus a political decision motivated by what a perceived threat to state power represented.⁹ Habyarimana subsequently exaggerated the severity of the RPF threat in order to broadly condemn his opposition and create the specter of an imminent threat to Rwandans.¹⁰ The threat of ethnic violence allowed Habyarimana to take draconian liberties in suppressing his political opposition in the name of restoring stability and stamping out ethnic hatred.¹¹ It was thus a combination of economic insecurity and political instability coupled with the social and political stigmatization of Tutsi as a threat to a unified Rwanda that created the kindling for ethnically based violence. It only required the spark of President Habyarimana's assassination to burst into the flames of violence that consumed Rwanda for three months in 1994, resulting in the death of nearly 20 percent of the population.

Kagame's Government and the Narrative of Genocide

Genocide, that is the label most commonly applied to this violence and it is the narrative of events aggressively promoted and nationally enforced by Paul Kagame. And indeed a staggering number of Tutsi were targeted and killed as an enraged populace, whipped into a frenzy by the assassinated president's party and military, sought vengeance on those they viewed as responsible. Indeed, the anti-Tutsi rhetoric promoted by Habyarimana's regime prior to his death seemed to justify the violent response against Tutsis, a group demonized as synonymous with political and economic oppression and threats to national security. Neither the atrocities against the Tutsi people nor this ethnic component of the violence should be diminished. However, the genocide terminology insisted upon by Kagame ideologues limits the narrative of violence to a rigid binary of perpetrators and victims, which are in turn ascribed to dichotomous ethnic classes of Hutu and Tutsi respectively. Indeed, the dominant narrative, as told by the Rwandan government today, is that Hutu perpetrators senselessly slaughtered Tutsi victims until the Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF) led by Kagame marched on the capital to put an end to the violence and restore order.

What this account, however, neglects is the hundreds of thousands of Hutu who were also killed in this process, not simply as a means of restoring order but in a campaign of targeted violence to purge the country of Hutu extremists. Even after securing power by taking Kigali, the RPF government continued until 1997 to widely engage in assassinations, torture, large-scale imprisonment, and even mass killings in an effort to eliminate opposition, primarily in the form of Hutu people.¹² In fact, the former chief of the intelligence service, Sixbert Musangamfura, alleged that by July 1995 the RPF had deliberately targeted and intentionally killed over 300,000 people.¹³ In some cases, civilians were blatantly murdered alongside potential guerrillas, such as the 1995 Kibeho Camp massacres, in which as many as 8,000

predominantly Hutu refugees were killed.¹⁴ After eliminating Hutu enemies at home, the RPF continued its campaign to hunt down those who had fled across neighboring borders. In 1996, for instance, the RPF invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo, targeting refugee camps and pursuing a months long campaign of vengeance, killing as many as 200,000 Hutu in the process.¹⁵ These so-called counter-insurgency operations continued in border regions through 1997 when between January and August alone at least 6,000 people, most of whom were unarmed civilians, were killed by RPF forces.¹⁶

The point here is not to deny or undermine the experience and severity of the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi who were killed in the violence of 1994. Rather it is to emphasize the atrocities that occurred against all Rwandans, regardless of ethnicity or class or political affiliations. The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR), the state military of the Habyarimana regime, and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, carried out most of the violence during and after 1994, though a great number of civilians also engaged in opportunistic and reprisal killings on both sides. Therefore, FAR and RPA soldiers as well as civilians both perpetrated violence and fell victim to it in great numbers regardless of ethnicity. Some scholars, such as René Lemarchand, have long argued that rather than a one-sided slaughter, we might more accurately understand Rwanda as a double genocide in which both Hutu and Tutsi groups targeted each other in succession to a genocidal degree.¹⁷ However, the narrative aggressively promoted and in fact nationally enforced by the RPF government under the leadership of Kagame denies the victimhood of any Hutus killed in the 1994 violence.

Indeed, according to Rwandan Laws of Genocide Ideology passed by the Kagame government in 2008 and amended in 2014, only Tutsi are recognized as legitimate victims of the 1994 Civil War, leaving the category of perpetrators to be filled only by Hutu people.¹⁸ The implications of this are severe both psychologically and socially. For instance, in 1998 the Survivors of Genocide Fund (FARG) was established to pay the school fees and grant assistance to orphans of the civil war. However, the fund lends support only to Tutsi children even in areas where violence did not occur, while children who are Hutu, including orphans whose parents were killed by other Hutu during the genocide for being Tutsi sympathizers, are denied assistance because they are not considered legitimate victims.¹⁹ The very recognition of Hutu as legitimate victims of violence is in fact criminalized by Rwandan law, as is the suggestion that a double genocide occurred, which is considered synonymous with “genocide denialism” by the law.²⁰

In addition, the vague language of these laws, which the 2014 amendments did little to change, allows for the prosecution of those accused of “promoting genocide ideology.” The RPF government has aggressively applied these laws to silence political opposition, journalists, and foreign scholars. For instance, when opposition candidate Victoire Ingabire Umuhoya returned to Rwanda in January of 2010 to participate in the elections after sixteen years of exile, she gave a speech emphasizing that many moderate Hutu were killed in the violence of 1994 and pointed out the atrocities of the RPA, for which she was immediately arrested, jailed, and charged under the genocide ideology law.²¹ During the same 2010 presidential election cycle, the RPF regime used the genocide ideology law to force the only two remaining independent newspapers in

Rwanda to suspend publication for six months.²² The Kagame government has even targeted a number of foreign national academics under the genocide ideology law, including Peter Erlinder, who was jailed in 2010 after serving as a defense counsel for Hutus accused of genocide, as well as Alan Stam and Christian Davenport, who have been banned for life from Rwanda after mapping FAR and RPA activities and casualties from 1994 only to find that many more Hutu and far fewer Tutsi than previously thought were killed in the violence.²³

The result of such laws is an effective silencing of opposition to the dominant narrative of 1994. Not only is the discussion and examination of the civil war itself considered off limits by the Kagame government unless it is to reaffirm the accepted version of events, but also the very mention of ethnicity is outlawed. Enshrined in the 2003 constitution, is a clause against ethnic divisionism, which includes banning all mention of ethnicity, a policy that is enforced through monitoring and suppression of public speech.²⁴ The criminalization of discussing ethnicity in a country with a history of politically, socially, and economically polarized ethnic groups has profound ramifications. This law removes any civil recourse for ethnic Hutu to oppose the very means of their exclusion from social and political positions, and it prevents them from discussing the system of structural violence that ensures their continued oppression.

Though the RPF Government claims to share power and be ethnically neutral, political and therefore social and economic power rests firmly in the hands of the victors of the 1994 civil war, who are predominantly ethnic Tutsi. An internal 2008 U.S. embassy analysis found that despite some ethnic Hutu achieving senior positions in the government, they are typically figureheads to placate international pressure for power sharing and in practice are often “twinned” with senior Tutsi who exert actual control.²⁵ Beyond even superficial efforts at power sharing, ethnic Tutsi held between 60-70 percent of the most important political offices in the RPF government over the past two decades, despite accounting for only 10-15 percent of the overall population.²⁶ The same aforementioned US Embassy report stated the following:

While the Rwandan government (GOR) presents itself as a champion of national unity and equal opportunity, de-emphasizing ethnic identity and ostensibly opening positions throughout society to those of skill and merit, political authority in the country does not yet reflect this ideal. Ethnic identity is still keenly felt and lived, and ordinary Rwandans are well aware of who holds the levers of power. The long-term stability of Rwanda depends upon a government and ruling party that eventually shares real authority with the majority population.²⁷

As this report makes clear, the Kagame government does not in principle or in practice seek to truly share power with ethnic Hutu. In its current form, the RPF government fits one of the primary markers of systemic racism, which as Kenneth White describes is when “institutional arrangements are designed not only to award preferential treatment to the dominant group but also to maintain one group’s supremacy over the other group.”²⁸

This consolidation of power goes beyond ethnicity as well, disproportionately favoring RPF ideologues made up of former Tutsi refugees from Uganda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.²⁹ Many in this new class of Tutsi elite brought to power by the 1994 civil war, including President Kagame himself, grew up outside of Rwanda as refugees.³⁰ It is easy to see why the

children of refugees driven out of their own country due to the Hutu revolution of 1959-1961, might grow up bearing a grudge against those they view as responsible. However, enshrining those grudges in the very power structure of a purportedly democratic government is extremely problematic. In fact, the stranglehold of the RPF on Rwanda's government is highly reminiscent of the Habyarimana regime's monopoly on state power. Just as the Habyarimana government excluded and marginalized ethnic Tutsi, so too now is the Kagame government denying Hutu the opportunity to engage in politics or even voice opposition to the status quo. By removing the oppressed group's ability to articulate their grievances along ethnic lines, the RPF has stripped them of recourse after being obviously excluded based upon ethnicity. Indeed, the denial of ethnicity is a tactic to simultaneously consolidate power along ethnic lines, while also discrediting arguments of ethnic favoritism.³¹

This is not the only example of Kagame's government using the narrative of genocide to their advantage. Indeed, this has been a theme throughout the RPF's regime, both to bolster their claims to legitimacy and to deflect domestic and international criticism of the regime and its repressive tactics. Following the RPF victory in the 1994, which put an end at least to the slaughter of Tutsi, Kagame was uniquely well positioned in the eyes of the international community to cast himself in the light of both victim and savior of the genocide.³² This dual role is one that Kagame has expertly exploited to escape international censure for his increasingly dictatorial practices, and egregious abuses of human rights. For instance, in 2005 the Rwandan government responded to a World Bank study focusing on basic rights and the strength of democratic institutions by seizing and destroying the research data, claiming that the study perpetuated genocide ideology.³³ Similarly, after the World Food Programme issued a statement in 2006 proclaiming a regional famine and requesting urgent humanitarian assistance for 300,000 rural Rwandans, the RPF government dismissed the claims as not only false but also subversive.³⁴ Dated as this example may be, the willingness of the RPF to deny the existence of a famine and reject offers for humanitarian assistance that would have benefited hundreds of thousands of citizens and possibly saved many lives is indicative of the extent to which the Kagame regime is willing to sacrifice the well-being of its own people to maintain control over the image of a stable and effective government.

Many researchers and human rights observers assert that Kagame's regime is granted generous leniency due to guilty consciences for failing to intervene in 1994 to stop the violence.³⁵ Indeed, the extent to which Paul Kagame and the RPF government have escaped censure even in the face of strong evidence of human rights abuses and repression is rather remarkable. After the UNDP published a 2007 report entitled "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," which critically assessed the Rwandan government's assertions of progress, emphasized the problem of growing inequality, and called for increased democratization and improved quality of governance, Kagame publicly criticized the review methodology and rejected the findings as unfounded.³⁶ In fact, he responded so violently to the report, accusing its authors of destabilizing the country, that he successfully pressured the UNDP into blacklisting their own researcher and withdrawing their findings.³⁷ Needless to say subsequent UNDP reports in 2008 and 2009 were full of positive comments about Rwanda's progress and

do not mention the issues of inequality, despite two studies in 2007 and 2008 that confirmed the ongoing trend of rising inequality in Rwandan society.³⁸

The exploitation of the memory and narrative of genocide for political ends does not stop there. While the repression of political dissent has become less overtly violent and indiscriminate, since 2000 the Rwandan government has moved to targeting journalists and political opponents of the regime.³⁹ The 2010 presidential elections saw the arrest of two opposition candidates on charges of crimes against the state, and stirring up genocide ideology by criticizing the Kagame government and the dominant narrative of genocide.⁴⁰ Additionally, numerous journalists, domestic and foreign alike have been subject to death threats, intimidation, and exile.⁴¹ The assassinations of journalists and political opponents even occur across borders. For instance, in 2011, Charles Ingabire, a Rwandan journalist critical of the RPF regime was shot and killed in Kampala, Uganda. Similarly, Patrick Karegeya, the former head of External Intelligence for the RPF was murdered in 2014 after seeking refuge in Johannesburg. Another refugee in South Africa, former Army Chief of Staff, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, has survived two separate assassination attempts in 2010 and 2014. Kagame and his ideologues have dodged accusations of involvement in these assassinations through outright indignation and aggressively insinuating that only supporters of genocide perpetuate such claims. Even more boldly, in a 2014 speech shortly after Karegeya's murder Kagame claimed that "Whoever betrays the country will pay the price. I assure you... Any person still alive who may be plotting against Rwanda, whoever they are, will pay the price," and then went on to deny involvement in the assassination after essentially condoning it.⁴²

International Response to Kagame's Regime

Incredibly, these tactics of outright denial followed by accusations that any detractors are in effect trying to destabilize the country and must support genocide have allowed the Kagame government to escape blame for these assassinations and clear violations of human rights and civil liberties with little to no censure from the international community. Despite mounting evidence of Kagame's abuses, between 2004 and 2014 foreign direct investment increased over thirty-five fold, from \$7.7 million US to more than \$291 million.⁴³ More troubling still, net official development assistance and official aid received more than doubled during the same period from some \$490 million to more than \$1.03 billion in 2014.⁴⁴ While this is an overall decrease from the high of 1.2 billion foreign aid dollars in 2011, following the controversy stirred by a 2012 UN report, which alleged that the RPF government was supporting the M23 rebel movement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, like so many other accusations they did not manage to stick to Kagame for long.⁴⁵ In fact foreign aid levels quickly rebounded from the temporary drop in 2012 and by 2014 once again made up nearly half (over 47 percent) of Rwanda's \$2.17 billion US budget, as reported by the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.⁴⁶ This means that foreign governments are in effect funding and maintaining Kagame's government, which arguably confers some degree of responsibility upon foreign donors when it comes to the outcomes and behaviors of this regime.

While some foreign donors, such as the United States, have made efforts to redirect aid to politically neutral areas like the health sector, donors have limited control over how the money

freed up by foreign aid is used. Indeed, the fungibility of aid dollars means that governments receiving such substantial sums of aid are enabled to engage in behaviors that might not otherwise be possible. For instance, a study of ninety-seven countries between 1975-2004 revealed that unearned foreign aid actually enabled autocratic governments to remain in power longer, by placing the burden of welfare goods on foreign donors, which in turns allowed autocrats to spend money on the patronage networks that helped keep them in power.⁴⁷ Foreign aid levels are so substantial in Rwanda that the Kagame government is able to effectively suppress free media, a luxury often reserved for dictators of oil-rich nations, since poorer dictators facing resource constraints are often forced to allow free press.⁴⁸ In fact, press freedoms in Rwanda are some of the most restricted worldwide.⁴⁹ Given the fact that such substantial development assistance, therefore, helps sustain the repressive behaviors of the RPF government, the burden of this responsibility is shared by the donor agencies and foreign governments that continue to provide aid despite volumes of evidence indicating Kagame's increasingly dictatorial tendencies and disregard for civil liberties and human rights.

Ironically, the international guilt felt due to inaction during the 1994 civil war has allowed Kagame to evade accountability for his regime's misconduct, thus prompting further inaction from an international community that is supporting his regime, a regime which is actively recreating the social, economic, and political divisions that contributed to the atrocities of 1994. Much as the Habyarimana government was run by a small enclave of elites, the RPF government is dominated by a homogenous group of former Tutsi refugees, far removed from the experiences or struggles of the rural majority, and based upon their policy prescriptions largely disinterested in improving their condition.⁵⁰ In fact, numerous rural policies directly conflict with the interests of subsistence farmers, placing severe burdens upon the predominantly Hutu rural masses and further disenfranchising them, while their persistent poverty is seen as an indicator of the same general corruptness of character that allowed them to commit genocide.⁵¹ Similarly, just as Habyarimana's mandate that all Rwandans belong to the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND) party by birth to give the outward impression of national unity, Kagame strictly enforces the erasure of ethnicity, restricting any discussion of the very real societal divides that persist along ethnic lines.⁵² Finally, the RPF government systematically excludes the ethnically Hutu majority from meaningful positions of political power while it simultaneously denies ethnic favoritism. The Habyarimana regime did exactly the same thing at the expense of the Tutsi minority.⁵³ Though these are not necessarily sufficient conditions for renewed violence in Rwanda, the socio-economic dynamics and ethnic monopolization of political power are strikingly similar to those that preceded the outbreak of the 1994 civil war.

Scholars of genocide identify several common factors that place a society at risk of such violence, including the existence of historic, pervasive and institutionalized prejudice, and the "moral exclusion" of a category of people, causing social and political marginalization.⁵⁴ This is exactly what we see in Paul Kagame's Rwanda, particularly in the aggressively promoted narrative of Hutu as categorical perpetrators of genocide. This narrow version of events as it is enshrined in the RPF government morally excludes Hutu from society and the political sphere.

In addition to being captured in the Rwandan constitution, the very foundation of its modern government, the rhetoric of Hutu as sole perpetrators was further institutionalized by the *gacaca* courts, which failed to try any RPF members and instead focused almost entirely on prosecuting Hutus.⁵⁵ Moreover, the *gacaca* system became a mechanism of political repression, as it could be used to try cases against those accused of the vague crime of “ethnic divisionism.”⁵⁶ Indeed, this unilateral reconciliation process by the RPF victors has failed to create trust in the peace imposed upon the country and has in fact increased frustration among Hutu people, only widening the chasm of ethnic divides.⁵⁷ Rwandans themselves have reported government coercion, fear, and pragmatism as the primary drivers of their participation in the fiction of reconciliation vehemently maintained by the Kagame government.⁵⁸

Yet the narrative of a fully reconciled, stable, and ethnicity-blind Rwanda persists. But this is decidedly the image perpetuated by Kagame’s government, the same government with a vested interest in maintaining the perception of peace and stability in order to maintain power and repress the opposition. Tony Waters points out that stories of ethnicity are often kept within their groups as “explicitly hidden or clandestine” narratives that form the basis of ethnic identity often defined in opposition to another antagonistic group.⁵⁹ Similarly, Max Weber notes, that stories often times not only define, but also re-enforce ethnic stratifications by reproducing their particular understanding of the world, and in the case of dominant groups by glorifying the past to justify their continued power.⁶⁰ This is not dissimilar to the annual genocide memorials, held each year at the behest of Kagame, which in practice serve to publicly shame Hutu perpetrators while aggrandizing the Tutsi victors in public ceremonies and spectacles that reinforce the narrative of genocide thereby reaffirming the RPF government’s righteousness for Rwandans and the international community alike. Interpreted along the lines of constructivist theories of ethnic violence, this is a dangerous example of political elites capitalizing upon ethnic divides, even if the label of ethnicity is obscured, to consolidate power at the expense of an ethnic other.⁶¹

While it is true that thus far the Kagame regime has not adopted an outward rhetoric of Tutsi dominance, the message is clear in terms of repressing the political opposition along thinly veiled ethnic lines and morally excluding Hutu through the ritualistic reinforcement of their guilt for committing genocide. Moreover, as the legitimacy of the RPF government continues to erode, due to enforced one-partyism, censures on civil liberties and free press, rampant human rights abuses, and uneven distribution of economic gains, its reliance upon repressive tactics and ethnic factionalism as a means of maintaining power will only increase.⁶² None of this is to say that renewed violence in Rwanda is inevitable. In fact, the 2017 election poses an incredible opportunity to ensure that Rwanda continues on its path towards political stability and lasting peace. But in order for such progress, genuine healing and reconciliation must occur. Ethnicity is not something that can simply be erased by changing the nomenclature, least of all when the RPF government continues to capitalize upon ethnic divides and demonize all Hutu as perpetrators of genocide. The habits and practices of ethnic divisionism by both groups must be addressed in order to build a secure society.⁶³

This means altering the stories of ethnicity, by acknowledging the past injustices of both ethnic groups, rejecting the justice of the victors that places sole blame on Hutu and exonerates

the RPF, and committing to building an inclusive government in which power is shared and the interests of all ethnic groups are represented. It means addressing the horrors of the past in order to heal its wounds, and confronting the issue of ethnic antagonism to begin repairing those divisions.⁶⁴ As Sebastian Silvia-Leander notes:

a proper treatment of historical traumas can be a vital element of a national reconciliation strategy, as was the case in Germany, where the universal and unequivocal rejection of the Nazi regime and its divisive ideology served as a common platform to forge a new national identity after 1945.⁶⁵

Currently this type of inclusive national reconciliation effort is absent in Rwanda. Instead of a unified national identity, its government perpetuates the narrative of ethnic genocide at the hands of the Hutu. While the crimes of Hutu *genocidaires* need to be acknowledged and justice served, the same is true for retributive killings of Tutsi and the RPF. Atrocities committed by both groups must be addressed if the country is ever to move forward as a unified nation.

On the political level, Rwanda must also strive for inclusion and true democratization. The current political system enforced by the Kagame government reinforces the political oppositionalism of Tutsi and Hutu, perpetuating the notion that hegemony of one group necessarily excludes power for the other. If Rwanda is ever to move forward as a unified nation, ethnic inclusion must become a foundation of its democracy rather than a professed ideology in principle rather than practice. To this end, Rwanda must avoid the third-term syndrome that has gripped so many other African nations, which have quickly turned promising democracies into repressive authoritarian regimes.⁶⁶ The international community has immense leverage in terms of its foreign aid dollars to pressure the government into respecting its own democratic constitution and committing to the thus far empty promise of ethnic power-sharing. Rather than preparing troops for potential deployment after renewed ethnic violence already manifests, as was the UN's response to the recent crisis in Burundi, the international community has the opportunity to take a proactive approach to protecting the integrity of Rwandan democracy.

Potential Foreign Policy Responses

The most common response of the international community, which here refers to foreign governments and their bilateral aid agencies, INGOs, and multilateral organizations, in such cases of human rights abuses, civil liberties repression, and erosion of democracy as those occurring in Rwanda under the Kagame regime are economic sanctions, conditional aid, or formal denouncements. Despite the prevalence of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool to pressure reform, there is little evidence that this is an effective method. Multiple cross-national studies have found that not only do generalized sanctions fail to achieve their stated objectives in up to 95 percent of cases, but also that they often increase political repression and human rights abuses by the state as a means of quelling political dissent in the face of declining economic conditions.⁶⁷ Broad economic sanctions tend to be particularly ineffective when triggered by concerns over human rights abuses, as they are often motivated by the vague goal of improving overall human rights conditions without a clear plan for reform.⁶⁸ The historical evidence therefore suggests that this tact would be not only ineffective in creating the desired

changes, but also harmful for Rwandan citizens, as the Kagame regime would likely only increase human rights abuses and political repression.

While there is moderate evidence that more targeted sanctions, such as partial foreign aid cutoffs, result in fewer negative consequences for the population, they are only marginally more effective in achieving their desired outcomes than broad sanctions.⁶⁹ In Libya, for instance, targeted sanctions succeeded in convincing the Khaddafi government to stop state sponsorship of terrorist groups and later to reduce weapons development programs without a concomitant increase in human rights violations; however, these targeted sanctions were combined with other diplomacy and policy tools, and may not have been effective on their own.⁷⁰ In contrast, targeted sanctions against the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe initiated by the US and EU in 2002 due to the clear erosion of democracy and fraudulent elections are widely considered to have failed.⁷¹ The effectiveness of targeted sanctions in inducing democratization is highly dependent upon the nature of the regime and the state's recent economic conditions.⁷² Though some critics argue that sustained foreign aid helped support brutal dictatorships in the former Zaire, similarly high levels of aid did not have the same impact in Benin, which despite receiving substantial foreign aid for over three decades underwent multiple regime changes.⁷³ In fact, out of the thirty-one African countries, including Rwanda, which received more than 10 percent of their GNP from foreign aid between 1990-1997, those that experienced substantial decreases in foreign aid were no more likely to democratize than those that did not.⁷⁴ Therefore, while targeted sanctions might not lead to the same decline in human rights conditions as broad sanctions, they are also unlikely to effectively induce democratization.

Conditional aid, which typically mandates economic or democratic reform as a condition for continued assistance, though often more effective in initiating democratic changes has a similarly worrisome record in regard to increasing political repression and ethnic violence. For example, in 1991, a consortium of international donors responded to Daniel Arap Moi's widespread repression of the political opposition in Kenya by suspending one billion annual foreign aid dollars stipulating aid would only be resumed under the condition of political and economic reforms. As a country heavily reliant upon foreign aid, the Moi government was forced to adopt such changes, though the result was a period of state-sponsored violence aimed at intimidating and eliminating political opposition disguised as ethnic violence, which killed over 1,500 people and displaced 300,000.⁷⁵ During the same time period in Rwanda, the IMF and World Bank with the ardent backing of the United States attempted to ease ethnic tensions and conflict by threatening to cease foreign aid unless the Habyarimana regime allowed for a multi-party government.⁷⁶ In practice, however, this period of rapid, forced democratization reinforced ethnic and regional identities creating greater factionalism and institutionalizing anti-Tutsi sentiment.⁷⁷ Though foreign donor-led democratization pressure through conditional aid suspension succeeded in Malawi during the same time period without similar levels of violence, it was unique in so far as the army tacitly supported the opposition and therefore limited Hastings Banda's capacity for state violence.⁷⁸ Based on this record, using conditional aid to impose immediate democratic reform in Rwanda would be unwise. Though the Kagame government is so reliant on foreign aid that it would likely be effective in forcing political

reform, it is probable that ethnic tensions would sharply increase creating an even greater likelihood of renewed violence.

If widespread economic sanctions and forced democratization both risk exacerbating human rights conditions and increasing political repression in Rwanda, then formal denouncements are the most viable remaining foreign policy tool. Though evidence on the efficacy of formal denouncements is mixed, there is potential for this approach to be utilized effectively in the case of Rwanda. While it may be argued that formal denouncements are purely symbolic and lack any real impact, they are often the push necessary to induce individual donor organizations to advocate for change, to embolden political opposition organizing within the denounced state, and to shame image-conscious leaders into reform. Additionally, formal public denouncements by respected organizations such as the UN, IMF, and World Bank, as well as renowned INGOs effectively challenge the image of Paul Kagame and his RPF government as the “benevolent leadership” that it so ardently strives to maintain.⁷⁹ Kagame’s care in crafting his image as the savior of Rwanda and of his regime as the enlightened rulers ushering the nation into a new future, is evidence that his image matters both domestically and internationally. His outrage and indignation at criticism from home and abroad further indicate how important this image is to maintaining his power. In this regard, the more foreign governments, INGOs, and multilateral agencies that formally and publicly denounce the practices of the Kagame government, in particular his decision to run for a third term, the greater the impact will be on weakening his stranglehold of Rwanda.

In addition, such formal public denouncements actually create leverage for individual foreign donors, INGOs, and governments to respond to the Kagame government’s abuses of power by reducing their levels of support, advocating for changes in governance, or asserting the need for greater autonomy over the implementation of their aid programs on a case by case basis. A study of public resolutions issued by the UNCHR criticizing certain states based on their human rights records found that such denouncements significantly reduced subsequent multilateral aid commitments.⁸⁰ This shows, that public denouncements serve as signals to other donors, which may inspire them to alter their aid relationships with the Rwandan government. In particular, foreign aid agencies can advocate for less state control over how donor dollars are spent, they can utilize aid dollars for direct services to the Rwandan people, especially disenfranchised Hutu groups, rather than giving discretionary spending privileges to the Kagame government, and they can funnel aid money toward democracy assistance. A study of 1,500 organizations receiving democracy assistance between 2008-2010 found that these programs can be highly effective in creating a viable political opposition, but that “donors—especially bilateral aid agencies—need to be willing to take more risks to support challenging groups in civil society rather than caving in to pressure from the host state.”⁸¹ In Rwanda, any efforts to support democratization and empower political opposition groups must be combined with peace-building and reconciliation efforts with an eye toward minimizing ethnic factionalization and fostering genuine post-genocide healing. However, formal public denouncements are an important first step to create the kind of leverage necessary for foreign

donors and aid agencies to regain autonomy over aid programs and implement the kind of efforts needed to create a viable democratic environment.

Regardless of the approach of individual aid agencies or foreign governments decide to adopt, the time for action in Rwanda is now. As Matthew Winters points out, donors hold a huge amount of leverage over recipient countries and need to be more willing to utilize this leverage to hold countries accountable to democratic principles and international human rights standards.⁸² The painful lessons of Rwanda's past, and the recent events in Burundi, should serve as a reminder that intervention is a poor substitute for prevention. Both France and Belgium continued supporting the Habyarimana regime even in the face of mounting ethnic tensions and a prolonged erosion of democracy. Their support of Habyarimana despite such warning signs contributed to the tragic events of 1994. In fact, Belgium offered a formal apology to the Rwandan government in 1997 for its role in contributing to the genocide.⁸³ Even the UN was censured for not doing more to prevent the outbreak of violence. As an official independent inquiry concluded, the UN "should support efforts to rebuild Rwandan society after the genocide, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, reconciliation and respect for human rights."⁸⁴ By blindly continuing to support Kagame and his regime, the UN is currently failing in this effort, and if it truly strives to help heal Rwandan society, must publicly denounce Paul Kagame's decision to run for a third term and his regime's practices of ethnic exclusion and political repression. If the international community fails to act, fails to censure the Kagame government and reconsider the nature of current aid programs, the political, social, and economic disparities growing along ethnic lines will only continue to deepen, and like Burundi the risk of renewed ethnic violence will continue to approach its breaking point.

Conclusion

Rwanda's past is inescapable. The brutality of 1994 left an indelible mark on the collective conscience of the international community, and even twenty years after the conflict it remains a subject of pivotal importance. No one can or should deny the violence and devastation that swept through this land of a thousand hills, or the anger, pain, and resentment felt by those who lost loved ones in the chaos that nearly tore this nation asunder. While this past may hang like a dark shadow over an otherwise vibrant and beautiful country, it need not define Rwanda in perpetuity. However, when fear of the past is cultivated instead of hope for the future, and the narrative of genocide is exploited by those who seek to consolidate power and silence opposition through ethnic shaming, the past continues to cast its long shadow. When this tragic history is used as an excuse for further injustices within the country or for further inaction on the part of the international community, rather than as an opportunity to confront the painful but necessary work of true reconciliation and healing, the horrors of the past are allowed to rule. Proper respect must be given to the conflict and its resultant tragedies, proper justice and healing sought for those guilty and those who suffered, but the people of Rwanda and the international community should not be held hostage by the memories of the past, or we risk blindly following the same path that led to such disastrous consequences for humanity in the first place.

If the international community is willing to take a hard look at a difficult past, and acknowledge its own failures in 1994 and the years preceding the outbreak of ethnic violence, there is potential to change the future course of Rwanda. Rather than allowing the past to keep the world in fear, or letting Paul Kagame and his government bully the international community into accepting his account of history, there is an opportunity to learn from it. In this regard, caution must be taken when deciding how to place pressure upon the Rwandan government. As history has shown, forcing an abrupt and artificial democratization may not be the answer, and may in fact cause more harm than good. However, letting an increasingly authoritarian leader sustain himself off of donor dollars used to maintain his own position of power at the expense of a repressed majority is also clearly not the answer. As the recent outbreak of violence and the resultant refugee crisis in Burundi demonstrates, the dangers of allowing Kagame to proceed in seeking a third term completely unchecked have potentially disastrous consequences.

Therefore, the 2017 presidential election marks an exceptional opportunity for the international community to assert its democratic values and define the limits of acceptable aid. Each donor organization and country may have to decide for themselves how best to approach the issue of continued support to Paul Kagame's government, but the responsibility for the outcomes of his regime is certainly shared by those that continue to enable him despite the mounting warning signs. While the past may be inescapable, the future need not be so. This is a chance for intervention, to ensure the continued stability and true lasting peace in Rwanda through reconciliation and democratic power-sharing, but the opportunity for this future must be taken, lest a fear of history compels its repetition.

Notes

- 1 *The Guardian* 2016.
- 2 Human Rights Watch 2016.
- 3 Lemarchand 1998, p. 6-7.
- 4 See for instance, Lemarchand 1998; Jefremovas; Uvin 2001; Kamola 2007; Reyntjens 2011.
- 5 Umutesi 2006, p. 165.
- 6 Ansoms 2009, p. 293.
- 7 Jefremovas 1997, p. 97.
- 8 Olusanya 2013, pp. 850-51.
- 9 Kirsche 2000, p. 239.
- 10 Uvin 1999, p. 260.
- 11 Des Forges 1999, p. 54.
- 12 Davenport 2007, p. 181.
- 13 Reyntjens 2013, p. 101.
- 14 Silvia-Leander 2008, p. 1607.
- 15 Umutesi 2006, p. 158.

- 16 Amnesty International 1997.
- 17 Lemarchand 1998, p. 8.
- 18 Uwizeyimana 2014, p. 2374.
- 19 Umutesi 2006, p. 169.
- 20 Uwizeyimana 2014, p. 2374.
- 21 Marijnen and van der Lijn 2012, p. 16.
- 22 Pflanz 2010, p. 30.
- 23 Uwizeyimana 2014, p. 2373.
- 24 Thomson 2011, p. 442.
- 25 US Embassy Kigali 2008.
- 26 Reyntjens 2013, p. 20.
- 27 US Embassy Kigali 2008.
- 28 White 2009, p. 471.
- 29 Naftalin 2011, p. 23.
- 30 Ansoms 2009, pp. 294-95.
- 31 Silvia-Leander 2008, p. 1609.
- 32 Glover 2010, p. 98.
- 33 Ingelaere 2010, p. 50.
- 34 Marijnen and van der Lijn 2012, p. 15.
- 35 Umutesi 2006, p. 163.
- 36 Marijnen and van der Lijn 2012, p. 18.
- 37 Ingelaere 2010, p. 48.
- 38 Marijnen and van der Lijn 2012, p. 18.
- 39 Silvia-Leander 2008, p. 1608.
- 40 Pflanz 2010, p. 30.
- 41 Santoro 2015.
- 42 Human Rights Watch 2014.
- 43 World Bank 2015.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 McDoom, 2013.
- 46 Republic of Rwanda 2015, p. 13.
- 47 Ahmed 2012.
- 48 Egoroy, et al. 2009.
- 49 Green 2011, p. 428.
- 50 Ansoms 2009, p. 296.
- 51 See for instance, Somers and Uvin 2011; Ansoms 2008; Desrosiers & Thomson 2011.
- 52 Naftalin 2011, p. 23.
- 53 White 2009, p. 475-6.
- 54 Uvin 1999, pp. 253-71.
- 55 Nyseth Brehm 2014, p. 338.

- 56 Davenport 2007, p. 183.
- 57 Umutesi 2006, p. 158.
- 58 Buckley-Zistel 2006, p. 142.
- 59 Waters 2003, p. 68.
- 60 Weber 1946, pp. 187-90.
- 61 Fearon and Laitin 2000, p. 853.
- 62 Silvia-Leander 2008, p. 1616.
- 63 Kay 2013, pp. 21-2.
- 64 Buckley-Zistel 2006, p. 147.
- 65 Silvia-Leander 2008, p. 1610.
- 66 Lumumba-Kasongo 2007, p. 132.
- 67 Wood 2008; Peksen 2009.
- 68 Kim 2009, p. 40.
- 69 Drezner 2011.
- 70 Ibid., p. 103.
- 71 Grebe 2010.
- 72 Wright 2009.
- 73 Ibid., p. 568.
- 74 Goldsmith 2001.
- 75 Roessler 2005, pp. 213-14.
- 76 Anderson 2000, p. 448.
- 77 Silvia-Leander 2008, p. 1605.
- 78 Roessler 2005, p. 220-22.
- 79 Desrosiers and Thomson 2011.
- 80 Lebovic and Voeten 2009.
- 81 Diamond 2015, pp. 440-41.
- 82 Winters 2010, p. 224.
- 83 Kerstens 2008, p. 194.
- 84 Feyter 2005, p. 327.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Rich, Undisciplined, and Poetic: A New Writing of the Colonial Past

FLORENCE BERNAULT

Nancy Hunt. 2016. *A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies and Reverie in Colonial Congo*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 376 pp.

Nancy Hunt's new book, *A Nervous State*, is a rich and undisciplined history of the colonial past in the Belgian Congo. The title itself does intrigue: next to the familiar angle of colonialism and violence, appears the uncharted terrain of *reveries* and *remedies*. Indeed, the reader who thinks he or she has read everything on Congo's violent history, its world-famous scandals and cosmopolitan heroes, and even the strange experiments with African fertility detailed in Hunt's first book, *A Colonial Lexicon*, will be guided here into a very different arrangement of stories. *A Nervous State* approaches the brutalized province of Equateur by refusing the obvious: it eschews the spectacle of torture and the fracas of destruction, sidestepping the wide-open trails burnt by exploitation and revolt. Instead, the book trusts more humble senses, like touching and hearing; it asks us to slow our pace, and move up marshes and hidden groves, looking for obscure healers and modest distractions. So *A Nervous State* [hereinafter *ANS*] brings us close to very small movements and diminutive stories: white hens and trembling trees, a female healer, a suicidal officer with a musical band, a detainee in a penal colony, an arrogant black nurse, some doctors and a shaking machine meant to unblock women's ovaries.

The book follows a classic chronological arc. Organized in six chapters, it starts with the violence of the Free State (1890s-1900s) and ends with the nervous hedonism of Congolese music in the 1950s. Although conventional, the structure helps to hold Hunt's treasure trove of stories and findings together. Each chapter unfolds around a critical juncture, an event that allows the contemporary reader to get a "feel" for the mood and energy of the period, and to get closer to the persons who lived, moved, clashed, healed and killed in the Equateur province.

This review essay focuses on three themes. Firstly, it looks at the ways in which Hunt uses the notion of *milieu* to construct her historical object. She wants to understand how people can live and heal in a milieu "shrunk" by colonialism. *ANS*

Florence Bernault, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison specializes in West and Equatorial African History and Contemporary Africa. Among her works are *Ruptures postcoloniales* (2010), *A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa* (2003), and the co-edited issue (85.3) of *Africa, Journal of the International African Institute* (2015) that focuses on "Histories of Violence in Africa."

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i1a6.pdf>

thus chronicles disasters and their aftermath; the “post” of colonial devastations. The review will then move into Hunt’s unique building of sources and what we can learn from her. Finally, it reflects on how *ANS* contests and renews the writing the past, asking anew what it is that we do when we write African history.

A Unique Milieu

Nancy Hunt creates the subject of her study as a single reality, that she calls “milieu,” in French middle (*mi-*) and place (*lieu*). In English like in French, *milieu* applies to natural and social science. The concept came to biology by way of mechanics, but also by an effort to talk about the social (Balzac) and history (Taine). In the 1940s, philosopher Georges Canguilhem revisited the notion, associating it with health and pathology. In a seminal text, Canguilhem defined health as “a certain latitude, a certain play,” by contrast with pathology, characterized by “shrunk” possibilities.¹ Such metaphors of play, movement and space provide Hunt with a rich way of interpreting colonial devastations and African survival. With Canguilhem, Hunt switches loyalty within the field of French theory. In *A Colonial Lexicon*, her first book, Hunt had chosen Canguilhem’s student, Michel Foucault, over the master.² *ANS* does not mention the intellectual filiation between the two men, but turns solidly towards the older one. *A Colonial Lexicon* looked at how history imprinted bodies and words, and defined colonialism as a biopolitical regime. It is a history of deep effects and transformative processes in the body politic of the colony. As Juan Obarrio aptly noted in a recent roundtable, in *ANS* the subject of the study has no internal organs; it is all nerves, skin, and surface.³ Indeed, mindsets, escapes and surfaces take over central stage. Here Hunt writes how emotions, affects, and intellects shape institutional power, not the other way round. The double-entendre of the term “state,” in the book title, orients this very original reading of colonial encounters.

But Hunt’s book goes further than a clever use of Canguilhem’s notion. She insists on the rich layers contained in the word: a *milieu* can be alive or inert, it can mean an institution, a living organism, a certain environment, a certain place. For doctors and administrators, milieu meant a social and pathological terrain, a place to conduct experiment over native people and tropical environments. In the colonial experience of the Congolese, milieus were mostly familiar places undergoing tremendous constraints and intrusions. Yet, by opposition to a “grass-roots” narrative, milieu does not bring Hunt towards a grounded, meticulous mapping of earthly stories. We are not rooted; instead, the story moves through the past with *nimbleness* and at *mid-height*, among brushes and tree branches, with the particular horizontal scope of eyes, senses, and skin sensitivity.

In *ANS*, milieu also defines a certain “plane” where the historian can retrieve stories, like, perhaps, a lens that vibrates at the interface between the ripples of the past and a multiplicity of possible futures. For instance, she shows that Maria Nkoi, who started healing in 1915, lived in a world that while almost a generation removed from the abuses of the 1900s still reeked of them. Combining milieu with *latitude*, an ability to move or expand with no strict lines or direction, Hunt is better able to follow the many

strategies and healing movements that emerged in the province. By avoiding straightjacketing therapeutic insurgencies in pre-assigned patterns, inherited structures, or obvious course of action, Hunt uses *milieu* to insist on the surprising versatility, indeterminacy, and volatility of Congolese reactions to colonial attacks.

Thirdly, *ANS* embraces Congo—or rather, the region of Equateur—as one place and one moment, in which *milieu* could also mean common ground, or center. The colony, Hunt suggests, was full of racial boundaries, fragmentations, and conflicts. Yet the Congolese and the Belgians also experienced it as a contiguous and common *milieu*. To frame her approach, she uses the usual suspect, Georges Balandier and the idea of “colonial situation.”⁴ I see two predecessors for this theoretical effort: Max Gluckman and Michael Taussig. Anthropologist Max Gluckman wrote a famous essay on Zululand in 1940, in which described the events of a single day by taking society as a whole, whites and Africans, as belonging in a single context and terrain of experience.⁵ As Hunt explains in *ANS*, in the Congo, “nervousness was on all sides” (p. 13); it affected the Congolese, sometimes destroyed the life of colonialists, and ended up undermining the very texture of Belgian power in the Congo. Michael Taussig, another anthropologist, also theorized colonialism as a single unit of analysis in *Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man*, only briefly mentioned in *ANS*. Looking at Amazonia and the rubber exploitation of Indians by European agents, Taussig constructs three crucial notions: colonial places of terror as common “spaces of death,” where “epistemic murk” and “colonial mirroring” erased the boundaries between torturers and tortured.⁶ Taussig, moreover, pioneered the concept of “nervousness,” along with the strategy of finding historical evidence “mostly in stories.”⁷

By using *milieu* as an epistemic approach of colonial milieus beyond racial differences, Hunt makes the important claim that we have for far too long ranked evidence for African histories by racial provenance, a tactic she calls *misguided* (p. 29). This brings me to my next point, the ways in which Nancy Hunt constructs and works with her archive.

Archives and History as Poetic Imagination

Nancy Hunt’s main tactic with archives, we soon discover, is antagonistic, suspicious, and conflictual. Firstly, Hunt exercises the systematic art of “skirting” around canonical texts and tired sources. She uses Roger Casement’s report on Congo atrocities instead of of E. D. Morel’s pamphlets, and the journal of an agent of the ABIR Company, named Dhanis, instead of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*. Skirting around, avoiding, refusing and focusing on the margins, makes *ANS* a book filled with storied abundance, but also, sometimes, disjointed and redundant narratives. I’ll try here to defend and make sense of the methodological choice taken up by Hunt in *ANS*.

Looking for “a fresh re-reading” of the violence of the Free State, Hunt fights against what she calls the “tenacity of the visual” (pp. 28-29), the obvious and the spectacular. The first chapter of the book (“Registers of Violence”) is a wonderful illustration of the benefits of this approach. Turning away from Alice Harris’ photographs of maimed limbs, projected in magic-lantern shows in Europe and the US,

she asks us to turn to what the Congolese themselves, saw, heard and remembered at the time (p. 48). To do so, Hunt eschews the ethnocentric turn to the visual to *acoustics*. Listening to sounds, noises, and silences, she suggests, allow a different kind of intimacy with violence and a different kind of perception of what happened on the ground. Hunt asks that we train our senses to listen to silent fright and muffled cries, the faint echo of the unsayable, and also the anguish of laughter. Meanwhile, Hunt restores *invisibility* and the *unseen* as historical forces of resistance and avoidance. In chapter one again, the main actors are Congolese rebels and an *ikakota* charm for invisibility that they use to flee in the sanctuary of marshes and forests. Like her, in a way, they skirt around; avoiding the state and its violence, restoring health through invisibility and lightness. Through her preference for the non-systemic, and her effort to remain alert to dead ends and unexpected irruptions, Hunt refuses to capture the past in well-ordered sequences. Instead of patterns and causes, she plays with divergent stories, figments and fragments, and with incomplete echoes. The concepts of *therapeutic insurgencies* and *therapeutic rebels*, illustrate such an innovative understanding of Congolese initiatives after violence. Hunt beautifully brings back to life their reduced possibilities, their invisible resources and interrupted, fragile initiatives.

By shedding light on emotions, moods and feelings, she opens new avenues for inquiry in the colonial past. Part of her effort is to retrieve the most recalcitrant object of all: the inarticulate, the unconscious, and the irrational. Looking at the healing movement *Lianja* against barrenness for instance (pp. 120-15) Hunt recovers indigenous views of pregnancy as ludic, teasing, and droll, but also of terrors about cannibalism and transgressive fatherhood. In her chapter about “A Penal Colony, An Infertility Clinic,” she traces the reveries, resentment and ennui of a convict (pp. 167-75).

Hunt is not the first to walk down this lane, but she is one of the few to do so in Africa. *ANS*, however, offers little conversation with the literature that has reinvented the archival record to work with moods, sentiments and the unconscious. I am thinking of Jacqueline Rose’s seminal book *States of Fantasy*, on the constitutive role played by fantasy in institutional and interpersonal relations, and the importance of analytical categories such as loss, yearning, resistance, and “protective fictions.” Ann Stoler, a central author on colonial intimacy, sentiments and disquiet, is curiously absent from Hunt’s interpretative toolbox, although amply listed in the bibliography. Absent too is Julie Livingston’s recent book on a cancer ward in Botswana.⁸ Livingston conceptualizes healing, pain, and laughter as terrain for social and biomedical experiments, and rich archives for the historian and anthropologist.

I will now turn to my final point—the ways in which Nancy Hunt’s writing serves her effort to write the past in new ways. One of the book’s most satisfying achievements indeed is to tilt the gaze and change the way we try to tiptoe near the past. The question of feeling and mood brings me to the question of history—how to get it and how to write it—an effort that perhaps provides the most vivid and successful ambition of *ANS*. The repertoire of *figuration* is useful here (I borrow it from chapter 2, “Maria Nkoi,” that looks at a female healer in 1915). For Hunt the quest, it seems to me, is to *figure out* the past, its consequences, and its ghosts. And then, it is to set out and create a *figuration* of

this experience—in all its messiness and hidden order. *ANS*, therefore, opens a conversation with what she calls the “poetic imagination” of the people who lived in the Congo province of Equateur.

Again, Hunt’s tactic is fueled by defiance, opposition, and resistance. The first fence she chooses to stand on has to do with refusing to give in to canonical historical writing. “Sidestepping old lexical frays” (p. 246), she uses *nervousness* but not anxiety, *distraction and health*, but not resilience, *violence* but not trauma (and one has to be thankful here that she refuses to jump on the latest bandwagon—trauma studies—led by Departments of English and Comparative Literature). Hunt then exercises a dexterous and ironical art of crisscrossing vocabularies and social groups: colonials get “nervous,” they “daydream.” Congolese, she writes, have their own “experimentality” (*likili*), they also “profess” therapeutics. Between all these experiences, she shows, *junctions* and “bleeding in” make the most important processes of the period.

Finally, Nancy Hunt relies on poetic writing to meet with what she sees as “the poetic imagination” of her subjects. Her prose insists, indeed, on evoking rather than resolving, and on suggesting rather than laying out (and I was about to say: leaving for dead). I want to say how much this is a rare gem in English-speaking academia. *ANS* is a unique text that chooses to lose oneself (and the reader) in stories, in persons, in small events, in happenstance dreams. Such a style, Taussig reminds us, is very close to the art of healing itself: to seek intimacy with the real, it lies at the cornerstone of power and representation. Writing about colonialism and nervousness calls indeed for an understanding of the representation as contiguous with that being represented. Hunt’s prose, too, exercises a form of *poetic imagination*, along with what I would venture to call a kind of *com-passion*, going with, feeling like.

There is a lot of risk taking here: from the reader’s perspective, this is a book with much quicksand and many dead ends. Sometimes you go with the flow, and other times you get bored, stuck in details and a cacophony of facts. But if you’re patient and not faint at heart, a new, stunning map of Equateur rises from this rich text: a milieu full of shrunken hopes and broken promises, but also pregnant with wondrous possibilities.

Notes

1 Canguilhem 2008, p. 132.

2 Canguilhem’s analysis of scientific knowledge as historically constituted was instrumental to Foucault’s reflections. In 1961, Michel Foucault asked Canguilhem to be his principal mentor for his dissertation “Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique.” He later wrote the introduction to the English translation of Canguilhem’s main opus (1991).

3 Obarrio 2016.

4 Balandier 1951.

5 Gluckman 1940. The paper came also be to known as the “Bridge Paper.”

6 Taussig 1987.

7 Taussig 1992.

8 Livingston 2012.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mensah Adinkrah. 2015. *Witchcraft, Witches and Violence in Ghana*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 325 pp.

Mensah Adinkrah's *Witchcraft, Witches and Violence in Ghana* presents a critical observation and documentation of outrageous implications and atrocities due to witchcraft accusations that happen in Ghanaian society. The author mainly focuses on the Akan of southern Ghana, the country's largest ethnic. He was born and grew up in Ghana in the 1960s and 1970s and is a sociologist at Central Michigan University. Awarded a Fulbright Senior Scholars Fellowship to study female homicide victimization in Ghana, he elected to focus on studying witchcraft-associated "lethal and nonlethal violence." Adinkrah spent ten years as a sociology ethnographer in Ghana researching witchcraft. His experiences, including witnessing a courtroom witchcraft trial, have made him aware of the brutality of witchcraft accusations, imputation, and witch hunts.

The book has nine chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. In chapter one, the author attempts to present his research setting and the geographical, political, economic, education and literacy, and health histories of Ghana in relation to the status of women, children, the elderly, the disabled, religion, traditional religion, and witchcraft there. In chapter two, he extends the previous chapter by historically providing us with the understanding of witchcraft beliefs in Ghana. He discusses how witchcraft beliefs operate among Akans. Adinkrah uses other scholars in defining witchcraft among the Akan, which is consistent with other ethnic groups in Ghana as "Akans regard witchcraft as a form of mystical, supernatural, or spiritual power possessed and used consciously by some individuals, either to protect and promote the welfare of or to cause harm to unsuspecting members of the witch(e)s" (p. 56). This definition is generally similar across various African societies.

Adinkrah discusses "good" and "bad" witchcraft; the society they belong to, and how dreams, nightmares, and witchcraft are connected in some cases. He made an effort to provide information on food and witchcraft, witches' guilds and families, symptoms of bewitchment, as well as the modes of preserving, transmitting, and acquiring witchcraft. He expresses how gender is very crucial in witchcraft, accusation. In most of the places in Africa and across the world, females, especially elderly women, are the primary victims. Nowadays, children are branded as witches and victimized. In Ghana, females are generally regarded as having a weaker spirit; as a result, they are "more prone to be utilized by malevolent spirits for evil ends" (p. 74). The author indicates that it is believed that female witches are more active practitioners of witchcraft than their male counterparts. In Akan witchcraft discourse, witches are usually pictured as elderly people. Akan witch beliefs acknowledge that child witches exist as well.

Adinkrah also examines the socialization of witchcraft beliefs within the context of mass media in Ghanaian society. The manner of socialization into witchcraft ideology is usually subtle past conscious awareness. Some of the socialization processes include family, peer, the mass media, television and video, radio, the internet, religious sermons via media outlets,

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v17i1a7.pdf>

religious organizations and practitioners, popular music, children's literature, adult fiction, folk tales, and witchcraft trials and cases. The author articulates witchcraft themes in popular Ghanaian music, specifically in the genres of highlife, hiplife, and gospel music. He notes that the context analyses of song lyrics uncover usual Ghanaian beliefs regarding witches and witchcraft. Some of the music he points to are "Bayi Kwasea" by lyricist Emmanuel Amponsa, "Anadwo Bogya" by Joseph Mensah, and "Efie Mpo Ni" by Dr. Paa Bobo.

Adinkrah reminds us that paremiologists, sociocultural anthropologists, and other social scientists have recognized the pervasive existence of proverbial expressions in many languages across the globe, stressing their engrained use in some cultures as well as the social roles of proverbial assertions. He indicates that importance and the functions of proverbs in Africa in general. He supports his book by discussing witchcraft imagery in Akan proverbs and analyzing some Akan language proverbs within the context of witchcraft.

In terms of the significance of African proverbs, Adinkrah utilizes some of those in the Akan language that revolve around witchcraft to support the book's overall argument. Some of them are: "Witchcraft (*bayie*) befits the status of an elderly woman (*aberewa*) but a child (*akodaa*) may be the bad one (*nnye*)"; "Wrongdoing is like witchcraft; some form of it is found in every lineage"; "It is the foolish witch that is typically caught or apprehended by the witch fetish"; and "Only a witch knows a fellow witch." He explores the events of witch killing in contemporary Ghana, which he considers as the ultimate method of witchcraft persecution. Other supplementary information he uses is Ghanaian dailies and weeklies as well as Ghanaian internet sites such as Ghanawe.com, Myzongo.com, and Ghanatoday.com. He particularly pays attention to the collected data of persecutions that occurred in Ghana between 2004 and 2012, during which time Adinkrah made several travels to Ghana.

In the conclusion, Adinkrah reevaluates the whole issue and discusses witchcraft accusations and the health professions within the context of but not limited to the following: autopsies, illicit drugs, fatalities, spiritualities and their churches, mental health issues and witchcraft. The book is written to illuminate witchcraft ideology in Ghana and to enlighten its consequences, especially for victims who have been accused of practicing witchcraft.

Finally, Adinkrah reminds us that just like in many other societies, the Ghana case demonstrates how witchcraft ideology contributes to marginalizing some members of the societies who are already vulnerable and disenfranchised such as children, the elderly, women, the poor, and the disabled. He notes how NGOs are assisting the victims and creating more awareness of the victimization of those accused of practicing witchcraft, particularly children. Adinkrah laments how the well-liked witchcraft radio shows more and more feature children claiming on the air to be witches, recounting their mischief. Thus, he indicates that the Ghanaian government is currently in signatory partisanship with some international treaties in cubing the human rights issues of the victims. Even though I wish the author had dedicated a chapter on children accused of practicing witchcraft, I recommend this book, since he has a deep knowledge of the subject given that he grew up in Ghana, moved to the USA, and then went back several times to Ghana as he continued to do research for this book. All this gives him an insider and outsider status.

Uchenna Onuzulike, *James Madison University*

Akinyinka Akinyoade and Jan-Bart Gewald (eds.). 2015. *African Roads to Prosperity: People en Route to Socio-Cultural and Economic Transformations*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. 278 pp.

This edited volume of papers generated from a research project by the African Studies Center in Leiden, the Netherlands initiates an interesting discourse on what happens to African migrants in the spaces between where they initially call “home” and where they finally or temporarily decide is “home.” As such, the authors posit that places along the migration routes by African migrants on “the road to prosperity” are ripe for further research, compared to extensive studies already extant on sending and receiving zones for the migrants. Indeed, it is “to understand more of the histories and present day realities of the zones of transit, both from the sending and receiving perspectives” (p. 4). Habitable areas along these migration routes are termed as “zones,” where migrants may decide to terminate or pause their migration trajectories based on their expectations and experiences—comprising of contestations over space, identity, socioeconomic status, and relationships with others. Amisah Zenabu Bakuri examines current definitions and understandings of transit migration in academic literature, and how these concepts influenced self-perceptions of migrants about their experiences. Ton Dietz urges the study of these migrants, their trajectories and the support structures along those routes. The remaining chapters in this volume have been grouped into three sections: zones of transit, zones of transference and zones of transit and transference.

Zones of transit are regions (both inside and outside the continent) where African migrants paused, stopped, or continued along their road to prosperity. Social networks that either helped or hindered migrants were characteristic of these zones. Migration was in search of money and status, often inspired by others “in flashy suits and gorgeous trunk boxes packed with new cloths, imitation jewelry and the like” (p. 53) as described by Jan-Bart Gewald. Stymied by financial difficulties, state wars and ethnoreligious conflicts, the shame of being unable to “walk home majestically” because of financial failures trapped these migrants in these places away from “home.” Negotiating their new identities as “others” that belonged, tenuous relationships with relatives back home, familial and religious ties developed with indigenes, further discouraged them from permanently leaving.

Zones of transference are regions where transiting migrants from Africa experienced changes in their socioeconomic status. Rijk van Dijk argues that “In addition to the study of the ‘social life’ of geographical zones of transit, social spaces of transference also need to be taken into account as being junctures that make people shift from one social status into another” (p. 113). Some migrants experienced upward social mobility by marrying indigenes, while the indigenes escaped some of their cultural relational expectations in return. For others, social reinvention was unsuccessful, due to indigenes’ unwillingness to change their internal representations of the migrants as “other,” as well as the migrants choosing occupations and lifestyles that identified them as outsiders. Walter van Beek poignantly describes this experience in his narrative of the *rerher* caste as “inside-outsiders” among the Kapsiki of North Cameroon and northeastern Nigeria.

Zones of transit and transference explore how African migrants advantaged themselves of livelihood trends in the places they passed through. Their social networks in these zones provided insider knowledge of these trends, as well as financial, moral, and physical support to

them. Some opportunities blossomed into guaranteed means of earning a livelihood and became aspirational tools of transference from one social milieu or location to a higher/better one. However, inside knowledge of local economic trends did not always actually lead to prosperity. Their legal status (or lack thereof) often subjected them to abuse, exploitation and injustice, as well as burgeoning debt incurred while trying to survive. Nevertheless, working illegally with low pay in order to care for their families was preferable to many migrants than remaining in their home countries unemployed. Many travelled the road to prosperity entrepreneurially—as aptly illustrated by Meike de Goede report on what former president Mobutu told his own migrating people: “Débrouillez-vous (“Fend for yourself”)” (p. 270).

This volume is an easy read and partial snapshot focused on migrants from the western and southern parts of Africa, with opportunity for contributions from the other regions of the continent, as well as African migrant experiences on other continents (such as in Asia, where they do not share a common lingua franca). Collecting data from migrants anywhere can be very challenging, so clearly articulating and reinforcing what readers can do with the information is needed.

Tochi Brown Adimiche, *Kennesaw State University*

Iris Berger et al. (eds.). 2015. *African Asylum at a Crossroads: Activism, Expert Testimony, and Refugee Rights*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 272 pp.

This volume explores the role of expert witnesses in asylum hearings, and the increasing need for their assistance in refugee status determination. The book particularly examines African claims and counterclaims, and the different ways in which experts must inspect these narratives. The Forward sets the tone by linking the role of experts and the challenges they face from Western jurisprudent issues and norms. In the succeeding chapters, African scholars explore expert testimony from a variety of different disciplinary approaches.

The editors' introductory chapter provides a breakdown of the role and task of expert testimony. This is especially useful for those who have no prior knowledge about expertise in asylum courts. Not only must experts determine if an applicant's claims are accurate, but also if “applicants are fabricating their claims by framing them within their knowledge of specific country or regional conditions” (p. 13). As the rest of the book will show, one of the many trials that experts face is in regard to interpreting a rather large span of evidence in order to determine if the applicant will be in danger if he or she is repatriated. However, the main premise of the volume is that asylum is multidimensional and cannot be merely reduced to legal processes (p. 16).

As a result, the next ten chapters provide a unique multidisciplinary approach to expertise testimony. The authors come from an array of different backgrounds such as history, political science, anthropology, and law. Chapter one (Joanna T. Tague) is distinctive compared to the other chapters in the volume, because it examines a timeframe before the rise of expert witnesses. It provides a prehistory of refugee status determination in the African continent. The ordering of the rest of the chapters, however, is disconnected. Chapter two (Meredith Terretta) argues that fraudulent asylum claims should not be dismissed, but rather viewed “as transnational reformers of asylum protocols” (p. 70). Chapter three (Karen Musalo) jumps to

another topic, which looks at the development of the refugee definition in the United States, and how it impacts the use of experts. Chapter four (John Campbell) observes how adjudicators in British courts come to different conclusions on the same issues. The fifth chapter (E. Ann McDougall) examines the challenges of the use of metanarratives in cases. Chapter six (Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman) looks at how assumptions and prior knowledge about certain countries on behalf of immigration officials affect political asylum hearings. Chapter seven (Iris Berger) underscores the challenges that African cultural practices pose, and the importance of making sense of African narratives. Chapter eight (Katherine Luongo) highlights the issues that experts may face surrounding asylum claims based on cultural constructions, such as on the grounds of witchcraft. Chapter nine (Charlotte Walker-Said) focuses on the complications arising from African sexual minorities and their discourses, which often do not adhere to American concepts relating to sexual minorities. Chapter ten (Tricia Redeker Hepner) acknowledges that the role and knowledge of researchers can routinely complicate asylum processes. The book concludes with an afterword (Fallou Ngom), which explains language analyses on behalf of experts, both in terms of translation issues and body language, which are rooted by cultural norms. While it is apparent that most of the chapters have explicit themes (for example, credibility and fraudulence, and problems of narration), the chapters are not divided by sections, and lack thematic organization overall. Like most African books on asylum, the chapters are compiled with different abbreviations. While the book does contain an index, some abbreviations are not properly defined (such as FRELIMO). A table of cases would have also been useful, particularly for those in the legal fields.

In general, expert testimony is often overlooked in asylum literature. Part of the volume's distinctive approach to asylum studies regards how different disciplines have a hand in expert witness testimony. Although the book is beneficial to those with an interest in African studies, it is also helpful to scholars or individuals who are drawn to asylum research in general, as many of the volume's general topics branch out to other regions of the world. For example, Musalo's chapter on what constitutes a refugee under the jurisprudence of the United States is also a challenge that many countries face. Similarly, asylum as a "political issue" not only affects developed nations, but those in the developing world as well. One of the pivotal components of the book is that it leaves many questions unanswered, thus fostering further debate on the issues.

Elizabeth Juhasz, *The University of New Orleans*

John Collins. 2015. *Fela: Kalakuta Notes*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. 344 pp.

Fela Anikulapo-Kuti (1938-1997)—the iconic Nigerian performer and outspoken political maverick—may not be Africa's best-known musician, but he is the most written-about. Since Carlos Moore published the first biography of Fela in 1982, dozens of publications have chronicled his personal and professional life, analyzed his music, and examined his sociopolitical influence.¹ Like Moore, many authors portray him in a hagiographic manner, flaunting that which made him famous not infamous, innovative rather than delusional, and anti-establishment instead of authoritarian. Unsurprisingly, then, much existing scholarship

pays limited attention to Fela's enigmatic nature, contradictory impulses, and controversial reputation.²

In the deft hands of John Collins, a Ghana-based musician, record producer, archivist, and scholar, we get fresh insights into Fela's complexities and idiosyncrasies. *Fela: Kalakuta Notes* is not a comprehensive biography nor conventional academic treatise. Rather, it is a rich collection of Collins' own reminiscences, diary entries, and interviews with musicians, promoters, and associates (principally Ghanaians) who worked with Fela in the zenith of his career. Offering first-hand accounts from the late 1960s until the 1990s, rare photographs, and valuable information about West Africa's wider popular musical landscape, this an intricate, but highly-accessible, examination of the afrobeat superstar. Rather than presenting his reader with a specific conclusion about Fela, his musicianship, or his legacy, Collins delivers a diverse, and at times incongruous, set of perspectives, which demonstrate just how difficult it is to arrive at one. The result is a wonderfully informative, engaging, and thought provoking read.

Fela: Kalakuta Notes consists of nineteen chapters divided into three main parts. Part One: "Early Days" contains four chapters detailing Fela's life and music until 1972. The first provides a concise overview of his time in London, early years with Koola Lobitos, and his creation of afrobeat. The remaining three detail Fela's time in Ghana and his relationship with two of its most prolific highlife musicians, Joe Mensah and Stan Plange. These chapters place Fela within a Ghanaian-Nigerian musical landscape that was remarkably vibrant, unapologetically cosmopolitan, and deeply intimate. Importantly, they frame his budding stardom not simply as a byproduct of his own talent and hard work, but of wider cultural currents that future studies would do well to further investigate.

Part Two: "Confrontation" consists of five chapters dedicated to the mid-1970s: a period in which Fela focused much of his artistic effort towards critiquing the Nigerian government. Chapter 5 is a journalistic account Collins compiled after witnessing police raid Fela's home in November 1974. This first-hand glimpse is complemented by Chapter Six's interview with "J.B." Daniel Koranteng, a musician who left Fela's band after its conclusion. The next two chapters detail the creation and demise of Fela's self-financed film project, "The Black President." Collins, who was cast as a British colonial education officer, kept a rather detailed month-long diary about its filming, the entirety of which appears as Chapter 7. This chapter—the book's best—is a remarkable foray into Fela's personality, events at his home (then dubbed the "Kalakuta Republic"), and escalating tensions with Nigerian authorities. Chapter 8 provides different viewpoints on the infamous military raid that destroyed Kalakuta in February 1977 (as well as the film's soundtrack and footage), while Chapter 9 outlines Fela's later years (1981-1997) by way of additional interviews and commentaries.

The third and final part, "Retrospect", is the most wide-ranging, of the book. Instead of directly building upon or engaging one another, its ten chapters feature interviews with some of Fela's band members (chapters 10-12), promoters (chapter 13), and musical contemporaries (chapter 16) as well as Fela himself (chapter 17). Others (chapters 14 and 15) feature detailed analyses of his music, while the final two (chapters 18 and 19) address his legacy, afrobeat's current prospects and offshoots, and the rise of "Felabratations" and other commemorative efforts. The book concludes with several valuable appendices, including a chronology of Fela's

life, a detailed bibliography, a comprehensive discography compiled by Ronnie Graham, and a full transcribed score of “Shuffering and Shmiling”.

All told, Collins has compiled an authoritative, raw, and multidimensional portrait of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti. It stands among the best books about the iconic musician and warrants the attention of anyone eager to appreciate his prolific and provocative career.

Notes

1. Carlos Moore, 1982. *Fela, Fela: This Bitch of a Life*. London: Allison and Busby.
2. The two most notable exceptions are Michael E. Veal, 2000. *Fela : The Life & Times of an African Musical Icon* Philadelphia : Temple University Press; and Tejumola Olaniyan, 2004. *Arrest the Music!: Fela and His Rebel Art and Politics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Nate Plageman, Wake Forest University

Dominica Dipio. 2014. *Gender Terrains in African Cinema*. Pretoria: UNISA Press. 227 pp.

African cinema is gradually garnering increasing attention in the history of world cinemas. Seen predominantly as a postcolonial art form, it is nonetheless an invaluable instrument for education on the continent. Gender has also become a hot topic in African literary circles as scholars and students alike continually interrogate the role and presence of both men and women in literary works. It is therefore a welcome surprise to see the analysis of gender being carried out in the films produced on the continent. Dominica Dipio’s work is very significant in that it sets the pace in showing the different ways gender issues are reflected in the films produced in Africa. Dipio’s text analyses how the cinema and the filmmaker interrogate gender issues and the representations of women in African communities. She looks at the girl child, the young woman, and the elderly woman, and their male counterparts.

The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter one, which serves as the introduction, describes the theoretical underpinnings of the work examining the various approaches and voices in African filmmaking. Dipio limits her selection to only male directors since she considers them representative of African filmmaking, and the films for the study are those that have been to world cinema festivals. She also delimits her choice to films from West and East Africa, and privileges francophone sub-Saharan Africa as being “canonical” in filmmaking. Chapter two discusses the image of the young girl in African cinema. Gender roles and boundaries are at once challenged and blurred in the representations of the young girl in African films. She is seen as a source of hope for a better tomorrow, often inviting the adults to reexamine their conception of gender and societal restrictions.

Chapter three focuses on young women. These are women actively breaking the chains of traditional restrictions and moving away from oppressive traditions. The young woman has to carve a niche for herself and define her space in the predominantly patriarchal space she inhabits. She is the most active in the fight against oppressive systems, sometimes aided by her male counterpart. Unlike the child in the previous chapter whose “look” and “voice” invite the audience to ponder on issues, the young woman “acts.” The films, set in the 1990s and 2000s,

have more instances of young women contesting gender oppression without facing death or banishment.

Chapter four shows the presence of the older generation of women in the films. These are older women and grandmothers who are the embodiment of the traditional values of the community and are often seen as the transmitters of knowledge. However, in the films selected for the study, elderly women are also seen contesting oppressive patriarchal structures in the community. There are images of the older woman who resists change and the one who welcomes it.

Chapter five, the last chapter and the conclusion, indicates the recurrent trends in gender representation in African cinema. One thing that becomes clear from the analysis of the films is that there is no monolithic image of the African woman. She is as diverse as her continent. There are women who resist the status quo and those who do not. There are women who bravely face the repercussions of their acts of rebellion and others who fail to do so. Themes reflected in the films revolve around marriage, childbirth, excision, and other domestic issues. There are instances of other issues that are outside the domestic sphere and affect a much larger portion of the population. In many of these instances, gender issues are subsumed into class and race arguments.

One area in which the text could have done justice to the representations of gender would have been to focus on both genders, female and male, equally. Although the work indicated that the male counterparts would be discussed, it is seen that more space is given to the female than the male. Secondly, inasmuch as there is a dearth of African female filmmakers, the inclusion of the few that exist would have enhanced the richness of the analysis and given a broad picture of the representations of gender in the films. The selection of only male directors as being representative of African filmmaking may have affected the findings of the research. The above notwithstanding, *Gender Terrains in African Cinema* is a book every scholar of gender in Africa should have and read.

Theresah P. Ennin, *University of Cape Coast*

Kristin Conner Doughty. 2016. *Remediation in Rwanda: Grassroots Legal Forums*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 283 pp.

Kristin Conner Doughty's ethnography-based research studies how Rwandans negotiated the mixture of harmony and punishment in grassroots courts ostensibly intended to rebuild the social fabric following the 1994 genocide. Adding to contemporary anthropological research on Rwanda, the book brilliantly and strongly chronicles how Rwandan authorities in the post-genocide era established new local courts presumably modeled on traditional dispute resolution practices as part of a wider national policy of harmony and reconciliation. It demonstrates that the three legal forums in Rwanda, namely genocide courts (*inkiko gacaca*), mediation committees (*comite y'abunzi*), and a legal aid clinic, though not identical, totally underscored mediation based on principles of conciliation and unity, mediated by third parties with the power to direct punishment. Doughty thoughtfully validates how appeals to unity in legal forums functioned as a form of cultural control, although people variably rebuilt moral community and considered different futures through discussions there. Examining a wide-

range of disputes, Doughty links the weighty disputes about genocide to the ordinary conflicts people underwent living in the post-genocide period. The book goes beyond just national reconstruction to include a wider account of how the acceptance of law, principally in post-conflict settings, impacts people's lives. It exposes that although law-based mediation is delineated as benign and is usually defensible as a wholesome form of culturally rooted dispute resolution, both by Rwanda's national government and others worldwide, and in the transitional justice crusade more generally, its execution encompasses coercion and associated resistance. Thus far in grassroots legal forums that are profoundly contextualized, law-based mediation may be able to uncover spaces in which people navigate the micro-politics of reconciliation.

Remediation in Rwanda consists of six chapters, besides an introduction and conclusion. The introduction presents the main argument of the book and that it is a product of qualitative research methodology, specifically ethnography. Its fieldwork was done in two specific field sites in the South Province, namely Ndora and Nyanza, and for wider context purposes, in Kigali. Chapters 1 and 2 give the context and outline, denoting a prelude to the ethnographic argument in the chapters that follow. In chapter 1, it is clear that the production of history and politics of memory in post-genocide Rwanda demonstrates that the government's version of history, which dominates, is meant to justify belonging and current power arrangements, networks, and marginalization. Its omissions are intended to dishonor the international community (because of its failure to prevent the genocide), stress national instead of regional dynamics, and conceal divisions rendering thinkable the employment of grassroots harmony models and mass trials for genocide criminalities. Chapter 2 places the post-genocide legal forums in historical context and demonstrates that present trends toward legal forums and inequality in law have reverberations in Rwanda's past.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively deliberate on how Rwandans maneuvered in the architecture of social rebuilding of *gacaca* courts, *comite ya'bunzi*, and the legal aid clinic. Each chapter explores how people experienced mediation efforts coupled with punishment across these diverse forums. Chapter 6 examines the mediators (*inyangamugayo*, *abunzi*, and legal aid clinic staff) at the center of the legal forums and demonstrates that they (particularly the *inyangamugayo* and *abunzi*) acted as intermediaries between trained government agents and their fellow citizens. Doughty asserts that this was a form of government through community because of its emphasis on harmony notwithstanding state power being improvised and non-monolithic (p. 194). The conclusion offers three suggestive cautions vital for transitional justice and peace-building practices: to renounce the pursuit for a wholesome cultural solution; recognize that although coercion and instrumentality may be amplified by legal forums they are not exclusively produced by them; and to recognize that reconciliation processes may undeniably be intrinsically violent and fraught.

Doughty should be congratulated for vividly producing a book on Rwanda's post-genocide peace rebuilding experience, which in her own words "tells a story tightly linked to a particular time period, even as I make claims that may extend beyond it" (p. 34). Her cautiousness in analysis should be applauded because throughout the text she guarded against overstating certainty on intricate situations where even Rwandans themselves felt irresolute. *Remediation in Rwanda* is relevant both as an academic analysis and fairly comprehensive and instructive for

policymakers. Indeed, the “book raises complex questions about why, when, and how people advocate for and against unity, and what, ultimately, is at stake in the debate over the legitimacy of mediation principles” (p. 27). Nonetheless, the largely brilliant work has been slightly diluted by Doughty’s style of writing that entailed some repetition (p. 96) and eliding of the question of measuring the *inyangamugayo* and *abunzi*’s fairness versus corruption (p. 219). Perhaps, she saw the latter as irrelevant for the purposes of her book (decentralization, legal processes and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda), however, it is.

Enock Ndawana, *University of Zimbabwe*

Amina Elbendary. 2015. *Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protest in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 276 pp.

Elbendary’s examination of the late Mameluke period in Egypt and Syria (15th and early 16th centuries CE) arose from discussions in her family in which elders remarked that the civil unrest and civil wars marking the Arab nations (“The Arab Spring”) which have been in-progress since December 2010 are not really something new, since Arab historians recorded significant incidents of civil unrest in the last century of Mameluke rule (concluding with the Ottoman conquest of 1517 CE). Elbendary then proceeded to examine macro-trends evident in the extant historical sources by such writers and chronographers as Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Maqrizi, Badr al-Din al-Ayni and others. To state the conclusion first: what emerges from Elbendary’s examination is the fact that the Arab Spring still seems new; the commoners in Damascus, Cairo and Alexandria in the 15th and early 16th centuries were rebelling against specific economic decrees and transgressions, not seeking to overturn the sultanate. Nevertheless, something was going on during the 15th century; social change was taking place. Despite there being no “Pre-Spring”, Elbendary’s work is still useful as she demonstrates that during the late Mameluke period new forms of historiography and literature emerged, non-elites became more educated and in many cases (also facilitated by population loss owing to eruptions of the plague) assumed official positions, autobiographical elements emerged in writing, and as a result of outside pressure structural economic change was unavoidable.

The use of familiar western terms and periodization is a problem in the text which Elbendary acknowledges immediately, and with cause. In the context of the Arab Middle East, “medieval” times would probably extend from the conquest of Roman (i.e. Eastern Roman) Egypt (642 CE) to the arrival of Napoleon (1798 CE). Because this nomenclature derives from study of European history, it seems awkward to superimpose it on North Africa and Western Asia, but since the Egyptian and Arab historians have reached no alternate consensus, one might as well continue using “medieval”. More vexing is use of the phrase “the bourgeois trend”, used to examine the broadening of historical writing to include events initiated by commoners, proto-autobiographical writings, and the concurrent diffusion of Mameluke power to include native-born officials, official positions which could be purchased by commoners, and so on. Since here the term bourgeois is not anchored in a Marxist or any other hard definition, it might have been best to dispense with the word altogether. The diffusion or unraveling of

Mameluke power in the 15th and early 16th centuries was real, so there is no reason to feel discomfort with Elbendary's alternate phrasing, as in "a discernable rise of the middling class", or she could have said "an embryonic middle class was emerging – ", etc.

The late Mameluke regime had to deal with population loss owing to outbreaks of the plague, dwindling revenue as the spice trade shifted to the trans-African route, and outside pressure from the Venetians, at the apogee of their power, and from the Ottomans, soon to be at the apogee of their power under the reign of Sulayman the Magnificent (1520-1566 CE). The Mamelukes were ill-equipped to respond to any of these challenges, much less all of them at once.

The key passages of the book are the seventy-odd examples (there is some repetition) the author provides from the historians detailing recall of officials, riots, usually brief clashes with Mameluke troops, protests among urban masses, and interaction and collusion between the merchant class, commoners, the learned *ulama* (religious scholars) and Sufi *tariqa* or sects. In many of these cases (but not all of them) officials were recalled and laws rescinded in response to popular pressure. There is a discernable growth of what today we would call "public opinion" and a rising conviction that the people had the right to express it – though not without risk.

Elbendary speculates that many of these trends would have continued during the Ottoman period (i.e. after 1517 CE) and that future research would do well to turn to that time-frame, but I wonder if it would not be more likely that imposition of rule from Constantinople actually nipped several of these trends in the bud. In other words, stronger non-elite formations might have started to emerge, something like a middle class would have solidified, but the arrival of the janissaries brought all that to a halt. That discussion must await the fruits of further research. I rather wish Elbendary had given us a complete translation of one of the historians, such as al-Maqrizi, but that would have been an entirely different project.

Kenneth W. Meyer, *Western Washington University*

Stephen Ellis. 2016. *This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organised Crime*. New York: Oxford University Press. 313 pp.

Ellis's *The Present Dark* shares critically with Frank Peretti's *The Present Darkness* in that the two books possibly derived their inspiration from the same source – Ephesians 6:12 – which gives an impression that both have theological or spiritual connotation. Although Peretti's book is a Christian fiction with a dualist foreground, which raises theological questions and a slide from acceptance of personal responsibility for sins committed, there is a modicum of thought that justifies the title, *The Present Darkness*, which gives a ray of hope that there is light at the end of the tunnel. Such theological hope is absent in Ellis's conclusion, suggesting that even though organized crime is not a Nigerian culture, there is no end in sight as it is amenable to new global developments. Ellis's clinical dissection of crime in Nigeria, presented with an avalanche of verifiable references cannot be said to be new nor does it claim to be all-inclusive and conclusive as his closing question indicates. But it offers a perspective that calls for critical reflection for a country said to be famous globally for the wrong reasons. That organized crime

is rampant in Nigeria and that it has international connections cannot be denied but it also speaks of the global nature of crime.

Although Ellis has investigated the history of crime from pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Nigeria and judged Nigerians to be squarely responsible for the negative attention and consequences crime has brought to their country, this does not represent the whole truth. Ellis deliberately selected and analyzed his data in such a way as to pitch the whole blame on Nigeria: he exonerated the colonialists from any crime of disruption of flourishing systems and dehumanization of their operators, even though it may be argued as he does that the past should not be the reason for the global aspect of Nigerian organized crime. "It would be ludicrous to blame today's organized crime on Lugard. He cannot possibly have foreseen the distant consequences of decisions he took a century ago" (p. 225). This further exposes the self-serving nature of colonialism. Harold Smith's confession is also quintessential: whereas Ellis dismissed it, he accepted the confessions of Nigerians who admitted to have committed crimes as evidence. This stereotype is evident in the book. Organized crime and criminals peppered with greed succeed in the calculus of supply and demand, which of course has to countenance risks and consequences. In a crime situation, criminals explore and exploit weaknesses in systems and where there seems to be none, create one in order to succeed. This is one take away, not only for the weak system in Nigeria as Ellis demonstrably showed but more crucially for the strong ones, which are victims of Nigerian organised crimes.

The spiritualization of crime is not only a Nigerian phenomenon; it is a global one which depends upon such factors as the level of secularism and media attention. As Ellis pointed out, the spirit world plays important roles in the lives of Nigerians prior to the advent of colonialists who did not understand its place in the people's existential situation. This explains why laws were and are still unable to root it out. The complexity, as Ellis noticed lies in the fact that there are two active "republics" in Nigeria, and the spiritual one has continued to influence the secular in the running of government and private businesses. The omnipotence of the spiritual argument has been shown to be a weak thesis because Christianity and Islam, which have preached against traditional religion, have also contributed to the "omnipresence" of corruption in many ways. "Christians and Islamic reformists have tended to demonise older concepts of the spirit world.... Nigerians nowadays experience greater difficulties than they once did in engaging with the spirit world and domesticating the spirits they believe to reside there" (p. 208).

With meticulous research, Ellis boldly associated particular crimes with regions—tribalization of crime—in Nigeria. Interestingly, only two individuals, Nuhu Ribadu and Dora Akunyili, one from the North and the other from the South, one male and the other female, are the only "saints" in a country of about 180 million people. Beyond these saints, Ellis inherently agreed that "a corrupt person or system can fight aspects of corruption if it has the powers to do so." This is depicted in Nigerian governments' attempts to fight crimes and corruption whether among the military or civilian leaders.

Apart from a few errors such as "Benin State" (p. 103), which should be Bendel State, "Lagos University" (p. 106), which should be University of Lagos, "House of Representatives" (p. 115), which should be House of Assembly, etc. the book is inveterately challenging to the

generations of Nigeria, whose task is to war against crime and corruption starting from their hearts.

Benson Ohihon Igboin, *Adekunle Ajasin University*

Randall Fegley. 2016. *A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma: The Mythmakers' Victims*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 169 pp.

Identity is an instrumental tool in the mechanisms of state formation and governance. For many nations, divisions within the national identity, whether based on religion, race, or family origins, lead to some sort of conflict. Rwanda provides an extreme case when national identity is used for political, economic and hateful reasons to perhaps the worst category of conflict, genocide. Within one hundred days between eight hundred thousand to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were butchered by their Hutu neighbors between April and July 1994. While the exact reasons behind what initiated the genocide are debated, a greater discussion is occurring for Rwandan genocide perpetrators, survivors, and the new youth generation is on how ethnic-based identities were crafted. The Rwandan government of President Paul Kagame orchestrate the understanding how ethnic identities began with German colonization and were cemented by the creation of ethnic identity cards by Belgium colonial officials in order to divide and rule over the small central African colony. Prior to colonisation, differences amongst the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa groups were based on socio-economic status rather than physical ethnic differences. Within the academic community there is a divide regarding the formation of ethnic identities. While some agree with the current government's view of history, others greatly disagree, citing that ethnic identities were crafted long before colonial rule. Fegley attempts to add to the scholarly literature by examining the aggregate Rwandan history to address the formation of ethnic identities. Additionally, the author examines how current Rwanda understands its history in terms of national unity and justice after the 1994 genocide.

The relatively short book consists of five main chapters addressing various historical and present topics in Rwanda's understanding of its identity and can be easily divided into two main categories. The first is on the historical role of ethnic identities before, during, and after the colonial period. This period includes the 1959 Hutu Revolution, 1962 Independence, First and Second Republic under President Gregoire Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana respectively, the genocide, and the rebuilding process since under the control of Kagame. The second section examines how the crafting and education of historic and current identities effects current understandings of what it means to be "Rwandan." This includes an understanding of the origins of Rwanda with the core focus on ethnic divisions. Fegley examines the grappling of this subject mostly in the various methods of reconciliation, justice, and education. The role of education to craft the new "Rwandan" identity provides the greatest amount of analysis and previously unpublished research. History education plays an important role, but teaching history is complicated as students, teachers, and parents all experienced the genocide. While some fear a possible repetition of the genocide, others such as teachers are nervous about being accused of denying the genocide when teaching Rwandan history and identity.

Any material on the origins of Rwandan identities must contain a strong level of information, analysis, and argument as the subject is controversial in Rwanda as well as within

the scholarly community. The quantity of information given in Fegley's new book is able to be both extensive as well as accessible. The organization of the various historical periods, events and people fosters an easy understanding of details and the possible consequences they have on how Rwandans view identity, whether in terms of socio-economic, royalty, ethnic, or the current nationalism. Various academic materials used throughout this book bolster its ability to inform and not be categorized as either "for" or "against" a specific interpretation of Rwandan history and identity. However, the level of analysis is not new as much of the book reads like a literature review of the debate rather than trying to help argue a specific interpretation of Rwandan identity. This lack of a new or fresh argument might stem from the relatively weak new information on the subject. While the author writes how he conducted fieldwork within Rwanda for this book, not enough of those experiences or data are used. Its attempt to use Stephen Karpman's Drama Triangle to help illustrate the complexities of the relationships within Rwanda's genocide perpetrator, survivor and bystander categories is only discussed during the last few pages of the book. More could have been done to analyze the mythologies of conflict. Additionally, more is needed on how the average Rwandans view the complexities in the nation's struggle to properly identify itself.

Jonathan Beloff, *SOAS University of London*

Edda Fields-Black. 2015. *Deep Roots: Rice Farmers in West Africa and the African Diaspora*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 277 pp.

Part history, anthropology, linguistics, and travelogue, Fields-Black's study of rice cultivation in West Africa is as fertile as the paddies cultivated during her fieldwork. This excellent interdisciplinary research study contains personal asides that make relatable the centuries-old, arduous labor processes. *Deep Roots* is essential for understanding West Africa over the past three millennia. The book also gives perspective on the Atlantic slave trade, with specific attention to rice production in the Sea Islands of South Carolina and Georgia.

First published in 2008, *Deep Roots* now appears in paperback. The study, built upon decade-long research, explores the Rio Nunez region, where coastal peoples "were overwhelmingly 'stateless' or lacking in centralized political authority" (p. 5). Europeans largely bypassed this stateless area for commercial centers elsewhere along the coast; they thus left few written records before the 1700s. Traders preferred the stability and ease of commerce within cities possessing centralized political authority. Yet the rice produced in the Rio Nunez area became key to feeding the slaves and traders in those commercial outposts.

Fields-Black traces the "antiquity of coastal dwellers' agricultural technology" through the clever use of "historical linguistics" (p. 8). Her astute dissection of linguistic patterns and vocabulary reconstructs the settlement and development of pre-colonial West Africa. She also identifies eighteen distinct microenvironments and eleven ways to irrigate rice fields. These microenvironments required specific agricultural knowledge, specialized vocabulary, and unique tools, such as the fulcrum shovel. Reclaiming land from mangrove forests while discovering the means of leaching salinity from rich coastal soils, a process of five to seven years for fresh fields, took precise knowledge. Recognizing the speculative nature of linguistic evolution and glottochronology, Fields-Black braces her claims with archeological evidence.

Rice was first domesticated in the inland Niger Delta of present-day Mali between 300BCE – 300CE. Fields-Black tracks the "deep roots—African roots—of adaptation, innovation, and technology" that popularized rice (p. 50). She argues that floodplain and mangrove rice farming was "developed by Nalu-, Mbulungish-, and Sitem-speakers who themselves have deep roots on the coast, not by Susu-speaking migrants from the interior" (p. 52). The "highly specialized and intensely localized" knowledge necessary to manage coastal fields and their salinity could only be learned through centuries of practice (p. 53). Linguistic evidence suggests that early coastal inhabitants first mastered farming in sandy areas populated by white mangroves, with vocabulary about farming in brackish areas populated by more salt-tolerant red mangroves arising after 1000CE. "Proto-Highlands-speakers" who gave rise to "daughter speech communities—Sitem-, Mandori, Kakissa-, Koba-, and Kalum-speakers"—migrated to the coast soon afterwards, likely due to a long dry period from 1100 to 1500 (p. 80). This pressured Highland-speakers to develop trading relationships stretching into the savanna and sahel regions as well as to incorporate more wild and domesticated animals into their land-use practices. Their subsequent "strategies for managing the forest-savanna environment planted the seeds for coastal dwellers' indigenous agricultural revolution" (p. 92). The "Rio Nunez first-comers and newcomers collaborated" in birthing rice agriculture in the region (p. 116).

Fields-Black acknowledges that many "pieces of the puzzle are missing," but her study is a landmark in the field of West African history (p. 118). Her book gives perspective to pre-colonial Africa and to how centuries-old agricultural practices were intensified as the slave trade gave rise to coastal urban centers with large numbers of "nonproducing consumers" hungry for rice, a calorific and highly storable commodity (p. 163). Further, a significant percentage of slaves from the Rice Coast were taken to the Sea Islands of Georgia and South Carolina, where they likely contributed to the success of American rice plantations. Fields-Black emphasizes that these "enslaved laborers were skilled, not merely brute, laborers" though planters rarely acknowledged this fact as it "would have undermined the ideology that justified" enslavement (p. 186). Yet, both the African Rice Coast and American Sea Islands "occupied the periphery of the periphery" in regard to major centers of the slave trade (p. 185).

Linguistic charts, photographs of remarkably unchanged agricultural practices, and engaging maps shore up the analysis. *Deep Roots* is a convincing corrective, showing how the African Diaspora involved both inheritances from the Old World and innovations in the New World. Appreciating pre-colonial African history and innovation nourishes a broader understanding of black societies throughout the Atlantic world.

Anthony J. Stanonis, *Queen's University Belfast*

Benjamin Gardener. 2016. *Selling the Serengeti: The Cultural Politics of Safari Tourism*. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press. 256 pp.

This book explores the linkages and disconnections between local, regional, national and global influences on the politics of rural resource use and conservation. It uses the Maasai ethnic group of Northeastern Tanzania and tourism activities to demonstrate adaptation and change of perceptions and meanings of the physical, social, and cultural spaces of the Serengeti landscape and ecosystem. The author argues that both local and wider influences on the Serengeti

ecosystem and landscapes are outcomes of negotiated processes involving policy changes, global tourist and conservation interests, and Maasai agency. It adds a significant contribution to understanding local adaptations towards fragile politico-environmental spheres in Tanzania. Most importantly, the book takes a further step from previous publications about Maasai in Tanzania to show that the Maasai did not always remain passive to changes affecting their interactions with natural resources. Rather, they used tourism opportunities to redefine meanings and values of their landscapes to make sense of the wider influences on their culture, society, economy, environment, and generally the rural livelihoods in Loliondo. The book has come at an opportune time, a time that is characterized by a scholarly trend that reconsiders the role of local knowledge, agency, and participation in resource's ownership, use, and management. The book takes further the discussions on the environmental degradation narratives that have over the past two to three decades occupied the work of historians, human geographers, and social anthropologists.

Gardener cross-examines how imposed perceptions towards environmental and resource conservation, protection, and use collided with local perceptions. Towards the end of the book, he manages to show that local environmental constructions and use was considerate of various factors and maintained an ecosystem that allowed both wildlife and human activities like domestic livestock to take place. This was revealed by the failure of newly introduced "Ranching Associations" scheme under the auspices of modernization of traditional Maasai pastoralism. The author shows that the conflict of interest between the projects under the scheme and the members who joined them ended in total failure after pastoralists thought it worthless in terms of the effort they were investing.

If anything is to be highly acknowledged in this book it is the choice of the title and the way the title is reflected in the main text. It clearly captures the whole story in the book. This is done in two ways. Firstly, the author provides the dynamics of pastoral-tourism land uses and cross-examines state and private investments in the Serengeti ecosystem as key factors for the social, economic, and environmental changes in the ecosystem. The common narrative maintained in this discussion is characterized by antagonistic representations of the Maasai and pro-Maasai NGOs on one side and the government and private investments on the other side. Secondly, the author's prose is clear, direct, and to the point. He avoids technical language and advanced analysis of the issues he engages in to allow a wider audience to understand his line of argument. In this way, the book provides a nice descriptive rather than an analytical history about the politics entangled in resource use in Africa by using the Serengeti ecosystem as a case study. It stands to be a good addition to literature on African resource use that is relevant not only to human geographers but also environmental historians, social anthropologists, and all the people interested in the politics of safari and cultural tourism. *Selling the Serengeti* carries two imagery interpretations in the text. The descriptions about the Maasai of Loliondo, their culture, and their interaction with their surrounding environments are informative for people planning tourist itineraries to Tanzania. The descriptions included some very small and common things to the eyes of the local people and also they contained lots of the author's self-misreading of the Maasai and their landscapes. On the other hand, selling the Serengeti carries an imagery of alienation and deprivation of resource use by the local people in favor of money generated through tourism activities and trophy hunting paid by foreign companies that have

invested in the area. The second imagery though not new in the discourses of pastoral-tourism and pastoral-conservation relationships stands nicely to represent the title of the book.

One of the weaknesses of the book that will make it fail the pressure of time is its methodological orientation. The author at some point wished to apply an interdisciplinary approach but in the end he did not manage to do so. The histories of Maasai in East Africa and that of the Serengeti in particular have had bitter interactions with the state since the colonial period. I think the historical aspect of the discussion in the book would benefit greatly by applying historical methods such as archival and documentary reviews. The use of historical works by other scholars though enriching the book limited the scope of interpretation and possible conclusions to be made. It resulted in the author making similar observations and conclusions to previous studies in the area and hence limiting the production of new knowledge. The use of archival sources would benefit the book even more than the consultative reports and media coverage that have been used in the book.

Maxmillian J. Chuhila, *University of Dar es Salaam*

Anthea Garman. 2015. *Antjie Krog and the Post-Apartheid Public Sphere: Speaking Poetry to Power*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 224 pp.

In the early years of South African democracy the African National Congress (ANC) understood the importance of a vibrant and inclusive public sphere where the diverse opinions of the people could be heard. At the present there is much socio-political unrest and the function of the public sphere is keenly felt. Anthea Garman's timely monograph, developing from her interest in media and citizenship, examines the construction of the South African post-apartheid public sphere through a prominent intellectual — Antjie Krog.

An associate professor in the school of Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes University, Garman argues convincingly that the genesis and trajectory of Krog's career as poet, political activist, journalist, translator, and writer provides insight into how the public sphere in South Africa is constructed and contested. Garman uses Krog as a "proxy or 'trope'" (p. xiv) for someone who embodies the potential of democracy and the promise of the public sphere. This focalization inhibits the critical analysis of the public sphere. However, the strength of Garman's study is the bifurcated investigation of Krog's poetic subjectivity and her accumulation of capital across literary, journalistic, and political fields. Garman uses Pierre Bourdieu's field theory in service of her shrewd and thorough investigation of Krog's accumulation of field capital. This is all done, Garman asserts, "in order to unpick how the platform to speak in public is created and crafted" (p. 3).

Carolyn Hamilton's description of the South African public and her emphasis on "active public citizenship" (p. 5) informs Garman's assessment of Krog as an intellectual deeply invested in the health of public conversation in South Africa. Chapter one describes the construction of this public sphere, and chapter two offers a short biography and resume of Krog's achievements and awards. Chapter three details Krog's emergence onto the literary scene, when at the age of seventeen her anti-racist poem "My Mooi Land" was published in the school newspaper to much local and national furor. With the groundwork laid in the early stages of the book, chapter four engages with the shifting and ambiguous

subjectivity performed in Krog's poetry and how her teaching in Kroonstad led to her further involvement with the ANC in exile. Using Dorothy Driver's term "self-othering" Garman reflects on Krog's political and poetic subjectivity. Chapter five narrates Krog's entry into the field of journalism and how her reporting on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission facilitated her accumulation of journalistic capital, which extended internationally with the publication of *Country of My Skull* (a hybrid work of creative non-fiction based on her experience of covering the TRC). Using the frameworks of self-othering and second person performance, chapters four and five begin to address the affecting relationship between ethics and aesthetics in Krog's work: how Krog is able to speak against the atrocities of apartheid and its continuing legacies of racism and structural inequality, and still imagine for her audience the possibility of ethical citizenship.

Consequently in chapter six Garman contends that in addition to being an "important writer" and "public figure" (p. 145) Krog is a public intellectual who challenges the limitations of the term and seeks to actively address them. In her final chapter the author credits the role of the literary in the creation of the public and its capacity "to generate mass subjectivity and to mediate between past and future" (p. 165). Thus, reformulating Said's famous phrase, Garman proposes that Krog "speaks poetry to power" (p. 175): employing the literary and the poetic in order to address and contest the structures of oppression which continue to marginalize the black majority in South Africa. Krog, Garman asserts, "models for her public the self-fashioning of a listening, self-reflexive and ethical 'second-person position' in relation to the world's marginalized now making claims for recognition and speaking positions" (p. 167).

Krog is a public intellectual who thinks critically about how we might be ethically involved in societies defined by alterity and inequality. Garman's study chimes with the challenging optimism of Krog's oeuvre. Garman's book opens up further discussion of Krog's assumed audience, the variation of "publics" her writing imagines, and what the limitations of Krog's authority might be. She has two further chapters on Krog in Andries Visagie and Judith Lütge Coullie's edited collection *Antjie Krog: An Ethics of Body and Otherness*.

Rebekah Cumpsty, *University of York*

Ch. Didier Gondola. 2016. *Tropical Cowboys: Westerns, Violence, and Masculinity in Kinshasa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 352 pp.

Didier Gondola's new book is a fascinating exploration of changing performances of masculinity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is not only a very valuable contribution to understanding gender in Central African history, but a major contribution to the study of masculinity and cultural appropriation, particularly in colonial contexts. In the 1950s and early 1960s, young men formed gangs in the capital city of Kinshasa. These groups developed their own slang version of the Lingala language drawn from US films and different Congolese languages. They wore cowboy hats, celebrated fighting, strengthened themselves through rituals that sometimes included swallowing glass and bullets, and became a target of outrage from colonial authorities and a source of concern from missionaries.

One of the most valuable aspects of *Tropical Cowboys* is Gondola's commitment to developing a genealogy of configurations of masculinity from the late 19th century to the present

in Kinshasa. Traders in and around Kinshasa competed with each other for access to foreign goods, slaves, and connections in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As Leopold II's independent state of the Congo seized control over Kinshasa, his government followed by direct Belgian rule after 1908 sought to remake the small city. Gondola analyzes how racist paternalism and growing demands for male African migrant labor into the city created a volatile situation by the 1920s and 1930s. Ironically, missionary efforts to promote cultural activities to tame the threat of angry Congolese men introduced Kinshasa audiences to US cowboy films.

By the 1950s, youth subcultures emerged in Kinshasa that celebrate access to occult power, promiscuity, strength, and avoiding the burden of regular employment. Gondola's examination of bodybuilding and spiritual tests designed to psychologically strengthen individuals in the 1950s (pp. 98-105) is just one example of his fascinating use of multiple oral, written, and visual sources. These practices were designed to impress men and women alike of an individual gang member's prowess. Young men in gangs also simultaneously claimed to be the defenders of women in their families and communities even as they also celebrated sexual violence. Just as dictator Mobutu Sese Seko presented himself as both a dangerous threat and a supposed protector of the Congolese people, so Kinshasa gang members did the same. Some women joined gangs and even gained notoriety as leaders, in part to protect themselves in the dangerous streets of Kinshasa.

Chapter 7 features a Belgian priest who made the gangs his main audience for evangelization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Just as Gondola denotes varied experiences among gang members, he also shows how individual missionaries could act in unexpected ways. Father Buffalo, as he liked to be known, learned to speak the argot of the gangs, smoked marijuana, and promoted a new understanding of Jesus as a young tough model to follow. Although one wishes Gondola might have gone a bit further in comparing this missionary's efforts to remake youth along with the rise of "youth" rebel militias in the early 1960s, the author's sensitivity to the changing political dynamics at independence demonstrate how gangs had to adjust to a drastically different political environment in the 1960s.

Just as Gondola had prepared an early history of performed masculinities dating back before colonial rule, he also turns his attention to the legacy of the mid-20th century gangs later on. Donat Mahele, a legend in Kinshasa for his willingness to maintain order as Mobutu's regime collapsed, is a fitting figure to conclude the book. A product of the tough Kinshasa streets documented by Gondola in the 1950s and 1960s, Mahele lived up to the code of toughness and bravery of his youth four decades later, even as he grew rich from robbing businesses in the twilight of Mobutu's rule. Mahele tried to negotiate a peaceful surrender by the few army units still loyal to the dictator as Rwandan and Congolese rebel forces had reached Kinshasa in 1997. However, some mutineers killed Mahele after he recklessly tried to maintain order despite knowing Mobutu was finished as the ruler. Gondola's genealogical approach allows the reader to see how early histories of violence, masculinity, and power set the foundation for Mahele's final stand.

This book would be quite effective for upper division undergraduate and graduate courses on gender, masculinity, and African social history. The heavy use of excerpts of oral accounts in Lingala and English is extremely valuable for the classroom. The author situates his own

methods in finding informants and conducting interviews very well. This book offers well-crafted examples for students to discuss the methods and challenges of oral history. In short, Gondola's book sets the bar high for historical research on gender in Africa as a whole.

Jeremy Rich, *Marywood University*

Shannen L. Hill. 2015. *Biko's Ghost: The Iconography of Black Consciousness*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 394 pp.

Shannen Hill's *Biko's Ghost: The Iconography of Black Consciousness* is a well-substantiated critique of narratives that allege that the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was "intellectual(ly) not practical and therefore unsustainable" (pp. 138-39). Using an interdisciplinary lens and drawing on a comprehensive collection of archival materials from her fieldwork in South Africa, Hill uncovers the ways in which Biko's legacy and ideology have impacted liberation movements and discussions surrounding race in South Africa and globally in a far-reaching manner. Although Stephen Biko's slogans and quotes remain banned in South Africa, Hill argues, "Many individuals and organisations relayed the enormous role played by Biko and the BC mantra through visual culture" (p. 274). Biko's undeniable influence on South African politics and visual arts is extensively discussed in the last two chapters.

Hill reveals the political-legal framework of race-based disenfranchisement of Blacks, depicted through binary terms such as "non-white/non-European" under The Population Registration Act of 1950. This binary framework seeped into all aspects of people's lives such as education type, residential location, health facilities, freedom of movement, as well as who could or could not vote. Beyond political and ideological differences, the resistance movement also became divided along racial lines, giving birth to parties such as the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, and the South African Congress of Democrats for whites.

Through "the portraiture vehicle" (p. 47) readers also journey through the formation of resistance movements such as the 1912 African National Congress (ANC), its Youth League (YL) in 1944, and the 1959 breakaway of that YL to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). According to Hill, significant political and philosophical differences existed between the parent ANC and the PAC, including the PAC's militant rejection of the ANC's "pleading" stance; as well, the PAC felt the African realities in the party's decisions were under-represented.¹

In 1960 the PAC embarked on the Defiance Campaign against the Pass Laws, marching to Langa and Sharpeville police stations. Shockingly, the apartheid government responded with the fatal shooting of sixty-nine people. Today, this massacre is commemorated as Sharpeville Day. Both the ANC and PAC were banned with some members subsequently incarcerated at the infamous Robben Island. Resistance was then elevated to a "Liberation War" that continued from countries outside South Africa.

In the late 1960's resistance resurged inside South Africa resulting in the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) under Steve Biko and other founding members. The new resistance chapter reflected the tri-continental solidarity with Black Consciousness as seen in America and other countries under the banner of "I am Black and I am Proud" versus the binary terminology of non-white or non-European. Hill's iconographies reflect the BCM's

reality-based dialectical response to apartheid through student organizations such as the South African Student Organisation (SASO) for university students and others.

The chapter "Of Icons and Inquest" is a blood-soaked record of the apartheid government's extrajudicial brutality captured by Colonel Goosen's response to QC Kentridge's question of what statutes guided them in their work as Security Police. Goosen's shocking reply was: "We did not work under statutes" (p. 70). This chapter illustrates the brutality and torture that many anti-apartheid activists like Biko had to undergo. Despite overwhelming evidence of his capture and torture by state police, at the end of Biko autopsy hearings, Magistrate Marthinus Prins announced that: "The available evidence does not prove that the death was brought about by any act or omission involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person" (p. 82). George Bizos, a human rights lawyer and a member of the Biko family legal team, expressed everyone's disbelief and outrage in his book *No One to Blame?*²

The traction of the BC message is reflected in the chapter "Creating A Culture of Resistance" where Hill highlights the irony of the ANC, UDM, and MDM. On one hand, they tried to undermine the relevance of BC, but at the same time they strategically appropriated the BC language to maintain their own political importance. The chapter "Silencing The Censors" could best be titled "The Silencing of the Silencers" because it exposes the ANC's misinformation that the BC was neither known nor sustainable. Attended by over 20,000 people, including officials from embassies of thirteen nations, Biko's funeral on its own illustrates the absurdity of the ANC statement that the BC was not known. Also, that the BC emancipatory modality continues to live can be seen in South Africa's 2015-2016 nationwide university student protests under various grievance-representative hash tags such as #Rhodes-Must-Fall, Fees-Must-Fall and others (#RMF).³ The protests crossed political affiliations uniting students against the post-colonial systemic lack of affirmative equity at universities.

To conclude, Shannen Hill's book is effective as a critique of the way that the ANC defaces the BC from the political landscape. Some political analysts from the Africanist school of thought, such as Liepollo Lebohang Pheko, reiterate Hill's concern regarding the re-engineering of South Africa's resistance history by the "airbrushing of political players who are not ANC" and moving them "from their ideological centre to a place that allows everyone to own them and their legacy, even those whose ideology and practice are diametrically different from theirs."⁴

Notes

1 Motsoko Pheko. 1972. *Apartheid: The Story of The Dispossessed People* (London: Marram Books): 85.

2 George Bizos. 1999. *No One To Blame? In Pursuit Of Justice In South Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip Publishers.

3 <http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/rhodes-must-fall-the-movement-after-the-statue/>.

4 Liepollo Lebohang Pheko. 2010. South African Civil Society Information Service <http://sacsis.org.za/s>

S. Nombuso Dlamini, York University /Thato Bereng, Independent Consultant, Canada

James A. Joseph. 2015. *Saved for a Purpose: A Journey from Private Virtues to Public Values*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 299 pp.

In many parts of Africa, truth is wrapped in a story. Listeners (or readers) are expected to find it for themselves. Joseph's *Saved for a Purpose* has this tension between straight autobiography and a treatise on public values. The preface outlines the book contents and goals. The prologue explains the title—*Saved for a Purpose*—stating that he survived a plane that went down in 1978 in Micronesia.

The first section entitled “The 1950s: The Genesis of Moral Consciousness” describes Joseph's origins in Louisiana and formative college years. He states, “It was at the feet of my father that I learned the importance of the microethics that build character, but it was at Southern (University) that I learned to appreciate the macroethics that build community” (p. 37).

The second section, “The 1960s: Applying Values to Social Movements,” covers Joseph's time at Yale Divinity school where he realizes that he will not be a pastor like his father. He writes, “I still felt a call to ministry, but now I saw the world as my parish and the call of the Old Testament prophets for social justice as my primary message and mission” (p. 47). In 1966, he took his first trip to Africa, specifically to Jamasi, Ghana where he gained perspective. “Africa was now on our radar screen in a very special way and we all became strong supporters of the idea of immersing oneself in a foreign culture in order to better understand ourselves and our world” (p. 80).

Section Three reveals Joseph's putting in to practice his theories and beliefs throughout the 1970s and 1980s in various arenas including business, higher education, and non-profit organizations. A major decision faced concerned how his company should respond to Apartheid in South Africa. He traveled there and met with many leaders on all sides. “South Africa was now in my blood” (p. 125). He shares his conviction that “Civil society has a purposeful result: to change the power relationships in society in ways that allow justice and equality to flourish” (p. 173).

In the fourth section, Joseph writes of his years as ambassador of the United States to South Africa and lessons he learned from Nelson Mandela in the 1990s. He felt that the example set by the new government would be helpful to the United States. Reconciliation he discovered is individual, communal, spiritual, and political. “What happened in South Africa, what remains with me as a prevailing insight, is that the healing of a nation requires an active process, not just some dramatic event...” (p. 192). Joseph described Mandela “as a diplomat he had no permanent friends or enemies, only friends and those with the potential for becoming friends” (215). Mandela's “belief that people can be lifted to their better selves ... was the secret to his ability to connect with other people, even his adversaries” (p. 230).

Section Five describes Joseph's continuing work nationally and globally, including the founding of the United States – Southern Africa Center for Leadership and Public Values. “We defined leadership as a way of being with four elements: emotional, social, moral, and spiritual intelligence” (p. 252). Joseph responds to *The Book of Virtues* by William J. Bennett. As the subtitle of his book - *A Journey from Private Virtues to Public Values* – indicates, Joseph feels that private virtues need to be applied to public ventures. He lists ten critical public values: empathy, compassion, altruism, justice, trust, tolerance, respect, freedom, equality, and

reconciliation. The epilogue contains this compelling quote: “I discovered along the way that the most effective critic is likely to be the one who is willing to be a servant and the most effective servant is likely to be the one who is willing to be a critic. I continue to be both” (p. 284).

This book is well-written for a broad informed readership. Jargon is minimal. However, a few editing issues remain. To avoid confusion between South Africa and Africa in Section 4 requires close reading. Also some repetition of quotes and near word-for-word sections appear as he reflects on earlier days. *Saved for a Purpose* is recommended, especially for those studying leadership. From reflections on his own leadership and that of other business people, politicians, and volunteers, Joseph concludes: “The capacity to cultivate hope may be the ultimate requirement of effective leadership” (p. 263).

Amy Crofford, *Africa Nazarene University*

Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P. Rotich (eds.). 2016. *Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 277 pp.

As Kenya, like a few other African states, passes the half-century mark of its political independence, this book represents a bold attempt at taking stock of the past, and carefully offering insightful lessons for post-colonial Kenya. The editors of this sensibly themed volume provide the historical context through five well-selected chapters, preceding another set of five well researched chapters that offer reviews of the political landscape, characterized by policy challenges and powerful political personalities. Attempting to pivot away from what may be perceived as a litany of failures and false starts of the Kenyan polity, the editors frame this book as “not a lamentation about squandered or lost opportunities but rather... an opportunity to reflect on the Kenyan postcolonial journey” (15).

The collection of chapters in part one begins with the rise and fall of federalism in independent Kenya. Maxon, the chapter’s author traces the sophisticated return to federalism (*majimbo*) through the contours of party polarization and ethnicity to a rule-based constitutional fundamentalism with devolution of power at its core. The historical discourse continues with connection to a recent court case that exonerated victims of the Mau Mau rebellion, along with an informative debate on the nuanced arguments for reparations. Koster fleshed out the key factors that led to the review of abuses toward victims of the Mau Mau struggle by intelligently recasting and grafting the familiar story of victimization on the frame of globalization of human rights. From the global to local, the editors follow with Weitzberg’s chapter, which focuses on what was deemed as the *Shiftya* rebellion, which was the confrontation between the Kenyan state and the Pan-Somali irredentist movement in the 1960s. The chapter succinctly conjures the noticeable challenge of arbitrary territoriality, and nationalist fervor, which have been convoluted by recent incursions by insurgents like Al Shabaab on Kenya’s northern frontier. Segal-Klein’s contribution in chapter four reinforces discussions in the preceding chapter using the case of Rendille pastoralists. Common to chapters three and four is the crux of building an inclusive postcolonial state, devoid of the exclusionism of varied identities and economies – a perennial challenge for most post-colonial African states. Part one ends with a chapter that

seems thematically displaced and alone in this part of the volume, but functionally, a good transition to the book's second part, which explores policies and politics. Otenyo's historical account of trade unionism and workers rights is skillfully interwoven with the use and abuse of political power, especially under the Moi administration.

After a stroll through intense historical subjects like marginalization, contested identities, and territorial politics, the editors cross over to address pertinent issues of a sovereign state, starting with Mumo Nzau's chapter on Kenya's foreign relations in retrospect. It captures the contentious and rather chaotic details in Kenya's relations with status-quo Western powers while embracing China in its latest surge in African engagements. The chapter also reflects on external reactions to Kenya's 2007 elections, "a black-spot in the country's history" which "seemingly continue to have wider ramifications on Kenya's foreign relations outlook now and in the future" (p. 156). Chapter seven represents a pivotal part of the whole volume, as the editors boldly place Nasong'o's thorough discussion of the contributions of the Odinga and Kenyatta families to national discordance, in spite of the history of palpable anticolonial nationalism fostered by these towering political dynasties. An immensely helpful part of this chapter is how the author weaves the rich biographical records that exude a sense of African nationalism to help conclusions of the unexpected outcomes of discord in the national mosaic. Chapters eight and nine reflect on earlier discussed themes of struggle for identity, marginalization, and dealing with domestic security, albeit, from different contexts and methodologies. Part two concludes with Mwangi's chapter, which is well positioned to straddle the themes of continuity and change in this volume. In a rather powerful and theoretically grounded chapter, Mwangi reasons through how Kenya's new emerging security challenges, mostly non-state, have shaped and re-shaped its resolve to engage these threats in a "globalized" and "terrorized" world order.

Like most stock-taking volumes on post-colonial African states, this volume is thick on pointing out the flaws and failures, but significantly thin on the celebration of successes, and workable recommendations for the future of the Kenyan state. Nonetheless, the weight and weave of the chapters and ideas in this volume astoundingly provide deep contextualization and conceptualization to the stories that define Kenya's past fifty years, and introspective to the next fifty years.

Fatuma B. Guyo, *Wright State University*

Roberta Laurie. 2015. *Weaving a Sunrise: A Woman, A School, A People*. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press. 418 pp.

The author in a delightful style convincingly projects the crucial role education plays in female empowerment. The author's focus on the development of women is in line with ongoing global efforts for female emancipation. This non-fictional work is set in Malawi and focuses on the efforts of some Canadians and Malawians to educate girls in Malawi and the gains that resulted from this. Every reader would agree with the statement that "What girls in Malawi need more than anything else is an education" (p. xviii). This applies to girls from every part of the world.

The author combines the above theme with a detailed description of many aspects of Malawian life and international affairs. These include Malawian history, the political terrain,

Malawi's educational system with its challenges, the AIDS epidemic in Malawi, and the social cultural life. The portrayal is vivid.

It is stated that "65% of Malawian women are illiterates, many ill-equipped for anything but the most menial of work" (p. 274). The first effort made by some Canadians to tackle this problem was a girl's school by Rotarian Canadians founded in rural Malawi. However, the school closed less than a year later due to a myriad of problems. Fortunately, Christie Johnson, a Canadian who had taught at the school with Memory Chazeza, a Malawian volunteer at the school laboured, got funds and placed the girls in other schools. At the end, five of the girls went on to attend university while the remaining seventeen graduated from technical schools.

Memory's deep desire for the education of Malawi girls propelled her with her husband and Christy who raised funds from Rotarians in Canada and Malawi to establish a secondary school for girls known as Atsikana Pa Ulend (APU). Christy said of Memory: "So often you encounter someone with a dream so gripping and convincing, you resolve to help make it come true" (p. xix).

The author points out in several places the tremendous gains in educating girls generally and particularly in Malawi. She projects that education helps against early marriages and early child birth with its complications such as death and traumatic injuries, education increases a woman's earnings power and generally empowers her by increasing her independence and sense of self-worth, enables her to defend her rights and resist oppression and makes her capable of becoming a community leader and role model. However, there were and there are several challenges in educating girls in Malawi. These include chronic poverty similar to other developing countries. Girls who are seen as sexual objects often get sexually abused by teachers, get pregnant, and withdraw from school. Early marriage of girls is a major challenge as the average marriage age for girls is between thirteen and fourteen years. Girls are also not seen as financial contributors to families; therefore many parents are reluctant to send them to school. Almost all the girls who got educated as projected in the book endured much hardship and were courageous and resilient. There are many outstanding characters in the book. An example is Memory Chazeza who labored tirelessly to get Malawian girls educated. She acquired her own education by surmounting severe challenges. She is described as a person of honesty, integrity, and determination and a fighter. A person driven by her convictions (pp. xviii-xix).

The labor and generosity of some Canadians also stands out in the story. Canadian Rotarians provided funding for the school they established and later the APU School. Christie Johnson labored tirelessly to raise funds and also taught in the above schools. Other Canadian teachers were Audrey and Larry (the first set) and later Holy and Evan while Rita was involved in the administrative aspect. Other Canadians were involved as board members of the Canadians Educating African Girls' School. The teachers labored in a culture very different from their own and in very poor conditions.

The story is above all that of Memory who struggled and moved beyond the expectations of her community in the hope of obtaining an education. It is also the story of the changing role of women in Malawian society and the importance of education for girls in the developing world. It is a story of hope and courage in time of poverty, famine and hardship. (p. xix).

Rosemary Asen, *Benue State University*

Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron (eds.). 2016. *Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 302 pp.

The book tends to give a detailed study and evaluates the historical background of Muslim institutions in Africa with a view to evaluate their performance in terms of the graduates they produced. It is also an attempt to discuss the current discourse on Muslims in Africa that has emerged from a polemical approach to the understanding of Islam as a religious tradition and a misunderstanding of the status of Muslims on the continent. The contributors utilize a multifaceted approach to neatly and correctly situate African Muslim higher education within the interconnectedness of localism, regionalism, and transnationalism (p. 3). However, a critical study was carried out on the usage of the qualifier “Islamic” or “Muslim” when referring to these institutions. The authors concluded by preferring to use “Muslim” than “Islamic,” simply because the former denotes the ownership to an Islamic organization or wealthy Muslims. While using the word “Islamic” gives the impression that these institutions adhere strictly to Shari’ah principles, when this might not be the case in practice (p. 5).

Part I, “Reforming Muslim Learning: Trajectories and Typologies of Reform in Africa,” examines the theoretical as well as the historical questions pertaining to educational reforms in Africa and the place of Muslim education in educational reform. Mbaye critically assesses the contour of Islam in Africa’s institutions of higher education; he questioned whether Muslim institutions of higher learning are undergoing reform, in an attempt to dissect the different controversial dimensions of Islam in Africa’s history and culture. Muhammed Haron frames Muslim educational reform within the process of social change that has taken place in varying degrees in the countries of the North as well as the South. South Africa’s Muslim education programs and institutions have not only asserted the community’s Muslim identity and subsequently flourished, but have also revitalized the community’s religious activities to such an extent that its global reach has been expanded. Roman Loimeier argues that through the process of colonization and modernization in the 19th and 20th centuries, Muslims in Africa lost their power to define “development” in their own terms. Using East Africa and Zanzibar, he showed how established traditions of Islamic learning were challenged and eventually marginalized in the course of the modernization process. Adam Adebayo Sirajudeen examines the philosophy, objectives, and the curricula of three leading Islamic institutions of higher learning in Nigeria with a view of assessing their achievements and analyzed how they are facing existential threats to social adaptability and ever-widening intellectual space. These institutions are Al-Hikmah University, Ilorin; Crescent University, Abeokuta; and Fountain University, Osogbo.

Part II, “The Rise of Modern Muslim Universities and Colleges: Remembrance and Reconstructions,” attempts to explore the factors that have contributed to the

emergence of these institutions, their development, and the role they seek to play in contemporary African societies. Hamza Mustafa Njozi's examines three interlocking issues surrounding the establishment, success, challenges, and prospects of the Muslim University of Morogo, Tanzania. Adnan Ali Adikata discussed how the Islamic University in Uganda (IUIU), its students, and its alumni may be affecting the context in which Islam and Islamic issues are debated in the public sphere, parliament, or non-Muslim institutions. Ahmad Sengendo discussed the background surrounding the establishment of IUIU in addition to the status of Muslims in the region. His study explores the extent to which IUIU has succeeded in advancing the socio-economic development of Muslim communities in East Africa. Isma'il Gyagenda and Wardah Rajab-Gyagenda present the perspective of the pioneers who were involved in IUIU's establishment in order to shed light on the religious, political and bureaucratic challenges they faced in bringing the project to fruition. Their interviews with some members of the University community enrich their work. Adam Youssouf Moussa addresses the phenomenon and dimensions of Islamic education in Chad, focusing specifically on King Faisal University as a model of contemporary Islamic universities in Africa. Ousman Murzik Kobo gives a preliminary study of Ghanaian Muslims' quest for an Islam-centered tertiary institution. The Islamic University College founded by the Ahlul-Bait Foundation of Iran, happens to be the only of its kind. Kobo argued that Ghanaian Muslims' aspiration for university education stems from their desire to obtain affordable secular education within an Islamic environment.

Part III, "Muslim College and Universities: Texts, Contexts, and Graduates," critically assesses issues of intellectual content and research agendas of these Islamic institutions. Chanfi Ahmed retraces the historic origins of the claims for Muslim universities in East Africa, examining the current situation of these universities and the achievements realized so far. In an attempt to explore and examine the scholarly output of the International University of Africa, Sudan (IUA), focusing on the domestic and regional output of doctoral and master's dissertation topics, Abdulmajeed Ahmed's work describe the origin and development of IUA, and represents an insider's assessment of one of the Africa's oldest and largest Muslim institute of higher learning (MIHL), as he depicts its response to Africa's postcolonial challenges of education reform and knowledge production. Moshood M.M Jimba examines the role of Al-Azhar University in Cairo in relation to the development of Arabic and Islamic education in Ilorin, Nigeria, and its environs. Jimba's study deals with an important aspect of Al-Azhar University as an African powerhouse and influential magnate in African Muslim education, underscoring the institution's transnational character and worldwide influence by specifically talking about Al-Azhar's connections with Nigeria in general and Ilorin in particular. Mamodou Youry Sall's "Scientific Profiles and Potentials of Al-Azhar's African Graduates" between 1960–2005, examines the role played by these graduates in terms of skill development, and appreciates their varying contributions

and potentials in Africa. Alex Thurston discusses the role of Aminu Kano College of Islamic and Legal Studies (AKCLIS) as a site for the renegotiation of Islamic law and authority in Kano, Nigeria. He further argued that, AKCLIS, as an educational institution, serves as an academic platform from which its (Arab educated) faculty members have continued to build profiles as scholars, professionals, and religious leaders. Mbaye Lo's study of the Islamic University of Niger draws on field visits, interviews, and historical documents to highlight the local stories of the University's development. It highlights the academic and administrative politics surrounding the institution in order to provide an explanation of the root causes of the university's decimal ranking amongst its peers, and attest to some of its often overlooked qualities.

Yusuf Abdullahi Yusuf, *University of Jos*

Philip Muehlenbeck. 2016. *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 271 pp.

This book is a follow-up on the author's first book, *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (2012), where he dealt with the Cold War era, focusing on the relations between the US government and African nationalist leaders and newly independent governments. Continuing with the trans-national approach, the current book focuses on the relationship between the USSR's satellite state of Czechoslovakia and African states between 1945 and 1968. In African and colonial histories, that period is referred to as "the classic period of decolonization," due to the numerous countries that attained their independence from decades of European rule. It was also incidentally a period when the Cold War (roughly 1919 to 1991) was at its peak, as both Western and Eastern powers scrambled to influence the turn of events in Africa.

Muehlenbeck's main task was to discuss and isolate the specific roles that Czechoslovakia played in the Eastern Bloc's relationship with African states, rather than merely focusing on the so-called Eastern/Soviet Bloc as a whole. He argues against those who generalize the operations of the Soviet Bloc as a united front. Rather he argues that Czechoslovakia often exercised significant autonomy in dealing with African states (p. 2). He posits that Czechoslovakia's involvement in African affairs predated both its inclusion in the USSR before the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, for the period under study, Czechoslovakia had more diplomatic relations with African states than the USSR (p. 2). The USSR only began to seriously engage in African affairs following the rise to power of Nikita Khrushchev in 1955 (pp. 9-10).

There were four main motivating factors for Czechoslovakia's involvement in African affairs: (1) economic motives (the main motivating factor), where Czechoslovakia looked at African states as potential markets for manufactured

products and as sources of raw materials, essential for economic growth; (2) the need to spread communism to Africa, once Czechoslovakia became a member of the USSR, and a member of such bodies as the Warsaw Pact and Comecon; (3) the search for prestige in the international community, which helped Czechoslovakia to attain international legitimacy; and (4) moral considerations among the Czechoslovakian elite, especially the notion that they were helping colonized and oppressed peoples (pp. 2-4). In the book's five main chapters, thematically organized, we learn more about the key roles played by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) to influence the pro-African foreign policy between 1948 and 1968.

Chapter one provides a brief background to Czechoslovakia's involvement in Africa from the early 1920s in such so-called "conservative countries" as Ethiopia and Egypt; and also during the post-World War II early relations with Morocco, Somalia, Nigeria, Belgian Congo, Sierra Leone, and Francophone Africa, among others, all for the reasons highlighted above. Sometimes such processes brought Czechoslovakia into collision with Western powers, especially the US, over relations with Egypt in 1955, where Czechoslovakia emerged as a major supplier of arms (pp. 24-26). One other theme focuses on relations with the so-called "radical African states"—those in the forefront in fighting for independence—including Ghana, Guinea, and Mali among others. Such states were regarded as a 'fertile ground' for the spread of Communism due to the policy inclinations of nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and Patrice Lumumba (pp. 49-50). We also learn about Czechoslovakia's arms exports to Africa, since the early 1920s, mostly produced by Zbrojovka Brno and Skoda (p. 88). Czechoslovakia also provided aid in the field of aviation through the provision of both training and sale of commercial airliners and military fighter jets (pp. 125-27). The influence of Czechoslovakia in post-colonial Africa was short-lived. After 1962, an economic downturn and the frustration of African leaders with the limited aid provided by the Eastern Bloc, in comparison with Western aid, both made matters worse (p. 157). In 1968, Russian troops also overthrew the leaders of the KSC (p. 184).

The book's main strengths lie in the extensive use of previously unstudied archival documents and the adoption of the trans-national approach in the study of relations between Africa, North and South America, Europe, and Asia. However, there are a number of shortfalls, including the lack of details on the reaction of the colonial powers once Czechoslovakia began to intervene in their colonies; the lack of discussion on the origins of the Cold War; and the lack of discussion of the reactions and experiences of ordinary people in the relations between Czechoslovakia and African states. Despite these shortfalls, I would recommend this book to those interested in such fields as international relations and the history of the Cold War and decolonization.

Paul Chiudza Banda, *West Virginia University*

Casimir L. Nyaki. 2015. *Nyerere's Philosophy of Economic Equality*. Peramiho, Tanzania: Benedictine Publication Ndanda. 183 pp.

Nyerere's Philosophy of Economic Equality consists of three chapters and is an assessment of the policies and strategies used by Nyerere after Tanzanian independence to ensure the establishment of an egalitarian society. The author mentions two main focuses employed by Nyerere to ensure an egalitarian society: achieving equal possession and lessening inequality.

In chapter one, the author x-ray's Nyerere's concept of economic equality: social justice, equality of profession, social status, and voice. From his perspective, the concept of equality is a network of systems networking with sub-systems to guarantee a smooth society. Illustrating by using a building on a piece of land, the land represents political equality; landowners, human equality; and the house represents economic equality. The house in this illustration will be completed only when enemies are defeated. The author identifies the enemies as: poverty, illiteracy, disease, and corruption. Graphically, this shows why African societies are not progressing because these enemies are not conquered.

Social justice is seen as equitable distribution of the wealth which society has produced. Equality of opportunity is ensuring the same chance for having access to whatever is provided by the society regardless of gender, race, religion, or nationality, so that individuals can use their talents and abilities to develop their lives and contribute to the society. Equality of profession is being skillful and competent at one's job to compete with those from other places. In social equality, he considered social status and individual freedom. Equality of voice is being privileged to air one's concern in the assembly of discussion and be heard.

The author mentions the three strategies employed by Nyerere to enhance economic production and distribution of the wealth of the society: promotion of one language, one party democracy, and the use of "Ujamaa." This he says will ensure a classless African society without contact with Western influence, a democratic and egalitarian society built on the principles of equality and proper distribution of goods to promote mutual respect, generosity, hospitality and security among the members. He however does not think a multi-party system leads to class structure and that class structure is bad except when parties are formed based on religion, tribe, ethnicity, or race.

The challenging questions here are: if Africa is a continent and has different cultures and ethnic groups, is it possible to think of an African society? Secondly, was African traditional society truly classless and egalitarian or socialist? Thirdly, what does Nyerere mean when he says that traditional African society was democratic? Fourthly, in forming Ujamaa villages, different communities were forcefully brought together without considering their religious backgrounds, ability to relate and different specialty in occupation. An African proverb says "you can take a horse to the water but you cannot force it to drink." So was Nyerere thinking that by Ujamaa policies one can force a horse to drink water?

Chapter two states that the strategies adopted were implemented. Though Nyerere was unable to eradicate poverty in Tanzania, he managed to reduce political, socio-economical, psychological, and religious inequalities. People's attitudes were improved towards wealth, one another and their country by lessening inequalities, ensuring political stability, imparting principles of socialism on the people's attitudes and religious life. These according to the author

had fostered the spirit of comradeship and brotherhood, which laid a solid foundation for inter-religious life.

Chapter three focuses on the future of Tanzania, which the author says depends on strong leaders who could practice good leadership and governance devoid of corruption and poverty. Poverty here is seen as a state of deprivation prohibitive of decent human life seen in illiteracy, inadequate clean water supply, high mortality, and inequality in the distribution of wealth. According to the author, poverty is caused by internal and external factors. He however concludes that poverty can only be eradicated by the poor themselves and that it is within their power to solve the economic, social and political problems with help from the government and the international community.

In all, the author acknowledged that the people of Tanzania had learned lessons from Ujamaa as a political system aimed at bringing about political equality which rather brought equity, relative peace, justice, and unity. In economic policy, the people's view is that it brought about disaster in the economy. However, for the intellectuals Nyerere is seen as a world teacher who in his originality contributed greatly to the fields of education, culture, and language as he had great imaginative abilities in creating principles, slogans, regulations, directions, and policies where previously there were none.

Sandra Ekpot, *Ahmadu Bello University*

Ebenezer Obadare and Wale Adebaniwi (eds). 2016. *Governance and the Cisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa: Leadership in Transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 298 pp.

Ever since remarks by Barack Obama to the Ghanaian parliament on 11 July 2009 that, among others, "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions," that "development depends upon good governance," and that it is the "ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long," issues of governance have been thrust to the fore of public discourse in Africa. Therefore, Obadare and Adebaniwi's book is a welcome addition to the scholarship on African governance by, among others, Padayachee's *The Political Economy of Africa* (2010), Booth and Cammack's *Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems* (2013), and Tettey's *Africa's Leadership Deficit: Exploring Pathways to Good Governance and Transformative Politics* (2012). In a related vein, social protests, sufficiently evidenced by public service delivery protests in South Africa, the global capital of public service delivery protests, have also led some to ask: can we have governance without government? Clearly, public service delivery protests and other socio-economic and political ills are signs that point to a governance deficit. The major cause is leadership which Obadare and Adebaniwi bring to the center of debate.

The overarching aim of Obadare and Adebaniwi's book is "to highlight the local and global factors constraining the exercise of leadership by post-colonial African leaders" (p. 11). The book does not seek to shield current leaders from censure. Rather, it seeks "to encourage an appreciation of the variety and complexity of factors influencing those leaders" (p. 11). To do this, the twelve chapters are divided into three parts: (i) postcolonial and decolonial philosophies of leadership; (ii) nation-building and the question of rule; and (iii) power, governance and non-state leadership. The first chapter provides the analytical framework;

leadership. This is adequately instanced by the authors stating that “leadership continues to provide a fascinating standpoint from which postcolonial African societies may be analysed” (p. 15). While not asserting a direct cause-effect between governance and leadership, it can be deduced from the chapter that the authors are saying that there is a correlation between the two; bad leadership is associated with bad governance.

Part 1, “Postcolonial and Decolonial Philosophies of Leadership,” draws from the leadership philosophies of Nelson Mandela (South Africa), Obafemi Awolowo (Nigeria) and Julius Nyerere (Tanzania). The common thread that runs through the chapters are lessons that the current crop of leaders can draw from these three leaders. Mandela, the contemporary of the three, was magnanimous in forging the Rainbow Nation (an inclusive and non-racial society) from the crucible of the horrors of apartheid. Part 2, “Nation-Building and the Question of Rule,” takes the reader through the minds of Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Ahmadu Bello (Nigeria), El Haj Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya (Cameroon), and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). This is an admixture of apples and oranges in the sense that while valuable nation-building lessons can be learnt from Kenyatta and Bello (to a large extent), the same cannot be said of the latter three. While Mugabe is said to have started off as a darling of the liberation movement, his record has degenerated over the recent years. The same is true of Ahidjo and Paul Biya, particularly their ideas of forging “good” citizenship and Biya’s long-lasting grip on power with all the hallmarks of a dictatorship. Part 3, “Power, Governance and Non-State Leadership,” takes on contemporary issues facing the African leadership such as insurgencies (for example, Boko Haram in Nigeria and problems in the Niger Delta), same-sex relationships (with the case studies of Nigeria and Uganda), the transformation of the military in Nigeria in the era of democracy and patron-client politics (using the case study of Olusola Saraki in Ilorin, Nigeria). The leadership is found wanting in failing to address issues like insurgency-induced insecurity and intolerance for gays, the failure to transform the military to fit into the democracy era in Nigeria and the corrosive effects of patron-client politics.

In conclusion, did the book highlight local and global factors constraining the exercise of leadership by post-colonial African leaders? Yes, it did. However, it is both demoralising and encouraging. Demoralising in that the governance deficit is self-inflicted; this is blameable on the current African leadership, and encouraging in that Africa does not have to look for heroes beyond its shores; it can readily tap into the minds of Mandela et al.

Emmanuel Botlhale, *University of Botswana*

Mutiat Titilope Oladejo. 2016. *Ibadan Market Women and Politics, 1900-1995*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 183 pp.

Market networks are extensive in Nigeria, and so has been the participation of such networks in politics since pre-colonial times. This is especially the case with market women in Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta, and other cities in southwestern Nigeria. Therefore, this appropriately entitled book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the subject. The strength of the study lies in its broad chronological examination of the major themes, range of sources used, and a rich empirical data base. The layout and organization of the book is similarly satisfactory,

containing a comprehensive list of abbreviations and a glossary of non-English words that facilitates understanding by non-Yoruba speaking readers. The author comes out particularly strong in her discussion of the background to the study, showing the link between the organized interest of market women and politics in 19th century Ibadan and 20th century Lagos. She argues that articles of trade in the 19th century markets of Ibadan were products of local agriculture and manufacture, emphasizing that “almost every woman was a producer and trader” (p. 42). The writer adds that the politics of market women in the city was significantly shaped by the administrative indiscretion of chiefs and their heightened exploitative practices when preparing for war. In the case of Abeokuta, and especially 20th century Lagos, the author demonstrates the link between colonial exploitation, market women, and anti-colonial struggles, which reached its peak with the 1945 General Strike.

When it comes to the more substantive examination of the role of market women in the politics of 20th century Ibadan, however, the analysis is less coherent. Here, politics is predicated not on production relations and the larger economy, but on other exogenous factors. Undeniably, the author admits that “colonialism changed and shaped” (p. 65) the Nigerian economy in the 20th century, and adds that after colonization, the British stripped the *Iyalode* (title for the woman who represented female traders) of her political role and status, and only marginally involved market women in the formulation of commercial policies. However, the author avoids a deeper consideration of colonial capitalism and the nature of changes it brought into market and political relations in the city--hence the missing link between colonialism, market women and politics. For sure, the writer does not deny the exploitative character of colonialism, and explicitly states that it “subjugated the rights of the masses” (p. 90), but the nature of the subjugation and its political significance is not embedded into the study. The analysis of the politics of market women in the postcolonial period suffers from similar defects, partly attributable to a conception that reduces the neo colonial economic basis of postcolonial politics to simply another phase of “modern politics.” These shortcomings are underpinned by the author’s use of the analytical frameworks of structural functionalism, behaviorism, and modernization theory. The outcome is an eclectic misrepresentation of the politics of market women as one of evolution from tradition to modernity through structural and behavioral changes. Consequently, the substantive differences in the nature of the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial politics of Ibadan remains obscure.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept of “class” is foreign to the analysis, while a picture of harmonious relationship among women, overlooking differences in class, status, interest, and aspirations is painted in the book. Of course, the author states that there were disparities among market women operating as retailers, middlemen, and wholesalers. However, the issue of how such differences influenced their individual or sub-group politics is marginal to the study. Although the writer demonstrates the link between the politics of women selling textile fabrics and their commercial rivalry with Lebanese middlemen in the colonial and post-colonial politics of Ibadan, this commendable effort is rare and not replicated in other sections of the book. On the whole, the book limits the essence of British colonialism to political and administrative changes, neglecting the far more important economic dimension, and hence, downplaying the nexus between politics and economics. The end result is a study which reduces the substance of the role of market women in the colonial and postcolonial politics of

Ibadan to the individual exploits of Madam Apampa, Humani Alade, Sulia Adededeji, and other gladiators. The obvious implication is that the writer shies away from focusing on the organized politics of market women as a group and a movement, placing undue emphasis on the relationship between a few market women leaders and politicians. We conclude by stating that the potential usefulness of this well-researched book is seriously handicapped by an approach that hinders a correct interpretation of important dimensions of its subject matter.

Usman Ladan, *Ahmadu Bello University*

Femi Osofisan. 2016. *The Muse of Anomy: Essays on Literature and the Humanities in Nigeria*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 297 pp.

Nigerian literature has been haunted by the specter of identity politics in the last two decades. This crisis, materialized in the present desire of some writers to break free from Western gatekeepers and write for local audiences, is arguably best evident in the inability of scholars in the field to clearly delineate the imbrications of literary voices and temperaments across generations. For instance, some writers in Nigeria's so-called third-generation could easily fit into a contemporary epoch that boasts of writers such as Teju Cole, Chimamanda Adichie, and Lola Shoneyin producing authentic works that recall the poetics and styles of even much earlier generations dating back to Chinua Achebe. The reterritorialization of the literary imagination from (the University of) Ibadan to Freedom Park is a symptom to be probed, for it shows how a politics of space is mapped by the struggle between a romanticized cosmopolitanism of Ibadan and the emergent Afropolitan vibes from modern Lagos for a new literary identity for the country. Femi Osofisan's latest offering, *The Muse of Anomy*, is therefore a timely volume that facilitates that investigation as it eloquently frames the shift and continuities in Nigerian literary and cultural discourses through an intervention organized around storytelling and humor. Aside the brilliant juxtaposition of writers and generations as disparate as Amos Tutuola and Elnathan John, the book offers a rich mélange of ideas that unsettles "an experience of life and history" defined by "unceasing anarchy" (p. 5). Beginning with an insightful, even if belabored, introduction, the text projects the critical musings of a Nigerian writer whose oeuvre, burdened with a neo-Marxist urgency, has been an essential articulation for the recentring of indigenous epistemologies, subaltern agency, and radical politics in Nigeria.

In thirteen finely cathected chapters reproduced from several lectures and seminars, Osofisan charts the varied locations and relocations of Nigerian literature and performance traditions from the 1950s, with Ibadan positioned as the initial artistic hub from which a hermeneutic of cultural resistance and humanism was birthed in Nigerian literature. The author's reprobation of contemporary intellectual practice in Nigeria recalls the Gramscian notion of "organic intellectuals," describing scholars committed to winning the consent of the working-class to counter-hegemonic ideas and values. Precisely because of what Osofisan identifies as a parlous absence of such an intellectual body, committed to both a genuine intellectual culture and a radical commitment to knowledge and enquiry on behalf of non-dominant groups, he implicates Nigerian intellectuals in what he calls a tragic betrayal of the people. By stressing the need to retranslate the dreams of pioneers who wrote to deessentialize

colonial and racist assumptions on Africa into a formidable literary tradition, he reiterates the necessity of a literary practice that responds to cultural particularities.

The first set of chapters (1-9) is a review of what might be called Nigeria's literary history, describing and sometimes celebrating the works of writers ranging from Wole Soyinka and J.P. Clark-Bekederemo to Niyi Osundare and Chimamanda Adichie. In the latter chapters (10-13), he exhorts a "return to our culture" (p. 237), affirming the need for Nigerian literature to recuperate values for its distracted consumers. I might add, though, that Osofisan hardly addresses this return-to-culture theme of the book in regard to how digital social networks and other forces inspire an Afropolitan consciousness among writers in Africa and its diaspora. What he does accomplish is the furnishing of an exegetical space in which an intra-generational corpus of Nigerian literature is infused with a fresh and rigorous reinterpretation. His trenchant criticism of these works draws from a broad range of Marxist perspectives that reveal his desire to reimagine anomy as a productive mode through which writers can engage with the Africa.

Overall, this is a coherent illustration of the countless reasons for the recession of Nigerian literary and cultural criticism and for a depletion in its quality, while lamenting the consequences of forces such as globalization and Pentecostalism on the Nigerian sociocultural terrain. Although *The Muse of Anomy* succeeds in locating a persistent ideological deficit in the Nigerian literary project, proposing a sufficient response to perennial postcolonial agonies, there are times it appears Osofisan's analyses favor perspectives visibly laden with social and political critiques and undermine aesthetic freedom and literary experimentations as ends in themselves. This final argument is not a flaw as such, for Osofisan's literary works affirm the centrality of a profound aesthetic vision and a commitment to society and culture. The balance of these two impulses is key to identifying the character of contemporary Nigerian literature.

James Yeku, *University of Saskatchewan*

Jesse Salah Ovadia. 2016. *The Petro-Developmental State in Africa: Making Oil Work in Angola, Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea*. London: Hurst and Co. 246 pp.

Of the perennial narratives on development in Africa's oil states, none has been as dominant as the Resource Curse thesis that basically indicates that underdevelopment and poverty are products of the mismanagement of wealth from natural resources. With a number of countries along the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) joining the league of oil-exporting countries, the conversation on oil and development in Africa has endured. In setting the premise, Ovadia reiterates a historical verdict anchored on the frailties of several oil-exporting countries stating that "despite the wealth being extracted and the revenue flowing into state treasuries (if they made it that far), quality of life was in sharp decline and there seemed to be little reason for optimism" (p. 2). He however attributes this phenomenon, partly, to the inadequacy of revenues paid in the form of royalties and taxes.

Within the context of the new scramble for Africa's oil boom, Ovadia explores an enabler—a change factor that can engineer the maximization of benefits for oil exporting countries in their dealings with international oil companies (IOCs). He identifies Local Content Policies (LCP) as the key and mathematically argues that sound investment of revenue from oil production plus effective LCPs should result in a Petro-Developmental

State. In my estimation, Ovadia's subsequent preoccupation was to present the utility of LCPs to discredit the supposed pervasiveness of the Resource Curse thesis using Angola and Nigeria as case studies. The discussion of the prospects and challenges of LCP was then translated into signposts for consideration by emerging oil states.

In line with the structure adopted, Ovadia explains the history of oil production in Nigeria and Angola focusing on early attempts at institutionalizing local content. In the case of Nigeria, for instance, Ovadia notes that such attempts "generated handsome profits for Nigerian dealers without building capacity" (p. 32). Angola was hardly different. The result, Ovadia notes, were oil sectors heavily detached from the non-oil economies in ways that sought to justify a prevailing resource curse. This notwithstanding, adjustment in recent perceptions of local content, including the broadening of the concept to go beyond economic value, appears to hold the lynchpin to Africa's renaissance. The Nigeria Content Act of 2010 for instance defines Nigeria Content as "the quantum of composite value added to or created in the Nigerian Economy by a systematic development of capacity and capabilities through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, material resources and services in the Nigerian oil and gas industry" (p. 72). Therefore, as regards utility of LCP, Ovadia surmises accordingly:

An indigenized oil service sector in Angola or Nigeria May have significant potential in itself. This potential exists because the service industry requires large numbers of skilled tradespeople and engineers and because local content may have the potential to anchor growth in manufacturing. In this way, it could allow a wider benefit from that growth to spread through the non-oil economy...(p. 58).

Ovadia's realistic approach to considering the utility of LCP is capped by the recognition of the political economy of corruption in parts of Africa as a challenge to the effectiveness of LCP. In both Angola and Nigeria, for instance, Ovadia details a long history of fronting practices calculated to avoid LCPs. Beyond the challenge of corruption low levels of education and human resources as well as limited capacity to offer quality goods and services are identified as challenges to local content policies that reserve the provision of specific services and human resources for the local economy. Although there are suggestions of attempts at lobbying away LCP by IOCs, it is clear that the general direction by state agencies is to stress the institutionalization of LCP.

Going forward, Ovadia points to some benefits in coordinating relationships with IOC across the GOG, noting that such coordination can strengthen positions of states relative to international actors while promoting region-wide industrial development. Ovadia further suggests the possibility of "highly valuable and rich exchange" between activist and interest groups in the different countries of the region to among other things address issues of mutual interest that require coordinated response like oil spills and boundary disputes.

Ovadia's outlook on the future of Africa's oil states makes a palpable departure from the generally pessimistic accounts situated within the Resource Curse thesis. This is refreshing and makes the book an interesting read.

Philip Attuquayefio, *University of Ghana*

Justin Pearce. 2015. *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 1975-2002*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 184 pp.

Pearce examines the internal politics of the war that divided Angola for more than a quarter of a century after independence. The book is based on interviews with the elites and ordinary people in towns and rural areas, which helped the writer to document how ideologies of state and nation developed on both sides of the Angolan conflict and how these came to define the relationship between political movements and people. The book is divided into an insightful introduction and nine chapters, which examined the period from independence in 1975 until the peace initiatives of the late 1980s. A major gap in literature the research attempts to fill is to interrogate the internal dynamics of the conflict in Angola, in particular the question of the relationship between elites and the broader Angolan population.

Specifically, the book examines, on the one hand, the mechanics of the relationship between political or military power and expression of political identity—how the creation and sustenance of ideas of grievance and identity became politically functional and to what extent people were able to articulate ideas that challenged those of the dominant political movement. Pearce illustrated how people's reaction to political education was not uniform but was influenced by factors such as their occupation, location, experience of events, and whether they had previously come into contact with different political ideas. On the other hand, the book interrogates how the ruling party, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), and its adversary, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) both sought hegemonic control over people in the parts of Angola that each dominated by trying to make its power legitimate in the eyes of those over whom it ruled.

Pearce's account started with a problem about political identity: what did it mean to be a "member" of UNITA or to be a "government person" during the Angolan war? The introductory section began with a quote from a young woman in the town of Mavinga – a town at the center of the MPLA-UNITA military struggle: "I used to be a member of UNITA. But now I'm a member of the government" Q: "Why are you a member of the government?" A: "Because I am here with the government" (p. 1). In other words, she identified with UNITA when she was "caught" by UNITA many years ago, and her allegiance changed when she was "caught" by the government more recently (p. 2). Thus, political identity for many Angolans appeared to be defined in terms of the political movement that ruled over the territory they were in at a particular time. Peasant farmers, particularly those who had suffered violence from both armies at different times, had no choice but to cooperate with whichever was dominant in order to avoid punishment. Additionally, the question of identity was further complicated by the fact that military and civilian officials on both sides habitually assigned identity to people simply on the basis of where the people were.

From the extensive interviews conducted, Pearce was able to show that each side of the conflict was associated with a distinct set of narratives about Angolan history, about the role of the two political movements within this history, and the relationship of the movements to the Angolan people. As such, only a minority of the people interviewed had ever been in a position to listen to both sides and to make a choice about which of the two best represented their interests. For most of them, their earliest consciousness of politics was

constituted within the narratives of one or other political movement. People who lived in the government-controlled towns for the most part believed that the MPLA's army was defending their security, while people in the parts of the countryside controlled by UNITA believed that UNITA was defending them against government forces that were a threat to their security.

Pearce was able to demonstrate that "the Angolan war was never a conflict between communities of people defined on the basis of mutually incompatible prior interests" (p. 180); rather, it was about the pursuit of power by the two rival movements and their use of force to control territory and through it the resident populations. He, however, concludes that the question of national identity in Angola remained unresolved.

Overall, the book is a well-written piece. It is intellectually stimulating, providing a very insightful glimpse into the Angolan conflict. It is a major contribution to the study of conflict and identity formation. The author showed a deep familiarity with relevant literature, which was used to serve as a foundation to weave together a very interesting narrative. The book is a worthy piece that should be read by everyone interested in the study of conflicts in post-colonial Africa.

Olubukola S. Adesina, *University of Ibadan*

Steven Pierce. 2016. *Moral Economies of Corruption: State Formation and Political Culture in Nigeria*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. xii, 282 pp.

Writing on corruption in Africa and in particular Nigeria is fast becoming a worthwhile pastime of Eurocentric scholars who take pleasure in localizing everything that is bad in governance to developing societies. It is as if those societies have autonomous socio-economic and political structures that are impervious to the influences of the legacies of colonial and postcolonial historical forces of their engagements with the developed economies as well as the subsisting influences of globalization from where they continuously draw currents for their existential realities. Nigeria has remained the archetypal African society that suits the analytical framework for "Africa-bashing" in all ramifications. Once any subject on Africa is broached, it gains salience and representativeness when our Africanist scholars localize it to Nigeria, which they consider to be the "guinea pig" of their theorizing. Corruption, which is one of the symptoms of underdevelopment, is the current fad of Africanist scholars who have continued to portray the phenomenon, ironically, as the causation of Nigeria's economic malady.

The book under reference is a complex but interesting scholarly piece which attempts to present a theory on Nigerian corruption from the standpoint of observed peculiarities and historical manifestations of the phenomenon. In his attempt to track the history of the corruption-complex through a careful appraisal of the manifold vernacular histories of different ethnicities in Nigeria, Steven Pierce shows, to a great extent, how corruption has developed and is perceived across the country. Far from being an exclusive presentation of the historical development of corruption in Nigeria, the book makes a case for the elucidation and appreciation of the multifaceted utilities of Nigerian corruption discourse, being a part of the country's cultural history and of its politics. The author raised critical issues about the existing body of knowledge on corruption in Nigeria, and affirms the historicity and ethnography of the

phenomenon as significant explanatory variables that could be deployed in studying and understanding Nigerian corruption.

The introductory section is an examination of the theoretical import of “corruption” and the operational utility of it as a concept and a tool of analysis mainly from the social science perspective on the phenomenon in question (pp. 1-23). The five chapters of the book are classified into two parts. In Part 1, which comprises three chapters, the author begins his analysis of the influences of the moral systems on the official conduct of government officials, noting that such influences could be ambiguous and complex when viewed against the backdrop of the possibility that the same moral systems through which government officials are evaluated could induce practices that could be regarded as corrupt. The plethora of languages and cultures in Nigeria complicates moral discourses about official conduct, a situation our author sees as an inhibition to the evolution of a definitive history of the Nigerian corruption-complex having examined carefully some manifestations of corruption across Nigeria’s political history (pp. 27-149). Part 2 of the book contains chapters four and five. Chapter four is an elaboration on what moral economies of corruption means in the Nigerian context, pointing out the different authors’ perspectives on the theory of moral economy as well as their consensus especially as it relates to their focus on how different groups of people assesses specific forms of conduct (pp. 153-87). Chapter five which examines the relationship between Nigerian corruption and the Nigerian State is a critical portrayal of the insincerity of successive Nigerian governments to prosecute anti-corruption fight. This is evident in the politics of selective arraignment of offenders for corruption charges, and the palpable political manipulation of anti-graft agencies among other indications of the dysfunction of the Nigerian State which are well-chronicled in the chapter (pp. 188-217). The conclusion of the book reiterates the arguments in chapters four and five which the author believes could provide veritable perspective on Nigerian corruption and serves as study tools for understanding the phenomenon of corruption within the broader context of the country’s political history (pp. 219-29).

There is a tone that runs through the book which depicts Nigerian corruption as a uniquely unmatched and incomparably complex pathology which should be studied as an isolated category whose findings cannot be regarded as “lessons” that other countries of Africa or Third World could learn from. According to the author, the development of corruption-complexes is ‘inextricably tied to the histories of individual polities’ (pp. 222-24). It is this apparent reification of historicism in the study of Nigerian corruption by the author that complicates the subject and gives the confusing impression that because corruption manifests itself in diverse forms across different historical epochs, its meaning is fluid and subject to change over time. In addition, the conceptualization of corruption as both a moral discourse and an objective reality (p. 20) evokes the adoption of an eclectic analytical framework that fuses normative and empirical methodologies in studying the phenomenon—an approach which our author utilizes but with minimum scientific value. It is derogatory to imply that corruption emerges from the country’s political culture and that no corrective initiative could originate from Nigeria because as our author would want us to believe “the charge of corruption is a central facet of Nigerian politics” (p. 226). Elsewhere in the book, our author declares that it was fruitless to seek to deal with corruption in Nigeria because such efforts would necessitate ‘dealing with issues

fundamental to the logic of local political culture” (p. 229). Rather, he makes a case for the accommodation of patronage as a fundamental political principle in Nigeria’s Constitution. According to him, Nigeria’s constitutional order must be brought into alignment with the Nigerian political culture of corruption (p. 229).

Steven Pierce’s characterization of Nigerian corruption as a product of the country’s political culture was not derived from any rigorous scientific analysis of the data he accessed in the course of his research into historical manifestations of the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria. The weakness of the Nigerian State and the domination of the majority by the minority elite group at different periods in the country’s over one hundred years of statehood are insufficient evidence to conclude that the values of the ruling elites in Nigerian societies are representative of the country’s political culture. If anything, our author’s consideration of corruption does not extend to the broader civil societies and the private sector; it was restricted to governmental activities and patronage as well as issues bordering on governmental distributive responsibilities across the country’s diverse cultural settings. How then did our author arrive at the conclusion that corruption is ingrained in the country’s political culture and has become a way of life for Nigerians? Our author’s prescription of constitutional amendment to tolerate and legitimize patronage in Nigeria’s political life is preposterous as it is disparaging, and therefore should be discountenanced outright.

The strength of Pierce’s book is the depth of its historical excavation and the synchronization of relevant data on the diverse forms of corruption across Nigeria’s multitudinous ethnicities at different periods in the country’s over one hundred years of statehood. The book is a product of a meticulous research and the utilization of eclectic analytical methodology involving a fusion of normative and empirical paradigms that were deployed in propounding a theory of moral economies of corruption with particular reference to Nigeria. The book is a guide on how to study Nigerian corruption that could be a worthwhile reference literature for ethnographical and sociological researches especially in tertiary institutions across Africa and other Third World countries.

John Olushola Magbadelo, *Centre for African & Asian Studies, Abuja*

Hannah Azieb Pool (ed.). 2016. *Fashion Cities Africa*. Bristol, UK: Intellect. 143 pp.

This richly illustrated publication addresses contemporary dress styles in four African cities: Nairobi, Casablanca, Lagos, and Johannesburg. The book accompanies an exhibition at the Brighton Museum and Art Gallery in the UK. In her introduction, the book’s editor, journalist Hannah Azieb Pool, describes this publication as “not an academic text or an exhibition catalogue, nor is it a definitive guide to ‘African fashion.’” Instead, she explains, it is intended to provide a snapshot of four fashion scenes and their stylish denizens. In this, the book succeeds admirably. It offers insights into the world of chic, urban youth in four cities, all of who create and project the sort of hipster aesthetic one might also find in New York City, Paris, and Seoul—these are young Africans who take part in global networks of cool. Their work in many media, from clothing to blogs, is part of the flourishing art worlds in these cities. *Fashion Cities Africa* is a valuable document of these fashion cultures, bringing together imagery and interviews from four diverse sites. This is not an analysis of cultural contexts, histories, and

aesthetic systems, but instead a vivid introduction to creative entrepreneurs. The text is celebratory, describing the experiences and milieus of these designers, their aims, and the appeal their work holds for their clientele.

In his foreword to the publication, Binyavanga Wainaina describes his own African fashion adventures, which take him across West Africa, to Abidjan, N'Djamena, Dakar, and Accra. Having clothing made successfully, he notes, requires an “inner ninja” that enables you to find the right tailors (even if this means stealing them from a friend), negotiating prices, finding the right fabrics, and knowing how to get from the airport to the right tailor shops and fabric stalls. Through fashion, Wainaina maps urban environments. And the young designers he patronizes provide another way to gain insights into places and people. The rest of the book takes us there.

The short essays that precede sections on each city, by Pool and journalist Helen Jennings, introduce key fashion innovators—designers, writers, brand consultants, musicians, and others who dwell on the cutting edge of style. Written in an approachable, engaging style, the essays describe markets and boutiques, introduce key figures, and broadly describe the dress styles that characterize the fashion scene in that city. Each essay is followed by a group of profiles of fashion entrepreneurs, many of whom are also mentioned in the essay. Each profile consists of photographs and a page-long excerpt from an interview or a statement by the designer, allowing the reader to “hear” their voices. These are thoughtful artists, who skillfully express the ideas and influences that shape their work. A photographer from each of the four cities was commissioned to document people and clothing, providing a crucial element of this publication: the color images on nearly every page. Some of these offer glimpses of the cities themselves, though these streets, buildings, and vistas are merely settings for the garments and the people who wear them.

As one might expect in a snapshot of fashion cultures, the book depicts a “slice” of dress practices in these large, diverse cities. The people and dress styles featured throughout share an avant-garde, “hipster” aesthetic. These are styles that might be familiar to many members of the creative class—internet entrepreneurs, musicians, artists, and others who might be drawn to urban areas that percolate with arts and entertainment. These are not the designers who work for mass markets, or for the conventional elites who might patronize the *haute couture* designers who show their work in Milan and are featured in mainstream fashion outlets like *Vogue*. The designers featured here circulate in smaller venues, and they produce garments in smaller quantities. Yet their work appears on runways and in the pages of magazines (and, perhaps more effectively, on blogs). Too rarely, however, does the reach of most African designers extend beyond their cities or regions. *Fashion Cities Africa* gives the rest of us a chance to see their work and learn about the markets in which they circulate. While much more could be said—each one of these designers could likely yield an extended analysis—this publication opens a window onto vivid fashion cultures in four major African cities.

Victoria L. Rovine, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Paul Schauert. 2015. *Staging Ghana: Artistry and Nationalism in State Dance Ensembles*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 342 pp.

This study based on phenomenology, centered on the lived experience of individual participants and their perspectives, examines how artists in state dance ensembles “manage,” or negotiate, personal creativity and opportunity within postcolonial nationalism. The text focuses on the Ghana Dance Ensemble (GDE), based at the University of Ghana in Legon, and its splinter organization the National Dance Company (NDC). Throughout his chapters and sections within, Schauert clearly reinforces his thesis with examples from artistic directors, dancers and musicians. A Preface lists several multimedia examples that assist the reader with understanding performances described in the text. Each URL has to be typed separately as no online menu is provided, and the quality of the videos is low. Yet, such companion videos bring to life the descriptions and comparisons given.

The Introduction and Conclusion chapters act as bookends for a series of six chapters, each discussing varying aspects of the GDE’s development in chronological order. Schauert gives a brief history of the GDE and summarizes how performers operate independently within an otherwise strict, state-sponsored ensemble. The Introduction presents his thesis and methodologies—using the belly as metaphor, power matrices negotiated through the body, cosmopolitan identity, and Michel Foucault’s technology of self. Most intriguing is his examination of the “dynamics of embodiment,” wherein individuals internalize external sensory experiences that produce bodily ways of being-in-the-world and self-knowledge (pp. 26-27). Throughout the book, Schauert will return to this concept through examples of the ways in which dancers manipulate dance movements within the choreography, demonstrating their agency as they negotiate the state system.

Chapter 1 only hints at the history of nationalism beginning earlier than Kwame Nkrumah’s presidency. In fact, the focus of this book relies on the development of African Personality and Pan-Africanism as expressions of nationalism dictated by Nkrumah and his administration. These directives aimed to institutionalize culture and were realized in the GDE through the artistic director Mawere Opoku and embodied by the performers.

Schauert explores what he terms “sensational staging” in Chapter 2. This term identifies the process of aesthetic transformation wherein cultural projects are created as a blend of the so-called best aspects of traditional local with foreign modern culture. In the GDE this translates as a hybrid of certain Ghanaian dances, primarily those by the Asante, Ewe, and Dagomba, with modifications to the costumes and choreography that would be more appealing to foreign audiences. Tensions and paradoxes develop between Opoku’s desire to please foreigners and the foreigners’ desires for authenticity. Yet, most consider the GDE’s traditional dances to be more authentic than those in communities today because the GDE continues to perform much of Opoku’s choreography based on community dances from the 1960s, while the community performances continue to evolve.

The next chapter deals with how individuals adhere and resist the ensemble’s disciplinary structure based on western military and professional practices. Despite strict punishments of humiliation and extra practices, performers aspire to be part of the GDE for monetary and career development, especially opportunities to travel abroad. Chapter 4 discusses how performers act as cultural soldiers promoting the state, yet also criticize the state—a Ghanaian

cultural pastime. To avoid overt criticism, performers utilize “indirection,” where the individual politely redirects the conversation. The use of metaphors and proverbs achieve this redirection through communication, song, drumming, dance, and visual symbols.

In 1990, the GDE split into two entities—the GDE continues at the University of Ghana and the new National Dance Company (NDC) is created and based in the new National Theatre. Chapter 5 compares the GDE who call themselves the “Originals” and the NDC who utilize the slogan of President J.J. Rawlings regime “Moving Forward.” The two groups represent competing ideas of nation and nationalism through Nkrumah’s rhetoric of “authenticity” and “traditional” (GDE) and President John Kufuor’s ideas regarding modern “development” (NDC) which has evolved into Francis Nii-Yartey’s African contemporary dance choreography.

Chapter 6 is a continuation of the former chapter, exploring the possibilities and limitations on creativity within these ensembles. In the Conclusion, Schauert revisits these ensembles in 2012, five years after conducting his primary research for the book. The NDC is thriving after receiving the bulk of government funding, yet the GDE continues to manage despite the challenges because of performer’s desire to adhere to so-called traditional dances.

This book makes an excellent contribution to the understanding of Ghanaian state dance ensembles and how individuals negotiate their socio-political position and artistic creativity within nation-making ideologies. Like many texts focused on Ghanaian arts today, this book focuses on the independence period with little reference to how nationalism played a seminal role in the arts of the colonial period.

Courtney Micots, *Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University*

Kate Skinner. 2015. *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914-2014*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 298 pp.

As Kate Skinner explains in *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland*, few people have examined the ongoing consequences of the unification of British Togoland with Ghana. Although Skinner benefits from the work on Togolese integration that has developed since Dennis Austin’s 1960s publications on the Ghana-Togo dispute, she disagrees with David Brown and Paul Nugent that the conflict surrounding Togoland’s status died down in the 1970s (p. 169). This came as a revelation to Skinner following Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission in 2003-04 and Kosi Kedem’s 2010 petition for Constitutional Review to redress the history of Togoland’s integration. She argues that the way in which British Togoland was integrated into Ghana in 1957 had a long-term impact on the lives and careers of the men and women who campaigned against it. From interviews with former activists or their children, Skinner learned that the failure to achieve *ablode*, the Ewe term for “freedom,” remained a source of resentment.

During their campaign for freedom, British Togolese activists fought to maintain their status as a Trust Territory in order to address the United Nations directly to negotiate for joint independence with French Togoland. Skinner reveals that the struggle to reunite with the French territory had less to do with a shared ethno-linguistic Ewe identity, as the majority of Togoland did not identify with this language and ancestry. Instead, she considers how Togolese people imagined citizenship through their past, particularly experiences of infrastructural development and violence under German rule. Claiming this shared history with French

Togoland, the British Togolese wanted to avoid becoming a small region in the larger independent Ghana. These first chapters also center on the pursuit of mass literacy in British Togoland during the 1930s and 1940s, decades after German colonization. Higher education was difficult to pursue in Togoland, as there were few schools outside of the major towns. Only the brightest students could find a place in a teaching college and continue their education. Skinner argues that teachers became political leaders in British Togoland because of their ability to translate and negotiate the demands of the British government and the Togolese people.

Skinner shows in Chapter 4 how attention to the different layers of local, territorial, and international issues together led to a “political cosmopolitanism” among British Togolese teachers (p. 122). This was crucial leading up to the 1956 plebiscite on integration, when teacher-activists used their elite education to create propaganda in the form of pamphlets, songs, and chants to convince voters to support reunification with French Togoland. Skinner introduces the actions taken by women to support reunification, including wearing cloths featuring the faces or symbols of their leaders and singing and chanting to excite people. Were these women primarily in supportive roles, or did some stand out as community leaders, writers, or teachers? While Skinner spends time examining the significance of generational differences in the reunification movement, the book would have benefitted from more analysis of the role that women did or did not play.

The second half of the book shifts toward the consequences of integrating British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Skinner reveals the challenges that faced outspoken activists after people in the territory voted for integration. Those who were not jailed often lost their positions as educators, and some escaped with their families to the French side of Togoland. Tensions between Kwame Nkrumah and Sylvanus Olympio, the first leaders of independent Ghana and Togo, exacerbated the problems facing people from the former British Togoland. Once Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, some Togolese activists found relief under new governments, but state instability held up development funds. The book closes with the Ghanaian National Reconciliation Commission in 2004 when Togolese *ablode* activists testified that their human rights had been violated because they were “deprived of their right to their nationality” or suffered from a “stolen citizenship” (p. 251).

The Fruits of Freedom explores multiple historical lines: an incomplete freedom and citizenship, the rise of mass education and literacy, and organization by teacher-activists for *ablode* despite dismissal or violence by the British, United Nations, and Ghana. These areas overlap to reveal that Skinner’s book is required reading for scholars of Ghana, Togo, and African decolonization. Furthermore, the way that Skinner applies Meredith Terretta’s work on human rights during Cameroon’s independence movement to her analysis of the nearly silenced history of British Togoland provides a model for rising scholars.

Alison K. Okuda, *New York University*

Pauline Ada Uwakweh, Jerono P. Rotich, and Comfort O. Okpala (eds.). 2014. *Engaging the Diaspora: Migration and African Families*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 192 pp.

This book has been written in a timely manner by addressing immigration and immigrants, a contemporary, hotly debated and contested issue. The 20th and 21st centuries has evoked an

unprecedented number of immigrants in developed countries putting immigrant and immigration issues at the center of political debates and a production of a plethora of literature from academic scholars. More importantly, the centrality of the family institution augments its timeliness as the nuclear normally presumed to be localized in one space becomes challenged by transnational dynamics, sometimes creating scattered families (Coe, 2013). In addition, traditional gender roles in patriarchal societies become challenged as women get more involved in professionally well-paying jobs. While most of research has been done from traditional immigrants, those from African immigrants have been scantily documented understudied or required new theoretical attention" (p. 1). Adding to the black population diversity, African immigrants. The author's literature search indicated that African immigrants are "though similar in many ways with other blacks in the United States bring with them uniqueness that influences their very adaptation and contributions to the host country. This book contributes to filling these gaps in discussing from a multidisciplinary perspective and engaging the African Diaspora focusing on migration and African families.

African immigrants have been increasing since the 20th century, caused by reasons ranging from poverty, to unemployment, war, conflict, the spill-over effect of colonial and post-colonial circumstances. Hence, migration becomes "a matter of necessity rather than choice" (p. 16). In addition, favorable conditions and incentives cushions migration challenges. In sum, African immigrants may owe their immigration to the Diversity Visa Lottery as a "golden ticket" (p. 127) that favored countries previously underrepresented, and to technological advancements in the 20th century that have opened borders, shortened distances, and reduced hazardous conditions of travel. Therefore, migration can be presumed to be a "permanent feature of the 21st century" (p. 3). However, it's important to note that, the African immigrant population is very diverse linguistically, by gender, country of origin, and career paths. Also, they contribute to the host country economy and culture through their skills, knowledge, and experiences such as those debited in the experiences of professors teaching in historically black colleges and predominantly white colleges.

The authors also emphasized the contribution African immigrants bring to their host countries by indicating that "many of these immigrant include Africa's best and brightest. In 2009, for instance, 41.7 percent of African-born adults over twenty-five had a bachelor's degree or higher compared to 28.1 percent of native-born and 26.8 percent of all other foreign born adults in the United States" (p. ix). Relative to other immigrant population, "compared to other immigrants, African-born be highly educated and speak English well" (p. 4).

The authors acknowledge the family unit as central to socialization, identity formation for both the individual and community and hence requiring attention. However, the book also portrays the family unit as a contested terrain when transplanted from one location to another through the process of immigration and adaptation to new environments. As an example, gender role conflicts between husbands and wives as patriarchy presumably associated with male figures as economic bases, hence, decision and bread winners, get challenged by female autonomy, a product, generated by ideals in contemporary market economies. Within the same vein, relationships between children and parents also become strained.

Pre- and post-immigration experiences impact their very social reality as they construct new experiences and spaces in the host country. For example, past experiences from war,

daunting memories causing trauma to both youth and adults, and the difficulties of members of one family living in different countries. In addition, their status as either as refugees, green card holders or professionals determine their very adaptation. Moreover, their adaptation experiences as immigrants are not immune to the host country's relations that are sometimes rooted in racial, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status. Their trans-nationality creates spaces for scattered families with members living across different countries, a phenomenon collapsing geographic family enclosures. These intersections and dynamic complicate African families' experience and the predictability of the family survival as a coherent unit, post-migration, as conventionally presumed, even as they take on imposed identities as "black women and, as third world immigrants" (p. 9).

An interdisciplinary mixed method approach was used to generate data and analyze present findings. Methods such as exploring written works, interviews with African parents and family case studies, memoir analysis, ethnographic interviews, photo voice, phenomenological, and quantitative approaches were used by contributors in this edition. These methods strengthen the validity of their findings. This book is therefore useful to the professional audience in academia and families in general as well as the public interested in immigration and migrants.

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Serah Shani, Westmont College

Goolam Vahed and Thembisa Waetjen. 2015. *Schooling Muslims in Natal: Identity, State and the Orient Islamic Educational Institute*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 457 pp.

Situated between colonialism, apartheid, and global Islamic modernism, *Schooling Muslims in Natal* narrates the story of the founding and operation of the Orient Islamic School in Durban, South Africa throughout the twentieth century with its successive state and racial regimes. Co-authored by two historians, one an alumnus of the school itself, this monograph meticulously weaves together archival sources and oral histories to produce a narrative that speaks more broadly to studies in Indian Ocean diasporas, Islamic education, and racial politics in apartheid South Africa.

Founded in 1943 by the Muslim Gujarati merchant community in the eastern coastal province of Natal, the Orient Islamic School aimed to provide British-style schooling for Indian children to enable them to make inroads against economic disadvantage and racial discrimination. It also aimed to provide instruction in Islam and the Urdu language as a means of cultivating Islamic identity, preserving cultural heritage, and instilling moral values. It was modeled after Aligarh Muslim University in India, dubbed the "Oxford of India," which had embraced British rule and education in an attempt to secure high posts for Indians in the government and contribute to policy-making, while also integrating Islamic studies especially as related to civic training. The men of the Indian Muslim commercial elite in Natal, meeting in

the exclusive Orient Club that mirrored the country clubs so iconic of British colonial rule, lobbied government to create a state-funded school that would offer “integrated” religious and secular training to meet the “particular conditions which are essential to (Indians).” These early origins and concerns are the subjects of Chapters 1 and 2.

Seen as “lagging” behind Christian and Hindu populations of the Indian community, the Muslim community finally received government support to build their own school, as education was heralded as an engine for Muslim “upliftment.” Yet this support was, predictably, circumscribed. Chapter 3 details the challenges faced in the attempts to actually build the school, particularly as related to finding a suitable location. Amidst fears of “Indian penetration” into the white community, Muslim Indians ultimately had to look outside Durban’s city boundaries to find a site for which they could avoid political challenge in establishing their school. Accustomed to employing a “strategy of gentlemanly diplomacy” based on a failing platform of class affinity, the Indian Muslim elites spearheading the project were successively thwarted by mounting racial prejudice.

Upon finding a location, the school faced even more challenges in attempting to define its “Islamic” character, the subject of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. This entailed creating a single curriculum and syllabus in contrast to the more informal *madressa* Islamic schooling, introducing “modern” pedagogical methods into Islamic education that did not rely on rote memorization, and finding suitable teachers and directors who both were trained in Islamic knowledge and could teach it in “modern” methods—and in English, rather than Urdu or Arabic. The school’s Islamic character was further reinforced through “Eastern-inspired” architecture, *kufic* Arabic calligraphy adorning its walls, and the establishment of the *kurta* as the school uniform for boys. Yet, curiously, while many of the authors’ alumni interviewees identified the school as one for Muslims, they did not see it as an “Islamic school” that fostered Islamic identity. The remaining Chapters 7 and 8 catalogue the schools’ efforts and challenges in providing physics and sports education, introducing education for girls, political activism under apartheid, and controversies associated with efforts to privatize the school following the fall of the apartheid regime.

Schooling Muslims in Natal is a comprehensive historical account of shifting religious, racial, and diasporic identities in twentieth century South Africa, all centered around the establishment of one school for Muslim Indian children. The text excels in the breadth and richness of minute historical data, yet consequently leaves many important analytical questions buried or unanswered in its quest for comprehensiveness. With its extensive documentation and inclusion of primary source material, it will prove to be an invaluable resource for scholars seeking to analyze wider trends related to the integration of Islamic education into modern schools, changing racial ideologies from the perspective of a privileged minority, and transoceanic diasporic exchange, particularly as they relate to the Indian Ocean and Islam in Africa.

Caitlyn Bolton, *The City University of New York*

Al J. Venter. 2015. *Biafra's War, 1967-1970: A Tribal Conflict in Nigeria That Left a Million Dead*. Solihull, England: Helion and Company Limited. 314 pp.

The Nigerian Civil War, otherwise known as the Biafra War, has enjoyed an infinite amount of coverage from key participants in the war as well as sideliners. Consequently, Al Venter's book on the war hardly aroused my interest initially, given the already surplus publications on the subject matter. This apathy however changed immediately after a quick perusal of the pages of *Biafra's War – 1967-1970: A Tribal Conflict in Nigeria That Left A Million Dead*. My attention was caught by the book's unique quality of historical evidence founded on primary documents and first-hand pictorial illustrations. That in itself serves to remove doubts from any reader about the authenticity of the account presented by Venter, just as it proves him (Venter) as the man on the spot, a participant in Africa's bloodiest post-independence inter-ethnic hostilities. Venter's stated aim is to expose the agony of Biafran civilians during the war and to show that the long-drawn-out Christian-Muslim clash in Nigeria had been there since independence and is still lingering. The twenty-five chapter book is an outcome of Venter's years as a journalist covering the war in Biafra. Unlike previous authors who viewed the war as a political fallout in Africa's largest democracy, Venter reexamines Biafra's war as tribal fallout in Africa's most heterogeneous nation-state, between the "Islamic North and the Christian (animist) South."

Venter starts by discussing Nigeria's first putsch of 14 January 1966, which distorted the political architecture and shattered the brittle trust obtainable among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. Six months later, a counter coup resulted in anarchy and after several futile attempts to salvage the situation, Odumegwu Ojukwu declared an independent Biafra on May 30, 1967 – war broke out. Venter examines the contradictory personalities of the Biafran and Nigerian commanders-in-chief. He also scrutinized the various domestic and external balance of power that played out in Nigeria, especially after the discovery of oil in the southern region. The British, Americans, Soviet Union et al. supported the Northern clamor for unity; while the secessionist Biafra was covertly supported by South Africa and France among others. At the early stage of hostilities, Biafra's amateurish military had an upper hand because the Federal government was ill prepared. As hostilities escalated, the federal forces undertook scorched earth atrocities—starvation, blockade, etc.—resulting in a great humanitarian catastrophe for Biafra, yet Biafra's resolve remained unbroken. Indeed, Venter explains that the Biafrans were not defeated, but were starved into submission.

The war ensued in a series of disjointed skirmishes. Both sides made extensive use of mercenaries. As the federal forces unleashed more callous assaults on Biafra, the war became for Biafrans a battle for survival more than secession. The humanitarian toll in beleaguered Biafra spurred international relief and medical volunteers. Propaganda was another major factor in the war with both engaged in marked press censorship. Venter also emphasized the prominent role of airpower in the war. For the Federal Government, Soviet MiG-17s played a decisive role in air maneuver against the rebels. For Biafra, aerial combat was coordinated from the improvised Uli airstrip. A number of eyewitness accounts are summarized by Venter to substantiate his own account, including Frederick Forsyth's *The Dogs of War*; Major Atofarati's *The Nigerian Civil War, Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt*; Jim Townsend's Autobiography; and Alves Pereira's *My Escapades as a Biafran Warplane Pilot*. Venter concludes by drawing attention to the possibility of another total war between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria of which the

international community needs to take cognizance. This reality is epitomized by the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in the country.

Venter's book opens readers to a larger understanding of contemporary Nigerian history, sociology and international relations. With such acclamation, further suggestions can come across as foul-mouthed. However, I deem the following areas worthy of a second look:

- Venter preponderantly designates Biafra as comprising the Igbo, apparently neglecting other minority ethnic groups that constituted Biafra. Actually, more than any other factor, the perfidy of these other groups has been accepted by many to have cost Biafra the war. Still, "Igbo" is written by Venter as "Ibo," a misrepresentation that Igbo people frown on.
- Venter does not hide his pro-Biafran empathy, which in turn questions the book's objectivity, if at all objectivity can be attained regarding such a highly controversial historical narrative.
- The author might have perhaps considered extending his scope to include proffering solutions for the lingering Christian-Muslim palaver in Nigeria, instead of just highlighting it.

In all, the above gaps do not in any way defeat the purpose of the book. The book gives a lucid account of the situation in Biafra, emphasizing Nigeria's inhumane tactics that brought Biafra to her knees. Venter utterly criticized his home (British) government's and other foreign support for Nigeria, which he explains as being entrenched in economic interests and gross delusion of the political circumstances. Venter aimed to add religious and humanitarian classiness to the Nigerian civil war, and he achieved this with ease. Overall, the book is suitable for all classes of readers. It reaffirms Venter's reputation as one of the leading writers on contemporary African conflicts, history and international relations.

Emah Saviour, *University of Uyo*

Hannah Whittaker. 2015. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Social History of the Shifta Conflict, c. 1963-1968*, Leiden: Brill. 176 pp.

This book examines insurgency and counterinsurgency in Kenya focusing on the *shifta* (literally bandit or rebel) conflict of 1963 to 1968. The introduction begins by stating that the book is a social history of war and that all wars are socially destructive. The book analyses the *shifta* insurgency in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya and its detrimental social, economic, and political effects, focusing on the use of political violence as a means to an end, militarism, environmental scarcity, and conflict, and issues of state capacity. The fundamental arguments raised are that the intricate quality of the insurgency and the nature of its counterinsurgency measures conducted by Kenya explain the explicitly destructive force of the conflict which combined a set of local, national and regional wars. The eruption of the insurgency and the consequent path of its violence are best understood as a convergence of the local-level underlying forces and state responses to those forces. The local dynamics centered on issues of state encroachment, private interests, and territorial resource conflicts whereas state responses focus subjugation and nation statebuilding through counterinsurgency. To this extent

the book aptly demonstrates that conflicts are shaped by the dynamics of interaction between the state, its apparatuses, and local-level developments.

The book indicates is thematically divided into two parts, the first dealing with the insurgency and the second with the counterinsurgency. Chapters two to six examine the origins, composition and the dynamics of interaction among the key actors on the insurgency. The chapters establish that the outbreak of the insurgency was primarily driven by the personal and political gains of the participants that revolved around protecting individual and communal interests, the struggle for natural resources, and the need to counteract state repression. The chapters also establish that Somali nationalism at the time failed to prevent parochialism. Chapters five and six analyze the nature of the counterinsurgency. They focus on the coercive measures employed by the state to defeat *shifita* and militarization of the NFD society. The chapters also pay attention to the political dimensions of the counterinsurgency by examining the policy of forced villagization in the region. These chapters establish that the counterinsurgency aimed at controlling pastoralism not only to subjugate pastoralists to the dominant agricultural order but also to implement social change and transform them into loyal Kenyan citizens. Attempts to do so failed, as the state's priority was a military rather than a political solution to the insurgency. Chapter seven looks at the long-term aftermath of the insurgency and emphasizes that the impact has exacerbated resource conflicts and banditry while the incorporation of NFD within the Kenyan state has enhanced intra and inter-community tensions in the region. The conclusion indicates the implications of the effects of the insurgency and counterinsurgency on contemporary political and security issues in Kenya.

The author adopts historical, and anthropological analytical approaches that make use of empirical research based on oral data and extensive secondary data as frameworks that describe, analyze, and explain the detrimental effects of the insurgency and counterinsurgency. The author is very familiar with the relevant academic literature both at the theoretical and empirical case-study level thus validating the arguments raised. The author aptly demonstrates that insurgencies are multi-layered hence counterinsurgencies measures must take care of these complexities if they are to succeed. This is evident in as far as the literature cited is concerned as well as in the analysis. This is an exceptional feature of the book. The book, therefore, demonstrates evidence of original work and significantly contributes to the knowledge and insight into the subject of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and their outcomes in African states. While the author emphasizes that the book is a social history of war and places much analysis on local, national and regional dynamics in the context of the Cold War, a more detailed scrutiny of the role of super powers as a catalyst to the detrimental effects of the insurgency and counterinsurgency would have been appropriate to support the fundamental arguments raised in the book. The book is valuable not only for scholars and students of history but also to those of political science and international relations who are interested in conflict and security issues.

Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, *National University of Lesotho*

Elizabeth Williams. 2015. *The Politics of Race in Britain and South Africa: Black British Solidarity and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle*. London: I. B. Tauris. xi, 316 pp.

Making extended use of oral history interviews and contemporary records, Elizabeth Williams focuses on a thoroughly under researched facet of British social, cultural, and political history: the solidarity felt by black communities in Britain toward the oppressed African population in South Africa. Compartmentalized into six main chapters, her study also assesses the complicated relationship between black British groups and other anti-racist organizations, paramount amongst which was the mainly white Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM).

The first chapter charts the development of a pan-African consciousness. The author pinpoints the death of the Barbadian seaman, Milton King, in a South African jail in 1951 as the catalyst that brought to the forefront of Caribbean consciousness the inescapable horror of racial aggression. Moreover, she explains how the day-to-day experience of racism for Africans in the diaspora “engendered empathy” with those suffering under the apartheid regime (p. 14). From here, the chapter draws attention to the crucial role played by the Committee of African Organisations (CAO), a student and worker-run movement which drew support from a smorgasbord of anti-racial and anti-colonial networks, in establishing the AAM’s precursor organization, the British Boycott Movement.

Chapter two outlines the attitude that successive British governments took toward the apartheid state, emphasizing the degree of continuity between Labour and Conservative governments as they opted against isolating Pretoria. As the author astutely explains, due to “vested British interests” in South Africa—as a valued trading partner, a supplier of raw materials, and as an important regional bulwark against the spread of communism—postwar British policy toward it “remained unchanged irrespective of which political party headed the government” (p. 38). After her election in 1979, Margaret Thatcher continued this trend, but with one notable difference. Unlike her predecessors, the new Conservative Prime Minister was more than willing to mount a strong defense of her government’s foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, as Williams relates, this led to frequent clashes and disagreements with the AAM throughout the 1980s, particularly over her government’s opposition to imposing sanctions (pp. 62-63).

Chapter three addresses the rivalry between the two primary opposition groups in South Africa that were forced into exile: the African National Congress (ANC), which welcomed multiracial involvement in the liberation struggle, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which favored a more African-centric form of resistance. This ideological split, Williams explains, travelled with their respective external missions abroad, ensuring that the ANC experienced more long-term success in its efforts to garner support from a broader segment of British society and to position itself as the sole representative of South African liberation internationally. Though the AAM did formally recognize both groups, their relations with the PAC (and other radical associations in South Africa) remained distant and estranged. For them it was clear, Williams contends, that “the motor of history was behind the ANC” (p. 110).

Moving on, chapter four focuses upon the AAM’s efforts to attract a greater number of black Britons to its campaigns. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, “the AAM failed to capitalise on black activist energy because it remained largely detached from the local anti-racist struggles that black communities faced throughout Britain” (p. 134). To remedy this, in 1989, the

AAM launched the Black and Ethnic Committee (BEM). Though its lifespan was cut short by the negotiated breakdown of apartheid, Williams maintains that the BEM did achieve moderate success in galvanizing black support. More importantly, for her, the commitment shown by the AAM executive to the BEM evidenced how seriously it prioritized the issue of connecting with black communities and activists, albeit belatedly.

The final two chapters cover the anti-apartheid activity of moderate and radical black groups independent of the AAM. Whilst both shared the desire to pursue their own distinctive activist agenda, the former took a more relaxed stance toward black and white cooperation in the struggle for equality, whereas the latter lay greater emphasis on black empowerment, autonomy of leadership, and pan-Africanism. Understandably, the ideological alignments of these groups, more often than not, affected which exiled liberation faction received preference (p. 204). Crucially, however, though both moderate and radical black groups found it far more natural to connect with black Britons due to their “interior position” (p. 167) within that community, or their willingness to amalgamate the fight against racial discrimination both at home and abroad, neither “could seriously challenge the formidable position that the AAM had attained in building an anti-apartheid consensus in Britain” (p. 232).

In sum, *The Politics of Race in Britain and South Africa* offers a meticulously researched and persuasive account of the critical part played by black British activists in the anti-racist struggle. Whilst it does feature a few typing and grammar errors (pp. 55, 127 for instance), and the author’s clear enthusiasm for recounting precise detail does, at times, detract from the overall intellectual narrative, Williams’ book does add great depth to scholarly understanding of British racial politics during the 1980s.

Todd Carter, *University College, University of Oxford*